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The Philosophical Development of Gilbert Ryle THE PHILOSOPHICAL DEVELOPMENT OF GILBERT RYLE A Study of His Published and Unpublished Writings © Charlotte Vrijen 2007 Illustrations front cover: 1) Ryle’s annotations to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 2) Notes (miscellaneous) from ‘the red box’, Linacre College Library Illustration back cover: Rodin’s Le Penseur RIJKSUNIVERSITEIT GRONINGEN The Philosophical Development of Gilbert Ryle A Study of His Published and Unpublished Writings Proefschrift ter verkrijging van het doctoraat in de Wijsbegeerte aan de Rijksuniversiteit Groningen op gezag van de Rector Magnificus, dr. F. Zwarts, in het openbaar te verdedigen op donderdag 14 juni 2007 om 16.15 uur door Charlotte Vrijen geboren op 11 maart 1978 te Rolde Promotor: Prof. Dr. L.W. Nauta Copromotor: Prof. Dr. M.R.M. ter Hark Beoordelingscommissie: Prof. Dr. D.H.K. Pätzold Prof. Dr. B.F. McGuinness Prof. Dr. J.M. Connelly ISBN: 978-90-367-3049-5 Preface I am indebted to many people for being able to finish this dissertation. First of all I would like to thank my supervisor and promotor Lodi Nauta for his comments on an enormous variety of drafts and for the many stimulating discussions we had throughout the project. He did not limit himself to deeply theoretical discussions but also saved me from grammatical and stylish sloppiness. (He would, for example, have suggested to leave out the ‘enormous’ and ‘many’ above, as well as by far most of the ‘very’’s and ‘greatly’’s in the sentences to come.) After I had already started my new job outside the academic world, Lodi regularly – but always in a pleasant way – reminded me of this other job that still had to be finished. I owe debt to my copromotor Michel ter Hark for his valuable comments on my writings. Brian McGuinness, James Connelly and Detlev Pätzold kindly agreed to be on my reading committee, and gave their approval to this dissertation. I would like to thank them for both. I am also grateful to Brian McGuinness for showing me an early unpublished letter from Ryle to his former tutor H. J. Paton (later published as McGuinness and Vrijen 2006). James Connelly greatly helped me to acquire some knowledge of Collingwood’s philosophical work and stimulated me to get in touch with other experts on the subject. Our discussions about the correspondence between Ryle and Collingwood were very useful as well. One of the things that made working on this dissertation a varied and stimulating experience was the fact that it involved doing research at Linacre College Library and the Bodleian in Oxford, as well as talking to some of Gilbert Ryle’s former colleagues, friends and relatives. Except for my conversations with Brian McGuinness I also benefited from personal stories and anecdotes by Rom Harré, John Rogers, David Pears, Peter Hacker, John North, Jerry Cohen and Tony Palmer. Ryle’s twin-sister’s stepdaughter Janet Beckley and his nephew Michael Ryle and his wife Bridget Ryle kindly invited me into their houses in respectively Dyffed (Wales) and Exmoor. Their anecdotes greatly helped me to get a better image of Ryle as a person. Louise Trevelyan and her fellow librarians at Linacre College Library enabled me to make use of the ‘Gilbert Ryle Collection’ to its full extent. My AIO-colleagues at the Department of Philosophy in Groningen who made working there a pleasant experience, not only focused on thinking and writing but also on talking, discussions, drinks and fun, are Kim van Gennip, Martine Prange, Casper Zijlstra, Jan-Willem Romeyn, Arend Jagersma, Barteld Kooi, Jan Albert van Laar, Katherine Gardiner, Alice Stollmeyer, Daan Franken, Menno Rol, Marc van Duijn and Constanze Binder. Other members of the department whom I would like to thank for their stimulating discussions and for creating a pleasant environment for doing research are Job van Eck, Pieter Sjoerd Hasper, Karin de Boer, Eddo Evink, Lodi Nauta, Michel ter Hark, Detlev Pätzold, Jeanne Peijnenburg, Jeroen Bartels, Jos Lensink, Theo Kuipers, Erik Krabbe, Martin van Hees, René Boomkens, Hans Harbers, Allard Tamminga, Gyan Otto, Gerda Bosma, Trijnie Hekman, Jorine Janssen, Marga Hids, Kirsten van der Ploeg, Janny Moesker, Miran Huizenga, Benno Ticheler, Eva-Anne le Coultre and Hauke de Vries. The board members of the GAIOO/GRASP! and my former badminton friends at Amor helped me to set my mind to other things than philosophy. My dear friends Barbara van der Pol, Reinier Michiels, Janien Kamps, Monique Heringa, Marco Visser and Liesbeth Schipper I thank for their support and friendship (and for not always asking when this dissertation was going to be finished). Finally I would like to thank my father and Bas, and my mother and Henk for always supporting me and giving me the opportunity to make my own mistakes. My brother Wouter and his girlfriend Gabie for their support, friendship and, occasionally, talking postcards. And, last but definitely not least, Wouter van Alst for being a great friend and boyfriend at the same time. Contents INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................ 5 CHAPTER 1 GILBERT RYLE – A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ..................................... 9 Family Background and Childhood............................................................................... 9 Life as a Student......................................................................................................... 10 Christ Church College ................................................................................................ 11 Ayer and the Vienna Circle......................................................................................... 16 Second World War ..................................................................................................... 17 Magdalen College....................................................................................................... 18 Ryle as a Teacher ....................................................................................................... 23 Ryle as a Person ......................................................................................................... 25 CHAPTER 2 RYLE’S EARLY WRITINGS ................................................................... 29 Position 1: Denotationalism and the Reformulation of Systematically Misleading Expressions.............................................................................................. 31 Influences and Philosophical Context...................................................................... 31 Ryle’s Realism and Russell’s Influence Illustrated by Two Papers........................... 35 ‘Systematically Misleading Expressions’................................................................ 40 Position 2: Rejecting Denotationalism......................................................................... 44 Category-Mistakes: the Essence of Philosophical Problems..................................... 46 Philosophy as a Method and the Reductio ad Absurdum as the Ultimate Philosophical Argument ......................................................................................... 50 Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 53 CHAPTER 3 THE CONCEPT OF MIND: MAIN AIMS, METHOD AND RECEPTION 55 Ryle’s Method: Starting With What We Already Know............................................... 56 Ryle’s Primary Target................................................................................................. 59 Theorizing as the Primary and Silent Activity of the Mind........................................... 62 One Action: Not Two ................................................................................................. 64 The Issues Under Discussion ...................................................................................... 66 Case-study: Self-Knowledge....................................................................................... 67 A More Accurate Account of the Category-mistake of Cartesian dualism .................... 70 The Reception of The Concept of Mind....................................................................... 71 Ryle’s Contemporaries ........................................................................................... 72 The Concept of Mind as a Non-Behaviourist Attack on Dualism.................................. 82 Ryle’s Behaviourism According to Modern Handbooks .......................................... 82 Suggestions of Behaviourism in The Concept of Mind............................................. 83 Ryle’s Rejection of a Behaviouristic Interpretation.................................................. 85 Two Interpretations: Shelley M. Park and Rowland Stout........................................ 86 Concluding Remarks .................................................................................................. 91 CHAPTER 4 GILBERT RYLE’S LATER WRITINGS................................................... 93 Ryle’s Meta-Philosophical Papers............................................................................... 94 Continuity in Ryle’s Ideas on Philosophical Method ............................................... 95 The Ordinary Use of Language............................................................................... 96 Language versus Speech and Words versus Sentences............................................. 97 Philosophy as an Inter-Level Activity ....................................................................
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