Anarchism and Analytic Philosophy

CHAPTER 12 Anarchism and Analytic Philosophy Paul McLaughlin The Problem In order to discuss the relationship between “anarchism” and “analytic phi losophy,” I open with a statement of what I take these concepts to mean— or, rather, what I take the associated phenomena to be. Put bluntly, I take both phenomena to be both real and ideal. Thus, anarchism as such can be un derstood as both political movement (henceforth “Anarchism”) and political theory (henceforth “anarchism”). Similarly, analytic philosophy as such can be understood as both intellectual tradition (henceforth “Analytic Philosophy,” or “AP” for short) and theoretical procedure (henceforth “analytic philosophy” or “ap” for short). Interesting questions can be asked about the relationship be tween Anarchism and anarchism.1 However, in this chapter I have nothing to say about Anarchism: doing so would contribute little (if anything) to our un derstanding of the relationship between anarchism as such and analytic phi losophy as such. As for the relationship between AP and ap, this will be taken up below, since it informs our understanding of the relationship between an archism and analytic philosophy as such. In this chapter, in other words, I discuss the relationship between anar chism (a specific political theory) and both AP (a specific intellectual tradi tion) and ap (a specific theoretical procedure). There is little to be said about the relationship between either AP or ap and Anarchism (a specific political movement) so this political movement is left out of the subsequent account. But what I hope to demonstrate with respect to the relationship between an archism and AP is that such a relationship exists, however limited, and that it may be of some interest from a strictly historical point of view. And what I hope to demonstrate with respect to the relationship between anarchism and ap is that such a relationship may be theoretically fruitful and that it ought to be cultivated by theorists of anarchism to the extent that it is. For the purposes of the remainder of this chapter, I take “anarchism” to be an unproblematic concept and define it as a particular attitude—namely, * I would like to thank Daniel Cohnitz and Juho Ritola for their comments on a draft of this chapter. 1 Some of these questions are raised in N. Jun, “Rethinking the Anarchist Canon: History, Philosophy, and Interpretation,” Anarchist Developments in Cultural Studies 1 (2013): 82–116. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��8 | doi ��.��63/9789004356894_0�4 342 McLaughlin skepticism—to a particular social phenomenon—namely, authority. Accor dingly, I define anarchism as skepticism about authority, or, somewhat more pre cisely, the belief that authoritative norms, practices, relations, and institutions can be and ought to be called into question with respect to their desirability. Thus, I deny that anarchism is, for example, definable in terms of an oppositional attitude (even towards authority) or a supportive attitude (towards, say, freedom or autonomy or equality). I also deny that the principal object of anarchist con cern is a social phenomenon other than authority (such as the state or domina tion or hierarchy). All of this is, of course, highly contentious.2 But the focus of this paper is on the relationship between a particular intellectual tradition and theoretical procedure, on the one hand, and a particular political theory, on the other, rather than on that political theory in its own right. Analytic Philosophies I began above by distinguishing between Analytic Philosophy (or AP) and ana lytic philosophy (or ap). This general philosophical distinction—between what might be termed “a trail of influence”3 and “a certain way of going on”4—is not usually made, at least as explicitly as one might wish. Nevertheless, schol arly attempts to answer the question “What is analytic philosophy [as such]?” typically prioritize AP over ap, or ap over AP, and do so implicitly, often to the point of confusing the relevant debate—that is to say, whether this debate concerns matters traditional or theoretical (however the relationship between these matters is to be understood). Thus, Peter Hacker answers the question by prioritizing AP: Most (but not all) of the threads out of which the tapestry of analytic philosophy was woven can be traced back into the more or less remote past. What is most distinctive about the tapestry are the ways in which 2 Further argumentation can be found in the first part of my Anarchism and Authority (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 2007). This will be developed in a workinprogress provisionally entitled Anarchism and Anarchy. 3 S. Soames, Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century: The Dawn of Analysis (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003), xiii. On Soames’s account, what I designate as AP is “a certain historical tradition in which the early work of G.E. Moore, Betrand Russell, and Ludwig Wittgenstein set the agenda for later philosophers, whose work formed the starting point for the philosophers who followed them.” 4 B. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Abingdon, U.K.: Routledge, 2006), viii. On Williams’s account, what I designate as ap is a procedure involving “argument, distinctions, and, so far as it remembers to try to achieve it and succeeds, moderately plain speech.”.

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