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Wittgensteinian Perspectives and Science Education Research

Wendy Sherman-Heckler Otterbein University

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Wittgensteinian Perspectives Wittgenstein’s name has been invoked with and Science Education Research increasing regularity, especially since what might be termed the “social turn” in research on learning Wendy Sherman Heckler in (science) education, including interest in the role Office of Academic Affairs, Otterbein University, of discursive interaction in human development Westerville, OH, USA and in sociological studies of scientificpractice. Less understood but no less significant in education research are the implications of Wittgenstein’s Synonyms vision of an alternative orientation for philosophy and, in turn, the impact of this vision on theory and Ludwig wittgenstein; Peter winch; Science research in the various human sciences. Wittgen- learning; stein claimed that frustration with psychology should not be mistaken for problems related to its being an underdeveloped science. Rather, he Introduction faulted “conceptual confusions” in which pre- scribed methods are thought to deliver solutions As one of the most influential philosophers of the to problems but instead miss the mark entirely. twentieth century, Ludwig Wittgenstein Extending these Wittgensteinian points, phi- (1889–1951) has impacted a variety of scholarly losopher Peter Winch argued that social science disciplines, including education theory and is much more conceptual than empirical and that research. Wittgenstein’s later works are often the proper understanding of meaningful human cited for their insights into a wide variety of phil- action involves dialectical examination of lan- osophical topics, including meaning and under- guage use. Producing empirical evidence to sat- standing, rule following, the “inner” and “outer” isfy an essentially conceptual question – for realms of human activity, and certainty about example, concern with identifying the “most knowledge. In contrast to the representationalist effective instructional method” or even “what view of language expressed in his earlier work, was learned in a laboratory exercise”–results in these writings identify the meaning of an expres- begging the question, regardless of the depth of sion as its rule-governed use in language, inextri- care we take in specifying operational definitions. cably tied to its use in our lives. Most theories that get adopted in education

# Springer Science+Business Media Singapore 2016 M.A. Peters (ed.), Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory, DOI 10.1007/978-981-287-532-7_40-1 2 Wittgensteinian Perspectives and Science Education Research research end up simply replacing the answers not the task of philosophy to produce this expla- given to the perpetual problems of educational nation, perhaps this is the rightful role of linguis- practice while leaving central analytic orienta- tics or social science more generally? Although tions intact; Wittgenstein’s and Winch’s notions some have certainly advanced this interpretation force us to examine whether education researchers of Wittgenstein, a more common response is to should instead fundamentally change the ques- point to his numerous references to the commonly tions that are asked. perceived but sorely misguided need to secure the foundations of all knowledge. Rather than suggesting a skeptical interpretation of his discus- Wittgenstein’s Philosophy sions of rule following, Wittgensteinian philoso- phers such as Peter Hacker (1999) and Cora Numerous summaries of Wittgenstein’s biogra- Diamond (1989) urge us to understand his writ- phy and philosophical contributions exist; only ings as pointing to the way that rules exist against broad arguments related most directly to the a background of modes of living in and talking uptake of his work in science education are about the world; rules and contexts are mutually given here. As outlined in Philosophical Investi- constitutive rather than causally emergent and in gations (Wittgenstein 1958) and other posthu- need of explanation. mously organized collections of his vast notes Wittgenstein’s insistence on the rule-governed and dialectical exemplars, Wittgenstein’s later nature of our lives may also be heard as validation work was concerned with pointing to the of scholars who insist on the primacy of social, unrelieved role of grammar in philosophical puz- rather than psychological, explanations of human zles. Wittgenstein proposed time and again that behavior. It is the case that Wittgenstein discusses philosophical difficulties were often the result of a and rejects the idea of a “private language”–the lack of clarity surrounding our concepts; certain notion that an individual attaches unique names to expressions (e.g., “to be” or “to exist”) continually individual experiences, and this creates an “inner lure us into supposed philosophical crises, world” known only to himself (e.g., see Hacker whereas examining the expression’s logic in use 1999). Typically, however, Wittgenstein should suggests a “therapeutic” alternative analysis and be interpreted not as “taking sides” in a familiar resolution. battle but as resetting the terms of the debate; in The analysis of the meaning of an expression this case, it is not so much the triumph of “social” relies on examination of its ordinary use in our over “individual” worlds that is noteworthy but, lives, use that is embedded in what Wittgenstein rather, the way in which the “inner-outer divide” referred to as “language games.” A language itself can be seen as illusory and a product of our game is essentially a grammar of practice, rule ways of speaking rather than a conundrum in governed, and knowable to competent speakers desperate need of resolution. of a language. It is sometimes assumed that Related to this critique of the mind-body philosophy’s task is to produce solutions to puz- (or more contemporary brain-body) dualism, zles of meaning and existence, akin to the natural Wittgenstein is largely seen as having dismantled sciences’ aim to produce causal explanations of a representationalist view of language. “Repre- observed patterns and relationships. Again, how- sentationalist” refers to the notion that language ever, for Wittgenstein, the goal of philosophy ties to and names the world, such that its use is properly conceived is to produce clarifying indicative of something lying behind it; language descriptions of the rule-governed use of concepts “stands for” or “points to” something, in the way in our various language games. that announcing “I am hungry” is sometimes One question raised by Wittgenstein’s philos- thought to imply that the speaker is translating ophy concerns the source of the aforementioned introspection into words, orienting to her inner rules: is it in fact the case that the origin of these condition in order to communicate with others. rules is what is in need of explanation? And if it is Alternatively, stating “I am hungry” can be seen Wittgensteinian Perspectives and Science Education Research 3 simply as a rule-governed behavior we engage in rationalities as more relevant to the student’s task (rather than, e.g., crying or enduring the pain of an than a universal scientific logic. empty stomach). It is a subtle distinction to talk of A second strand of research has enlisted Witt- language as expressing rather than representing. genstein in the project of theorizing student learn- And of course, language can be used to represent, ing as a sociocultural rather than individual- or to name – Wittgenstein challenges us to see that psychological process. Students’ acquisition of representing is but one use for language, not a scientific concepts was characterized as success- fundamental, singular, or universal relationship ful participation in a scientific language game. between language and the world. Most theorists argued for a picture of learning that involved a combination of “individual” and “social” elements, for example, appropriate lan- Influence in Science Education Research guage performance as evidence of a scientific concept correctly internalized. However, occa- In order to appreciate the influence of sionally Wittgenstein’s philosophy has been used Wittgenstein’s writings in science education in science education to argue for rejecting the research, it is helpful to have a general outline of individual-social dichotomy and any sense of a studies of student learning in the field. While uniquely individual cognition. consensus on the approach to research or even The introduction and use of the science studies the goal of inquiry is not readily apparent, the literature – broadly, sociological, historical and overwhelming focus has been on students’ under- philosophical inquiries into scientific practice as standing of scientific concepts. Conceptual learn- it occurs in particular settings, on particular ing has been and is often still thought of as the occasions – in science education provided a third acquisition or restructuring of individual mental opening for the use of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. representations. Increasingly, though, language An interest in science studies grew out of the and social interaction have been viewed as critical sociocultural in research on science learning; in shaping these mental representations; in some rather than imagine logical scientific theory cases, the notion of concept-as-mental- change as a cognitive development, investigators representation has been called into question. studied science classrooms as sites of scientific Attempts to determine the causal relevance of practice (and concept development), inspired by other factors such as motivation, attitude, ele- methods and arguments from science studies. The ments of individual identities, learning environ- path to Wittgenstein here is somewhat indirect, ments, or other “internal” or “external” but emanates largely from the writings of David characteristics have also been undertaken. Bloor, who as spokesperson for the “Edinburgh In relation to research on students’ learning in Strong Programme” in science studies argued science, Wittgenstein’s philosophy has been (following Saul Kripke) that Wittgenstein’s dis- invoked in at least four broad ways over the last cussion of rule following licensed a skeptical several decades (Heckler 2014). Early dissenters interpretation: that if we can’t point to empirically to the emerging “conceptual change” theory of derived, natural causes for the rules we follow in cognitive learning in science as analogous to various forms of practice (including rules for lan- rational theory replacement in the discipline of guage use), the explanation must lie in social science argued against the plausibility of novice consensus, the formation of which should be stud- students’ ability to logically justify and appropri- ied and understood theoretically. This social- ate scientifically superior counterparts to their constructivist approach to explaining how stu- naïve and unworkable explanations of the world. dents come to understand science in classroom Wittgenstein’s writings were used to emphasize settings was embraced by science education the nonrational aspects of human interaction researchers beginning in the mid-to-late 1990s. (persuasion versus reason; learning by imitation Finally, Wittgenstein’s writings have inspired and training) or to point to multiple and local discussion of new methodologies in researching 4 Wittgensteinian Perspectives and Science Education Research students’ science learning. The most robust of Wittgenstein in examining just these questions, these has been known as “practical epistemology asking, for example, should empirical linguistics analysis,” which involves analyzing transcripts of replace philosophy as the source of truth about our science learning activities, in order to pinpoint use of concepts? Winch’s and Wittgenstein’s phi- where students have difficulty understanding and losophies suggest they would oppose such a con- how that difficulty is resolved via known con- clusion for the study of much of human social life. cepts. Wittgenstein’s notion of meanings that However, the prevalence of scientistic tendencies “stand fast” in relation to their surroundings was across a vast swath of contemporary academic combined with the notion of “family resem- work may suggest a lack of familiarity with the blance” across language games in order to reimag- argument – or perhaps, the common, scientistic ine and investigate students’ acquisition of new assumptions behind the current plethora of conceptual understanding in science. Such analy- “methods” and “theories” at play in the social sis was used to describe what students learned studies are concealed by their seeming differences from various laboratory practicals and how (Hutchinson et al. 2008). student-teacher interaction guided learning, to Education research is not immune to these identify metaphors as important connectors pressures. In fact, the desirability of a scientific between students’ established knowledge, and to approach to studies in education has been codified illustrate students’ use of aesthetic judgments in by laws such as the Every Student Succeeds Act negotiating their participation in a school science (ESSA) of 2015 (which recently replaced the No classroom, among others. Child Left Behind Act of 2001). ESSA specifies that educational initiatives deserving of federal funding for implementation and further study The Problem of Scientism must be “evidence based,” defined as derived from experimental, quasi-experimental, or corre- Although Wittgenstein’s philosophy has been lational studies that have demonstrated a statisti- cited in service of studying student learning in cally significant effect on student learning science in various ways, the claim has been outcomes or from rationales for approaches that made that ultimately these references miss the show promise of scientific validation. point of his arguments (Heckler 2014). To under- This evidence-based orientation has affected stand why, it is important to appreciate the under- traditional norms of educational practice, as currents of anti-scientism (not antiscience)at well. For example, curriculum was once idealized work in Wittgenstein’s writings. In this context, as an expression of values or of an educational “scientism” refers to the tendency to lift up scien- philosophy tied to its ultimate purpose: educating tific methodology as the preferred (if not sole) for individual development, social efficiency, source of certain knowledge in all human prac- social reform, vocational training, participation tices. Many academic disciplines beyond the nat- in democratic society, social mobility, knowledge ural sciences model their modes of inquiry on the replication and production, proof of status, trans- empirical methods of the natural sciences. How- mission of cultural heritage, exposing and ever, we could ask whether some endeavors – for transgressing oppression and injustice, and so example, aesthetics, ethics, or philosophy more on. But increasingly today, curriculum is seen as generally – need to emulate this methodology or necessarily tied to “models of student learning”; whether they might rightfully pursue other the curriculum itself must be “evidence based.” In approaches to generating knowledge. In part, the a field where research traditions have been sum- answer depends on how we think about what is marized as possessing “no rules that everyone real: must the concepts covered by epistemologi- follows, no beliefs that everyone shares, no find- cal or metaphysical questions be empirically ings that everyone agrees on” (Anderson 2007, observable to count as “real?” Lyas (1999) p. 3), the assumption that research should set explains how Peter Winch draws from Wittgensteinian Perspectives and Science Education Research 5 curricular policy might reasonably be called into To say that the study of social life is more often question. conceptual than empirical is to assert that such Wittgenstein spoke against the analytic ten- study takes interest in meaningful behavior, and dency to reduce our human understanding of the following Wittgenstein, meaningful behavior is world to universal concepts and causal rule-governed behavior, dependent on occasion relationships – what he called a “craving for gen- and purpose. We expose and uncover social con- erality.” But the overwhelming imperative in con- cepts and relationships by examining what we temporary education research is indeed to satisfy know about our rule-governed forms of life. such a craving. To suggest otherwise invites Empirical investigation, on the other hand, charges ranging from naiveté to professional depends on settling the criteria of what is to be incompetence. With occasional exceptions, the observed. When social concepts are use of Wittgenstein’s philosophy in science educa- operationalized in order to perform experimental tion has not been to call for an alternative analytical investigations of them, we can give the illusion of orientation but, rather, to appropriate singular con- discovering new information or of exposing cepts or notions in service of the familiar ways of causal generalizations. But the act of operatio- seeking to provide explanation for students’ learn- nalizing concepts in order to observe human inter- ing (or lack thereof) in educational settings. “Lan- action often masks myriad ways that rules are guage games,”“standing fast,”“family meaningfully followed and the choices people resemblance,” and other Wittgensteinian notions have in social life. Empirical analysis ends up have been used to provide new ways of character- begging philosophical questions about the izing students’ learning in science, when what is occasion- and purpose-bound use of concepts in needed instead is an inquiry into whether it makes our lives (Hutchinson et al. 2008). sense to investigate learning as a process or a causal What might conceptual analysis look like in phenomenon in the first place. education research? One example is given in Francis (2005); this critique of radical and social constructivism relies on insights from both Witt- Wittgensteinian Alternatives genstein and Winch, as well as analysis of the for Educational Inquiry logic inherent in von Glasersfeld’s “radical con- structivism” and Bloor’s “social constructivism” Peter Winch, in drawing upon and extending to illustrate the nonsensical elements of these Wittgenstein’s philosophy in his book, The Idea research agendas. Francis observes that both the- of Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy ories are essentially philosophical arguments (Winch 1990), argued that the study of people is purporting to be empirical research programs. more akin to philosophical than to natural scien- Similar critiques might be undertaken of the var- tific inquiry. One way to summarize it might be ious theoretical traditions existing in science edu- this: philosophy (e.g., epistemology) is funda- cation research today. mentally concerned with the nature of human A different approach, no less informed by Witt- social life but not empirically so. Empirical gensteinian philosophy, guides Macbeth’s(2000) study (in Winch’s sense) reveals something new analysis of a recorded interview between a young about the world and in particular about (causal) student and a conceptual change researcher. relationships between objects. But philosophy’s Rather than using the analysis to suggest new interest is in conceptual truths – or how our con- theoretical understandings of science learning, cepts are related to the world – and typically, this Macbeth essentially exposes the logic of alternate is not new information but information that any “language games” at play during the interaction competent user of a language knows and can and foregrounds the way in which the professional recognize (Lyas 1999). Philosophers remind us analytic practice of a “diagnostic interview” both of the various ways that concepts are used mean- relies on and simultaneously disavows the stu- ingfully in our lives (Diamond 1989). dent’s everyday orientation to questions and 6 Wittgensteinian Perspectives and Science Education Research answers in order to ascribe to her various levels of Diamond, C. (1989). Rules: Looking in the right place. In conceptual (mis)understanding. D. Z. Phillips & P. Winch (Eds.), Wittgenstein: Atten- fi tion to particulars. Essays in honor of Rush Rhees The dif culty of resisting the urge to theorize, (1905–1989) (pp. 12–34). London: Macmillan. of ignoring the weight of expectations to produce Francis, D. (2005). Using Wittgenstein to respecify con- causal explanations of students’ learning, or of structivism. Human Studies, 28, 251–290. eschewing the idea that social study should aspire Hacker, P. M. S. (1999). Wittgenstein: On human nature. New York: Routledge. to anything like prediction or control of interac- Heckler, W. S. (2014). Research on student learning in tional outcomes should not be underestimated. science: A Wittgensteinian perspective. In But the promise of clear and penetrating descrip- M. R. Matthews (Ed.), International handbook of tions of education as rule-governed practice and research in history, philosophy and science teaching (pp. 1381–1410). 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