DOCSLIB.ORG

In Defense of Russell (A Reply to Some Old Thesis of Peter Hacker's

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
In Defense of Russell (A Reply to Some Old Thesis of Peter Hacker's Russell vs. Wittgenstein: In Defense of Russell (A Reply to Some Old Thesis of Peter Hacker’s Interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus) Henrique Jales Ribeiro, Coimbra, Portugal [email protected] Peter Hacker is currently one of the most influential and Russell and Wittgenstein: i) the philosophy of the for- brilliant specialists of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. His thesis mer―before Tractatus―has wrongly confused the subjec- on the connection between Russell and Wittgenstein, both matter of logic with those of psychology and epistemology; prior to Tractatus and therein, were presented mainly in ii) the philosophy of the latter proved, particularly in that Wittgenstein’s Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Phi- book, that such confusion was illegitimate by putting logic losophy, published in 1996, that is, 14 years ago. In sub- in its right place and unveiling its true meaning; iii) by and sequent books, Hacker resumes these thesis and contin- large Russell accepted this fact, although he did not fully ues to use them in his readings of Wittgenstein after the understand it, nor managed to draw the appropriate con- Tractatus. To my knowledge they have not been subjected sequences from it. to any more or less systematic criticism from reviewers particularly interested in Russell’s philosophy, as would be The first assumption needs to be elaborated for a perfectly natural, since (as I will suggest) they are debat- better understanding. An important illustration of it are able or even controversial for those who have interpreted Russell’s views on the relation between logic and ordinary this philosopher under different, and probably more coher- language. Max Black had previously argued that it is pre- ent, presuppositions. Hacker’s theses are illustrations of cisely the confusion between logic and epistemology that what I have polemically called in my doctoral dissertation in the end explains the need for a logically perfect lan- and in some papers in English (Ribeiro 1999, 2001, 2005) guage when this is contrasted to a ordinary one (see a ‘Wittgensteinian reading of Russell’s philosophy”. For all Black 1989), and for what is known as the “myth of the of the above reasons, I will focus essentially on Hacker’s paraphrase” or of “the ideal translation”. According to book previously mentioned. Naturally, my intention, as his Hacker, both Frege and Russell subscribe to the same in Wittgenstein: Connections and Controversies, is to pro- fundamental view on the matter: “They held natural lan- vide input for a better understanding of the matters at is- guages to be logically defective, both in containing vague sue. terms and in failing adequately to represent the subject- matter of the truths of logic. Hence, for logical, proof- Peter Hacker’s central thesis is that the Tractatus theoretic and metaphysical purposes, they should be re- provides the first systematic research on the nature of logic placed by a logically perfect language: namely the lan- from a viewpoint which, albeit largely metaphysical, envis- guage of Begriffsschrift or Principia. This would make ages eliminating any impure associations with psychology sense only if… the role of the propositions of logic is in- and epistemology, or, as he says, “liberating the philoso- deed to represent a certain subject-matter with maximal phy of logic from its antecedents failure to differenciate accuracy…Contrary to Frege and Russell, Wittgenstein adequately the truths of logic from empirical, psychological argued that ‘all propositions of everyday language, just as or putative Platonist generalisations” (Hacker 1996: 34), as they stand, are in perfect logical order’ (TLP, 5.5563). By the ones of Frege and Russell. The novelty and originality this, he later explained, he meant that ‘the propositions of of Tractatus consists, in fact, in such logical reduction of its our ordinary language are not in any way less correct or subject-matter, against the mentioned associations made less exact or more confused than propositions written by those thinkers, in spite of the antipsychologistic prem- down, say, in Russell’s symbolism or any other ‘Be- ises of their respective philosophies. In the case of Russell griffsschrift’” (Hacker 1996: 26). and before that book, there were, of course, serious incon- sistencies in his philosophy, which lead to Wittgenstein’s Russell’s concept of ordinary language can be criticisms and are carefully studied by Hacker; but the main summarised in three main ideas, according to Hacker’s difference between the two philosophers, according to him, interpretation, which, as previously mentioned, matches was not merely a technical one. What we have with Trac- that of Black and other authors: α) ordinary language is not tatus is a new conception of logic based on the rejection of in perfect logical order, i.e., it is essentially vague and de- the confusion between logic, on the one hand, and psy- fective, and it is for that reason that philosophical analysis chology and epistemology, on the other hand, “even requires a logically perfect language; β) such is precisely though distortions remained” (ibid.) This was already the the artificial language of Principia; γ) Russell believes in α) direction in which Wittgenstein’s review of Russell’s theo- because he wrongly confuses the subject-matter of logic ries in the manuscript Theory of Knowledge pointed (see with the ones of psychology and epistemology. ibid.: 26). Hacker, like some other critics before him (see I now intend to briefly dispute the reading of Russell Hylton 1990), suggests that Russell should have lead his and Wittgenstein which can be drawn from the thesis de- thought according to the methodologically pure path of scribed above. As for Russell: In spite of Hacker’s careful Wittgenstein’views on logic, and that he did not know how historical analysis, he does not takes into consideration to do it without renouncing to its own approach, which was some special developments of Russell’s philosophy after the cause of the inextricable troubles underlying his theo- “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism”, which lead to find- ries. Furthermore, he believes that the evolution of Rus- ings on the connection between logic and ordinary lan- sell’s philosophy after Tractatus had no relevance at all to guage signficantly different from the ones already pre- the genesis of contemporary analytical philosophy. In sented. I will return to this point later on. On the other short, Hacker’s interpretation is founded on three funda- hand, Hacker’s reading is based on the metahistorical mental assumptions regarding the connection between assumption that the development of Russell’s philosophy, 268 Russell vs. Wittgenstein: In Defense of Russell … / Henrique Jales Ribeiro after Principia, should have been subordinated to Wittgen- clearly in the preparatory manuscripts of The Analysis of stein’s conception of logic, in view of its greater consis- Mind (Russell 1988), even before the English edition of tency . Why should the foundations of logic not be Tractatus, and had as its main consequence the with- grounded on psychology and epistemology, contrary to drawal of the acquaintance theory. In fact, it was just this what Russell suggests in the introduction of Tractatus (cf. partial holism that leads Russell to a new concept of Wittgenstein 1933: 7-8)? Evidently, only by developing a vagueness (Russell 1988a) and to a view similar to that of philosophical project of the kind could Russell have found Wittgenstein, according to which ordinary language is in the answer to the question; and this was just what he en- order and does not require any correction through a logi- deavoured until the book An Inquiry into Meaning and cally perfect language (see Russell 1978: Lecture X). And Truth. The argument that, after Tractatus, the most inter- it is from its perspective, against to a radical version of esting developments of logic were achieved entirely inde- holism that leads directly to the end of the philosophy, as pendently of Russell’s views and pursuant to those of Witt- happens apparently with Tractatus, that we should reread genstein, is disputable and, on several accounts, contro- today Russell’s introduction to that book (Ribeiro 2005). versial. Nonetheless, it is unacceptable in the protohistori- Generally speaking, after the 1920s holism and its prob- cal version that Hacker lends to it in Wittgenstein’s Place in lems are the leitmotif of the development of Russell’s phi- Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy: that Wittgenstein, losophy. already at the time of Tractatus, was to some extent aware of the impact and historical scope of his own theories. Concluding and in light of the observations above, I woukd like to comment briefly Hacker’s thesis on the con- However, this is not very important for me here. I cept of logically perfect language. First, the concept only would like to reply to Hacker’s theory according to which appears to us in 1918, namely in “The Philosophy of Logi- both Russell’s philosophy and that of Wittgenstein at the cal Atomism” (Russell 1986: 176). Hacker, like Black be- time of Tractatus were essentially atomist, the difference fore him, ambiguously suggests to its readers that the between the two atomisms being that, unlike the former, concept had already been unveiled in Principia (Hacker the latter would be pure and free of epistemological as- 1996: 20); but for reasons I cannot develop here, this is sumptions (cf. Hacker 1996: 29-30). In my view, this is a not true. Furthermore, one cannot forget that when the disputable interpretation, which once again comes closer concept emerges in the development of Russell’s philoso- to the interpretations of some English authors of the 1960s phy its purpose was not to correct ordinary language and who believed in an alleged “tradition of British empiricism” to restore a precision or accuracy somehow alienated.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • CRITICAL NOTICE Why We Need Ordinary Language Philosophy
    CRITICAL NOTICE Why We Need Ordinary Language Philosophy Sandra Laugier, Translated by Daniela Ginsberg, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2013, pp. 168, £ 24.50. ISBN-13: 978-0-226-47054-2 (cloth). Reviewed by Derek A. McDougall Originally published in French in the year 2000, the English version of Sandra Laugier’s short book of 10 Chapters plus an Introduction and Conclusion, has a 7 page Preface, 9 pages of Notes, a brief Bibliography and 121 pages of actual text. The reading of Wittgenstein and Austin that she provides is distinctly Cavellian in character. Indeed, Stanley Cavell in a dust-cover quote, remarks that her work is already influential in France and Italy, exciting as it does a new interest in ‘language conceived not only as a cognitive capacity but also as used, and meant, as part of our form of life’. Cavell goes on to say that this new translation is not merely welcome but indispensable, and has at least the capacity to alter prevailing views about the philosophy of language, so affecting what we have come to think of as the ‘analytic-continental divide’. Toril Moi of Duke Uni., in another dust-cover quote, states that Laugier’s reading of Wittgenstein-Austin-Cavell shows how their claim that ‘to speak about language is to speak about the world is an antimetaphysical revolution in philosophy that tranforms our understanding of epistemology and ethics.’ She concludes with the thought that anyone who wishes to understand what ‘ordinary language philosophy’ means today should read this book. This is a large claim to make, and anyone who is inclined to read Wittgenstein and Austin strictly in their own terms, and with their own avowed intentions - where discernible - steadily in view, is almost bound to conclude that it is simply not true.
    [Show full text]
  • Anarchism and Analytic Philosophy
    CHAPTER 12 Anarchism and Analytic Philosophy Paul McLaughlin The Problem In order to discuss the relationship between “anarchism” and “analytic phi­ losophy,” I open with a statement of what I take these concepts to mean— or, rather, what I take the associated phenomena to be. Put bluntly, I take both phenomena to be both real and ideal. Thus, anarchism as such can be un­ derstood as both political movement (henceforth “Anarchism”) and political theory (henceforth “anarchism”). Similarly, analytic philosophy as such can be understood as both intellectual tradition (henceforth “Analytic Philosophy,” or “AP” for short) and theoretical procedure (henceforth “analytic philosophy” or “ap” for short). Interesting questions can be asked about the relationship be­ tween Anarchism and anarchism.1 However, in this chapter I have nothing to say about Anarchism: doing so would contribute little (if anything) to our un­ derstanding of the relationship between anarchism as such and analytic phi­ losophy as such. As for the relationship between AP and ap, this will be taken up below, since it informs our understanding of the relationship between an­ archism and analytic philosophy as such. In this chapter, in other words, I discuss the relationship between anar­ chism (a specific political theory) and both AP (a specific intellectual tradi­ tion) and ap (a specific theoretical procedure). There is little to be said about the relationship between either AP or ap and Anarchism (a specific political movement) so this political movement is left out of the subsequent account. But what I hope to demonstrate with respect to the relationship between an­ archism and AP is that such a relationship exists, however limited, and that it may be of some interest from a strictly historical point of view.
    [Show full text]
  • The Philosophical Development of Gilbert Ryle
    THE PHILOSOPHICAL DEVELOPMENT OF GILBERT RYLE A Study of His Published and Unpublished Writings © Charlotte Vrijen 2007 Illustrations front cover: 1) Ryle’s annotations to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 2) Notes (miscellaneous) from ‘the red box’, Linacre College Library Illustration back cover: Rodin’s Le Penseur RIJKSUNIVERSITEIT GRONINGEN The Philosophical Development of Gilbert Ryle A Study of His Published and Unpublished Writings Proefschrift ter verkrijging van het doctoraat in de Wijsbegeerte aan de Rijksuniversiteit Groningen op gezag van de Rector Magnificus, dr. F. Zwarts, in het openbaar te verdedigen op donderdag 14 juni 2007 om 16.15 uur door Charlotte Vrijen geboren op 11 maart 1978 te Rolde Promotor: Prof. Dr. L.W. Nauta Copromotor: Prof. Dr. M.R.M. ter Hark Beoordelingscommissie: Prof. Dr. D.H.K. Pätzold Prof. Dr. B.F. McGuinness Prof. Dr. J.M. Connelly ISBN: 978-90-367-3049-5 Preface I am indebted to many people for being able to finish this dissertation. First of all I would like to thank my supervisor and promotor Lodi Nauta for his comments on an enormous variety of drafts and for the many stimulating discussions we had throughout the project. He did not limit himself to deeply theoretical discussions but also saved me from grammatical and stylish sloppiness. (He would, for example, have suggested to leave out the ‘enormous’ and ‘many’ above, as well as by far most of the ‘very’’s and ‘greatly’’s in the sentences to come.) After I had already started my new job outside the academic world, Lodi regularly – but always in a pleasant way – reminded me of this other job that still had to be finished.
    [Show full text]
  • IS THERE ANYTHING IT IS LIKE to BE a BAT? Philosophie Der Von P.M.S
    e-Journal IS THERE ANYTHING IT IS LIKE TO BE A BAT? Philosophie der von P.M.S. Hacker (Oxford) Psychologie 1. Consciousness and qualia The concept of consciousness has been the source of much philosophical, cognitive scientific and neuroscientific discussion for the past two decades. Many scientists, as well as philosophers, argue that at the moment we are almost completely in the dark about the nature of consciousness. Stuart Sutherland, in a much quoted remark, wrote that 'Consciousness is a fascinating but elusive phenomenon; it is impossible to specify what it is, what it does, or why it evolved.'1 Cognitive scientists, such as Phillip Johnson-Laird, aver that 'no one knows what consciousness is, or whether it serves any purpose'.2 Leading neuroscientists have gone so far as to suggest that 'Perhaps the greatest unresolved problem ... in all of biology, resides in the analysis of consciousness.'3 And David Chalmers proclaims that our ignorance may be 'the largest outstanding obstacle [to] a scientific understanding of the universe'.4 There are, no doubt, many problems concerning consciousness. Some are empirical problems amenable to scientific investigation. Others are conceptual problems, which can be tackled only by means of conceptual analysis. Distinguishing the two kinds of problem is important, for when a conceptual problem is confused or conflated with an empirical one, it is bound to appear singularly intractable — as indeed it is, for it is intractable to empirical methods of investigation. Equally, when an empirical problem is investigated without adequate conceptual clarity, misconceived questions are bound to be asked, and misguided research is likely to ensue.
    [Show full text]
  • The Method of the Tractatus
    The Method of the Tractatus Nikolay Milkov, Bielefeld 1. Radical Philosophers Despite this marked difference between the two parties, A few years ago, a group of American philosophers, Cora they have something in common. Both assume that at the Diamond and James Conant among them, suggested a bottom of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus lies Frege’s conception resolute, or radical reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. of saying/showing. In this, they follow Peter Geach (see These two authors claim that the Tractatus has a body, Geach 1976). My point of dissent is that, in fact, Wittgen- and a frame. Wittgenstein minded the frame seriously, stein’s Tractatus is rather a study of a completely different whereas all the remaining propositions of the Tractatus, kind from both Frege’s Grundgesetzte and from Russell– which belong to its body, are written tongue in cheek. To Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica. Its genre is not logic the frame of the work belong the Preface, §§3.32–3.326, but logical–philosophical meditations, or philosophical 4–4.003, 4.111–4.112 and 6.53–6.54. In it Wittgenstein reflections on the logical writings of Frege and Russell. gave meta-theoretical instructions how to treat the rest of This explains, among other things, why typical logicians, the book. The main idea of the frame is expressed in § such like C.I. Lewis, the Polish logicians, Whitehead, 6.54 which reads: “My propositions serve as elucidations in Quine and Hao Wang, didn’t held much of Wittgenstein’s the following way: anyone who understands me eventually logical–philosophical inquiries.
    [Show full text]
  • AGAINST LINGUISTIC EXCLUSIVISM Søren Overgaard 1. Introduction
    CHAPTER FOUR AGAINST LINGUISTIC EXCLUSIVISM Søren Overgaard 1. Introduction The aim of this chapter, broadly stated, is to clear away one major obsta- cle to constructive engagement between two traditions separated by the analytic-continental divide: what I will call linguistic philosophy (com- prising Oxford ordinary language philosophy as well as the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein and his followers) and phenomenology.1 The prominent Wittgensteinian Peter Hacker will be the main focus of my discussion. The chapter is motivated by the idea that there is something paradoxical about the fact that linguistic philosophers have shown little interest in any rapprochement with phenomenology. It is certainly not that they lacked opportunities. The notorious 1958 Royaumont Collo- quium, for example, which counted Ryle, Strawson, Urmson, and Austin among the speakers, and which was attended by phenomenologists such as H.L. Van Breda2 and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, was an abject failure. Ryle, who had previously published on both Husserl and Heidegger, and whom the other Oxonians no doubt regarded as something of an expert on phenomenology, took the opportunity to deliver a paper aptly entitled “Phenomenology versus ‘The Concept of Mind’.” In this highly polemical paper, Ryle caricatured Husserl and was tactless enough to accuse him of claims to philosophical “Führership” (Ryle 2009, 189). As Hans-Johann Glock has remarked, “Ryle seemed interested less in establishing whether there was a wide gulf between analytic and ‘Continental’ philosophy than in ensuring that there would be” (Glock 2008, 63). Nor did any of the other 1 Many prominent philosophers have made similar efforts to get the analytic and Con- tinental traditions talking to each other—including Cavell, Dummett, Føllesdal, Hintikka, and Putnam.
    [Show full text]
  • Saul Kripke Pdf, Epub, Ebook
    SAUL KRIPKE PDF, EPUB, EBOOK Alan Berger | 382 pages | 17 Aug 2011 | CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS | 9780521674980 | English | Cambridge, United Kingdom Saul Kripke PDF Book A: There are cases where it is better to divide. You must log in to post a comment. Retrieved Jump to: navigation , search. The Middle East The topic of our conversation changes somewhat. A former student wrote a novel where the main character seems to be modeled after Kripke. Kripke's main propositions in Naming and Necessity concerning proper names are that the meaning of a name simply is the object it refers to and that a name's referent is determined by a causal link between some sort of "baptism" and the utterance of the name. In contemporary discussion very few people, if any, distinguish between the concepts of statements being a priori and their being necessary. Please refer to the appropriate style manual or other sources if you have any questions. But Kripke has also been criticized. Main article: Naming and Necessity. Marcus, however, has refused to publish the verbatim transcript of the lecture. Although Kripke himself drew no conclusion on this point, his discussion was widely interpreted as a serious challenge to attempts to explain meaning in purely naturalistic terms. Kripke is an observant Jew. Kripke's response to this difficulty was to eliminate terms. Finally, Kripke gave an argument against identity materialism in the philosophy of mind, the view that every mental fact is identical with some physical fact See talk. So, the link between the property of being a murderer and the person referred to is contingent.
    [Show full text]
  • How Could He Try to Try to Whistle It?
    How could he try to try to whistle it? Lemaire Francis Eric, Nancy, France 1) What is philosophy?1 language in logical language is the mean to draw the fron- tier between sensical and nonsensical propositions. Philosophy is not a natural science. The purpose of phi- losophy is not to build general theories or to construct phi- In 3.323, he writes that in “every day language losophical propositions, such as synthetic a priori judg- (3.323), it frequently happens that the same word has dif- ments, but it is to logically clarify thoughts. “Philosophy is ferent modes of signification – and so belongs to different not a body of doctrines but an activity”. In philosophy, you symbols – or that two words that have different modes of cannot do any hypothesis. Philosophy is not an empirical signification are employed in propositions in what is super- enquiry but an a priori one. His aim is, he says in 4.113, to ficially the same way.” If one is tempted, he says in 3.324, “set limits to the much disputed sphere of natural sci- to assert some philosophical propositions, it is due to the ences.” fact that the apparent logical structure of ordinary lan- guage is not necessarily the real logical one, as the signs The main thesis of the book, which is expressed in we use to express thoughts do not necessarily and imme- the preface, is that problems of philosophy are based on diately reflect what they mean. the misunderstanding of the logic of our language. The only thing one can do with philosophical propositions is to The logical imperfection of ordinary language is not eliminate them because they do not have a clear sense.
    [Show full text]
  • Words As Deeds: Wittgenstein‟S „Spontaneous Utterances‟ and the Dissolution of the Explanatory Gap
    This is the final, pre-publication draft. Please cite only from published paper in Philosophical Psychology 13:3 (September 2000), 355-72. Words as Deeds: Wittgenstein‟s „spontaneous utterances‟ and the dissolution of the explanatory gap Abstract Wittgenstein demystified the notion of „observational self-knowledge‟. He dislodged the long-standing conception that we have privileged access to our impressions, sensations and feelings through introspection, and more precisely eliminated knowing as the kind of awareness that normally characterizes our first-person present tense psychological statements. He was not thereby questioning our awareness of our emotions or sensations, but debunking the notion that we come to that awareness via any epistemic route. This makes the spontaneous linguistic articulation of our sensations and impressions nondescriptive. Not descriptions, but expressions that seem more akin to behaviour than to language. I suggest that Wittgenstein uncovered a new species of speech acts. Far from the prearranged consecration of words into performatives, utterances are deeds through their very spontaneity. This gives language a new aura: the aura of the reflex action. I argue, against Peter Hacker, that spontaneous utterances have the categorial status of deeds. This has no reductive consequences in that I do not suggest that one category is reduced to another, but that the boundary between them is porous. This explodes the myth of an explanatory gap between the traditionally distinct categories of saying (or thinking) and doing, or of mind and body. 2 Words as Deeds: Wittgenstein‟s „spontaneous utterances‟ and the dissolution of the explanatory gap But instead of the intonation and the accompanying gestures, I might ..
    [Show full text]
  • Wittgensteinian Perspectives and Science Education Research
    Otterbein University Digital Commons @ Otterbein Administrators/Executives/Staff Scholarship Administrative Offices, ogrPr ams and Centers 2016 Wittgensteinian Perspectives and Science Education Research Wendy Sherman-Heckler Otterbein University Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.otterbein.edu/acaffairs_scholar Part of the Science and Mathematics Education Commons Repository Citation Sherman-Heckler, Wendy, "Wittgensteinian Perspectives and Science Education Research" (2016). Administrators/Executives/Staff Scholarship. 6. https://digitalcommons.otterbein.edu/acaffairs_scholar/6 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Administrative Offices, ogrPr ams and Centers at Digital Commons @ Otterbein. It has been accepted for inclusion in Administrators/Executives/Staff Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Otterbein. For more information, please contact [email protected]. W Wittgensteinian Perspectives Wittgenstein’s name has been invoked with and Science Education Research increasing regularity, especially since what might be termed the “social turn” in research on learning Wendy Sherman Heckler in (science) education, including interest in the role Office of Academic Affairs, Otterbein University, of discursive interaction in human development Westerville, OH, USA and in sociological studies of scientificpractice. Less understood but no less significant in education research are the implications of Wittgenstein’s Synonyms vision of an alternative orientation for philosophy and, in turn, the impact of this vision on theory and Ludwig wittgenstein; Peter winch; Science research in the various human sciences. Wittgen- learning; stein claimed that frustration with psychology should not be mistaken for problems related to its being an underdeveloped science. Rather, he Introduction faulted “conceptual confusions” in which pre- scribed methods are thought to deliver solutions As one of the most influential philosophers of the to problems but instead miss the mark entirely.
    [Show full text]
  • Language and World
    Language and World Papers of the 32nd International Wittgenstein Symposium August 9 – 15, 2009 Kirchberg am Wechsel Volume XVII Editors Volker A. Munz Klaus Puhl Joseph Wang Printed in cooperation with the Department for Culture and Science of the Province of Lower Austria Kirchberg am Wechsel, 2009 Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society Is the Resolute Reading Really Inconsistent?: Trying to Get Clear on Hacker vs. Diamond/Conant Michael Maurer, Vienna, Austria [email protected] For over two decades the Resolute Reading of the Trac- straightforward, garden variety, completely incomprehen- tatus has attempted to create an awareness of the fact that sible gibberish.” (Conant, 1989, 253) Therefore they have readings which traditionally focus on the topic of ineffability a completely different picture of the philosophical activity to are methodologically inconsistent and do not truly reveal which the author of the Tractatus was profoundly commit- the dialectical movement of Wittgenstein’s early master- ted in his work: his aim is not to show inexpressible deep piece. In what follows my intention is to shed light on the truths that represent the metaphysical features of reality, question of whether the Resolute Reading is methodologi- but to free the philosophically inclined reader from the cally inconsistent in itself, as is held by Peter Hacker, the illusory meaningfulness of such obsessive pictures. Throw- most influential opponent of this position. ing away the Tractarian ladder – after having undergone the dialectical process of climbing it – means to have fully dissolved the philosophical problems produced by the logic Two Paradigms for Reading the Tractatus of our language from within.
    [Show full text]
  • How Many Wittgensteins?
    How many David G. Wittgensteins? Stern 1. Debates in Wittgenstein scholarship The paper maps out and responds to some of the main areas of disagreement over the nature of Wittgenstein’s philosophy: (1) Between defenders of a “two Wittgensteins” reading (which draws a sharp distinction between early and late Wittgenstein) and the opposing “one Wittgenstein” interpretation. (2) Among “two-Wittgensteins” interpreters as to when the later philoso- phy emerged, and over the central difference between early and late Witt- genstein. (3) Between those who hold that Wittgenstein opposes only past philosophy in order to do philosophy better and those who hold that Wittgenstein aimed to bring an end to philosophy and teach us to get by without a replacement. I begin by summarizing and responding to these debates over the nature of Wittgenstein’s philosophy and his philosophical methods. My reply turns on the point that each of these debates depends on some deeply un-Wittgen- steinian, and quite mistaken, assumptions. Why should we have to argue over whether there is “something in common to all that we call” (PI § 65) Wittgenstein’s philosophy (early, late, or all of it)? As there are both continu- ities and discontinuities in Wittgenstein’s thought, we would be better off acknowledging that his writings “are related to one another in many differ- ent ways” (PI § 65) and turning to the more productive task of investigating A. Pichler, S. Säätelä (eds.), Wittgenstein: The Philosopher and his Works, pp. 205–229, Frankfurt a.M.: ontos verlag 2006, © ontos verlag, David G. Stern. |205 those relations in greater detail.
    [Show full text]