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Wittgenstein, Modernity and the Critique of Modernism Ben Ware a a the University of Manchester Version of Record First Published: 09 Oct 2012

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Wittgenstein, Modernity and the Critique of Modernism Ben Ware a a the University of Manchester Version of Record First Published: 09 Oct 2012 This article was downloaded by: [Ben Ware] On: 19 October 2012, At: 04:45 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Textual Practice Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rtpr20 Wittgenstein, modernity and the critique of modernism Ben Ware a a The University of Manchester Version of record first published: 09 Oct 2012. To cite this article: Ben Ware (): Wittgenstein, modernity and the critique of modernism, Textual Practice, DOI:10.1080/0950236X.2012.721384 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0950236X.2012.721384 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms- and-conditions This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub- licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. Textual Practice, 2012, 1–19, iFirst Article Ben Ware Wittgenstein, modernity and the critique of modernism This article aims to demonstrate how new light can be cast upon Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by looking at the work in the contexts of modernity and modernism. Rather than placing the book, as exegetes traditionally have done, in the lineage of analytic philosophy, I examine it instead in relation to some of the cultural and aesthetic dis- courses of its times. Specifically, I contend that the Tractatus’ engagement with issues of modernity and culture can be grasped through a close analysis of the work’s literary form. I also argue that an understanding of the author’s dialectical method can bring us to think differently about the so-called ‘problems of language’ that we encounter in certain works of literary modernism. By examining the Tractatus in these contexts, my primary aim is to show how Wittgenstein’s philosophical insights can be extended and applied to domains where his own work does not explicitly focus. Keywords Ludwig Wittgenstein; Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus; modernism; Literature; Modernity Downloaded by [Ben Ware] at 04:45 19 October 2012 Textual Practice ISSN 0950-236X print/ISSN 1470-1308 online # 2012 Taylor & Francis http://www.tandfonline.com/journals http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0950236X.2012.721384 Textual Practice All the propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand, are in perfect logical order. 1 – Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Stanley Cavell has long argued that Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investi- gations is a work which engages with the modern predicament. For Cavell, not only does the Investigations present ‘a philosophy of culture’ – one which responds to the pressures of modernity as directly as the writ- ings of Spengler, Freud, Nietzsche or Emerson2 – it can also be seen as a modernist work in its own right – one in which the ‘portrait of the human is recognizable as one of the modern self, or, as we are given to say, of the modern subject’.3 The work’s cultural perspective is, as Cavell argues, internal to its philosophical teaching,4 and, as such, is inseparable from the ‘deliberateness’ and ‘seriousness’ of the author’s mode of writing.5 In this paper, my aim will be to explore the extent to which Wittgenstein’s early work, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, can also be understood in relation to the cultural and aesthetic discourses of modernity and modern- ism. This broad project will, however, be given a particular focus. In the first part of the paper (Sections I and II), I will look at some of Wittgen- stein’s specific remarks on modernity and culture, and will argue that these remarks (which appear in his later manuscripts) can serve as the basis for a new reading of the ladder metaphor which he employs in the Tractatus.In the second part of the paper (Section III), I will carry out a reassessment of the Tractatus’ relationship to literary modernism. Here, rather than drawing direct parallels between the Tractatus and modernist works, I will instead show how Wittgenstein’s writings can be used in order to shed new light on modernist problems of language. I Downloaded by [Ben Ware] at 04:45 19 October 2012 There is no doubt that Wittgenstein considered himself to be isolated from the dominant currents of modern thought. In conversation with M.O’C. Drury, for instance, he remarks: ‘My type of thinking is not wanted in this present age, I have to swim so strongly against the tide. Perhaps in a hundred years people will really want what I am writing’.6 Wittgenstein’s attitude towards his times is explicitly summed up in a passage in his manu- scripts entitled ‘Sketch for a Foreword’.7 Here he argues that the spirit in which he is writing is ‘different from that of the prevailing European and American civilization’.8 ‘The spirit of this civilization’ is, he says, ‘a spirit that is alien and uncongenial’.9 For Wittgenstein, a defining feature of Western civilization, at the beginning of the twentieth century, is ‘a disappearance of the arts’.10 He 2 Ben Ware Wittgenstein modernity and modernism thus argues that ‘what today represents itself as architecture is not architec- ture’; and that ‘what is called modern music’ can only be approached with ‘the greatest mistrust’.11 Wittgenstein insists that here he is not making a ‘value judgment’: ‘the disappearance of the arts’, he writes, ‘does not justify judging disparagingly the human beings who make up this civiliza- tion’.12 Nevertheless, he claims that his times are ‘without culture’;13 and he concludes the ‘Sketch’ with the following words: Even if it is clear to me then that the disappearance of a culture does not signify the disappearance of human value but simply of certain means of expressing this value, still the fact remains that I contem- plate the current of European civilization without sympathy, without understanding its aims if any. So I am really writing for friends who are scattered throughout the corners of the globe.14 In these passages, Wittgenstein expresses a strong antipathy towards his age. ‘Culture’, the ‘great organization which assigns to each of its members [a] place’, allowing them to ‘work in the spirit of the whole’, has declined, leading to a stage of civilization in which ‘forces are fragmen- ted and the strength of the individual is wasted through the overcoming of opposing forces and frictional resistances’.15 Such remarks suggest clear affinities with the discourse of Kulturkritik. According to Francis Mulhern, Kulturkritik, as developed in the early twentieth century in the works of thinkers such as Thomas Mann, Julien Benda and Karl Man- nheim, sought to advance an ethico-spiritual critique of mass culture and modern political formations.16 For this constellation of writers, mod- ernity is seen ‘as degeneration, as the valorisation of the mass, as the para- doxical hyperactivity of essentially inert forces (the “revolt” of the passive “multitude”), as the decay or contamination of traditional, normally minoritarian values, as the disintegrative advance of high and vulgar enlightenment’.17 Downloaded by [Ben Ware] at 04:45 19 October 2012 Despite Wittgenstein’s close proximity to this intellectual tradition, it is also important to note some significant points of divergence. Unlike Thomas Mann – and his contemporary Oswald Spengler18 – Wittgenstein does not provide a systematic account of the relation between culture and civilization; nor, like Benda and Mannheim, does he attempt to formulate a vision of how society might be organized in the future.19 Indeed, as G.H. von Wright notes: ‘Wittgenstein’s world view is anything but “prophetic”’.20 And, as Wittgenstein himself puts it in a passage in his manuscripts of 1941: ‘You can’t construct clouds. And that is why the future you dream of never comes true’.21 (And later: ‘Who knows the laws according to which society unfolds? I am sure even the cleverest has no idea’.22) In this respect, rather than putting 3 Textual Practice forward his concerns about Western civilization in the form of a theory, Wittgenstein expresses them instead through the form and style of his phi- losophizing – a mode of writing which is intimately connected to what he refers to, in the Preface to the Philosophical Investigations, as the ‘darkness’ of his times.23 According to Wittgenstein, the hallmark of a civilization without culture is belief in ‘progress’ – progress, that is, understood in terms of cea- seless scientific and technological endeavour. For Wittgenstein, unrest- rained faith in science and technology is linked to what he calls the ‘apocalyptic’ conception of the world: The truly apocalyptic view of the world is that things do not repeat themselves. It is not e.g. absurd to believe that the scientific and tech- nological age is the beginning of the end for humanity, that the idea of Great Progress is a bedazzlement, along with the idea that the truth will ultimately be known; that there is nothing good or desirable about scientific knowledge and that humanity, in seeking it, is falling into a trap. It is by no means clear that this is not how things are.24 This scepticism towards progress is a familiar theme amongst Wittgen- stein’s contemporaries.
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