DOCSLIB.ORG

Pueblo Chemical Depot Phase III RCRA Facilitv Investigation Final Report SWMU 33

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Pueblo Chemical Depot Phase III RCRA Facilitv Investigation Final Report SWMU 33 Pueblo Chemical Depot Phase III RCRA Facilitv Investigation Final Report SWMU 33 Pre0ared For Pueblo Chemical Depot UnderCentractTe U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Omaha District AugusI1999 18838-1/1-M PA14SONS PARSONS IMMIMMERING SMENCO, INC. 10003872 1700 6-roadwoy, Suits 900 - 0anver, Colorado 80290 PUEBLO CHEMICAL DEPOT PHASE III RCRA FACILITY INVESTIGATION SWMU 33 FINAL REPORT Prepared For PUEBLO CHEMICAL DEPOT Under Contract To U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS OMAHA DISTRICT August 1999 Prepared By Parsons Engineering Science, Inc. 1700 Broadway, Suite 900 Denver, Colorado 80290 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page EXECUTIVE SUM M ARY ...........................................................................................ES-1 LIST OF ACRONYMS, ABBREVIATIONS, AND UNITS OF MEASURE ...................v SECTION I - INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................1-1 1.1 Project Background and Authority ......................................................................1-1 1.2 Purpose and Scope ...............................................................................................1-2 1.3 Docum ent M odifications .....................................................................................1-2 1.4 Report Structure ................................................................................................... 1-3 1.5 Facility Background .............................................................................................1-4 1.5.1 Facility Description and History ..............................................................1-4 1.5.2 Environm ental Setting .............................................................................1-5 1.5.2.1 Topography .............................................................................1-5 1.5.2.2 Clim ate ....................................................................................1-5 1.5.2.3 Surface W ater Hydrology ........................................................1-5 1.5.2.4 Geology ...................................................................................1-6 1.5.2.5 Hydrogeology ..........................................................................1-7 1.5.3 Regional W ell Inventory ..........................................................................1-8 1.6 Sum m ary of Study Areas .....................................................................................1-8 SECTION 2 - INVESTIGATION SUMMARY AND PROCEDURES .........................2-1 2.1 Investigation Sum m ary ........................................................................................2-1 2. 1.1 Overview ..................................................................................................2-1 2.1.2 SW MU 33 Investigations .........................................................................2-2 2.2 Investigation Procedures ......................................................................................2-2 2.2.1 Field-Screening M ethods .........................................................................2-2 2.2.1.1 Field Photoionization Detector Headspace Screening ............2-2 2.2.1.2 Field X-Ray Fluorescence .......................................................2-2 2.2.2 Surface Soil Sam pling ..............................................................................2-3 2.2.3 Soil Borehole Drilling and Subsurface Soil Sam pling ............................2-4 2.2.4 M onitoring W ell Installation ....................................................................2-4 2.2.5 M onitoring W ell Developm ent ................................................................2-5 2.2.6 M onitoring Well Purging and Sampling ..................................................2-5 2.2.7 W ater Level M easurem ent .......................................................................2-5 2.2.8 Aquifer Testing ........................................................................................2-6 2.2.9 Equipm ent Decontam ination ...................................................................2-6 2.2.9.1 Nonsampling Equipm ent .........................................................2-6 2.2.9.2 Sam pling Equipm ent ...............................................................2-6 2.2.10 Sam ple Handling and Shipping ...............................................................2-7 2.2.10.1 Sample Identification ..............................................................2-7 2.2.10.2 Sam ple Labels .........................................................................2-8 2.2.10.3 Sample Packaging and Shipping .............................................2-9 _i_ S:\ES\WP\PROJECTS\731018\SWMU33\1.DOC TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED) Page 2.2.11 Surveying ................................................................................................. 2-9 2.2.11.1 Use of the Global Positioning System ....................................2-9 2.2.11.2 Conventional Surveying ........................................................2-10 2.2.12 Field Quality Assurance Samples ..........................................................2-10 2.2.12.1 Trip Blanks ............................................................................2-10 2.2.12.2 Ambient Blank ......................................................................2-10 2.2.12.3 Decontamination W ater Blank ..............................................2-10 2.2.12.4 Distilled W ater Blank ............................................................2-11 2.2.12.5 Equipment Rinseate Blanks ..................................................2-11 2.2.12.6 Field Duplicate Samples .......................................................2-11 2.2.13 Disposition of Investigation-Derived W astes ........................................2-11 2.3 Deviations from W ork Plan ...............................................................................2-11 SECTION 3 - INVESTIGATIVE RESULTS FOR SWMU 33 ......................................3-1 3.1 Site History .......................................................................................................... 3-1 3.1.1 FormerRifle/Pistol Range (SW M U 33) ..................................................3-1 3.1.2 Results of Phase I and II Investigations ...................................................3-1 3.2 Phase III Investigation ......................................................................................... 3-1. 3.2.1 Geologic Setting and Soil Conditions ......................................................3-1 3.2.2 Hydrogeologic Setting .............................................................................3-'? 3.2.3 Soil Investigation .....................................................................................3-3 3.2.3.1 Soil Investigation Summary ....................................................3-3 3.2.3.2 Nature and Extent of Soil Contamination ...............................3-3 3.2.4 Groundwater Investigation .......................................................................3-5 3.2.4.1 Groundwater Investigation Summary .....................................3-5 3.2.4.2 Nature and Extent of Groundwater Contamination .................3-6 3.2.5 Fate and Transport ...................................................................................3-6 3.2.6 Summary of SWMU 33 Risk Screen Results for Human and Ecological Receptors ...............................................................................3-6 Results of the Ecological Benchmark Screening Comparison .................3-6 3.2.7 Summary and Conclusions ......................................................................3-7 SECTION 4 - REFERENCES .........................................................................................4-1 -ii- S:\ES\WPTROJECTS\731018\SWMU33\1.DOC TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED) LIST OF TABLES No. Title Page Section 1 1.1 W ater W ell Survey ................................................................................................ 1-17 Section 2 2.1 Investigation Summary for SWMU 33 .................................................................2-14 2.2 D rilling Summ ary Table .......................................................................................2-15 2.3 Analyses Conducted for Groundwater Samples ...................................................2-21 2.4 Analyses Conducted for Soil Samples Collected From Soil Boreholes and Boreholes for M onitoring W ells ....................................................................2-22 2.5 Renaming of Existing Monitoring Wells ..............................................................2-23 Section 3 3.1 Summary of Laboratory Geotechnical Results .....................................................3-17 3.2 Results of Alluvial Aquifer Slug Test Analyses ...................................................3-18 3.2 Detected Analytical Results.for Organic Compounds in Soil Samples ................349 3.3 Detected Analytical Results for Inorganic Compounds in Soil Samples .............3-21 3.4 Detected Analytical Results for Nitrate/Nitrite in Soil Samples ..........................3-25 3.5 Detected Analtyical Results for Organic Compounds in Groundwater S am p les ................................................................................................................. 3-26 3.6 Summary of Field Parameters for Groundwater ...................................................3-27 -iii- SAESMPTROJECTSM 101 8\SWMU33\1.D0C TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) LIST OF FIGURES No. Title Page Section
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program
    SAFE TODAY, SAFER TOMORROW CSEPP CHEMICAL STOCKPILE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM CHEMICAL STOCKPILE CHEMICAL STOCKPILE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM WHAT IS CSEPP? The Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness departments and agencies, two States, local Program (CSEPP) works closely with the communities governments, volunteer organizations, the private around the Nation’s two remaining chemical weapons sector and the public under a single goal – enhancing storage and disposal sites in Kentucky and Colorado, emergency preparedness. This partnership has with the mission to “enhance existing local, installation, improved the ability to protect the public by upgrading tribal, state and federal capabilities to protect the emergency plans and providing chemical accident health and safety of the public, work force and response equipment and warning systems. environment from the effects of a chemical accident Aside from chemical stockpile response, communities or incident involving the U.S. Army chemical stockpile” may face emergencies related to weather, earthquakes, (CSEPP Strategic Plan, July 2019). floods, fires, hazardous material spills or releases, A whole community partnership created in 1988, and transportation and industrial accidents. The CSEPP unites the U.S. Army, Federal Emergency capabilities augmented by CSEPP enable communities Management Agency (FEMA), other Federal to better respond to all hazards. 1 SAFE TODAY, SAFER TOMORROW CHEMICAL STOCKPILE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM ENHANCING EMERGENCY SAFER BECAUSE OF CSEPP PREPAREDNESS The Department of Defense is CSEPP was created in 1988 to The stockpiles In Colorado and CSEPP is committed to maintaining its preparedness CSEPP officials work together to prepare the whole destroying chemical weapons at enhance emergency response Kentucky are safely stored by the mission until the entire chemical stockpile is destroyed community.
    [Show full text]
  • The Chemical Weapons Conventions at 1
    Rudderless: The Chemical Weapons Convention At 1 ½ Amy E. Smithson Report No. 25 September 1998 Copyright© 1998 11 Dupont Circle, NW Ninth Floor Washington, DC 20036 phone 202.223.5956 fax 202.238.9604 http://www.stimson.org email [email protected] Rudderless: The Chemical Weapons Convention At 1 1/2 Amy E. Smithson INTRODUCTION On the 29th of April 1997, the majority of the world’s nations joined to activate an arms control and nonproliferation accord that will gradually compel the elimination of one of the most abhorred classes of weapons of all times. Previously, the international community had fallen short of the mark in efforts to try to abolish poison gas, despite the opprobrium following its widespread use in World War I.1 The new Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) extends the no use-prohibitions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol2 to outlaw the development, acquisition, production, transfer, and stockpiling of chemical weapons as well. The CWC requires the destruction of chemical weapons production facilities and arsenals over a ten-year period, and countries will witness the shrinking numbers of poison gas factories and munitions. A less tangible function of the CWC, but one that may turn out to be equally valued over the long term is that the CWC will help redefine how states assure their national security. The CWC requires nations to declare activities that were previously considered state secrets and private business information. The treaty authorizes routine and challenge inspections to monitor compliance with its prohibitions. Instead of building large caches of arms, the CWC’s verification processes give governments reason to be confident that managed transparency—a limited waiver of state sovereignty—can enhance national and international security.
    [Show full text]
  • Annual Status Report on the Destruction of the United States Stockpile of Lethal Chemical Agents and Munitions for Fiscal Year 2019
    Annual Status Report on the Destruction of the United States Stockpile of Lethal Chemical Agents and Munitions for Fiscal Year 2019 September 30, 2019 The estimated cost of this report or study for the Department of Defense is approximately $740 for the 2019 Fiscal Year. This includes $0 in expenses and $740 in DoD labor. TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction ..........................................................................................................................1 II. Mission .................................................................................................................................1 III. Organization .........................................................................................................................1 IV. Current Status of U.S. Chemical Weapons Destruction ......................................................2 A. Site-by-Site Description of Chemical Weapons Stockpile Destruction……………….2 B. Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives Program……………………………..….3 V. Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program ......................................................5 VI. Funding Execution ...............................................................................................................7 VII. Safety Status of Chemical Weapons Stockpile Storage .......................................................8 APPENDICES A. Abbreviations and Symbols B. Program Disbursements C. Summary Occurrences of Leaking Chemical Munitions i I. Introduction The Department of Defense (DoD) is submitting
    [Show full text]
  • Colorado Csepp Community Recovery Plan
    COLORADO CSEPP COMMUNITY RECOVERY PLAN June 2016 1 Executive Summary Purpose The purpose of the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) Recovery Plan is to outline the coordination and support activities that occur in the recovery phase following a chemical event at Pueblo Chemical Depot (PCD). The term “recovery” includes measures to assess the hazard and perform other urgent tasks in the area affected by the emergency; a controlled process for reentry, restoration, and remediation; and provision of services to persons, businesses and other organizations affected by the emergency. The primary purpose of recovery activities is to protect public health and safety while returning the community to normal or near normal conditions. The Colorado CSEPP Team has been an active participant in the evolution of CSEPP recovery planning and preparedness, beginning April 15, 1992 when it identified the programmatic need for resolution of recovery issues during a Table Top Exercise (TTX) conducted in Pueblo. Between January 2014 and August 2015, a series of seminars and tabletop exercises had been conducted focusing on different aspects of the plan with the goal of validating its contents. Additional stakeholders were brought into the processes that were not included when the original plan was written. Changes in regulatory requirements were also updated. This was accomplished as the first set of chemical munitions was being destroyed. Management of such an incident will conform to the principles of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) as required by Colorado Executive Order D 011 04, dated December 6, 2004 and the PCD and / or PCAPP Contingency Plan pursuant to the facility permit or interim status plans and the Colorado Hazardous Waste Regulations, 6 CCR 1007-3, Section 264.1(g)(8)(iii).
    [Show full text]
  • Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
    FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2008/09 BUDGET ESTIMATES February 2007 CHEMICAL AGENTS AND MUNITIONS DESTRUCTION PROGRAM ASSESSMENT Chemical Demilitarization The Chemical Demilitarization Program destroys the U.S. stockpile of chemical weapons. The United States has an obligation to destroy all such weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which was entered into in 1997. PERFORMING Adequate • After destroying only 136 tons in 2003 the program has destroyed over 4,473 tons since, and 11,506 tons overall. All CWC treaty milestones have been met to date, and the program is on track to achieve the CWC 45% destruction milestone by December 2007 including destroying binary chemicals and the destruction of former production facilities by April 2007. • The program has an excellent safety record. Nonetheless, community concerns have delayed construction of plants. This has resulted in increased costs and will delay the destruction of the chemical stockpile. • The program has developed annual destruction goals to guide its progress toward destroying the entire U.S. chemical weapons stockpile as close as practicable to the CWC 100% destruction deadline of April 2012. We are taking the following actions to improve the performance of the program: • Expediting disposal of secondary waste by assessing alternative technologies or using off-site treatment to reduce cost, shorten schedules, make better use of equipment, and improve processing. • Maintaining an Integrated Risk Management Program that stresses early risk identification, mitigation planning, and execution to minimize impacts on cost, schedule, performance, and safety. • Implementing and tracking performance measures such as Annual Cost Index, Annual Schedule Index, and Cost per Ton Index to ensure meeting or exceeding annual destruction goals.
    [Show full text]
  • Chemical Agents and Munitions Destruction
    FISCAL YEAR 2006/2007 BIANNUAL BUDGET ESTIMATE SUBMISSION February 2005 CHEMICAL AGENTS AND MUNITIONS DESTRUCTION - i - DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY BUDGET ESTIMATE SUBMISSION FOR FY 2006/2007 CHEMICAL AGENTS AND MUNITIONS DESTRUCTION TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE NO APPROPRIATION LANGUAGE . .. 1 APPROPRIATION JUSTIFICATION . .. .. 2 PART I - PURPOSE AND SCOPE PART II - JUSTIFICATION OF FUNDS REQUIRED PART III - MILESTONES BUDGET ACTIVITY 1: OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE . ... 14 PURPOSE AND SCOPE JUSTIFICATION OF FUNDS REQUIRED FUNDED FINANCIAL SUMMARY JUSTIFICATION BY PROGRAM BUDGET ACTIVITY 2: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT . .. .. .. ..23 PURPOSE AND SCOPE JUSTIFICATION OF FUNDS REQUIRED FUNDED FINANCIAL SUMMARY JUSTIFICATION BY PROGRAM ii DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY BUDGET ESTIMATE SUBMISSION FOR FY 2006/2007 CHEMICAL AGENTS AND MUNITIONS DESTRUCTION TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont’d) PAGE NO BUDGET ACTIVITY 3: PROCUREMENT . .. .. 33 PURPOSE AND SCOPE JUSTIFICATION OF FUNDS REQUIRED FUNDED FINANCIAL SUMMARY JUSTIFICATION BY PROGRAM BUDGET ITEM JUSTIFICATION SHEET (EXHIBIT P-40) WEAPONS SYSTEM COST ANALYSIS (EXHIBIT P-5) BUDGET PROCUREMENT HISTORY AND PLANNING (EXHIBIT P-5A) ii JUSTIFICATION OF FY 2006/2007 BUDGET ESTIMATE SUBMISSION CHEMICAL AGENTS AND MUNITIONS DESTRUCTION APPROPRIATION LANGUAGE For expenses, not otherwise provided for, necessary for the destruction of the United States stockpile of lethal chemical agents and munitions in accordance with the provisions of Section 1412 of the National Defense Authorization Act, 1986 (50 U.S.C. 1521), and for the destruction of other chemical warfare materiel that are not in the chemical weapon stockpile, $1,405,827,000 to become available on October 1, 2005 of which $1,241,514,000 shall be for Operation and Maintenance, to remain available until September 30, 2006; $47,786,000 shall be for Research and Development, to remain available until September 30, 2007; and $116,527,000 shall be for Procurement, to remain available until September 30, 2008.
    [Show full text]
  • Rudderless: the Chemical Weapons Convention at 1 ½
    Rudderless: The Chemical Weapons Convention At 1 ½ Amy E. Smithson Report No. 25 September 1998 Copyright© 1998 11 Dupont Circle, NW Ninth Floor Washington, DC 20036 phone 202.223.5956 fax 202.238.9604 http://www.stimson.org email [email protected] Rudderless: The Chemical Weapons Convention At 1 1/2 Amy E. Smithson INTRODUCTION On the 29th of April 1997, the majority of the world’s nations joined to activate an arms control and nonproliferation accord that will gradually compel the elimination of one of the most abhorred classes of weapons of all times. Previously, the international community had fallen short of the mark in efforts to try to abolish poison gas, despite the opprobrium following its widespread use in World War I.1 The new Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) extends the no use-prohibitions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol2 to outlaw the development, acquisition, production, transfer, and stockpiling of chemical weapons as well. The CWC requires the destruction of chemical weapons production facilities and arsenals over a ten-year period, and countries will witness the shrinking numbers of poison gas factories and munitions. A less tangible function of the CWC, but one that may turn out to be equally valued over the long term is that the CWC will help redefine how states assure their national security. The CWC requires nations to declare activities that were previously considered state secrets and private business information. The treaty authorizes routine and challenge inspections to monitor compliance with its prohibitions. Instead of building large caches of arms, the CWC’s verification processes give governments reason to be confident that managed transparency—a limited waiver of state sovereignty—can enhance national and international security.
    [Show full text]
  • Chemical Agents and Munitions Destruction, Defense
    FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2011 BUDGET ESTIMATES February 2010 CHEMICAL AGENTS AND MUNITIONS DESTRUCTION, DEFENSE This page is intentionally left blank i FISCAL YEAR (FY)2011 BUDGET ESTIMATES CHEMICAL AGENTS AND MUNITIONS DESTRUCTION, DEFENSE TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE NO APPROPRIATION LANGUAGE.......................................................... 1 APPROPRIATION JUSTIFICATION..................................................... 2 PART I - PURPOSE AND SCOPE PART II - JUSTIFICATION OF FUNDS REQUIRED PART III - MILESTONES BUDGET ACTIVITY 1: OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE ................................. 10 PURPOSE AND SCOPE JUSTIFICATION OF FUNDS REQUIRED FUNDED FINANCIAL SUMMARY JUSTIFICATION BY PROGRAM EXHIBIT OP-5 EXHIBIT OP-32 BUDGET ACTIVITY 2: RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION ................ 38 PURPOSE AND SCOPE JUSTIFICATION OF FUNDS REQUIRED FUNDED FINANCIAL SUMMARY JUSTIFICATION BY PROGRAM EXHIBIT R-1 EXHIBIT R-2 BUDGET ACTIVITY 3: PROCUREMENT................................................ 52 PURPOSE AND SCOPE JUSTIFICATION OF FUNDS REQUIRED FUNDED FINANCIAL SUMMARY JUSTIFICATION BY PROGRAM EXHIBIT P-40 EXHIBIT P-5 ii CHEMICAL AGENTS AND MUNITIONS DESTRUCTION, DEFENSE APPROPRIATION LANGUAGE Fiscal Year 2011 For expenses, not otherwise provided for, necessary for the destruction of the United States stockpile of lethal chemical agents and munitions in accordance with the provisions of section 1412 of the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1986 (50 U.S.C. 1521), and for the destruction of other chemical warfare materials that
    [Show full text]
  • Chemical Weapons
    44.348: Advanced Seminar on Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism Week 2: Chemical Weapons Dr. James Forest Chemical Weapon Attributes • Use the toxic properties of chemical substances to cause physical or psychological harm to an enemy • Can be delivered through bombs, rockets, artillery shells, spray tanks, and missile warheads; can be dispersed as vapors, aerosols or liquids • Many kinds have been developed since WWI, including choking agents, blister agents, blood agents, nerve agents, incapacitants, riot-control agents, and herbicides. • Some are highly lethal; a few drops can kill victims within minutes • Some evaporate in minutes or hours and lose their effect rapidly. – Sarin is a lethal but nonpersistent nerve agent. – VX can persist for days or weeks in lethal form Types and Categories • Biotoxins • Long-acting anticoagulants • Blister agents/vesicants • Metals • Blood agents • Nerve agents • Caustics (acids) • Organic solvents • Choking/lung/pulmonary • Riot control agents/tear gas agents • Toxic alcohols • Incapacitating agents • Vomiting agents Source: Centers for Disease Control Hazardous Chemicals • Abrin • Mustard gas (H) • Arsine (SA) • Nitrogen mustard (HN-1, HN-2, HN-3) • Benzene (CA) • Paraquat • Bromine (CA) • Phosgene (CG) • Bromobenzylcyanide (CA) • Phosgene oxime (CX) • Chlorine (CL) • Potassium cyanide (KCN) • Chloroacetophenone (CN) • Ricin • Chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile • Riot control agents/tear gas (CS) • Sarin (GB) • Chloropicrin (PS) • Sodium azide • Cyanide • Sodium cyanide (NaCN) • Cyanogen chloride
    [Show full text]
  • The 2008 Chemical Weapons Convention Review Conference: a Collection of Articles, Essays, and Interviews on Tackling the Threats Posed by Chemical Weapons
    An Arms Control Today Reader The 2008 Chemical Weapons Convention Review Conference: A Collection of Articles, Essays, and Interviews on Tackling the Threats Posed by Chemical Weapons. April 2008 An Arms Control Today Reader The 2008 Chemical Weapons Convention Review Conference: A Collection of Articles, Essays, and Interviews on Tackling the Threats Posed by Chemical Weapons. April 2008 ii Chemical Weapons Convention Reader Arms Control Today (ACT), published by the Arms Control Association (ACA), provides policymakers, the press, and the interested public with authoritative information, analysis, and commentary on arms control proposals, negotiations and agreements, and re- lated national and international security issues. ACA is a national nonpartisan membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for arms control policies. In addition to ACT, ACA provides additional information through its web site, regular press briefings, and commentary and analysis by its staff for journalists and scholars in the United States and abroad. Acknowledgements ACA thanks each of the contributors to this reader for their work and insights. It would also like to thank OPCW Director-General Rogelio Pfirter, U.S. Ambassador Don- ald A. Mahley, and British Ambassador Lyn Parker for their participation in interviews with ACT. ACA thanks its individual members and contributors, as well as the following organizations for their financial support, which made this series on chemical weapons issues possible: Colombe Foundation Ford Foundation John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation New-Land Foundation Ploughshares Fund Prospect Hill Foundation Public Welfare Foundation Stewart R. Mott Charitable Trust ©Arms Control Association, April 2008 Chemical Weapons Conve Chemical Weapons ntion Reader Cover Photo: Japanese police participating in a chemical weapons drill Oct.
    [Show full text]
  • Pre-Event Recovery Sampling and Analysis Framework for Blue Grass CSEPP Community
    ANL/DIS-18/3 Pre-Event Recovery Sampling and Analysis Framework for Blue Grass CSEPP Community Decision and Infrastructure Sciences Division About Argonne National Laboratory Argonne is a U.S. Department of Energy laboratory managed by UChicago Argonne, LLC under contract DE-AC02-06CH11357. The Laboratory’s main facility is outside Chicago, at 9700 South Cass Avenue, Argonne, Illinois 60439. For information about Argonne and its pioneering science and technology programs, see www.anl.gov. DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY Online Access: U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) reports produced after 1991 and a growing number of pre-1991 documents are available free at OSTI.GOV (http://www.osti.gov/), a service of the US Dept. of Energy’s Office of Scientific and Technical Information. Reports not in digital format may be purchased by the public from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS): U.S. Department of Commerce National Technical Information Service 5301 Shawnee Rd Alexandria, VA 22312 www.ntis.gov Phone: (800) 553-NTIS (6847) or (703) 605-6000 Fax: (703) 605-6900 Email: [email protected] Reports not in digital format are available to DOE and DOE contractors from the Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI): U.S. Department of Energy Office of Scientific and Technical Information P.O. Box 62 Oak Ridge, TN 37831-0062 www.osti.gov Phone: (865) 576-8401 Fax: (865) 576-5728 Email: [email protected] Disclaimer This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, nor UChicago Argonne, LLC, nor any of their employees or officers, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights.
    [Show full text]
  • Milestones in U.S. Chemical Weapons Storage and Destruction with More Than 2,600 Dedicated Employees Plus Contractor Support Staff, the U.S
    Milestones in U.S. Chemical Weapons Storage and Destruction With more than 2,600 dedicated employees plus contractor support staff, the U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency (CMA) leads the world in chemical weapons destruction with a demonstrated history of safely storing, recovering, assessing and disposing of U.S. chemical weapons and related materials. CMA manages all U.S. chemical materiel except for the disposal of two weapons stockpiles that fall under the Department of Defense’s U.S. Army Element Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives pilot neutralization program. Through its Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program, CMA works with local emergency preparedness and response agencies at weapons stockpile locations. 1960-1982 1960s and before 1971 1979 The United States begins stockpiling and The United States finishes transferring The Army constructs and begins using chemical weapons against Germany chemical munitions from Okinawa, Japan, operating the Chemical Agent in World War I, which lasts from 1914 to to Johnston Island, located about 800 Munitions Disposal System (CAMDS), 1918. The weapons are securely stored miles from Hawaii, in September of 1971. a pilot incineration facility located at U.S. military installations at home at what is now the Deseret Chemical and abroad. 1972 Depot (DCD), Utah. The Army tests disposal equipment and processes The Edgewood Arsenal, Md., produces The Army forms the U.S. Army Materiel at the plant. More than 91 tons of mustard and phosgene but the Arsenal Command’s Program Manager for chemical agent are safely destroyed. is not large enough to store the agent Demilitarization of Chemical Materiel, and new installations are constructed in headquartered at Picatinny Arsenal, Huntsville, Ala., Denver, Colo., Pine Bluff, near Dover, NJ.
    [Show full text]