Chapter Nineteen

The Doctrine of God: Elaboration

Simplicity

We begin this chapter on the doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS) by tak- ing note of F.G. Immink’s dissertation Divine Simplicity (1987). At the out- set, Immink states that DDS is a complex of, on the one hand, theological notions and, on the other hand, logical reasoning. The relation between theological motives and logical argumentation determines the structure of DDS.1 In his preliminary exposition of DDS, Immink distinguishes between a logical and a hermeneutical version of the doctrine of divine simplic- ity. Where DDS is understood as a logical characterization of the exalted divine being, this doctrine claims an identity between God and his prop- erties, and between each of God’s properties. Significant theologians have elaborated this basic idea in slightly different ways. Anselm of Canter- bury starts with God’s unique and independent existence as the being “than which nothing greater can be thought.” He understands ‘greatness’ in an evaluative sense as ‘excellence.’ This excellence implies the lack of composition and the possession of perfect unity. Thomas Aquinas com- bines the denial of any composition in God with a logical analysis of the rejected forms of composition. Aquinas distinguishes eight possible forms of composition, some of which are conceived from an Aristotelian framework (form—matter, potentiality—actuality), others from a more Augustinian-Platonic framework (God—essence, essence—existence, genus—differentia, substance—accidents) do not apply, while other deni- als of composition are simply motivated by the biblical account of God (composition out of parts, composition of God and a created entity).2 In recent Protestant theology, the scholastic version of DDS has been heavily criticized. H. Cremer, for instance, argued that DDS shows the intrusion of the Greek idea of God as a pure and absolute Being into Christian thinking. Similarly, Emil Brunner understood DDS as concerned

1 Immink, Divine Simplicity, 9–10. 2 Immink, Divine Simplicity, 11–15. 572 chapter nineteen with “das Eigenschaftslose Absolute” (the Absolute without Properties). The threefold method of the classical doctrine of God (via negationis- via eminentiae-via causalitatis) originates in Greek, Platonic philosophy, says Brunner. A more careful discussion of the classical concept of God is given by Wolfhart Pannenberg. Pannenberg states that the reception of philosophical concepts for God is justified by the biblical claim of God’s universality. In the early Christian appropriation of philosophical ideas, Pannenberg discerns three important aspects: first, the thought of God’s being the origin of reality; second, the statement of God as the ultimate unity; third, the recognition of God’s being wholly-other and inconceiv- able. Whereas Pannenberg agrees with the latter element, he argues that the God of biblical revelation is a personal agent who acts contingently, and can therefore not be decorated with the philosophical concepts of ultimate cause and final unity.3 After the exposition of the logical version of DDS, Immink turns to a kerygmatic or hermeneutical defense of the doctrine. Surprisingly some theologians, notably Karl Barth and K.H. Miskotte, upheld important theo- logical motives in DDS despite their criticism of the scholastic account. Basing his doctrine of divine simplicity on the mystery of God’s Name, Karl Barth argues that the core of DDS is the assertion of God’s reliability: “in all that God is and does, God is wholly and undividedly himself.” Barth connects simplicity with God’s freedom, which means that God is so dif- ferent from created reality that he can at once have and hold communion with this reality. Finally, Barth asserts ‘the unity of God,’ which Immink understands as the consistency in God’s actions. K.H. Miskotte, the sec- ond kerygmatic defender of DDS, rejects logical reasoning about a pure and abstract concept of simplicity. Just as Barth did, Miskotte starts with God’s Name, and sees DDS as an explanation of the Name pointing to God’s uniqueness and unity. The uniqueness is conceived by Miskotte in terms of God’s concrete revelation. Moreover, God’s unity is based on his uniqueness: it is no logical unity, but the unity of consistency in the his- tory of salvation. According to Immink, both Barth and Miskotte discov- ered important theological notions in DDS, but they unjustly neglected the logical factor in this doctrine: it is, even in their version, not simply revealed in the Bible, but contains a substantial amount of logical thinking.4

3 Immink, Divine Simplicity, 15–20. 4 Immink, Divine Simplicity, 20–26.