THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY of AMERICA Divine Ideas: 1250–1325
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THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA Divine Ideas: 1250–1325 A DISSERTATION Submitted to the Faculty of the School of Philosophy Of the Catholic University of America In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree Doctor of Philosophy By Carl A. Vater Washington, D.C. 2017 Divine Ideas: 1250–1325 Carl A. Vater, Ph.D. Director: Timothy B. Noone, Ph.D. A theory of divine ideas was the standard Scholastic solution to the question “How does God know and produce creatures?” Such a theory was only held to be successful if it upheld the nobility of God’s perfect knowledge without violating his supreme simplicity and unity. The theories of divine knowledge coming from philosophers like Aristotle, Avicenna, and Averroes, which posit no divine ideas, uphold divine simplicity, but seem to compromise the nobility of divine cognition because they are forced to say either that God does not know creatures at all, or that he only knows them in a universal (and therefore imperfect) or indeterminate way. They also seem to compromise divine causality because they have to posit either necessary (as opposed to voluntary) or mediated (as opposed to immediate) creation. Yet, positing multiple ideas in God as Augustine does seems contrary to divine simplicity. Faced with these difficulties, the medieval Schoolmen were forced to articulate very precisely how God can know and create a multiplicity of creatures without jeopardizing the divine simplicity. A complete explanation of how God knows and produces creatures requires the Schoolmen to answer a number of questions that can be divided into two types. The first type of question concerns the status of divine ideas: questions such as what is an idea? Are they speculative or practical? Are divine ideas multiple and, if so, how? How many divine ideas are there? How are the divine ideas related to God? What sort of existence, if any, does an idea enjoy? What is the status of non-existing possibles? The second type of question asks about the scope of divine ideas: questions such as are there divine ideas of singulars, evil, prime matter, genera, species, and number? These questions cause Scholastics to articulate clearly, among other things, their positions on the nature of knowledge, relation, exemplar causality, participation, infinity, and possibility. The goal of this dissertation is to trace the way in which reflection upon the theme of divine ideas in the period between 1250 and 1325 became increasingly refined as the metaphysical, epistemological, and logical topics related to them became subject to greater scrutiny. This dissertation by Carl A. Vater fulfills the dissertation requirements for the doctoral degree in Philosophy approved by Timothy B. Noone, Ph.D., as director, and by Gregory T. Doolan, Ph.D., and Kevin White, Ph.D., as Readers. ____________________________________ Timothy B. Noone, Ph.D. ____________________________________ Gregory T. Doolan, Ph.D. ____________________________________ Kevin White, Ph.D. ii To my wife Margaret iii Table of Contents Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................ix CHAPTER I .............................................................................................................................. 1 A. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 1 B. DIVINE SIMPLICITY ................................................................................................................. 3 1. Arguments for Divine Simplicity ....................................................................................................................... 5 2. Arguments for the Compatibility of Distinctions with Divine Simplicity ................................................. 14 3. Ockham on Divine Simplicity .......................................................................................................................... 19 C. PROBLEMATIC ACCOUNTS OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE ................................................. 24 1. Aristotle (384–322 BC) ...................................................................................................................................... 25 B. Avicenna (980–1037 AD) ................................................................................................................................. 33 a. The Necessary and The Possible. ............................................................................................................................... 33 b. The Intelligence of the Necessary Being. .................................................................................................................. 37 C. Averroes (1126–1198 AD) ............................................................................................................................... 45 4. Recapitulation and Summary ............................................................................................................................ 51 D. OUTLINE OF FOLLOWING CHAPTERS ............................................................................. 52 CHAPTER II .......................................................................................................................... 56 A. ST. BONAVENTURE OF BAGNOREGIO (c. 1217–1274 AD) ................................................ 58 1. The Place of Ideas in St. Bonaventure’s Thought ......................................................................................... 58 2. The Status of the Divine Ideas ......................................................................................................................... 60 a. Does God have Ideas? ................................................................................................................................................. 61 i. In I Sententias (ca. 1251). ........................................................................................................................................... 61 ii. De scientia Christi (1254). .......................................................................................................................................... 65 iii. Conclusions. ............................................................................................................................................................ 69 iv. Exemplar in General. ............................................................................................................................................. 71 v. Exemplar as Word. ................................................................................................................................................. 72 v. Exemplar as Art. ...................................................................................................................................................... 74 vi. Exemplar as Ratio. ................................................................................................................................................. 76 viii. Imitative Likeness. ............................................................................................................................................... 79 b. The Unity and Plurality of Divine Ideas .................................................................................................................... 80 i. In I Sententias (ca. 1251). ........................................................................................................................................... 81 ii. De scientia Christi (1254). .......................................................................................................................................... 86 iii. Conclusions ............................................................................................................................................................. 88 iv. Real vs. Rational Relations. ................................................................................................................................... 90 c. The Infinity of the Divine Ideas ................................................................................................................................. 93 i. In I Sententias (ca. 1251). ........................................................................................................................................... 93 iii. Conclusions. ............................................................................................................................................................ 98 d. The Existence of Things in God and the Possibles ................................................................................................. 99 i. In I Sententias (ca. 1251). ........................................................................................................................................... 99 ii. Conclusions. ........................................................................................................................................................... 103 3. The Scope of the Divine Ideas ....................................................................................................................... 104 a. Singulars ....................................................................................................................................................................... 104 b. Evil ..............................................................................................................................................................................