Absolute Identity and the Trinity
Chris Tweedt
Trinititarians are charged with (at least) two contradictions. First, the Father is God and the Son is God, so it seems to follow that the Father is the Son. Trinitarians affirm the premises but deny the conclusion, which seems contradictory. Second, the Father is a god, the Son is a god, and the Holy Spirit is a god, but the Father isn’t the Son, the Father isn’t the Holy Spirit, and the Son isn’t the Holy Spirit. This seems to entail that there are three gods. Again, Trinitarians affirm the premises but deny the conclusion. There are two main views of the Trinity that are designed to (among other things) avoid these alleged contradictions. These views, however, have problems. In this paper, I present a resolution to these alleged contradictions that a Trinitarian proponent of divine simplicity can endorse without succumbing to the problems of the two main current views. What is surprising about the view I’ll propose is that it is helped by divine simplicity. This is surprising because many current Trinitarian views either reject divine simplicity or find it a difficult doctrine to maintain. In section 1, I’ll better describe the alleged contradictions the Trinitarian needs to dispel and the way in which the Trinitarian needs to dispel these alleged contradic- tions. In section 2, I’ll give the two main ways to dispel these alleged contradictions and give the problems with these views. In sections 3–5, I’ll propose and defend a view that dispels the alleged contradictions. If sections 3–5 are successful, the view I propose will avoid the heresies of modalism and tritheism in a way that is supported by divine simplicity. In section 6, I’ll show that the view I’m proposing avoids the problems the two main views from section 2 face.1
1Throughout this article, I will reference Aquinas in the footnotes, because I think the view I propose here is (at least very close to) Aquinas’ view, and because, to many at least, a view of the Trinity is more plausible if it is supported in the tradition. However, even if you’re not convinced that this is Aquinas’ view, the view is, I think, independently attractive to a Trinitarian. 1 Introduction
Peter van Inwagen (2003) raises two arguments that allegedly result in a contradiction for any orthodox Trinitarian view. Here’s the first. Trinitarians want to affirm the premises but not the conclusion of this argument:
1. The Father is God.
2. The Son is God.
3. So, the Father is the Son.
If someone were to affirm the conclusion, that would be to affirm modalism. Modal- ism is the view that the Father and the Son (and the Holy Spirit) are not really distinct. Rather, they are roles, functions, or guises of the same thing, like Clark Kent and Superman are just the Kryptonian Kal-El in different guises, or playing different roles.2 Trinitarians cannot accept modalism and remain orthodox, because modalism was condemned at the First Council of Nicaea. So, Trinitarians must deny 3, which seems to be inconsistent with accepting 1 and 2. Here’s the second alleged contradiction. Trinitarians also want to affirm the premises but not the conclusion of this argument:
4. The Father is a god.3
5. The Son is a god.
6. The Holy Spirit is a god.
7. The Father is not the Son.
8. The Father is not the Holy Spirit.
9. The Son is not the Holy Spirit.
10. So, there are at least three gods.
In case it’s not clear why the conclusion follows, let us translate ‘x is a god’ as ‘Gx’. The conclusion, then, is:
Gf & Gs & Gh & f6=s & f6=h & s6=h,
2This is Michael Rea’s example (2003, 443). 3I’m assuming here that God is a god.
2 which we can translate ‘There are at least three gods.’ To accept the conclusion, then, is to accept polytheism, the view that there is more than one god. To accept polytheism would be disastrous to the Trinitarian, because monotheism is a central tenet of Christian Trinitarianism. The Trinitarian must deny 10, which seems to be inconsistent with accepting 4–9. How is the Trinitarian to respond? I will follow Aquinas in holding that the task of the Trinitarian is merely to provide some way to dispel contradictions rather than to understand the Trinity.4 That is, the Trinitarian merely needs to show how someone can affirm the premises but deny the conclusion without violating Trinitarian doctrine. To understand the Trinity would require a vision of God’s essence, which we can’t do in this life. Rather, the Trinitarian should take it on authority that it is possible to affirm the premises but not the conclusion of these arguments and show how this can be done without contradiction.
2 The two main views and their problems
In this paper, I’ll present a way of dispelling the alleged contradictions that is different than the two main extant ways of dispelling these contradictions: Social Trinitari- anism and Relative Identity. Below I’ll give the ways these views aim to dispel the contradictions, and I’ll give the problems with each view. Social Trinitarians take the ‘is’ in the first argument to be an ‘is’ of predication. The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit share the same divine nature like individual humans share a human nature. Each individual human is a human; the ‘is’ here is an ‘is’ of predication. This solves the first problem. Socrates is human and Aristotle is human, but Socrates isn’t Aristotle. Social Trinitarianism, however, doesn’t solve the second problem. For example, Socrates is a human, Aristotle is a human, and Socrates 6= Aristotle, so there are at least two humans. It is hard to see how Social Trinitarians avoid polytheism. This is the biggest problem for the view, and it is one that has led many to reject Social Trinitarianism.5 The second main view is the Relative Identity view. All proponents of relative identity hold that there is sortal-relative identity. That is, there is a sortal F in respect of which the relata are the same. For example, Cicero is the same person as Tully. To relative identity theorists, possibly x is the same F as y but x is not the same G as y. For example, I am the same person as I am, but perhaps I am not the
4My strategy here is influenced by Aquinas (Summa Contra Gentiles, vol. 1, ch. 9, sec. 2. and vol. 4, ch. 1, sec. 10, and Summa Theologica I.32.1 ans). This kind of strategy is also found in contemporary work, e.g. Pruss (2008) and Gorman (2011). 5E.g. Brower (2004), Leftow (1999), and Clark (1996).
3 same passenger as I am, because I may be counted by, say, an airline as two different passengers.6 For another example, two men are the same surmen if they have the same surname, but different men can be the same surman.7 This enables relative identity theorists to say that, e.g., the Father is the same God as the Son but not the same person as the Son. Proponents of Relative Identity come in two varieties: extreme or moderate.8 Proponents of extreme Relative Identity accept RI1. Proponents of moderate Rela- tive Identity accept RI2 but not RI1.9
RI1 All absolute identity statements are ill-formed. RI2 All absolute identity statements are reducible to relative identity state- ments.
Either way, the first alleged contradiction is dispelled. Either each premise is an absolute identity statement so is ill-formed, or it’s reducible to a relative identity statement. If the latter, the first two premises, if they’re stated as absolute identity statements, should instead be reformulated using relative identity. Here’s an example of how this might be done:10
1’. The Father is the same god as God. 2’. The Son is the same god as God.
6This example is from Tuggy (2009). 7This example is taken from Geach (1967). 8My thinking about relative identity into these categories was largely formed by Rea (2003). 9van Inwagen says he remains neutral about whether there is absolute identity or not, but if there is absolute identity, at least the second problem remains. See Rea (2003, 440–442) for an argument that a RI theorist like van Inwagen needs to endorse RI1 or RI2 at least in relation to Trinitarian formulations. 10The reformulation of the argument here captures the essence of the project of the Trinitarian proponent of Relative Identity, but it may not be exactly right under some views of Relative Identity. For example, vanInwagen doesn’t accept that there are singular referring terms, though it’s not clear he shouldn’t. (See Rea 2003, 439 n. 18) Further, vanInwagen translates ‘The Father is God’ differently than I do below, for more reasons than eschewing singular referring terms. First, vanInwagen starts with two undefined predicates: ‘is the same being as’ and ’is the same person as’. Second, he translates ‘x is God’ as ‘x is divine & ∀y(y is divine → x is the same being as y)’. If we translate ‘The Father’ as ‘a begetting being’, we would then translate ‘The Father is God’ as: ‘A begetting being is divine, and it is the same being as any other divine being’, which (ignoring the issue with singular referring terms) is equivalent to ‘The Father is the same god as God’, if, as I have assumed here, God is a divine being and: x is the same god as y iff x is the same being as y and both x and y are divine. For formalized translations of these sentences, see vanInwagen (2003, 95–96) and vanInwagen (1988).
4 3’. So, the Father is the same god as the Son.
3’ follows from 1’ and 2’, and the Trinitarian can accept all three premises. The following are not true:
1”. The Father is the same person as God. 2”. The Son is the same person as God. 3”. So, the Father is the same person as the Son.
The second argument can be answered by taking predicates containing count- nouns like ‘is a god’ as reducible to relative identity statements. The second argument translated into relative identity statements the Trinitarian can accept is:11
4’. The Father is the same god as the Father. 5’. The Son is the same god as the Son. 6’. The Holy Spirit is the same god as the Holy Spirit. 7’. The Father is not the same person as the Son. 8’. The Father is not the same person as the Holy Spirit. 9’. The Son is not the same person as the Holy Spirit.
In Relative Identity logic, it does not follow from 4’–9’ that there are at least three gods. It only follows that there are at least three persons. There are problems, however, with the Relative Identity view. First, it conflicts with pretheoretic and philosophical intuitions. It is intuitively plausible that there is absolute identity. It would be better if a view could solve the above problems Trinitarians face without holding that absolute identity statements are ill-formed or that all (or at least all the problematic) identity statements are reducible to relative identity statements. Second, to the Relative Identity view, there can’t be maximally general sortals like ‘thing’, ‘being’, or ‘entity’. Plausibly, identity between x and y under one of these sortals expresses x=y, and a denial of x=y entails the denial of one of them. This is a problem even for those Relative Identity theorists who accept RI2 but not RI1. Michael Rea (2003) gives the following plausible principle:
11Again, the logic is more complicated than I’ve made it here, but again, this captures the essence of the project of the Trinitarian proponent of Relative Identity.
5 (P) ∀xy ( x6=y → ¬(x is the same being as y) )
(P) with 4-9 entails a contradiction in relative identity logic.12 To avoid the contra- diction, the Trinitarian proponent of RI2 needs either to deny (P) or adopt RI1. But to adopt RI1 is also to deny that there are maximally general sortals. That’s a cost. Maximally general sortals help us identify the things over which we can quantify with an existential quantifier, and it’s what we count by when we want to count everything there is. If there is a view that can resolve the above contradictions without committing to RI1 or RI2, the view will (for those reasons at least) avoid the above problems with Relative Identity views. Further, if there is a view that can resolve the second contradiction, the view will avoid the main problem with Social Trinitarianism. In the next section, I propose a view that does all of this.13
3 Absolute identity and the Trinity
The view I’m proposing will allow well-formed absolute identity statements and hold that the statements containing ‘is’ in each of the two above alleged contradictions are absolute identity statements without committing Trinitarians to the conclusion of either argument. That is, I think, the natural reading of the ‘is’ statements.14 Let’s take the first alleged contradiction first. Here’s the argument again.
1. The Father is God.
2. The Son is God.
3. So, the Father is the Son.
If we take the ‘is’ in each premise to be an ‘is’ of absolute identity, we need to take at least one of the above premises to contain an opaque context. An opaque context is a linguistic context in which substituting co-referring terms does not guarantee the
12For the proof, see Rea (2003, 440-441). 13For length considerations, I’ve omitted the Numerical Sameness Without Identity view held by Michael Rea and Jeff Brower. For a defense of this view, see Brower and Rea (2005) and Rea (1998). For problems with the view, see Craig (2005) and Pruss (ms). 14This is also the reading Aquinas endorses. Aquinas says that in God “the suppositum and the [divine] nature do not differ from one another,” (ST I.3.3 ans) that the real relations in God are “altogether the same as the essence,” (ST I.28.2 ans) that “the [divine] essence does not differ as a thing from a [divine] person,” (ST I.39.1.ans), and that “the divine essence is the same in reality as the act of generating and as the Paternity.” (ST I.41.5 ad 2) See also ST I.32.2 ad 2.
6 same truth value. That is, there is no guarantee of substitution salva veritate into an opaque context. For example, Clark Kent = Superman. Lois Lane knows that she is in love with Superman. It doesn’t follow that she knows that she is in love with Clark Kent. The elided context in ‘knows that...’ is opaque. Substituting a co- referring term into the context sometimes yields a different truth value—in this case, false. If there is an opaque context in the first alleged-contradiction argument above, the substitution into that context doesn’t commit the Trinitarian to the conclusion. Where the opaque context is and why it is generated will be the main issues I’ll address in the next section. Before I address these issues, I should note that not all Trinity-related inferences can be blocked. The Trinitarian wants to preserve some inferences. Suppose ‘P’ is the name of the omnipotent being. Trinitarians want to affirm the premises and conclusion of this argument:
11. The Father is God. 12. God is P. 13. So, the Father is P.
Trinitarians need a principled way of distinguishing the kinds of inferences made so that 1–3 is invalid but 11–13 is valid. There is a way to do this. Even if a context is opaque, sometimes the truth- value of the pre-substitution sentence is preserved in the post-substitution sentence. Using the above example, if Lois Lane were to know that Clark Kent = Superman (and knowledge is closed under known entailment and Lois goes through the logical steps), the truth value of the conclusion would be the same, viz. it would be true that Lois Lane knows that she is in love with Clark Kent.15 So, an opaque context may, under some conditions, preserve the truth value of the sentence from before to after substitution. In the above example, when the context is made opaque by the ‘knows’ operator and the subject who knows also knows that the substituted terms co-refer, the truth value is preserved. That the truth value is preserved under some conditions doesn’t prevent the context from being opaque. What makes a context opaque is that it doesn’t guarantee the same truth value from before to after the substitution under all conditions. So, to make it so that 3 does not follow from 1–2 but 13 does follow from 11–12, I need to give conditions under which the inference to 3 does not hold but the inference to 13 does. 15That is to say, that there is an intensional operator operating over the identity statement doesn’t always prevent substitutivity salva veritate. Logical operations occur in the context of an intensional operator in many inferences, e.g. in epistemic closure principles.
7 Here’s how I’ll do this. In the next section, I’ll first give an account of when opaque contexts are created in Trinitarian statements. Second, I’ll give conditions under which the inference to 3 does not hold but the inference to 13 does. Third, I’ll explain why the relevant opaque contexts are created in the way I think they’re created.
4 Resolving the first alleged contradiction
First, I need to provide an account of when these opaque contexts are created. I propose that they are created whenever a context is described by a phrase that refers to something that is: (1) identical to or described by an internal divine relation, or (2) identical to or described by something that is based on an internal divine relation.16 For example, divine persons are based on internal divine relations.17 So, the elided contexts in ‘...is the Father’, ‘...is the Son’, and ‘...is the Holy Spirit’ are all opaque, as are the elided contexts in ‘The Father is...’, ‘The Son is...’, and ‘The Holy Spirit is...’. The following elided contexts are also opaque: ‘...is a being who begets’, ‘...spirates’, and ‘...proceeds from the Father’. If this is right, 3 is not entailed by 1 and 2 in the following argument:
1. The Father is God.
2. The Son is God.
3. So, the Father is the Son.
The inference is blocked because either premise 2 is used to substitute into an opaque context in 1, or 1 is used to substitute into an opaque context in 2. Either way, an opaque context is substituted into, so 3 is not guaranteed to have the same truth value as 1 or 2. What about the following argument?
16If you don’t think internal divine relations are fundamental, you can hold, for example, that opaque contexts are created whenever a context contains a phrase that refers to something that is described by a phrase that refers to something that is identical to a divine person or identical to or described by something that is based on a divine person. There may be other options. 17At least Aquinas holds this, and I am defending what I think is a Thomistic view here. Aquinas holds that persons are based on intrinsic divine relations. He says, for example, “‘Father’ is pred- icated only because of the Paternity, and ‘Son’ is predicated only because of the Filiation,” (ST I.28.1 sed contra) and “‘[P]erson’ directly signifies a relation and indirectly signifies the essence.” (ST I.29.4 ans) See also ST I.40.2-3, where Aquinas says that if relations are even merely intellec- tually abstracted from the persons, the persons don’t remain.
8 11. The Father is God.
12. God is P.
13. So, the Father is P.
Since Trinitarians want to infer 13 from 11 and 12, I propose that some kinds of terms are substitutable salva veritate into the opaque context created by, say, ‘The Father is...’ and others aren’t. Here’s the distinction between kinds of terms I pro- pose. There are person-involving descriptions/names (PIDs) and person-uninvolved descriptions/names (PUDs). A PID is a description or name of God that has its ba- sis in an internal divine relation. For example, ‘The Father’, ‘The Son’, and ‘God’s begetting’ are PIDs. A PUD is a description or name of God that does not have its basis in an internal divine relation. For example, ‘The omnipotent being’ and ‘God’ are both PUDs.18 On the view I’m proposing, PIDs cannot be substituted salva veritate for PUDs into a sentence containing the relevant opaque context. On the other hand, PIDs can be substituted for PIDs salva veritate,19 and PUDs can be substituted for PUDs salva veritate into the relevant opaque context. In 11–13, since ‘God’ and ‘P’ are PUDs, substitution of one for the other into the opaque context created by ‘The Father is...’ doesn’t change the truth value of the sentence from before to after substitution. So, 13 follows from 11 and 12. On the other hand, in 1–3, since ‘God’ is a PUD and ‘The Son’ is a PID, substitution of ‘The Son’ for ‘God’ into the opaque context created by ‘The Father is’ does not preserve the truth value of the sentence. So on the view I’m proposing, by accepting
18There are some cases where ‘God’ is a PID for Aquinas, which allows the inference from ‘The Father begets the Son’ to ‘God begets God’. Here’s what Aquinas says: “[A]mong the properties of locutions, one must pay attention not only to the thing signified, but also to the mode of signifying. And so, since the name ‘God’ [sometimes] signifies the divine essence as existing in one who has that essence...others have claimed more correctly that, because of this mode of signifying, the name ‘God’ is such that it can properly supposit for [viz. signify] a person...” (ST I.29.4 ans) However, these cases don’t apply to premises 1 or 2 above. If ‘God’ were to supposit for a person in premises 1 and 2, ‘God’ would supposit for the Father in 1 and the Son in 2. Just as you cannot substitute ‘The Son’ for ‘The Father’, you cannot substitute ‘God’ as it supposits for the Father with ‘God’ as it supposits for the Son. I’ve avoided this complication above. See also footnote 19. 19Of course, this is only if the intrinsic divine relation or person the descriptions are based on is the same. For example, you cannot substitute a description of the Father for a description of the Son. This necessary condition is rarely needed, because usually if the persons involved in the description are different, a premise will be false. The necessary condition is needed in the cases in which a term (e.g. ‘God’, as in the rare cases like the one in the footnote 18) has different bases, to prevent the inference from 1 and 2 to 3.
9 1 and 2, we don’t need to accept 3, but by accepting 11 and 12, we do need to accept 13. Someone may object: merely seeing the arguments doesn’t clue us in to the idea that there are opaque contexts. There are no explicit (intensional) operators like ‘knows that...’ or ‘feels that...’. So, the proposal I’ve just made seems ad hoc. In re- ply, such operators, if they are present, are elided, and there is precedent for holding that there are elided intensional operators. Take, for example, Michael Della Rocca’s interpretation of Spinoza.20 To Della Rocca’s Spinoza, there are descriptions/names involving a certain divine attribute A (viz. that are based in A) that are not substi- tutable for descriptions/names not involving A (viz. that are not based in A). For example, the following inference for Spinoza is invalid:
14. My body causally interacts with mode of extension E.
15. My body = my mind.
16. So, my mind causally interacts with mode of extension E.
Premise 14 contains an opaque context, viz. the elided context in ‘...causally interacts with mode of extension E.’ Premise 15 contains an absolute identity state- ment. The term on the left involves the relevant attribute (extension) and the term on the right does not involve that attribute. ‘My body’ is a term that has its basis in the extended attribute of God, but ‘my mind’ is a term that does not have its basis in the extended attribute of God. When terms flanking an identity sign differ with respect to whether they have their basis in a certain attribute, one cannot be substituted for the other salva veritate into the relevant opaque context. So, if Della Rocca is right about Spinoza, Spinoza holds that there are elided intensional oper- ators throughout Spinoza’s work. We’re clued into them when we see that Spinoza wanted to accept the premises but not the conclusion in 14–16 above. Similarly, Trinitarians are clued into when to hold that there are elided intensional operators because Trinitarians believe on authority that they ought to hold to the premises but not the conclusion of the first alleged contradiction argument (1–3) above. The most natural way to read the premises is as absolute identity. We can revise the natural reading of the premises (which is problematic) or find ways to make the natural reading work. My view tries to do the latter. Remember, the task for the Trinitarian is to avoid contradiction. The Trinitar- ian’s task is not to offer explanations wherever they can be offered. Some explana- tions aren’t provided. Plausibly, if there were elided intensional operators created
20See Della Rocca (1993), (1996). This section is largely taken from these two works.
10 in the way I’ve proposed, why there are elided intensional operators is not given via divine revelation. That is, however, not a reason to think they’re not there, and there are reasons to think they are there. It is worth noting that on Della Rocca’s view of Spinoza, there are conditions such that if they are met, co-referring terms are substitutable salva veritate into the relevant Spinozistic opaque context. For example, if two terms that each do not have their basis in a Spinozistic attribute flank an identity sign, one term can be substituted for the other salva veritate even into the relevant opaque context. For example,
17. The thing that has four things causally preceding it causally interacts with mode of extension E.
18. The thing that has four things causally preceding it = the fifth being to have existed.
19. So, the fifth being to have existed causally interacts with mode of extension E.
17–19 is valid, because each term flanking the identity sign in 18 does not involve any attribute. Della Rocca’s Spinoza allows the inference from 17 and 18 to 19 in much the same way I propose Trinitarians allow the inference from 11 and 12 to 13 even though the substitution in each of these arguments is into an opaque context. That’s the linguistics. What is the metaphysics? To be sure, since the Trinity is a mystery, I cannot pretend to offer anything close to a complete metaphysical account of the Trinity. However, what is relevant to this paper is just that I give a metaphysical account of why the opaque contexts are created in the way I think they’re created. I will give an account that is compatible with divine simplicity. In the rest of this section, I’ll first give a reason the opaque contexts are created, then I’ll try to show that Aquinas held this view. Last, I’ll give a reason that this view should be attractive to the Trinitarian. First I’ll give the reason the opaque contexts are created. Suppose God = God’s begetting. It is reasonable to suppose that a divine attribute or activity has its basis in God’s begetting but not in God. If this is the case, some substitutions cannot occur salva veritate. For an analogy, take again the Lois Lane example. Clark Kent = Superman. Suppose Lois Lane is pretty shallow: her only basis for loving someone is that they are a heroic figure. The basis for Lois Lane’s love for Kryptonian Kal- El is that he is Superman. It doesn’t follow that the basis for Lois Lane’s love for Kryptonian Kal-El is that he is Clark Kent. Here, there is something that has a basis: Lois Lane’s love. It has a basis in something that is identical to Kal-El (Superman),
11 but there is also something identical to Kal-El that Lois Lane’s love does not have its basis in: Clark Kent. When a feature has its basis in something but not in an identical thing, an opaque context is created in a sentence that refers to that feature. I propose that Trinitarians take all divine features (attributes, activities, names, descriptions, etc.) to have their basis in God or some internal divine relation that (assuming divine simplicity) is identical to God. Orthodox Trinitarians agree that God = The Father, God = The Son, and God = The Holy Spirit. To have a valid argument by substituting, the basis for the substituted term can’t be different than the basis for the term that it is substituted for. Just like in the Lois Lane example, if the basis changes, we can’t expect the truth value to remain the same after substitution. Here’s how the bases are different and why substitution cannot occur because of this difference. An internal divine relation provides the basis for opposing a feature to another internal divine relation. For example, since paternity is based on the Father, paternity is not truly predicated of the Son or Holy Spirit. All the real divine relations are identical to God. God, however, doesn’t provide the basis for opposing a feature to any internal divine relation. For example, if something is based on God, it’s truly predicated of each of the divine persons. So far, the difference in what these bases provide for a feature isn’t enough to prevent an internal divine relation from being identical to God. But it is enough to prevent substitution. Here’s why. If an internal divine relation R provides the basis for opposing a feature to an internal divine relation S, S cannot be identical to R. Similarly, a PID based on R signifies the basis for opposing a feature based on it to an internal divine relation S. If we were to allow a PID to substitute for a PUD, we would sometimes get the result that two terms, each signifying opposition to the other, signify the same thing. But that’s metaphysically impossible. The terms’ signifying opposition to each other is enough for them not to signify the same thing. Identity between x and y is allowable only if the basis of x doesn’t oppose the basis of y or vice versa. So, PIDs cannot substitute for PUDs salva veritate into contexts described by PIDs. Objection: according to my view, there are pairs
21Alex Pruss gave this objection to my view.
12 identical to or described by an internal divine relation, or (2) identical to or de- scribed by something that is based on an internal divine relation. Under most views, substitution of co-referring terms into some contexts may result in a sentence with a different truth value. I’ve merely proposed another of those, and I’ve explained why. We just need to add another exception to the rule of being able to substitute co-referring terms and expecting the resulting sentence to have the same truth value as the one we substituted into. It is another project to say whether or not identity and ontological basing are fundamental and how exactly they relate. In this paper, it has been my goal to give a reason why the opaque contexts are created how I think they are. I hope I’ve said enough in this brief account to offer that explanation and to answer an objection to that view.22 The picture we have so far, then, is that although God is identical to, say, the Father, God and the Father23 provide different bases for at least some divine fea- tures. The Father provides the basis for opposing these features to something that is identical to God, e.g. the Son, but God doesn’t provide the basis for opposing these features to anything that is identical to God. For example, the ability to generate is
22Aquinas also held this view—that the divine essence (God) and the divine relations (to which the divine persons are reducible) are absolutely identical but differ only insofar as they provide different bases. Here’s Aquinas: [I]t is clear that a real relation existing in God is the same in reality as His [God’s] essence and differs from the essence only conceptually, insofar as the relation implies a connection with its relational opposite—something that is not implied by the name ‘essence’. Therefore, it is clear that in God the esse of the relation and the esse of the essence do not differ, but are instead one and the same. (ST I.28.2 ans) When Aquinas says that a divine relation and the divine essence differ conceptually, he does not mean that we merely conceive them to be different. He means something more substantial than that; plausibly, this difference is their bases or grounds. For Aquinas, this difference is explained by the fact that the divine relations provide the basis for an opposition that the divine essence does not provide the basis for, which is the account I gave earlier. Aquinas reiterates this view later: Every plurality of things predicated absolutely [i.e. non-relationally] is excluded from God because of His utter oneness and simplicity, but not every plurality of relations is excluded. For relations are predicated of a thing with respect to something else. (ST I.30.1 ad 3) Further, the divine persons are distinguished from each other only because each divine person provides the basis for an opposition to the other divine persons: “The real distinction among the divine relations consists of nothing other than relational opposition.” (ST I.30.2 ans) 23I’m using the Father as a basis instead of begetting, because it’s easier to speak this way. Fundamentally for Aquinas, the basis is divine begetting.
13 a divine feature. This feature is based on the Father,24 and its being based on the Father is the basis for not attributing it to the Son. For another example, omnipo- tence is a divine feature. This feature is not based on the Father; rather, it’s based on God. So, omnipotence doesn’t have a basis for not being attributed to any divine person.25 A benefit to the view I’ve given so far is that there only needs to be one way of counting. We don’t have to count by sortals or distinguish counting by identity with counting by numerical sameness.26 Here’s how we count, at least with regard to divine things. First, we pick a basis, then we count the things identical to God that the basis is opposed to.27 If we start with God, we get one thing. God is identical to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, but God is not opposed to any of them. If we start with any divine person, we get three things. Suppose we start with the Father. The Son is identical to God, and the Father is opposed to the Son. Same with the Holy Spirit. Since the Father is opposed to two things identical to God, there are three things. We call these ‘persons’. In this view, then, there is one way to count, but what matters is where you start. If you start with a person, you get three. If you start with God, you get one. So far, I hope to have provided some metaphysical support for why the opaque contexts are generated in the way that they are. I’ve also briefly given some evidence that Aquinas held this account, and I’ve given a benefit to holding to this account. However, even if I’ve resolved the first contradiction, I still face the second problem, to which I turn in the next section. 24Or, alternatively, the Father is based on it. See footnote 23. The same outcome will result, mutatis mutandis. 25The preceding should help us understand some passages in Aquinas more clearly. For example, Aquinas answers an objection that goes like this: the Son doesn’t have the same power the Father does, because the Father can generate but the Son can’t. (ST I.42.6 obj 3) Aquinas’ response mirrors what I’ve said in this section. Here’s the response: [T]he Son is able to do whatever the Father is able to do. However, it does not follow that the Son is able to generate. Rather, a relational name (ad aliquid) has here replaced a substantival name (quid), since ‘generation’ signifies a relation in God. Therefore, the Son has the same omnipotence as the Father, but with a different relation.
26The Numerical Sameness Without Identity view, which I don’t discuss above except in a foot- note, advocates this distinction. 27This is my shorthand way of saying that it is the basis for opposing a feature to something identical to God.
14 5 Avoiding polytheism
Here’s the second alleged contradiction again.
4. The Father is a god. 5. The Son is a god. 6. The Holy Spirit is a god. 7. The Father is not the Son. 8. The Father is not the Holy Spirit. 9. The Son is not the Holy Spirit. 10. So, there are at least three gods.
The view I’ve proposed so far doesn’t yet get Trinitarians out of this alleged con- tradiction, because this argument doesn’t, on the face of it, require any substitutions. There is a way to get out of this contradiction: adopt the doctrine of divine simplicity. According to the doctrine of divine simplicity, “there is no ontological composition in God of any sort, whether of matter and form, or of essence and accident, or of this attribute and that attribute considered as ontologically distinct.” (Pruss 2008, 150) To proponents of divine simplicity, God is not distinct from any intrinsic, non-relational28 property that is truly predicated of God. There is no composition in God at all. So, if God has any non-relational attribute essentially, God’s having that attribute is identical to God. Aquinas endorses this view. He writes:
Since God’s simplicity excludes a composition of form and matter, it follows that in God the abstract is the same as its concrete counterpart; for instance, the divinity is the same as God. (ST I.40.1 ad 1)29
28That is, relational properties in which God is related to something that is not God. This is the kind of relation I’ll assume throughout unless I preface ‘relation’ with ‘divine’. 29There are other statements like this. For example, God must be His own divinity, His own life, and whatever else is predicated of God in this way. (ST I.3.3 ans) [T]he fact that divinity, life, and other things of this sort are said to be ‘in’ God should be traced back to a diversity that occurs in our intellect’s grasp of the thing and not to any diversity within the thing itself. (ST I.3.3 ad 1)
15 Some contemporary proponents of divine simplicity make similar statements. For example, Bergmann and Brower (2006, 31), write, “[T]o say that God is identical with his goodness is just to say that God is identical with God.” So, according to the doctrine of divine simplicity to have an intrinsic and non- relational property such as being a god just is to be identical to God (where God is an individual, not a property). If that’s the case, we can write 4–6 like this: 4”. The Father = God. 5”. The Son = God. 6”. The Holy Spirit = God. The conclusion that follows from 4”–6” and 7–9 is this: 10’. f=g & s=g & h=g & f6=s & f6=h & s6=h. 10’ would be contradictory if all the relevant contexts were transparent. But, as I’ve proposed in the previous section, they aren’t. 10’ is not a contradiction for the same reasons the first alleged contradiction is not a contradiction. Substitutions that would create a contradiction from 10’ are not allowable salva veritate.30 In either case, the second alleged contradiction is dispelled. The second alleged contradiction arises only if being a god is an exemplifiable distinct from God or the being that exemplifies it. But if to be a god is just to be identical to God, the Trinitarian can endorse the conclusion that results from the modified premises. It is worth noting that divine simplicity helps the view I’ve proposed. This should be surprising. Divine simplicity is thought to be trouble for a doctrine of the Trinity. I hope to have shown that it is compatible with the resolution to the first alleged-contradiction argument and advantageous for the dispelling of the second alleged-contradiction argument. There may be a way to dispel the second alleged contradiction argument without divine simplicity, but I think divine simplicity is the simplest way to dispel it, and there are reasons to be independently attracted to the doctrine. 30For example, an argument that would allegedly show a contradiction could run like this: 1. f=g 2. s=g 3. f=s (1 & 2) 4. f6=s 5. f=s & f6=s (3 & 4) On the view I’ve proposed above, 3 doesn’t follow from 1 and 2.
16 6 Avoiding other views’ problems
The view I’ve proposed avoids the problems associated with Social Trinitarianism and Relative Identity views. It avoids Social Trinitarian problems by avoiding a commitment to polytheism. I’ve shown this by offering a resolution to the second alleged contradiction argument. The resolution I’ve offered is not one that a Social Trinitarian would offer.31 I’ve avoided the problems with Relative Identity views by avoiding commitment to RI1 or RI2. Here they are again:
RI1 All absolute identity statements are ill-formed. RI2 All absolute identity statements are reducible to relative identity state- ments.
Throughout, I’ve held that absolute identity statements are well-formed, and nothing I’ve said has committed me to the view that all absolute identity statements are reducible to relative identity statements. I don’t appeal to any sort of sortal identity in the proposal I’ve made. Further, I don’t see how the problems for Relative Identity views I’ve given here (denying that there are absolute identity statements or that there are maximally general sortals) would arise independently of RI1 and RI2 for the view I’ve proposed. If my proposal is successful, Trinitarians can have the benefits of the Relative Identity view without its problems.32
7 Conclusion
Trinitarian face two alleged contradictions. In both, the Trinitarian accepts the premises and seems to be forced to accept the heretical conclusion. I’ve offered a view that allows Trinitarians to read the premises naturally—as absolute identity statements—without having to accept the problematic conclusions. I’ve argued that I’ve done this without succumbing to the problems with the two most popular Trini- tarian views—Social Trinitarianism and the Relative Identity view. I’ve also tried
31By maintaining that the relevant ‘is’ is an ‘is’ of predication instead of an ‘is’ of identity, Social Trinitarians don’t try to offer resolutions to the argument in 4”–6”. Further, Platonism is a primary motivation for Social Trinitarianism, and Platonism gives the Social Trinitarian a reason to reject divine simplicity. (See Bergmann and Brower 2006) 32There are problems for the Numerical Sameness Without Identity view, but these problems are (almost) all very specific to that view. To my knowledge, the view I’ve given here is not susceptible to those problems. Plus, my view has the advantage of having only one counting method instead of two, and my view is compatible with divine simplicity.
17 to show that there is precedent for the view I’ve proposed in Della Rocca’s view of Spinoza and the Lois Lane example.33 Further, I’ve shown how divine simplic- ity helps resolve the second alleged contradiction. You may see this as a cost, but if it is, it is to be weighed against the benefit of being able to resolve the alleged contradictions without the unnatural reading of the premises and the problematic consequences that the two main views face. If this makes accepting divine simplicity more attractive, that is, I think, so much the better for divine simplicity.34
References
Bergmann, M. and J. Brower. 2006. A theistic argument against platonism (and in support of truthmakers and divine simplicity). In Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, ed. D. Zimmerman, Volume 2, 357–386. Oxford University Press. Brower, J. 2004. The problem with social trinitarianism: A reply to wierenga. Faith and Philosophy 21: 295–303. Brower, J. and M. Rea. 2005. Material constitution and the trinity. Faith and Philosophy 22: 487–505. Clark, K. J. 1996. Trinity or tritheism? Religious Studies 32: 463–76. Craig, W. L. 2005. Does the problem of material constitution illuminate the doctrine of the trinity? Faith and Philosophy 22: 77–86. Della Rocca, M. 1993. Spinoza’s argument for the identity theory. Philosophical Review 102:2: 183–213. Della Rocca, M. 1996. Representation and the Mind Body Problem in Spinoza. Oxford University Press. Geach, P. 1967. Identity. Review of Metaphysics 21: 3–12. Gorman, M. 2011. Incarnation. In Oxford Handbook to Aquinas, eds. B. Davies and E. Stump. Oxford University Press. Leftow, B. 1999. Anti social trinitarianism. In The Trinity: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Trinity, eds. D. K. Stephen Davis and G. O’Collins. Oxford University Press.
33I’ve also, in the footnotes, argued that Aquinas held this view 34I’d like to thank Alex Pruss for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
18 Pruss, A. 2008. On two problems of divine simplicity. In Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, ed. J. Kvanvig, 150–167. Oxford University Press.
Pruss, A. ms. Aquinas, analogy, and the trinity.
Rea, M. 1998. Sameness without identity: An aristotelian solution to the problem of material constitution. Ratio 11:3: 316–328.
Rea, M. 2003. Relative identity and the doctrine of the trinity. Philosophia Christi 5:2: 431–446.
Tuggy, D. 2009. Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. vanInwagen, P. 1988. And yet they are not three gods but one god. In Philosophy and the Christian Faith, ed. T. Morris. University of Notre Dame Press. vanInwagen, P. 2003. Three persons in one being: On attempts to show that the doctrine of the trinity is self-contradictory. In The Holy Trinity, ed. M. Stewart. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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