View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Texas A&M Repository DIVINE SIMPLICITY AS ACTUS PURUS A Thesis by ALLEN STANLEY GEHRING JR Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS August 2005 Major Subject: Philosophy DIVINE SIMPLICITY AS ACTUS PURUS A Thesis by ALLEN STANLEY GEHRING JR Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS Approved by: Chair of Committee, Hugh J. McCann, Jr. Committee Members, C. Shaun Longstreet Robert Boenig Head of Department, Robin Smith August 2005 Major Subject: Philosophy iii ABSTRACT Divine Simplicity as Actus Purus. (August 2005) Allen Stanley Gehring Jr., B.A., Cedarville University Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Hugh J. McCann, Jr. This thesis presents a case for the traditional doctrine of divine simplicity by construing it along the lines that God exists as actus purus. My formulation of divine simplicity draws upon the medieval insight that God is what He is in virtue of what He does in one, eternal act of will with which He is identical. In chapter I, I survey the contemporary literature on divine simplicity. In chapter II, I critique Alvin Plantinga’s Platonic theory of the divine attributes as formulated in Does God Have a Nature? I contend it brings with it the cost of abandoning the doctrine of God’s aseity, as well as a problematic understanding of the very notion of what it means to claim that God has a particular property. In chapter III, I provide rejoinders to all of Plantinga’s defeaters against divine simplicity. I argue that by understanding the origin of God’s attributes to be the result of what He does, Plantinga’s two major criticisms against divine simplicity fail. In chapter IV, I develop a viable theory of divine simplicity, given an actus purus conception of God, and I formulate a number of arguments supporting it. By drawing upon the resources of action theory, I clarify, in detail, what exactly it means to claim that God is identical with His act of will. And I demonstrate the fruitfulness of an actus purus construal of divine simplicity by showing how it solves a large number of problems that theists face. iv In the last chapter, I note some of the difficulties with my position due to its commitment to an eternal God, and I suggest some of the ways that these problems can be overcome. However, in addition to showing the difficulties that face my position, I also demonstrate the rich number of implications that follow from it. As such, I seek to demonstrate that the traditional understanding of the divine essence is something that is worthy for theists to embrace and to explore, because it is full of truth and wisdom that deserves to be preserved for later generations to celebrate and enjoy. v TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT ……………………………………………………………….. …… iii TABLE OF CONTENTS ……………………………………………………….. v CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION ……………………………………………… 1 II A CRITIQUE OF PLANTINGA’S PLATONISM ……………. 10 Plantinga on the Divine Attributes …………………………….. 10 Plantinga Compared to Classic, Natural Theology ……………. 13 Motivation for Plantinga’s Position: A Negative Argument ..... 17 Motivation for Plantinga’s Position: A Positive Argument …... 19 Reasons Against Plantinga’s View of the Divine Attributes: Preliminaries ………………………………………………….... 27 Reasons Against Plantinga’s View of the Divine Attributes: Main Arguments ………………………………………………... 37 Conclusion ……………………………………………………… 48 III A DEFENSE OF AQUINAS ON DIVINE SIMPLICITY …….. 50 Plantinga’s Critique of Divine Simplicity and Possible Responses ………………………………………………………. 50 Conclusion ……………………………………………………… 67 IV FORMULATING DIVINE SIMPLICITY AS ACTUS PURUS ………………………………………………………….. 69 An Argument for an Actus Purus Construal of Divine Simplicity ……………………………………………………….. 69 Clarifying an Actus Purus Account of Divine Simplicity: God as Pure Act ……………………………………………………… 76 Clarifying an Actus Purus Account of Divine Simplicity: God’s Attributes ……………………………………………………….. 84 The Fruitfulness of an Actus Purus Construal of Divine Simplicity ………………………………………………………. 91 vi CHAPTER Page Consequences of Rejecting an Actus Purus Account of Divine Simplicity ………………………………………………………. 100 Conclusion ……………………………………………………… 111 V CONCLUSION ………………………………………………… 113 REFERENCES …………………………………………………………………. 125 VITA ……………………………………………………………………………. 130 1 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Within contemporary, analytic philosophy, Alvin Plantinga’s Does God Have a Nature? (DGHN) is the work that sets forth the problems that any account of divine simplicity needs to overcome. He levels two major objections against the traditional view which theists such as Aquinas developed, and the second has been taken to be the coup de grace: 1) if God is identical with His properties, then all of His properties are identical with each other, and He has only one property, and 2) if God is identical with His properties, then He is a property and not a person. Due to these problems, Plantinga rejects divine simplicity in favor of a Platonic understanding of the divine attributes. As such, he embraces the notion that God is not the creator of modality, and the view that He depends on the Platonic host of abstract objects to exist and to have the properties which He has.1 Since the purpose of this thesis is to defend the doctrine of divine simplicity in the face of Plantinga’s objections, before explaining how I propose to carry out that task, it will be helpful to survey some of the contemporary literature on the subject. Such a survey will serve to position my defense within the contemporary literature. William Mann provided one of the earliest attempts to respond to Plantinga’s critique. Mann’s thesis is that God is not identical with a property but rather a property instance. Mann This thesis follows the style and format outlined in The Chicago Manual of Style, 14th edition. 1 Alvin Plantinga, Does God Have a Nature? (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980). Hereafter, all in-text pages numbers in parentheses refer to the page numbers of this work. 2 agrees with Plantinga that it is absurd to contend that God is identical with the property of, for example, life or wisdom. But he argues, prima facie, it is not absurd to conceive of Him as identical with the property instance of a rich property, namely being a Godhead. Moreover, while he agrees that it is absurd to claim the property, for example, of goodness is identical with wisdom, it is not absurd to contend, for example, the property instance of the life of God is identical with the property instance of the wisdom of God.2 Mann’s response, however, received harsh criticism from the philosophic community. Part of the theoretical motivation behind divine simplicity is to maintain the belief that God depends upon nothing other than Himself to exist. Thomas Morris points out, though, on Mann’s view God is dependent on the Godhead property to exist, since He is only an instance of it. Moreover, Morris argues that Mann’s theory is problematic, because it implies God cannot have any accidental properties, since He is identical with all of the properties of which He is a property instance. As such, one needs to claim it is essential to God that He create the world or call Abraham out of Ur, which, traditionally, theists have rejected.3 Nicholas Wolterstorff summarizes aptly the problems with Mann’s theory when he claims it is too underdeveloped to be helpful in solving the original dilemmas Plantinga raised.4 A number of different philosophers have responded to Plantinga by arguing his criticisms against divine simplicity fail, because they attack a straw man, since he failed 2 William Mann, “Divine Simplicity,” Religious Studies 18 (1982): 451-471. 3 Thomas Morris, “On God and Mann: A View of Divine Simplicity,” Religious Studies 21 (1985): 299- 318. 4 Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Divine Simplicity,” in Our Knowledge of God: Essays on Natural and Philosophical Theology, ed. Kelly Clark (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992), 133-149. 3 to understand Aquinas properly. Lawrence Dewan, for example, claims Aquinas would agree with Plantinga that it is wrongheaded to assert God is identical with a property. For Dewan, however, Aquinas never taught such a notion, nor does anything he claimed need to be taken to imply it. According to Dewan, Aquinas’s view of God, correctly understood, is that God is being itself subsisting.5 Katherin Rogers argues Plantinga’s criticisms fail, because, historically, proponents of divine simplicity, such as Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas, never took talk about God’s attributes to imply He has properties. In fact, Rogers contends, historically, theists conceived of Him having no properties at all. Instead, Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas understood Him to be one, simple act.6 While philosophers such as Mann, Dewan, and Rogers responded to Plantinga by defending the traditional view against the objections leveled against it, other philosophers responded by employing an offensive strategy, re-considering the theoretical motivation behind divine simplicity. In particular, Brian Leftow argues divine simplicity follows, deductively, from two beliefs theists should not abandon. On the one hand, it follows from the assumption that it is impossible for God to create His own nature. On the other hand, it follows from the ultimacy explanation, the belief no regress of explanations can go further than God. As for Plantinga’s objection that if God is identical with a property He is not a person, Leftow questions whether it is problematic to conceive of Him in this manner. Abstract objects are taken to be timeless and eternal, so conceiving of Him as an abstract object accords well with beliefs theists 5 Laurence Dewan, “Saint Thomas, Alvin Plantinga, and the Divine Simplicity,” The Modern Schoolman 66 (1989): 141-151. 6 Katherin Rogers, The Anselmian Approach to God and Creation (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellon Press, 1997), 29-60.