JOHN HOWE (1630–1705) ON DIVINE SIMPLICITY: A DEBATE OVER SPINOZISM

Reita Yazawa

Introduction

Some contemporary scholarly discussions on divine simplicity deviate from the originally intended meaning of simplicity in the seventeenth century Reformed orthodoxy. For example, Brian Davies states, “from first to last the doctrine of divine simplicity is a piece of negative or apophatic and not a purported description of .”1 William Mann thinks that the concept of divine simplicity has difficulty in accommodating diversely distinct attributes.2 and think that the doctrine of divine simplicity, specifically that of , is untenable and incoherent.3 Contrary to these modern read- ings, Richard A. Muller argues that the debate over the divine simplicity in the Middle Ages was “not over the implications of a distinctionless notion of simplicity but over the precise of the distinctions that, arguably, belong to the Godhead.”4 One of the ramifications of the debate over the precise interpretation of divine simplicity can be found in a debate in the seventeenth century. Seventeenth-century Reformed theology faced a radical challenge from Cartesian notions of substance and simplicity.5 One consequence of this Cartesian inroad into Reformed theology is the debate over Spinozism.

1 Brian Davies, “Classical and the Doctrine of Divine Simplicity,” in his Lan­ guage, Meaning and God (London: Chapman, 1987), 59. See also F. Gerrit Immink, “The One and Only,” in Understanding the Attributes of God, ed. van den Brink and Sarot (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1999), 115–117. 2 William Mann, “Divine Simplicity,” Religious Studies 18.4 (1982): 451–471; Mann, “Simplicity and in God,” in The Concept of God, ed. Morris (Oxford: OUP, 1987), 253–267. See also Christopher Hughes, On a Complex Theory of a Simple God: An Investigation in Aquinas’ Philosophical Theology, ed. Alston (Ithaca: Cornell, 1989). 3 Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Divine Simplicity,” in Our Knowledge of God, ed. Clark (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1992), 133–149; Alvin Plantinga, Does God Have a Nature? (Milwaukee: Marquette UP, 1980), 46–47. 4 See Muller, PRRD, 3:41, with review of modern scholarship on divine simplicity on 39–41. For the distinction of divine persons in the Godhead, PRRD, 4:189–195. 5 Muller, PRRD, 3:124.

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Spinoza appropriated Cartesian metaphysics and introduced an interpre- tation of divine simplicity different from the traditional reformed under- standing: simplicity that does not allow distinctions of divine intellect, will, power, and persons.6 This novel concept of simplicity was perceived by many Reformed thinkers to nullify the God-world distinction, divine freedom, secondary causes, and the . Accordingly, late seventeenth- century Reformed theologians developed serious diatribes against Spi­ noza’s pantheistic thought.7 One of the Reformed writers who vehemently opposed Spinoza’s philo- sophical theology was John Howe (1630–1705), a nonconformist Puritan and one-time private chaplain to Oliver Cromwell. Howe recognized Spinoza’s work as a threat to a traditional understanding of divine sim- plicity, attributes, and Trinitarian persons. Although the French philoso- pher Nöel Aubert de Versé published his own criticism of Spinoza, it did not satisfy Howe.8 Thus Howe developed his own lengthy discussion in The Living Temple9 against Spinoza’s posthumously published work, The Ethics.10 Despite his significant argument against Spinozism, scholarly treat- ment of Howe is unfairly limited. David Field characterizes Howe’s thought as “rigid Calvinism in a softer dress,” but Howe’s debate with Spinozism is not addressed.11 Citing Rosalie L. Colie,12 Jonathan I. Israel argues that only Henry More and Samuel Clarke critically engaged

6 Benedictus de Spinoza, Earlier Philosophical Writings: The Cartesian Principles and Thoughts on Metaphysics, trans. Hayes (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merill, 1963). Hereafter EPW. 7 Early-eighteenth century late-orthodox and transitional theologians also responded to Spinoza, but their thought is not discussed here. See Maria-Cristina Pitassi, “De la cen- sure à la réfutation. L’Académie de Genève,” Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 93.2 (1988): 147–164. I am grateful to the editors for calling my attention to this source. 8 Nöel Aubert de Versé, L’impietie convaincu, ou dissertation contre Spinosa (Amsterdam, 1685). Concerning Aubert’s engagement with philosophical controversies of the 1680s, see Paul J. Morman, Nöel Aubert de Versé: A Study in the Concept of Toleration (Lewiston: Mellen, 1987), 36–41, 95–154. 9 John Howe, The Living Temple…Part I. Concerning God’s and His Connect­ edness with Man against , or the Epicurian (1676). Part II. Concerning Animadversions on Spinoza, and a French Writer Pretending to refute Him (1702), in Works, 3 vols. (London: Tegg, 1848; reprinted: Ligonier: SDG, 1990), 1:1–344. 10 Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics, in A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other works, ed. and trans. Curley [= Reader] (Princeton: PUP, 1994). 11 David Field, ‘Rigide Calvinisme in a softer dresse’: the moderate Presbyterianism of John Howe (1630–1705) (Edinburgh: Rutherford House, 2004). 12 Rosalie L. Colie, “Spinoza in England, 1665–1730,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 107.3 (1963): 183–219, who discusses Howe on 188–189. I am grateful to the editors for calling my attention to this source.