Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Public Disclosure Authorized Report No: ICR00004993
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-D0460)
ON A
GRANT
IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 17.8 MILLION Public Disclosure Authorized (US$25 MILLION EQUIVALENT)
TO THE
REPUBLIC OF BURUNDI
FOR AN INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE EMERGENCY PROJECT December 16, 2019
Public Disclosure Authorized Transport Global Practice Africa Region
Public Disclosure Authorized
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(Exchange Rate Effective September 18, 2019)
Currency Unit = Burundi Francs (BIF) BIF 1,846.76 = US$1 US$1,370 = SDR 1
FISCAL YEAR July 1 - June 30
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ADB Asian Development Bank AfDB African Development Bank BAPW Burundi Agency for Public Works (ABUTIP) BOHC Burundi Office of Housing and Construction CAS Country Assistance Strategy CERC Contingent Emergency Response Component CPF Country Partnership Framework DRM Disaster Risk Management ESIA Environmental and Social Impact Assessment EU European Union GBV Gender-based Violence GDP Gross Domestic Product GDCPDM General Directorate for Civil Protection and Disaster Management GoB Government of Burundi GIS Geographic Information System ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report IREP Infrastructure Resilience Emergency Project IRM Immediate Response Mechanism ISR Implementation Status and Results Report LRRP Landscape Restoration Project M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MTPWE Ministry of Transport, Public Works, and Equipment MTR Midterm Review NRF National Road Fund NRA National Road Agency (ex- Office des Routes) NPDRPR National Platform for Disaster Risks Prevention and Reduction NTS National Transport Strategy ORSEC Emergency Response Plan (Organisation des Secours) PAP Project-affected Person PDO Project Development Objective PMU Project Management Unit RAP Resettlement Action Plan RDB Road Database (Base de Données Routière) RN1 National Road 1 UNDP United Nations Development Programme
Table 1. Project Components and Description ...... 13 Table 2. Achievement of PDO Indicators ...... 25 Table 3. Project Preparation and Implementation Phases ...... 32 Table 4. PDOs and Indicators ...... 35
Regional Vice President: Hafez Ghanem
Country Director: Jean-Christophe Carret
Regional Director: Riccardo Puliti
Practice Manager: Nicolas Peltier-Thiberge
Task Team Leader: Papa Mamadou Fall
ICR Main Contributor: Danye Aboki
The World Bank Infrastructure Resilience Emergency Project (P150929)
TABLE OF CONTENTS DATA SHEET ...... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES ...... 6 A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL ...... 6 B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION (IF APPLICABLE) ...... 14 II. OUTCOME ...... 15 A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs ...... 15 B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY) ...... 15 C. EFFICIENCY ...... 25 D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING ...... 27 E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY) ...... 27 III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME ...... 30 A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION ...... 30 B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION ...... 32 IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME .. 34 A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) ...... 34 B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE ...... 36 C. BANK PERFORMANCE ...... 38 D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME ...... 40 V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 41 ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS ...... 43 ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION ...... 52 ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT ...... 55 ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS ...... 56 ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS ... 61 ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (IF ANY) ...... 62
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The World Bank Infrastructure Resilience Emergency Project (P150929)
DATA SHEET
BASIC INFORMATION
Product Information Project ID Project Name
P150929 Burundi- Infrastructure Resilience Emergency Project
Country Financing Instrument
Burundi Investment Project Financing
Original EA Category Revised EA Category
Partial Assessment (B) Partial Assessment (B)
Organizations
Borrower Implementing Agency
MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT Road Agency (OdR) ECONOMIC PLANNING
Project Development Objective (PDO)
Original PDO The Project’s objective is to enhance the climate resilience of key transport and drainage infrastructure in Greater Bujumbura while strengthening the country’s capacity to manage and prevent natural disasters.
PDO as stated in the legal agreement The Project’s objective is to enhance the climate resilience of key transport and drainage infrastructure in the Target Area while strengthening the country’s capacity to manage and prevent natural disasters.
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The World Bank Infrastructure Resilience Emergency Project (P150929)
FINANCING
Original Amount (US$) Revised Amount (US$) Actual Disbursed (US$) World Bank Financing
25,000,000 25,000,000 24,433,597 IDA-D0460 Total 25,000,000 25,000,000 24,433,597
Non-World Bank Financing 0 0 0 Borrower/Recipient 0 0 0 Total 0 0 0 Total Project Cost 25,000,000 25,000,000 24,433,597
KEY DATES
ApprovalFIN_TABLE_DAT Effectiveness MTR Review Original Closing Actual Closing A 31-Mar-2015 17-Aug-2016 23-Apr-2018 30-Jun-2019 30-Jun-2019
RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING
Date(s) Amount Disbursed (US$M) Key Revisions
KEY RATINGS
Outcome Bank Performance M&E Quality Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory Modest
RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs
Actual No. Date ISR Archived DO Rating IP Rating Disbursements (US$M) 01 30-Jun-2015 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 0
02 10-Jun-2016 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 0
03 03-Jan-2017 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 1.50
04 06-Jul-2017 Satisfactory Satisfactory 6.56
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05 30-Nov-2017 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 10.89
06 25-May-2018 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 14.90
07 16-Nov-2018 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 17.36
08 23-Apr-2019 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 21.41
SECTORS AND THEMES
Sectors Major Sector/Sector (%)
Public Administration 12 Other Public Administration 12
Transportation 45 Rural and Inter-Urban Roads 39 Other Transportation 6
Water, Sanitation and Waste Management 43 Sanitation 9 Public Administration - Water, Sanitation and Waste 8 Management Other Water Supply, Sanitation and Waste 26 Management
Themes Major Theme/ Theme (Level 2)/ Theme (Level 3) (%)
Private Sector Development 9
Jobs 9
Job Creation 9
Finance 13
Finance for Development 13
Disaster Risk Finance 13
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Urban and Rural Development 77
Urban Development 29
Urban Infrastructure and Service Delivery 29
Rural Development 9
Rural Infrastructure and service delivery 9
Disaster Risk Management 39
Disaster Response and Recovery 13
Disaster Risk Reduction 13
Disaster Preparedness 13
ADM STAFF
Role At Approval At ICR
Regional Vice President: Makhtar Diop Hafez M. H. Ghanem
Country Director: Philippe Dongier Jean-Christophe Carret
Director: Pierre A. Guislain Riccardo Puliti
Practice Manager: Supee Teravaninthorn Nicolas Peltier-Thiberge
Task Team Leader(s): Noroarisoa Rabefaniraka Papa Mamadou Fall
ICR Contributing Author: Danye Amele Laila Aboki
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I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES
A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL
Context
1. Burundi is a small, densely populated, landlocked, mostly hilly country vulnerable to drought, landslides, and flooding. It has considerable altitude variations, from 774 m to 2,600 m above sea level, and an average annual rainfall of about 150 cm, over two wet seasons. Burundi is one of the smallest countries in Africa with a land area of 27,834 km2 and a population of about 9.8 million, giving it a population density of about 350 persons per km2. Although it is urbanizing faster than other Sub-Saharan Africa countries, 90 percent of the country’s population still live in rural areas.
2. At the time of appraisal in 2014, Burundi had experienced moderate real gross domestic product (GDP) growth of about 4 percent during the past decade, mainly due to improved agricultural performance, but poverty remained widespread. The share of the poor population declined by 6 percent between 2006 and 2012 but remained very high at 60 percent. The country was ranked among the 10 poorest countries in the world, with a Human Development Index of 0.389 in 2013, which was well below Sub-Saharan Africa’s average, estimated at 0.502 for the same period.
3. The country was repeatedly affected by the effects of climate change1 and the Government of Burundi (GoB) adopted a National Policy on Climate Change and National Determined Contributions in November 2013. Torrential rains caused massive flooding, especially in the 1960s, when the level of Lake Tanganyika increased by 4 m causing districts in Bujumbura and Gatumba to flood. In the decade preceding appraisal, floods caused by heavy rain affected thousands of people, including 15,500 people in 2004 alone. In rural areas, the combination of environmental stress, climate change-related shocks, and poor land management exacerbate the poverty situation. For instance, eight of the most impoverished provinces2 are also the most vulnerable to climate impacts and the most environmentally degraded.
4. The capital city, Bujumbura, concentrated more than 75 percent of the urban population of Burundi with an estimated 800,000 inhabitants at the time of project appraisal in 2014. Over the last three decades, Bujumbura sprawled rapidly, from about 37 km2 in 1983 to over 100 km2. This rapid expansion was, however, not accompanied by proper land use planning and watershed management, creating a complex hydrological situation. Uncontrolled urbanization with the expansion of informal settlements, coupled with insufficient public investment, especially in Bujumbura’s neighborhoods, resulted in deficiencies in the provision of basic infrastructure and services and increased the climate vulnerability of the population and of the infrastructure.
5. Catastrophic events of February 2014 in Bujumbura. On February 9 and 10, 2014, heavy rains caused extensive flooding and landslides in neighborhoods of Greater Bujumbura. About 80 casualties were reported, a large market was washed away, about 1,000 houses collapsed, and more than 20,000
1 While the duration of the rainy season seems to be decreasing in the northeastern regions of Burundi, they have experienced torrential rains, lightning, and thunder during the rainy season, increasing their vulnerability to loss of livestock, food insufficiency, decreased agricultural output, bush fires, and loss of human life. 2 There are 18 provinces in Burundi.
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people were left homeless. The damage also affected public infrastructure, including major national and urban roads.
6. The GoB declared a state of emergency and requested assistance from the World Bank and other development partners through a letter dated February 21, 2014. In March 2014, a joint rapid assessment mission was coordinated by the country’s National Platform for Disaster Risk Prevention and Reduction (NPDRPR)3 with the support of the World Bank and other financial and technical partners.4 This rapid assessment provided critical information and data that helped (a) identify the causes of the disaster, (b) assess the costs of damages to socioeconomic infrastructure, and (c) provide recommendations for reconstruction and rehabilitation.
7. Causes of the disaster. Intense rainfall, 80 mm over a duration of two and a half hours, caused an artificial dam on the Gasenyi River to burst. The artificial dam breach or burst was created by the compounded effects of landslides from unstable riverbanks and the uncontrolled quarrying of material from the riverbed. Figure 2 illustrates satellite imagery used by the mission to identify the uncontrolled collection of material in the riverbed as being mainly responsible for the artificial dam to burst. About 15,000 m3 of water was released by the rupture of the artificial dam, sending a violent water wave with large quantities of rocks and soil to the areas downstream of the river. The water wave continued downstream through the district of Carama causing several casualties and major damages to homes and infrastructure. Further, the flooding resulted in the closure of key road transport links such as National Road 1 (RN1). Heavy rainfall also induced flooding along several other rivers in Bujumbura, including Kinyankongwe, Nyabagere, and Ntahangwa, and resulted in flooding in the plain along Lake Tanganyika. As shown in Figure 1, 80 percent of damages occurred in the five municipalities: Buterere, Isale, Kamengé, Kinama, and Mutimbuzi.
3 3The NPDRPR is the monitoring, coordination body in charge of the national strategy for disaster risk reduction. It ensures DRR development in development policies, plans, programs, and projects. It is composed of experts from the ministry departments with support from representatives of the United Nations system, human rights, religious organizations, civil society, and technical and financial partners. 4 World Bank, United Nations agencies and programs (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], United Nations Children’s Fund, World Food Program, Food and Agriculture Organization, and International Organization for Migration); European Union (EU); African Development Bank (AfDB); and Red Cross.
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Figure 1. Map of the Five Districts (communes) Most Affected by the Disaster
Figure 2. Satellite Imagery of 2011 Showing RN1 and Five Trucks in Gasenyi Riverbed
8. The root causes of this disaster were identified as follows: (a) land degradation, related to inappropriate agricultural practices on steep slopes and deforestation upstream of rivers; (b) lack of expansion of water management services in coordination with the urbanization; (c) inadequate sizing of the stormwater collection system, particularly in the district of Carama; (d) building of houses and social infrastructure in flood-prone areas (Buterere and Gatunguru); and (e) absence of a monitoring and early
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warning system, which could have identified the danger associated with the artificial dam in the riverbed and prompted preventive evacuation of populations downstream.
9. The direct damages to economic and social infrastructure were estimated at BIF 6.9 billion (about US$4.5 million) representing 0.2 percent of the country’s GDP. The road infrastructure suffered more than 50 percent of the damages. RN1, a key primary road corridor connecting Burundi to Rwanda and Tanzania, was almost cut off throughout Bujumbura and only small vehicles were able to travel on it under very unsafe conditions because of the reduced pavement width at several locations. Therefore, large parts of the country were at a great risk of being isolated unless urgent interventions were implemented. Several markets (Kamenge, Guanturu) were flooded or completely washed away by mudslides. In addition to the infrastructure damage, about BIF 2.5 billion (US$1.2 million) was indirectly lost in terms of harvests, destruction of homes, and temporary displacement of residents.
10. Immediate emergency response. The World Bank was the first development partner to respond to the disaster, by reallocating US$3.4 million from ongoing infrastructure projects.5 The AfDB responded to the emergency by (a) reallocating about US$3 million and (b) providing about US$420,000 to finance part of the urgent water drainage works identified in the abovementioned rapid assessment. The EU was expected to provide about US$8.5 million to finance the upstream work to restore the Gasenyi River watershed, including the restoration of its riverbed and the stabilization of its banks. Finally, the GoB was expected to finance the most urgent repairs to the drainage structures and pavements and the rehabilitation of the Ntahangwa River’s banks, for an amount of about US$3 million.
11. The GoB finalized its short-medium term response through the Infrastructure Resilience Emergency Project (IREP) (P150929). Considering the abovementioned situation, in addition to the immediate response described earlier, in November 2014, the World Bank agreed to provide a grant of US$25 million to help the GoB address the medium-term recommendations of the rapid need’s assessment.
12. Figures 3, 4, 5, and 6 illustrate the material damages to socioeconomic infrastructures assessed by the joint mission in March 2014.
5 Publics Works and Urban Management Project (P112998) and Road Sector Development (P064876).
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Figure 3. Erosion at the Level of the RN1 at the Figure 4. Landslide of the Excavation Slopes that Passage of the Gasenyi Structure Caused the Pavement to Collapse on the RN1
Figure 5. Mud-covered and Inaccessible Schools Figure 6. Flooded Market of Kamenge
Source: Joint Mission Assessment Report, March 2014.
13. Figure 7 illustrates the proposal made by the mission to support resilient drainage rehabilitation and reconstruction.
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Figure 7. Proposal and Scope of Intervention to Improve Drainage Infrastructure in Bujumbura
Source: Joint Mission Assessment Report, March 2014.
Theory of Change (Results Chain)
14. The IREP was designed to support and address the vulnerabilities of key transport infrastructure (mainly national roads) to flooding and landslides by a selection of spot interventions (road pavement, linear and crossing structures, and slopes) while improving and expanding drainage infrastructure in the affected neighborhoods downstream of the Gasenyi, Nyabagere, and Kinyankongwe rivers. In addition, the IREP aimed at building the capacity of the Government and communities to manage and respond to natural disasters. Figure 8 illustrates the theory of change.
15. The underlying assumptions for realization of the project’s Theory of change were that (a) emergency civil works activities would stop the progression of damage on RN1 and reduce occurrence and mitigate impacts of floods in neighborhoods downstream of the Gasenyi and Nyabagere Rivers and (b) a package of technical assistance and awareness-raising activities on disaster risk management (DRM) would improve the GoB’s response to future flood events in Bujumbura. Furthermore, the use of accelerated and streamlined procurement procedures was expected to ensure the timely materialization of the project’s outcomes through a flexible, rapid, and effective World Bank emergency response.
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Figure 8. Theory of Change
Project Development Objectives (PDOs)
16. The PDO, as described in the Financing Agreement, was “to enhance the climate resilience of key transport and drainage infrastructure in the Target Area6 while strengthening the country’s capacity to manage and prevent natural disasters.”
Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators
17. The PDO indicators as specified in the annex 1 of the Project Appraisal Document were (a) Direct project beneficiaries of which female (number, percentage); (b) number of people with access to improved drainage in the areas served by the project, of which female (percentage); (c) number of people supported by participatory evaluation of disaster risks and operational early warning and response systems, of which female (percentage); and (d) reduction in unit transport cost along RN1 in Project Impact Area (percentage).
6 The PDO description in the PAD contains a minor difference “to enhance the climate resilience of key transport and drainage infrastructure in Greater Bujumbura.” However, the project effectively carried out interventions out of Great Bujumbura. Therefore, the project interventions are consistent with the legal PDO that will be used for the ICR.
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Components
18. The project was organized around three main components. Table 1 provides a description of the components, estimated costs at appraisal, and actual costs.
19. Coordination and overall management was ensured by a Project Management Unit (PMU) housed in the National Road Agency (NRA) within the Ministry of Transport, Public Works, and Equipment (MTPWE), PMU retained the fiduciary management. The two implementing agencies were NRA and the Burundian Agency for Publics Works (BAPW) also housed within the same ministry. Disaster risks management and preparedness activities were managed by the General Directorate for Civil Protection and Disaster Management (GDCPDM) of the Ministry for Public Security.
Table 1. Project Components and Description Component Implementing Activities Agency A.1. Transport Infrastructure Rehabilitation (estimated cost of US$12.6 million, actual cost of US$10.6 million): NRA Rehabilitation of critical points and improvement of the drainage system on the RN1 A. Rehabilitation A.2. Drainage Infrastructure (estimated cost of US$9.0 million, actual of roads and urban cost of US$11.2 million): infrastructure Reinforcement of channels of approximately 7.5 km along the estimated cost of recipient’s Nyabagere and Kinyankonge Rivers US$21.6 million, Construction of a channel on the recipient’s Gasenyi River actual cost of BAPW Resizing of water outlets underneath the recipient’s NR-9 route US$21.8 million Construction of a lined canal in the recipient’s district of Carama Dredging of the canal, upstream of the recipient’s Buterere wastewater treatment plant to improve downstream flow and fortification of the retention walls of said treatment plant B.1. Capacity Strengthening in Disaster Risk Management (estimated cost of US$0.5 million, actual cost of US$0.7 million) Evaluation and mapping of risks and underlying factors in the B. Capacity project area including their potential impacts on infrastructure Strengthening in Strategic information system to prioritize structural and non- Disaster Risk GDCPDM structural risk mitigation activities, and take action regarding the Management BAPW location, orientation, and design of infrastructure under the project estimated cost of Establishment of a prevention, early warning and response system US$2.0 million, in areas at risk of flooding and landslides to reduce losses to actual cost of infrastructures and protect lives and livelihoods US$1.2 million Development of risk evaluation and extreme event monitoring tools to be owned by the communities B.2 Disaster Risk Recovery Contingency Funds (estimated cost of US$1.5 PMU million, actual cost of US$0.5 million) C. Institutional Project management and coordination costs, including the PMU Support, Project PMU/NRA operating costs Management, and Establishment of a new transport strategy, including multiyear Coordination investment plans and maintenance program covering 5–10 years estimated cost of Road database US$1.4 million,
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Component Implementing Activities Agency actual cost of US$1.5 million
B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION (IF APPLICABLE)
20. At project preparation, the initial scope of activities was to address road vulnerabilities along the most damaged sections of RN1, a section of about 30 km between Bujumbura and Bugarama. In the meantime, the drainage infrastructure and disaster risks activities would cover the five communes of Great Bujumbura most affected downstream. However, during implementation, it appeared that there was a need to strengthen infrastructure, beyond the priority spots on Bujumbura–Bugarama and extend the road sections interventions to spots located beyond Bugarama, about 110 km toward the border with Rwanda.
21. New flooding in April 2018 caused new damages and extended the scope of civil works which were financed from the project without restructuring or additional financing. Newly built drainage channels were partly damaged by large boulders carried by the water from the Gasenyi River. Additional damage was also incurred on existing drainage channels in the project area. Further, additional critical spots appeared on RN1 and required immediate attention to protect nearby residents from landslides. The additional emergency works were done by the contractors though amendments to their initial contracts. The financing was supported by Subcomponent B.2 (Recovery Contingency Funds) after its activation by the World Bank in July 2018.7
Revised PDOs and Outcome Targets
22. The objectives of the project were not revised.
Revised PDO Indicators
23. There were no changes to PDO indicators.
Revised Components
24. There were no changes to project components.
Other Changes
25. Not applicable.
Rationale for Changes and Their Implication on the Original Theory of Change
26. The changes described earlier led to additional emergency works but did not have any implication on the original theory of change.
7 The World Bank approved the activation of the Contingent Emergency Response Component (CERC) in July 2018 once the disbursement conditions were fulfilled and after a request from the Government.
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II. OUTCOME
A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs
27. The PDOs remain highly relevant. The project (through both Components A and B) fully contributes to the objectives of the World Bank Group’s most recent Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for Burundi (FY19–FY23)8 which highlights the importance of resilient transportation infrastructure to strengthen the country’s foundation for economic and social resilience. Indeed, the CPF’s Focus Area 2 ‘Strengthening Foundations for Economic and Social Resilience’ recognizes the importance of resilient infrastructure to strengthen the country’s foundation for economic and social resilience. Also, the CPF recognizes that that the IREP contributes to reduction of the risk related to environmental and climatic shocks that reduce, notably, agricultural productivity.
28. In addition, the overall objective of improving climate resilience of infrastructure remains a top priority for the country as outlined in GoB’s National Policy on Climate Change and National Determined Contributions adopted in 2013. The project not only undertook rehabilitation of roads but did so in a climate-resilient manner.
Assessment of Relevance of PDOs and Rating
29. Considering the above, the rating for relevance of PDO is High.
B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY)
Assessment of Achievement of Each Objective/Outcome
30. The PDO had two clear objectives, (a) enhancing the climate resilience of key transport and drainage infrastructure and (b) strengthening the country’s capacity to prevent and respond to natural disasters of the project. Based on the assessment of what was achieved under the project against the two specific project objectives described in the following paragraphs, this Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) rates the overall achievement of the PDOs Substantial.
Objective 1: Enhance the climate resilience of key transport and drainage infrastructure in the Target area
31. Subcomponent A.1 transport infrastructure works have all been entirely delivered in the timeline despite the implementation challenges. The area of intervention initially focused on RN1 first 35 km from Bujumbura to Bugarama because this section was the most severely affected and degraded following the 2014 event. Those initial civil works were completed in about 12 months on time. In the meantime, following heavy rains in April 2018, additional works were also included to preserve the new built structures and contain the rapid degradation of other sections. Overall, 48 sections of RN1 have been strengthened by a combination of works targeting hydraulic structures (crossing or longitudinal), roadway pavements, and slopes. This includes 40 hydraulic structures that were reconstructed by replacing undersized pipe culverts with box culverts featuring larger hydraulic sections. At several locations, short
8 Report No. 122878-BI.
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sections of roadway (less than 100 m) were rehabilitated to rigid (concrete) pavements to reduce premature deterioration of the road due to the risk of overtopping during high-intensity storm events. These sections included spots that were initially affected by the 2014 floods and new sections of RN1 that needed to be strengthened following the subsequent events.9 Four technical audits were completed during the implementation of civil works, including the final audit in May 2019, all acknowledging the high quality of works execution and overall good supervision
32. Cost-effective climate-resilient standards were successfully rolled out to ensure all- weather/season accessibility with an adequate level of service for RN1. Climate-resilient standards include the use of local material and stabilizations of hillslopes with retaining walls or replanting trees to retain soil. Also, the solution of gabions walls (either with rocks or armed soils) supported the provision of goods and services available in the local market, economical and easily achievable by local companies. Besides, the spot improvement approach, that is, the emphasis on preserving minor bridges/culverts, and improving drainage structures materials turned out to be less costly rather than a full-scale rehabilitation.
Figure 9. Spots Treated with Gabionsa
Source: NRA Note: Several spots have been treated with'Gabions’. This wall is a climate-resilient technique used to strentghten several spots of the road or river slopes.
33. Technical assistance activities have significantly increased capacity in road asset management. Under Component C, the project provided a road asset management system10 for road data collection and intervention planning. A road asset inventory was conducted on 4,500 km of roads representing about 70 percent of the classified road network including 100 percent of the national roads (1,950 km), 65 percent of the provincial roads (2,630 km), and 10 percent of the rural roads. The data collection included information not only on the road conditions (potholes) but also on structures related to the roads (bridges, culverts, pipes, and retaining walls), and so on. Four staff within the NRA have been trained to manage
9 Following the 2017 and 2018 rain events, additional critical points that needed immediate attention appeared on RN1. 10 Logiroad.
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the road database (Base de Données Routière, RDB) which is currently used to enhance programming and planning of maintenance and new investment.
34. The NRA envisages to integrate the maps of climate data and risks in the road asset management to maximize its benefits. Substantial efficiency in planning of interventions could be gained through the inclusion of climate risk data and maps in the RDB to inform maintenance11 needs and related costs. This would enable the ministry to develop a preventive approach to climate change risks, focusing on adaptive measures, in place of the current reactive approach.
Figure 10. Gutter Constructed on RN1 = PK 29 Figure 11. Gutter Constructed on RN1 = PK 29
Source: World Bank, October 2019.
Figure 12. RN1 (before the works) Figure 13. Same section of RN1 with Gutter and Slope Stabilization
Source: NRA March 2017. Source: World Bank, October 2019.
11 The RDB provides a list of maintenance interventions classified into three types: emergency, routine maintenance, and periodic maintenance.
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Figure 14. RN1 Gasenyi River Crossing Stabilization with Figure 15. RN1 Gasenyi Crossing Rehabilitated Gabions
Source: World Bank 2019. Source: World Bank 2019. Figure 16. Burundi’s Road Database
Note: Green = good condition (27 percent), yellow = fair (21 percent), red = bad (23 percent), black = unknown (23 percent).
35. Under Subcomponent A.2 the project prioritized works into two phases. The first phase, which was the top priority, consisted the construction and rehabilitation of drainage networks in the districts
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downstream of RN1 which were directly affected by the 2014 events. The second phase consisted in the upgrading of 7.5 km12 of existing drainage networks to increase discharge capacity into Lake Tanganyika.
36. The first phase of works has been substantially delivered in a timely manner. More specifically it consisted in the: (a) construction of drainage channel on Gasenyi River in Carama district (as illustrated in figures 15 and 16), (b) construction of a stormwater basin in Carama district to regulate peak water flows during high intensity events, and (c) construction of drainage channels along Nyabagaere and Kinyankongwe Rivers in the districts of Carama and Buterere. Overall, 10.6 km of new drainage channels were successfully constructed. Along those works, several houses, schools, and markets located on the riverbanks are now protected from flooding.
37. During the execution of phase 1, it was decided to include additional works13 on the Gasenyi River upstream of RN1 to sustain outcome achievement. The rationale for adding these works during the project implementation was to reduce the risk of appearance of artificial dams on the Gasenyi Riverbed, the rupture of which triggered the 2014 events. The Gasenyi upstream river bed stabilization was a priority mitigation measure to reduce the vulnerability of the downstream drainage channels from siltation and damage. Gabion retaining walls were erected to prevent landslides at those locations, thus significantly reducing the risk of obstruction of the riverbed. Consequently, the quantity and the size of materials and rocks14 carried downstream has significantly decreased.
38. The second phase, consisting of the upgrading of drainage networks into the Lake Tanganyika, was not completed due to the unavailability of financing. About US$4 million would have been necessary to complete this works. Consequently, several neighborhoods in the districts of Mugaro and Buterere15 might continue to be affected from flooding from the Nyabagere River.
Outcomes Achieved
39. First, the project successfully reduced the vulnerability of RN1 to climate events by increasing its climate resilience. Project interventions on RN1 significantly increased the climate resilience of the road and have minimized the risk of loss of performance due to the flood and landslides. The ICR mission, which took place during the 2019 rainy season,16 witnessed the proper functioning of the RN1’s rehabilitated drainage system: water was properly channeled, and the culverts and side drains were performing satisfactorily.
40. Second, the road asset management system is operational and provides a critical building block toward the road network resiliency through proper monitoring and maintenance. The RDB was successfully established by collecting data on about 70 percent of the road network. Its coverage is
12 The second phase consisted of (a) upgrading of Kinyankongwe River to connect Gasenyi and Nyabagere Rivers (3.6 km of channelization works on Kinyankongwe River from the Mubone rice fields to Nyabagere River); (b) upgrading of Nyabagere River downstream of the Buterere wastewater treatment plant to discharge stormwater into Lake Tanganyika (2.7 km of channelization works); and (c) executing 1.2 km of additional channelization works on Kidumbugwe River between Kanga and Kinyankongwe Rivers. 13 Financed by the CERC. 14 During the heavy rains of April 2018, works in progress on the Gasenyi River were damaged by large rocks that were driven by the water and descended and damaged the channels. These large rocks came from the part of the Gasenyi River RN1 upstream. 15 About 17, 000 people. 16 The rainy season in Bujumbura is usually from October to March.
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expected to be expanded in quantity (100 percent of the network), contributing to improving road asset management practices.
41. Third, the project has drastically improved stormwater passage control and regulation in the districts of Bujumbura located downstream of the Gasenyi, Nyabagere, and Kinyankongwe. Thanks to the project, more than 66,000 people were provided with access to improved drainage, resulting in a significant reduction of the risk of flooding in the communes targeted by the project. For example, in the district of Carama, located downstream of the Gasenyi River, houses that were abandoned by their owners in 2014 were reclaimed by the latter because the stormwater drainage situation drastically improved. Compared to the previous rainy seasons before completion of works, the 2019 rainy season has caused very limited flooding, no traffic disruption, and no major damages.
Outcomes Achieved
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Figure 17. Gasenyi River in Carama Before Works, Figure 18. Gasenyi River After Works, October 2019 April 2017
Source: NRA (left pictures in April 2017), World Bank (pictures on the right from October 2019).
Figure 19. Avenue Kiniyami Before Works, April 2017 Figure 20. Avenue Kinyami After Works, October 2019
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Figure 21. Nyabagere River Before Works, April 2017 Figure 22. Nyabaegere River Channel After Works, October 2019
Figure 23. Gasenyi River Upstream RN1 Before Works, Figure 24. Gasenyi River Upstream RN1 After Works, April 2017 June 2019
Source: NRA. Figure 25. Retention Basin Created in Carama October 2019 (It had rained two days before)
Source: World Bank , October 2019.
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Objective 2: Strengthen the country’s capacity to prevent and respond to natural disasters
42. Outputs delivered. In coordination with the GDCPDM and with the the support of high caliber consultants, BAPW delivered capacity-building and awareness-raising activities in parallel with the delivery of drainage infrastructure through the following:
(a) Trainings of coordination entities at local and national level. Several workshops were held in April–June 2017, for the members of the NPDRPR, at the national and commune levels to build capacity in the following themes: risk assessment and mapping of potential impacts through the use of Geographic Information System (GIS) Global Positioning System; operational procedures for prevention, early warning, and emergency response to reduce losses; protection of people and their livelihoods; and updating of contingency plans and monitoring/warning tools for extreme events in vulnerable communities.
(b) Awareness-raising workshops were directed to the communities located in the target area during 2017. In addition, from July 25–27, 2017, a three-day workshop was organized to sensitize about 20 members of Parliament on DRM. The closure remarks were delivered by the President of the Parliament himself who urged the representatives for strengthening the legal framework for DRM and adopting laws for better land management (construction prohibition in flooded areas) and quarry exploitation control for the prohibition of extraction of building materials from rivers that flow mainly into Lake Tanganyika.
(c) Capacity-building activities were also directed to the first responders of the GDCPDM within the Ministry for Public Security to improve the collection, capture, analyze, and archive past disasters.
43. Outputs partially completed. A climate risk mapping tool was developed under the project and tested through a supporting system PADRE (Platform for Assessment of Disaster Risk and Environment) that was serving five countries (Mali, Niger, Senegal, Gambia and Burundi). Training sessions were organized for the stakeholders of the NPDRPR17 and consisted with principles of open-data, data collection and analysis, visualization and real time analysis, informed decision-making in term of preparedness and emergency response etc. The Burundi website www.georisquesburundi.org was created but is no longer operational since the overall supporting system is lacking resources. However, the GoB is committed to transition to a locally run system.
17 About 20 people were trained from the NPDRPR, the Geographical Institute of Burundi (meteorological and climate services), and other local stakeholders of the city of Bujumbura and the University.
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Figure 26. Screenshot of Training Material Presenting www.georisquesburundi.org
44. Some key activities in DRM were dropped, thus adversely affecting the achievement of DRM objectives. The following key technical assistance activities were not completed due to the lack of consultants capable of performing the required services:
(a) Revision of Burundi's national emergency response plan (Organisation des Secours, ORSEC).
(b) Study for an information system in the watershed of the project area. Further, some of the equipment initially planned under the project to improve local capacity to respond to natural disasters were not procured in the project time frame.
(c) Provision of minimum equipment, such as hydraulic pumps, for the five communes of the project was delayed because of the technical specifications required.
(d) Procuring equipment for setting up an early warning system at the national level.
Outcomes Achieved
45. The project has certainly increased capacity in risk awareness and DRM prevention and coordination through unprecedented trainings and dissemination activities at the communal level in the five targeted districts of Greater Bujumbura (Isare, Muha, Mukaza, Mutimbuzi, and Ntahangwa), at the national level with the NPRPDRR, and even at the legislative level with the members of Parliament. By project closing, more than 38,000 people had participated in a training evaluation of disaster risks and operational early warning and response system supported by an elaboration of risk mapping and the organization of simulation exercises.
Justification of Overall Efficacy Rating
46. Efficacy is rated Substantial for the reasons stated in the following paragraphs.
47. Albeit shortcomings in the DRM capacity-building activities, non-completion of the risk mapping tool, and the uncompleted additional drainage works, the project has successfully addressed the aftermath of the 2014 disaster by ensuring that RN1 is fully open to traffic and by providing relief to more than 60,000 dwellers downstream of the Gasenyi, Nyabagere, and Kinyankongwe Rivers. Further, owing
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to the emergency works conducted on the Gasenyi River to stabilize its banks, the risk of major flood- related disasters, such as the 2014 events, has been drastically reduced.
48. The project has largely met its achievements despite the reduced time frame for implementation (two instead of four years) See section B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION. Substantial works and some key technical assistance activities were successfully completed in a relatively short time frame. Table 2 that shows that 10 out of the 12 indicators have achieved or exceeded their targets including three out of four outcome indicators.18 It must be emphasized that the project has exceeded its target for rehabilitated hydraulic structures which were built to higher resilient standards.19 By project closing, more than 97 percent of the project funds have been disbursed. In addition, the project managed to achieve key outcomes without additional financing or restructuring.
Table 2. Achievement of PDO Indicators Outcome Indicators Baseline Target Status Percentage Achievement 926,000 926,871 Direct project beneficiaries (number), of which female (%) 0 100 (50%) (51%) Number of people with access to improved drainage in the 77,000 66,151 0 86 areas served by the project of which female (%) (50%) (46%) Reduction in unit transport cost along RN1 in Project Impact 0 4% 4.81% 120 Area (%) Number of people supported by participatory evaluation of 39,000 38,385 disaster risks and operational early warning and response 0 98 (50%) (46%) systems, of which female (%) Baseline Target Status Percentage Intermediate Results Indicators Achievement Number of drainage structures rehabilitated/ reconstructed 0 17 40 143 Number of kilometers newly constructed/ rehabilitated 0 12.6 10.4 83 drainage network Number of crossing structures rehabilitated 0 3 30 1000 Number of municipalities supported for emergency information, dissemination, emergency response and 0 8 8 100 contingency planning Contingency funding mechanism established and ready to provide access to financial resources in case of an eligible No Yes Yes 100 crisis (Y/N) Transport Strategy and road investment completed (Y/N) No Yes Yes 100 Road database completed and tested for paved and unpaved No Yes Yes 100 road (Y/N) Annual maintenance budget and percentage share of annual 68 85 91.3 107 road maintenance budget disbursed (%)
C. EFFICIENCY
Assessment of Efficiency and Rating
18 Although, as explained in the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) section, two of the four PDO indicators were not adequate. 19 Flooding with a 10-year period of return.
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49. Efficiency is Substantial considering that the initial infrastructure investment, representing 86 percent of the financing (Component A), has been fully executed at project closure on June 30, 2019, with overall good quality of outputs and without major delays. The contract amendments, extending delays, and adding costs were unavoidable given the overall climate vulnerability of the infrastructure causing additional damages on the existing infrastructure or infrastructure under rehabilitation. On the administrative processing, the amendments, limited to a very few numbers of contracts, have been processed in a transparent manner, duly justified by the PMU, reviewed by the World Bank team, and validated by the Procurement Commission. It is highly likely that the flexibility of the procurement process and strong communication between the PMU and the World Bank team allowed diligent adaption to unforeseen circumstances and achievement of the objectives.
50. Economic analysis. A proper cost-benefit analysis could not be carried out at appraisal stage because of the nature of the operations. First due to the emergency nature of the operation and second, because of the limited availability of data to prepare a proper cost-benefit analysis. Besides, for the component related to road rehabilitation, the works have been limited to spots improvements and restoration and not a full rehabilitation of RN1. Thus, the classical benefits expected from reduction of travel time and vehicle operation costs cannot be significant. However, a cost-benefit analysis is not the only way to evaluate efficiency achievement. It is proposed here to assess operational and administrative efficiency of the works contracts execution and management.
51. Operational and administrative efficiency: design and implementation of works. The technical design studies of the road infrastructure and urban infrastructure were performed through two projects that were under way before the IREP. Given the emergency nature of the operation, this allowed a quick mobilization of those studies which were completed in November 2015. This allowed the bidding process to select the contractors and approve the contracts in September 2016, one month after the Financing Agreement became effective. The effective start of civil works was in December 2016 and the completion date was December 2017, that is, 12 months, within the expected completion date.
52. The infrastructure outputs were delivered on time without major cost overruns (see annex 4) including interventions beyond the original scope. The actual costs for road infrastructure are US$11.8 million to compare to 11.4 million. Thus, cost overruns are limited to +4 percent of the initial costs which is considered good for road project designed in an emergency situation. These costs include the extension of the scope due to new damages occurred in the wet season 2017/18. These works were necessary to maintain the condition of the newly rehabilitated infrastructure and not aggravate the existing deteriorations. At project closure, an independent audit confirmed the quality of RN1 works and delivery delays. The financing of the works was possible through the activation the contingency funds in April 2018 under Subcomponent B.2 (US$1.5 million). The procurement process was flexible and responsive both on the client side that on the World Bank side and allowed amendment of the existing contracts to carry out the additional works without delaying their implementation further.
53. Drainage infrastructure cost overruns are higher (24 percent) but are due to factors beyond the PMU and the implementing agency’s control (see section B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION):
The heavy rains of the 2017/18 rainy seasons caused landslides damages on four out of eight works that were ongoing. As a result, the PMU concluded amendments to the contracts to deal with this damage and safeguard the implementation of works. The contracts amendments (representing less than 15 percent of the initial contracts) have
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been submitted to the Procurement Commission and were compliant with the World Bank’s procurement policies.
The initial poor quality of design studies of two lots including the retention basin of lot 8 in Carama. The design studies, awarded to an international consultant, turned out to have underestimated the required capacity of the basin. As the contractor was ready to carry out the civil works, it became evident that the basin’s capacity was largely underestimated. The design was redone by a local consultant. Consequently, the contractor’s contract was amended to reflect the increase in quantities and costs.
54. Finally, now that the RDB is operational, there will be significant efficiency gains in the programming of the Annual Road Maintenance Program. A road data service unit is being set up within the NRA and is already staffed with four individuals who were trained by the consultant in charge of establishing the RDB.
D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING
55. The project adopted a clear and straightforward objective of recovery of damaged infrastructure while improving the country’s capacity to adapt and recover from natural disasters. The objective of raising awareness of the Government and local communes on DRM was sound and was expected to foster high-level ownership of climate resilience issues. The project has indeed contributed to restore and sustain access to key economic and social infrastructures in Bujumbura and mitigate risks of damage and losses because of future climate-related events. To that extent, the project has achieved its objectives by completing and supporting activities beyond the original scope within the project time frame and despite adverse factors and some activities (related to drainage and DRM) not being completed by the project closing.
56. In consideration of the above, and given the High rating for relevancy, and Substantial rating for both efficacy and efficiency, the overall outcome is rated Moderately Satisfactory.
E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY)
Gender
57. A specific gender gap analysis was not conducted at the project appraisal stage. However, the project provides gender-disaggregated PDO indicators though they do not monitor closure of gender gaps.
58. Women were identified as a vulnerable group for resettlement compensation. Awareness- raising campaigns were conducted on the impacts of the project on women, especially with regard to expropriation and compensation of property before the work. The Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) and Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) for RN1 identified women among the most vulnerable group,20 with special attention paid to them for RAP implementation. For RN1, among the 302 project-affected persons (PAPs) identified, 65 were women (21.5 percent). During the RN1 RAP
20 Women, as heads of households (single and widow) exploit the agricultural land with the support of relatives (children, brothers, parents, and so on) to cultivate their land. In the event of compensation, they are particularly vulnerable because of the risk of being subjected to strong pressure from family and friends and neighbors.
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consultations carried out in April 2015, the presence of women and vulnerable groups was targeted: 4 out of 12 meetings were almost entirely with women while the rest were mixed. These meetings helped raise awareness among the target population. As a result, the presence of women in these meetings differed from one municipality to another but remained at about 60 percent overall.
59. Access to employment opportunities for women. The drainage infrastructure works recruited about 30 percent of women as part of the workforce generating about US$430,000 income for them (annex 4). The rationale was that the urban infrastructure works, relatively simple, could hire local workers especially for positions that did not require specific qualifications. Specific provisions were included in the contracts and performance indicators for female employment were monitored.
60. Raising contractor’s awareness about the risks of gender-based violence (GBV). During the main phase of execution of civil works during 2018, the World Bank team also raised awareness of the client and contractors about the risks of gender-based violence related to the civil works. Anticipating the World Bank’s Good Practices Note on GBV published in September 2018,21 and taking into account the contracts that were awarded in April 2017, the World Bank team and client retroactively put in place some of the recommended GBV mitigation measures. For example, further to the recommendations of the April 2018 supervision mission, all project workers signed a code of conduct in the local language which was explained to them before signing during short briefing sessions.
Institutional Strengthening
61. The project has contributed to strengthen the capacity of the Ministry for Publics Works and Transport and its two implementing agencies, specifically the NRA and BPAW through (a) the adoption of a National Transport Strategy (NTS) and its action plan for 2018–2027, (b) the establishment of the RDB with equipment and capacity housed in the NRA (c) the study on transport prices on RN1. The DRM capacity has been improved as well (see section 33).
62. Technical assistance to the transport sector must be continued in cooperation with other donors of the sector (African Development Bank [AfDB] and EU) for institutional strengthening started by the project with the NTS and a multimodal investment plan. Completed in June 2019 and presented to sectors stakeholders in July 2019,22 the NTS needs to be coordinated with the Government priority to achieve resilient transport that contributes to economic and social resilience. The following activities will be continued:
Development of an Infrastructure Adaptation Strategy at the national level (national roads) and at the local level for drainage infrastructure and urban roads. Capacity built at the national level should also be devolved at the local level to integrate climate risks in the programming, planning, and costs evaluation of investment and rehabilitation.
A multiyear transport investment plan. The NTS needs to be translated into a multiyear investment plan with an embedded maintenance program to cover routine, periodic maintenance and emergency repair as well. The investment will take into account not only the primary network but also the secondary network and local roads whose maintenance
21 World Bank. 2018. Good Practice Note Addressing Gender-based Violence in Investment Project Financing Involving Major Civil Works. 22 http://www.rtnb.bi/fr/art.php?idapi=3/1/75.
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falls under the responsibility of the local government (commune) This will allow the Government to assess the priorities of investment and financing needs.
Road maintenance financing. The National Road Fund (NRF) remains the main channel for road maintenance; however, its resources must be secured and expanded to cover maintenance needs. Technical assistance can provide best regional practices of NRF and explore new options for road fund governing and financing.
Road Safety Action Plan. This is a priority of the NTS. In 2013, a road safety strategy was adopted in line with the decade of action 2011–2020 and the African Road Safety Action Plan 2011–2020. The objective was to reduce by half, by 2025, the number of road accidents in Burundi estimated at 3,2 accidents with a ratio of 2.6 fatalities and 35 injured for 100,000 accidents. However, the NTS aims at building a plan with priority actions and M&E.
Mobilizing Private Sector Financing
63. Attracting private entities in Burundi to provide infrastructure services is difficult given the low public sector capacity and the high perceived risk of instability and insecurity. Given the current situation of the NRF (see paragraph 111), there is little room to mobilize private sector financing in the road sector in the medium term. As demonstrated by the recent comparative study of 30 road funds in Sub-Saharan Africa countries, Burundi’s NRF is one with the lowest resources and lowest coverage of maintenance needs. However, through technical assistance, the stabilization and expansion of the resource of Burundi’s NRF could improve confidence in the Government’s ability to make public payments to private sponsors.
Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity
64. Although poverty reduction impacts have not been quantified, the resilient infrastructure built by the project helps protect the most vulnerable and contributes to the poverty reduction goal. Natural disasters have a greater impact on the most vulnerable people located in the most vulnerable locations of the city, especially in informal settlements located downstream of the major rivers of Greater Bujumbura area. Owing to the project, risk of loss of life and assets during storm events has been drastically reduced. In addition, the project has improved the poor’s mobility and accessibility to city services, while decreasing the risk of major disruption during the wet season.
65. Resilient infrastructure is a key driver for shared prosperity by mitigating the impacts of natural disasters on the economy and by facilitating quick recovery of the social and economic functions after a disaster. The project has successfully improved the climate resilience of RN1, which is a key section of Greater Bujumbura’s road network and an economic lifeline of Burundi connecting it to the north corridor. In case of a future emergency, RN1 can be relied upon to facilitate social and economic recovery.
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Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts
Figure 27. Piles of Sand Collected in the Drainage Channel and Drying Before Being Packaged, Carama District
Source: World Bank October 2019
66. Sand carried by the drainage systems constructed by the project has become a valuable source of income for youth in the project area. Regular day-to-day maintenance is necessary to remove the sediments resulting from the upstream erosion of the watershed. However, because of the good quality of sand deposited in the drainage channels, locals, youth in particular, collect the sand to sell them as building materials. It is estimated that the value of a wheelbarrow of sand is about BIF 4,000 (about US$2.5) to be compared to the international poverty line of US$2.5 a day. Unexpectedly these income- generating activities ensure, on the one hand, that no trash is deposited in the channels, and on the other hand, that routine maintenance is somehow effected.
III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME
A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION
67. The IREP was consistent with the 2013–2016 Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for Burundi.23 It supported its strategic objective of reducing infrastructure-related bottlenecks to growth. This strategic objective was confirmed by the Performance and Learning Review of February 2015 which featured the IREP in its Results Framework. At appraisal stage, the project was in line with Burundi’s Infrastructure Action Plan (2010–2015) with Road Network Improvement Program to support the productive sectors of the economy. Its main objectives for 2011–2015 were to (a) safeguard and preserve the national paved and unpaved road network; (b) pave inter/intra-regional roads; (c) increase budgetary resources allocated to the road network; and (d) build institutional capacity for road maintenance. The PDO to strengthen infrastructure was aligned with the CAS strategic objective 1 ‘improving competitiveness’ and its outcome related to reduced infrastructure bottlenecks. Further, the objective of building capacity in DRM was a top priority for the country as outlined in the adaptation needs of the country identified in Burundi’s National Policy on Climate Change and National Determined Contributions adopted in 2013. Human
23 Report No. 72334-BI.
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resource capacity building in the field of water management was outlined as a national priority for adaptation to climate change.
68. The project design successfully built on the recommendations for resilient rehabilitation and reconstruction that were provided under the Rapid Assessment conducted in 2014 with the help of the World Bank and other donors. To accelerate the implementation of the Government's existing infrastructure and DRM policies, strategies, and action plans24 the assessment proposed activities classified into three categories: (a) emergency: activities to stop the progression of damage, (b) medium term: activities that allow the rehabilitation of infrastructures, and (c) long term: activities that make it possible to envisage resilient reconstruction. Out of a proposed US$107 million envelope, US$87 million was earmarked for infrastructure or DRM activities. Within the US$87 million, US$17.2 million was considered priority (emergency/medium term) to enable infrastructure rehabilitation together with DRM activities for a ‘built-back-better’ resilient approach. In addition, US$20 million was recommended for sustainable land management to stabilize watersheds and hillslopes around Bujumbura.
69. The project design was cognizant of the challenge of post-disaster recovery in a low capacity and fragile environment. The emergency situation was amplified by the already fragile environment characterized by poor institutional capacity to address emergencies. The project’s strategy to centralize all decision making within one entity, NRA, was sound as it ensured that decision making was not hampered by conflicting interests or diverging views from the numerous stakeholders.
70. The emergency to restore traffic on a main road RN1 to minimize economic losses and prevent early degradation of secondary roads. RN1 was and remains a major national road placed on the north corridor that connects Burundi to the port of Mombasa in Kenya through Uganda and Rwanda: 90 percent of the goods transported (import and export) to Burundi arrive through this corridor. Beyond this logistic capacity, RN1 is also an urban road providing access to social and economic services. In 2015, the average daily traffic on RN1 entering in Bujumbura was estimated to be about 2,800 vehicles per day, of which 20 percent were trucks. The traffic increase was of about 3 percent per year. Following the 2014 natural disaster, the country was facing the risk of being isolated quickly if urgent road rehabilitation interventions were not implemented. Also, the closure of RN1 to heavy trucks traffic endangered the secondary roads toward which traffic had been diverted.
71. A simple and credible project design was adopted to resolve emergencies. The above-mentioned emergencies threatened to undermine the country’s economy and exacerbate the fragility and vulnerability of poor people in Bujumbura. Consequently, the IREP was designed to address them using a pragmatic strategy (spots treatment and not full rehabilitation) based on more flexible and relevant procurement arrangements.25 Further the project adopted a clear and straightforward objective of recovery of damaged infrastructure while improving the country’s capacity to adapt and recover from natural disasters. The objective of raising awareness of the Government and local communes on DRM was sound and was expected to foster high-level ownership of climate resilience issues. Finally, the project design supported the mainstreaming of the Immediate Response Mechanism (IRM) tool.
24 Master Plan for Urban Planning, Master Plan for Stormwater Sanitation, National Strategy for Capacity Building in Disaster Risk Reduction, and National Action Plan for Adaptation to Climate Change. 25 In accordance with OP/BP 10.00 paragraph 11.
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72. The project had an adequate risk mitigation matrix, with the risks and mitigation clearly identified during the preparation phase. The IREP was considered a substantial risk operation. As governance and corruption continued to be a substantial risk, the implementation capacity was affected by the low capacity of the line ministry under which the Project Management Unit (PMU) was located. The risk of not achieving the core PDOs was deemed substantial, although the project would still be able to significantly contribute to the abatement of the emergency situation even if some activities did not materialize.
73. Readiness for implementation was acceptable given that the IREP was an emergency operation. Procurement for most of the project’s budget was under way or completed by the time the project was approved. A retroactive financing mechanism was implemented to ensure that key technical studies and safeguards were completed by project effectiveness.
Table 3. Project Preparation and Implementation Phases Phases/Time Line Description/Activities Request for assistance from the GoB to the World Bank on February 21, 2014 Phase 1. Preparation (February 2014– Donors’ joint needs assessment mission of March 2014 March 2015) - 12 months Project approval by the Board in March 2015 Preparation of technical. environmental studies for studies for the civil works Declaration of effectiveness on April 2016 Preparation of safeguard documents ESIA and RAP Phase 2. (March 2015–April 2017) - 23 Approval and publication of ESIA and RAP in March 2017 months Disbursement conditions were lifted on March 30, 2017 Works related to the main contracts (RN1 and urban drainage infrastructure) were launched on April 10, 2017 Full execution of civil works: May 2018 Additional emergency works further to the 2017/18 rainy seasons Phase 3. April 2017–June 2019 - 26 November 2017 and March 2018: fatal worksite accidents months Midterm review (MTR): April 2018 Activation of the CERC: July 2018 Project closing on June 30, 2019
B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION
74. Implementation was affected by the following key factors: (a) the 2015 political crisis (b) the suspension of EU operations in Burundi, (c) the country’s inherent climate vulnerability posing community and occupational health and safety risks at building sites and responsible for (d) fatal accidents on worksites in April 2018, (e) the disbursement conditions related to the approval of safeguards documents (usual condition for road works involving resettlement plans) were lifted seven months after effectiveness, (f) the impact of shortage of hard currency and the volatility of exchange rates on works, (g) the poor quality of technical studies for drainage works and difficulty to mobilize expertise for DRM capacity-building activities, (h) the MTR review was a positive milestone and the project could have been a good candidate for an additional financing.
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75. In May 2015, a few months after the project approval, a major conflict broke out between the contenders of the presidential election, and a failed coup attempt was followed by contested election-related violence that claimed hundreds of lives. While the conflict opened a period of instability and civil unrest, the challenging security and socioeconomic conditions in the country triggered unprecedented forced displacement. The suspension of external budget support by donors in response to the 2015 crisis heightened the need for the Government to mobilize additional domestic revenue and consolidate spending, drying up much-needed spending on development. As a result, this new emergency situation stalled project effectiveness by delaying the preparation, approval and disclosure of safeguards documents notably the resettlement plans for the road works. Another consequence was the suspension of the EU’s assistance.
76. The EU’s co-financing to the tune of US$8.5 million to address the upstream landscape restoration and rehabilitation needs in the commune of Isale and on the Gasenyi River did not materialize because of the suspension of EU assistance following the 2015 political crisis. Consequently, the project area downstream of the Gasenyi River continued to experience flash floods caused by the sudden rupture of artificial dams created by landslides that obstruct the riverbed. Three26 flash floods occurred during implementation and adversely affected the project area. However, the severity of the resulting damages was less important compared to the 2014 events mainly for the following reasons: (a) the drainage structures and networks that were rehabilitated and upgraded by the project helped regulate the flow of water and (b) the root cause of the problem, illegal quarrying of material from the Gasenyi Riverbed, had significantly decreased. Nevertheless, several properties were flooded and the existing drainage channels, as well as channels rehabilitated under the project, were damaged by the massive rocks and soil material carried by the water.
77. Burundi’s inherent climate vulnerability was a major challenge to project implementation. During implementation, increased intensity and frequency of climate hazards have affected the project area thus expanding the scope of intervention and the financing needs.
78. Fatal accidents of March 2018. On Friday March 16, 2018, a group of workers started clearing the approach of a culvert on the Gasenyi River to remove the leftover concrete poured the day before and washed away by heavy rain. As the workers were working on the riverbed near the culvert, a sudden landslide on the bank of the river sent large chunks of soil and rocks down on them. Ten workers were directly hit and some of them were buried by the mass of earth from the unstable river embankment. Six out of the ten workers died on-site, while four were injured. As a response to the incident, the following proactive measures were taken: (a)suspension of works while a root-cause analysis was being conducted, (b) implementation of additional safeguards measures such as the hiring of another social specialist to support BAPW activities, and (c) retrofitting of enhanced health and occupational safety rules in the contracts and regular monitoring of the same by the supervision consultant and the client.
79. The shortage of hard currency and the volatility of exchange rates negatively affected the prices of material for construction with an impact on costs. All civil works contracts, especially the urban drainage works which are paid fully in local currency, were severely affected. The contractors struggled to source cement and steel for construction from neighboring countries. This was compounded by the adverse fluctuation in exchange rates which led to an increase by 40 percent of the
26 One in February 2017 and two in April 2018.
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price of such commodities. Consequently, the pace of works substantially slowed from early 2018 to mid-2018.
80. Implementation of the DRM component was negatively affected by the difficulty in mobilizing expertise for key capacity-building activities. Due to the complexity of the tasks, and the scarcity of experienced consultants on DRM, BAPW struggled to mobilize expertise for capacity-building activities. With the help of the World Bank, BAPW identified a limited number of specialists who were invited to bid for the proposed technical assistance activities. However, most of them were over-committed and unable to participate in the IREP. Consequently, key DRM activities, such as the revision of ORSEC, were not completed.
81. Despite the above challenges, the MTR conducted in April 2018 was a positive milestone. The MTR concluded that implementation was on track, despite initial delays in the implementation of DRM capacity-building activities under Component B and fatal accidents. Progress in implementation of road works and the construction of urban drainage channels under Component A was deemed satisfactory. In May 2018, 21 months after the project effectiveness, the project had disbursed US$15.5 million equivalent—about 62 percent of the total grant—exceeding the planned disbursements for the same period. The MTR identified the need to provide additional finance to support achievement of the PDO.
82. The activation of the Recovery Contingency Fund under Subcomponent B.2 successfully contributed to mobilize this fund to finance additional works. The IREP was one of the first World Bank operation to include a CERC and activate it during the project lifetime. Although the allocation of funds is different between CERC and the Recovery Funds under the IREP, the disbursement conditions are the same: elaboration of an Immediate Response Manual and request of the Government following an eligible event. The related civil works were completed in June 2019, by project closure and without extension.
83. An additional financing was envisaged to scale up project’s impacts. Further to the MTR, the World Bank team initiated the preparation of an additional financing to address the outstanding drainage needs in the project area as well as the additional measures required to improve sustainability and road safety of RN1. While the additional financing was not needed to achieve the project objectives, it was deemed necessary to scale up its impacts. A request for US$20 million financing was prepared and supported by a detailed PPSD. However, the proposed additional financing was dropped in favor of a new project that would adopt a comprehensive approach for infrastructure resilience. The proposed Road Infrastructure Resilience Project (P172988), currently under preparation, builds on the IREP’s achievements.
IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME
A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E)
M&E Design
84. The PDO for the project was simple and clearly defined. Four PDO indicators and eight intermediate results indicators were identified to monitor progress toward the objectives.
85. Objective 1 key indicators are not relevant to measure progress toward improved climate resiliency. ‘Number of direct project beneficiaries’ and ‘Reduction in unit transport costs along RN1’ are
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generally used in transport projects to measure objectives related to ‘improved accessibility’ but less relevant for climate resiliency. Another indicator that could have been proposed is, for example, the number of days (or hours) per year with traffic disruptions related to climatic events, possibly with a classification taking into account the severity of disruption related to its duration. Besides, both indicators raise the question of attribution to the project. With a baseline of 800,000 corresponding to the whole population of Greater Bujumbura in 2014, the number of beneficiaries is calculated by a simple projection of the population growth between 2014 and 2018; population growth is indeed independent from the project impact.
86. However, the four intermediate indicators27 provide more evidence of increased resilience. Improved road asset knowledge and management, road asset planning, and programming, including the maintenance program, are activities that help build road sustainability and hence resiliency.
Table 4. PDOs and Indicators PDOs # Indicators (PDO indicators in bold) 1 Number of direct project beneficiaries 2 Number of people with access to improved drainage in the areas served by the project 3 Reduction in unit transport costs along RN1 in Project Impact area 1.Enhance the climate 4 Number of drainage structures rehabilitated/reconstructed resilience of key 5 Number of kilometers of newly constructed/rehabilitated drainage network transport and drainage 6 Number of crossing structures rehabilitated infrastructure 7 Transport strategy and road investment plan completed 8 Road database completed and tested for paved and unpaved roads 9 Annual maintenance and percentage share of annual maintenance budget disbursed the 10 Number of people supported by participatory evaluation of risks and 2. Strengthen the operational early warning and response systems, of which female country’s capacity to 11 Contingency funding mechanism established and ready to provide access to prevent and respond to financial resources in case of an eligible crisis or emergency natural disasters 12 Number of municipalities supported for emergency information dissemination, emergency response, and contingency planning
87. The number of people with access to improved drainage in the area served by the project is adequate to capture the benefit of the improvement for the population. The provision of new or improved access to drainage and sanitation services to residents supports social resiliency and improve livelihoods, notably in informal settlements.
88. Objective 2 was accurately supported by two indicators reflecting the impact of DRM activities at the community level and at the municipal level with the number of people supported by such activities which represent the local residents, and the number of municipalities which represent the local governments.
27 (a) Number of kilometers of newly constructed/rehabilitated drainage network, (b) transport strategy and road investment plan completed, (c) road database completed and tested for paved and unpaved roads, and (d) annual maintenance budget and percentage share of annual maintenance budget disbursed.
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89. The intermediate indicator related to the establishment and activation of a CERC wise component is highly relevant to capture the progress toward a flexible and reactive funding mechanism for reallocating funds in case of an emergency. As mentioned, the IREP was one the first World Bank’s operations to establish and activate such component to enable funding of emergency repair and to have those repairs completed within the time frame of the same operation. This successful achievement in an fragility, conflict, and violence context can serve as a lessons learned for World Bank operations (see chapter LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS).
M&E Implementation
90. Each implementing agency was in charge of collecting indicators related to the civil works progress and completion. The NRA was responsible for activities under Subcomponent A.1 and technical assistance activities under Component C. BAPW was responsible for activities under Subcomponent A.2 and Component B. The PMU was coordinating and consolidating. Most of the targets were achieved after the completion of civil works in 2018, in the last year before project closure.
91. A proper impact evaluation or socioeconomic assessment was not done at project closure. A traffic study on RN1 would have been useful to assess its economic impact with a count of the direct users of RN1 by origin-destinations and by type of users (pedestrian, trucks, car, and bus).Given the difficulty of a proper economic assessment to capture the climate resiliency valuation, a beneficiary survey would have been useful to capture beneficiary satisfaction of the civil works implementation and DRM activities for the beneficiaries located in the target area (the five communes for drainage works).
M&E Utilization
92. The short time frame for the project implementation did not leave much time to use the Result Framework as a monitoring tool. While the works started in April 2017, the first tangible results of the project occurred in the 2018 after completion of the spots improvement on RN1 and first drainage works. While the client and the World Bank team were focused on solving implementation issues and delivering results, the M&E started to be filled during the last year of the project. As a matter of fact, it could not be used to inform or modify the project. There may be a missed opportunity at the MTR to revise and modify the M&E. However, confident that the project was on the track to achieving its objectives, there have been no discussion on the M&E design during the MTR.
93. On balance, M&E is rated as Modest. Despite evidence of results as demonstrated by the works quality and by Table 2. Achievement of PDO Indicators, the positive impacts of the Project could have been better measured using a stronger M&E framework, particularly regarding infrastructure resilience.
B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE
Fiduciary Management
94. Fiduciary management was Satisfactory. At project closure, an external auditor reviewed the entire procurement process for the civil works from the preparation of consultation and tender documents to the launch of new contracts; the preparation of consultation and tender documents; and the launch of the tender notice (and the request for proposal in the case of consultants) at the award
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stage, both for studies and for work and monitoring. The technical audit28 concluded that procurement management was conducted in accordance with World Bank procedures and provisions of the Financing Agreement, including the use of standard bidding documents or requests for proposals, and the proper application of the agreed procurement process have been delivered on time. None of the audits have identified any anomalies or serious accountability issues in the financial management of the project.
Environmental Safeguards
95. Delays in preparing and approving the safeguards documents delayed the implementation of works. As mentioned in paragraph 33 , the delay resulted from the major political and social crisis of 2015, few weeks after project approval by the World Bank.
96. Environmental and social performance remained Moderately Satisfactory because of delays in PAPs’ compensation and environmental, health, and safety compliance issues at construction sites. At appraisal, the project triggered three safeguards policies: OP/BP 4.01 (Environmental Assessment), OP/BP 4.11 (Physical Cultural Resources), and OP/BP 4.12 (Involuntary Resettlement). The ESIA with specific Environmental and Social Management Plans and RAPs for the RN1 works and the validated urban development works were prepared and assumed to be sufficient to manage the environmental and social risks and impacts. The environmental and social risks remained Substantial during the first five sequences of ISRs. The major change in ISR sequence #6 was an upgrade of the risk from Substantial to High following two incidents classified as severe, as they resulted in fatalities.
97. Non-compliance in reporting incidents to the World Bank. The first severe incident in November 2017 was a traffic accident involving a vehicle with two passengers and a bicycle with two passengers and two workers working on the RN1 drainage ditch. The accident resulted in the death of one of the workers and one of the passengers on the bicycle, and the other passengers (bicycle and vehicle) were injured. After the accident, the contractor took all the required action to call the police, evacuate the injured, and stop the works. Eventually the family of the deceased workers were compensated under the contractor’s insurance policy. The accident was reported to the World Bank late, after five months, in breach of the contractor and PMU’s requirements.
98. The second severe accident occurred on one of the urban works and was also classified severe as it resulted in the death of six workers. The accident occurred on March 16, 2018, on the river downstream canal. Ten site employees were assigned to the diversion of river water to allow the resumption of the pouring of clean concrete which had been washed away by the heavy rains of March 15, 2018. The workers started to clear the stones when suddenly a landslide fell on them. Six people were buried by the rockslide and died on the spot while four others were injured. Following the investigation, it was stated that the contractor bore the main responsibility for the accident by giving the order to start the works execution without a detailed project design. The World Bank suspended the project for several months while the investigation was being performed and the victims’ families were compensated.
28 See annex 6.
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Social Safeguards
99. Delays in preparation and adoption of safeguards documents are related to the 2015 political crisis and the unstable social context.
100. Delays in PAP compensation payment. The resettlement activities caused by the RN1 civil works were composed of (a) land in the right-of-way area, (b) existing or repetitively cultivated crops on land, (c) economic activities that are practiced in the right-of-way area, and (d) construction. The RN1 RAP and further consultations identified 634 affected PAPs divided into three types: households owning or growing on plots of land in the right-of-way area (64 percent); owners of the houses in the right-of-way area (6 percent); and landowners in the right-of-way (30 percent). The total amount of PAP compensation of BIF 430 million (about US$275,000) was financed by the Government. However, at the project closure in June 2019, only 356 out of the 634 PAPs (56 percent) had received their compensation with variations within types of PAPs. While 94 percent of the PAPs land owners were compensated, only 40 percent of the crop losses and 43 percent of houses were compensated. The main reason was the PMU’s lack of funds availability from the Minister of Finance. However, in October 2019, all the PAPs’ compensation was paid.
101. Strengthening environmental and social supervision. Several recommendations were issued by the World Bank team to improve construction and environmental and social compliance as documented by the Aide Memoire of the April 2018 mission. These include installation of a safety retention tank, storage tank of fuel for the company's life base, improvement of ports and equipment for personnel protection, and strengthening of traffic signaling in the work areas. Those measures were verified by the mission control, the PMU, and the World Bank team. In addition, to strengthen the whole supervision chain, BAPW had to recruit a full-time environmental and social specialist. The satisfactory implementation of these measures by each implementing agency allowed the World Bank team to downgrade the environmental and social risks from High to Substantial from ISR #7 and #8 until project completion.
C. BANK PERFORMANCE
Quality at Entry
102. The World Bank had a long history of engagement in the transport sector and urban sector in Burundi because two projects were already under implementation when the disaster happened in 2014. The PMU and implementing agencies of both projects played a critical role in the first rapid assessment. At that time, the World Bank took the lead among other development partners, such as EU, ADB, UNDP, and Red Cross, and was more involved in the humanitarian response. The experience of the World Bank and PMU allowed quick mobilization of resources and promoted a strong ownership of the project by the Government. The project preparation was also underpinned by preparatory technical studies started under both precedent projects and provided significant time gain for quick execution of works.
103. Building on Government entities with proven capacity for delivery. Given the emergency nature of the operation, building on a PMU and implementing agencies with a proven track record allowed swift design and preparation and execution of the project. The PMU within the NRA had already successfully implemented the previous transport project and its additional financing, both 100 percent completed. The BAPW was also the implementation agency and successfully implemented the urban sector project.
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This allowed quick impact with swift implementation and great capacity to respond to challenging implementation issue
104. Leading the donor’s technical assistance. As the leader of the first response to the GoB, the World Bank played its role as a convening power and technical expert in a major crisis.
105. However, the DRM activities were pursuing too ambitious objectives during an emergency situation and the World Bank could have advised its client differently. The drop of key DRM activities during project implementation illustrates that the objectives may have been too ambitious. The DRM activities requires long-term strategic planning and strong coordination. For example, flood risk mapping requires extensive watershed modelling and an understanding of flood dynamics. Long-term strategies, such as the national emergency plan and the establishment of early warning systems, turned out to be bigger than the scope of this project. Beyond the investment in equipment, they require significant investment in coordinating various ministries and local government and development partners.
Quality of Supervision
106. Strong presence and diligent supervision. The World Bank supervision team held six field missions during the four years of the project. The World Bank team supervision team was stable with two experienced task team leaders; one task team leader brought the project to the Board and effectiveness, and the second continued over the implementation. The World Bank provided ‘no objection’ on time and was proactive in resolving implementation issues, including the delayed implementation of the RAP and the management of the severe incidents with the client, and reporting to the World Bank management.
107. Flexible and adaptive procurement process. The procurement strategy, selected based on the nature of emergency and initial assessment of the PMU’s fiduciary capacity, allowed quick selection of contractors once the technical and design studies were completed. For drainage works, the eight contracts were awarded by direct selection to six different local contractors based on the short list. This allowed significant time and efficiency gains in the procurement process that usually delayed the execution of infrastructure works.
108. Worksite fatal accidents management and response. See also section B (B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION). During the first months of civil works, two severe accidents resulted in fatalities for workers or/and roads users. The first incident was discovered by the World Bank during a supervision mission. For both accidents, the Bank team acted diligently using the Environmental and Social Incident Response Toolkit six-step approach. This pragmatic approach was used successfully allowing the works to resume after clarifying responsibilities and deficiencies as well as compensating the families of the victims.
109. Coordination with other donors. The World Bank team kept regular contact with other donors’ (ADB and EU mainly) interventions, especially during field missions. For the transport intervention, consultation between donors supported the preparation of a regional trade and facilitation operation on Lake Tanganyika. The project’s DRM activities supported the adoption of the National Strategy for Disaster Risks Management and Prevention for 2018–2025, adopted in 2019 by the Ministry for Public Security with the support of UNDP.
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Justification of Overall Rating of Bank Performance
110. Considering minor shortcomings in quality of entry but strong and effective supervision, overall Bank performance is being rated Satisfactory.
D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME
111. Sustaining project outcomes. Continuation of the project’s outcomes in terms of drainage improvement is under way through the World Bank-financed Landscape Restoration Project (LRRP) (P160613), which is currently supporting the restoration of the catchment area upstream of the IREP’s interventions. Owing to the combination of erosion control works and sensitization on sustainable agricultural practices, the erosion issues affecting the Gasenyi and Nyabagere Rivers are expected to drastically reduce in the medium to long term. The LRRP will construct terraces on degraded hillsides and strategically augment vegetation cover at critical points in the landscape to prevent soil erosion, increase soil moisture, and reduce surface runoff. This will entail activities such as biophysical treatment of gullies, tree planting, agroforestry, water harvesting, and so on. Further, the World Bank is currently identifying a new operation in the transport sector that will focus on safe and resilient road investments on key corridors as well as the improvement of institutional capacity to manage the road sector, building on the IREP’s achievements.
112. Despite the creation of a specific new tax, drainage infrastructure constructed by the Project may not be properly maintained. Drainage channels require routine and periodic maintenance to function properly. The maintenance of urban infrastructure falls under the responsibility of local municipalities. However, they lack the financial resources to perform maintenance, as the budgets allocated to them by the Central Government are very limited. The GoB recently created the Burundi Office of Housing and Construction (BOHC) within the MTPWE to provide technical and financial support to municipalities in the maintenance of urban infrastructure, including the drainage system constructed under the IREP. The BOHC will be endowed with financial resources from a tax levied on real estate transactions.
113. Despite the existence of the National Road Fund (NRF), road investments financed by the Project may not be properly maintained. Road maintenance falls under the responsibility of the NRA through the NRF. The NRF resources mainly come from a fuel levy. However, since 2016, the Government has capped the fuel levy and only 50 percent of the revenues collected are effectively transferred to the NRF. Hence, NRF resources have dropped from BIF 18 billion (US$11.5 million) to BIF 7.2 billion (US$4.4 million) in 2016 and then rose to BIF 8.7 billion in 2017 (US$5.6 million). The available resources do not cover the maintenance funding needs (estimated at US$18 million for the classified road network as of 2019) for the road network, and other sources of finance need to be secured.
114. Road safety is a big concern in Burundi, especially on RN1. No official statistics on road safety is available in Burundi. In 2016, according to the World Health Organization, there were 35 road deaths per 100,000 vehicles in Burundi, compared to 29 in Tanzania and 25 in Zambia. This is likely a conservative estimate as some of the crashes go unreported. The situation is likely to worsen with the national vehicle fleet increasing at an average rate of 13,000 vehicles per year. The adoption and effective implementation of a road safety strategy is still needed to address the growing concern of road safety.
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V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
115. The IREP as an emergency operation related to infrastructure resiliency in a very fragile environment draws on the following lessons and recommendations to be considered for future emergency operations addressing climate resiliency.
116. Building on implementing/coordinating agencies with a proven track record. The first rapid assessment mission was supported by the implementing agencies already successfully implementing two projects. Beyond the technical execution, key functions related to coordination and procurement were devolved to two staff with extensive experience.
117. Mainstreaming the CERC in World Bank operations. At the time of the project, the CERC was not as much in the mainstream as it was at project closing. The project was one of the first to activate a CERC and support the adoption of the IRM manual at a country level. By allowing a quick reactivation of undisbursed funds at the World Bank country portfolio level, the Government can use the funds after an eligible crisis, if the IRM manual has been approved. Building on a well-performing PMU, especially on fiduciary management, is also a key learning for IRM activation and proper implementation. The benefits of the CERC for emergency reconstruction following a natural disaster is high and mainstreaming of the CERC must be pursued. Mainstreaming of the CERC in World Bank operations must be done especially for fragility, conflict, and violence or natural disaster-prone countries.
118. Embedding a maintenance program in financing climate-resilient infrastructure. Climate risk impacts and hence damages are exacerbated by the lack of proper maintenance that put new investments at risk. Transport projects must include an embedded maintenance program to sustain investment beyond the lifetime of the project. This maintenance program must be defined at the beginning of the operation to avoid ‘too late’ considerations once the civil works are completed. New operations must include a financing scheme for the maintenance of the infrastructure. The experience of the project is that the project focused on adaptation with investment on infrastructure post disaster risk and recovery. Strategic planning and an enabling environment could be improved for future projects.
119. Building capacity for climate-resilient road asset management at the national and local government. Road asset management must integrate climate considerations in the management of infrastructure to move away from a reactive decision-making process, sometimes in an emergency situation, to a risk-based approach. The project successfully paired an investment program with road asset and DRM activities. These efforts must be continued in the long term with stand-alone technical assistance or a project and expanded spatially. Capacity must be built not only at the NRA but also at the local level (for urban and rural roads).
120. Labor-intensive works build local capacity and thrive on community ownership. One of the key factors that helped achievement of the project was the design of works that was based on the assessment of the local capacity of construction firms. The procurement of works was designed to be procured from the local market (spots improving, drainage structure with no technicality). Labor-intensive works supported the hiring of women and youth, thus generating income and increasing the community’s ownership of the infrastructure.
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121. Addressing the larger-scale issues of watershed management, landscape, and land use management. While the IREP has adapted infrastructure to decennial flooding events, the broader issues of the river’s watershed control landscape management and uncontrolled quarry exploitation are still pending because they require a coordinated long-term approach. Beyond the investment, improving the resilience of road and infrastructure located downstream should include cross-cutting measures for the proactive management of watersheds and hillslopes stabilization. Although this goes beyond the scope of this Project, reinforcing the stability of upstream rivers banks and eliminating aggravating factors, such as uncontrolled quarry exploitation, will be important measures to consider in order to increase the sustainability of road investments such as the one financed by the IREP. .
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ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS
A. RESULTS INDICATORS
A.1 PDO Indicators
Objective/Outcome: Enhance the climate resilience of key transport and drainage infrastructure in the Target Area Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Direct project beneficiaries Number 800000.00 926000.00 926871.00
24-Mar-2015 31-Dec-2018 31-May-2019
Female beneficiaries Percentage 50.00 50.00 51.00
Comments (achievements against targets): The indicator number of direct project beneficiaries was based on the assumption that the whole population of Greater Bujumbura will be direct beneficiaries of the infrastructure improvements. The baseline of 800,000 is an estimation of the population in 2015. The target of 926,000 was calculated by applying an annual population growth of +5% between 2015 and 2018.
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Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Number of people with Number 0.00 77000.00 66151.00 access to improved drainage in the areas served by the 24-Mar-2015 31-Dec-2018 31-May-2019 project of which female (%)
Female Beneficiaries Percentage 50.00 50.00 46.00
Comments (achievements against targets): The indicator '' number of people with access to improved drainage'' is estimated from the census population of the five neighborhoods/districts of Greater Bujumbura impacted by the drainage structures construction or rehabilitation.
Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Reduction in unit transport Percentage 0.00 4.00 4.81 cost along NR-1 in Project Impact Area (PIA) 24-Mar-2015 31-Dec-2018 31-May-2019
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Comments (achievements against targets): The indicator reduction in transport cost unit along RN-1 was deemed to captured the benefits of the road restoration and improvement on the passenger and goods transport price. It was assumed that after the project, the average transport price would drop by 4%.The indicator was calculated by a consultant following a survey on the field in April 2019 to road users. The methodology is based on road user recollection of the prices at three periods( before the 2014 flooding / during the RN1 detoured / after the Project) . The study tends also to demonstrate that the prices were slightly higher after the Project because of of external factors such as the increase of fuel prices between 2015 and 2019.
Objective/Outcome: Strengthening the country’s capacity to manage and prevent natural disasters. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Number of people supported Number 0.00 39000.00 38385.00 by participatory evaluation of disaster risks and operational 24-Mar-2015 31-Dec-2018 31-May-2019 early warning and response systems, of which female (%)
Female beneficiaries Percentage 0.00 50.00 46.00
Comments (achievements against targets):
A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators
Component: Component A. Rehabilitation of Roads and Urban Infrastructure
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Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Number of drainage Number 0.00 17.00 40.00 structures rehabilitated/reconstructed 24-Mar-2015 31-Dec-2018 31-May-2019
Comments (achievements against targets): The number of drainage structures rehabilitated counts the number of spots treated along RN1. At the project preparation, the scope of activities was focused on the first 30 kilometers between Bujumbura and Bugarama and it was estimated about 17 spots to rehabiliate. After the rainy events of 2017/2018, the scope was extended and additional spots were included beyond Bugarama, about 110 kilometers towards the border.
Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Number of kilometers of Number 0.00 12.60 10.37 newly constructed/ rehabilitated drainage 24-Mar-2015 31-Dec-2018 31-Dec-2018 network
Comments (achievements against targets): This indicator target has achieved at 86 % by considering the total kilometer of channels reconstructed or rehabilitated under the Project. However the missing extension drainage channel of to Lake Tanganiyka by lack of financing explains why the target was not reached at 100 percent.
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Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Number of crossing Number 0.00 3.00 30.00 structures rehabilitated 24-Mar-2015 31-Dec-2018 31-May-2019
Comments (achievements against targets): The number of crossing structures over key transport infrastrcutures (RN1 and RN9) rehabilitated includes : small bridges, gutters, pipes. The initial target was expanded to include additional vulnerabilites points. Hence increasing the number of crossing structures.
Component: Component B. Capacity Strengthening in Disaster Risk Management
Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Number of municipalities Number 0.00 8.00 8.00 supported for emergency information dissemination, 24-Mar-2015 31-Dec-2018 31-May-2019 emergency response and contingency planning
Comments (achievements against targets): The indicator 'number of municiplaities supported for DRM information and prevention ' was deemed to capture the muncipalities concerned by the drainage structucture improvements along with the DRM implementation. There is no gap in the target/ achivement : a law adopted in 2014 on the reorganization of municipalities in the city of Bujumbura has reduced the number of municipalities from thirteen (13) to three(3). The three counes are : Muha, Mukaza and Ntahangwa Each of the 3 communes are composed by districts.
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At the project completion, the 5 districts/municipalities initially impacted by the 2014 flooding have all benefited from workshops and awareness campaigns: Isare, Muha, Mukaza, Mutimbuzi, and Ntahangwa,
Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Contingency funding Yes/No N Y Y mechanism established and ready to provide access to 24-Mar-2015 31-Dec-2018 31-May-2019 financial resources in case of an eligible crisis or emergency
Comments (achievements against targets): The Contingency Recovery Fund was activated by a World Bank letter dated of July 27, 2018.
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Component: Component C. Institutional Support, Project Management and Coordination
Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Transport strategy and road Yes/No N Y Y investment plan completed 24-Mar-2015 31-Dec-2018 31-May-2019
Comments (achievements against targets): The National Transport Strategy was adopted in June 2019 and a dissemniation workshop organized with public and private stakeholders in July 2019. The Strategy is organized around 3 parts (i) Diagnosis of the transport sector, (ii) Development objectives and strategic axes, (iii) a Ten-year action plan 2018 - 2027. For the road sector, the objective is to upgrade all national roads with rehabilitation and asphalting works before 2025.This represents a total expenditure of US$ 580 Million. Other objectives are set for the provincial and communal roads and overall maintenance as well.
Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Road Database completed Yes/No N Y Y and tested for paved and unpaved roads 24-Mar-2015 31-Dec-2018 31-May-2019
Comments (achievements against targets): The Road Database is now active and housed within the NRA.Four staff within the NRA have been trained to manage and exploit the road database (RDB) that is currently used to enhance programming and planning of investment as well. The Project successfully provided consulting services for the provision of a software (Logiroad) for road asset management, equipment and training and inventory. The road asset inventory was conducted during the year 2019 on 4,500 km of roads representing about 70 percent of the classified road network including 100 percent of the national roads (1,950 km), 65 percent
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of the provincial roads (2,630 km), and 10 percent of the rural roads. The data collection included information on the type (paved/unpaved), classification (national ,provincial, communal), pavement conditions, infra- or super-structures condition (bridges, culverts, pipes, and retaining walls), and so on.
Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Annual maintenance budget Percentage 68.00 85.00 91.30 and percentage share of annual road maintenance 24-Mar-2015 31-Dec-2019 31-May-2019 budget disbursed
Comments (achievements against targets): The indicator is calculated by the ratio o Disbursed Fund f vs the budgeted Fund of Road Maintenance. The National Road Fund budget is about BIF 8.2 billion ( about 4 US$ 4 million) for the year 2019.
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B. KEY OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT
Objective/Outcome 1 1. Number of direct project beneficiaries 2. Number of people with access to improved drainage in the areas served by Outcome Indicators the project 3. Reduction in unit transport costs along RN1 in Project Impact area
1. Number of drainage structures rehabilitated/reconstructed 2. Number of kilometers of newly constructed/rehabilitated drainage network 3. Number of crossing structures rehabilitated Intermediate Results Indicators 4. Transport strategy and road investment plan completed 5. Road database completed and tested for paved and unpaved roads 6. Annual maintenance and percentage share of annual maintenance budget disbursed 1. RN1 40 spots rehabilitated and reconstructed Key Outputs by Component 2.Gasenyi upstream RN1 riverbanks stabilization (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 1) 2.Construction of 10.6 km of drainage channels for rivers Gasenyi, Nyabagere and Kinyankonge in the impacted area
Objective/Outcome 2
1. Number of people supported by participatory evaluation of risks and Outcome Indicators operational early warning and response systems, of which female 1. Contingency funding mechanism established and ready to provide access to financial resources in case of an eligible crisis or emergency Intermediate Results Indicators 2. Number of municipalities supported for emergency information dissemination, emergency response, and contingency planning 3. Key Outputs by Component 1. DRM awareness activities for 38,000 people in the communities (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 2) 2. Capacity building activities for members of National Platform of DRM
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The World Bank Burundi- Infrastructure Resilience Emergency Project (P150929)
ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION
A. TASK TEAM MEMBERS
Name Role Preparation Noroarisoa Rabefaniraka Task Team Leader(s)
Melance Ndikumasabo Procurement Specialist(s)
Bella Diallo Financial Management Specialist
Alice Museri Team Member
Christian Simbananiye Team Member
Laure Deffa Barry Team Member
Faly Diallo Team Member
Jean Baptiste Migraine Team Member
Elikia Merleen Vanessa Abraham Team Member
Nneoma Veronica Nwogu Counsel
Aurelien Serge Beko Team Member
Paul-Jean Feno Social Specialist
Noroarisoa Rabefaniraka Team Member
Patrice Joachim Nirina Rakotoniaina Team Member
Monthe Bienvenu Biyoudi Team Member
Antoine V. Lema Social Specialist
Alexandre K. Dossou Team Member
Bouraima Diaite Team Member
Fabio Galli Team Member
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The World Bank Burundi- Infrastructure Resilience Emergency Project (P150929)
Supervision/ICR Papa Mamadou Fall Task Team Leader(s) Arcade Bigirindavyi, Prosper Nindorera, Procurement Specialist(s) Rahmoune Essalhi Yeo Yenemanyan Financial Management Specialist Joe Abdallah Team Member Alice Museri Team Member Faly Diallo Team Member Patrick Goy Ndolo Team Member Monica Vidili Team Member Nneoma Veronica Nwogu Counsel Philippe Rapaport Team Member Clarette Rwagatore Team Member Paul-Jean Feno Environmental Specialist Hugues Agossou Team Member Mary C.K. Bitekerezo Social Specialist
B. STAFF TIME AND COST
Staff Time and Cost Stage of Project Cycle No. of staff weeks US$ (including travel and consultant costs) Preparation FY15 26.100 85,393.42 FY16 0 0.00
Total 26.10 85,393.42
Supervision/ICR FY16 21.113 101,858.37 FY17 18.417 64,975.11 FY18 23.915 170,258.13 FY19 18.118 146,265.31
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The World Bank Burundi- Infrastructure Resilience Emergency Project (P150929)
FY20 8.667 58,362.07 Total 90.23 541,718.99
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The World Bank Burundi- Infrastructure Resilience Emergency Project (P150929)
ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT
Components Amount at Approval Actual at Project Percentage of Approval (US$, millions) Closing (US$, millions) Component A. 21.60 21.80 101 Rehabilitation of Roads and Urban Infrastructure Component B. Capacity 2.00 1.20 60 Strengthening in Disaster Risk Management Component C. Institutional 1.40 1.50 107 Support, Project Management, and Coordination Total 25.00 24.50 98
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The World Bank Burundi- Infrastructure Resilience Emergency Project (P150929)
ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
Table 4.1. Contracts Amendments and Cost Overruns on RN1 Works RN1 Civil Description Original Original Starting Date Original Date Completion Date Final Works - and Amendments Number Amount Amount (Order date) (Completion (Final Amount Contract (BIF, (US$, date) acceptance) (US$, Number millions) millions) millions) (% increase original amount) Rehabilitation of the drainage system on RN1 (30 km section Bujumbura- April 10, October 10, 17.8 11.4 11.8 Bugarama), slope stabilization, shoulder 2017 2018 repair, groundwater diversion RN 1 Amendment #1: 4 months delay September7, December 31, June 9, 2019 0 0.0 4% extension 2017 2018 Amendment #2: additional spots (4) 680 0.4 April 30, 2019 Amendment #3: delays related to 0 0.0 June 9, 2019 materials provisions Source: World Bank based on technical audit reports. Note: Estimated costs in U.S. dollars may vary from disbursement because of the fluctuation of exchange rate. Here: US$1= BIF 1,564.
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The World Bank Burundi- Infrastructure Resilience Emergency Project (P150929)
Table 4.2. Cost Overruns for Drainage Channel Works Urban Firm Description Original Original Starting Date (order Original Date Completion Final Infrastructure Amount Amount date) (Completion Date (final Amount Civil Works - (BIF, (US$, date) acceptance) (US$, Contract millions) millions) millions) Number (% increase original amount) Channel construction (907 1,317 0.8 April 10, 2017 March 31, 2018 June 25, 2018 1.0 m) on Nyabagere River Amendment #1: Pice 62 0.0 September 6, 2017 Lot 1 ECBROH 15% adjustment Amendment #2: additional 214 0.1 September 11, 2017 March 14, damages 2019 Channel construction (1,090 1,128 0.7 April 10, 2017 March 31, 2018 July 4, 2018 0.8
m) on Nyabagere River 14% Lot 2 ECAM Contract amendment #1: 160 0.1 September 20, 2018 December 4,
Additional damages 2018 Channel construction (1,475 1,897 1.2 April 10, 2017 March 31, 2018 July 27, 2018 1.3 m) on Nyabagere River 11% Lot 3 ERCON Amendment #1: Material 214 0.1 September 12, 2017 and quantity price adjustment Channel construction (525 1,400 0.9 April 10, 2017 March 31, 2018 June 30, 2019 m) on Gasenyi River and 1.3 retention basin in Carama district Lot 4 ECBROH Amendment #1: Price 544 0.3 December 13,2017 38% adjustment Amendment #2: Additional 123 0.1 August 20,2018
damages Channel construction (950 1,250 0.8 April 10, 2017 March 31, 2018 June 30, 2019 Lot 5 ROBUCO 1.1 m) on Gasenyi River
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The World Bank Burundi- Infrastructure Resilience Emergency Project (P150929)
Urban Firm Description Original Original Starting Date (order Original Date Completion Final Infrastructure Amount Amount date) (Completion Date (final Amount Civil Works - (BIF, (US$, date) acceptance) (US$, Contract millions) millions) millions) Number (% increase original amount) Amendment#1: Material 258 0.2 October 24, 2017 39% quantity adjustment (17%) Amendment #2 Additional 238 0.2 September 24, 2018 December 2018
damages Channel construction (1,749 1,596 1.0 April 10, 2017 March 31, 2018 June 30, 2019 1.2 m) Amendment #1: Gutter September 12, 2017 Lot 6 SOCOA 14% construction Amendment 2: additional 218 0.1 October 20, 2018 Nov-18
damages Gutter construction (2,783 1,876 1.2 April 10, 2017 March 31, 2018 March 31, 1.3 m) 2019 Lot 7 ERCON Amendment #1: additional 134.7 0.1 September 12, 2017 November 1, 2018 39% material quantity Channel construction (856 483 0.3 April 12, 2017 March 31, 2018 February 13, 0.6 m) 2019 Lot 8 ECAM Amendment #1: Retention 430.5 0.3 September 6, 2017 December 20, 39% basin resizing 2018 Gasenyi River 0.3 Channel construction (856 upstream TRANSTECH 502 0.3 December 31, 2018 June 30, 2019 m) 0% works Supervision of Lots 1–8 625.6 0.4 November 1, 2016 November 1, 2017 0.6 works Supervision Amendment#1: Delays September 10, mission Lots CIMA 237.7 0.2 March 6, 2018 June 30, 2019 52% extension 2018 1–8 Amendment#2: Additional 59.7 0.0 August 31, 2018 works
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The World Bank Burundi- Infrastructure Resilience Emergency Project (P150929)
Urban Firm Description Original Original Starting Date (order Original Date Completion Final Infrastructure Amount Amount date) (Completion Date (final Amount Civil Works - (BIF, (US$, date) acceptance) (US$, Contract millions) millions) millions) Number (% increase original amount) Amendment#3: Additional December 19, 2018 March 10, 2019 works 28.2 0.0 7.7 9.6 OVERALL 15 24% Source: World Bank based on technical audit reports. Note: Estimated costs in U.S. dollars may vary from disbursement because of the fluctuation of exchange rate. Here: US$1= BIF 1,564.
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The World Bank Burundi- Infrastructure Resilience Emergency Project (P150929)
Table 4.3. Contractors Performance Indicator for Women Employment Jobs Jobs Jobs Income Income Contract created created created generation Contract Cost generation Contract# Firm Description/Section Cost - male - Female for for BIF for Female (US$) (man- (man- Female Females (BIF) day) day) (%) (US$) Assainissement Carama et 406,069,243 259,703 18,536 7,812 30 21,620,721 13,828 ETRAC protection buterere Lot 1 ECBROH Nyabagere amont 1,379,974,613 882,568 42,463 26,253 38 117,235,714 74,979 Lot 2 ECAM Nyabagere intermediaire 1,128,175,230 721,529 31,328 8,267 21 40,001,019 25,583 Lot 3 ERCON Nyabagere aval 2,111,734,410 1,350,568 41,983 7,059 14 62,268,089 39,824 Lot 4 ECBROH Gasenyi rurale amont 2,056,676,243 1,315,355 41,772 18,163 30 102,787,726 65,738 Lot 5 ROBUCO Gasenyi rurale intermediaire 1,224,245,880 782,971 21,874 6,634 23 40,108,613 25,652 Lot 6 SOCOA Gasenyi rurale aval 2,012,464,777 1,287,080 33,715 16,450 33 107,278,817 68,611 Lot 7 ERCON Gasenyi urbaine (carama) 2,010,563,638 1,285,864 47,067 12,421 21 61,661,554 39,436 Lot 8 ECAM Gasenyi En aval de la RN 9 913,320,738 584,118 11,324 6,999 38 43,719,208 27,961 ETRAC Nyabagere Aval Immediat RN 1 288,625,868 184,592 3,402 1,618 32 11,249,774 7,195 ECAM Protection Dalot Kanyoni 58,954,524 37,705 150 150 50 725,796 464 Rehabilitation Kibonobono et 166,923,339 106,756 480 1,920 80 10,854,200 6,942 ETRAC Taba + prolongement canal lot 8 (en terre) + curage B.E. CHICO Curage Gasenyi 69,100,668 44,194 360 240 40 1,440,000 921 TRANSTECH Gasenyi amont RN 1 548,534,450 350,817 8,208 7,830 49 44,762,563 28,628 TOTAL 14,375,363,621 9,193,819 302,662 121,816 29 665,713,794 425,760 Source: NRA. Note: Estimated costs in U.S. dollars may vary from disbursement because of the fluctuation of exchange rate. Here: US$1= BIF 1,564.
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The World Bank Burundi- Infrastructure Resilience Emergency Project (P150929)
ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS
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The World Bank Burundi- Infrastructure Resilience Emergency Project (P150929)
ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (IF ANY)
1. Borrower’s Evaluation report, MTPWE, June 2019.
2. Burundi Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC), September 2015.
3. Burundi Country Assistance Strategy FY13–FY16 and Performance and Learning Review 2015. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/490171468238758418/Burundi-Country-assistance- strategy-for-the-period-FY13-16
4. Country Partnership Framework for 2019–2023. https://hubs.worldbank.org/docs/imagebank/ (type P150929)
5. Project Appraisal Document. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/152931468226763689/Burundi-Infrastructure- Resilience-Emergency-Project
6. Project Aide Memoires and Implementation Status Results Reports from 2016 to 2019: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/docsearch?query=P150929
7. Technical Audit, 4th and final mission May 2019, Ministry of Transport and Publics Works, Final report of June 2019.
8. National Transport Strategy 2018–2027, June 2019.
9. Final Report of the Price Survey Passenger Transport Units, Passenger Transport Units Goods and Services on RN1 in the Area Influence of the Puri Project, NRA, June 2019.
10. Final audit of the Resettlement Action Plans implementation, MTPWE, June 2019.
11. Concept Note of the Request for Additional Financing (P167737) and PPSD.
12. Burundi National Strategy for Disaster Risks Management and Prevention 2018–2025, Ministry for Public Security, 2019.
13. Aide Memoire, Mission on the Implementation of a System Disaster Risk Information in Burundi, April 2018.
14. Africa Business Climate Plan, Climate Resilient and Low-carbon Transport in Sub-Saharan Africa, World Bank.
15. Climate, Environment and Disaster Risks Reduction Integration Guidance (CEDRIG) https://www.cedrig.org/
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