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EXTERMINATION WARFARE? THE CONDUCT OF THE SECOND MARINE DIVISION AT SAIPAN Benjamin P. Hegi, BA Thesis Prepared for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS May 2008 APPROVED: Adrian R. Lewis, Major Professor and Chair of the Department of History J. Todd Moye, Committee Member Randolph B. Campbell, Committee Member Sandra L. Terrell, Dean of the Robert B. Toulouse School of Graduate Studies Hegi, Benjamin P. Extermination Warfare? The Conduct of the Second Marine Division at Saipan. Master of Arts (History), May 2008, 132 pp., 2 tables, 1 map, 6 figures, references, 94 titles. Historians John W. Dower, Craig Cameron, and Ronald Takaki argue that the Pacific War was a war of extermination fueled by race hate. Therefore, the clash between the military forces of the Japanese Empire and United States of America yielded a “kill or be killed” environment across the battlefields of the Pacific. This work examines the conduct of the Second Marine Division during its campaign of conquest against the Japanese held island of Saipan from June 15, 1944-July 9, 1944. It is based upon traditional military history sources to test their theories in context of the conduct of Marines toward Japanese soldiers and civilians during the Saipan campaign. Did Marines practice a war of extermination or conduct themselves in a humane manner? Copyright 2008 by Benjamin P. Hegi ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS My argument in this thesis is not new. The debate over the nature of the Pacific War began in the 1980s at the University of Michigan among John W. Dower, Craig Cameron, Gerald Linderman, and John Shy. Dower was the first scholar to argue that technology coupled with racism and cultural differences between the Japanese Empire and Allied Nations directly led to a “kill or be killed” battlefield environment, which culminated in his book War Without Mercy: Race & Power in the Pacific War, first published in 1986. His argument, however, was based almost completely upon cultural sources rather than primary documents generated from the war and its participants. Cameron agreed with Dower’s thesis but highlighted this flaw. Cameron examined the conduct of the First Marine Division using primary documents as well as psychological and cultural sources in his work American Samurai: Myth, Imagination, and the Conduct of Battle in the First Marine Division, published in 1994. His work fundamentally fell short as well but highlighted the principal problem with the exterminationist argument--it is impossible to quantify atrocities to prove it is valid. John Shy exposed this flaw in his article “The Cultural Approach to the History of War,” published in 1993. Gerald Linderman furthered Shy’s argument in his book The World Within War: America’s Combat Experience in World War II, published in 1997. In the case of the Pacific War, both scholars argued that race hate and cultural factors represented the experience of war rather than the primary cause for its exterminationist nature. My thesis chair, Dr. Adrian Lewis, was a student of John Shy during this debate and presented the Shy and Linderman argument in his World War II course. My iii argument falls in line with Shy, Linderman, and Lewis. The work presented here is a test case for Dower and Cameron’s argument. I used American Samurai as a general model and examined the conduct of the Second Marine Division on Saipan, specifically, whereas Cameron examined the conduct of Marines in all of the First Division’s campaigns. I would like to thank my committee, Dr. Adrian Lewis, Dr. Todd Moye, and Dr. “Mike” Campbell for their valuable comments that improved this work. Dr. Brian Linn at Texas A&M University and two colleagues at UNT, Glenn Johnston and John Chalkley, were especially helpful during the early stages of this work. There were numerous other peers at UNT who helped me along in this process as well. I would like to thank all of you. I’d like to thank my family and friends for prodding me along when I became bogged down in writing and discouraged. Finally, I’d like to thank my wife DeAnn for her love and support, and especially for reading every page of this document and offering excellent feedback that improved its quality. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...............................................................................................iii LIST OF TABLES, MAPS, AND ILLUSTRATIONS .........................................................vi LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS............................................................................................vii Chapters I. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 1 II. THE SECOND DIVISION, FORAGER, AND SAIPAN ............................. 32 III. SOLDIERS............................................................................................... 57 IV. CIVILIANS ............................................................................................... 90 V. CONCLUSION....................................................................................... 119 APPENDIX: JAPANESE TEXT USED IN PROPAGANDA LEAFLETS DISPERSED BY AMERICAN FORCES DURING THE INVASION OF SAIPAN .................................... 122 BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................... 125 v LIST OF TABLES, MAPS, AND FIGURES Page Tables 1. POWs Taken by the Second Marine Division, June 15, 1944-July 13, 1944...... 82 2. POWs Taken by the Second Marine Division, June 15, 1944-July 13, 1944 (duplicate)......................................................................................................... 111 Maps 1. The Marianas Islands: Saipan 1944 ................................................................... 47 Figures 1. Surrender? ......................................................................................................... 70 2. Life or Death....................................................................................................... 70 3. Digging Out a Jap [sic] ....................................................................................... 77 4. Holed Up .......................................................................................................... 104 5. Good Care........................................................................................................ 105 6. Bag and Baggage............................................................................................. 106 vi LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 2MD Second Marine Division HQ Headquarters JICPOA Joint Intelligence Center: Pacific Oceans Area MCUOHC Marine Corps University Oral History Collection MCURC Marine Corps University Research Center NACP National Archives, College Park NTLF Northern Troops and Landing Force TEWPPC Thomas Eugene Watson Personal Paper Collection UNTOHC University of North Texas Oral History Collection VAC Fifth Amphibious Corps vii CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION War is, according to perhaps the most famous Western military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, “an extreme but natural expression of policy.”1 Clausewitz‟s influence upon military theorists, commanders, and armies around the world was and is far-reaching. His work is still considered one of the most important analyses of war in existence. First, Clausewitz presented a theoretical model--total war--with which historians and military leaders could use to analyze real conflicts. Second, the theorist introduced a list of the components necessary to fight a total war successfully--the remarkable trinity. Clausewitz did not, however, delve in-depth into a unique aspect of war that some argue inherently influences the strategy and military policy of all nations at war--culture. In the case of the Pacific War between the United States of America and the Japanese Empire culture influenced both sides‟ promulgation of the conflict and, thus, must be examined to provide an appropriate context with which to study any particular campaign that occurred during it. The seeds of the Pacific War began germinating during the Imperialism phase of American and European foreign policy. During the mid to late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Western powers quickly extended their influence into the Pacific area by economic, military, and political means. As China and other Pacific and Asian territories were quickly gobbled up by Great Britain, Germany, France, the United States, and others, Japan recognized the danger these nations posed to their own 1 Peter Paret, “Clausewitz,” in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, eds. Peter Paret, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 187. 1 sovereignty. Consequently, national leaders initiated a difficult transition from feudalism to modernity beginning in 1868 with the Meiji Restoration. By 1905 the Meiji Government had westernized economically, politically, and militarily. Japan‟s meteoric rise militarily was made evident to the world with its victory over Russia during the Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905. Soon after Japanese leaders laid plans for “Asian solidarity, cooperation, and resistance to Western imperialism;” what would come to be known as the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.2 Japan had proved that it was able to avoid colonization by hostile European powers. Furthermore, it arose as a world power and a major player in Asia and the Pacific. Japan had not only eluded Western domination, but become an aggressive imperial power in its own right.

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