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ORSAM REVIEW OF ORSAM REVIEW OF REGIONAL AFFAIRS No.19, December 2014 REGIONAL AFFAIRS No.19, December 2014

THE ‘DEEPENING’ OF STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN AND Assist.Prof.Dr. Bayram Sinkaya

Bayram Sinkaya holds This policy brief implications of major develop- a Ph.D. in International ments that took place in 2014 for the bilateral relations be- Relations from Middle tween Baghdad and , including the parliamentary East Technical University elections, the seizure of by ISIS, and the formation of (METU), , new government in Iraq. Iran closely follows developments . He was a visiting in Iraq because of its national security concerns and its re- researcher at Tehran gional strategies. In order to preserve its interests in Iraq, Ira- University in 2003, and nian government adopted a cautious approach throughout at in the elections, played a critical role in the formation of Abadi 2007-2008. He is currently government, and provided comprehensive military support an Assistant Professor to Iraq in its struggle against ISIS. Iran’s political support to of Political at Abadi for the formation of the new government facilitated Yıldırım Beyazıt University, the preservation of Iranian interests in Iraq and strategic re- and works as advisor in lations between Baghdad and Tehran. The comprehensive ORSAM. His academic military support of Iran that was extended to Iraq to boost interests include the its struggle against ISIS led to the widening of military co- Revolutionary Guards of operation between the two countries. It is argued that major Iran, Iranian politics, and developments throughout 2014 furthered Iranian influence international relations of in Iraq, and culminated in the ‘deepening’ of strategic part- the . nership between the two countries. THE ‘DEEPENING’ OF STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN

ne of the most dra- Iranian President Mahmoud matic developments Ahmadinejad paid his last state Othat took place in the visit to Iraq in July 2013. One last decade in the Middle East of the foreign policy priorities politics is the transformation of Hassan Rouhani, who was of the relations between Iraq inaugurated as the new Iranian and Iran from hostility into President in August 2014, has ‘strategic partnership.’ Certa- been sustaining ‘strategic re- inly, the United States played lations’ between Baghdad and a major role in this transfor- Tehran. Hence, M. Javad Za- mation, simply by its interven- rif, Minister of Foreign Affairs, tion in Iraq in 2003 that dest- paid his first visit to Baghdad royed the Baath rule and built in September 2013. a new federal and ‘democratic’ The consecutive visits regime. Iran effectively utili- between Tehran and Baghdad zed the structural change and display critical place of Bagh- new circumstances in the ne- dad in foreign policy strategies ighboring country, and eleva- of Iran, which is maintained ted Baghdad-Tehran relations by successive governments in to a ‘strategic’ level. Former Tehran. Iraq has a remarkable

2 ORSAM REVIEW OF REGIONAL AFFAIRS No.19, December 2014 place with regard to both re- major developments this year, gional strategies and defense which closely affected and sha- policies of Iran. The increase ped bilateral relations between in the volume of total trade the two countries. They are the between the two countries to a parliamentary level above 12 billion dollars conducted on April 30, the sei- indicates that economic aspe- zure of Mosul by ISIS in June, cts of Baghdad-Tehran relati- and the formation of new go- ons have also been growing. vernment in Iraq in September Although the regional power 2014. This review addresses Iran wishes of Iran has perceivably increa- the implications of the afore- a weak and sed partly due to its influence mentioned developments on ‘compromising’ over Iraq, the Iranian leader- Iraq-Iran relations. It is argued government ship has two major concerns that each of the aforementio- in Baghdad with regard to this country. ned developments has led to that would not Firstly, Iran follows closely the the furthering of the Iranian pose threats growing instability across Iraq influence in Iraq, and the ‘dee- to its invested that may eventually lead to the pening’ of strategic partnership interests in the dissolution of the country. The between the two countries. country, but a second major concern of Iran is government the re-empowerment of the Ba- Iraq Parliamentary strong enough to athist groups in Iraq. In other keep the country words, Iran wishes a weak and Elections of 2014 and Iran united. ‘compromising’ government in Iran pursued a cautious poli- Baghdad that would not pose cy vis-à-vis the parliamentary threats to its invested interests elections in Iraq that was held in the country, but a govern- on April 30, 2014. Against the ment strong enough to keep the widespread belief about Irani- 1 country united. an backing of the then Prime The relations between Iraq Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Iran and Iran, however, are hea- always maintained contacts vily affected by internal and with various political move- regional developments. In this ments. It was because the Ira- regards, there have been three nian leadership was also aware 3 THE ‘DEEPENING’ OF STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN

of the fact that policies of Ma- participation in elections as the liki alienated the Sunnis and response of people to terrorism. the towards the regime. The provision of stability in Iran was also concerned with Iraq after the American military the prospect about the rise of withdrawal has become one of violence and instability in the the priorities of Iran. After the country. Additionally, Iran had withdrawal of the American some reservations with Maliki, soldiers, however, the security who was known to be an ‘Arab situation in Iraq was worsened nationalist,’ and who was temp- due to the sectarian-based po- ted to act ‘independently.’2 litical tensions and the adverse There are three important affects of the civil war in . points that could be detected A number of Salafi movements from the statements of Irani- led by ISIS and some bands an statesmen, including Presi- organized by former Baathists dent Rouhani, about the April have widened their maneuver 30 elections.3 These points capability in Iraq and increased constitute the bases of Iranian their attacks in different parts discourse on Iraq, and reflect of the country. Whereas the vi- major concerns of the Iranian olence caused the death of ap- officials. First, they viewed proximately 4,000 civilians in

4 ORSAM REVIEW OF REGIONAL AFFAIRS No.19, December 2014

2011, this number rose to abo- relation to the parliamentary ve 9,500 at the end of 2013.4 elections was the territorial in- The same organizations had tegrity of Iraq. Their stress on called for the boycott of the the territorial integrity could elections shortly before April be regarded as a reaction to 30, and had warned people not various scenarios that envisa- to participate in elections. That ged the disintegration of Iraq is why the Iranian government in response to the recent deve- welcomed relatively high par- lopments in the region. Accor- ticipation rate (60 %) and cal- ding to the Iranian leadership, Additionally, a led it ‘Iraqi people’s challenge such scenarios are imperialist deepening of against terrorist threats.’5 This designs that aimed at fragmen- instability and was largely because of the fact ting and weakening the Islamic security issues that the rising terrorist attacks world. Moreover, the fact that may result in and instability are viewed as the most probable candidates dissolution of threats not only to Iraqi peop- to be adversely affected from Iraq, or outbreak le and the government in Ba- such scenarios are Iraq and of civil war, or ghdad, but also to the Iranian Syria, one ‘strategic partner’ rise of a hostile interests. Maintaining Iranian and the other ‘ally’ of Iran, regime to Tehran, achievements in Iraq, which respectively, further increased all of which mean was acquired through the last Iranian government’s anxiety. emergence of decade, was dependent on the The insistence of the territorial new challenges establishment of stability and integrity of Iraq also could be for Iran. security in the country. Ad- regarded as the Iranian reaction ditionally, the deepening of to the Iraqi Kurdish statements instability and the outbreak of for independence, which came security issues may have resul- just before the elections due to ted in the dissolution of Iraq, or the rise of tensions between Ar- outbreak of civil war, or rise of bil and Baghdad. Although Iran a hostile regime to Tehran, all was one of the supporters of of which meant the emergence the establishment of a federal of new challenges for Iran. system in Iraq, it is not ready to The second point that Ira- accept an independent state of nian authorities underlined in Iraqi Kurds. 5 THE ‘DEEPENING’ OF STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN

The third issue underlined of different social groups in the by Iranian officials was the for- government, as well. However, mation of a government sup- the principal concern of Iran is ported by the majority of Iraqi not the empowerment of par- people. A statement released by ticipatory democracy in Iraq, the Foreign Ministry soon af- but the preservation of power ter the elections expressed the of the Shiite majority in the Iranian hope that “the outcome country and justification of that of the elections would strengt- power through elections. hen the trend of democracy in Outcomes of the elections Iraq and enhance unity betwe- were officially announced in en the Iraqi nation and political groups.” It also stated that “the late May. Accordingly, State formation of a government ele- of Law Coalition led by Ma- cted by people would accelera- liki secured the elections by te the process of development winning 92 of the 325 seats in in Iraq and further isolate ter- the parliament. Since Iranian rorist and extremist movements government had maintained its in the country and the region.”6 ties with Maliki while seeking This kind of statements inclu- for alternatives before the ele- ded necessity of representation ctions, the victory of State of 6 ORSAM REVIEW OF REGIONAL AFFAIRS No.19, December 2014

Law Coalition did not mean a unanswered. As a condition to defeat for Iran. However, Ma- provide military and political liki could not have reflected his support to Iraq, the United Sta- election performance in the ad- tes and its allies asked for the ministration of the country and formation of a national unity national politics. Two subsequ- government in Baghdad that ent developments stroke a he- would include different social avy blow to Maliki’s ambition groups. to lead the government for the Iran is the first third time. Firstly, many poli- Implications of the Rise of country to provide tical groups coming from dif- ISIS on Iraq-Iran Relations unconditional ferent social backgrounds inc- Iran is the first country to pro- support to the luding the Shiites, particularly vide unconditional support to the Kurds, resisted to the third- Maliki government. the Maliki government. Rather term prime ministry of Maliki. Rather than any than any fixed policy of kee- Second, ISIS increased its atta- fixed policy of ping Maliki in power at any cks in , and Sa- keeping Maliki in cost, the preservation of stra- ladin provinces and seized the power at any cost, tegic interests of Iran played a control of many places inclu- the preservation of decisive role in the extension ding the second biggest in strategic interests of that support. Therefore, Iran of Iran played a the country, Mosul. Eventual- is the first country to provide decisive role in the ly, Prime Minister Maliki was support against ISIS threat not extension of that forced to pay political cost of only to the central government support. his sectarian policies, the est- in Baghdad represented by Ma- rangement of the Kurds from liki, but also to the the regime, and the poverty of Regional Government. Iran has the security forces under his taken action in the face of the command to face ISIS. His ri- rise of ISIS -called by Iranians vals answered Maliki’s call for as ‘takfiri terrorist’-, its threat national unity on the condition to the political regime in Iraq, that he would give up his cla- its approach to Iran-Iraq bor- im for the third period in prime der, and its hostility to the Shii- ministry, whereas his call for tes. President Rouhani declared international support remained Iran’s red-lines by stating that 7 THE ‘DEEPENING’ OF STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN

Iran would not allow the fall Assad administration in Syria of Shiite shrine , and the central government in , , and Baghdad Iraq. Additionally, the seizure to the hands of ISIS.7 of vast lands in Iraq, stretching Since the outbreak of the from the Turkish border in the civil war in Syria, Iran has north to the Jordanian border seen the rise of ‘takfiri’ and in the southwest, has disrupted extremist movements in the territorial connection between region as a threat to its inte- the members of the ‘resistance rests. In addition to the com- front’ led by Iran. Second, the mon perception as a source extremists excommunicate the for destabilization, Iran’s con- Shiites and consider them ene- cerns with regard to extremist mies. Because Iranian govern- movements could be analyzed ment views itself as the prote- under three headings. First, ctor of all Shiites, any danger these movements primarily th- surrounding the Shiites in the reaten Iran’s regional allies, the region is regarded as a threat 8 ORSAM REVIEW OF REGIONAL AFFAIRS No.19, December 2014 by Iran. Finally, the advance of Moreover, claiming that the the ‘takfiri’ movements to the United States and its allies Iran-Iraq border is regarded as are mostly responsible for the a major threat to the security of emergence of ISIS, Iranian of- Iran. In this regard, Iran’s ex- ficials called the coalition aga- perience with Taliban in Afg- inst ISIS ‘ridiculous’ and op- hanistan played a decisive role. posed the military intervention After capturing the north of of foreign powers in Iraq. On in 1998, Taliban the one hand, the rise of ISIS had killed 13 Iranian diplomats threat against the government in Mazar-i Sharif and exerted a in Baghdad alarmed security Iran has heavy pressure on the Shiites considerations in Tehran. On also been in the region. That is why Iran the other hand, it provided a re- concerned with was on the brink of a war with asonable base for the improve- the possibility Taliban. Hence, the advance of ment of the strategic relations of the return of ISIS in Khanakin, in the pro- between Iraq and Iran, and an the American vince of Diyalah, 20-km close opportunity for Iran to contain troops to Iraq to the Iranian border, increa- US influence in Iraq. under the sed security concerns of Iran. Iran’s support to the Iraqi pretext of Therefore, Tehran increased government to fight against fighting against security measures at the border ISIS could be classified into ISIS. area. three groups. First, Iran pro- Iran has also been concer- vided arms and munitions to ned with the possibility of the the , the Shiite mi- return of the American troops litia forces and the Kurdish to Iraq under the pretext of fi- peshmerga. Additionally, in ghting against ISIS. For this re- coordination with Russia, Iran ason, Iranian officials asserted supplied 7 SU-25 jet fighters that Iraqi forces have enough with their pilots and a number capacity to fight ISIS and pro- of drones to the service of Iraqi mised the Iraqi government government. Hence, defense every support that it needs in of Iraq, who la- struggling against terrorism. cked an efficient air force, was 9 THE ‘DEEPENING’ OF STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN D ecem be 2014 8-10 Oc r 20-21 2014 to August be 2014 12 r T conference, ‘the W went to T Iraqi Foreign Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari 2014 errorism and Extremism.’ Ju 25 D ly ecem be 2013 ehran to join international 4-5 Se state visit to Iran. Abadi paid his first Iraqi Prime Minister ptem be 2013 14 Prime Minister by President Masum as al-Abadi, who was nominated Iran congratulated Haidar r orld Against

19-20 2013 Ju r President newly elected Iraqi Rouhani congratulated Iranian President Hassan ly Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki visited Iran. T al-Nujaifi went to Parliament Usama Speaker of Iraqi ehran.

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en TIm el t Re I raq-I la tI In ran on e of first visit to Baghdad. M. Javad Zarif paid his Iranian Foreign Minister s visited Iran. Sadun al-Dulaymi Iraqi Defense Minister

Midhat al-Mahmoud visited T Chief of Judicial Council Iraq, judicial cooperation. The two countries signed a MoU on Najaf and Arbil. Council of Iran visited Baghdad, of the Supreme National Security , General Secretary Iranian Foreign Minister Baghdad, Najaf M. Javad Zarif visited

T Nouri Maliki visited Vi ehran. ce-, ehran. Se

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ORSAM REVIEW OF REGIONAL AFFAIRS No.19, December 2014 improved to some extent. The military operations. Iraqi secu- second dimension of Iranian rity forces, the militia, and the support to Iraq is military tra- peshmerga undertake operati- ining. It became obvious that ons in close cooperation with training of Iraqi security for- the Revolutionary Guards. ces was poor. Iraq established Iran’s support to Iraq is not ‘National Defense Forces’ on limited to the logistical sup- a voluntary base in response to port, military training, intel- calls of the Iraqi government ligence sharing and military and the – Ayatollah Sis- advise. Iranian F-4 jets strai- Iranian officers tani – to ‘enlist in the national ghtly bombed some ISIS tar- attached to security forces to fight against gets around Diyala. The role of the Qods terrorism’ soon after the fall Iran in ‘liberating’ some towns 8 Force of the of Mosul to the ISIS. These is repeatedly admitted by vari- voluntary forces also lacked Revolutionary ous Iraqi, Iranian and Kurdish Guards have adequate military training. authorities. The activities of Additionally, the Shiite militia taken charge Qasem Sulaimani in Iraq are of training forces like Badr, Asaib-e Ahl-e pretentiously reported in some voluntary forces al-Hak, and Kataib-e Hizbul- media outlets.9 Although the and the militias lah, which are in coordination exact number of Iranian offi- in addition to with Iran in different levels, cers, who are in Iraq for trai- formal security took action and moved into the ning or advising, is unknown, forces. conflict zones. Iranian officers different sources report that attached to the Qods Force of between 120 and 500 Revo- the Revolutionary Guards have lutionary Guards are active in taken charge of training volun- Iraq.10 tary forces and the militias in addition to formal security for- ces. Third, Iran is engaged in a The Abadi Government close cooperation with the Iraqi and its Relations with Iran security forces on intelligence Iran’s decision to support Iraqi sharing. Furthermore, the Ira- government against ISIS did nian officers provide tactical not mean an effort to keep Ma- consultation throughout the liki in power. Neither of the 11 THE ‘DEEPENING’ OF STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN

Iranian officials congratulated promoted the formation of a the election victory of Mali- new government. In this regard, ki; instead, they waited for the Iran persuaded Maliki to give formation of the government up his claims for the prime mi- in accordance with alliances in nistry, and convinced the Iraqi the new parliament. The parli- Kurds to take part in the new ament, which convened in July government; thereby it helped 2014 elected Fuad Masum as to save ‘national integrity of new president of Iraq. Iran im- Iraq.’11 Additionally, the Iranian mediately congratulated Haidar officials repeated Iran’s promi- al-Abadi, who is nominated as se to support Iraqi government prime minister by President to fight against ISIS. Masum on August 11. Although There are several factors Maliki insisted on his claim to that affected Iran’s decision to be prime minister for a while, support the Abadi government. he could not secure Iran’s sup- Above else, activities of the port. Maliki government relegated In the mid of negotiations both the Sunnis and the Kurds for the establishment of new to the margins of the political government, two high-level fi- system, and made it difficult to gures of the Iranian administra- govern Iraq. Secondly, Iranian tion visited Iraq consecutively. government could not tolera- Firstly, Ali Shamkhani, the Ge- te political quarrels and power neral Secretary of the Supreme vacuum in Baghdad in a critical National Security Council of period, when ISIS continued Iran, visited Baghdad, Najaf to advance in Iraq. Additional- and Arbil on July 16-19. Later, ly, the tense relations between Foreign Minister Zarif visited the Maliki government and the the same cities on August 25- regional countries, including 26, and negotiated with leading Turkey and , were political figures. The consecu- believed to be responsible for tive visits principally aimed at instability in Iraq. Moreover, coordinating a smooth transiti- the growing cooperation betwe- on in government in Iraq, and en the Maliki government and 12 ORSAM REVIEW OF REGIONAL AFFAIRS No.19, December 2014

Tehran heightened concerns of was the fight against ISIS. Aba- a number of regional govern- di thanked his Iranian counter- ments with regard to the Midd- parts for their support against le East strategy of Iran, which ISIS. Iranian officials repea- accelerated the polarization of ted their support to Baghdad the regional countries. In other to preserve territorial integrity words, through his internal and of Iraq and to struggle against foreign policies, the Maliki go- terrorism. Both Supreme Le- vernment endangered Iranian ader Ali Khamanei and Presi- interests in Iraq and in the regi- dent Rouhani asserted that the on. Nevertheless, Maliki could formation of a coalition against secure neither the support of ISIS under the leadership of the Having formed the United States, nor the sup- United States is meaningless his cabinet port of any of the regional go- because the same forces helped and secured vernments. In this regard, Iran to the emergence of the ‘takfi- parliamentary reviewed its position and deci- ri’ group. They underlined that approval on ded to support Abadi. The anti- the primary responsibility for September 8, cipation that Abadi would adopt the struggle against terrorism Abadi paid his a compromising and moderate “should be shouldered by Iraqi first official visit policy inside and outside Iraq government and popular for- to Tehran on 12 led many of the political parties ces.” Interestingly, just before October 20-22. in Iraq and the regional count- his trip to Tehran, Abadi had ries, including Iran, to support stated that Iraq did not need fo- Abadi government. Thereby, reign soldiers to fight against soon after the formation of Iraqi terrorism. The same issues that government under Abadi, the were brought to the agenda by relations between Saudi Arabia the Iranian leaders during the and Iraq started to normalize. visit illustrated both the simi- Having formed his cabinet larities in the views of the two and secured parliamentary ap- governments, and the Iraqi go- proval on September 8, Abadi vernment’s compromise with paid his first official visit to the major concerns of Iran. Tehran on October 20-22. The Iran’s support to the Abadi principal agenda of the visit government does not mean that 13 THE ‘DEEPENING’ OF STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN

it suspended its ties with Mali- over 2014 have led to the dee- ki. That is why Iranian officials pening of the strategic coopera- did not forget ‘valuable contri- tion between the two countries butions’ of Maliki in providing that dates back a decade. The stability in Iraq, while declaring parliamentary elections and the their support to the Abadi go- formation of Abadi government vernment. Soon after Abadi’s did not decrease Iran’s influen- visit to Tehran, Nuri Maliki, ce in Iraq; on the contrary, the now Vice-President, visited two countries have come closer. Iran on November 9-11 and was Iran’s political support to Abadi received by the highest autho- for the formation of government rity in Tehran. This visit meant facilitated the preservation of that Maliki is still an influential the Iranian interests in Iraq and figure in Iraqi politics, and Iran strategic relations between Ba- continues to support different ghdad and Tehran. The comp- political actors in order to save rehensive military support of its interests in Iraq. Iran that was extended to Iraq to help in its struggle against Conclusion ISIS led to the widening of mi- litary cooperation between the Iraq is critically important for two countries. It is not a simple Iranian government both for military cooperation between its regional policies, and for the two governments, since the security of its borders. That is critical role of the Revolutio- why Iran could not remain in- nary Guards either in military different to the developments in Iraq. The structural changes in theatre, or in the training of Iraqi politics after the American security forces, militias and vo- intervention led to the rise of the lunteers have paved the ground Iranian influence in this country. for the consolidation and wide- Eventually, the relationship ning of the Iranian influence in between Iraq and Iran has evol- Iraq. Therefore, developments ved into a strategic partnership. in 2014 culminated in the dee- The major developments that pening of strategic partnership took place in Iraq-Iran relations between Iraq and Iran. 14 ORSAM REVIEW OF REGIONAL AFFAIRS No.19, December 2014

ENDNOTES

1 Bu konuda bkz. International Crisis Group, “Iran in Iraq: How Much Influence?” Middle East Report No. 38, 21 Mart 2005; Reidar Visser, “Iran’s Role in Post-Occupation Iraq: Enemy, Good Neighbor, or Overlord?” The Century Foundation Report, Mart 2009; M. Eisenstadt, M. Knights & A. Ali, “Iran’s Influence in Iraq: Countering Tehran’s Whole- of- Government Approach,” Policy Focus, no.111, Nisan 2011; Babak Rahimi, “Iran’s Declining Influence in Iraq,” The Washington Quarterly, cilt 35, no.1 (2012); Bayram Sinkaya, “Amerikan Askerlerinin Çekilmesinden Sonra Irak-İran İlişkileri,” SETA Rapor, No 9, Mayıs 2013.

2 Ali Hashem, “Iran not Just Focused on Maliki on Iraqi Elections,” Al Monitor, 2 Mayıs 2014; Kenneth M. Pollack, “Iraqi Elections, Iranian Interests,” Brookings, 4 Nisan 2014,

3 Örneğin bkz. ‘Iraq elections Thwarted Terrorists’ Plots: Rouhani,’ Press TV, 18 Mayıs 2014.

4 Bkz.” Monthly civilian deaths from violence, 2003 onwards,” Iraq Body Count , (https:// www.iraqbodycount.org/database/)

5 “Iran: Iraq’s Challenges Terrorism Threats by Holding Parliamentary Elections,” Iraqinews, 1 Mayis 2014, (http://www.iraqinews.com/baghdad-politics/iran-iraqis- challenges-terrorism-threats-by-holding-parliamentary-elections/)

6 “Iran Congratulates Iraq on Parliamentary Polls,” Press TV, 1 Mayıs 2011.

7 “Iran’s Rouhani Blasts ISIS and ‘Ridiculous’ U.S.-led Coalition,” NBC News, 17 Eylül 2014, (http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/irans-rouhani-blasts-isis-ridiculous- u-s-led-coalition-n205496); Brian M Downing, “Iran versus the Islamic State,” Times Online, 4 Aralık 2014, (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/MID-02-041214. html).

8 , “Enter the Ayatollah: Sistani Calls on to Enlist in Fight Against ‘Terrorists’,” Informed Comment, 14 Haziran 2014 (http://www.juancole.com/2014/06/ ayatollah-against-terrorists.html)

9 Bkz, Siobhan O’Grady, “The Dark Knight Rises,” Foreign Policy, 15 October 2014, (http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/15/the-dark-knight-rises/); R. Serdar Ataş, “İran›ın Ortadoğu›daki kılıcı: Kâsım Süleymâni,” Turk, 11 Kasım 2014.

10 “ISIS militants still pressing forward in Iraq,” CNN, 14 Haziran 2014, (http://edition. .com/2014/06/13/world/meast/iraq-violence/index.html); “Iran ‘sent soldiers to fight Iraq” Aljazeera, 23 Agustos 2014 (http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/08/ iran-soldiers-iraq-islamic-state-2014823161322258630.html); 15 THE ‘DEEPENING’ OF STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN

11 “FM: Iran Endeavoring to Hammer out Unity between Baghdad, ,” Fars News Agency, 26 Ağustos 2014, (http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13930604001259).

12 “Abadi in Iran: Leader Asserts Iraq can Defeat Terrorism, President Blames West,” Al- Manar, 21 October 2014.

ORSAM is an independent think-tank specializing on Middle Eastern affairs. ORSAM seeks to diversify sources of knowledge on the region and establish a channel of communication between the local experts and Turkish academic and policy circles. Toward that end, ORSAM facilitates the exchanges of officials, academics, strategists, journalists, businesspeople and members of civil society from the region with their Turkish counterparts. ORSAM conducts studies on the regional developments and disseminates their results to the policy and academic circles as well as the wider public through various publication outlets. ORSAM publications include books, reports, bulletins, newsletters, policy briefs, conference minutes and two journals Ortadoğu Analiz and Ortadoğu Etütleri. © Content of this report is copyrighted to ORSAM. Except reasonable and partial quotation and use under the Act No. 5846, Law on Intellectual and Artistic Works, via proper citation, the content may not be used or re-published without prior permission by ORSAM. The views expressed in this report reflect only the opinions of its authors and do not represent the institutional opinion of ORSAM.

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