IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Lea D. Smith,
Appellant, Case No. 10-0809
V. On Appeal from the Franklin Vashawn L. McBride, et al., County Court of Appeals, Tenth Appellate District Appellees.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT LEA D. SMITH
Brian G. Miller (0063241) (COUNSEL OF RECORD) Brian G. Miller Co., L.P.A. 326 South High Street, Suite 500 Columbus, Ohio 43215 Telephone: (614) 221-4035 Facsimile: (614) 222-1899 Email: b¢mkbgmillerlaw.com COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT, LEA D. SMITH
Boyd W. Gentry (0071057) Joshua R. Schierloh (0078325) Surdyk Dowd & Turner Co. L.P.A. 1 Prestige Place, Suite 700 Miamisburg, Ohio 45342 ^^^^^ ^F COURT Telephone: (937) 222-2333 ^^^RS-a4i='('U'^T 0^` aHIO__^ Facsimile: (937) 222-1970 0 Email: boentry n sdtlawyers.com j schierlohksdtlawyers. com COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES, CLINTON TOWNSHIP AND SGT. TRAVIS D. CARPENTER TABLE OF CONTENTS
Paee
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...... iii
I. INTRODU CTI ON ...... 1
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND LEGISLATIVE INTENT ...... 1
A. The Plain Statutory Language and Legislative Intent Behind the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act ...... :...... 1
B. Reading Statutes In Pari Materia ...... 2
C. Ohio Police Officers Do Not Have Statewide Authority ...... <5
III. PUBLIC POLICY FAVORS A BRIGHT-LINE STANDARD ...... 6
A. Appellant's Propositions of Law Promote Clarity not Confusion ...... 6
B. Appellant's Propositions of Law Promote Fiscal Integrity and ...... 7 Conservation of Resources
C. Appellees' Arguments Are Misplaced ...... 9
IV. APPELLEES' COUNTERARGUMENTS AND SUPPORTING CASES DO NOT ADDRESS THE ISSUES PRESENTED IN THE CASE SUB JUDICE...... 10
A. The Relationship Between Geography, R.C. § 2744, et seq., and R.C. § 11 505.431 ......
B. Mutual Aid Agreements Provide a Basis For Extending Immunity ...... 18
C. Results of Appellant's Position Are Consistent with Statutory Law ...... 21
D. Emergency Calls Can Take Place Outside of Jurisdictional Boundaries But Sufficient Criteria for "Professional Obligation" Must be Met ...... 22
V. APPELLEES' STATEMENT OF "FACTS" ...... 23
VI. CONCLUSION ...... 24
PROOF OF SERVICE ...... 26
i APPENDIX Appendix Page
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 176, Section 8, 141 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1733 ...... 1
O.R.C. § 1.49(D) ...... 39
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8953 ...... 40
California Penal Code § 803.1 ...... 45
725 ILCS 5/107-4 ...... 49
Maryland Criminal Procedure § 2-102 ...... 51
O.R.C. § 307.93 ...... 55
O.R.C. § 341.12 ...... 58
O.R.C. § 341.16 ...... 59
O.R.C. § 341.23 ...... 60
O.R.C. § 341.32 ...... 61
O.R.C. § 753.16 ...... 62
O.R.C. § 2931.30 ...... 64
O.R.C. § 2935.02 ...... 65
O.R.C. § 2949.12 ...... 66
O.R.C. § 2949.13 ...... 67
O.R.C. § 2949.17 ...... 68
O.R.C. § 719.01 ...... 69
O.R.C. § 719.02 ...... 71 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Paize CASES:
Agnew v. Porter (1970), 23 Ohio St.2d 18 ...... 16
Brown v. City of Cuyahoga Falls (9`h Dist., 2010), 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 3659, 2010 Ohio 4330 ...... 21
Burnell v. Dulle (12`h Dist., 2006), 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 7033, 2006-Ohio-7044 ...... 18 ...... 1 Cline v. Ohio Bur. OfMotor Vehicles (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 93 ......
(1946), 146 Ohio St.203 ...... 1 Carter v. Division of Water (2003), 99 Ohio St.3d 215, 2003-Ohio-3319 ...... 2,20,21 Colbert v. Cleveland (July 24, 2008) 8th Dist. No. 88375, 2008-Ohio-3660 ...... 20 Fogle v. Bentleyville
(2007), 115 Ohio St.3d 77 ...... :.1,7,8 Hubbell v. City ofXenia (ls` Dist., 1999), 133 Ohio App.3d 535 ...... 14,15 Hunsche v. City of Loveland Dist., 1987), 1987 Ohio App. LEXIS 5559 ...... 17 Jennings v. Grayczyk (6h
Dist., 1991), 75 Ohio App.3d 453, 456 ...... 15 Lewis v. Bland (9`" (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 1216, 1999-Ohio-296 ...... 20 McGuire v. Lovell (9`" Dist., 1998), 125 Ohio App.3d 33 ...... 14,15 McNamara v. City ofRittman
Menefee v. Queen City Metro (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 27 ...... 7
Parton v. Weilnau (1959), 169 Ohio St.145 ...... 23
Perry v. City of East Cleveland (11`h Dist., 1996), 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 507...... 11,12,13
Posner v. Dept. of Pub. Safety (10`h Dist., 2000), 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 4496 ...... 20,21
Rambus v. Toledo (e Dist., 2008), 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 3590, 2008-Ohio-4283 ...... 9,13,14,15
Rutledge v. O'Toole (8th Dist., 2005), 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 1023, 2005-Ohio-1010...... 14,20 Sawicki v. Ottawa Hills (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 222 ...... 3
iii Ohio App. LEXIS 12626 ...... 24 Shaffer v. Thompson (10`h Dist., 1980), 1980 2002), 148 Ohio App.3d 41, 2002 Ohio 222...... 15 Shalkhauser v. City of Medina (9"' Dist., 1956), 164 Ohio St.463 ...... 4 State ex rel. Pratt v. Weygandt ( (5`h Dist., 1982), 1982 Ohio App. LEXIS 13766 ...... 15,16 Stover v. Hamilton
STATUTES AND RULES: California Penal Code § 803.1 ...... 6
725 ILCS 5/107-4 ...... 6
Maryland Criminal Procedure § 2-102 ...... 6
O.R.C. § 1.49(D) ...... 4
O.R.C. § 307.93 ...... 13
O.R.C. § 311.29 ...... :...... 3,6,11,23
O.R.C. § 341.12 ...... 13
O.R.C. § 341.16 ...... 13
O.R.C. § 341.23 ...... 13
O.R.C. § 341.32 ...... 13
O.R.C. § 505.43 ...... 3,6,7,8,9,11,23
O.R.C. § 505.431 ...... 1,2,3,4,6,7,11,12,13,16,19,23,24
O.R.C. § 719.01 ...... 14
O.R.C. § 719.02 ...... 14
O.R.C. § 737.04 ...... 3,6,11,23
O.R.C. § 737.041 ...... 3,4,6,11,23
O.R.C. § 753.16 ...... 13
iv O.R.C. § 2744.01 ...... 2,4,11,16,17,19,20
O.R.C. § 2744.02 (or § 2744.) ...... 1,2,3,4,8,9,10,11,12,13,15,18,19,21,22,24
O.R.C. § 2744.03 ...... 11,22
O.R.C. § 2931.30 ...... 13
O.R.C. § 2935.02 ...... 13
O.R.C. § 2935.03 ...... 6
O.R.C. § 2949.12 ...... 13
O.R.C. § 2949.13 ...... 13
O.R.C. § 2949.17 ...... 13
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8953 ...... 5
v I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant's argument is simple - Appellee Sgt. Travis Carpenter was not on an
"emergency call" at the time of the underlying accident because there was no written mutual aid pact or equivalent legislative resolution' between Appellee Clinton Township
and Franklin County. Without such mutual aid agreement, Appellee Sgt. Carpenter had
no "professional obligation" to respond outside his jurisdiction to the general call for
assistance issued by the Franklin County Sheriff's Office, and in the absence of such
professional obligation there was no call to duty and, therefore, no "emergency call."
The analysis in this case should focus on the interrelationship between R.C. §
2744.02(B)(1)(a) and R.C. § 505.431 in construing the term "emergency call." Without
sufficient basis for an "emergency call," there can be no R.C. § 2744.02(B)(1)(a)
immunity.
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND LEGISLATIVE INTENT
In interpreting statutes, a court must first look to the plain language of the statute
to determine the legislative intent Z If, however, a statute is subject to more than one
interpretation, then the rules of statutory construction may be invoked.3 This Court has
written that "The primary rule in statutory construction is to give effect to the
legislature's intention."4
A. The Plain Statutory Language and Legislative Intent Behind the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act
1 For the sake of ease, Appellant will collectively refer to a written contract, pact and/or legislative resolution as a "mutual aid agreement" 2 Hubbell v. City ofXenia (2007), 115 Ohio St.3d 77, ¶ 11 3 Cline v. Ohio Bur. ofMotor Vehicles (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 93, 96 ° Id., 97 (citing Carter v. Division of Water (1946), 146 Ohio St. 203, ¶ 1 of syllabus)
1 As noted above, this case involves the interpretation of and interrelationship between R.C. § 2744.02(B)(1)(a) and R.C. § 505.431. Ohio Revised Code § 2744.01, et seq. is the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act and was passed in 1985. Under the
Act, political subdivisions such as Appellee Clinton Township are generally presumed to be immune from civil liability. However, pursuant to R.C. § 2744.02(B)(1)(a) they can be held liable if one of their police officers, while not on an "emergency call," negligently causes injury to another person.5 The term "emergency call" is defined in the
Revised Code as "a call to duty"6 and has been defined by this Court as "a situation to
which a response by a peace officer is required by the officer's professional
obligation."7 In passing the Act, the Ohio General Assembly made its intent apparent. the protections afforded to political subdivisions and employees of political subdivisions by this act are urgently needed in order to ensure the ... continued ability of local governments to provide public peace, health, and safety services for their residents.8 Clearly, then, the Ohio General Assembly recognized that the immunity it was conferring
upon political subdivisions was limited to situations involving the provision of services to
the political subdivisions' own residents and that the term "emergency call" should be
limited to circumstances where police officers are providing services and protection to
the residents of the political subdivisions by which they are employed.
B. Reading Statutes In Pari Materia The Ohio General Assembly also recognized that there are situations where one
political subdivision's police department may provide police services to another political
5 O.R.C. § 2 744.02 (B) (1) (a) 6 O.R.C. 2744.01(A) 7 Colbert v. Cleveland (2003), 99 Ohio St.3d 215, syllabus, 2003-Ohio-3319 (emphasis added) 8 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 176, Section 8, 141 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1733 (App. pp. 1-38 at 37) (emphasis added)
2 subdivision. Consequently, the legislature specifically provided for such situations by enacting laws whereby political subdivisions could provide and receive additional police protection.9 Collectively, these statutes provide a framework that allows counties, townships, and other similar political subdivisions to provide police protection to and receive police protection from other political subdivisions. As the present case involves a police officer from Appellee Clinton Township providing additional police protection to
Franklin County, the applicable statute is R.C. § 505.431. This statute reads, in pertinent
part: The police department of any township * * * may provide police protection to any county * * * without a contract to provide police protection, upon the approval, by resolution, of the board of township and upon trustees of the township in which the department is located authorization by an officer or employee of the police department providing the police protection who is designated by title of office or position, pursuant to the resolution of the board of township trustees, to give such authorization.10 Clearly, then, in the absence of a contract or a board of township trustees resolution, a
township police officer has no obligation or authority to provide police protection to any
county. Thus, when a township police officer such as Appellee Sgt. Carpenter responds
to a call for assistance from a county with which he does not have a mutual aid
agreement, he does so not pursuant to any duty or obligation but rather "with only the „ii authority and the insurance protection of an ordinary citizen.
Although Appellant does not believe that R.C. § 2744.02(B)(1)(a) is ambiguous,
particularly in light of the General Assembly's stated purpose in passing that statute (as
part of the Act), if it is ambiguous then it can be read in conjunction with R.C.§
9 See O.R.C. §§ 311.29, 505.43, 505.431, 737.04 and 737.041 10 O.R.C. § 505.431 (emphasis added) 11 Sawicki v. Ottawa Hills (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 222, 227
3 505.431.12 This position was, in fact, advanced by Appellees in their brie£ As Appellees appropriately set forth, "statutes relating to the same ... subject ... are in pari materia and should be read together to ascertain and effectuate if possible the legislative intent."13
Interestingly, after making this argument, Appellees completely fail to note that R.C. §
505.431 specifically incorporates R.C. § 2744.01, et seq. Chapter 2744. of the Revised Code, insofar as it applies to the operation of police departrnents, shall apply to any township police department or township police district and to its members when such members are rendering police services pursuant to this section outside the township or township police district by which they are employed.14
Appellees are clearly misguided when they argue that Appellant relies on the "inference
that the language in R.C. § 505.431 ... give[s] immunity to police officers providing
mutual aid pursuant to contract."15 Indeed, the explicit language of R.C. § 505.431
makes it clear that R.C. § 2744 applies only when police officers are providing aid
pursuant to R.C. § 505.43 1, i.e., pursuant to a mutual aid agreement. Moreover, reading
this language along with the stated legislative intent behind R.C. § 2744.01, et seq. makes
it obvious that the Ohio General Assembly specifically intended to limit the immunity
conferred by the Act to situations where police officers are providing police protection
within their own boundaries and/or to their political subdivision's own residents, or to a
political subdivision with which their own political subdivision has a mutual aid
agreement. If it were not, and Appellees' argument were accepted, then the phrase
"pursuant to this section outside the township or township police district by which they
are employed"16 would be superfluous and have no legal significance.
12 See O.R.C. § 1.49(D); see also State ex rel. Pratt v. Weygandt (1956), 164 Ohio St. 463, ¶ 2 of syllabus 13 Appellees' Brief, p. 15 (quoting Weygandt, supra, 12 of syllabus) 14 O.R.C. § 505.431 (emphasis added); O.R.C. § 737.041 contains analogous language incorporating Chapter 2744. 15 Appellees' Brief, p. 15 16 O.R.C. § 505.431 (emphasis added)
4 C. Ohio Police Officers Do Not Have Statewide Authority
Finally, a review of the Ohio Revised Code finds nothing that indicates a police officer has statewide jurisdiction, which would, essentially, be the outcome if Appellees' argument were accepted. In contrast, other states do have specific laws which give police officers statewide power in certain situations.
For instance, Pennsylvania law allows a police officer make extra-jurisdictional arrests in six instances: (1) pursuant to court order; (2) when the officer is in hot pursuit of any person for any offense which was committed...within his primary jurisdiction; (3) when aiding or assisting another law enforcement officer; (4) with the other jurisdiction's
prior consent; (5) when the officer is on official business and views an offense, or has
probable cause to believe that a felony, misdemeanor, breach of the peace or other act
which presents an immediate clear and present danger has been committed; and (6) when
the officer witnesses an offense which is a felony, or has a probable cause to believe...a
felony has been committed.17
Similarly, California law also gives California police officers extra-jurisdictional
authority in certain circumstances:
... The authority of these peace officers extends to any place in the state, as follows:
(2) Where the peace officer has the prior consent of the chief of police or chief, director, or chief executive officer of a consolidated municipal public safety agency, or person authorized by him or her to give consent, if the place is within a city, or of the sheriff, or person authorized by him or her to give consent, if the place is within a county.
17 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8953 (App. pp. 40-44 at p. 43-44)
5 (3) As to any public offense committed or which there is probable cause to believe has been committed in the peace officer's presence, and with respect to which there is immediate danger to person or property, or of the escape of the perpetrator of the offense.l$ Other states have similar provisions.19 In contrast, however, Ohio has very specific circumstances, such as hot pursuit20 and pursuant to mutual aid agreements,21 under which police officers may respond extra-jurisdictionally. Thus, pursuant to the maxim
"inclusio unius est exclusio alterius," in the absence of a statute to the contrary, police
officers in Ohio do not have blanket extra-jurisdictional authority and thus their political
subdivisions are not entitled to blanket immunity when such officers are acting outside of
the borders of the political subdivision.
III. PUBLIC POLICY FAVORS A BRIGHT-LINE STANDARD
A. Appellant's Propositions of Law Promote Clarity not Confusion Contrary to Appellees' argument, creating a bright-line standard with respect to
an officer's extra-jurisdictional qualifications for immunity would lead to neither
confusion nor a chilling affect on the ability of police officers to perform the functions of
their job. In fact, the exact opposite is true. When mutual aid agreements are in place
and properly maintained, and police officers are properly educated with respect to the
existence of the same, officers will know precisely where and when they and their
political subdivisions are entitled to immunity. Having a mutual aid agreement in place
with a nearby jurisdiction will ensure that police officers will know that they can conduct
themselves in exactly the same manner in both (or all) jurisdictions when responding to a
set of circumstances that would (within their own jurisdiction) constitute an emergency
18 California Penal Code § 830.1 (App. pp. 45-48 at p. 47) 19 See 725 ILCS 5/107-4 (App. pp. 49-50 at p. 50); see also Maryland Criminal Procedure § 2-102 (App. pp. 51-54 at p. 53) 210. R.C. § 2935.03 21 O.R.C. §§ 311.29, 505.43, 505.431, 737.04 and 737.041
6 call. The regular maintenance of such mutual aid agreements will, therefore, eliminate confusion and create clarity in the operation of police departments. It will also ensure
police accountability and eliminate the potential for abuse and after-the-fact justification
of runs.
Appellees suggest that there are restraints preventing political subdivisions from
entering into mutual aid agreements, yet they offer no support for this contention. As a
practical matter, mutual aid agreements typically consist simply of a 2-3 page template
which can easily be executed by representatives of the respective political subdivisions
involved. Inconvenience or political inexpediency simply do not justify the failure to
comply with the law in terms of having mutual aid agreements drafted and regularly
maintained in order to extend the protections of a political subdivision's immunity. By
doing their part - as required by statutes such as R.C. § 505.43 and/or R.C. § 505.431-
the decision-makers for neighboring jurisdictions will eliminate questions about
jurisdictional authority "flickering" on and off. This, in turn, will eliminate second
guessing and promote the efficient performance of police officers' job responsibilities.
B. Appellant's Propositions of Law Promote Fiscal Integrity and Conservation of Resources
Moreover, a bright-line rule would further the purposes behind the Political
Subdivision Tort Liability Act. This Court has held that an additional purpose of the Act
was to conserve the fiscal resources of political subdivisions while allowing injured
persons to recover for torts committed by political subdivisions 22 A bright-line rule
would allow for exactly that by promoting judicial economy. As this Court noted in
Hubbell, supra:
22 Menefee v. Queen City Metro (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 27, 29
7 "[D]etermination of whether a political subdivision is immune from liability is usually pivotal to the ultimate outcome of a lawsuit. Early resolution of the issue of whether a political subdivision is immune from liability pursuant to R. C. Chapter 2744 is beneficial to both of the parties. If the appellate court holds that the political subdivision is immune, the litigation can come to an early end, with the same outcome that otherwise would have been reached only after trial, resulting in a savings to all parties of costs and attorney fees. Alternatively, if the appellate court holds that immunity does not apply, that early finding will encourage the political subdivision to settle promptly with the victim rather than pursue a lengthy trial and appeals. Under either scenario, both the plaintiff and the political subdivision may save the time, effort, and expense of a trial and appeal, which could take years."23
By establishing a bright-line rule limiting a police officer's professional obligation to provide extra-jurisdictional police services to situations where a mutual aid agreement is in effect, parties involved in litigation where such an issue is in play can save costs. If a mutual aid agreement exists then there is a clear basis for determining that a police officer is on an emergency call and that immunity applies, meaning that any litigation can come to an early end (if litigation is even instituted). If no mutual aid agreement exists, then the police officer was not on an emergency call, there is no immunity, and the political subdivision may be encouraged to settle promptly. In either case, "both the plaintiff and the political subdivision [would] save the time, effort, and expense of a trial
and appeal. . . ."24 Mutual aid agreements, themselves, also further the purpose of fiscal conservation
by allowing political subdivisions with sparse capital resources to obtain police
protection for their residents. For example, in a situation where a township does not have
the budget for a $500,000.00 per year police force but could pay a neighboring political
subdivision $100,000.00 for police protection, R.C. § 505.43 would allow it to contract
with that neighboring political subdivision for the police protection. As a result, the
23 Hubbell, supra, ¶ 25 (internal citations omitted) (bold added; italics original) 24 Id.
8 township would save $400,000.00 per year and still ensure that its residents have police protection while the neighboring political subdivision would receive an additional
$100,000.00 in revenue for patrolling and protecting the township and still enjoy the
immunity conferred under R.C. § 2744.02(B)(1)(a) as a result of complying with R.C. §
505.43.
C. Appellees' Arguments Are Misplaced
Still, Appellees assert that the adoption of Appellant's position would lead to
negative consequences25 First, Appellees bring up the need for officers to transport
prisoners outside of their jurisdiction.26 Appellees then jump to the overreaching
conclusion that acceptance of Appellant's argument would result in police officers having
to choose between their duties and immunity.27 Nothing could be further from the truth.
As is discussed farther below, the statutes and case law are clear - transporting a prisoner
is an emergency call.28 Furthermore, the plain language of the Political Subdivision Tort
Liability Act makes it clear that officers need not choose between their duties and
immunity. If an officer is on an emergency call, i.e., something that is required by their
professional obligation, then, assuming an absence of willfulness or wantonness,
immunity applies pursuant to R.C. § 2744.02(B)(1)(a). There is no choice between duty
and immunity. When acting pursuant to a professional obligation or duty there is
immunity.
Appellees next point out that the boundaries of political subdivisions are not
"cleanly aligned" and that Appellant's argument would have immunity flicker on and off
25 Appellees' Brief, pp. 8-9 26Id., p. 8 27 Id 28 Rambus v. Toledo (61h Dist., 2008), 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 3590, 2008-Ohio-4283
9 with each passing street.29 This, however, is not the problem that Appellees perceive it to be. Appellant is asking this Court to find that a mutual aid agreement is required for there to be an "emergency call" when an officer is providing police protection or services to another jurisdiction. If a police officer is providing protection to his own jurisdiction, then the officer is on an emergency call and both he and the political subdivision have immunity, irrespective of where the officer may travel. Immunity would not be determined specifically by the jurisdiction in which the officer is traveling. Rather, it would be determined by whether the officer has a basis for actually being on an
emergency call - whether within or outside of his or her own jurisdiction.
Finally, Appellees hypothesize a situation involving paramedics who are
"[w]ithout question ... on an `emergency call."'30 Their hypothetical situation, however,
fails to recognize that R.C. § 2744.02(B)(1)(a), the particular code section in question in
the present case, is limited to police departments and police agencies. Consequently,
such hypothetical is irrelevant to the present case.
IV. APPELLEES' COUNTERARGUMENTS AND SUPPORTING CASES DO NOT ADDRESS THE ISSUES PRESENTED IN THE CASE SUB JUDICE
Appellees make counterarguments - which they set forth as "Propositions of
Law" - and in support of such arguments cite a number of cases. At the outset it should
be noted that Appellees have not filed a cross-appeal and, as such, have no authority to
set forth any "propositions of law." Notwithstanding this, Appellees counterarguments
are unpersuasive as the cases on which they rely are generally distinguishable from and
inapposite to the circumstances involved in the case at bar.
29 Appellees' Brief, p. 8 30 Id.
10 A. The Relationship Between Geography, R.C. § 2744, et seq., and R.C. § 505.431
The thrust of Appellees' first counterargument is that the Political Subdivision
Tort Liability Act is not limited by geography. As demonstrated above, however,
Appellees' claim contravenes the stated purpose of the Act, to wit, "to ensure the ...
continued ability of local governments to provide ... services for their residents."31
Moreover, Appellees' argument not only necessitates that this Court ignore the stated
purpose of the Act but also requires that the Act be viewed in a vacuum and without
giving consideration to R.C. § 505.431 (or any of the other related statutes).32 As noted
above, R.C. § 505.431 specifically applies the Act to situations where township police
officers are "rendering police services pursuant to this section outside the township or
township police district by which they are employed."33 If R.C. § 2744.01, et seq. were
not limited by geography then there would have been no need for the General Assembly
to promulgate R.C. §505.431 (and related sections) and to note that R.C. §2744 applies
when township police officers are rendering services "outside" of their jurisdiction
pursuant to a mutual aid agreement.
Appellees further claim that the existence of a mutual aid pact is irrelevant to the
application of R.C. §§ 2744.02 and 2744.03 and cite Perry v. City of East Cleveland34 in
support of this assertion. But Perry is completely inapposite to the case at bar. Appellees
fail to advise the Court that the issue in Perry was whether the underlying act: (1) involved the necessary or essential exercise of [the governmental body's] powers; (2) was within the discretionary policy-making powers of the employee; or (3) was within the resource allocation powers of the employee.3s
31 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 176, Section 8, 141 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1733 (App. p. 37) (emphasis added) 32 Including O.R.C. §§311.29, 505.43, 737.04, and 737.041 33 O.R.C. § 505.431 (emphasis added) 34 (11" Dist., 1996), 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 507 35 Id., *8
11 More importantly, and in complete contrast to the case at bar, there is no discussion in
Perry about mutual aid agreements or any "emergency call." Rather, Perry involved the housing of a police dog in another jurisdiction, not the operation of a motor vehicle related to the provision of police protection to another jurisdiction. Consequently, neither
R.C. § 2744.02(B)(1)(a) nor R.C. § 505.431 was ever at issue and Perry has no bearing on the present case.
Nonetheless, Appellees assert that Perry "addressed the merits of Appellant's
contention that a police officer engaged in a governmental function outside of his or her "36 jurisdictional limits is not protected by the immunity provisions of R.C. 2744, et seq.
Appellees clearly misunderstand Appellant's position. Appellant does not seek a blanket
rule of law removing immunity for police officers who act outside of their jurisdiction.
Rather, Appellant's argument is limited to circumstances involving the question of
whether a police officer providing police protection or services to another jurisdiction is
on an "emergency call" for purposes of R.C. § 2744.02(B)(1)(a) innnunity, and this
matter was not addressed by the Eleventh District in Perry.
Appellees further point to R.C. § 2744.02(A)(2), which reads,
The defenses and immunities conferred under this chapter apply in connection with all governmental and proprietary functions performed by a political subdivision and its employees, whether performed on behalf of that political subdivision or on behalf of another political subdivision 37
Appellees assert that the emphasized language demonstrates that the immunity travels
with the political subdivision employee when he is outside of his jurisdiction.38 Again,
however, Appellees fail to take into consideration mutual aid agreement statutes such as
36 Appellees' Brief, pp. 6-7 37 O.R.C. § 2744.02(A)(2) (emphasis added) 38 Appellees' Brief, p. 6
12 R.C. § 505.431. All of the statutes addressing mutual aid agreements were specifically amended when Chapter 2744 was enacted to refer to Chapter 2744. It is, therefore, clear that the General Assembly intended R.C. § 505.431 (and similar statutes) to work in conjunction with - as opposed to isolated from - the Political Subdivision Tort Liability
Act.
Appellees next cite other situations where police officers leave their jurisdictions but are still on emergency calls. First, they direct the Court's attention to Rambus supra,
which, like Perry, makes absolutely no mention of mutual aid agreements. Appellees
claim that, per Rambus, "[i]t is roundly accepted that a police officer is engaged in an
`emergency call' while transporting a prisoner."39 First, it is worth nothing that Ohio
courts have already determined that when officers are transporting a prisoner they are on
an "emergency call" and Appellant has made no argument to the contrary. Even more
significantly, there are statutes which clearly contemplate situations where police officers
will be transporting prisoners. For example, Chapter 3 of the Revised Code provides for
the establishment of correctional centers that serve multiple counties, thereby requiring
the transport of out-of-county prisoners to and from the center.40 Chapter 3 also allows
the sheriff of a county not having a sufficient jail or staff to convey a prisoner to a jail in
any county the sheriff considers most convenient and secure.41 Thus, there is a clear
statutory framework in place that supports the determination that the transporting of a
prisoner constitutes an "emergency call" pursuant to R.C. § 2744.02(B)(1)(a) 42
Additionally, Appellees fail to discuss the fact that, in Rambus, the
39 Appellees' Brlef, p. 6 41 O.R.C. § 307.93 41 O.R.C. § 341.12 42 See also O.R.C. §§ 341.16, 341.23, 341.32, 753.16, 2931.30, 2935.02, 2949.12, 2949.13 and 2949.17
13 officer in question "was transporting a prisoner pursuant to an order he received from the police dispatcher.i43 Had the officer in Rambus failed to transport the prisoner, such action (or non-action) would have amounted to a dereliction of duty for which he could have been reprimanded.44 In contrast, Appellee Sgt. Carpenter, in the case at bar, was not
directly ordered to assist the Franklin County Sheriff s deputy nor was he specifically
requested by the Sherift's Office.45 And had Appellee Sgt. Carpenter not responded to
the general call for help, he would not have been reprimanded for ignoring his duties.
Rambus is, therefore, factually distinguishable from the present case. The case sub judice
is fact-specific and deals only with an officer responding to a general call for assistance
from outside of his or her jurisdiction.
Appellees also cite Hunsche v. City of Loveland,46 which dealt with a park owned
by the City of Loveland but located outside the city's borders. While the court in
Hunsche held that the City of Loveland was entitled to immunity for negligent acts
related to the park, the First District's decision dealt with the right of a municipality to
exercise power of local self-governance pursuant to specific statutes, namely, R.C. §§
719.01(B) and 719.02 47 Similarly, McNamara v. City of Rittman,48 also relied upon by
Appellees, involved negligent operation of a well owned by the City of Rittman but
located outside of the city. In that case, the Ninth District determined that the City of
Rittman was entitled to immunity because the City, in the operation of its well, was
exercising discretion or judgment and such discretion was not exercised maliciously, in
43 Rambus, supra, ¶ 16 44 See Rutledge v. O'Toole (8`" Dist., 2005), 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 1023, 2005-Ohio- 1010, ¶ 22 45 Supp. p. 17; Deposition of Sgt. Carpenter, pp. 63-65 ab (1st Dist., 1999), 133 Ohio App.3d 535 47 Id., 539 48 (9th Dist., 1998), 125 Ohio App.3d 33
14 bad faith or wantonly or recklessly.49 Clearly both Hunsche and McNamara, like
Rambus above, are factually and legally distinguishable from the present case as they
involve facts and issues not at all related to any sort of "emergency call."
Appellees later cite Shalkhauser v. City of Medina50 and Stover v. Hamilton.51 In
Shalkhauser, the officer involved, Officer Daniel Getto of the Medina Police Department,
personally observed a vehicle, in his jurisdiction, veer left of center and then come back
into the proper lane.52 Officer Getto initiated a traffic stop but instead of stopping the
vehicle fled.53 Officer Getto pursued the vehicle and that vehicle eventually collided with
a third vehicle.54 In finding the City of Medina was immune under R.C. §
2744.02(B)(1)(a), the Ninth District noted that in a previous case it had determined that it
was "`the duty of law enforcement officials who observe reckless motorists to apprehend
those motorists who make the highways dangerous to others."'55 As Officer Getto had
personally observed the reckless operation of the other vehicle within his jurisdictional
limits, the court concluded that he was responding to an emergency call.56 Contrast this
to the case at bar where, again, Appellee Sgt. Carpenter did not observe any illegal or
improper activity. Moreover, the illegal activity in Shalkhauser occurred in Officer
Getto's jurisdiction. In the present case, any illegal activity that may have occurred took
place outside of Appellee Clinton Township's borders.
49 McNamara, supra, 44-47 so (90' Dist., 2002), 148 Ohio App.3d 41, 2002 Ohio 222 " (5th Dist., 1982), 1982 Ohio App. LEXIS 13766 52 Shalkhauser, ¶ 2 s3Id ¶3 54Id,¶5 ss Id., ¶ 25 (quoting Lewis v. Bland (9th Dist., 1991), 75 Ohio App.3d 453, 456) (emphasis added) 56 Id.
15 Stover involved the immunity of an officer, not of a political subdivision, and it was decided prior to the enactment of R.C. § 2744.01, et seq. In Stover, Officer Wilford
Stover, who was already in his patrol car, was specifically called to the scene of a burning car, outside of his jurisdiction, by another officer from his jurisdiction.57 While en route, he was involved in an accident 58 In finding that Officer Stover was entitled to immunity, the Fifth District, citing Agnew v. Porter,59 held that Officer Stover was engaged in an
emergency call because, as an officer who received a call from another officer within his
own department, he was "`entitled, as a matter of law, to accept the call at face value and
[had] no duty to independently determine whether an actual emergency [existed]...."'bo
Again, the promulgation of R.C. § 2744.01 et seq. and the corresponding revisions of
R.C. §505.431 and related statutes suggest that a mutual aid agreement is now required
for the type of run that took place in Stover. It should also be noted as a matter of
distinguishing the cited cases and the one sub judice that both Officer Stover and the
police officer in Agnew were already in their police cruisers and both were directly
ordered to proceed to their destinations by someone within their own police department.61
In fact, in Agnew, this Court specifically wrote in the syllabus that its decision applied
"Where a policeman, on duty in a police cruiser, is informed by radio message from
police headquarters. ..." In the present case, however, Appellee Sgt. Carpenter was not
in his cruiser on patrol but, rather, was at his desk doing paperwork.62 Moreover, neither
he nor Appellee Clinton Township were specifically called to the scene.63
57 Stover, *2 581d., *3 s9 (1970), 23 Ohio St.2d 18,12 of the syllabus 60 Id., * 6 (quoting Agnew, supra) 61 Id , *2; Agnew, 18 62 Supp. p. 83 63 Supp. p. 17, Carpenter Depo. pp. 63-65
16 Finally, Appellees rely on Jennings v. Grayczyk.64 In this case, Officer Bernard
Grayczyk of the City of Sylvania was dispatched to a possible burglary that was occurring within his jurisdiction.fi5 Officer Grayczyk's route to the location took him out of the City of Sylvania and into Sylvania Township, where he was involved in an accident.66 The Sixth District held that "Officer Grayczyk's perhaps mistaken entrance into another jurisdiction [did not divest] him of the cloak of immunity. ...i67
Notwithstanding the fact that this case was also decided prior to the enactment of the
Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, it is an important fact that, in Jennings, Officer
Grayczyk was going to a possible burglary that was occurring within his jurisdiction and, therefore, he was providing police protection for his jurisdiction.68 Therefore, based on the stated purpose of R.C. § 2744.01, et seq., and consistent with Appellant's position, he
would still be entitled to immunity. Additionally, in Jennings, Officer Grayczyk was told
to go to the burglary location by his own police deparhnent.69 In contrast, Appellee Sgt.
Carpenter was responding to a call that he knew was outside of his jurisdiction and to
which neither he nor the Clinton Township Police Department was personally requested
to respond.70
In addition to situations involving the transporting of prisoners, Appellees also
assert "a police officer must act outside his jurisdiction [when] responding to court to
testify in a criminal matter,i71 presumably as another example where police officers act
6' (61h Dist., 1987), 1987 Ohio App. LEXIS 5559 65Id, *1 667d., *4 67Id *5 68 Id., * 1 69 Id. 70 Supp. pp. 18 & 20, Carpenter Depo. pp. 66 & 75 71 Appellees' Brief, p. 6
17 extra jurisdictionally under the cloak of immunity. Yet in Burnell v. Dulle,72 the Twelfth
District Court of Appeals found that an officer traveling to court to testify in response to a subpoena was not on an emergency call. Specifically, that Court wrote "It was not
Deputy Dulle's professional duty, but his civic duty, to respond to the subpoena."73
Therefore, and contrary to Appellees' implication, the fact that a police officer must act outside of his jurisdiction does not automatically confer upon him or his employer R.C. §
2744 immunity.
Appellees' contention that mutual aid agreements are irrelevant to the inununity
conferred by the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act is simply wrong. Appellees'
position not only fails to consider the General Assembly's stated purpose behind enacting
the Act - to wit, "to ensure the ... continued ability of local govennnents to provide
public peace, health, and safety services for their residents,"74 but also fails to recognize
that the statutes addressing mutual aid agreements were specifically amended when the
Act was passed to include language referencing Chapter 2744. Additionally, many of the
cases cited by Appellees have nothing to do with the specific statute at issue in this case -
R.C. § 2744.02(B)(1)(a) - and the term "emergency call." Consequently, those cases
should have no bearing on this Court's decision in the case sub judice.
B. Mutual Aid Agreements Provide a Basis For Extending Immunity
Although Appellees' Brief contains a "heading" claiming that mutual aid pacts do
not provide immunity, the Brief itself does not actually discuss this position in depth.
Rather, Appellees allege some concerns about the difficulties associated with entering
into mutual aid agreements and claim that it is not always feasible for political
72 (12a' Dist., 2006), 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 7033, 2006-Ohio-7044 73 Id., ¶16 74 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 176, Section 8, 141 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1733 (emphasis added)
18 subdivisions to do so. Yet Appellees cite no statutory law, no case law, and no evidence to support these contentions. Nor do they explain why it is justifiable to not comply with the law in terms of having mutual aid agreements drafted and regularly maintained
simply because it is inconvenient or politically inexpedient to do so.
Appellees also mistakenly claim that "[p]olice officers do not control whether a
mutual aid agreement exists or is timely renewed". 75 While it is true that such
agreements and/or legislative enactments are usually drafted by elected officials or policy
makers, R.C. § 505.431 makes it clear that a township's police department is involved in
the mutual aid agreement process. Under R.C. § 505.431, if a township wants to provide
police protection to another jurisdiction, it may do so upon the approval, by resolution, of the board of township trustees of the township in which the department is located and upon authorization by an officer or employee of the police department providing the police protection who is designated by title of office or position.76 Thus, the General Assembly made it clear that an officer or employee from the township
police department had to sign off on any mutual aid agreement.
Appellees are correct in one respect, however. Mutual aid agreements, in and of
themselves, do not provide immunity. And Appellant has never argued otherwise.
Mutual aid agreements do, however, provide a basis for extending immunity pursuant to
R.C. § 2744.02. In other words, even if a mutual aid agreement is in existence there is
still no guarantee of immunity for officers responding to an extra-jurisdictional call.
However, if a mutual aid agreement exists, then the inquiry may move to the next
question of whether an officer's professional obligation was triggered.
Appellees, in citing the cases they did, failed to note that the case law interpreting
R.C. § 2744.01(A) has only recognized three general situations in which a "professional
75 Appellees' Brief, p. 7 76 C.R.C. § 505.431 (emphasis added)
19 obligation" is triggered: 1) when an officer personally receives a communication from citizens or a police dispatch; 2) when an officer actually observes some kind of criminal activity; or 3) in response to inherently dangerous situations . . . "that demand an immediate response on the part of the officer."77 All cases in which a court has determined that an officer was on an emergency call can be neatly placed in one of these three situations. In Colbert and McGuire v. Lovell,78 the police officers involved personally observed criminal activity - one of the three "professional obligation"- triggering events enumerated in the statute. Similarly, in Fogle v. Bentleyville79 and
Rutledge, supra, the police officers involved were personally instructed to take a
particular action. The court in Fogle noted this, writing "Officer Enk was doing what he
was told to do by his supervising officer.i80 Appellees have failed to provide a case
where a court has found an officer to be on an emergency call not based on one of these
three general situations.
None of the cases cited by Appellees establishes that Appellee Sgt. Carpenter's
professional obligation was triggered. Appellees have not asserted that Appellee Sgt.
Carpenter was personally called to the scene or that he personally observed wrongdoing.
And Appellees have not articulated any inherently dangerous circumstances "demanding
an immediate response" thereby triggering Sgt. Carpenter's professional obligation.
Ohio courts have held that not every call to duty constitutes an emergency call.81
Rather, in order to be on an emergency call, as defined in R.C. § 2744.01, an officer must
be responding to a call to duty which "involves a situation to which a response by a peace
77 Colbert v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St.3d 215, 2003-Ohio-3319 78 (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 1216, 1999-Ohio-296 79 (July 24, 2008) Eighth Dist. No. 88375, 2008-Ohio-3660 80Id.,¶41 81 Posner v. Dept. of Pub. Safety (10"' Dist., 2000), 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 4496, at *8
20 officer is required by the officer's professional obligation."82 Thus, when there is no
sense of urgency for an immediate response, "the call cannot be perceived to be an
emergency."83 Critical to the inquiry "is what information did [the officer] have at the
time he decided to respond."84
Interestingly, Appellees made no effort to distinguish or rebut the Ninth District's
decision in Brown v. City of Cuyahoga Falls.gs Again, in that case, while there was no
question that Officer Brandon Good was within his own department's jurisdictional
borders, based upon each of the factors outlined in Appellant's Merit Brief which are
analogous to the facts of the case sub judice, the Ninth District still found a question of
fact as to whether he was on an emergency call.
The existence of a mutual aid agreement does not, alone, provide immunity. It
does, however, provide a basis for immunity. If a mutual aid agreement exists then the
next question may be asked in inquiry of whether there is immunity - was there a
professional obligation-triggering event? However, in the absence of any mutual aid
agreement the next question does not even get asked. In the present case there was no
mutual aid agreement between Appellee Clinton Township and Franklin County and, in
the absence of such, Appellee is not entitled to immunity under R.C. § 2744.02(B)(1)(a).
C. Results of Appellant's Position Are Consistent with Statutory Law
Appellees argue that acceptance of Appellant's position would lead to an
inconsistent result whereby an officer could be immune but a political subdivision could
82 Colbert, supra, ¶14 83 Posner, *7 84 Id. ss (9^h Dist., 2010), 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 3659, 2010-Ohio-4330
21 be liable. In fact, it is not Appellant's position that creates this result but rather the wording of the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act that does.
Imagine a scenario where a police officer is acting within the course and scope of his employment within his own jurisdiction and, while not on an emergency call, collides
with a pedestrian. His actions are not willful or wanton but they are negligent. Under
that scenario, the officer's political subdivision would be liable to the pedestrian pursuant
to R.C. § 2744.02(B)(1)(a). However, under R.C. § 2744.03(A)(6), the officer, himself,
would not be personally liable. Whether Appellant's argument is accepted or rejected is
irrelevant in that situation. Appellees' claim that this result is only possible if
Appellant's argument is accepted is clearly incorrect and, if Appellees take issue with this
seemingly incongruous result, then Appellees should lobby the General Assembly to
change the law.
D. Emergency Calls Can Take Place Outside of Jurisdictional Boundaries But Sufficient Criteria for "Professional Obligation" Must be Met Appellees claim on page 10 of their brief, that "Appellant contends a`call to duty'
can only occur within geographical limits."86 As has been pointed out, however, this is
not Appellant's claim. Appellant not only recognizes that a "call to duty" can occur
outside of an officer's geographical jurisdiction but also that an officer is entitled to
immunity when responding to an "emergency call," whether such call is within or outside
of that officer's jurisdictional boundaries. The important issue, when an officer is acting
extra-jurisdictionally, is whether he has a professional obligation to do so. If he does,
then he may be on an emergency call and both he and his political subdivision may be
entitled to immunity. However, an obligation to act extra jurisdictionally for the benefit
86 Appellees' Brief, p. 10
22 of another political subdivision only arises when there exists a mutual aid agreement between political subdivisions. As delineated above, this is evident not only from the stated purpose of the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act but also by the interrelationship between the Act and the mutual aid agreement statutes like R.C. §
505.431, which specifically apply the immunity conferred by the Act to situations where
police officers are responding outside their jurisdictions pursuant to mutual aid
agreements.87
V. APPELLEES' STATEMENT OF "FACTS" Finally, Appellant would be remiss if she did not address several glaring issues
created by Appellees' so-called Statement of "Facts". Appellees' statement begins with a
discussion regarding the consumption of alcohol by Appellant and Defendant Vashawn
McBride.88 Such a discussion is completely inappropriate. Notwithstanding the fact that
alcohol consumption is not at issue in this appeal, any reference to it is completely
inadmissible. As this Court wrote in Parton v. Weilnau,89 without some definite expert testimony to explain the significance of the percentage of alcohol found in decedent's blood, the evidence as to that percentage does not tend to prove decedent was under the influence of alcohol.9 There is no evidence regarding the percentage of alcohol found in either Appellant's or
Defendant McBride's bloodstream and, even if there were, there is absolutely no expert
testimony to explain the significance of it.
Similarly, Appellees improperly assert that Defendant McBride was "cited by the
Columbus Police Department as the at-fault driver."91 Not only is such information
87 See O.R.C. §§ 311.29, 505.43, 505.431, 737.04 and 737.041 88 Appellees' Brief, pp. 2-3 89 (1959), 169 Ohio St. 145 90 Id., 151 91 Appellees' Brief, p. 4
23 inadmissible92, this statement of "fact" is false. While Appellant testified, in her deposition, that she believed the Columbus Police Department cited Defendant McBride, the police report does not list anyone being cited for the accident. Moreover, a review of the Franklin County Municipal Court's website reveals no traffic case arising out of this accident.
Appellees also contend that Sgt. Carpenter "slowed down" to allow another car to safely complete its turn.93 Yet, the record in this case simply does not support that representation.94 Such inaccuracies serve only to misdirect the Court from the relevant underlying facts and the main issues presented in this case.
VI. CONCLUSION
Again, this is a case which involves the potential application of immunity to a
R.C. §2744.02(B)(1)(a) matter outside of an officer's jurisdiction. A review of legislative history and the necessary interpretation of interrelated statutes, R.C. §§ 2744.02 and
505.431, makes clear the Ohio General Assembly's intent to limit the immunity conferred by the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act to situations where police officers are providing police protection within their own boundaries and/or to their political
subdivision's own residents, or to a political subdivision with which their own political
subdivision has a mutual aid agreement. Because there is no evidence of such a mutual
aid agreement in this case, there is no basis for Sgt. Carpenter to have been considered on
an emergency call as he responded to a general call for assistance from outside of his jurisdiction. Thus, no immunity should be conferred to Appellees for Sgt. Carpenter's
negligent acts and Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the decision of
92 Shaffer v. Thompson (10lh Dist., 1980), 1980 Ohio App. LEXIS 12626 93 Appellees' Brief, p. 3 94 Supp. p. 16, Carpenter Depo. pp. 59-61
24 the Tenth District Court of Appeals and remand this matter to the trial court for a jury's determination of material issues of fact pertaining to Appellees' liability for damages.
Respectfully submitted, Bri^ler, Counsel of Recor ^)^ n-A4-/1
Brian G.1Glille Counsel for Appellant Lea D. Smith
leinman, ounsel . Gold m Co., L.P.A.
Seth K. Kleinman Co-Counsel for Appellant Lea D. Smith
Craig T. Smith, Co-Counsel Schiff & Associates Attorneys at Law
Craig T. S Co-Counsel for Appellant Lea D. Smith
25 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and exact copy of the foregoing was served upon Boyd
W. Gentry and Joshua R. Schierloh, attorneys for Appellees, 1 Prestige Place, Suite 700,
Miamisburg, Ohio 45342; Margaret M. Murray, counsel for Amicus Curiae, The Ohio
Association for Justice, 111 East Shoreline Drive, Sandusky, Ohio 44870; and Jay D.
Patton, counsel for Amicus Curiae, The Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys, 5300
Socialville-Foster Road, Suite 200, Mason, Ohio 45040, by ordinary U.S. mail, postage
prepaid, this 31s` day of January, 2011.
Brian G. Miller Counsel for Appellant Lea D. Smith
cc: Lea D. Smith Christina L. Corl, Esquire
26 APPENDIX Appendix Page
1733 ...... 1 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 176, Section 8, 141 Ohio Laws, Part I,
O.R.C. § 1.49(D) ...... 39 ...... 40 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8953 ......
California Penal Code § 803.1 ...... 45 ...... 49 725 ILCS 5/107-4 ......
Maryland Criminal Procedure § 2-102 ...... 51
...... 55 O.R.C. § 307.93 ...... 58 O.R.C. § 341.12 ...... 59 O.R.C. § 341.16 ...:...... 60 O.R.C. § 341.23 ......
O.R.C. § 341.32 ...... 61
O.R.C. § 753.16 ...... 62
...... 64 O.R.C. § 2931.30 ...... 02 ...... 65 O.R. C. § 2935 ...... 66 O.R.C. § 2949.12 .... .:...... 67 O.R.C. § 2949.13 ...... :...... 68 O.R.C. § 2949.17 ......
O.R.C. § 719.01 ...... 69 ...... 71 0 .R.C. § 719.02 ...... YNE SUPREME CbURi LAW L•iSRARY
THE STATE OF OHIO
- VOLUME CXLI LEGISLATIVE _'ACTS FNCLUDING APPROPRIATION ACTS PASSED
AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED
BY THE ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF OHIO
AT ITS REGULAR SESSION JANUARY 7, 1985 TO DECEMBER 31, 19861NCLUSIVE
Issued by SHERROD BROWN Secretary of State ,,Vw"ppr q ACCESSION No. - "V
1 1699
:rmanent nature and does (Amended Substitute House Bill Number 176) tive Service Commission. AN ACT y of State at Columbus, -, A. D. 19_$T`, To amend sections 9.60, 133.27, 305.12, 505.43, 505.431,505.50,723.01,723.54,737.04,737.041, 3313.203, 4731.90, and 5511.01, to enact sec-, tions 2744.01 to 2744.09 and 3345.202, and to repeal sections 505.05, 505.06, 701.02, and 5571.10 of the Revised Code, and to repeal Sections 3, 4, and 5 of Am, Sub. S.B. 76 of the 113th General Assembly, relative tothe sov- ereign immunity of political subdivisions and the immunity of their employees, relative to liability insurance purchases by boards of education and state universities and colleges, and to continue to provide for immunity, indemnification, and defense counsel in civil actions for state officers and ' employees, to retain the jurisdiction of the Court qf Claims to include all cases in which state officers and employees have personal immunity under Am. Sub. S.B. 76 of the 113th deneral Assem- bly, to continue to permit certain political subdivisions to provide insurance and indem- nification for their members, officers; or employees, and to eliminate the duty of the Legislative Budget :Offiice to report on the effect of Am. Sub. S.B. 76 of the 113th Gen- eral Assembly, and to declare an emergency.
2 Am. Sc
(D) of Ohio: Assembly of the State fire cor Be it enacted by the General instrun SECTION 1. That sections 9.60, 133.27, 305.12, 50 4731.90, and 505.50, 723.01, 723.54, 737.04, 737.041, 3313.203, 4731 to a gc 5511.01 be amended and sections 2744.01, 2744.02, 2744.03, tract tc 2744.04,2744.05,2744.06,2744.07,2744.08,2744.09, and 3345.202 ing boc upon a of the Revised Code be enacted to read as follows: agency Sec. 9.60. (A) As used in this section: (1) "Firefighting agency" means a municipal corporation, office ^ township, township fire district, joint ambulance district, or board^ (E joint fire district. group or (2) "Private fire company" means any nonprofit €ap IN organization owning and operating firefighting equipment not ments, membt controlled by any firefighting agency. (3) "Governing board" means the board of county commis- bound .sioners in the case of a county; the legislative authority in the Fi case of a municipal corporation; the board of trustees of a joint the fii ambulance district in the case of a joint ambulance district; the pate board of township trustees in the case of a township or township emplo fire district; the board of fire district trustees in the case of a aries joint fire district; and the board of trustees in the case of a pri- and b exten vate fire company. (4) "Fire protection" includes the provision of ambulance, firefiF S emergency medical, and rescueser° fire companypand the certif of a firefighting agency or by a private hting apparatus or firefighting its ft extension of the use of firefig avail: equipment. fire company may final (B) Any firefighting agency or private contract with any state agency or instrumentality, county, or in an othei political subdivision of this state or wit^o^egovonr ^h thereonta may of an adjoining state to provide fire p regular basis or only in times of emergency, upon the approval to p of the governing boards of the counties, firefighting agencies, amoi IN 7 political subdivisions, or private fire companies or the adminis- begE trative heads of the state agencies or instrumentalities that are COt parties to the contract. (C) Any county, political subdivision, or state agency or whic inte instrumentality may contract with a firefighting agency of this appi state, a private fire company, or a governmental entity of an able adjoining state to obtain fire protection,wi^hehauthorizationlot EX] basis or only in times of emergency, upon the governing boards of the, counties, firefighting agencies, DEl political subdivisions, or prencies fore inst umental tie s that are TH: tive heads of the state ag parties to the contiract. TH
3 Am. Sub. H. B. No. 176 1701
(D) Any firefighting agency of this state or any private f Ohio: fire company may provide fire protection to any state agency or 05.43, 505.431, instrumentality, county, or political subdivision of this state, or , 4731.90, and to a governmental entity of an adjoining state, without a con- 4.02, 2744.03, tract to provide fire protection, upon the approval of the govern- , and 3345.202 ing board of the firefighting agency or private fire company and upon authorization of an officer or employee of the firefighting agency providing the fire protection designated by title of their tl corporation, office or position pursuant to the authorization of the governing e district, or board of the firefighting agency. (E) ,^^ nn,v CHAPTER 12744. of the Revised Code, ee. rofit group or €ar INSOFAR as it is applicable to the operation of fire depart- equipment not ments, applies to the firefighting agencies and fire department members when such members are rendering service outside the ounty commis- boundaries of the firefighting agency pursuant to this section. ithority in the Fire department members acting outside the bounda a^tic f ;tees of a joint the firefighting agency by which they are employed may P their pate in any pension or indemnity fund established by ce district; the the iip or township employer to the same extent as lareaentig eltolall thboiinrights the case of a aries of the firefighting agency, and case of a pri- and benefits of Chapter 4123. of the Revised Code, to the same extent as while performing service within the boundaries of the of ambulance, firefighting agency. re department Sec. 133.27. (A) When the fiscal officer of any subdivision npany and the certifies to the bond-issuing authority that, within the limits of or firefighting its funds THAT HAVE BEEN APPROPRIATED AND ARE available for the purpoderedsagainst thels bdvision company may final judgment or judgments ren ty, county, or in an action for personal injuries OR DEATHTHEas bdivision nmental entity other noncontractual obligation, f^rovidi g funds with which whether on a may issue bonds for the purpose P n the approval to pay sae4 THE final judgment OR JUDGMENTS in an amount not exceeding, EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED iting agencies, judgments .r the adminis- IN THIS DS^ON osts alities that are costs AND EXPENSES TAXED BY COURT OR CQURTS INVOLVED ^tWERE OR ate agency or which such judgment or judgments agency of this interest Lkereeg ON THE JUDGMENT OR JUDGMENTS to the tl entity of an approximate date when the proceeds of such bonds are avail- r on a regular able. THE BONDS ALSO MAY INCLUDE COVERAGE FOR uthorization of EXPENSES INCURRED BY THE SUBDIVISION IN ting agencies, DEFENDING THE SUIT OR SUITS. or administra- lities that are THIS SECTION MAY BE EITHER OF THE FOLLOWING, OF (1) GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS THAT PLEDGE THE GENERAL TAXING POWER, INCLUDING AD VAL-
4 OREM PROPERTY TAXES, OF THE SUBDIVISION AND THAT ARE SECURED BY THE GENERAL FAITH, CREDIT, AND REVENUES OF THE SUBDIVISION; (2) SPECIAL OBLIGATION BONDS THAT ARE PAY- ABLE ONLY OUT OF THE PARTICULAR TAXES AND REV- ENUES PLEDGED, OTHER THAN AD VALOREM PROP- ERTY TAXES, THAT DO NOT CONSTITUTE GENERAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE ISSUING SUBDIVISION, AND THAT DO NOT PLEDGE THE FAITH, CREDIT, OR REVE- NUES OF THE SUBDIVISION, EXCEPT THE PARTICULAR TAXES OR REVENUES PLEDGED. THESE BONDS DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN INDEBTEDNESS OF THE SUBDIVISION, AND THEY MAY BE ISSUED OUTSIDE ALL STATUTORY AND, WHEN PERMITTED BY THE OHIO CONSTITUTION, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON INDEBTEDNESS OF THE SUBDIVISION. (C) BONDS ISSUED PURSUANT TO THIS SECTION SHALL HAVE A MAXIMUM MATURITY OF THIRTY YEARS. Sec. 305.12. The board of county commissioners may sue and be sued, AND plead and be impleaded, in any court of ju .e,_°° IT MAY bring, maintain, and defend all suits in law er Ia equity, involving an injury to any public, state, or county road, bridge, ditch, drain, or watercourse estabRshed by eueh beard in 1Ls THE county WITH RESPECT TO WHICH THE COUNTY HAS THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY TO KEEP IN PROPER REPAIR, and for the prevention of injury LkeFet,e TO THEM. The board skall be liable, i* its ef€ieial eapaeity, €en damages re;pd by r-easen e€ iEs --^^^ee or ear-elessr:ess in rtoL 1#eeging any silek wead or lr-idge in preper r-epair-, a-xd shall demand and receive, by suit or otherwise, any. real estate or interest kl3erein IN REAL ESTATE, legal or equi- table, belonging to the county, or any money or other property due the county. The money so recovered shall be paid into the county treasury, and the board shall take the county trea- surer's receipt LkeFe€er- FOR IT and file it with the county audi- tor. Sec. 505.43. In order to obtain police protection, or to obtain additional police protection in times of emergency, any township may enter into a contract with one or more townships, munici- pal corporations, or county sheriffs upon such terms as are agreed to by them, for services of police departments or use of police equipment, or the interchange of the service of police departments or use of police equipment within the several terri- tories of the contracting subdivisions, if the contract is first authorized by respective boards of township trustees or other
5 Am. Sub. H. B. No. 176 1703
legislative bodies. The cost of the contract may be paid for from DIVISION AND the township general fund or from funds received pursuant ta ^AITH, CREDIT, the passage of a levy authorized pursuant to division (J) of sec- tion 5705.19 and section 5705.25 of the Revised Code. i HAT ARE PAY- Seegiea 494:93 CHAPTER 2744. of the Revised Code, se €a4-7 o the operation of police depart- kXES AND REV- INSOFAR as it is applicable t ALOREM PROP- ments, applies to the contracting political subdivisions and UTE GENERAL police department meinbers when the members are rendering )IVISION, AND service outside their own subdivision pursuant to the contract. DIT, OR REVE- Police department members acting outside the s en ion ior E PARTICULAR in which they are employed may participate in any p BONDS DO NOT indemnity fund established by their employer to the same SUBDIVISION, extent as while acting within the employing subdivision, and LL STATUTORY are entitled to all the rights and benefits of sections 4123.01 to ,ONSTITUTION, 4123.94 of the Revised Code, to the same extent as while per- EBTEDNESS OF forming service within the subdivision. The contract may provide for a fixed annual charge to be THIS SECTION paid at the times agreed upon and stipulated in the contract. Y OF THIRTY Sec. 505.431. The police department of rptiany ectonnshipany township police district may provide police p ssioners may sue county, municipal corporation, or township of this state or to a in any court of governmental entity of an adjoining state without re a solutont of efend ell suits in provide police protection, upon the approval, by public, state, or the board of township trustees of the township off certor ,5e tab,i-'^-^ §y department is located and upon authorization by an protec- ECT TO WHICH tion of the police department providing the polito ONSIBILITY TO tion who is designated by title of office or position, pursuant ^vention of injury the resolution of the board of township trustees, to give such Ae; in i-ks ef4:ieiRl authorization. Seetiert 703 93 CHAPTER 2744. of the Revised Code, insofar bridg'e iR prePe-e as it applies to the operation of police departments, shall apply or otherwise, any to any township police department or township police district TE, legal or equi- and to its members when such members are rendering police or other property services pursuant to this section outside the township or town- .l be paid into the ship police district by which they are employed. the county trea- Police department members acting, as provided in this sec- h the county audi- tion, outside the township or township police district by which they are employed shall be entitled to participate in any pension ction, or to obtain or indemnity fund established by their employer to the same acy, any township extent as while acting within the township or township police ownships, munici- district by which they are employed. Such members shall be ch terms as are entitled to all the rights and benefits of sections 4123.01 to rtments or use of 4123.96 of the Revised Code to the same extent as while per- service of police forming services within the township or township police district the several terri- by which they are employed. contract is first trustees or other
6 Sec. 505.50. The township trustees may purchase or other- wise acquire such police apparatus, equipment, including a pub- lie communications system, or materials as the township police district requires and may build, purchase, or lease such building or buildings and site thereof as are necessary for the operations of the district. The boards of trustees of any two or more contiguous town- ships, may, by joint agreement, unite in the joint purchase, maintenance, use, and operation of police equipment, for any other police purpose designated in sections 505.48 to 505.55; ,,,e;ae;ve;^ of the Revised Code, and to prorate the expense of such joint action on such terms as are mutually agreed upon by the trustees in each affected township. The board of trustees of any township may enter into a con- tract with one or more townships, a municipal corporation, or the county sheriff upon such terms as are mutually agreed upon for the provision of additional police protection services either on a regular basis or for additional protection in times of emer- gency. Such contract shall be agreed to in each instance by the respective board or boards of township trustees, the county commissioners, or the legislative authority of the municipal cor- poration involved. Such contract may provide for a fixed annual charge to be paid at the time agreed upon in the con- tract. SeeLiere 491 93 CHAPTER 2744. of the Revised Code, se €ae INSOFAR as it is applicable to the operation of police depart- ments, applies to the contracting political subdivisions and g police department members when such members are s ervin outside their own subdivision pursuant to such contract. Police department members acting outside the subdivision in which they are employed may participate in any pension or indemnity to all the fund established by their employer and are entitled rights and benefits of sections 4123.01 to 4123.41; inel sive of the Revised Code, to the same extent while performing services within the subdivision. Sec. 723.01. Municipal corporations shall have special author- power to regulate the use of the streets. The legislative ity of suel:'r A municipal corporation shall have the care, super- vision, and control of THE public highways, streets, avenues, alleys, ' sidewalks, public grounds, bridges, aqueducts, and viaducts within the municipal corporation, and THE MUNICI- PAL CORPORATION shall cause them to be kept open, in repair, and free from nuisance. of a municipality Sec. 723.54. The legislative authority shall designate a municipal official to have responsibility for inspection of all br4dges or portions tkeree€ OF BRIDGES
7 within such municipality, except for bridges on the state high- aurchase or other- way system and the county highway system. ;, including a pub- This section does not prohibit the municipality from inspec; ie township police ting any bridge within its limits. ease such building Such inspection shall be made at least annually by a profes- for the operations sional engineer or other qualified person under the supervision of a professional engineer, or more frequently if required by the contiguous town- legislative authority, in accordance with the manual of bridge e joint purchase, inspection described in section 5501.47 of the Revised Code. [uipment, for any The legislative authority may contract for inspection services. 505.48 to 505.55, The municipal official responsible for inspection shall main- te the expense of tain an updated inventory record of all bridges in the municipal- y agreed upon by ity and indicate on such inventory record who is responsible for inspection and maintenance, and the authority for such respon- , enter into a con- sibilities. al corporation, or He shall report the condition of a11 bridges to the municipal ually agreed upon m services either legislative authority not later than sixty days after his annual inspection, or shall report more frequently if required by the in times of emer- legislative authority. Any bridge for which the municipality !h instance by the has inspection or maintenance responsibility which, at any ;tees, the county time, is found to be in a condition that is or may be a potential ;he municipal cor- danger to life or property shall be identified in reports, and if vide for a fixed such official determines that the condition of such a bridge rep- ;;upon in the con- resents an immediate danger he shall immediately report the condition to the legislative authority. With respect to those ,ised Code, se fap bridges where there exists joint maintenance responsibility, the of police depart- municipal official shall furnish a copy of his report to each party subdivisions and responsible for a share of maintenance. bers are serving "Maintenance" as used in this section means actual perfor- contract. Police mance of maintenance work. livision in which A mssnieigRl eorper: yion slqgll aret be liable €ee damages sion or indemnity xnder seeLiex 42381 of the Revisecl Cede €ee ifi}uries to $erseH ntitled to all the or praper-t3= en bridges €er whiph t,lie munietpal eerperaLien elees .41; '^^^i:ve, of not lsave L13e r-esponsibility e€ •.^ ^ anena=,ee ®e iAspeetier+: rforming services Sec. 737.04. The legislative authority of any municipal cor- poration may, in order to obtain police protection or to obtain all have special additional police protection, enter into contracts with one or egislative author- more municipal corporations in this state, or with a contiguous the care, super- municipal corporation in an adjoining state, upon such terms as streets, avenues, are agreed upon, for services of police departments or the use of aqueducts, and police equipment or for the interchange of such service or equip- I THE MUNICI- ment within the several territories of the contracting subdivi- ie kept open, in sions. Seetien 701 02 CHAPTER 2744. of the Revised Code, so €as= f a municipality INSOFAR as it applies to the operation of police departments, responsibility for shall apply to the contracting political subdivisions and to the € OF BRIDGES
8 Am. Sub. H. B. No. 176 1706 police department members when they are rendering service outside their own subdivisions pursuant to such contracts. Police department members acting outside the subdivision in which they are, employed, pursuant to such contracts, shall be entitled toi i€ the ru3es e€ the board ef Lrxstees of 4he poliee men,e kn^ ^ ^de therefor, participate in any. indemnity fund established by their employer to the same extent as while acting within the employing subdivision. Such members shall be entitled to all the rights and benefits of sec- tions 4123,01 to 4123.94 of the Revised Ctide, to the same extent as while performing service within the subdivision. Such contracts may provide for: (A) A fixed annual charge to be paid at the times agreed upon and stipulated therein; (B) Compensation based upon: (1) A stipulated price for each call or emergency; (2) The numbei• of members or pieces of equipment employed; (3) The elapsed time of service required in sueh call or emergency. (C) Compensation for loss or damage to equipment while i engaged outside the limits of the subdivision owning and fur- nishing the equipment; (D) Reimbursement of the subdivision in which the poliee department members are employed, for any indemnity award or premium contribution assessed against the employing subdivi- sion for workers' compensation benefits for injuries or death of its police department members occurring while engaged in rend- ering such service. .Sec. 737.041. The police department of any municipal corpo- ration may provide police protection to any county, municipal corporation, or township of this state or to a governmental entity of an adjoining state without a. contract to provide police protection, upon the approval, by resolution, of the legislative, i authority of the municipal corporation in which the department is located and upon authorization by an officer or employee of the police department providing the police protection who is designated by title of office or position, pursuant to the resolu- tion of the legislative authority of the municipal corporation, to give such authorization. gee6iex+791.98 CHAPTER 2744. of the Revised Code, insofar as it applies to the operation of police departments, shall apply to any municipal corporation and to members of its police department whei) such members are rendering police services pursuant to this section outside the municipal corporation by which they are employed.
9 Am. Sub. H. B. No. 176 1707
are rendering service Police department members acting, as provided in this sec- such contracts. tion, outside the municipal corporation by which they are outside the subdivision employed shall be entitled; i€ Lhe rtries e€ the board of EFustees such contracts,'shall be of the $el•ieea3eu's pensieR e+ :"..deFa:*:oT firac3 grewide therefor, ' Erustees e€ the peliee to participate in any pension or indemnity fund established by+ &r, participate in any their employer to the same extent as while acting within the employer to the same municipal corporation by which they are employed. Such mem- )ying subdivision. Such bers shall be entitled to -all the rights and benefits of sections hts and benefits of see- 4123.01 to 4123.96 of the Revised Code to the same extent as 1ode, to the same extent while performing services within the municipal corporation by ivision. which they are employed. Sec. 2744.01. AS USED IN THIS CHAPTER: aid at the times agreed (A) "EMERGENCY CALL" MEANS A CALL TO DUTY INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED. TO, COMMUNICATIONS FROM CITIZENS, POLICE DISPATCHES, AND PERSONAL mergency; OBSERVATIONS BY PEACE OFFICERS OF INHERENTLY pieces of equipment DANGEROUS SITUATIONS THAT DEMAND AN IMMEDI- ATE RESPONSE ON THE PART OF A PEACE OFFICER. aquired in such call or (B) "EMPLOYEE" MEANS AN OFFICER, AGENT, EMPLOYEE, OR SERVANT, WHETHER OR NOT COMPEN- ige to equipment while SATED OR FULL-TIME OR PART-TIME, WHO IS AUTHO- ivision owning and fur- RIZED TO ACT AND IS ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT FOR A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION. ion in which the police "EMPLOYEE" DOES NOT INCLUDE AN INDEPENDENT any indemnity award or CONTRACTOR. "EMPLOYEE" INCLUDES ANY ELECTED the employing subdivi- OR APPOINTED OFFICIAL OF A POLITICAL SUBDIVI- for injuries or death of SION. "EMPLOYEE"' ALSO INCLUDES A PERSON WHO while engaged in rend- HAS BEEN CONVICTED OF OR PLEADED GUILTY TO A CRIMINAL OFFENSE AND WHO HAS BEEN SENTENCED of any municipal corpo- TO PERFORM COMMUNITY SERVICE WORK IN A POLITI- any county, municipal CAL SUBDIVISION WHETHER PURSUANT TO SECTION or to a governmental 2951.02 OF THE REVISED CODE OR OTHERWISE, AND A >ntract to provide police CHILD WHO IS FOUND TO BE A DELINQUENT CHILD ution, of the legislative. AND WHO IS ORDERED BY A JUVENILE COURT PURSU- s which the department ANT TO SECTION 2151.355 OF THE REVISED CODE TO PER- . officer or employee of FORM COMMUNITY SERVICE OR COMMUNITY WORK IN olice protection who is A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION. pursuant to the resolu- (C)(1). "GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION" MEANS A nunicipal corporation, to FUNCTION OF A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION THAT IS SPEC- IFIED IN DIVISION (C)(2) OF THIS SECTION OR THAT SAT- ie Revised Code, insofar ISFIES ANY OF THE FOLLOWING: lepartments, shall apply (a) A FUNCTION THAT IS IMPOSED UPON THE members of its police STATE AS AN OBLIGATION OF SOVEREIGNTY AND THAT ;ndering police services IS PERFORMED BY A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION VOLUN- unicipal corporation by TARILY OR PURSUANT TO LEGISLATIVE REQUIRE- MENT; +
10 Am. Sub. H. B. No. 176 1708
(b) A FUNCTION THAT IS FOR THE COMMON GOOD OF ALL CITIZENS OF THE STATE; (c) A FUNCTION THAT PROMOTES OR PRESERVES THE PUBLIC PEACE, HEALTH, SAFETY, OR WELFARE, THAT INVOLVES ACTIVITIES THAT ARE NOT ENGAGEIY IN OR NOT CUSTOMARILY ENGAGED IN BY NONGOV- ERNMENTAL PERSONS, AND THAT IS NOT SPECIFIED IN DIVISION (G)(2) OF THIS SECTION AS A PROPRIETARY FUNCTION, "GOVERNMENTAL IS NOT LIMITED TOTHE FOLLOWINGN" INCLUDES, BUT THE PROVISION OR NONPROVISION OF POLICE, FIRE, EMERGENCY MEDICAL, AMBULANCE, AND RESCUE SERVICES OR PROTECTION; (b) THE POWER TO PRESERVE THE PEACE, TO PRE- VENT AND SUPPRESS RIOTS, DISTURBANCES, AND DIS- ORDERLY ASSEMBLAGES, AND TO PROTECT PERSONS AND PROPERTY; (c) THE PROVISION OF A SYSTEM OF PUBLIC EDU- CATION; (d) THE PROVISION OF A FREE PUBLIC LIBRARY SYSTEM; (e) THE REGULATION OF THE USE OF, AND THE MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR OF, ROADS, HIGHWAYS, STREETS, AVENUES, ALLEYS, SIDEWALKS, BRIDGES, AQUEDUCTS, VIADUCTS, AND PUBLIC GROUNDS; (f) JUDICIAL, QUASI,IUDICIAL, PROSECUTORIAL, LEGISLATIVE, AND QUASI-LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS; (g) THE CONSTRUCTION, RECONSTRUCTION, REPAIR, RENOVATION, MAINTENANCE, AND OPERA- TION OF BUILDINGS THAT ARE USED IN CONNECTION WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF A GOVERNMENTAL FUNC- TION, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, OFFICE BUILDINGS AND COURTHOUSES; (h) THE DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION, RECONSTRUC- TION, RENOVATION, REPAIR, MAINTENANCE, AND OPERATION OF JAILS, PLACES OF JUVENILE DETEN- TION, WORKHOUSES, OR ANY OTHER DETENTION FACILITY, AS DEFINED IN SECTION 2921.01 OF THE REVISED CODE; (i) THE ENFORCEMENT OR NONPERFORMANCE OF ANY LAW; (j) THE REGULATION OF TRAFFIC, AND THE EREC- TION OR NONERECTION OF TRAFFIC SIGNS, SIGNALS, OR CONTROL DEVICES;
11 Am. Sub. H. B. No. 176 1709
(k) THE COLLECTION AND DISPOSAL OF GARBAGE, E COMMON GOOD REFUSE, AND OTHER SOLID WASTES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE OPERATION OF DUMPS, SANI- OR PRESERVES' TARY LANDFILLS, AND FACILITIES; Y; OR WELFARE, (1) THE PROVISION OR NONPROVISION, PLANNING, E NOT ENGAGED IN BY NONGOV- PUBLIC MPROVEMENT1, INC UDINGOBUT NOT LOIM TED OT SPECIFIED IN TO, A SEWER SYSTEM; A PROPRIETARY (m) THE OPERATION OF A HEALTH OR HUMAN SER- VICES DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY, INCLUDING, BUT NOT SSISTANCEkTO 'INCLUDES, BUT LIMITED TS AND OF AND INFIRM PERSON PERSONSTO A WHO ARE SION OF POLICE, INDIGENT; BULANCE, ' AND (n) THE OPERATION OF MENTAL HEALTH FACILI- TIES, MENTAL RETARDATION OR DEVELOPMENTAL PEACE, TO PRE- DISABILITIES FACILITIES, ALCOHOL TREATMENT AND 1NCES, AND DIS- CONTROL CENTERS, AND CHILDREN'S HOMES OR AGEN- OTECT PERSONS CIES; (o) THE PROVISION OR NONPROVISION OF INSPEC- BUT OF PUBLIC EDU- TION TIO,E INSPECTIONS EIN INCONNECTION WITH UBLIC LIBRARY BUILDING, ZONING, SANITATION, FIRE, PLUMBING, AND ELECTRICAL CODES, AND THE TAKING OF ACTIONS E OF, AND THE IN CONNECTION WITH THOSE TYPES OF CODES, l.DS, HIGHWAYS, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE APPROVAL OF ALKS, BRIDGES, PLANS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF BUILDINGS OR 3ROUNDS; STRUCTURES AND THE ISSUANCE OR REVOCATION OF 'ROSECUTORIAL, BUILDING PERMITS OR STOP WORK ORDERS"IN CON- 'E FUNCTIONS; NECTION WITH BUILDINGS OR STRUCTURES; CONSTRUCTION, (p) URBAN RENEWAL PROJECTS AND THE ELIMI- E, AND OPERA- NATION OF SLUM CONDITIONS; IN CONNECTION (q) FLOOD CONTROL MEASURES; VMENTAL FUNC- (r) THE DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION, RECONSTRUC- SD TO, OFFICE TION, RENOVATION, OPERATION, CARE, REPAIR, AND MAINTENANCE OF A TOWNSHIP CEMETERY; , RECONSTRUC- (s) THE ISSUANCE OF REVENUE OBLIGATIONS TENANCE, AND UNDER SECTION 140,06 OF THE REVISED CODE; VENILE DETEN- (t) A FUNCTION THAT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ER DETENTION MANDATES A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION TO PERFORM. 2921.01' OF THE (D) "LAW" MEANS ANY PROVISION OF THE CONSTI- TUTION, STATUTES, OR RULES OF THE UNITED STATES RFORMANCE OF OR OF THIS STATE, PROVISIONS OF CHARTERS, ORDI- NANCES, RESOLUTIONS, AND RULES OF POLITICAL AND THE EREC- SUBDIVISIONS, AND WRITTEN POLICIES ADOPTED BY 3IGNS, SIGNALS, BOARDS OF EDUCATION. WHEN USED IN CONNECTION WITH THE "COMMON LAW," THIS DEFINITION DOES NOT APPLY.
12 -r
Am. Sub. H. B. No. 176 1710
(E) "MOTOR VEHICLE" HAS THE SAME MEANING AS 'IN SECTION 4611.01 OF THE REVISED CODE. (F) "POLITICAL SUBDIVISION" OR "SUBDIVISION" MEANS A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, TOWNSHIP, COUNTY, SCHOOL' DISTRICT, OR OTHER BODY CORPO- RATE AND POLITIC RESPONSIBLE FOR GOVERN- MENTAL ACTIVITIES IN A GEOGRAPHIC AREA SMALLER THAN THAT OF THE STATE. "POLITICAL SUB- DIVISION" INCLUDES A. COUNTY HOSPITAL COMMIS- SION APPOINTED UNDER SECTION 339.14.OF THE REVISED CODE, REGIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION CREATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 713.21 OF THE REVISED CODE, COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION CRE- ATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 713.22 OF THE REVISED CODE, JOINT PLANNING COUNCIL CREATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 713.231 OF. THE REVISED CODE, INTER- STATE REGIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION CREATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 713.30 OF THE REVISED CODE, AND REGIONAL COUNCILS OF POLITICAL SUBDIVI- SIONS ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO CHAPTER 167. OF THE REVISED CODE. (G)(1) "PROPRIETARY FUNCTION" MEANS A FUNC- TION OF.A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION THAT IS SPECIFIED IN DIVISION (G)(2) OF THIS SECTION OR THAT SATISFIES ALL OF THE FOLLOWING: (a) THE FUNCTION IS NOT ONE DESCRIBED IN DIVI- SION (C)(1)(a) OR (b) OF THIS SECTION AND IS NOT ONE SPECIFIED IN DIVISION (C)(2) OF THIS SECTION; (b) THE FUNCTION IS ONE THAT PROMOTES OR PRESERVES THE PUBLIC PEACE, HEALTH, SAFETY, OR WELFARE AND THAT INVOLVES ACTIVITIES THAT ARE CUSTOMARILY ENGAGED IN BY NONGOVERNMENTAL PERSONS. (2) A "PROPRIETARY FUNCTION" INCLUDES, BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO, THE FOLLOWING: (a)' THE OPERATION OF A HOSPITAL BY ONE OR MORE POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS; (b) THE DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION, RECONSTRUC- TION, RENOVATION, REPAIR, MAINTENANCE, AND OPERATION OF A PUBLIC CEMETERY OTHER THAN A TOWNSHIP CEMETERY, PARK, PLAYGROUND, PLAY- FIELD, ZOO, ZOOLOGICAL PARK, BATH, INDOOR RECRE- ATIONAL FACILITY, OR SWIMMING POOL OR POND; (c) THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE, AND OPERATION OF A UTILITY, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIM- ITED TO, A LIGHT, GAS, POWER, OR HEAT PLANT, A
13 Am. Sub. H. B. No. 176 1711
RAILROAD, A BUSLINE OR OTHER TRANSIT'COMPANY, 3AME MEANING AS. AN AIRPORT, AND A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION WATER ",ODE. SUPPLY SYSTEM; )R "SUBDIVISION" (d) THE MAINTENANCE, DESTRUCTION, OPERA- PION, TOWNSHIP, TION, AND UPKEEP OF A SEWER SYSTEM; 3ER BODY CORPO- (e) THE OPERATION AND CONTROL OF A PUBLIC E FOR GOVERN- STADIUM, GOLF COURSE, AUDITORIUM, CIVIC OR OGRAPHIC .AREA SOCIAL CENTER, EXHIBITION HALL, ARTS AND CRAFTS "POLITICAL SUB- CENTER, BAND OR ORCHESTRA, OR OFF-STREET PAR- OSPITAL COMMIS- KING FACILITY. V 339.14 OF THE (B) "STATE" MEANS THE STATE OF OHIO, INCLUD- fING COMMISSION ING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, d 713.21 OF THE THE SUPREME COURT, THE OFFICES OF.ALL ELECTED COMMISSIONCRE- STATE OFFICERS, AND ALL DEPARTMENTS, BOARDS, OF THE REVISED OFFICES, COMMISSIONS, AGENCIES, COLLEGES AND EATED PURSUANT UNIVERSITIES, INSTITUTIONS, AND' OTHER INSTRU- ED CODE, INTER- MENTALITIES OF THE STATE OF OHIO. "STATE" DOES [ISSION CREATED NOT INCLUDE POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS. E REVISED CODE, (A)(1) FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS ,ITICAL SUBDIVI- Sec. 2744.02. CHAPTER 167. OF CHAPTER, THE FUNCTIONS OF POLITICAL SUBDIVI- SIONS ARE HEREBY CLASSIFIED AS GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS AND PROPRIETARY FUNCTIONS. EXCEPT ' MEANS A FUNC- (B) OF THIS SECTION, A HAT IS SPECIFIED AS PROVIDED IN DIVISION R THAT SATISFIES POLITICAL SUBDIVISION IS NOT LIABLE IN DAM GES IN A CIVIL ACTION FOR INJURY, DEATH, OR LOS TO ^^kNY 7SCRIBED IN DIVI- PERSONS OR PROPERTY ALLEGEDLY CAUSED BI' AND IS NOT ONE ACT OR OMISSION OF THE POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OR SECTION; AN EMPLOYEE OF THE POLITICAL SUBDIVISION IN kT PROMOTES OR CONNECTION WITH A GOVERNMENTAL OR PROPRI- ,LTH, SAFETY, OR ETARY FUNCTION. VITIES THAT ARE (2) SUBJECT TO STATUTORY LIMITATIONS UPON JGOVERNMENTAL THEIR MONETARY JURISDICTION, TIIE COURTS OF COM- MON PLEAS, THE MUNICIPAL COURTS, AND THE [NCLUDES, BUT IS COUNTY COURTS HAVE JURISDICTION TO HEAR.AND DETERMINE CIVIL ACTIONS GOVERNED BY OR ITAL BY ONE OR BROUGHT PURSUANT TO THIS CHAPTER. (B) SUBJECT TO SECTIONS 2744.03 AND 2744.05 OF Nk , RECONSTRUC- THE REVISED CODE, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION IS YTENANCE, AND LIABLE IN DAMAGES IN A CIVIL ACTION FOR INJURY, e OTHER THAN A DEATH, OR LOSS TO PERSONS OR PROPERTY ALLEG- iCGROUND, PLAY- EDLY CAUSED BY AN ACT OR OMISSION OF THE POLITI- [, INDOOR RECRE- CAL SUBDIVISION OR OF ANY OF ITS EMPLOYEES IN OL OR POND; CONNECTION WITH A GOVERNMENTAL OR PROPRI- 4TENANCE, AND ETARY FUNCTION, AS FOLLOWS: TG, BUT NOT LIM- (1) EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THIS HEAT PLANT, A DIVISION, POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS ARE LIABLE FOR
14 Am. Sub. H. B. No. 176 1712
INJURY, DEATH, OR LOSS TO PERSONS OR PROPERTY CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENT OPERATION OF ANY MOTOR VEHICLE BY THEIR EMPLOYEES UPON THE PUBLIC ROADS, HIGHWAYS, OR STREETS WHEN THE EMPLOYEES ARE ENGAGED WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THEIR EMPLOYMENT AND AUTHORITY. THE FOLLOW- ING ARE FULL DEFENSES TO SUCH LIABILITY: (a) A MEMBER OF A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION POLICE DEPARTMENT OR ANY OTHER POLICE AGENCY WAS OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE WHILE. RESPOND- ING TO AN EMERGENCY CALL AND THE OPERATION OF THE VEHICLE DID NOT CONSTITUTE WILLFUL OR WAN- TON MISCONDUCT; (b) A MEMBER OF A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION FIRE DEPARTMENT OR ANY OTHER FIREFIGHTING AGENCY WAS OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE WHILE ENGAGED IN DUTY AT A FIRE, PROCEEDING TOWARD A PLACE WHERE A FIRE IS IN PROGRESS OR IS BELIEVED TO BE IN PROGRESS, OR IN ANSWERING ANY OTHER EMERGENCY ALARM AND THE OPERATION OF THE VEHICLE DID NOT CONSTITUTE WILLFUL OR WANTON MISCONDUCT; (c) A MEMBER OF AN EMERGENCY MEDICAL SER- VICE OWNED OR OPERATED BY A POLITICAL SUBDIVI- SION WAS OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE WHILE RESPONDING TO OR COMPLETING A CALL FOR EMER- GENCY MEDICAL CARE OR TREATMENT, THE MEMBER WAS HOLDING A VALID OPERATOR'S OR CHAUFFEUR'S LICENSE ISSUED PURSUANT TO CHAPTER 4507, OF THE REVISED CODE, THE OPERATION OF THE VEHICLE DID NOT CONSTITUTE WILLFUL OR WANTON MISCONDUCT, AND THE OPERATION COMPLIES WITH THE PRECAU- TIONS OF SECTION 4511.03 OF THE REVISED CODE. (2) POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS ARE LIABLE FOR INJURY, DEATH, OR LOSS TO PERSONS OR PROPERTY CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENT PERFORMANCE OF ACTS BY THEIR EMPLOYEES WITH RESPECT TO PROPRI- ETARY FUNCTIONS OF THE POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS. (3) POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS ARE LIABLE FOR INJURY, DEATH, OR LOSS TO PERSONS OR PROPERTY CAUSED BY THEIR FAILURE TO KEEP PUBLIC ROADS, HIGHWAYS, STREETS, AVENUES, ALLEYS, SIDEWALKS, BRIDGES, AQUEDUCTS, VIADUCTS, OR PUBLIC GROUNDS WITHIN THE POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS OPEN, IN REPAIR, AND FREE FROM NUISANCE, EXCEPT THAT IT IS A FULL DEFENSE TO SUCH LIABILITY, WHEN A
15 Am. Sub. H. B. No. 176 1713
BRIDGE WITHIN A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION IS ONS OR PROPERTY INVOLVED, THAT THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION DOES ERATION OF ANY NOT HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAINTAINING OR ,OYEES UPON THE INSPECTING THE BRIDGE. REETS WHEN THE (4) POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS ARE. LIABLE FOR IN THE SCOPE OF INJURY, DEATH, OR LOSS TO PERSONS OR PROPERTY ITY. THE FOLLOW- THAT IS CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENCE OF THEIR ';IABILITY: EMPLOYEES AND THAT OCCURS WITHIN OR ON THE 'AL CORPORATION GROUNDS OF BUILDINGS THAT ARE USED IN CONNEC- :R POLICE AGENCY TION WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF A GOVERNMENTAL 's WHILE RESPOND- FUNCTION, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, OFFICE. CHE OPERATION OF BUILDINGS AND COURTHOUSES, BUT NOT INCLUDING WILLFUL OR WAN- JAILS, PLACES OF JUVENILE DETENTION, WORK- HOUSES, OR ANY OTHER DETENTION FACILITY, AS )AL CORPORATION DEFINED IN SECTION 2921.01 OF THE REVISED CODE. ER FIREFIGHTING (5) IN ADDITION TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES 3 VEHICLE WHILE DESCRIBED IN DIVISIONS (B)(1) TO (4) OF THIS SECTION, EEDING TOWARD A A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION IS LIABLE FOR INJURY, SS OR IS BELIEVED DEATH, OR LOSS TO PERSONS OR PROPERTY WHEN LIA- ;RING ANY OTHER 'ERATION OF THE BILITY SUBDSUBDIVISION BY ALSECTION OFUTHE REVISEDICODE, .LFUL OR WANTON INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SECTIONS 2743.02 AND 5591.37 OF THE REVISED.CODE. LIABILITY SHALL ICY MEDICAL SER- NOT BE CONSTRUED TO EXIST UNDER ANOTHER SEC- )LITICAL SUBDIVI- VEHICLE WHILE RESPONSIBIiLITYEIS IM OSED UPONRA P.OL TICAL SUB- CALL FOR EMER- DIVISION OR BECAUSE OF A GENERAL AUTHORIZATION ENT, THE MEMBER THAT A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION MAY SUE AND BE t OR CHAUFFEUR'S SUED. LPTER 4507. OF THE Sec. 2744.03. (A) IN A CIVIL ACTION BROUGHT THE VEHICLE DID AGAINST A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OR AN EMPLOYEE 'TON MISCONDUCT, OF A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION TO RECOVER DAMAGES ITH THE PRECAU- FOR INJURY, DEATH, OR LOSS TO PERSONS OR PROP- VISED CODE. ERTY ALLEGEDLY CAUSED BY ANY ACT OR OMISSION ARE LIABLE FOR IN CONNECTION WITH A GOVERNMENTAL OR PROPRI- )NS OR PROPERTY ETARY FUNCTION, THE FOLLOWING DEFENSES OR )RMANCE OF ACTS IMMUNITIES MAY BE ASSERTED TO ESTABLISH NON- ,PECT TO PROPRI- LIABILITY: lL SUBDIVISIONS. (1) THE POLITICAL SUBDIVISION IS IMMUNE FROM kRE LIABLE FOR INVOLVED )NS OR PROPERTY ENGAGED INFTHE PERFORMANCE OF A JUDICIAL, EP PUBLIC ROADS, QUASI-JUDICIAL, PROSECUTORIAL, LEGISLATIVE, OR LEYS,. SIDEWALKS, QUASI-LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION. 3 PUBLIC GROUNDS (2) THE POLITICAL SUBDIVISION IS IMMUNE FROM ISIONS OPEN, IN LIABILITY IF THE CONDUCT OF THE EMPLOYEE ?, EXCEPT THAT IT INVOLVED, OTHER'THAN NEGLIGENT CONDUCT, THAT 4.BILITY, WHEN A
16 Am. Sub. H. B. No. 176 1714
GAVE RISE TO THE CLAIM OF LIABILITY WAS REQUIRED BY LAW OR AUTHORIZED BY LAW, OR IF THE CONDUCT OF THE EMPLOYEE INVOLVED THAT GAVE RISE TO THE CLAIM OF LIABILITY WAS NECESSARY OR ESSENTIAL TO THE EXERCISE OF POWERS OF THE POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OR EMPLOYEE. (3) THE POLITICAL SUBDIVISION IS IMMUNE FROM LIABILITY IF THE ACTION OR FAILURE TO ACT BY THE EMPLOYEE INVOLVED THAT GAVE RISE TO THE CLAIM OF LIABILITY WAS WITHIN THE DISCRETION OF THE EMPLOYEE WITH RESPECT TO POLICY MAKING, PLAN- NING, OR ENFORCEMENT POWERS BY VIRTUE OF THE DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE OFFICE OR POSITION OF THE EMPLOYEE. (4) THE POLITICAL SUBDIVISION IS IMMUNE FROM LIABILITY IF THE ACTION OR FAILURE TO ACT BY THE POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OR EMPLOYEE INVOLVED THAT GAVE RISE TO THE CLAIM, OF LIABILITY, RESULTED IN INJURY OR DEATH TO A PERSON WHO
CRIMINAL OFFENSE AND WHOP AT THE TIME OF THE INJURY OR DEATH, WAS SERVING ANY PORTION OF HIS SENTENCE BY PERFORMING COMMUNITY SERVICE
WHETHERRPURSUANTTO SECTION 2951.02 THE OF I THE
INJURY OR DEATH TO A CHILDIWHO WAS FOUND TO BE A DELINQUENT CHILD AND WHO, AT THE TIME OF THE INJURY OR DEATH, WAS PERFORMING COMMUNITY SERVICE OR COMMUNITY WORK FOR OR IN A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ORDER OF A JUVENILE COURT ENTERED PURSUANT TO SECTION 2151.355 OF THE REVISED CODE, AND IF, AT THE TIME OF HIS INJURY OR DEATH, THE PERSON OR CHILD WAS : COVERED FOR PURPOSES OF CHAPTER 4123. OF THE ^
SERVICE OR COMMUNITY WORK FOR O R IN THE POLITI- 54 CAL SUBDIVISION. (6) THE POLITICAL SUBDIVISION IS IMMUNE FROM LOSS PER- LIABILITYSONS PROPERTY EXERCISE RESULTED FROM THE
WHETHER TO ACQUIRE,I OR HOW TO I USE, EQUIPMENT, SUPPLIES, MATERIALS, PERSONNEL, FACILITIES, AND DIS- CRETION WAS EXERCISED WITH MALICIOUS PURPOSE,
17 Am. Sub. H. B. No. 176 1715
LIABILITY WAS IN BAD FAITH, OR IN A WANTON OR RECKLESS MAN-. Y LAW, OR• IF THE NER. VEDTHAT GAVE (6) THE EMPLOYEE IS IMMUNE FROM LIABILITY S NECESSARY OR UNLESS ONE OF. THE FOLLOWING APPLIES: 'OWERS OF THE (a) HIS ACTS OR OMISSIONS WERE MtYNIFESTLY E. OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT OR OFFI- :S IMMUNE FROM CIAL RESPONSIBILITIES; E TO ACT BY THE (b) HIS ACTS OR OMISSIONS WERE WITH MALICIOUS 3E TO THECLAIM PURPOSE, IN BAD FAITH,.OR IN A WANTON OR RECK- )RETION OF THE LESS MANNER; "MAKING, PLAN- LIABILITY IMPOSED THE VIRTUE OF THE EMPLOYEE BY A SECTION OF THE REVISED CODE. THE OFFICE OR (7) THE POLITICAL SUBDIVISION IS ENTITLED TO ANY DEFENSE OR IMMUNITY AVAILABLE AT COMMON i S IMMUNE FROM LAW OR ESTABLISHED BY THE REVISED CODE. E TO ACT BY THE (B) THE IMMUNITY CONFERRED UPON AN ,YEE INVOLVED EMPLOYEE BY. DIVISION (A)(6) OF THIS SECTION DOES OF LIABILITY, NOT AFFECT OR LIMIT ANY LIABILITY OF A POLITICAL A PERSON WHO SUBDIVISION FOR AN ACT OR, OMISSION OF THE ED GUILTY TO A EMPLOYEE AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 2744.02 OF THE IE TIME OF THE REVISED CODE. PORTION OF HIS Sec. 2744.04. (A) AN ACTION AGAINST A POLITICAL JNITY SERVICE SUBDIVISION TO RECOVER DAMAGES FOR INJURY, L SUBDIVISION DEATH, OR LOSS TO PERSONS OR PROPERTY A.LLEG- 2951.02 OF THE EDLY CAUSED BY ANY ACT OR OMISSION IN CONNEC- RESULTED IN TION WITH A GOVERNMENTAL OR PROPRIETARY FUNC- AS FOUND TO BE TION, WHETHER BROUGHT AS AN ORIGINAL ACTION, HE TIME OF THE CROSS-CLAIM, COUNTERCLAIM. THIRD-PARTY CLAIM, NG COMMUNITY OR CLAIM FOR SUBROGATION, SHALL BE BROUGHT t INA POLITICAL WITHIN TWO YEARS AFTER THE CAUSE OF ACTION 'HE ORDER OF A AROSE, OR WITHIN ANY APPLICABLE SHORTER PERIOD NT TO SECTION OF TIME FOR BRINGING THE ACTION PROVIDED BY THE AT THE TIME OF REVISED CODE. THIS DIVISION APPLIES TO ACTIONS OR CHILD WAS BROUGHT AGAINST POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS BY ALL ER 4123, OIP THE PERSONS, GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES, AND THE STATE. PHE COMMUNITY 5 (B) IN THE COMPLAINT FILED IN A CIVIL ACTION R IN THE POLITI- AGAINST A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OR AN EMPLOYEE OF A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION TO RECOVER DAMAGES S IMMUNE FROM FOR INJURY, DEATH, OR LOSS TO PERSONS OR PROP- R LOSS TO PER- ERTY ALLEGEDLY CAUSED BY AN ACT OR OMISSION IN THE EXERCISE CONNECTION WITH A GOVERNMENTAL OR PROPRIETARY DETERMINING FUNCTION, WHETHER FILED IN AN ORIGINAL ACTION, SE, EQUIPMENT, CROSS-CLAIM, COUNTERCLAIM, THIRD-PARTY CLAIM, 'ACILITIES, AND OR CLAIM FOR SUBROGATION, THE COMPLAINANT )GMENT,OR DIS- SHALL INCLUDE A DEMAND FOR A JUDGMENT FOR THE OIOUS PURPOSE, DAMAGES THAT THE JUDGE IN A NONJURY TRIAL OR
18 Am. Sub. H. B. No. 176 1716
THE JURY IN A JURY TRIAL FINDS THAT THE COM- PLAINANT IS ENTITLED TO BE AWARDED, BUT SHALL NOT SPECIFY IN THAT DEMAND ANY MONETARY AMOUNT FOR DAMAGES SOUGHT. Sec. 2744.05. NOTWITHSTANDING ANY OTHER PROVI-' SIONS OF THE REVISED CODE OR RULES OF A COURT TO THE CONTRARY, IN AN ACTION AGAINST A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION TO RECOVER DAMAGES FOR INJURY, DEATH, OR LOSS TO PERSONS OR PROPERTY CAUSED BY AN ACT OR OMISSION IN CONNECTION WITH A GOVERN- MENTAL OR PROPRIETARY FUNCTION: (A) PUNITIVE OR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES SHALL NOT BE AWARDED; (B) IF A CLAIMANT RECEIVES OR IS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE BENEFITS FOR INJURIES OR LOSS ALLEG- EDLY. INCURRED FROM A POLICY OR POLICIES OF INSURANCE OR ANY OTHER SOURCE, THE BENEFITS SHALL BE DISCLOSED TO THE COURT, AND THE AMOUNT OF THE BENEFITS SHALL BE DEDUCTED FROM ANY AWARD AGAINST A POLITICAL SUBDIVI- SION RECOVERED BY THAT CLAIMANT. NO INSURER OR OTHER PERSON IS ENTITLED TO BRING AN ACTION UNDER A SUBROGATION PROVISION IN AN INSURANCE OR OTHER CONTRACT AGAINST A POLITICAL SUBDIVI- SION WITH RESPECT TO SUCH BENEFITS. NOTHING IN THIS DIVISION SHALL BE CONSTRUED TO LIMIT THE
POLICY OR THE.R GHTS OF SURETIES UNDER FIDELITY OR SURETY BONDS. (C)(1) THERE SHALL NOT BE ANY LIMITATION ON COMPENSATORY DAMAGES THAT REPRESENT THE ACTUAL LOSS OF THE PERSON WHO IS AWARDED THE DAMAGES. HOWEVER, EXCEPT IN WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS BROUGHT PURSUANT TO CHAPTER 2125. OF THE REVISED CODE, DAMAGES THAT ARISE FROM THE SAME CAUSE OF ACTION, TRANSACTION OR OCCUR-
RENCES AND THAT DO NOT REPRESE TSTHE ACTUAL I LOSS OF THE PERSON WHO IS AWARDED THE DAMAGES SHALL NOT EXCEED TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND LIMITA- DOLLARS TION ON DAMAGESOTHAT DOENOT REPRESENT THE ACTUAL LOSS OF THE PERSON WHO IS AWARDED THE DAMAGES PROVIDED IN THIS DIVISION DOES NOT
PLAINTIFF,COR TO INTEREST ONRA JUDGMENT REN-
19 Am. Sub. H. B. No. 176 1717
DERED IN FAVOR OF A PLAINTIFF, IN AN ACTION THAT THE COM- AGAINST A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION. ;DED, BUT SHALL (2) AS USED IN THIS DIVISION, "THE ACTUAL LOSS ANY MONETARY OF THE PERSON WHO IS AWARDED THE DAMAGES" INCLUDES ALL OF THE FOLLOWING: NY OTHER PROVI- (a) ALL WAGES, SALARIES, OR OTHER COMPENSA- ES OF A COURT TO TION LOST BY THE PERSON INJURED AS A RESULT OF NST A POLITICAL THE INJURY, INCLUDING WAGES, SALARIES, OR OTHER ES FOR INJURY, COMPENSATION LOST AS OF THE DATE OF A JUDGMENT 'ERTY.CAUSED BY AND FUTURE EXPECTED LOST EARNINGS OF SUCH A WITH A GOVERN- PERSON; (b) ALL EXPENDITURES OF THE PERSON INJURED DAMAGES SHALL OR ANOTHER PERSON ON HIS BEHALF FOR MEDICAL CARE OR TREATMENT, FOR REHABILITATION' SER- [ IS ENTITLED TO VICES,:OR FOR OTHER.CARE, TREATMENT, SERVICES, OR LOSS ALLEG- PRODUCTS, OR ACCOMMODATIONS THAT WERE NECES- OR POLICIES OF SARY BECAUSE OF THE INJURY; ;, THE BENEFITS (c) ALL EXPENDITURES TO BE INCURRED IN THE ]URT, AND THE FUTURE, AS DETERMINED BY THE COURT, BY THE PER- ', BE DEDUCTED SON INJURED OR ANOTHER PERSON ON HIS BEHALF ,ITICAL SUBDIVI- FOR MEDICAL CARE OR TREATMENT, FOR REHABILITA- NT. NO INSURER TION SERVICES, OR FOR OTHER CARE, TREATMENT, 3RING AN ACTION SERVICES, PRODUCTS, OR ACCOMMODATIONS THAT N AN INSURANCE WILL BE NECESSARY BECAUSE OF THE INJURY; f :,ITICAL SUBDIVI- (d) ALL EXPENDITURES OF A PERSON WHOSE ITS. NOTHING IN PROPERTY WAS INJURED OR DESTROYED OR OF .D TO LIMIT THE ANOTHERPERSON ON HIS BEHALF IN ORDER TO LIFE INSURANCE REPAIR' OR REPLACE THE PROPERTY THAT WAS UNDER FIDELITY INJURED OR DESTROYED; (e) ALL EXPENDITURES OF THE PERSON INJURED f LIMITATION ON OR WHOSE PROPERTY WAS INJURED OR DESTROYED OR ZEPRESENT THE OF ANOTHER PERSON ON HIS BEHALF IN RELATION TO [S AWARDED THE THE ACTUAL PREPARATION OR PRESENTATION OF THE 'RONGFUL DEATH PERSON'S CLAIM; !HAPTER 2125. OF' (f) ANY OTHER. EXPENDITURES OF THE PERSON ARISE FROM THE INJURED OR WHOSE PROPERTY WAS INJURED:OR TION OR OCCUR- DESTROYED OR OF ANOTHER PERSON ON HIS BEHALF [ONS OR OCCUR-. THAT THE COURT DETERMINES REPRESENT AN ^NT THE ACTUAL ACTUAL LOSS EXPERIENCED BECAUSE OF THE PER- ED THE DAMAGES SONAL OR PROPERTY INJURY OR PROPERTY LOSS, FIFTY THOUSAND "THE ACTUAL LOSS OF THE PERSON WHO IS 0 30N. THE LIMITA- AWARDED THE DAMAGES"'DOES NOT INCLUDE ANY REPRESENT THE FEES PAID OR OWED TO AN ATTORNEY, FOR ANY SER- [S AWARDED THE VICES RENDERED IN RELATION TO A PERSONAL 'OR [SION DOES NOT PROPERTY INJURY OR PROPERTY LOSS, AND DOES NOT AWARDED TO A INCLUDE ANY DAMAGES AWARDED FOR PAIN AND SUF- JUDGMENT REN-
20 Am. Sub. H. B. No. 176 1718
FERING, FOR THE LOSS OF SOCIETY, CONSORTIUM, COM- PANIONSHIP, CARE, ASSISTANCE, ATTENTION, PROTEC- TION, ADVICE, GUIDANCE, COUNSEL, INSTRUCTION, TRAINING, OR EDUCATION OF THE PERSON INJURED, FOR MENTAL ANGUISH, OR FOR ANY OTHER INTANGI- BLE LOSS. See. 2744.06. (A) REAL OR PERSONAL PROPERTY, AND MONEYS, ACCOUNTS, DEPOSITS, OR INVESTMENTS OF A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION ARE NOT SUBJECT TO EXECUTION, JUDICIAI. SALE, GARNISHMENT, OR ATTACHMENT TO SATISFY A JUDGMENT RENDEREI) AGAINST A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION IN A CIVILACTION TO RECOVER DAMAGES FOR INJURY, DEATH, OR LOSS TO PERSONS OR PROPERTY CAUSED BY AN ACT OR OMISSION OF THE POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OR ANY OF ITS EMPLOYEES IN CONNECTION WITH A GOVERN- MENTAL OR PROPRIETARY FUNCTION. SUCH JUDGMENTS SHALL BE PAID FROM FUNDS OF THE POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS THAT HAVE BEEN APPROPRI- ATED FOR THAT PURPOSE, BUT, IF SUFFICIENT FUNDS ARE NOT CURRENTLY APPROPRIATED FOR THE PAY- MENT OF JUDGMENTS, THE FISCAL OFFICER OF A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION SHALI. CERTIFY THE AMOUNT OF ANY UNPAID JUDGMENTS TO THE TAXING AUTHOR- i ITY OF THE POLITICAL SUBDIVISION FOR INCLUSION IN THE NEXT SUCCEEDING BUDGET AND ANNUAL APPROPRIATION MEASURE AND PAYMENT IN THE NEXT SUCCEEDING FISCAL YEAR AS PROVIDED BY SEC- TION 5705.08 OF THE REVISED CODE, UNLESS ANY SUCH JUDGMENT IS TO BE PAID FROM THE PROCEEDS OF BONDS ISSUED PURSUANT TO SECTION 133.27 OF THE REVISED CODE OR PURSUANT TO ANNUAL INSTALL- MENTS AUTHORIZED BY DIVISION (B) OR (C) OF THIS SECTION. (B) (1) (a) AS USED IN THIS DIVISION, "THE ACTUAL LOSS OF THE PERSON WHO IS AWARDED THE DAM- AGES" INCLUDES ALL OF THE FOLLOWING: (i) ALL WAGES, SALARIES, OR OTHER COMPENSA- TION LOST BY THE, PERSON INJURED AS A RESULT OF THE INJURY, AS OF THE DATE OF THE JUDGMENT; (ii) ALL EXPENDITURES OF THE PERSON INJURED OR OF ANOTHER PERSON ON HIS BEHALF FOR MEDI- CAL CARE OR TREATMENT, FOR REHABILITATION SER- VICES, OR FOR OTHER CARE, TREATMENT, SERVICES, PRODUCTS, OR ACCOMMODATIONS THAT WERE NECES- SARY BECAUSE OF THE INJURY; I I
21 Am. Sub. H. B. No. 176 1719
CONSORTIUM, COM- (iii) ALL EXPENDITURES OF A PERSON WHOSE TTENTION,PROTEC- PROPERTY WAS INJURED OR DESTROYED OR OF 3EL, INSTRUCTION, ANOTHER PERSON ON HIS BEHALF IN ORDER TO ; PERSON INJURED, REPAIR OR REPLACE THE PROPERTY THAT WAS IY OTHER.INTANGI- INJURED OR DESTROYED; (iv) ALL EXPENDITURES OF THE PERSON INJURED 2ONAL PROPERTY, OR WHOSE PROPERTY WAS INJURED OR DESTROYED OR 3, OR INVESTMENTS OF ANOTHER PERSON ON HIS BEHALF IN RELATION TO E NOT SUBJECT TO THE ACTUAL PREPARATION OR PRESENTATION OF THE ,ARNISHMENT, OR PERSON'S CLAIM; GMENT RENDERED (v) ANY OTHER EXPENDITURES OF THE PERSON 1 IN A CIVIL'ACTION INJURED OR OF THE PERSON WHOSE PROPERTY WAS Y, DEATH, OR LOSS INJURED OR DESTROYED OR OF ANOTHER PERSON ON ED BY AN ACT OR HIS BEHALF THAT THE COURT DETERMINES REPRE- IVISION OR ANY OF SENT AN ACTUAL LOSS EXPERIENCED BECAUSE OF WITH A GOVERN- THE PERSONAL OR PROPERTY INJURY OR PROPERTY 'UNCTION. SUCH LOSS. iM FUNDS OF THE (b) AS USED IN THIS DIVISION, "THE ACTUAL LOSS IE BEEN APPROPRI- OF THE PERSON WHO IS AWARDED THE DAMAGES" ;UFFICIENT FUNI)S DOES NOT INCLUDE ANY OF THE FOLLOWING: PED FOR THE PAY- (i) WAGES, SALARIES, OR OTHER COMPENSATION AL OFFICER OF A LOST BY THE PERSON INJURED AS A RESULT OF THE 2TIFY THE AMOUNT INJURY, THAT ARE FUTURE EXPECTED EARNINGS OF E TAXING AUTHOR- SUCH A PERSON; )N FOR INCLUSION (ii) EXPENDITURES TO BE INCURRED IN THE ;ET AND ANNUAL FUTURE, AS DETERMINED BY THE COURT, BY THE PER- PAYMENT IN THE SON INJURED OR BY ANOTHER PERSON ON HIS BEHALF > PROVIDED BY SEC- FOR MEDICAL CARE OR TREATMENT, FOR REHABILITA- UNLESS ANY SUCH TION SERVICES, OR FOR OTHER CARE, TREATMENT, PHE PROCEEDS OF SERVICES, PRODUCTS, OR ACCOMMODATIONS THAT CION 183.27 OF THE WILL BE NECESSARY BECAUSE OF THE INJURY; ANNUAL INSTALL- (iii) ANY FEES PAID OR OWED TO AN ATTORNEY (B) OR (C) OF THIS FOR ANY SERVICES RENDERED IN RELATION TO A PER- SONAL OR PROPERTY INJURY OR PROPERTY LOSS;' iION, "THE ACTUAL (iv) ANY DAMAGES AWARDED FOR PAIN AND SUF- JARDED THE DAM- FERING, FOR THE LOSS OF SOCIETY, CONSORTIUM, COM- )WING: PANIONSHIP, CARE, ASSISTANCE, ATTENTION, PROTEC- OTHER COMPENSA- TION, ADVICE, GUIDANCE, COUNSEL, INSTRUCTION, ^D AS A RESULT OF TRAINING, OR EDUCATION OF THE PERSON INJURED, [E JUDGMENT; FOR MENTAL ANGUISH, OR FOR ANY OTHER INTANGI- ' PERSON INJURED BLE LOSS. tEHALF FOR MEDI= (2) EXCEPT AS SPECIFICALLY PROVIDED TO THE iABILITATION SER- CONTRARY IN THIS DIVISION, A COURT THAT RENDERS TMENT, SERVICES, A JUDGMENT AGAINST A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION AS HAT WERE NECES- DESCRIBED IN DIVISION (A) OF THIS SECTION AND THAT IS NOT IN FAVOR OF THE STATE MAY AUTHORIZE
22 Am. Sub. H. B. No. 176 1720
THE POLITICAL SUBDIVISION, UPON THE MOTION OF THE POLITICAL SUBDIVISION, TO PAY THE JUDGMENT OR A SPECIFIED PORTION OF THE JUDGMENT IN ANNUAL INSTALLMENTS OVER A PERIOD NOT TO
INTEREST AT THE RATE SPECIFIED IN SECTION 1343.03 OF THE REVISED CODE. A COURT SHALL NOT AUTHO- RIZE THE PAYMENT IN INSTALLMENTS UNDER THIS DIVISION OF ANY PORTION OF A JUDGMENT OR ENTIRE JUDGMENT THAT REPRESENTS THE ACTUAL LOSS OF THE PERSON WHO IS AWARDED THE DAMAGES. ADDITIONALLY, A COURT SHALL NOT AUTHORIZE THE PAYMENT IN INSTALLMENTS UNDER THIS DIVI- SION OF ANY PORTION OF A JUDGMENT OR ENTIRE JUDGMENT THAT DOES NOT REPRESENT THE ACTUAL LOSS OF THE PERSON WHO IS AWARDED THE DAMAGES UNLESS THE COURT, AFTER BALANCING THE INTER- ESTS OF THE POLITICAL SUBDIVISION.AND OF THE PERSON IN WHOSE FAVOR THE JUDGMENT WAS REN- DERED, DETERMINES THAT INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS
AND WOULD NOT BE UNJUST TO THE PERSON IN WHOSE FAVOR THE JUDGMENT WAS RENDERED. IF A COURT MAKES SUCH A DETERMINATION, IT SHALL FIX THE AMOUNT OF THE INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS IN SUCH A .MANNER AS TO ACHIEVE FOR THE PERSON IN WHOSE
ECONOMIC RESULT OVER THER PERIOD AS HE WOULD HAVE RECEIVED IF THE JUDGMENT OR PORTION OF THE JUDGMENT SUBJECT TO THE INSTALLMENT PAY- MENTS HAD BEEN PAID IN A LUMP SUM PAYMENT. (C) AT THE OPTION OF A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION, DESCRIBED A RENDERED INIFAVOR OF THEH SECTIONDION AND THAT IS MENTS OVER A PERIOD NOTQTO EXCEED TENNYEARS, t WITHOUT THE PAYMENT OF INTEREST. Sec. 2744.07. '(A)(1) EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE PRO- VIDED IN THIS DIVISION, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION PROVIDE ORFOR FTHE DEFENSE SHALL COURT, IN ANY CIVIL IN ANY STATE EDERAL INJURY,OR EATHCORDLOSS TO PERSONS OR PROPERTY ALLEGEDLY CAUSED BY AN ACT OR OMISSION OF THE
OR PROPRIETARY FUNCT ON FI THE ACCT OR OMISSION
I
23 Am. Sub. H. B. No. 176 1721
• THE MOTION OF OCCURRED OR IS ALLEGED TO HAVE OCCURRED WHILE Y THE JUDGMENT THE EMPLOYEE WAS ACTING IN GOOD FAITH AND NOT E JUDGMENT IN MANIFESTLY OUTSIDE THE SCOPE'OF HIS EMPLOY- PERIOD NOT TO MENT 'OR OFFICIAL RESPONSIBILITIES. AMOUNTS 'HE PAYMENT OF EXPENDED BY A POI.ITICAL SUBDIVISION IN THE N SECTION 1343.03 DF:FENSE OF ITS EMPLOYEES SHALL BE FROM FUNDB' [ALL NOT AUTHO- APPROPRIATED FOR THIS PURPOSE OR FROM PRO-: NTS UNDER THIS CEEDS OF INSURANCE. THE DUTY TO PROVIDE FOR iMENT OR ENTIRE THE DEFENSE OF AN EMPLOYEE SPECIFIED IN THIS ACTUAL LOSS OF DIVISION DOES NOT APPLY IN A CIVIL ACTION OR PRO= )AMAGES. CEEDING THAT IS COMMENCED BY OR ON BEHALF OF A NOT AUTHORIZE POLITICAL SUBDIVISION. NDER THIS DIVI- (2) EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THIS rIENT OR ENTIRE DIVISION, A POLITICAI. SUBDIVISION SHALL INDEM- ENT THE ACTUAL NIFY AND HOLD HARMLESS AN EMPLOYEE IN THE ED THE DAMAGES AMOUNT OF ANY JUDGMENT, OTHER THAN A CING THE INTER- JUDGMENT FOR PUNITIVE OR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES, :ON AND OF THE THAT IS OBTAINED AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE IN A 1MENT WAS REN- STATE OR'FEDERAL COURT OR AS A RESULT OF A LAW ,MENT PAYMENTS OF A FOREIGN JURISDICTION AND THAT IS FOR DAM- CIRCUMSTANCES AGES FOR INJURY, DEATH, OR LOSS TO PERSONS OR 'ERSON.IN WHOSE PROPERTY CAUSED BY AN ACT OR OMISSION IN CON- t,ED. IF A COURT NECTION WITH A GOVERNMENTAL OR PROPRIETARY ' SHALL FIX THE FUNCTION, IF AT THE TIME OF THE ACT OR OMISSION VIENTS IN SUCH A THE EMPLOYEE WAS ACTING IN GOOD FAITH AND ERSON IN WHOSE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT OR OFFICIAL 3RED, THE SAME RESPONSIBILITIES. )D AS HE WOULD (B')(1) A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION MAY ENTER INTO OR PORTION OF A CONSENT JUDGMENT OR SETTLEMENT AND MAY STALLMENT PAY- SECURE RELEASES FROM LIABILITY FOR ITSELF OR M PAYMENT. AN EMPLOYEE, WITH RESPECT TO ANY CLAIM FOR AL SUBDIVISION, INJURY, DEATH,.OR LOSS TO PERSONS OR PROPERTY [SION (A) OF THIS CAUSED BY AN ACT OR OMISSION IN CONNECTION WITH N FAVOR OF THE A GOVERNMENTAL OR PROPRIETARY FUNCTION. vNUAL INSTALL- (2) NO ACTION OR• APPEAL OF ANY KIND SHALL BE EED TEN YEARS, BROUGHT BY ANY PERSON, 'INCLUDING ANY F. EMPLOYEE OR A TAXPAYER, WITH RESPECT TO' THE OTHERWISE PRO- DECISION OF A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION PURSUANT'1`O ;AL SUBDIVISION DIVISION (B)(1) OF THIS SECTION WHETHER'TO ENTER )F AN EMPLOYEE, INTO A CONSENT JUDGMENT OR SETTLEMENT OR. TO T, IN ANY CIVII. SECURE RELEASES, OR CONCERNING THE. AMOUNT R DAMAGES FOR ' AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF A' CONSENT JUDGMENT OR NS OR PROPERTY SETTLEMEN.T. AMOUNTS EXPENDED FOR ANY SET- DMISSION OF THE TLEMENT SHALL BE FROM FUNDS APPROPRIATED FOR GOVERNMENTAL THIS PURPOSE. ACT OR OMISSION
24 Am. Sub. H. B. No. 176 1722
(C) IF A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION REFUSES TO PRO- VIDE AN EMPLOYEE WITH A DEFENSE IN A CIVIL ACTION OR PROCEEDING AS DESCRIBED IN DIVISION (A)(1) OF THIS SECTION, THE EMPLOYEE MAY FILE, IN .THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF THE COUNTY IN WHICH THE POLITICAL SUBDIVISION IS LOCATED, AN ACTION SEEKING A DETERMINATION AS TO THE APPRO-
DIRVISIONETOPROVIEE HIM WITH A DEFENSE UNDER THAT DIVISION. Sec. 2744.08. (A)(1) A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION MAY USE PUBLIC FUNDS TO SECURE INSURANCE WITH RESPECT TO ITS AND ITS EMPLOYEES' POTENTIAL LIA- BILITY IN DAMAGES IN CIVIL ACTIONS FOR INJURY, DEATH, OR LOSS TO PERSONS OR PROPERTY ALLEG- EDLY CAUSED BY AN ACT OR OMISSION OF THE POLITI- CAL SUBDIVISION O1Z ANY OF ITS EMPLOYEES IN CON- NECTION WITH A GOVERNMENTAL OR PROPRIETARY FUNCTION. THE INSURANCE MAY BE AT THE LIMITS, FOR THE CIRCUMSTANCES, AND SUBJECT TO THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS, THAT ARE DETERMINED BY THE POLITICAL SUBDIVISION IN ITS DISCRETION. THE INSURANCE MAY BE FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME THAT IS SET FORTH IN SPECIFICATIONS FOR COMPETI- TIVE BIDS OR, WHEN COMPETITIVE BIDDING IS NOT REQUIRED, FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME THAT IS MUTU- ALLY AGREED UPON BY THE POLITICAL SUBDIVISION AND INSURANCE COMPANY. THE PERIOD OF TIME DOES NOT HAVE TO BE, BUT CAN BE, LIMITED TO THE FISCAL CYCLE UNDER WHICH THE POLITICAL SUBDIVI- SION IS FUNDED AND OPERATES. (2)(a) REGARDLESS OF WHETHER A POLITICAL SUB-
ITY INSURANCE PUR UANT TO DIV SIONE(A)(1) OF THIS SECTION OR OTHERWISE, THE POLITICAL SUBDIVISION MAI NTAIN ITSFEMPLOYEES' PR GRAM RELATIVE TO POTENTIAL LIABILITY IN DAMAGES IN CIVIL ACTIONS FOR INJURY, DEATH, OR LOSS TO PERSONS OR PROP- ERTY ALLEGEDLY CAUSED BY AN ACT OR OMISSION OF THE POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OR ANY OF ITS EMPLOY- EES IN CONNECTION WITH A GOVERNMENTAL OR PRO- PRIETARY FUNCTION. IF IT SO CHOOSES, THE POLITI- CAL SUBDIVISION MAY CONTRACT WITH ANY PERSON, OTHER POLITICAL SUBDIVISION, OR REGIONAL COUN- CIL OF GOVERNMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF THE ADMIN- ISTRATION OF SUCH A PROGRAM.
25 Am. Sub. H. B. No. 176 1723
(b) POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS THAT HAVE ESTAB- N REFUSES TO PRO- LISHED SELF-INSURANCE PROGRAMS RELATIVE TO ?ENSE IN A CIVIL THEIR AND THEIR EMPLOYEES' POTENTIAL LIABILITY RIBED IN DIVISION AS DESCRIBED IN DIVISION (A)(2)(a) OF THIS SECTION )YEE MAY FILE, IN MAY MUTUALLY AGREE THAT THEIR SELF-INSURANCE F THE COUNTY IN PROGRAMS WILL BE JOINTLY ADMINISTERED IN A )N IS LOCATED, AN SPECIFIED MANNER. N AS TO THE APPRO- (B) THE PURCHASE OF LIABILITY INSURANCE, OR HE POLITICAL SUB- THE ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF A SELF- ^DEFENSE UNDER INSURANCE PROGRAM, BY A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A WAIVER OF ANY IMMUNITY SUBDIVISION MAY OR DEFENSE OF THE POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OR ITS INSURANCE WITH EMPLOYEES, EXCEPT THAT THE POLITICAL SUBDIVI- ES' POTENTIAL LIA- SION MAY SPECIFICALLY WAIVE ANY IMMUNITY OR .'IONS FOR INJURY, DEFENSE TO WHICH. IT OR ITS EMPLOYEES MAY BE PROPERTY ALLEG- ION OF THE POLITI- ICALLYEINCLUDED IN THE POLICY OF INSURANCE OR MPLOYEES IN CON- IN A WRITTEN PLAN OF OPERATION OF THE SELF- OR PROPRIETARY INSURANCE PROGRAM, OR, IF ANY, THE LEGISLATIVE BE AT THE LIMITS, ENACTMENT OF THE POLITICAL SUBDIVISION AUTHO- SUBJECT TO THE RIZING THE PURCHASE OF THE INSURANCE OR THE E DETERMINED BY ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF THE SELF- 1 DISCRETION. INSURANCE PROGRAM. SUCH A SPECIFIC WAIVER 3E PERIOD OF TIME SHALL BE ONLY TO THE EXTENT OF THE INSURANCE IONS FOR COMPETI- OR SELF-INSURANCE PROGRAM COVERAGE. 'E BII)DING IS NOT (C) THE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR POLITICAL SUB- ME THAT IS MUTU- DIVISIONS TO SECURE INSURANCE AND TO ESTABLISH ?ICAL SUBDIVISION AND MAINTAIN SELF-INSURANCE PROGRAMS IN THIS PERIOD OF TIME SECTION ARE IN ADDITION TO ANY OTHER AUTHORITY E, LIMITED TO THE TO SECURE INSURANCE OR TO ESTABLISH AND MAIN- 'OLITICAL SUBDIVI- TAIN SELF-INSURANCE PROGRAMS THAT IS GRANTED PURSUANT TO THE REVISED CODE OR THE CONSTITU- R A POLITICAL SUB- TION OF THIS STATE, AND THEY ARE NOT IN DERO- OLICIES OF LIABIL- GATION OF ANY OTHER AUTHORIZATION. ISION (A)(1) OF THIS See. 2744.09. THIS CHAPTER DOES NOT APPLY TO, PICAL SUBDI V ISION AND SHALL NOT BE CONSTRUED TO APPLY TO, THE SELF-INSURANCE FOLLOWING: ) ITS EMPLOYEES' (A) CIVIL ACTIONS THAT SEEK TO RECOVER DAM- 3 IN CIVIL ACTIONS AGES FROM A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OR ANY OF ITS PERSONS OR PROP- EMPLOYEES FOR CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY; .CT OR OMISSION O.F (B) CIVIL ACTIONS BY AN EMPLOYEE, OR THE COL- NY OF ITS EMPLOY- LECTIVE BARGAINING REPRESENTATIVE OF AN ZNMENTAL OR PRO- EMPLOYEE, AGAINST HIS POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE )OSES, THE POLITI- ANY THAT ARISES WITH ANY PERSON, EMPLOYMENT RELA ION HIP BETWEEN THE [t REGIONAL COUN- EMPLOYEE AND THE POLITICAL SUBDIVISION; ' 3ES OF THE ADMIN-
26 Am. Sub. H. B. No. 176 1724
'(C) CIVIL ACTIONS BY AN EMPLOYEE OF A POI,ITI- CAL SUBDIVISION AGAINST THE POLITICAL SUBDIVI°- SION RELATIVE TO WAGES, HOURS, CONDITIONS, OR OTHER TERMS OF HIS EMPLOYMENT; (D) CIVIL-ACTIONS BY SURETIES, AND THE RIGHTS OF SURETIES, UNDER FIDELITY OR SURETY BONDS; (E) CIVIL CLAIMS BASED UPON ALLEGED VIOLA- TIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION OR STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES, EXCEPT THAT THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 2744.07 OF THE REVISED CODE SHALL APPLY TO SUCH CLAIMS OR RELATED CIVIL ACTIONS. Sec. 3313.203. The board of education of any school district may do any of the following: (A) Purchase €Fem a* ;,:^ eempany }ieeiqsed to do business in this stabe a policy or policies of insurance insuring the board, or members of boards of education, superintendents, principals, other administrators, teachers or any other group of employees einployed by the board, or volunteer bus rider assis- tants authorized by section 3327.16 of the Revised Code against liability on account of damages or injury to persons and prop- erty resulting from any act or omission of such board, or such individual in his official capacity as a member or employee of the board of education or as a volunteer bus rider assistant or resulting solely out of his membership on, or employment by, or voltznteer services to the board. ANY SUCH POLICY SHALL BE PURCHASED FROM AN INSURANCE COMPANY LICENSED TO DO BUSINESS IN THIS STATE, IF SUCH A POLIC.Y IS AVAILABLE FROM SUCH A.COM- ANY_ Whenever the board considers it necessary to procure such insurance, it shall adopt a resolution setting forth the amount of the insurance to be purchased, the necessity thereof, and a statement of the estimated premium as quoted in writing by not less than two insurance companies if more than bne com- pany offers such insurance for sale to the board. Upon the adop- tion of such resolution, the board may purchase insurance from the insurance company submitting the lowest and best quota- tion. (B) Except for findings for recovery in an audit report pur- suant to section 117.28 of the Revised Code, indemnify, defend, and hold harmless any person included in division (A) of this section. against all civil demands, claims, suits, and legal pro- ceedings, whether threatened or instituted, and defend such person against any criminal legal proceedings, whether threat- ened or instituted, that arise from the acts or omissions of such person while acting within the scope of the person's employ- ment by the school board and in the good faith belief that such
27 Am. Sub. H. B. No. 176 1725 of the school dis- DYEE OF A POLITI- conduct was lawful and in the best interests under this divi- iLITICAL SUBDIVI- trict, except that expenditures and obligations for such pur- ,.CONDITIONS, OR sion shall not exceed the amounts appropriated
poses. (A) AS USED IN THIS SECTION, "STATE I, AND THE RIGHTS Sec. 3345.202. URETY BONDS; I R COLLEGE" N I ALLEGED VIOLA- AS IN DIVISION (A)(1) OF SECTION 3345.12 OF THE {TATUTES OF THE REVISED CODE. E . PROVISIONS OF (B) THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF A STATE UNIVER- )DE SHALL APPLY SITY OR COLLEGE MAY PURCHASE FROM AN INSURER ACTIONS. OR INSURERS LICENSED TO DO BUSINESS IN THIS of any school district STATE A POLICY OR POLICIES OF LIABILITY INSUR- q3any Iieensed to de EMPLOYEES OF THE STATE UNIVERSITY OR COLLEGE, of insurance insuring AND VOLUNTEERS AND STUDENTS WHO ARE ACTING ion, superintenclents, UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE STATE UNIVERSITY OR ^r any other group of COLLEGE AGAINST CIVIL LIABILITY FOR INJURY, iteer bus rider assis- DEATH, OR LOSS TO PERSONS OR PROPERTY THAT 3evised Code against ARISES FROM ACTS OR OMISSIONS OF THE MEMBERS, :o persons and prop- OFFICERS, OR EMPLOYEES WHILE ACTING WITHIN THE such board, or such SCOPE OF TfIEIR EMPLOYMENT OR OFFICIAL RESPON- nber or employee of SIBILITIES OR FROM ACTS OR OMISSIONS OF THE VOL- THE us rider assistant or r employment by, or UNTEERS THE S AITENUNIVERS TY OR COLLE E. THE H POLICY SHALL POLICY OR POLICIES SHALL NOT INCLUDE COVERAGE ANCE COMPANY THAT EXTENDS TO ACTS OR OMISSIONS BY THE MEM- TATE, IF SUCH A BERS, OFFICERS, EMPLOYEES, VOLUNTEERS, OR STU- SUCH A COM- DENTS THAT ARE MANIFESTLY OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF ^cessary to procure THEIR EMPLOYMENT, OFFICIAL RESPONSIBILITIES, OR 1 setting forth the AUTHORIZED CONDUCT UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE i e necessity thereof, STATE UNIVERSITY OR COLLEGE, THAT INVOLVE MALI- is quoted in writing CIOUS PURPOSE OR BAD FAITH, OR THAT ARE PER- more than bne com- FORMED IN A WANTON OR RECKLESS MANNER. THE ard. Upon the adop- iase insurance from ATTORNEY'S FEES AND OTHER EXPENSES INCURRED st and best quota- IN THE DEFENSE OR SETTLEMENT OF A CLAIM FOR DAMAGES. in audit report pur- THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES MAY PAY ANY'PORTION POL- indemnify, defend, livision (A) of this OFICY OR POL INSURANCE CIES OFILABO FROM ANY its, and legal pro- FUNDS UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE STATE UNIVER- and defend such SITY OR COLLEGE. or paramedic is s, whether threat- Sec. 4731.90. (A) No EMT-A, ADV EMT-A, omissions of such liable in civil damages for injury, death, or loss to persons or person's employ- property resulting from his administration of emergency medi- th belief that such cal care or treatment, unless the care or treatment is adminis-
28 tered in a manner constituting willful or wanton misconduct. No licensed medical doctor, doctor of osteopathic medicine and surgery, or registered nurse designated by a physician, who is advising or assisting in the emergency care or treatment by means of any communication device or telemetering system, is liable in civil damages for injury, death, or loss to persons or property resulting from his advisory communication or assis- tance, unless the advisory communication or assistance is pro- vided in a manner constituting willful or wanton misconduct. (B) No political subdivision, joint ambulance district, or other public agency, nor any officer or employee of a public agency or of a private organization operating under contract or in joint agreement with one or more political subdivisions, that provides emergency medical services, or that enters into a joint agreement or a contract with the state, any political subdivi- sion, or joint ambulance district for the provision of emergency medical services, is liable in civil damages for injury, death, or loss to persons or property arising out of any actions taken by an EMT-A, ADV EMT-A, or parameilic working under the offi- cer's or employee's jurisdiction, or for injury, death, or loss to persons or property arising out of any actions of licensed medi- cal personnel advising or assisting the EMT-A, ADV EMT-A, or paramedic, unless the care, treatment, or assistance is provided in a manner constituting willful or wanton misconduct. (C) No student, who is enrolled in a program of instruction for certification as an EMT-A, ADV EMT-A, or paramedic thaf meets the standards specified in section 4731.84 of the Revised Code and that is conducted by an institution accredited under section 4731.83 of the Revised Code, is liable in civil damages for injury, death, or loss to persons or property resulting from either of the following: (1) The student's administration of emergency medical or patient care or treatment, if the care or treatment is adminis- tered while the student is under the direct supervision and in the immediate presence of an EMT-A, ADV EMT-A, paramedic, registered nurse, or licensed physician and while the student is receiving clinical training that is required by the program of instruction, unless the care or treatment is provided in.a man- ner constituting willful or wanton misconduct; (2) The student's training as an ambulance driver that is required by the program, unless the driving is done in a manner constituting willful or wanton misconduct. (D) No EMT-A, ADV EMT-A, paramedic, or other operator, who holds a valid operator's or chauffeur's license issued pursu- ant to Chapter 4507. of the Revised Code and who is employed by an emergency medical service THAT IS NOT OWNED OR
29 Am. Sub. H. B. No. 176 1727 ^ NED OPERATED BY A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION is li DEFINED nton misconduct. thic medicine and IN SECTION 2744.01 OF THE1R 5 tio peDocODEp^operty that is damages for injury, death, or opera- physician, who is EMT-A's, ADV EMT-A's, p aramedic's or treatment by tor's operation of an ambulance while responding to or complet- tering system, is tor'sing a callby thefor emergency medical care or treatment, unless the oss to persons or does not nication or assis- operation constitutes oof setion 4511.03Uof.the Revised assistance is pro- comply with the p'ecautio misconduct. Code. No emergency medical servicaore property thagis lance district, or for any injury, death, or loss to persons its emlo ee or caused by the operation of an ambulance by ent pmmnnity loyee of a public agent,if this division grants the employee or ag under contract or subdivisions, that from eivil liability for the injury, of an emergency medical service (E) No employee or agent mters into a joint who receives requests for emergency medical care or treatment political subdivi- that are directed requests, 4com^un^ ates sion of emergency medicso the response dispatches injury, death, or As,such or requests paa to those employees or agents of the service who actions taken by are authorized to dispatch emergency medical technicians, or ng under the offi- performs any combination of these functions for the service, is death, or loss to liable in civil, damages for injury, cleath , or loss to persons of licensed medi- prope•ty resulting from his acts or omissions in the ADV EMT-A, or unless employee'serf or rr tance is provided mance of his duties for tof his duties constitutes agent's conduct in the performance duct. willful or wanton misconduct. EMT- •am of instruction (F) A person who is performing the functions of an >r paramedic that or paramedic under the auth 14 of the Revised A, ADV EMT-A, yoor^tserves as a vol- accredited under a state that borders Ohio, who al servcde based in that state, unteer with an emerg Y medic civil damages for and WHO provides emergency medical care TO or trans- y resulting from portation of a patient in Ohio is not liable in civil damages for injury, death, or loss to persons or property resulting from his ;ency medical or administration of emergency medical care or treatment, unless ment is adminis- the care or treatment is administered in a manner canstituting ipervision and in willful or wanton misconduct. No licensed medical doctor, doc- 7T-A, paramedic, tor of osteopathic me(licine and surgery, or racgticeein Ohioror .le the student is designated by a physician, who is licensed to p the program of in the adjoining state and who is advising or assisting such a )vided in a man- person in the emergency care or treatment by means of any communication device or telemetering system, is liable in civil :e driver that is damages for injury, cleath, or loss to persons or property result- lone in a manner ing from his advisory communication or assistance, unless the advisory communication or assistance is provided in a manner ,r other operator, constituting willful or wanton misconduct. law shall ise issued pursu- Sec. 5511.01. All state highways established by who is employed continue to be known as state highways, and the state highway )T OWNED OR
30 system established by law shall continue to be known as the state highway system. Before establishing any additional highways as part of the state highway system, or making any changes in existing high- ways comprising the system, the director of transportation shall give notice, by publication in one newspaper of general circula- tion in each of the counties in which the highway proposed to be established is to be located or in which it is proposed to make such changes, once each week for two successive weeks. Such notice shall state the time and place of hearing which shall be held in the county, or one of the counties, in which the proposed highway or some part thereof is to be situated, or in which it is proposed to make such changes. The notice shall state the route of the proposed highway or the change proposed to be made in an existing highway of the system. Hearing shall be open to the public and the director or a deputy designated by him shall attend and hear any proof offered on such matter. Any changes made in existing highways by the director or any additional highways established by him following such hearing shall be certified to the following authorities interested therein: the legislative authority of municipalities, board of county commissioners, board of township trustees, municipal, county, and regional planning commissions, and the municipal, township, or county officer authorized to issue land use or build- ing permits. Before any zoning change or subdivision plat is approved and before any permit for land use or the erection, alteration, or moving of a building is granted affecting any land within three hundred feet of the center line of a proposed new highway or highway for which changes are proposed, as described in the certification by the director, or within a radius of five hundred feet from the point of intersection of ea4d THAT center line with any public road or highway, the authority authorized to approve the zoning change or subdivision plat or the authority authorized to grant the permit for land use or the erection, alteration, or moving of the building shall give notice, ] by e,- 4.^rcertifiedea mail, to the director, and shall not approve a zoning change or subdivision plat or grant a permit for land use or the erection, alteration, or moving of a building for one hundred twenty days from date notice is received by the director. During such one hundred twenty day period and any extension theeesf OF IT as may be agreed to between the direc- tor and any property owner, notice of which has been given to the authority to which the application has been made, the direc- tor shall proceed to acquire any land needed by purchase or gift, or by initiating proceedings to appropriate, or, make a finding that acquisition at such time is not in the public interest. Upon
31 Am. Sub. H. B. No. 176 1729
purchase, initiation of appropriation proceedings, or a finding known as the that acquisition is not in the public interest, the director shall notify the authority from which notice was received of such as part of the action. Upon being notified that the director has purchased or existing high- initiated proceedings to appropriate such land Llse ea4d THAT sportation shall authority shall refuse to rezone land or to approve any subdivi- general circula- sion plat that includes the land which the director has pur- proposed to be chased or has initiated proceedings to appropriate, and such )posed to make authority shall refuse to grant a permit for land use or the erec- ? weeks. Such tion, alteration, or moving of a building on the land which the which shall be director has purchased or initiated proceedings to appropriate. h the proposed Upon notification that the director has found acquisition at that r in which it is time not to be in the public interest, or upon the expiration of >hall state the the one hundred twenty day period or any extension thereof, if )roposed to be no notice has been received from the director, sa^d THAT aaring shall be authority shall proceed in accordance with law. designated by A report of such change or addition shall be filed in the such matter. office of the director, and the report of the director making such lirector or any change or establishing such highway shall be placed on file in such hearing the office of the department of transportation. es interested In no event shall the total mileage of the state highway sys- :ies, board of tem be increased, under this section to exceed two hundred es, municipal, miles in one year. the municipal, The director, upon petition of the boards of the counties tra- 9 use or build- versed thereby or of citizens of such counties, may officially ivision plat is assign to a highway of the state highway system a distinctive the erection, name, commemorative of a historical event or personage, or to :ting any land officially assign thereto a commonly accepted and appropriate proposed new name by which such highway is known. The director may, upon proposed, as giving notice and holding a hearing, abandon a highway on the ithin a radius state highway system or part thereof which he determines is of of sa-id• THAT minor importance, or which traverses territory adequately the authority served by another state highway, and the abandoned highway vision plat or shall revert to a county or township road or municipal street. A nd use or the report covering such action shall be filed in the office of the 1 give notice, director, and the director shall certify.his action to the board of 3nd shall not the county in which such highway or portion thereof so aban- •ant a permit doned is situated. of a building The directo"r shall make a map showing thereon, by appro- :eived by the priate numbering or other designation, all the state highways riod and any which map shall be kept on file in his office and he shall cause :en the direc- the same to be corrected and revised to show all changes and een given to additions to the date of such correction. A copy of such map, le, the direc- certified by the director as a correct copy of the map on file in ;hase or gift, his office, shall be admissible as evidence in any court to prove ke a finding the existence and location of the several highways and roads of ^rest. Upon the state highway system.
32 The state highway routes into or through municipal corpo- rations, as designated or indicated by state highway route markers erected thereon on October 11, 1945, are state high- ways and a part of the state highway system. The director may' erect state highway route markers and such other signs direct- ing traffic as he thinks proper upon those portions of the state highway system lying within municipal corporations, and the consent of such municipal corporations to such erection and marking shall not be necessary. No change in the route of any highway through a municipal corporation shall be made except after notice and hearing. No duty of constructing, reconstructing, maintaining, and repairing such state highways within municipal corporations shall attach to or rest upon the director; but he may enter upon such state highways within any municipal corporation and con- struct, reconstruct, widen, improve, maintain, and repair the same provided the municipal corporation first consents thereto by resolution of its legislative authority, except that he need not obtain the consent of the municipal corporation if the existing highway being changed or the location of an additional highway being established was not within the corporate limits of the municipal corporation at the time such establishment or change was journalized by the director. The director shall place in the files of the department a record of the routes of all such state highways within municipal corporations, and shall cause them to be corrected and revised to show all changes and additions to the date of such correc- tion. A copy of such record or any pertinent part thereof, certi- fied by the ciirector to be a true ancl correct copy, shall be admis- sible in evidence in any court of tie state for the purpose of proving the existence and location uf any state highway within a municipal corporation. When the director proposes to change an existing state highway, and there exists upon such highway a separated rail- road crossing, the clirector shall mail to the interested railroad company a copy of the notice which shall be mailecl by first-class mail, postage prepaid, and r 33 1731 Nothing in this section shall be construed to require notice gh municipal corpo- and hearing before the construction, reconstruction, mainte- ate highway route nance, improvement, or widening of an existing highway where (45, are state high- no relocation is involved. The director may With the exception of the authority conferred upon the other signs direct- director by this section, to erect state highway route markers ortions of the state and signs directing traffic, Chapters 5501., 5503., 5511., 554; •porations, and the 5513., 5515., 5516., 5517., 5519., 5521., 5523., 5525., 5527., 5528., such erection and 5529., 5531., 5533., and 5535. of the Revised Code, shall not in any in the route of any modify, limit, or restrict the authority conferred by section all be made except way,723.01 of the Revised Code upon municipal corporations to regu- late the use of streets and to have the care, supervision, and ;, maintaining, and control of THE public highways, streets, avenues, alleys, side- iicipal corporations walks, public grounds, bridges, aqueducts, and viaducts within he may enter upon ^# THE municipal eeppetatiee CORPORATIONS and to keep )rporation and con- Lhesa-me THEM, SUBJECT TO DIVISION (B)(3) OF SECTION in, and repair the 2744.02 OF THE REVISED CODE, open, in repair, and free 5t consents thereto pt that he need not from nuisance. :ion if the existing SECTION 2. That existing sections 9.60, 133.27, 305.12, additional highway 505.43, 505.431, 505.50, 723.01, 723.54, 737.04, 737.041, 3313.203, rate limits of the 4731.90, and 5511.01 and sections 505.05, 505.06, 701.02, and lishment or change 5571.10 of the Revised Code are hereby repealed. SECTioN 3. The provisions of section 2744.06of t Revised rendered the department a Code, as enacted by this act, shall apply to judgments ,s within municipal after the effective date of this act in civil actions brought pursu- rected and revised ant to Chapter 2744. of the Revised Code, as enacted by this act, te of such correc- to recover damages for injury, death, or loss to persons or prop- part thereof, certi- erty caused by an act or omission of a political subdivision or py, shall be admis- any of its employees in connection with a governmental or pro- 'or the purpose of prietary function, as defined in section 2744.01 of the Revised te highway within Code as enacted by this act. Those provisions also shall apply to judgments that are rendered after the effective date of this an existing state act in civil actions, whether based upon a section of the Revised a separated rail- Code or the common law of this state, that were commenced nterested railroad prior to the effective date of this act or that are based on a claim ailed by first-class arising prior to that date, and that seek to recover damages for FIED with return injury, death, or loss to persons or property caused by an act or the time fixed for omission of a political subdivision or any of its employees while iange an eicisting engaged in the scope of their employment. . he shall mail to .xch municipal cor- SECTION 4. The provisions of section 2744.07 of the Revised iiled by first-class Code shall be used by and inure to the benefit of a political sub- ?IED with return division and its employees in connection with judgments ren- :he time fixed for dered prior to as well as on or after the effective date of this act, I actions commenced prior to and pending on, or commenced on or 34 after, the effective date of this act, and claims arising or made, prior to or on or after the effective date of this act. As used in this section, judgments, actions, and claims include judgments, actions, and claims for injury, death, or loss to persons or prop- erty caused by an act or omission of a political subdivision or any of its employees while engaged in the scope of their employ- ment, as well as judgments, actions, and claims relative to Chapter 2744. of the Revised Code, as enacted by this act. SECTION 5. (A) The provisions of division (A) of section 2744.04 of the Revised Code, as enacted by this act, shall apply only to causes of action against political subdivisions for injury, death, or loss to persons or property that arise on or after the effective date of this act. With respect to causes of action against a political subdivision for injury, death, or loss to persons or property that arose prior to the effective date of this act, that have not been barred by a statute of limitations speci- fied in the Revised Code, and that are not, on the effective date of this act, the subject of a civil action pending in a court of this state, a civil action based on such a cause of action shall be brought within the applicable statute of limitations. (B) Except as provided in this division, the provisions of section 2744.05 of the Revised Code, as enacted by this act, shall apply only to causes of action against political subdivisions for injury, death, or loss to persons or property that arise on or after the effective date of this act. With respect to causes of action against a political subdivision for injury, death, or loss to persons or property that arose prior to the effective date of this act, that have not been barred by a statute of limitations, and that are not the subject of a civil action with respect to which a trial has commenced prior to the effective date of this act in a court of this state, the provisions of divisions (A) and (C) of section 2744.05 of the Revised Code, as enacted by this act, shall apply. (C) The provisions of sections 2744.02 and 2744.03 of the Revised Code, as enacted by this act, shall apply only to causes of action against political subdivisions or their employees for injury, death, or loss to persons or property that arise on or after the effective date of this act. With respect to causes of action against a political subdivision or any employee of a politi- cal subdivision for injury, death, or loss to persons or property that arodse prior to the effective date of this act and that have not been barred by a statute of limitations, the liability or immunity from liability of a political subdivision or employee of a political subdivision, and defenses available to a political sub- division or employee of a political subdivision, shall be deter- 35 elaims arising or made mined, subject to division (B) of this section, in accordance with if this act. As used in the common law or statutes that would have been in effect if the ms include judgments, provisions of sections 2744.02 and 2744.03 of the Revised Code, )ss to persons or prop- as enacted by this act, had not been enacted. of (D) If any provision of this section or the application political subdivision or scope of their employ- any provision of this section to any person is declared invalid by ind claims relative to a court of this state, the invalidity does not affect other provi- eted by this act. sions of this section or of this act, or applications of other provi- of division (A) of section sions of this section is on or application, be snendethe pro- by this act, shall apply the invalid prov itical subdivisions for visions are severable. iperty that arise on or SECTIoN 6. Sections 3, 4, and 5 of Amended Substitute th respect to causes of Senate Bill No. 76 of the 113th General Assembly are hereby 'injury, death, or loss to repealed. The repeal of Section 3 of that act is not affected by he effective date of this the rule of construction contained in section 1.57 of the Revised ,ute of limitations speci- Code. ot, on the effective date SEC'rtoN 7. The. Superintendent of Insurance shall conduct ending in a court of this at least four public hearings commencing no earlier than April :ause of action shall be 1, 1986, and no later than June 1, 1986, to determine whether limitations. insurance then is generally available to political subdivisions ,ision, the provisions of with respect to their potential liability in damages in civil nnacted by this act, shall actions for injury, death, or loss to persons or property allegedly )olitical subdivisions for caused by acts or omissions of the political subdivisions or their operty that arise on or employees, and, if such insurance then is generally available to ith respect to causes of political subdivisions, to determine whether its availability is at )r injury, death, or loss a rate that is not excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discrimina- to the effective date of tory. The Superintendent shall prepare a report that contains a statute of limitations, a summary of all testimony, evidence, and information pre- action with respect to sented at any such hearing, and that sets forth his determina- he effective date of this tions as to the availability of premium rates of political subdivi- s of divisions (A) and (C) sion liabilty insurance and as to whether such rates are not as enacted by this act, excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory, as based on such testimony, evidence, and information. No later than Janu- 4.02 and 2744.03 of the ary 1, 1987, the Superintendent shall file with the General hall apply only to causes Assembly a copy of the report, along with the Superintendent's or their employees for recommendations as to the necessity or lack of necessity for the •operty that arise on or establishment of a joint underwriting association to facilitate 'ith respect to causes of the provision of political subdivision liability insurance, and if any employee of a politi- the Superintendent recommends that there is a necessity for s to persons or property such an association, his recommendations as to the nature and )f this act and that have details of the association. The General Assembly is not bound itations, the liability or by the recommendations of the Superintendent, and is not bdivision or employee of required to act in any way in relation to the establishment of a ailable to a political sub- joint underwriting association. If the General Assembly con- division, shall be deter- siders the establishment of a joint underwriting association, it 36 Am. Sub. H. B. No. 176 1733 may consider the Superintendent's recommendations, if any, as to the nature and details of such an association, it may consider those recommendations in part or with modifications, it may reject those recommendations, or it may establish and consider its own proposal for the establishment of such an association. SECTION 8. This act is hereby declared to be an emergency measure necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety. The 'reason for such necessity is that the protections afforded to political subdivisions and employees of political subdivisions by this act are urgently needed in order to ensure the continued orderly operation of local governments and the continued ability of local governments to provide public peace, health, and safety services to their residents. Therefore, this act shall go into immediate effect. President of the Senate. Passed^6= +" fy, 19JE- Approved-OW&Ok-70 t 19-Lg 4- . 0- Governor. 37 Am. Sub. H. B. No. 176 1734 dations, if any, as The section numbering of law of a general and permanent in, it may consider nature is complete and in conformity with the Revised Code. lifications, it may iblish and consider n association. ) be an emergency ation of the public :h necessity is that :)ns and employees Filed in the otBce of the Secretary of State at Columbus, .ly needed in order Ohio, on tbe!!jW day of hPr , A. I).18-U, local governments s to provide public idents. Therefore, Secretary of State. 93 File No. Effective Date November 20, 1985 Eative3. C .of the Senate. tc- Goverreor. 0 38 Lawriter - ORC - 1.49 Determining legislative intent. Page 1 of 1 1.49 Determining legislative intent. If a statute is ambiguous, the court, in determining the intention of the legislature, may consider among other matters: (A) The object sought to be attained; (B) The circumstances under which the statute was enacted; (C) The legislative history; (D) The common law or former statutory provisions, including laws upon the same or similar subjects; (E) The consequences of a particular construction; (F) The administrative construction of the statute. Effective Date: 01-03-1972 39 1/31/2011 http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/gpl.49 GENERAL PROVISIONS Title 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS TITLE 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS PART I. THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSOLIDATED STATUTES Chapter 1. Short Title, Form of Citation and Effective Date § 101. Short title. § 102. Citation of Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes. § 103. Effective date. Chapter 2. (Reserved) Chapter 3. Format of the Consolidated Statutes § 301. Arrangement. § 302. Section headings. § 303. Cross references between provisions of the Consolidated Statutes. § 304. References to other statutes. § 305. Re-use of section numbers. § 306. Bills to amend the Consolidated Statutes. Chapter 4. ( Reserved) Chapter 5. Official Publication of the Consolidated Statutes § 501. Publication and distribution. § 502. Preparation and contents. § 503. Official status of publication. PART Ii. (Reserved) PART III. ADOPTION AND PUBLICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS Chapter 9. Constitutional Provisions § 901. Legislation to show changes. § 902. Conduct of election. result of election. § 903. Governor to proclaim corrected numbering. § 904. Governor to proclaim § 905. Section headings. § 906. Short titles of Constitutions of 1874 and 1968. 40 JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE Title 42 TABLE OF CONTENTS TITLE 42 JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE PART I. PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS Chapter 1. General Provisions § 101. Short title of title. § 102. Definitions. § 103. Principles of construction. PART II. ORGANIZATION SUBPART A. COURTS AND MAGISTERIAL DISTRICT JUDGES ARTICLE A. PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS Chapter 3. General Structure and Powers Subchapter A. Unified Judicial System § 301. Unified judicial system. Subchapter B. General Provisions Relating to Courts § 321. Court of record. § 322. Seal. § 323. Powers. § 324. Sessions and terms of court. § 325. Chief Justice and president judges. § 326. Quorum. § 327. Oaths and acknowledgments. ARTICLE B. APPELLATE COURTS Chapter S. Organization of Appellate Courts Subchapter A. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania § 501. Supreme Court. § 502. General powers of Supreme Court. § 503. Reassignment of matters. § 504. Seat of court. Subchapter B. Superior Court of Pennsylvania § 541. Superior Court. § 542. Powers of Superior Court. 41 Subchapter B. Availability of Otherwise Confidential Information § 8721. Definitions. § 8722. Petition for access to confidential information. § 8723. Grounds for access. § 8724. Disclosure of confidential information. § 8725. Penalties for improper disclosure. Chapter 89. Commencement of Proceedings Subchapter A. General Provisions § 8901. Intrastate hot pursuit (Repealed). § 8902. Arrest without warrant. Subchapter B. Interstate Hot Pursuit § 8921. Scope of subchapter. § 8922. Authority of officers of another state to arrest in this Commonwealth. § 8923. Hearing after arrest. § 8924. Construction of subchapter. Subchapter C. Indictment and Information § 8931. Indictment and information. § 8932. Nolle prosequi or settlement. § 8933. Dismissal of criminal cases. § 8934. Sealing of affidavits. Subchapter D. Municipal Police Jurisdiction § 8951. Definitions. § 8952. Primary municipal police jurisdiction. § 8953.Statewide municipal police jurisdiction. § 8954. Noncompliance with mandatory certification requirements. Chapter 91. Detainers and Extradition Subchapter A. Agreement on Detainers § 9101. Agreement on detainers. § 9102. Appropriate court. § 9103. Enforcement and cooperation. § 9104. Second and subsequent offenses. § 9105. Escape. § 9106. Duty of warden or other official. § 9107. Administrator and information agent. § 9108. Transmission of subchapter. Subchapter B. Extradition of Persons Charged with Crime § 9121. Short title of subchapter. 42 Any dulyemployed municipal police officer shall have the power and authority to enforce the laws of this Commonwealth or otherwise perform the functions of that office anywhere within his primary jurisdiction as to: (1) Any offense which the officer views or otherwise has probable cause to believe was committed within his jurisdiction. (2) Any other event that occurs within his primary jurisdiction and which reasonably requires action on the part of the police in order to preserve, protect or defend persons or property or to otherwise maintain the peace and dignity of this Commonwealth. § 8953. Statewide municipal police jurisdiction. (a) General rule. --Any duly employed municipal police officer who is within this Commonwealth, but beyond the territorial limits of his primary jurisdiction, shall have the power and authority to enforce the laws of this Commonwealth or otherwise perform the functions of that office as if enforcing those laws or performing those functions within the territorial limits of his primary jurisdiction in the following cases: (1) Where the officer is acting pursuant to an order issued by a court of record or an order issued by a district magistrate whose magisterial district is located within the judicial district wherein the officer's primary jurisdiction is situated, or where the officer is otherwise acting pursuant to the requirements of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, except that the service of an arrest or search warrant shall require the consent of the chief law enforcement officer, or a person authorized by him to give consent, of the organized law enforcement agency which regularly provides primary police services in the municipality wherein the warrant is to be served. (2) Where the officer is in hot pursuit of any person for any offense which was committed, or which he has probable cause to believe was committed, within his primary jurisdiction and for which offense the officer continues in fresh pursuit of the person after the commission of the offense. (3) Where the officer has been requested to aid or assist any local, State or Federal law enforcement officer or park police officer or otherwise has probable cause to believe that the other officer is in need of aid or assistance. (4) Where the officer has obtained the prior consent of the chief law enforcement officer, or a person authorized by him to give consent, of the organized law enforcement agency which provides primary police services to a political subdivision which is beyond that officer's primary jurisdiction to enter the other jurisdiction for the purpose of conducting official duties which arise from official matters within his primary jurisdiction. (5) Where the officer is on official business and views an offense, or has probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed, and makes a reasonable effort to identify himself as a police officer and which offense is a felony, 43 misdemeanor, breach of the peace or other act which presents an immediate clear and present danger to persons or property. (6) Where the officer views an offense which is a felony, or has probable cause to believe that an offense which is a felony has been committed, and makes a reasonable effort to identify himself as a police officer. (b) Limitation. --Nothing contained in subsection (a) shall be deemed to extend or otherwise enlarge a municipal police officer's power and authority to arrest any person for an offense unless specifically authorized by law. --Whenever a municipal police (c) Relinquishing authority. officer exercises any power or authority over any person or event pursuant to the provisions of subsection (a)(3), (4), (5) or (6), the officer shall relinquish authority and control over any such person or event upon the request of the chief law enforcement officer, or a person authorized by him to make the request, of the organized law enforcement agency which regularly provides primary police services in the municipality. --Any municipal police (d) Immunities and benefits preserved. officer who exercises any power or authority granted under this section, and the employing municipality of the police officer, shall have the same immunities from liability as would be applicable if the actions were performed within the territorial boundaries of the officer's primary jurisdiction and the police officer shall be entitled to the same benefits of employment as the officer would possess if acting solely within his primary jurisdiction. However, when any municipal police officer is responding to a request for aid or assistance from a State law enforcement officer pursuant to subsection (a)(3) for purposes of workers' compensation and allocation of liability for any death, injury or damage he may cause in the performance of his requested duties, he shall be considered to be an employee of the Commonwealth. All costs incurred by any municipality in the defense of lawsuits arising from the performance of any requested duties shall be borne by the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth shall provide attorneys to defend any lawsuits arising under this section. For purposes of compensation, pension or indemnity fund rights and other rights and benefits to which he may be entitled, the municipal officer shall be considered to be performing his duties in his normal capacity as a municipal law enforcement officer. Nothing in this section shall be construed to restrict the authority of any municipality to limit the exercise of any power or authority conferred on its police by this section. (e) Existing and future municipal police service agreements preserved. --Nothing in this section shall be construed to restrict the authority of any municipality to maintain current or to enter into new cooperative police service agreements with another municipality or municipalities for purposes including, but not limited to, describing conditions of mutual aid, assigning liability and determining appropriate costs of these cooperative efforts. (July 1, 1987, P.L.180, No.21, eff. imd.; Dec. 22, 1989, P.L.730, No.100, eff. 60 days) 44 Page 1 of 14 CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 ...... TITLE OF THE ACT THE PENAL CODE OF CALIFORNIA ...... 2-24 PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS .... PART 1. OF CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS PERSONS LIABLE TO PUNISHMENT FOR CRIME ...... 25-29 TITLE 1. OF PARTIES TO CRIME ...... 30-33 TITLE 2. OF OFFENSES AGAINST THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE STATE ...... 37-38 TITLE 3. OF CRIMES BY AND AGAINST THE EXECUTIVE POWER OF THE STATE 67-77 TITLE 5. OF ...... 85-88 TITLE 6. OF CRIMES AGAINST THE LEGISLATIVE POWER TITLE 7. OF CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC JUSTICE CHAPTER 1. BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION 92-100 CHAPTER 2. RESCUES ...... 102 ESCAPES AND AIDING THEREIN ...... 107-110 CHAPTER 3. CHAPTER 4. FORGING, STEALING, MUTILATING, AND FALSIFYING JUDICIAL AND PUBLIC RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS ...... 112-117 PERJURY AND SUBORNATION OF PERJURY ...... 118-131 CHAPTER 5. CHAPTER 6. FALSIFYING EVIDENCE, AND BRIBING, INFLUENCING, INTIMIDATING OR THREATENING WITNESSES ...... 132-141 CHAPTER 7. OTHER OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC JUSTICE ...... 142-181 CHAPTER 8. CONSPIRACY ...... 182-185 CHAPTER 9. CRIMINAL PROFITEERING ...... 186-186.8 CHAPTER 10. MONEY LAUNDERING ...... 186.9-186.10 CHAPTER 10.5. FRAUD AND EMBEZZLEMENT: VICTIM RESTITUTION ...... 186.11 CHAPTER 11. STREET TERRORISM ENFORCEMENT AND PREVENTION ACT 186.20-186.33 TITLE 8. OF CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON CHAPTER 1. HOMICIDE 187-199 CHAPTER 2. MAYHEM ...... 203-206.1 CHAPTER 3. KIDNAPPING 207-210 CHAPTER 3.5. HOSTAGES ...... 210.5 ...... 211-215 CHAPTER 4. ROBBERY "I Inlo 2 CHAPTER 5. ATTEMPTS TO KILL ...... CHAPTER 6 . ASSAULTS WITH INTENT TO COMMIT FELONY, OTHER THAN ASSAULTS WITH INTENT TO MURDER ...... 220-222 CHAPTER 8. FALSE IMPRISONMENT 236-237 CHAPTER 9. ASSAULT AND BATTERY ...... 240-248 TITLE 9. OF CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON INVOLVING SEXUAL ASSAULT, AND CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC DECENCY AND GOOD MORALS CHAPTER 1. RAPE, ABDUCTION, CARNAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN, AND SEDUCTION ...... 261-269 CHAPTER 2. ABANDONMENT AND NEGLECT OF CHILDREN ...... 270-273.75 CHAPTER 2.5. SPOUSAL ABUSERS 273.8-273.88 CHAPTER 4. CHILD ABDUCTION ...... 277-280 CHAPTER 5. BIGAMY, INCEST, AND THE CRIME AGAINST NATURE ...... 281-289.6 CHAPTER 5.5. SEX OFFENDERS 290-294 45 http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/calawquery?codesection=pen&codebody=&hits=20 1/28/2011 Page 3 of 14 CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE CHAPTER 1.5. INVASION OF PRIVACY ...... 630-638 CHAPTER 2. OF OTHER AND MISCELLANEOUS OFFENSES ...... 639-653.2 CHAPTER 2.5. LOITERING FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENGAGING IN A PROSTITUTION OFFENSE ...... 653.20-653.28 CHAPTER 3. IMMIGRATION MATTERS ...... 653.55-653.61 CHAPTER 4. CRIMES COMMITTED WHILE IN CUSTODY IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 653.75 TITLE 16. GENERAL PROVISIONS ...... 654-678 TITLE 17. RIGHTS OF VICTIMS AND WITNESSES OF CRIME ...... 679-680 PART 2. OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS ...... 681-691 TITLE 1. OF THE PREVENTION OF PUBLIC OFFENSES CHAPTER 1. OF LAWFUL RESISTANCE ...... 692-694 CHAPTER 2. OF THE INTERVENTION OF THE OFFICERS OF JUSTICE ...... 697-698 CHAPTER 3. SECURITY TO KEEP THE PEACE ...... 701-714 CHAPTER 5. SUPPRESSION OF RIOTS ...... 723-727 TITLE 2. MODE OF PROSECUTION 737-740 TITLE 2.5. NIGHTCOURT ...... 750 TITLE 3. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS REGARDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CHAPTER 1. OF THE LOCAL JURISDICTION OF PUBLIC OFFENSES ...... 777-795 CHAPTER 2. TIME OF COMMENCING CRIMINAL ACTIONS ...... 799-805 CHAPTER 3. COMPLAINTS BEFORE MAGISTRATES ...... 806-810 CHAPTER 4. THE WARRANT OF ARREST ...... 813-829 CHAPTER 4.2. CODE ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS ...... 829.5 CHAPTER 4:5:PEACEOFFICERS...... 830-832.17 CHAPTER 5. ARREST, BY WHOM AND HOW MADE ...... 833-851.90 CHAPTER 5a. UNIFORM ACT ON FRESH PURSUIT ...... 852-852.4 CHAPTER SB. INTERSTATE JURISDICTION Article 1. Colorado River Crime Enforcement Compact ...... 853.1-853.2 Articie 2. California-Nevada Compact for Jurisdiction on Interstate Waters ...... 853.3-853.4 CHAPTER 5C. CITATIONS FOR MISDEMEANORS ...... 853.5-853.85 CHAPTER 5D. FILING COMPLAINT AFTER CITATION ...... 853.9 CHAPTER 6. RETAKING AFTER AN ESCAPE OR RESCUE ...... 854-855 CHAPTER 7. EXAMINATION OF THE CASE, AND DISCHARGE OF THE DEFENDANT, OR HOLDING HIM TO ANSWER ...... 858-883 TITLE 4. GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS ...... 888-892 CHAPTER 2. FORMATION OF GRAND JURY Article 1. Qualifications of Grand Jurors ...... 893-894 Article 2. Listing and Selection of Grand Jurors ...... 895-902 Article 3. Jury Commissioners ...... 903.1-903.4 Article 4. Impaneling of Grand Jury ...... 904-913 CHAPTER 3. POWERS AND DUTIES OF GRAND JURY Article 1. General Provisions ...... 914-924.6 Article 2. Investigation of County, City, and District Affairs 925-933.6 Article 3. Legal and Other Assistants for Grand Juries ...... 934-938.4 Article 4. Conduct of Investigations ...... 939-939.91 TITLE 5. THE PLEADINGS CHAPTER 1. FINDING AND PRESENTMENT OF THE INDICTMENT ...... 940-945 CHAPTER 2. RULES OF PLEADING ...... 948-973 TITLE 6. PLEADINGS AND PROCEEDINGS BEFORE TRIAL CHAPTER 1. OF THE ARRAIGNMENT OF THE DEFENDANT ...... 976-992 CHAPTER 2. SETTING ASIDE THE INDICTMENTOR INFORMATION ...... 995-999a CHAPTER 2.2. CAREER CRIMINALS ...... 999b-999h CHAPTER 2.3. REPEAT SEXUAL OFFENDERS ...... 999i-999p CHAPTER 2.4. CHILD ABUSERS ...... 999a-999V CHAPTER 2.5. SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS IN NARCOTICS AND DRUG ABUSE CASES...... 1000-1000.6 CHAPTER 2.6. DEFERRED ENTRY OF JUDGMENT REENTRY PROGRAM ... 1000.8-1000.10 CHAPTER 2.65. CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT COUNSELING ...... 1000.12-1000.17 CHAPTER 2.7. MISDEMEANOR DIVERSION ...... 1001-1001.9 CHAPTER 2.71. AIDS PREVENTION PROGRAM IN DRUG ABUSE AND PROSTITUTION CASES ...... 1001.10-1001.11 46 http://www.leginfo.ca. gov/cgi-bin/calawquery?codesection=pen&codebody=&hits=20 1/28/2011 CA Codes (pen:830-832.17) Page 1 ot 41 PENAL CODE SECTION 830-832.17 830. Any person who comes within the provisions of this chapter and who otherwise meets all standards imposed by law on a peace officer is a peace officer, and notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person other than those designated in this chapter is a peace officer. The restriction of peace officer functions of any public officer or employee shall not affect his or her status for purposes of retirement. 830.1. (a) Any sheriff, undersheriff, or deputy sheriff, employed in that capacity, of a county, any chief of police of a city or chief, director, or chief executive officer of a consolidated municipal public safety agency that performs police functions, any police officer, employed in that capacity and appointed by the chief of police or chief, director, or chief executive of a public safety agency, of a city, any chief of police, or police officer of a district, including police officers of the San Diego Unified Port District Harbor Police, authorized by statute to maintain a police department, any marshal or deputy marshal of a superior court or county, any port warden or port police officer of the Harbor Department of the City of Los Angeles, or any inspector or investigator employed in that capacity in the office of a district attorney, is a peace officer. The authority of these peace officers extends to any place in the state, as follows: (1) As to any public offense committed or which there is probable cause to believe has been committed within the political subdivision that employs the peace officer or in which the peace officer serves. (2) Where the peace officer has the prior consent of the chief of police or chief, director, or chief executive officer of a consolidated municipal public safety agency, or person authorized by him or her to give consent, if the place is within a city, or of the sheriff, or person authorized by him or her to give consent, if the place is within a county. (3) As to any public offense committed or which there is probable cause to believe has been committed in the peace officer's presence, and with respect to which there is immediate danger to person or property, or of the escape of the perpetrator of the offense. (b) The Attorney General and special agents and investigators of the Department of Justice are peace officers, and those assistant chiefs, deputy chiefs, chiefs, deputy directors, and division directors designated as peace officers by the Attorney General are peace officers. The authority of these peace officers extends to any place in the state where a public offense has been committed or where there is probable cause to believe one has been committed. (c) Any deputy sheriff of the County of Los Angeles, and any deputy sheriff of the Counties of Butte, Calaveras, Colusa, Glenn, Humboldt, Imperial, Inyo, Kern, Kings, Lake, Lassen, Mariposa, Mendocino, Plumas, Riverside, San Benito, San Diego, San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara, Santa Clara, Shasta, Siskiyou, Solano, Sonoma, Stanislaus, Sutter, Tehama, Tulare, and Tuolumne who is employed to perform duties exclusively or initially relating to custodial assignments with responsibilities for maintaining the operations of 47 http://www.leginfo.ca. gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=pen&group=00001-01000&fi1e=8... 1/28/2011 rage /- or ^+i CA Codes (pen:830-832.17) county custodial facilities, including the custody, care, supervision, security, movement, and transportation of inmates, is a peace officer whose authority extends to any place in the state only while engaged in the performance of the duties of his or her respective employment and for the purpose of carrying out theprimary function of employment relating to his or her custodial assignments, or when performing other law enforcement duties directed by his or her employing agency during a local state of emergency. 830.2. The following persons are peace officers whose authority extends to any place in the state: (a) Any member of the Department of the California Highway Patrol including those members designated under subdivision (a) of Section 2250.1 of the Vehicle Code, provided that the primary duty of the peace officer is the enforcement of any law relating to the use or operation of vehicles upon the highways, or laws pertaining to the provision of police services for the protection of state officers, state properties, and the occupants of state properties, or both, as set forth in the Vehicle Code and Government Code. (b) A member of the University of California Police Department appointed pursuant to Section 92600 of the Education Code, provided that the primary duty of the peace officer shall be the enforcement of the law within the area specified in Section 92600 of the Education Code. (c) A member of the California State University Police Departments appointed pursuant to Section 89560 of the Education Code, provided that the primary duty of the peace officer shall be the enforcement of the law within the area specified in Section 89560 of the Education Code. (d) (1) Any member of the Office of Correctional Safety of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, provided that the primary duties of the peace officer shall be the investigation or apprehension of inmates, wards, parolees, parole violators, or escapees from state institutions, the transportation of those persons, the investigation of any violation of criminal law discovered while performing the usual and authorized duties of employment, and the coordination of those activities with other criminal justice agencies. (2) Any member of the Office of Internal Affairs of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, provided that the primary duties shall be criminal investigations of Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation personnel and the coordination of those activities with other criminal justice agencies. For purposes of this subdivision, the member of the Office of Internal Affairs shall possess certification from the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training for investigators, or have completed training pursuant to Section 6126.1 of the Penal Code. (e) Employees of the Department of Fish and Game designated by the director, provided that the primary duty of those peace officers shall be the enforcement of the law as set forth in Section 856 of the Fish and Game Code. (f) Employees of the Department of Parks and Recreation designated by the director pursuant to Section 5008 of the Public Resources Code, provided that the primary duty of the peace officer shall be the enforcement of the law as set forth in Section 5008 of the Public Resources Code. (g) The Director of Forestry and Fire Protection and employees or 48 http://www.leginfo. ca. gov/cgi-bin/displayeode?section=pen&group=00001-01000&fi1e=8... 1/28/2011 Page 1 ot I 725 ILCS 5/ Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. Illinois Compiled Statutes CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (725 ILCS 51) Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. View Entire Act Title I - General Provisions Article 100 - Title And Scooe Article 101 - General Purposes Article 102 - General Definitions Article 103 - Riohts Of Accused Article 104 - Fitness For Trial, To Plead Or To Be Sentenced Article 106 - Witness - Immunity Article 1066 Child and Developmentally Disabled Victims of Sexual Abuse Article 106C - (Repealed) Article 106D - Closed Circuit Television Testimonv Article 106E Task Force on Professional Practice in the Illinois Justice Systems (Repealed Internally, Eff. 12-31-00. Title II Aporehension And Investiaation Article 107 - Arrest Article 107A - Lineup and Photo Spread Procedure Article 108 - Search And Seizure Article 108a Judicial Supervision Of The Use Of Eave$drogoina Devices Article 108b - Electronic Criminal Surveillance Title II I- Proceedinas After Arrest Article 109 - Preliminary Examination Article 110 - Bail Article 110a - Peace Bonds Title IV - Proceedinas To Commence Prosecution Article 111 - Charainc An Offense Article 112 - Grand Jury Article 112a - Domestic Violence: Order Of Protection Title V- Proceedinas Prior To Trial Article 113 - Arraignment Article 114 - Pre-Trial Motions Title Vl - Proceedinas At Trial Article 115 - Trial Article 116 - Post-Trial Motions Article 119 - Execution Of Sentence Article 121 - Appeal By Defendant Article 122 - Post-Conviction Hearino Title VIII - Miscellaneous Article 124A - Liens And Costs Article 124B - Forfeiture Part 5 - General Provisions Part 100 - Standard Forfeiture Provisions Part 300 Forfeiture; Involuntary Servitude and Trafficking of Persons Part 400 - Obscenitv Part 500 - Other Sex Offenses Part 600 - Computer Crime Part 700 - WIC Fraud Part 800 - Terrorism Part 900 - Animals Article 125 - Construction And Effective Date Article 126 - Repeal 49 http://www.ilga.gov/legistation/ilcs/ilcs3.asp?ActID=1966&ChapterlD=54 1/28/2011 Page 1 ot 1 725 ILCS 5/107-4 (725 ILCS 5/107-4) (from Ch. 38, par. 107-4) Sec. 107-4. Arrest by peace officer from other jurisdiction. (a) As used in this Section: (1) "State" means any State of the United States and the District of Columbia. (2) "Peace Officer" means any peace officer or member of any duly organized State, County, or Municipal peace unit, any police force of another State, the United States Department of Defense, or any police force whose members, by statute, are granted and authorized to exercise powers similar to those conferred upon any peace officer employed by a law enforcement agency of this State. (3) "Fresh pursuit" means the immediate pursuit of a person who is endeavoring to avoid arrest. (4) "Law enforcement agency" means a municipal police department or county sheriff's office of this State. (a-3) Any peace officer employed by a law enforcement agency of this State may conduct temporary questioning pursuant to Section 107-14 of this Code and may make arrests in any jurisdiction within this State: (1) if the officer is engaged in the investigation of an offense that occurred in the officer's primary jurisdiction and the temporary questioning is conducted or the arrest is made pursuant to that investigation; or (2) if the officer, while on duty as a peace officer, becomes personally aware of the immediate commission of a felonyor misdemeanor violation of the laws of this State; or (3) if the officer, while on duty as a peace officer, is requested by an appropriate State or local law enforcement official to render aid or assistance to the requesting law enforcement agency that is outside the officer's primary jurisdiction; or (4) in accordance with Section 2605-580 of the Department of State Police Law of the Civil Administrative Code of Illinois. While acting pursuant to this subsection, an officer has the same authority as within his or her own jurisdiction. (a-7) The law enforcement agency of the county or municipality in which any arrest is made under this Section shall be immediately notified of the arrest. (b) Any peace officer of another State who enters this State in fresh pursuit and continues within this State in fresh pursuit of a person in order to arrest him on the ground that he has committed an offense in the other State has the same authority to arrest and hold the person in custody as peace officers of this State have to arrest and hold a person in custody on the ground that he has committed an offense in this State. (c) If an arrest is made in this State by a peace officer of another State in accordance with the provisions of this Section he shall without unnecessary delay take the person arrested before the circuit court of the county in which the arrest was made. Such court shall conduct a hearing for the purpose of determining the lawfulness of the arrest. If the court determines that the arrest was lawful it shall commit the person arrested, to await for a reasonable time the issuance of an extradition warrant by the Governor of this State, or admit him to bail for such purpose. If the court determines that the arrest was unlawful it shall discharge the person arrested. (Source: P.A. 94-846, eff. 1-1-07; 95-423, eff. 8-24-07; 95-750, eff. 7-23-08; 95-1007, eff. 12-15-08.) 50 http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/documents/072500050K107-4.htm 1/28/2011 Michie's Legal Resources Page 1 of 7 MICHIE'S CODE OF MARYLAND Statutes current through the 2010 Regular Session. United States Constitution Maryland Constitution Michie's Code of Maryland CODE OF MARYLAND Auiculture. Business Occupations and Professions. Business Regulation. Commercial Law. Corporations and Associations. Correctional Services. Courts and Judicial Proceedin¢s. Criminal Law. Criminal Procedure. Economic Development. Education. Election Law. Environment. Estates and Trusts. Family Law. Financial Institutions. Health - General. 51 http://www.michie.com/maryland/lpext.dlUmdcode/1?fn=document-frame.htm&f=templat... 1 /28/201>1 Michie's Legal Resources Page 1 of 2 TITLE 2. LAW ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES; ARREST PROCESS Subtitle 1. Definitions; General Provisions. 2-101. Definitions. 2-102. Authority of police officers - In Qeneral. 2-103 . Authority of police officers - Service of arrest warrants. 2-104. Authority of federal law enforcement officers. 2-104 1 Authority of federal law enforcement officers - United States Park Police officer. 2-105. Mutual aid agreements. 2-106. Keening custody of arrested persons. 2-107 . Duty to semiconscious or unconscious suspects. Subtitle 2. Warrantless Arrests. 2-201. Effect of subtitle. 2-202. Warrantless arrests - In general. 2-203 . Warrantless arrests - Commission of specified crimes. 2-204. Warrantless arrests - For domestic abuse. 2-204 1 Warrantless arrests -For violation of protective order. 2-205. Warrantless arrests - For stalkine. 2-206. Warrantless arrests durina state of emergency. 2-207. Authority of correctional and other emplo yees. 2-208. Authority of State Fire Marshal and assistants. 2-208 1 Authority of Montgomery County fire and explosive investigator. 2 208 2 Authority of Anne Arundel County or City of Annapolis fire and explosive investigator. 2-208 3 Authority of Prince George's County fire and explosive investigator. 2-208 4 Authority of Worcester County fire and explosive investigator. 2-208 5 Authority of City of Hagerstown fire and explosive investigator. 2-209. fRenealedl. 2-210. Trespassing on nosted property used for defense-related activity. Subtitle 3. Fresh Pursuit. PART I. Fresh Pursuit In-State. 2-301. Elements and conditions of fresh pursuit; authority of officers. 2-302, 2-303. fReservedl. PART II. Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit. 2-304. Definitions. 2-305 . Authority of officers of other states to arrest in this State. 2-306 Hearing to determine lawfulness of arrest. 2-307. Notice of subtitle. 52 http: //www.michie.com/maryland/lpext.dll/mdcode/a574/a5 ae?fn=document-frame.htm&f... 1/28/2011 Michie's Legal Resources Page 1 of 2 § 2-102. Authority of police officers - In general. (a) Scope of section.- This section does not apply to an employee of the Departrnent of State Police to whom the Secretary of State Police assigns the powers contained in § 2-412 of the Public Safety Article. (b) In general.- (1) Subject to the limitations of paragraph (3) of this subsection, a police officer may make arrests, conduct investigations, and otherwise enforce the laws of the State throughout the State without limitations as to jurisdiction. (2) This section does not authorize a police officer who acts under the authority granted by this section to enforce the Maryland Vehicle Law beyond the police officer's sworn jurisdiction, unless the officer is acting under a mutual aid agreement authorized under & 2-105 of this subtitle. (3) A police officer may exercise the powers granted by this section when: (i) 1. the police officer is participating in a joint investigation with officials from another state, federal, or local law enforcement unit, at least one of which has local jurisdiction; 2. the police officer is rendering assistance to another police officer; 3. the police officer is acting at the request of a police officer or State Police officer; or 4. an emergency exists; and (ii) the police officer is acting in accordance with regulations adopted by the police officer's employing unit to carry out this section. (4) The powers granted by this section are in addition to the powers granted by §§ 5-801, 5-802, 5-807, 5-808, and 5-901 of the Criminal Law Article and to the powers of fresh pursuit granted by Subtitle 3 of this title. (c) Required notifications. - (1) A police officer who acts under the authority granted by this section shall notify the following persons of an investigation or enforcement action: (i) 1. the chief of police, if any, or chiefs designee, when in a municipal corporation; 2. the Police Conunissioner or Police Commissioner's designee, when in Baltimore City; 3. the chief of police or chiefs designee, when in a county with a county police department, except Baltimore City; 4. the sheriff or sheriffs designee, when in a county without a county police department; 5. the Secretary of Natural Resources or Secretary's designee, when on property owned, leased, operated 53 http://www.michie.com/maryland/lpext.dll/mdcode/a574/a5ae/a5b0/a5b6?f=templates&fn... 1/28/2011 Michie's Legal Resources Page 2 of 2 by, or under the control of the Department of Natural Resources; 6. the chief of police of the Maryland Transportation Authority or chiefs designee, when on property owned, leased, operated by, or under the control of the Maryland Transportation Authority, Maryland Aviation Administration, or Maryland Port Administration; 7. the chief of police of the Department of General Services or the chiefs designee, when on property owned, leased, operated, managed, patrolled by, or under the control of the Department of General Services; and 8. the chief of police of the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission for the county in which the property is located, when on property owned, leased, or operated by or under the control of the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission; and (ii) the Departrnent of State Police barrack commander or commander's designee, unless there is an agreement otherwise with the Department of State Police. (2) When the police officer participates in a joint investigation with officials from another state, federal, or local law enforcement unit, the police officer shall give the notice required under paragraph (1) of this subsection reasonably in advance. (d) Immunities and exemptions; employee status. - A police officer who acts under the authority granted by this section: (1) has all the immunities from liability and exemptions as a State Police officer in addition to any other immunities and exemptions to which the police officer is otherwise entitled; and (2) remains at all times and for all purposes an employee of the employing unit. (e) Effect ofsection. - (1) This section does not impair a right of arrest otherwise existing under the Code. (2) This section does not deprive a person of the right to receive a citation for a traffic violation as provided in the Maryland Vehicle Law or a criminal violation as provided by law or the Maryland Rules. [An. Code 1957, art. 27, § 594B(k), (1), (m)(1)(iii), (iv), (2)(i), (ii), (3), (4), (5), (6); 2001, ch. 10, § 2; ch. 35; 2002, ch. 213, § 6; 2003, ch. 17; 2005, ch. 10; ch. 25, § 1; ch. 534; 2006, chs. 44, 352.] 54 http://www.michie.com/maryland/lpext.dll/mdcode/a574/a5 ae/a5b0/a5b6?f`templates&fn... 1/28/2011 Lawriter - ORC - 307.93 Joint establishment of a multicounty correctional center. Page 1 of 3 307.93 Joint establishment of a multicounty correctional center. (A) The boards of county commissioners of two or more adjacent counties may contract for the joint establishment of a multicounty correctional center, and the board of county commissioners of a county or the boards of two or more counties may contract with any municipal corporation or municipal corporations located in that county or those counties for the joint establishment of a municipal-county or multicounty-municipal correctional center. The center shall augment county and, where applicable, municipal jail programs and facilities by providing custody and rehabilitative programs for those persons under the charge of the sheriff of any of the contracting counties or of the officer or officers of the contracting municipal corporation or municipal corporations having charge of persons incarcerated in the municipal jail, workhouse, or other correctional facility who, in the opinion of the sentencing court, need programs of custody and rehabilitation not available at the county or municipal jail and by providing custody and rehabilitative programs in accordance with division (C) of this section, if applicable. The contract may include, but need not be limited to, provisions regarding the acquisition, construction, maintenance, repair, termination of operations, and administration of the center. The contract shall prescribe the manner of funding of, and debt assumption for, the center and the standards and procedures to be followed in the operation of the center. Except as provided in division (H) of this section, the contracting counties and municipal corporations shall form a corrections commission to oversee the administration of the center. Members of the commission shall consist of the sheriff of each participating county, the president of the board of county commissioners of each participating county, the presiding judge of the court of common pleas of each participating county, or, if the court of common pleas of a participating county has only one judge, then that judge, the chief of police of each participating municipal corporation, the mayor or city manager of each participating municipal corporation, and the presiding judge or the sole judge of the municipal court of each participating municipal corporation. Any of the foregoing officers may appoint a designee to serve in the officer's place on the corrections commission. The standards and procedures shall be formulated and agreed to by the commission and may be amended at any time during the life of the contract by agreement of the parties to the contract upon the advice of the commission. The standards and procedures formulated by the commission shall include, but need not be limited to, designation of the person in charge of the center, the categories of employees to be employed at the center, the appointing authority of the center, and the standards of treatment and security to be maintained at the center. The person in charge of, and all persons employed to work at, the center shall have all the powers of police officers that are necessary for the proper performance of the duties relating to their positions at the center. (B) Each board of county commissioners that enters a contract under division (A) of this section may appoint a building commission pursuant to section 153.21 of the Revised Code. If any commissions are appointed, they shall function jointly in the construction of a multicounty or multicounty-municipal correctional center with all the powers and duties authorized by law. (C) Prior to the acceptance for custody and rehabilitation into a center established under this section of any persons who are designated by the department of rehabilitation and correction, who plead guilty to or are convicted of a felony of the fourth or fifth degree, and who satisfy the other requirements listed in section 5120.161 of the Revised Code, the corrections commission of a center established under this section shall enter into an agreement with the department of rehabilitation and correction under section 5120.161 of the Revised Code for the custody and rehabilitation in the center of persons who 55 http://codes.ohio.gov/oro/307.93 1/31/2011 Lawriter - ORC - 307.93 Joint establishment of a multicounty correctional center. Page 2 of 3 are designated by the department, who plead guilty to or are convicted of a felony of the fourth or fifth degree, and who satisfy the other requirements listed in that section, in exchange for a per diem fee per person. Persons incarcerated in the center pursuant to an agreement entered into under this division shall be subject to supervision and control in the manner described in section 5120.161 of the Revised Code. This division does not affect the authority of a court to directly sentence a person who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony to the center in accordance with section 2929.1 6 of the Revised Code. (D) Pursuant to section 2929.37 of the Revised Code, each board of county commissioners and the legislative authority of each municipal corporation that enters into a contract under division (A) of this section may require a person who was convicted of an offense, who is under the charge of the sheriff of their county or of the officer or officers of the contracting municipal corporation or municipal corporations having charge of persons incarcerated in the municipal jail, workhouse, or other correctional facility, and who is confined in the multicounty, municipal-county, or multicounty- municipal correctional center as provided in that division, to reimburse the applicable county or municipal corporation for its expenses incurred by reason of the person's confinement in the center. (E) Notwithstanding any contrary provision in this section or section 2929.18, 2929.21, 2929.36, or 2929.37 of the Revised Code, the corrections commission of a center may establish a policy that complies with section 2929.38 of the Revised Code and that requires any person who is not indigent and who is confined in the multicounty, municipal-county, or multicounty-municipal correctional center to pay a reception fee, a fee for medical treatment or service requested by and provided to that person, or the fee for a random drug test assessed under division (E) of section 341.26 of the Revised Code. (F)(1) The corrections commission of a center established under this section may establish a commissary for the center. The commissary may be established either in-house or by another arrangement. If a commissary is established, all persons incarcerated in the center shall receive commissary privileges. A person's purchases from the commissary shall be deducted from the person's account record in the center's business office. The commissary shall provide for the distribution to indigent persons incarcerated in the center of necessary hygiene articles and writing materials. (2) If a commissary is established, the corrections commission of a center established under this section shall establish a commissary fund for the center. The management of funds in the commissary fund shall be strictly controlled in accordance with procedures adopted by the auditor of state. Commissary fund revenue over and above operating costs and reserve shall be considered profits. All profits from the commissary fund shall be used to purchase supplies and equipment for the benefit of persons incarcerated in the center and to pay salary and benefits for employees of the center, or for any other persons, who work in or are employed for the sole purpose of providing service to the commissary. The corrections commission shall adopt rules and regulations for the operation of any commissary fund it establishes. (G) In lieu of forming a corrections commission to administer a multicounty correctional center or a municipal-county or multicounty-municipal correctional center, the boards of county commissioners and the legislative authorities of the municipal corporations contracting to establish the center may also agree to contract for the private operation and management of the center as provided in section 9.06 of the Revised Code, but only if the center houses only misdemeanant inmates. In order to enter into a contract under section 9.06 of the Revised Code, all the boards and legislative authorities establishing the center shall approve and be parties to the contract. 56 http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/307.93 1/31/2011 Lawriter - ORC - 307.93 Joint establishment of a multicounty correctional center. Page 3 of 3 (H) If a person who is convicted of or pleads guilty to an offense is sentenced to a term in a multicounty correctional center or a municipal-county or multicounty-municipal correctional center or is incarcerated in the center in the manner described in division (C) of this section, or if a person who is arrested for an offense, and who has been denied bail or has had bail set and has not been released on bail is confined in a multicounty correctional center or a municipal-county or multicounty-municipal correctional center pending trial, at the time of reception and at other times the officer, officers, or other person in charge of the operation of the center determines to be appropriate, the officer, officers, or other person in charge of the operation of the center may cause the convicted or accused offender to be examined and tested for tuberculosis, HIV infection, hepatitis, including but not limited to hepatitis A, B, and C, and other contagious diseases. The officer, officers, or other person in charge of the operation of the center may cause a convicted or accused offender in the center who refuses to be tested or treated for tuberculosis, HIV infection, hepatitis, including but not limited to hepatitis A, B, and C, or another contagious disease to be tested and treated involuntarily. (I) As used in this section, "multicounty-municipal" means more than one county and a municipal corporation, or more than one municipal corporation and a county, or more than one municipal corporation and more than one county. Effective Date: 01-01-2004 57 http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/307.93 1/31/2011 Lawriter - ORC - 341.12 Confinement of persons in custody in jail of another county. Page 1 of 1 341.12 Confinement of persons in custody in jail of another county. In a county not having a sufficient jail or staff, the sheriff shall convey any person charged with the commission of an offense, sentenced to imprisonment in the county jail, or in custody upon civil process to a jail in any county the sheriff considers most convenient and secure. In the case of a person who has been charged with an offense and is being held pending trial, any county includes a contiguous county in an adjoining state. The sheriff may call such aid as is necessary in guarding, transporting, or returning such person. Whoever neglects or refuses to render such aid, when so called upon, shall forfeit and pay the sum of ten dollars, to be recovered by an action in the name and for the use of the county. Such sheriff and his assistants shall receive such compensation for their services as the county auditor of the county from which such person was removed considers reasonable. The compensation shall be paid from the county treasury on the warrant of the auditor. The receiving sheriff shall not, pursuant to this section, convey the person received to any county other than the one from which the person was removed. Effective Date: 07-06-1982; 2008 HB215 04-07-2009 58 http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/341.12 1/31/2011 Lawriter - ORC - 341.16 Process for the return of prisoner. Page 1 of 1 341.16 Process for the return of prisoner. The prosecuting attorney of the county from which a person charged with the commission of an offense has been removed for safekeeping, may file a praecipe with the clerk of the court of common pleas thereof, directing that a warrant be issued to the sheriff having the custody of such person, and commanding him to deliver the prisoner to the sheriff of the county from which the prisoner was removed, or to the sheriff of the county in which the trial is to take place upon change of venue. Effective Date: 10-01-1953 59 http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/341.16 1/31/2011 Lawriter - ORC - 341.23 Confinement of county or municipal prisoners in county jail. Page 1 of 1 341.23 Confinement of county or municipal prisoners in county jail. (A) The board of county commissioners of any county or the legislative authority of any municipal corporation in which there is no workhouse may agree with the legislative authority of any municipal corporation or other authority having control of the workhouse of any other city, or with the directors of any district of a joint city and county workhouse or county workhouse, upon terms on which persons convicted of a misdemeanor by any court or magistrate of a county or municipal corporation having no workhouse, may be received into that workhouse, under sentence of the court or magistrate. The board or legislative authority may pay the expenses incurred under the agreement out of the general fund of that county or municipal corporation, upon the certificate of the proper officer of the workhouse. (B) The sheriff or other officer transporting any person to the workhouse described in division (A) of this section shall receive six cents per mile for the sheriff or officer, going and returning, five cents per mile for transporting the convict, and five cents per mile, going and coming, for the service of each deputy, to be allowed as in cases in which a person is transported to a state correctional institution. The number of miles shall be computed by the usual routes of travel and, in state cases, shall be paid out of the general fund of the county, on the allowance of the board, and for the violation of the ordinances of any municipal corporation, shall be paid by that municipal corporation on the order of its legislative authority. (C) Pursuant to section 2929 .37 of the Revised Code, the board of county commissioners, the directors of the district of a joint city and county workhouse or county workhouse, or the legislative authority of the municipal corporation may require a person who was convicted of an offense and who is confined in a workhouse as provided in division (A) of this section, to reimburse the county, district, or municipal corporation, as the case may be, for its expenses incurred by reason of the person's confinement. (D) Notwithstanding any contrary provision in this section or section 2929.18, 2929.28, or 2929.37 of the Revised Code, the appropriate board of county commissioners and legislative authorities may include in their agreement entered into under division (A) of this section a policy that complies with section 2929.38 of the Revised Code and that requires any person who is not indigent and who is confined in the county, city, district, or joint city and county workhouse under this section to pay a reception fee, a fee for any medical treatment or service requested by and provided to that person, or the fee for a random drug test assessed under division (E) of section 341.26 of the Revised Code. (E) If a person who has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to an offense is incarcerated in the workhouse as provided in division (A) of this section, at the time of reception and at other times the person in charge of the operation of the workhouse determines to be appropriate, the person in charge of the operation of the workhouse may cause the convicted offender to be examined and tested for tuberculosis, HIV infection, hepatitis, including but not limited to hepatitis A, B, and C, and other contagious diseases. The person in charge of the operation of the workhouse may cause a convicted offender in the workhouse who refuses to be tested or treated for tuberculosis, HIV infection, hepatitis, including but not limited to hepatitis A, B, and C, or another contagious disease to be tested and treated involuntarily. Effective Date: 01-01-2004 60 http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/341.23 1/31/2011 Lawriter - ORC - 341.32 Agreement for work camp services with other counties and muni... Page 1 of 1 341.32 Agreement for work camp services with other counties and municipal corporations. The board of county commissioners of any county not having a county rehabilitation work camp or the legislative authority of any municipal corporation may agree upon the terms on which persons convicted of a misdemeanor by any court or magistrate of such county or municipal corporation may be received into a county rehabilitation work camp under sentence of such court or magistrate. Such board or legislative authority may pay the expenses, including the cost of transportation of prisoners, incurred under such agreement out of the general fund of such county or municipal corporation, upon the certificate of the proper officer of such county work rehabilitation camp. Effective Date: 11-05-1959 61 http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/341.32 1/31/2011 Lawriter - ORC - 753.16 City or district workhouse may receive prisoners from other cou... Page 1 of 2 753.16 City or district workhouse may receive prisoners from other counties - agreements - reimbursement by prisoner - medical testing or treatment. (A) Any city or district having a workhouse may receive as inmates of the workhouse persons sentenced or committed to it from counties other than the one in which the workhouse is situated, upon the terms and during the length of time agreed upon by the boards of county commissioners of those counties, or by the legislative authority of a municipal corporation in those counties and the legislative authority of the city, or the board of the district workhouse, or other authority having the management and control of the workhouse. Prisoners so received shall in all respects be and remain under the control of that authority, and shall be subject to the rules and discipline of the workhouse to which the other prisoners detained in the workhouse are subject. (B) Prior to the acceptance for housing into a jail or workhouse of persons who are designated by the department of rehabilitation and correction, who plead guilty to or are convicted of a felony of the fourth or fifth degree, and who satisfy the other requirements listed in section 5120.161 of the Revised Code, the legislative authority of a municipal corporation having a jail or workhouse, or the joint board managing and controlling a workhouse for the joint use of a municipal corporation and a county shall enter into an agreement with the department of rehabilitation and correction under section 5120.161 of the Revised Code for the housing in the jail or workhouse of persons who are designated by the department, who plead guilty to or are convicted of a felony of the fourth or fifth degree, and who satisfy the other requirements listed in that section, in exchange for a per diem fee per person. Persons incarcerated in the jail or workhouse pursuant to an agreement of that nature shall be subject to supervision and control in the manner described in section 5120.161 of the Revised Code. This division does not affect the authority of a court to directly sentence a person who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony to the jail or workhouse in accordance with section 2929.16 of the Revised Code. (C) Pursuant to section 2929.37 of the Revised Code, the board of county commissioners, the legislative authority of the municipal corporation, or the board or other managing authority of the district workhouse may require a person who was convicted of an offense and who is confined in the workhouse as provided in division (A) of this section, to reimburse the county, municipal corporation, or district, as the case may be, for its expenses incurred by reason of the person's confinement. (D) Notwithstanding any contrary provision in this section or section 2929.18, 2929.28, or 2929.37 of the Revised Code, the board of county commissioners, the legislative authority of a municipal corporation, or the board or other managing authority of the district workhouse may establish a policy that complies with section 2929.38 of the Revised Code and that requires any person who is not indigent and who is confined in the jail or workhouse under division (A) or (B) of this section to pay a reception fee, a fee for any medical treatment or service requested by and provided to that person, or the fee for a random drug test assessed under division (E) of section 753.33 of the Revised Code. (E) If a person who has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to an offense is confined in the workhouse as provided in division (A) of this section or is incarcerated in the workhouse in the manner described in division (B) of this section, or if a person who has been arrested for an offense, and who has been denied bail or has had bail set and has not been released on bail is confined in the workhouse pending trial, at the time of reception and at other times the person in charge of the operation of the 62 http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/753.16 1/31/2011 Lawriter - ORC - 753.16 City or district workhouse may receive prisoners from other cou... Page 2 of 2 workhouse determines to be appropriate, the person in charge of the operation of the workhouse may cause the convicted or accused offender to be examined and tested for tuberculosis, HIV infection, hepatitis, inciuding but not limited to hepatitis A, B, and C, and other contagious diseases. The person in charge of the operation of the workhouse may cause a convicted or accused offender in the workhouse who refuses to be tested or treated for tuberculosis, HIV infection, hepatitis, including but not limited to hepatitis A, B, and C, or another contagious disease to be tested and treated involuntarily. Effective Date: 01-01-2004 63 http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/753.16 1/31/2011 Lawriter - ORC - 2931.30 Change of venue - transfer of accused. Page 1 of 1 2931.30 Change of venue - transfer of accused. When a change of venue is ordered pursuant to section 2901.12 of the Revised Code, and the accused is in jail, a warrant shall be issued by the clerk of the court in which the cause originated, directed to the proper officer, commanding him to convey the prisoner to the jail of the county or municipal corporation where the prisoner is to be tried, there to be kept until discharged. If the accused is charged with a bailable offense, and at the date of the order changing the venue is under bond for his appearance at the court from which the venue is changed, the court may fix in said order the amount of recognizance which said accused shall give for his appearance at the time the court may designate, in the court to which the venue is changed, and the clerk shall take such recognizance as in other cases, and forward the same with the record. The court shall recognize the witnesses of the prosecution to appear before the court in which the accused is to be tried. Effective Date: 01-01-1974 64 http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/2931.30 1/31/2011 Lawriter - ORC - 2935.02 Accused may be arrested in any county. Page 1 of 1 2935.02 Accused may be arrested in any county. If an accused person flees from justice, or is not found in the county where a warrant for his arrest was issued, the officer holding the same may pursue and arrest him in any county in this state, and convey him before the magistrate or court of the county having cognizance of the case. If such warrant directs the removal of the accused to the county in which the offense was committed, the officer holding the warrant shall deliver the accused to a court or magistrate of such county. The necessary expense of such removal and reasonable compensation for his time and trouble, shall be paid to such officer out of the treasury of such county, upon the allowance and order of the county auditor. Effective Date: 10-01-1953 65 http://codes.ohio.gov/oro/2935.02 1/31/2011 Lawriter - ORC - 2949.12 Reception facilities for convicted felons. Page 1 of 1 2949.12 Reception facilities for convicted felons. Unless the execution of sentence is suspended or the convicted felon has less than thirty days to serve in prison and the department of rehabilitation and correction, the county sheriff, and the court agree otherwise, a convicted felon who is sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment in a state correctional institution shall be conveyed, within five days after sentencing, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, by the sheriff of the county in which the conviction was had to the facility that is designated by the department of rehabilitation and correction for the reception of convicted felons. The sheriff shall deliver the convicted felon into the custody of the managing officer of the reception facility and, at that time, unless the department and the sheriff have agreed to electronically processed prisoner commitment, shall present the managing officer with a copy of the convicted felon's sentence that clearly describes each offense for which the felon was sentenced to a correctional institution, designates each section of the Revised Code that the felon violated and that resulted in the felon's conviction and sentence to a correctional institution, designates the sentence imposed for each offense for which the felon was sentenced to a correctional institution, and, pursuant to section 2967.191 of the Revised Code, specifies the total number of days, if any, that the felon was confined for any reason prior to conviction and sentence. The sheriff, at that time, also shall present the managing officer with a copy of the indictment. The clerk of the court of common pleas shall furnish the copies of the sentence and indictment. In the case of a person under the age of eighteen years who is certified to the court of common pleas by the juvenile court, the clerk of the court of common pleas also shall attach a copy of the certification to the copy of the indictment. The convicted felon shall be assigned to an institution or designated to be housed in a county, multicounty, municipal, municipal-county, or multicounty-municipal jail or workhouse, if authorized pursuant to section 5120.161 of the Revised Code, shall be conveyed to the institution, jail, or workhouse, and shall be kept within the institution, jail, or workhouse until the term of the felon's imprisonment expires, the felon is pardoned, paroled, or placed under a post-release control sanction, or the felon is transferred under laws permitting the transfer of prisoners. If the execution of the felon's sentence is suspended, and the judgment thereafter affirmed, the felon shall be conveyed, in the same manner as if the execution of the felon's sentence had not been suspended, to the reception facility as soon as practicable after the judge directs the execution of sentence. The trial judge or other judge of the court, in the judge's discretion and for good cause shown, may extend the time of the conveyance. Effective Date: 07-01-1996; 2008 HB130 04-07-2009 66 http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/2949.12 1/31/2011 Lawriter - ORC - 2949.13 Sheriff may require assistance. Page 1 of 1 2949.13 Sheriff may require assistance. During the time the sheriff is conveying a convicted felon to an institution for imprisonment therein, he may secure him in a jail and demand the assistance of a sheriff, jailer, or other person in keeping such prisoner, as if he were in his own county. Such sheriff, jailer, or other person is liable, on refusal, to like penalties as if the sheriff making the demand were in his own county. Effective Date: 10-01-1953 67 http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/2949.13 1/31/2011 Lawriter - ORC - 2949.17 Prisoner transportation - expenses. Page 1 of 1 2949.17 Prisoner transportation - expenses. (A) The sheriff may take one guard for every two convicted felons to be transported to a correctional institution. The trial judge may authorize a larger number of guards upon written application of the sheriff, in which case a transcript of the order of the judge shall be certified by the clerk of the court of common pleas under the seal of the court, and the sheriff shall deliver the order with the convict to the person in charge of the correctional institution. (B) In order to obtain reimbursement for the county for the expenses of transportation for indigent convicted felons, the clerk of the court of common pleas shall prepare a transportation cost bill for each indigent convicted felon transported pursuant to this section for an amount equal to not less than one dollar a mile from the county seat to the state correctional institution and return for each prisoner. The number of miles shall be computed by the usual route of travel. The clerk's duties under this division are subject to division (B) of section 2949.19 of the Revised Code. Amended by 128th General Assembly File No. 9, HB 1, § 101.01, eff. 10/16/2009. Effective Date: 09-29-1999 68 http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/2949.17 1/31/2011 Lawriter - ORC - 719.01 Appropriation of property by municipal corporations. Page 1 of 2 719.01 Appropriation of property by municipal corporations. Any municipal corporation may appropriate, enter upon, and hold real estate within its corporate limits: (A) For opening, widening, straightening, changing the grade of, and extending streets, and all other public places, and for this purpose, the municipal corporation may appropriate the right of way across railway tracks and lands held by railway companies, where such appropriation will not unnecessarily interfere with the reasonable use of such property, and for obtaining material for the improvement of streets and other public places; (B) For parks, park entrances, boulevards, market places, and children's playgrounds; (C) For public halls and offices, and for all buildings and structures required for the use of any municipal department; (D) For prisons, workhouses, houses of refuge and correction, and farm schools; (E) For hospitals, pesthouses, reformatories, crematories, and cemeteries; (F) For levees, wharves, and landings; (G) For bridges, aqueducts, viaducts, and approaches thereto; (H) For libraries, university sites, and grounds therefor; (I) For constructing, opening, excavating, improving, or extending any canal or watercourse, located in whole or in part within the limits of the municipal corporation or adjacent and contiguous thereto, and which is not owned in whole or in part by the state, or by a company or individual authorized by law to make such improvements; (J) For sewers, drains, ditches, public urinals, bathhouses, water closets, and sewage and garbage disposal plants and farms; (K) For natural and artificial gas, electric lighting, heating, and power plants, and. for supplying the product thereof; (L) For establishing esplanades, boulevards, parkways, park grounds, and public reservations in, around, and leading to public buildings, and for the purpose of reselling such land with reservations in the deeds as to the future use of such lands, so as to protect public buildings and their environs, and to preserve the view, appearance, light, air, and usefulness of public grounds occupied by public buildings and esplanades and parkways leading thereto; (M) For providing a water supply for itself and its inhabitants by the construction of wells, pumps, cisterns, aqueducts, water pipes, dams, reservoirs, reservoir sites, and water works, and for the protection thereof; and to provide for a supply of water for itself and its inhabitants, any municipal corporation may appropriate property within or without its limits; and for such purpose and [any] such municipal corporation may appropriate, in the manner provided in sections 163.01 to 163.22, inclusive, of the Revised Code, any property or right or interest therein, previously acquired by any private corporation for any purpose by appropriation proceedings or otherwise, and either party to 69 http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/719.01 1/31/2011 Lawriter - ORC - 719.01 Appropriation of property by municipal corporations. Page 2 of 2 such appropriation proceedings shall have the same right to change of venue as is given in the trial of civil actions; (N) For the construction or operation of street, interurban, suburban, or other railways or terminals and the necessary tracks, way stations, depots, terminals, workshops, conduits, elevated structures, subways, tunnels, offices, sidetracks, turnouts, machine shops, bridges, and other appurtenances for the transportation of persons, packages, express matter, freight, and other matter, in, from, into, or through the municipal corporation; and for such purpose any municipal corporation may appropriate any property within or without its corporate limits; and any municipal corporation may appropriate any property, right, or interest therein previously acquired by any private or public utility corporation for any purpose by appropriate proceedings, as well as the right to cross on, over, or under any street, avenue, alley, way, or public place or part thereof of any other municipal corporation, township, or county; (0) For establishing airports, landing fields, or other air navigation facilities, either within or without the limits of a municipal corporation for aircraft and transportation terminals, with power to impose restrictions on any part thereof and leasing such part thereof as is desired for purposes associated with or incident to such airports, landing fields, or other air navigation facilities and transportation terminals, including the right to appropriate a right of way for highways, electric, steam, and interurban railroads leading from such airport or landing field to the main highways or the main line of such steam, electric, or interurban railroads, as are desired; all of which are hereby declared to be public purposes. Division (0) of this section does not authorize a municipal corporation to take or disturb property or facilities belonging to any public utility or to a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce, which property or facilities are required for the proper and convenient operation of such utility or carrier, unless provision is made for the restoration, relocation, or duplication of such property or facilities elsewhere, at the sole cost of the municipal corporation. The powers conferred upon municipal corporations by this section shall be exercised for the purposes and in the manner provided in sections 163.01 to 163.22, inclusive, of the Revised Code. "Airport," "landing field," and "air navigation facility," as defined in section 4561.01 of the Revised Code, apply to division (0) of this section. Effective Date: 01-01-1966 70 http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/719.01 1/31/2011 Lawriter - ORC - 719.02 Appropriation of property outside municipal corporation - paym... Yage i oi i 719.02 Appropriation of property outside municipal corporation - payment in lieu of taxes. In the appropriation of property for any of the purposes named in section 719.01 of the Revised Code, the municipal corporation may, when reasonably necessary, acquire property outside the limits of the municipal corporation. If real property so acquired is removed from the tax duplicate, the municipal corporation shall pay annually to the county treasurer of the county in which such property is located, commencing with the tax year after the removal of such property from the tax duplicate, an amount of money in lieu of taxes equal to the smaller of the following: (A) The last annual installment of taxes due from the acquired property before removal from the tax duplicate; (B) An amount equal to the difference between the combined revenue from real estate taxes of all the taxing districts in which such property is located in the tax year immediately prior to the removal of such acquired property from the tax duplicate, and (1) the total revenue which would be produced by the tax rate of each such taxing district in the tax year immediately prior to the removal of such acquired property from the tax duplicate, applied to the real estate tax duplicate of each of such taxing districts in each tax year subsequent to the year of removal, or (2) the combined revenue from real estate taxes of all such taxing districts in each tax year subsequent to the year of removal, whichever is the greater. The county auditor of each county in which such property is located shall apportion each such annual payments to each taxing district as if such annual payment had been levied and collected as a tax. Such annual payments shall never again be made after they have ceased. Effective Date: 09-16-1957 71 1/31/2011 http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/719.02