Dutch Sephardi Jewry, Millenarian Politics, and the Struggle for Brazil (1640-1654)
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
DUTCH SEPHARDI JEWRY, MILLENARIAN POLITICS, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR BRAZIL (1640-1654) JONATHAN I. ISRAEL The notion that Jews were a marginal, isolated group which took no sig nificant part in the great political struggles and rivalries of early modern times is so ingrained in the historiography of the period that any conten tion to the contrary is bound to seem startling and be looked on with scepticism. But the evidence that western Sephardi Jewry (and the Portu guese New Christians in Portugal) played a central role in the vast trian gular, trans-Atlantic struggle between Portugal, Spain and the Dutch in the 1640s is extensive and deserves to be analyzed more systematically than has been the case hitherto. The secession of Portugal from the Spanish crown in December 1640, the outcome of a conspiracy among the Portuguese nobility against Phil ip IV of Spain, and in favor of the Duke of Braganza, who was now pro claimed King John IV of Portugal, was one of the most dramatic events of the mid-seventeenth century - and one of the most far-reaching in its implications. Its effects, especially after Portuguese Brazil and the Portuguese East Indies followed Portugal itself in throwing off allegiance to the Spanish crown, during 1641, were indeed world-wide in scope. Portugal, a key market and hub of a global empire severed its links with the Spanish Monarchy, at that time still the largest and most powerful world imperium, starting a war in the Iberian Peninsula which was to last for over a quarter of a century1. But if the Lisbon coup d'état of December 1640 represented a new beginning for the kingdom of Portugal after sixty years under the hegemony of Spain in Europe and the Indies, the seces sion also marked the onset of major new dilemmas for the Dutch. For in the period from 1580 to 1640 the Portuguese, under Spain, and the Dutch had been enemies locked in a bitter conflict for supremacy in Bra zil, West Africa and the Far East. For the Portuguese, independence pre sented a desperately needed opportunity to halt the war with the Dutch outside Europe, consolidate what remained of their empire in Brazil, 1 C.R. Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654 (Hamden, Connecticut, 1973), pp. 100- 104; J. H. Elliott, The Count-Duke oj Olivares. The Statesman in an Age of Decline (New Haven and London, 1986), pp. 597-615; it was not until the Spanish-Portuguese peace of 1668 that the Spanish crown was finally forced to recognize the independence of Portugal. THE STRUGGLE FOR BRAZIL 77 Africa and Asia, and deploy all their resources against Spain. For the Dutch, the secession presented an opportunity to weaken Spain perma nently. By helping the Portuguese against Spain, the Dutch could also expect to conquer more territory in the Spanish Netherlands - the Stad- holder Frederick Henry in effect captured Hulst, Sas van Gent, and other enclaves in Flanders during the early 1640s - and make fresh gains at Spanish expense in the Caribbean. On the other hand, halting the struggle with the Portuguese and helping them against Philip IV also held serious disadvantages for the Dutch colonial companies2. A volte- face in Dutch policy towards Portugal would mean giving up plans to ex tend the Dutch-occupied zone in Brazil and for further expansion at Por tuguese expense in Africa, Ceylon, and southern India. Initially, though, the secession of Portugal posed less of a dilemma for Dutch Sephardi Jewry than it did for the Dutch regent class which domi nated the politics of the Republic. In 1640, Amsterdam Jews were not yet major share-holders in the colonial companies and as their principal traffic, that with Portugal had been seriously eroded by the resumption of war with Spain, since 1621, they were bound to look with enthusiasm on any circumstances likely to restore it3. Thus the Portuguese secession offered the prospect of Dutch ships and goods being allowed back legally into the ports of Portugal which, in turn, could be expected to revive Se phardi business activity in Holland and reverse the decline of the Amster dam community which had been in progress for two decades, since Philip IV had imposed his total embargo on Dutch ships and merchandise in the ports of Spain and Portugal in April 16214. The break-away of Portugal from Spain was also bound to find favor among most of the Portuguese New Christian diaspora in western Europe. The Portuguese New Christians resident at Rouen, Bordeaux, and Bayonne, who enjoyed the protection of Cardinal Richelieu as long as they were discreet about their private Judaism, could now re-establish their links with Portugal, broken since France had entered the Thirty Years' War against Spain in 1635 and at the same time support Riche lieu's policy of helping the Portuguese achieve their independence so as to weaken Spain, a policy in which the Cardinal's New Christian favor- 2 Lieuwe van Aitzema, Historie of verhael van saken van staet en oorlogh in, ende ontrent de Vereenigde Nederlanden (The Hague, 1667-1671), iv. 197-199; Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, pp. 103-104. 3 Jonathan I. Israel, "Spain and the Dutch Sephardim, 1609-1660", Studia Rosen- thaliana, iii (1978), 29-31. 4 Ibid. ; John IV readmitted Dutch ships and cargoes to the ports of Portugal by edict of 21 January 1641 : see Edgar Prestage, A embaixada de Tristäo de Mendonça Furtado a Holan- da em 1641 (Coimbra, 1920), p. 14. .