No. 1080 Delivered April 10, 2008 May 2, 2008

The Crisis in the Andes: Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela Ray Walser, Ph.D.

On the night of February 29, 2008, a group of guerrillas/terrorists of the Revolutionary Armed Forc- es of Colombia (FARC) and sympathizers bedded Talking Points down for the evening in a rustic but well-established encampment in the jungle near the Putumayo River, • On March 1, 2008, the Colombian military approximately one mile inside Ecuadorian territory. eliminated a key leader of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in a raid For the FARC fighters it must have seemed like just on a camp in neighboring Ecuador. another night in the guerrilla movement’s unending war against the Colombian people. • The attack sparked a diplomatic crisis as Ecuador and Venezuela denounced the Suddenly, in the first hour of March 1, Colombia’s incursion and threatened diplomatic, and armed forces struck out of the dark skies with deadly possibly military, retaliation. effect. Bombs rained down on the FARC camp, fol- • The Organization of American States and lowed by the arrival of an assault force of elite Colom- the Rio Group of Latin American nations bian troops. In the confused mêlée of bombs and defused the immediate crisis but not under- gunfire, 25 people died, three were wounded, and an lying tensions. undetermined number of FARC guerrillas escaped • Documents seized in the raid indicate disturb- into the jungle. Two corpses—one the body of Luis ing levels of support by the governments of Édgar Devia Silva, known by the nom de guerre Raúl Ecuador and Venezuela for the FARC and their Reyes—along with three laptop computers, hard disks, efforts to weaken Colombia and shift it into and flash drives were recovered and flown to Bogotá. the leftist camp of President Hugo Chávez. Called “Operation Phoenix” by the Colombians, • The incident occurred at a time when the the punitive strike aimed a carefully coordinated blow U.S. Congress moved to delay indefinitely a at the commander of the FARC’s Southern Front and vote on a free trade agreement with U.S. the number two man in the leadership of the terrorist friend and ally, Colombia. force. It was viewed by the operation’s architects in This paper, in its entirety, can be found at: Bogotá as a significant blow to the FARC’s seemingly www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/hl1080.cfm invulnerable leadership structure. Produced by the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies Reyes, argued the Colombian government, was no of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis ordinary guerrilla fighter. For years, he played a con- Institute for International Studies spicuous role as a godfather to the FARC on matters as Published by The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE diverse as war fighting, murder, kidnapping, drug Washington, DC 20002–4999 (202) 546-4400 • heritage.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflect- ing the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. No. 1080 Delivered April 10, 2008 trafficking, hostage-taking and hostage negotia- bardment. The Colombian force exchanged fire tions, dealing with foreign governments, meeting with the surviving members of the FARC band and with a steady stream of sympathizers, and presum- a Colombian solider died in the firefight. ably working to secure international backing for President Uribe admitted he considered notify- the FARC. While recognized as a public face of ing the Ecuadorian government in advance of the the FARC to the outside world of the extreme and operation but did not for fear of someone warning violent Left, he was, in the eyes of Colombian law, a Reyes, and perhaps also for fear of a negative re- notorious criminal fugitive with over 100 outstand- sponse. It was not until after the attack was under- ing charges or convictions for murder, kidnapping, way that President Uribe telephoned President and extortion. Rafael Correa of Ecuador to inform him of the raid. The Colombian military strike against Reyes and In the conversation, President Uribe apparently FARC guerrillas ignited a diplomatic crisis that was made it seem the encounter was between hostile perhaps the most acute witnessed in the Western forces and involved “hot pursuit.” Shortly after- Hemisphere in the last decade. Now, more than a ward, the Colombian military passed the coordi- month after the initial incidents, the threat of direct nates of the camp to their Ecuadorian counterparts. conflict between nations has largely subsided, but On March 2, the Colombian government began the polarization and loss of cooperation and trust releasing selected documents recovered from the between nations—particularly between Ecuador computers belonging to Reyes. The FARC docu- and Colombia—will have serious repercussions ments, in the form of letters and e-mails between throughout the Andean region, especially if foreign members of the FARC leadership, indicated close governments further align themselves with the connections between the FARC and the political lead- FARC and the “revolutionary forces” active in and ership of Ecuador and Venezuela on matters relating around Colombia. to the exchange of political hostages the FARC holds Colombia (including former Colombian presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt and three U.S. citizen contractors). The basic facts of the raid are no longer in dis- They also included information regarding contacts pute. The Colombian military had been hunting with Ecuadorian Minister of Internal and External Reyes for years. Earlier operations to eliminate him Security Coordination Gustavo Larrea about estab- were frustrated on several occasions. Clearly, the lishing a more permissive operating environment Colombians would have preferred to strike against for the FARC in Ecuador and about friendship and the elusive Reyes on Colombian territory, but this support offered by Hugo Chávez. proved difficult. The Colombians were able to fix Reyes’ location in a well-established safe haven on The partial release of documents exposed an Ecuadorian soil—reportedly by tracing Reyes’ extensive web of the FARC’s foreign ties and friend- phone conversations with Venezuelan President ships. If Colombia was to be faulted for an infrac- Hugo Chávez. tion of international law, it wanted national and world opinion to recognize that foreign officials President Álvaro Uribe and the Colombians sure- were engaging in dangerous relationships with the ly weighed the cost and benefits of the operation FARC and acting against international obligations before launching it. Because previous cross-border not to aid and abet known terrorists. incidents had produced minimal consequences, perhaps they believed the attack would cause no On the other hand, as the crisis mounted, Colom- significant fallout. bia did not sever diplomatic relations with either Ecuador or Venezuela or fall in with efforts to mil- The Colombians reported that fighter aircraft itarize the diplomatic crisis. Colombia welcomed that delivered the bombs on the FARC camp did not Organization of American States (OAS) and United enter Ecuadorian air space. Four Colombian Black- Nations investigations into possible terrorist linkag- hawks, however, carrying special forces and judicial es, as well as independent technical verification of police, did cross the frontier after the initial bom- the authenticity of the computer’s contents.

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Given the high value assigned to the target, the missed the Colombian efforts to link his govern- Colombians took a calculated risk. Perhaps they ment with the FARC via the computer files as a believed mistakenly that they could strike without comedy (“una cantinflada”). The refusal to recognize serious repercussions in the largely ungoverned, the potential validity of the information contained unpoliced space where the FARC—not the govern- in the FARC files was equally advanced by Foreign ment of Ecuador—tends to predominate. Minister María Isabel Salvador and Minister of Pub- On balance, the Colombians, when presented lic Security Fernando Bustamante when they later with an opportunity to strike punitively at a danger- appeared in Washington. They, too, heaped ridicule ous terrorist capo dei capo, did not let the opportu- on the documents and showed no readiness to nity slip. I believe leaders in the U.S government invite a public investigation of links between the would have acted similarly to protect the lives of FARC and sympathizers in Ecuador. U.S. citizens. President Correa visited five countries to argue the Ecuadorian position on the incident and to Ecuador pressure for a sharp condemnation of Colombia’s The reaction of the government of Ecuador to actions. Speaking before the OAS on March 5, the incursion became, within a few hours, one of Foreign Minister Salvador defended Ecuador’s disagreement and anger. President Correa quickly record of standing against terrorism, policing the denounced the attack as a massacre, perpetrated by border, dismantling FARC camps, and sheltering aircraft entering Ecuadorian air space and aided by refugees from Colombia’s wars. She denounced the sophisticated technology provided by the U.S. He release of the FARC documents as “a hostile and faulted President Uribe for lying and for a wanton deliberate attempt to divert attention” from Colom- attack on Ecuadorian territory. Correa also claimed bia’s act of naked aggression. that some of the dead had been shot in the back Ecuador’s officials attempted to paint a positive and reported that international humanitarian laws image of their government’s non-involvement in the were violated. Colombian conflict, to deny any complicity with the Later evidence would surface regarding the pres- FARC in providing havens, and to demonstrate that ence of an Ecuadorian and Mexican citizens among Ecuador was doing everything possible to keep the those killed in the FARC camp. If Colombia FARC out of Ecuador. believed the incursion might pass as another unfor- In my view, in their zeal to defend national sov- tunate incident in a largely ungoverned area where ereignty and to win a diplomatic contest with brief cross-border incursions and incidents were Colombia, President Correa and high Ecuadorian not uncommon, they were mistaken. officials rendered a one-sided version of a very On March 2, President Correa denounced the nuanced and difficult case—obscuring inconve- raid as “an act of aggression” and expelled the nient facts, such as the failure of their civil and mil- Colombian Ambassador. He also called several itary intelligence to locate an established guerrilla Hemispheric presidents and demanded the prompt encampment that could be reached in a matter of involvement of the OAS. On March 3, Ecuador sev- days by visiting Mexican Leftists. ered diplomatic relations with Colombia. President Correa outlined his government’s demands: an Venezuela international rejection/condemnation of the attack; On Sunday, March 3, President Hugo Chávez of an OAS investigation; and a promise of no further Venezuela, in his weekly television program Aló Pres- incursions. Relations between the countries, which idente, startled Venezuelans by turning the bilateral had been deteriorating since Correa took office in incident into a regional crisis. Before a national audi- 2006, appeared to hit bottom. ence, Chávez eulogized Reyes as a “good revolution- Correa and his senior officials set out within the ary.” In his pep talk to the nation, Chávez digressed, first 24 hours to disentangle themselves from any informing Venezuelans that one of the cherished possible connections with the FARC. Correa dis- goals of his foreign policy was to carry his anti-

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American campaign to Colombia and to see Colom- The OAS debate centered on often-repeated pro- bia liberated from the yoke of U.S. imperialism. hibitions against the violation of territorial sover- Chávez reaffirmed solidarity with Ecuador, eignty enshrined in numerous instruments of the recalled his diplomatic personnel from Bogotá, and Inter-American and international system versus an instructed his Defense Minister to “send me 10 bat- equally recognized right of self-defense—between talions to the border, including tanks.” Chávez the protection of state sovereignty and the duty warned Colombia that he would interpret a strike not to allow one’s territory to be used to harm others. against the FARC on Venezuelan territory as an act At the core of the debate was the clash between of war. Following Chávez’s intervention, it appeared classic upholders of an overarching set of interna- that the Andean region might be spiraling toward tional laws and realists who rigorously defend their armed conflict. right and obligation to protect the lives and safety of their people in an essentially anarchical interna- In my view, the response of the President of Ven- tional environment. ezuela was to encourage what one Latin American commentator called “the diplomacy of micro- The initial OAS resolution, issued March 5, reaf- phones.” How far Chávez intended to go with his firmed “the principle that the territory of a state is brand of brinksmanship remains unclear. But if he inviolable and may not be the object, even tempo- had wanted to manufacture an incident and pro- rarily of military occupation or other measures of voke a shooting war, he had all the opportunities. force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any ground whatsoever.” The Organization of American States, The permanent council instructed the OAS Sec- Part I retary General to lead a mission to Ecuador and The incident was one of the gravest challenges to Colombia in order to “propose formulas for bring- the OAS in the last decade. Under Secretary General ing the two nations closer together.” The permanent José Miguel Insulza, the OAS moved swiftly to council also summoned the foreign ministers of the defuse the crisis and reduce it to manageable pro- Hemisphere to meet in a special session on March portions. On March 4, the OAS convened its perma- 17. The government of Brazil constructively provid- nent council. Ecuador rushed its Foreign Minister ed a military aircraft for the special OAS mission, to Washington to argue her nation’s case, based and the governments of Ecuador and Colombia largely on Article 21 of the Organization of Ameri- covered the daily expenses and in-country trans- can States’ Charter, which states: portation of the mission. The territory of a State is inviolable; it may The Rio Group not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken It was fortuitous that most regional heads of state by another State, directly or indirectly, on any of the Hemisphere were already committed to meet- grounds whatsoever. No territorial acquisi- ing in the Dominican Republic for the 20th meeting tions or special advantages obtained either of the 20-member Rio Group on March 7. The Rio by force or by other means of coercion shall Group is a mechanism of consultation that evolved be recognized. out the Contadora support group during the Central American crisis of the 1980s. It remains a vehicle for As Secretary General Insulza noted, “This prin- Latin American heads of state to consult annually on ciple is one of the cornerstones of the interna- topics of common interest. The U.S. does not partic- tional legal order and, in particular, the inter- ipate in the meetings of the Rio Group. American legal system, and a principle that has always been indisputably linked to the principle The gathering of most presidents of the region— of peaceful settlement of controversies between Brazil’s Lula da Silva did not attend—offered ample States and cooperation to safeguard peace, security, opportunity for regional leaders to confer, publicly and development.” and privately. It was also a chance to indulge in some political theater. At President Uribe’s request,

page 4 No. 1080 Delivered April 10, 2008 the entire session was opened to the media. With • To take note of the full apology for the events the world watching, the pressure mounted for the that occurred and the pledge by Colombia, contending parties to moderate their positions and expressed by its President to the Rio Group and produce a positive outcome. reiterated by its delegation at this Meeting of Although at one point, during President Uribe’s Consultation, that they would not be repeated initial speech, President Correa stormed out of the under any circumstances. session, he later returned. Uribe yielded to the • To reiterate the firm commitment of all member demand for a public apology for the March 1 inci- states to combat threats to security caused by dent and a promise there would be no repeat of the actions of irregular groups or criminal orga- attacks on Ecuadorian soil. Dominican President nizations, especially those associated with drug Leonel Fernández engineered a meeting of Presi- trafficking. dents Correa and Uribe, including handshakes and • To instruct the Secretary General to use his abrazos (hugs). The march toward war yielded to good offices to implement a mechanism for promises of peace and renewed friendship. observing compliance with this resolution and The passage of a resolution by the Rio Group the restoration of an atmosphere of trust greatly defused the animosity built up in the previ- between the two Parties. ous six days. The key text of the resolution stated: The ministers charged the OAS with encourag- We reject the violation of the territorial integ- ing Colombia and Ecuador to reestablish diplomatic rity of Ecuador, and consequently reaffirm the relations and to reactivate existing political consul- principle that the territory of a State is inviola- tation mechanisms. It also called for the formation ble and cannot be the object of military occu- of an OAS mission for follow-up and verification of pation nor other measures of force taken by commitments assumed and agreements reached by another State, directly or indirectly, whatever the two countries for cooperation on border issues the reason. and other matters of common interest, for the The Bogotá weekly, La Semana, wrote that the strengthening of border mechanisms for dialogue meeting of the Rio Group “did not moderate the and cooperation, and for the study of a possible inclinations of the leaders of the three countries, but bilateral early-warning system. it did curb their impulses.” After the Rio Group While the OAS resolution appeared to vindicate meeting, threats of conflict, particularly the tension Ecuador’s grievances, it did not produce a condem- between Colombia and Venezuela, swiftly defused, nation of Colombia, and it recognized the responsi- leaving many to wonder just how profound the bility of states to combat security threats posed by crisis had been. groups like the FARC. It also made clear that the OAS approach to terrorism requires further updat- The Organization of American States, ing of international law and accepted practice in Part II light of the growing challenge of transnational crime Foreign ministers gathered for the OAS minis- and, in the aftermath of September 11 to synchro- terial meeting on March 17. After lengthy discus- nize the inherent rights of self-defense against ter- sion, the OAS agreed to a resolution, the final text rorist attack with traditional protections of national of which called on all OAS members and the sovereignty and territorial integrity. involved parties: The United States • To reject the incursion by Colombian military forces and police personnel into the territory of The initial response of the U.S. government was Ecuador, in the Province of Sucumbíos, on to encourage Ecuador and Colombia to take the March 1, 2008, carried out without the knowl- incident to the OAS. In light of the belligerent Ven- edge or prior consent of the Government of ezuelan reaction and dispatch of troops to the Ecuador, since it was a clear violation of Articles Colombian border, the White House quickly recog- 19 and 21 of the OAS Charter. nized the importance of supporting President Uribe

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and Colombia in its struggle against narco-terrorism have been driven by the deep-seated territorial, eth- and in standing up to Chávez. nic, tribal or religious beliefs that are the hallmarks On March 4, President George W. Bush called of conflict and war in the 21st century. President Uribe and reaffirmed his full support for For these reasons, the crisis was also contained democracy in Colombia. The President expressed by the active diplomacy of the OAS and the Rio opposition “to any acts of aggression” aimed at desta- Group and by the reluctance of the parties them- bilizing the region. The statement made clear where selves to escalate the crisis to the point of war. the U.S. government stands with regard to any pos- Nevertheless, this incident will likely have sible military attack by Venezuela against Colombia. enduring and troubling repercussions. The three In the OAS debate on March 17, the U.S. repre- nations most involved in the conflict are drifting sentative urged a balanced resolution, one that away from any collective recognition of the need to weighed the responsibility of states to respect fron- resolve either the problem of the FARC and other tiers and guard national sovereignty but also urged irregular combatant and criminal forces, or the need nations to take collective action against internation- to enhance regional cooperation in the fight against al terrorism. The U.S. joined the consensus that the drug trade. The political will needed to confront passed the OAS resolution but caveated its vote by the true enemies of organized, legal states is becom- inserting a clear reference to the obligation of states ing lost in a growing thicket of ideological divisions, not to support international terrorism. personal rivalries, and myopic decision-making. On March 18, President Bush spoke of the con- At a time when the FARC is increasingly exposed nections between the FARC and Venezuela’s govern- as a murderous, narco-terrorist group lacking polit- ment by reaffirming, “The United States strongly ical legitimacy in Colombia and as a waning military supports, strongly stands with Colombia in its fight force, it is winning fresh political converts in Ecua- against the terrorists and drug lords.” dor and Venezuela. The new interventionism of A U.S. position that stands up for a vital friend and Hugo Chávez and his Bolivarian Leftist pals seeks partner in the Hemisphere and recognizes the trans- directly or indirectly to exploit the political situa- national, destabilizing threats posed by the narco- tion in Colombia and prolong—not resolve—the terrorists of the FARC and those who support and conflict. To date, none of the new Bolivarians have sympathize its activities is, I believe, fully consistent offered constructive proposals aimed at ending the with the security interests of the American people. conflict in Colombia on a balanced basis. The longer-term fissures underlying the March Observations crisis will be difficult to resolve as long as there is a The March crisis in the Andes produced a height- loss of common understanding and a clash of rival ened state of tensions and a surge in nationalist sen- paradigms for Latin America’s future political and timent that are often the antecedents of war. Three economic course. This battle is between a generally nations sought to exploit the incident for full polit- liberal, democratic, free-market philosophy based ical advantage and to rally domestic support behind on partnership with the U.S. and the new Bolivarian their positions. How serious was the threat of war? brand of activism, which holds the view that there This remains a matter for debate. should be no enemies on the Left, even if the parties Fortunately, South America is a continent where operating under the mantle of “revolutionary inter- military conflicts between nations remain rare. The nationalism” are prepared to follow the path of restraints on belligerent behavior are substantial and armed violence and rebellion and have unalterable include common cultural and linguistic ties, largely terrorist and narcotics-trafficking tendencies. democratic governments committed to peace and The increased need for cooperation among gov- non-intervention, and increased interdependence ernments to control ungoverned space, to act in and integration of regional economies. Although concert against narcotics trafficking, and to curb nationalism helped encourage warlike emotions in and eliminate the actions of irregular forces is giving the Andes, none of the parties involved appeared to way to bitter political rivalries and partisanship. The

page 6 No. 1080 Delivered April 10, 2008 region is in the process of creating, as one veteran preserve a working relationship and counter-drug Latin American official observed, “a classic zero- cooperation faces an uphill struggle. These divisions sum game.” will undoubtedly be rapidly exploited by the FARC Another troubling facet of the crisis is the reluc- and other drug traffickers. tance of many in the Hemisphere, adhering to the Conclusion long-established principle of non-intervention, to speak out openly and forcefully against the FARC The March 1, 2008, incident is a stark reminder and to join with the people of Colombia in repudi- of the serious governance and security problems ating acts of terrorism by all parties. This laissez- that prevail in parts of the Western Hemisphere. faire attitude gives further oxygen to the fire that has The presence of immense ungoverned spaces and consumed Colombia for decades. the continued existence of severe transnational and terrorist threats demonstrate the need to overhaul Finally, a central concept in the war against drugs or transform existing practices of international law. has been the recognition that strong regional coop- eration from source to market is necessary if progress In a world of inviolable, sovereign states, what is to be made in the anti-narcotics fight. The break- rights, what mechanisms do nations, operating in a down in cooperation with two of the five countries real-time world, have to defend themselves against that border Colombia is troublesome and indicates elusive terrorist or insurgent forces operating in that the regional collaboration needed to make head- ungoverned space beyond borders—especially if way in the drug fight has largely disappeared. these hostile forces operate with the tacit support of another sovereign state that is either unable or Venezuela has essentially ceased cooperating with unwilling to enforce its borders and remove the the U.S. to combat drug trafficking, and Ecuador belligerent force? appears headed in a similar direction. Ecuador is suffering from the “balloon effect” of the drug war. —Ray Walser is Senior Policy Analyst for Latin The decision of Ecuador to take Colombia to the America in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for International Court of Justice because of aerial Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation. spraying or President Correa’s efforts to root out These remarks were delivered April 10, 2008, before the “CIA influences” in his intelligence service (i.e., House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on pro-American officials) is not helpful. Any effort to the Western Hemisphere.

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