The London School of Economics and Political Science Transnational Networks of Insurgency and Crime: Explaining the Spread of Th
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The London School of Economics and Political Science Transnational networks of insurgency and crime: explaining the spread of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia beyond national borders. Oscar Palma A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, March, 2013 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 99,662 words. 2 Acknowledgments To all of those who contributed with my dissertation, most especially to my supervisor Christopher Coker and Razeen Sally, Fawaz Gerges, Ambassador Mauricio Rodriguez, Virginia Contreras, Sergio Jaramillo, Cynthia Arnson, Thomas Marks, David Spencer, Alejandro Arbelaez, General Carlos Ospina, Leonardo Tique, Rocio Cruz, Cesar Castaño, Eliana Sanabria, “Lucho”, Alejandra Ripoll, Jorge Ignacio Calixto, Rodrigo Paris, Commander Wilmer Castro Soteldo, Cristian Garay, Gonzalo Montaner, Adolfo Vera, Luis Villamarin, Fernando Egaña, Indira de Peña, Natalia Cobo, Andres Molano, Alicia La Rotta, Anibal Romero, Carlos Romero, “Tania Roja”, Jean Dazor, Hernando Torrez-Fernandez, Luis Giacoma Macchiavello, Ramon Diego Abasolo, Adolfo Vera, Alejandro Arevalo, Domingo Marileo, Israel Aillapan, Juan Luis Cordova, Liza Zuñiga, Ronal Rodriguez, Rafael Arraiz, Jacob Parakilas, Sebastiana Barraez, Caroline Varin, Nick Srnicek, Janel Smith, Samuel Jones, Alejandro Sanchez, Valentina Gracia, Cesar Baquero and the Centre for Hemispheric Defense Studies-National Defense University. I am also grateful to those who contributed with my initial engagement on PhD studies including Geoff Berridge, Eduardo Barajas, Vicente Torrijos, Stephanie Lavaux and Sandra Borda. 3 Abstract Through official and academic circles a particular understanding of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) had spread: an almost devastated terrorist group whose interests in profiting from drug trafficking clouded its political objectives. Its transnational networks were either underestimated, perceiving they didn’t offer much to the organization; or overestimated, believing that every Latin American agent on the Left of the political spectrum was part of a conspiracy against the Colombian state. The dissertation proposes a different narrative to explain the importance of transnational networks and structures, especially how they may serve as a base for FARC to survive. The Colombian insurgency is here addressed as a typical case of a kind of organization in which political and criminal interests are blended. It further develops the concept of ‘commercial insurgencies’, opposing a vision of the insurgency as a monolithic entity, to explain it as a system of interconnected individuals with diverse functions and interests who constitute its three dimensions: political, military and criminal. It is here argued that commercial insurgencies exploit specific elements through the environment to embed its nodes beyond the borders of a single state. These include sympathy from individuals, support from national governments, connections with political and social organizations, alliances with armed actors, the exploitation of empty spaces, and the secretive placement of nodes. Common single-variable explanations to the embedment of insurgents, such as support from a foreign allied government, are insufficient as an objective account of this phenomenon. Furthermore, given certain environmental processes, survival of insurgency elements may contribute to the reconstitution and re-emergence of the organization. In this sense the challenge of the counterinsurgent is two-fold: the insurgency is multidimensional, and it tends to be transnational. Consequently, for an offensive to be successful it needs to address all the dimensions simultaneously and to control the effects of elements existing beyond borders. 4 Table of Contents Introduction 9 Methodological approach 17 Dissertation structure 22 Chapter 1. Complexity, networks and warfare 24 The linear paradigm 24 The complexity paradigm 26 The networked society 31 Networks in Strategic Studies 34 Complexity and networked insurgencies 37 The study of social networks 46 Chapter 2. The triadic character of commercial insurgencies 56 The concept of insurgency 57 The blurring boundaries of insurgency and crime 61 Understanding interactions between criminality and insurgency 65 The concept of commercial insurgencies 68 The triadic character of commercial insurgencies 71 The environment of operations 77 Chapter 3. The evolution of counterinsurgency warfare 87 The era of brutality 88 Brutality meets civic action 94 The emergence of Maoism 97 Theorisation of counterinsurgency during the Maoist era 102 Counterinsurgency failure during the Cold War 105 Hearts and minds and the comprehensive approach 108 Counterinsurgency beyond the state: looking to the future 111 5 Chapter 4. The configuration of FARC as a commercial insurgency and the evolution of state responses 114 The inception of FARC 115 Building a COIN approach 116 From self-defence to guerrilla resistance 118 The emergence of a commercial insurgency 119 Ideas for develop-centred counterinsurgency 122 Negotiations as a strategic base for growth 124 Towards strategic stalemate 126 A turn towards brutality 130 Regaining strategic initiative 132 Democratic Security Policy and widening COIN 136 Applying development-centred COIN 140 FARC’s conditions by the end of the Uribe era 141 Chapter 5. Networks and structures through the primary environment 146 Military structures: towards flexibility 147 Military structures: urbanization and militia networks 155 Political networks 161 Partido Comunista Colombiano Clandestino (PC3) 163 Movimiento Bolivariano por la Nueva Colombia (MB) 168 Criminal networks 174 FARC as a networked insurgency 180 Chapter 6. Node embeddedness and structures through the secondary environment 185 The International Commission and a first configuration of networks 185 Strengthening networks: the Movimiento Continental Bolivariano 193 Government support or permissiveness 197 Connections with social and political organizations 201 6 Alliances with Armed actors 206 Empty spaces 209 Node embeddedness and network characteristics 214 Chapter 7. FARC as a regional actor and the survival of its structures 218 The case for a regional revolution 220 The real scenario: node preservation 222 Government Support 222 Political and Social Movements 225 Alliances with armed actors 230 Empty Spaces 235 The re-emergence of a commercial insurgency 240 A potential future 246 Conclusion 250 Appendixes 258 Appendix 1. Number of FARC combatants 261 Appendix 2. FARC guerrilla conferences 262 Appendix 3. FARC’s militias 264 Appendix 4. Structure of networks developed by the COMINTER 265 Appendix 5. Networks after 2003 including MCB developments 266 Appendix 6. Members of the Campaign for the Liberation of Manuel Olate 267 Appendix 7. Elements remaining beyond Colombian borders 269 Appendix 8. Evolution of trafficking routes 270 Maps 270 Map 1. Colombian political-administrative división 273 Map 2. “Repúblicas Independientes” 274 Map 3. Coca leaf zones of expansion 275 7 Map 4. Zona de Distensión 276 Map 5. FARC’s Fronts and Blocs 277 Map 6. FARC camps and activities in Venezuela 278 Bibliography 279 8 Introduction During the Cold War, and especially after the triumph of the Cuban revolution, socialist and communist insurgencies flourished through Central and South America with an idea of revolutionary transformation. With the end of the bipolar confrontation it was believed that Marxist-Leninist and Maoist insurgencies would disappear, not only through the Western hemisphere but throughout the developing world. To a certain extent this was true. In most Latin American countries insurgencies disappeared: peace agreements were signed; rebels demobilized and political parties were formed. In El Salvador and Nicaragua parties created by former insurgents even won presidential elections. But this was not always the case. Insurgencies such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) continued to exist, challenging security and order, adapting to new strategic contexts, and profiting from illicit drug markets. This circumstance has invited formulations about the nature of insurgencies and the reasons of their persistence. In the case of FARC a dominant narrative became widespread through official circles, and even through the nation. It explains the organization basically as a criminalized entity whose interest in profiting from the drug market corrupted its original political interest, motivating its continued participation in war. Given the profound damages that the Colombian state managed to inflict on the insurgency during the decade of the 2000s, it became widely accepted that this criminalized group was close to its defeat and elimination. A brief observation of the discourse of Colombian leaders during the