Skeletons in the Closet

SKELETONS IN THE CLOSET

Explaining the Repression of Non- Violent Protests in South American Democracies

Beatriz Sannuti de Carvalho S1255827 Master Thesis 2014

Leiden University

Faculty of Social And Behavioural Sciences Institute of Political Science Master of Science in International Relations and Diplomacy

Beatriz Sannuti de Carvalho

Master Thesis

Skeletons in the closet ~ Explaining the Repression of Non-violent Social Protests in South American Democracies

First reader: Prof. Dr. Rebekah Tromble (Leiden University)

Second reader: Prof. Dr. Oda van Cranenburgh (Leiden University)

Leiden, 27 August 2014

Acknowledgements

I am very grateful to Prof. Dr. Rebekah Tromble who kindly accepted being my supervisor and whose advice, corrections, kindness towards me when I was facing difficulties and valuable inputs and support were essential for this thesis. I would also like to thank Prof. Dr. Oda van Cranenburgh for being kind to serve as the second reader for this thesis and Prof. Frank de Zwart for his support.

I must also thank my friends, classmates and the professors of the Master of Sciences in International Relations & Diplomacy for enriching my time in Leiden University and for their support and friendship, which I hold dearly to my heart. I specially would like to thank four of these incredible people: Bas, Bob, Sus and Jana, knowing I could count on you has been the most precious gift I could have ever received from Leiden and I hope I can repay your kindness and friendship one day. Those who have friends indeed have everything.

My gratitude must also go to my brothers Vicente and Vinicius and to my boyfriend Rafael for making themselves present even with an Ocean between us, for their patience, understanding in challenging times and for being my rock. I love you and could not have done it without you.

Finally, my utmost gratitude goes to my parents Rosa Maria and Paulo Cesar, for making it all possible and for always being the hands that push me forward.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Abreviations………………………….…………………………………………….….v List of Tables & Figures…………………………………………………………………..….vi I. INTRODUCTION ...... 01

FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

II. EXPLAINING THE REPRESSION OF NON- VIOLENT PROTESTS...………….…...06 III. RESEARCH DESIGN ...... 14 i. Case selection……...... 14 ii. Methodology……...... 14 a. Concept Definition….…………………………………………………..15 iii. Operationalization………...... 18 a. Dependent Variable...... 18 b. Independent Variables...... 21 c. Limitations of the Data...... 28

ANALYSIS

IV. CASE STUDIES ...... 31 i. Contextual Factor…………...... 31 a. Brazil…………………………...... 31 b. Chile………………………………………………………………………..44 c. Uruguay…...…………………………………………………………..……55

V. ANALYSIS OF HYPOTHESES...... 66 i. H1: ‘Level of Threat’ and ‘Level of Repression’...... 67 ii H2: ‘Elite Continuity’ and ‘Level of Repression’…………………………………71 iii H3: ‘Existence of a militarized police/ Lack of accountability’ and ‘ Level of Repression’…………………………………………………………………………...74

VI. FINAL REMARKS ...... 79

VII. REFERENCES...... 84

APPENDIX A: SPSS OUTPUT…...... II APPENDIX B: DATA COMPILATION……………………………….……….…...……....V

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AI- Atos Institucionais (Institutional Acts in the translation to English)

ICCPR- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

NGO- Non Governmental Organization

MCP- Military-coercion perspective

MPL- Movimento Passe Livre

PM- Policia Militar (Militarized police in the translation to English)

PTS- Political Terror Scale

UDHR- Universal Declaration on Human Rights

UN- United Nations

UP- Unidad Popular (Popular Unity in the translation to English)

LIST OF TABLES & FIGURES

Table i: Operationalization of ‘Level of Repression’ used against non-violent protests…… 18

Table ii: Operationalization of the scale for overall ‘Level of Repression’ for each country. 20

Table iii: Operationalization of ‘Level of Threat’…………………………………………... 23

Table iv: Protests by type of claim- Brazil………………………………………………….. 40

Table v: ‘Level of Represion’ of protests- Brazil…………………………………………… 41

Table vi: SPSS Crosstabulation for Brazil (Brazil_LevelofThreat * Brazil_LevelofRepression

Crosstabulation)…………………………………………………………………………….. 43

Table vii: Protests by type of claim- Chile…………………………………………………...52

Table viii: ‘Level of Repression’ of protests- Chile………………………………………….53

Table ix: SPSS Crosstabulation for Chile (Chile_LevelofThreat * Chile_LevelofRepression

Crosstabulation)……………………………………………………………………………...54

Table x: Protests by type of claim- Uruguay…………………………………………………62

Table xi: ‘Level of Repression’ of protests- Uruguay………………………………………..63

Table xii: SPSS Crosstabulation for Uruguay (Uruguay_LevelofThreat *

Uruguay_LevelofRepression Crosstabulation)………………………………………………64

Table xiii: ‘Level of Repression’ per year and country………………………………………67

Table xiv: ‘No Repression’ of protests and ‘Level of Threat’……………….………………67

Table xv: ‘Mild Repression’ of protests and ‘Level of Threat’………….…………………..68

Table xvi: ‘Significant Repression’ of protests and ‘Level of Threat’..……………………...68

Table xvii: SPSS Crosstabulation for all three countries (LevelofThreat_all3countries *

LevelofRepression_all3countries Crosstabulation)…………………………………………..69

Table xviii: SPSS correlation between ‘Level of Threat’ and ‘Level of Repression’………..69

Table xix: Summary of ‘Elite Continuity score and overall ‘Level of Represision’………...71

Table xx: Summary of ‘Existence of a Militarized Police/ Lack of Accountability score and overall ‘Level of Represision’………………………………………….…………………….74

Figure i: Freedom Score- Brazil (2001-2013)………………………………………………..39

Figure ii: Freedom Score- Chile (2001-2013)………………………………………………..51

Figure iii: Freedom Score- Uruguay (2001-2013)…………………………………………...61

vii

I. INTRODUCTION

State response to non- violent demonstration has not been uniform across geography and time. This thesis explores the existing puzzle around the different state responses to protests in Brazil, Chile and Uruguay.

The field of social sciences that investigates the relationship between the type of regime in a state and repression against its citizens is vast. Although the repression of non- violent protests by democracies has received substantial scholarly attention, there are still many areas that demand further development in the academic literature.

The debate around why democracies and authoritarian regimes are expected to respond to non-violent protests in a certain way is one of the richest political sciences topics around.

There is a general argument that suggests that a democracy will refrain from repressing its own own citizens, since by repressing freedoms and rights the elected politicians hinder their chances of reelection and necessary public support. Furthermore, democracies are expected to have a political apparatus that allow them to peacefully handle non-violent protests.

On the other hand, autocracies are broadly expected to be less preoccupied with maintaining public support by protecting the aforementioned rights and freedoms, as politicians do not experience the same incentives as in a democracy. These kind of regimes seek citizen compliance bt spreading fear and are more likely to, as this standard argument suggests, promptly repress any social movement that would represent a threat to their power.

In addition to examining why regime types differ in their approaches to dealing with non- violent protest, another field of literature seeks to explain why different democracies might react differently to social protests based on the calculations of costs. Such current scholarship would lead us to believe that countries with similar political systems, histories, structures and challenges would react in a similar way to non-violent protests. Nevertheless,

that is not what is observed with the cases of Chile, Brazil and Uruguay. Although having similar political histories and possessing other similarities—such as being former dictatorships in Latin American that now have presidential systems—these three countries present different responses to non-violent social protests.

For an example, from January 2011 to December 2013, Brazil responded with significant repression to almost 20% of non-violent demonstrations, while Chile significantly repressed around 13% of such events and Uruguay did not have any single event significantly repressed.

In the literature, the hypothesis that best offers an answer to this puzzle explains the variation in the level of repression through the level of threat posed by a given specific protest action. To borrow the words of Earl et al. (2003, p. 581), that is to say ‘the larger the threat to political elites, the greater and more severe the expected repression’.

Although such a hypothesis is intuitively satisfying, this thesis assumes it is not universally applicable, especially because it is able to explain a good part, but not all of the events observed. Therefore, this thesis examines two alternative explanations (stemming from regime legacy) which might also impact the level of repression exercised by Brazil, Chile and Uruguay: namely, elite continuity and police militarization.

As mentioned above, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay have some similarities that would make us expect them to respost similarly to similar protests: they experienced authoritarian regimes at around the same time and transitioned back to democracy in close periods. Nonetheless, while Brazil still has a rather strong militarized police, influential elite and, out of the three, has achieved the less in terms of justice, truth and memory processes and accountability in relation to its Military regime, the other two countries present different dynamics nowadays.

Although Chile has also maintained their militarized police and their elites have some considerable political influence, the country has made considerable steps to achieve

2 transitional justice. For its part, Uruguay dismantled its militarized police in terms of civilian control, has few examples of elites continuously influencing policies after the authoritarian years and has gone through an extensive truth and memory process during their reconciliation efforts.

This thesis argues that these subtle variations might be related to the way each of these countries respond to protests. Out of the three Brazil presented the largest number of protests with Chile behind. Both had some violent response to non- violent protests, using rubber bullets, tear gas and intimidating dispersion tactics in recent protests, but showed similar proportional rates of non- repressive behavior towards demonstrations; and Uruguay has demonstrated an overall peaceful response to those events, not having not even one account of significant repression during the observed period of January 2011 to December 2013.

Thus, this suggests that a variation in one or all of these aspects (militarized police, elites and transitional justice), which might represent the endurance of past institutions in current democracies, could bear a relation with the levels of repression against non- violent protests of a given country.

In order to attempt to explain the aforementioned puzzle, this thesis is divided into two parts.

The first one reviews the literature on the repression of non- violent demonstrations and presents this thesis’ hypothesis. This is followed by a research design section which explains the case selection and methodology employed herein, as well as defining some key concepts, exposing how the operationalization of the dependent and independent variables will be done and acknowledging the limitations of the data used. This procedure allows this thesis to explore the factors that might influence the repression of non-violent protests in those countries. By doing so, the second part of this work focuses on the analysis of whether some factors contribute to the variation in the level of repression of non-violent protests between

3 the cases (Brazil, Chile and Uruguay). Subsequently, the findings will be discussed and concluded on part VI.

Framework for Analysis

II. EXPLAINING THE REPRESSION OF NON-VIOLENT PROTESTS

Many scholars have studied the democracy-repression nexus (Berlin, 2010; Reagan &

Henderson, 2002; Schedler, 1999; Goldstein, 1978; Davenport, 2007a; Davenport, 2007b and

Davenport, 2007c; Grassi, 2013) and there was once a common assumption that a democratic regime, given its nature and intrinsic values, would hinder political repression of any kind.

This assumption can be found in works that defend democratic peace such as Sartori, 1976;

O´Donnel, 2004; Diamond (1999) among others.

Democracy is

[t]hought to reduce violent conflict by providing institutionalized channels of communication with political opponents, by offering to incorporate them into political debate, and by conceding to at least some of their political and social demands. […] if regimes are open to dissent and have institutional channels through which grievances can be addressed, political actors will be more likely to press their claims from within the system. In general, democratic governments are more likely to be responsive and open to dissent than non- democracies. Therefore, democracies should be less susceptible to rebellion (Grassi: 2013, p. 7).

This rationale allows a very straightforward interpretation: in an authoritarian government a critical level of grievances can usually only be expressed through violent means; whereas in democracies, the peaceful and institutional resolution of citizen grievances prevail most of the time.

Other authors (Reagan & Henderson, 2002; Davenport, 2007a and 2013) however, reject the assumption of an absolute domestic democratic peace and suggest a more complex relationship between regime type and political repression and go further to understand why some governments repress their constituents.

Ted Gurr (1986)1 posits that ‘violent repression is a reaction to well-developed governments’

(Rogers: 2011, p. 11), and Anne Costain (1992)2 complements this position by stating that early repression—that is repression before protestors are fully organized—terminates protests.

Rogers (2011, p. 11) also points out that ‘repression is rarely visible when there is little to repress: the existence of a movement in a position to seriously challenge the state suggests that the state’s reaction to such a movement is almost by definition reactive’. Furthermore, there is a segment in the literature in which the nature of the relationship between the number of protests and the actions to control such protests is believed to be directly linearly correlated. Nonetheless, many authors (Stohl and Lopez 1984; Eberwein 1987; Gurr 1986a,

Ziegenhagen 1986; Franks 1989; Hoover and Kowalewski 1992 In Davenport: 1995b, p. 684) counter this assumption by stating that such relationship is more complex and that variation in government response is due to

[t]wo factors: 1) different attributes of the conflict behavior encountered, and 2) the structure of the political economy (i.e., system type, economic development and so forth). To these authors, domestic threats are not one- dimensional phenomena but rather multidimensional, defined, and responded to differently across con- texts (Davenport: 1995b, p. 684).

Moreover, the term “repressive propensity” is used in reference to the level to which a given government classifies the actions of its constituents as threatening (or not) and choses to react to it repressively or not. A given administration might interpret large protests directed against the state´s policies, or the government itself, as a threat to that government´s legitimacy and authority. Such political behavior can disturb society and threaten those within power. Thus, by level of threat this literature refers to the level of threat that political oppositions, protests,

1 Apud Rogers: 2011, p. 11. 2 Apud Rogers: 2011, p. 11.

7 strikes etc. might represent to the ruling government (Davenport, 1995b; Reagan &

Henderson: 2002).

Davenport assesses the possible interpretation of a threat by the government based on four criteria: ‘1) basic frequency counts of events, 2) the presence of violence, 3) the variety of strategies employed by dissidents and 4) current behaviors relative to the cultural norm’.

(Davenport, 1995b: p. 685) Building on that, Reagan & Henderson (2002) identify the level of threat through the perception by leaders of the credibility and magnitude of the threat facing their regime (Reagan & Henderson: 2002, p. 120).

In order to control such threats, augment the costs of protesting (to try to diminish the number of those that have such political behavior) and neutralize its undesired outcomes, governments might choose to politically repress protests which they interpret as a real threat to their interests (Davenport: 1995b, p. 685).

Reagan & Henderson (2002) contribute to that by finding that

(1) the level of threat is positively and significantly associated with political repression; (2) the level of threat has a greater impact than regime type on the likelihood of political repression; and (3) controlling for the level of threat, less developed states with intermediate levels of democracies—semi democracies—have the highest levels of political repression (Reagan & Henderson: 2002, p. 119).

Moreover, the perception that a given government has of the intensity, representation and credibility of a threat posed against it is key to the existence or not of repression. This view implies that authoritarian regimes and democracies are equally likely to repressively respond to protests and that ‘the common view that democracies repress less is largely a function of the different type of threats they face in comparison with autocracies’ (Reagan & Henderson:

2002, p. 1).

The first hypothesis that will attempt to explain the existing puzzle in the variance of the repression level in Chile, Uruguay and Brazil will reflect the aforementioned literature around the level of threats.

H1: The higher the level of threat, the higher the likelihood for the repression of non-violent protests.

Possible alternative explanations for the variation in use of repression by Brazil, Chile and

Uruguay emerge from a careful reading of the literature on the impact of regime legacies in democratization processes.

The literature on democratization examines the impact of “regime legacies” on the level and type of democracies. This part of the literature is especially useful for Latin America as will be further exposed in this thesis. This field of study examines the conditions that might affect the level of democracy in a country such as

(1) basic characteristics of the country (territorial extension, geographic location) that do not change over time; (2) institutional designs that remain unaltered during the period under study; (3) historical experiences that have already taken place by the time the country enters the sample; or (4) social conditions that change very slowly and because of limited data are better treated as time-invariant (Mainwaring & Pérez- Liñán: 2008, p.11). By doing so, it lays the foundation of the possibility that the use of political repression by a given government against its constituents might be connected to the remaining institutions from past political experiences (Mainwaring & Pérez- Liñán: 2008, p.11).

To date, the discussion of regime legacies in democratization processes has not been tied to the protest literature. The literature around regime legacies is helpful to understand the dynamics that make Brazil, Chile and Uruguay be similar in most institutional areas.

Nonetheless, the present research will attempt to build on that literature by studying two other dimensions—elite continuity and militarization of the police—which may help explain the

9 observed variation in the levels of repression in those countries. These two regime legacy variables seem to have particular potential for helping understand why certain democracies repress non-violent protest more than others.

Regarding the first dimension—elite continuity—Wright and Escribá-Folch (2012) argue that authoritarian parties usually bargain with civilian elites in the regime transition, which might influence the power distribution after the democratization process since it may shield the interests of authoritarian elites. The authors suggest that a patronage system, as the one that could be observed in Brazil, can be useful in electing candidates sympathetic to the military line, which would guarantee military prerogatives, after the transition to democracy.

Another mechanism that could facilitate the elite continuity and, therefore, make it easier for certain policies to remain in the subsequent democracy is the military influence on the composition of constituent assemblies. Many bargains were made at the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy in order to appease the elites’ interests. Through that, those who have gained their governing experience under authoritarian regimes (whether they were directly linked to military leadership or not) are more likely to continue those practices if they continue to hold power after democratic transition.

Adding to that, Hagopian (1990) argues that the political bargains made by the elites during the regime transition might allow the military to remain holding a great level of formal and informal power over the civilians, while preserving the ‘clientelism and undermining the ability of political parties to transform themselves into genuine transmission belts for non- elite interests’ (Hagopian: 1990, p. 147).

Thus, there is strong motivation to repress since the interests that might be threatened are not necessarily the state´s but also of a particular group of individuals, which will try to hinder any major positive changes in the political culture and in the institutions in ways that impinge

10 on the quality of democracy in the medium to long term, therefore perpetuating their repressive modus operandi that aims at protecting their interests.

Thus, the second hypothesis drawn from theory will pick up from this part of the literature and explore whether elite continuity in these countries might increase the likelihood of repression of protests in the new democratic regimes.

H2: Elite continuity increases the likelihood for the repression of non-violent protests

The third hypothesis of this thesis is motivated by a more recent literature that argues that the existence of a militarized police during the authoritarian years, and its consequent permanence after the democratic transition, might explain a higher incidence of repression against non-violent protests since this police is unfit to adequately deal with protests.

Davenport (1995a) has labeled the effect of the military over the use of repression as the

“military-coercion perspective (MCP)”, which focuses ‘on the military as an organization that specializes in the use of violence and actively participates in the implementation of repression within its jurisdiction’ (Davenport: 1995, p.120). The author states that repression is compatible with the ideology of this institution, which sees force as a tool to achieve control

(Wayman, 1975 & Cortese, 1976 In Davenport, 1995a).

In regards to this ideology, Kraska (2001) defined two important terms: militarism and militarization. The first is defined as an ideology ‘that stresses the use of force and threat of violence as the most appropriate and efficacious means to solve problems’. By its turn, militarization is the ‘implementation of that militarism ideology’ (Kraska, 2001 In Hill &

Beger: 2009, p.28). Thus, a militarized police would basically be a force that exercises police functions with a military modus operandi. This argument is supported by other scholars that state that some police characteristics might affect the level and type of repression (Earl, et al.,

2003).

Building on that theory, Anderson (2014) argues that both the existence of a militarized police that remains as an heirloom of the authoritarian period influencing the repression of the current democracy against social protests, and the lack of accountability some countries might experience since the transition period might work as a motivator for perpetrators of the current repression.

The causal mechanism that connects the militarized police and the impunity of past perpetrators can be succinctly put as follows: faced with the historical lack of accountability regarding high and low ranking officials that perpetrated systematic violations of human rights during the dictatorship years, the current members of the militarized police have a sense of assurance that, regardless of the way they might behave and regardless of the freedoms and rights they might be infringing, they will not be held accountable for their crimes. This sense of security, enhanced by the fact that in some cases the military can only be prosecuted in their own Judicial Courts, makes the military feel above the law and free to act as they (or their commanders) see fit (Conectas, 2013).

The path towards reconciliation is already a challenging process for a country to take having gone through at least some kind of transitional justice. Nonetheless, it can be even more complex in case a country does not go through an appropriate and continued process of justice on the return to democracy. This might allow a culture of impunity to be absorbed and perpetrated by police forces, especially if this police force is so closely connected with the recent authoritarian past of a given country.

Moreover, the lack of accountability in relation to the perpetrators of the military dictatorship is considered by many NGOs to be connected to the excessive use of force by the government´s forces, since there is the overall belief that perpetrators of new cases of repression will also not be held accountable for their acts (Amnesty International, 2013). This

12 argument is in line with broader literature around democratization that argues that the type of transition will have a great impact in future policy choices and hence in the quality of democracy (Skaar, 1999).

The range of policy choices regarding the transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one, especially regarding transitional justice, is vast. This transition is a lengthy process, and many measures might be used in the process of

dealing with the past human rights abuses, mass atrocities, or other forms of severe social trauma in the aftermath of authoritarian rule or violent conflict, (and includes) commissions, criminal prosecutions, reparations programs, and institutional reform policies including lustration/vetting are implemented as a means of achieving account-ability, promoting peace, strengthening democracy and protecting human rights (Freedom House Org., 2014). The transitional justice process is challenging and lengthy, but it is crucial for the rule of law of a country. If systematic and massive human rights violations are not addressed appropriatedly they might be a source of future violence and turbulence (United States

Institute of Peace, September 2008).

Skaar (1999, p. 1109) asks whether, ‘in situations where state officials of the previous regime have been responsible for murdering, imprisoning, torturing and disappearing its citizens, should the new government listen to public demand for disclosure of the truth and prosecution of the guilty? Or should it give in to the outgoing regime’s demand for impunity for past crimes?’ If the first is neglected during the transition period, there is a chance that the

‘new democratic government may risk losing popular support and legitimacy, as well as risk failing to build respect for the rule of law and democratic institution (Skaar: 1999, p. 1109).

This reflection is central to understanding whether there is a connection between the existence of a militarized police and the repression of non-violent protests, and if the transitional justice path followed by a given government might have an effect on the way the militarized police act during protests

Is there a relationship between the existence of a militarized police and the violent repression of non-violent demonstrations? Moreover, does a militarized police force behave more repressively when there has been lack of accountability in relation to crimes commit during the dictatorship of that country? These questions bring us to the final hypothesis:

H3: The existence of a militarized police force increases the likelihood of the repression of non-violent protests. This likelihood further increases if there was a lack of accountability regarding the perpetrators of the repression under the authoritarian rule.

III. RESEARCH DESIGN

i. Case Selection

The reason for focusing on Latin America and choosing Brazil, Chile and Uruguay is because of the interesting puzzle regarding the different levels of repression existing in countries that had broad political- historical similarities in the recent past. This degree of similarities would have been lost had other cases been chosen in the region, which would affect the credibility of the analysis. Furthermore, for the purposes of this research it was crucial that the three selected cases had experienced protests in a similar period so that the government´s reaction to them can be compiled. Thus, the time interval chosen to observe protests that happened in each of the three countries was 2011 to 2013.

ii. Methodology

For the purposes of this research, qualitative methods are mainly employed. As the aforementioned case selection section made clear, three cases will be investigated: Brazil,

Chile and Uruguay. This will be developed through a small-n comparative case study methodology and this method was chosen because it

resembles the statistical method in all respects except one. The crucial difference is that the number of cases it deals with is too small to permit systematic control by means of partial correlations. This problem occurs in statistical operations, too; especially when one wants to control simultaneously for many variables, one quickly "runs out of cases." The comparative method should be resorted to when the number of cases available for analysis is so small that cross-tabulating them further in order to establish credible controls is not feasible (Lijphart: 1971, p. 684).

Furthermore, faced with the scarcity of time and financial capacities, the small-n comparative case study method presented itself as more ‘promising than a more superficial statistical analysis of many cases’ (Lijphart: 1971, p. 685). Nonetheless, one of the hypothesis (H1) is tested with the help of quantitative analysis method. For that specific hypothesis some simple correlation will help support the qualitative anaylis’ findings, the significance level used for statistical correlation is at the 0.05 level (2- tailed). a. Concept Definition

There are two main concepts that fall in the core of this research: the concept of protest and political repression. These two concepts have different definitions in the literature and it is very important that their meaning, for the purposes of this thesis, are defined before we move on to the next sections of the research. Furthermore, a clarification is needed: in order to avoid repetition protest and demonstrations will be used interchangeably, while repression, political repression, negative sanctions and response will also be used interchangeably.

Protest

For the purposes of this research, one single march through the streets will already be considered as one protest. In practice it means that it is not necessary for a longer string of events to have occurred for a protest to be denominated as such. For an example, an isolated event of a specific claim will be coded as one protest, as well as one event included in a broader string of events (e.g anti-World Cup protests).

Following Earl (2003), this thesis will not consider one man acts of protest (e.g. self- immolation) as a demonstration, only coding events that clearly had collectiveness in its nature. Furthermore, people part of the social movement must explicitly articulate some claim

(even if the claim is generalized dissatisfaction),3 support or grievance towards something.

With that, block parties, concerts and other people gatherings are excluded of the study. Also, in order for a given event to be considered it is necessary that it has happened in the public sphere, which excludes private meetings of any sort (Earl, 2003). Finally, it is important to define the subdivision of protest that will be analyzed by this thesis. There are literally hundreds of different formats of non-violent protest that fall under an even bigger umbrella of all types of protest.

Sharp (1973) put forward a list of 198 forms of non-violent action which he divided amongst three main categories: persuasion and non-violent action (considered to be at the mildest end of the spectrum); noncooperation; and, nonviolent intervention (which falls at the strongest end of the spectrum) (Sharp, 1973). Out of all Skaar’s methods of non-violent protest and persuasion this thesis will include those related to picketing, vigils, marches, assemblies of protest or support, all kinds of strikes, stalling and obstruction, sit-ins, stand-ins, non-violent land seizure etc. In order to be considered for the database, these methods must have more than one person present and happen in open and public spaces.

The present research collected data from a wide range of collective action events, such as the ones mentioned above, but no event that had violence from the side of the participants was considered since it would fall beyond the non-violent scope. Thus, in order to be considered, a given event must have been non-violent. According to the Conflict Research Consortium of the University of Colorado

3 The coding regarding the claims of protests will be presented in the operationalization segment of this research.

non-violent resistance is a strategy for countering the power of violent force with the power of the integrative system. Many non-violent techniques can also be effective when used against illegitimate uses of legal, political, or other types of force (University of Colorado, s.d.).

Repression

Another central concept that will be used throughout this research is the concept of repression. Regan & Henderson (2002, p.120) define political repression as the ‘systematic violation of the civil liberties and human rights of groups and/or individuals. While civil liberties generally refer to particular types of expression, human rights refers to the respect for people’s personal integrity’.

Repression is also reflected at any action that violates human rights and fundamental freedoms as defined in relevant international human rights instrument, such as the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political

Rights (ICCPR). This means that many different actions might be an instrument for repression. Torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or sanction, summary, extrajudicial and/or arbitrary executions and imprisonments, extensive and continued illegal surveillance, wiretapping, access to private and legally protected information (bank statements, phone and internet records) and any other suppression or violation of human rights and/or fundamental freedoms all tools through which a given government or another entity might want to exert control (or obtain another end) over a given population (United Nations, 1948) (United

Nations, 1966).

Furthermore, specifically regarding protest policing (which is not necessarily repressive) there is a vast number of tools that can be used to control, constrain and disperse demonstrations. Violent methods, which will be the object of the present study, vary from the use of coercive language to the use of lethal and non-lethal weapons (Davenport, 2005).

iii. Operationalization

a. Dependent Variable

In order to carry out the research proposed by this thesis both dependent and independent variables were identified. The dependent variable is the level of repression brought to bear against non-violent protests. An original scale will be put forward to observe the variation of such variable across the selected cases.

Since the present research will only be focused in the ‘hard information’—such as the number of people present, number of injured and arrested and the use (or not) of coercive methods of protest dissipation (tear gas, rubber bullet, pepper spray)—there is little risk of

‘description bias’. However,

[e]ven under the best of circumstances, events reported in newspapers are affected by selection (what is reported) and description (how it is reported) bias according to criteria of news-worthiness, corporate interests, and the explicit and implicit expectations of audiences, which leads, most notably, to an over reporting of large and violent events […] and an under-reporting of phenomena in areas considered peripheral or of low interest (Rogers: 2011, p.24).

The research will investigate every reported protest from 2011 to 2013 in each of the three countries and observe whether there were reports of repression, arrests, injured people, deaths and what the estimated total of participants was. With that we will be able to assess the level of overall repression of each of the study cases. Therefore, the scale of repression will be measured based on the following criteria:

Table i: Operationalization of ‘Level of Repression’ used against non-violent protests A protest will be coded as having received ‘no repression’ when:

- There was no use of coercive tactics (tear gas, rubber bullet, pepper spray, physical

sanctions)

and

- no occurrence of outcomes such as injuries, arrests or deaths.

A protest will be coded as having received ‘mild repression’ when:

- There was use of coercive tactics (tear gas, pepper spray, water jets)

- the occurrence of outcomes such as injuries and/or arrests.

A protest will be coded as having received ‘significant repression’ when:

- There was the use of coercive tactics (such as rubber bullets, physical sanctions)

and

- the occurrence of outcomes such as injuries and/or arrests and/or deaths.4

This research will observe and assess whether the dependent variable—repression against non-violent protests—has actually occurred in each of the three cases by using data found in local news media. For Chile the media used will be the online version version of the newspaper La Nación (Chile), for the observation of the Uruguayan case the La Diaria online newspaper will be the source and Folha de São Paulo was chosen for the Brazilian case. All of them have daily publications (physical and/or online).

In order to select these media outlets some factors were analyzed: the number of subscribers on the national level (when available for subscription), not being overtly associated with the government or any political party, having daily publications and having an online search mechanism that allowed to research the observed period.5 The time interval that will be taken into consideration is 1 January 2011 to 31 December 2013, inclusive.

4 Causes of death not- related with the use of coercive tactics (eg being run by a car—not police owned) will not be included in the coding. 5 Among the main news media in Uruguay, La Diaria was chosen because it currently has 7500 subscriptions (La Diaria, 2014. Available at: http://ladiaria.com.uy/faq/distribucion/), appears to have a bias-free reporting and has a satisfactory online search mechanism. In Chile, El Mercurio was the first choice, however its online

Each event was coded individually and then a table was compiled to observe the overall repressive behavior of the country in relation to non-violent protests in a given year. For a given calendar year to be considered as being ‘significantly repressive’ it must have met the threshold of ≥ 20% of all entries for the calendar year being labelled as ‘significantly repressive’. This threshold is such because no peaceful protest should be violently repressed.

Hence, in the case that a fifth of all events of a given year have been met by ‘significant repression’, it is enough for that year to be considered as ‘significantly repressive’.

If the ‘significantly repressive’ threshold is not met, the second threshold is for the ‘mildly repressive’ behavior which has to meet ≥ 33% of the total number of protests of a given calendar year under the ‘mild repression’ label, because one third of every non-violent event being repressed is already too great of a proportion, especially in democracies. Finally, if none of these thresholds are met, a given calendar year will be considered as being ‘non- repressive’. The same thresholds are used when establishing the overall level of repression of a given country. Thus, in a nutshell:

Table ii: Operationalization of the scale for ‘Level of Repression’

A ‘significantly repressive’ year is a year in which ≥ 20% of all entries of a given calendar year were coded as ‘significant repression’.

If the above threshold is not met, then a year might be considered as ‘mildly repressive’ if ≥

33% of all entries of a given calendar year are coded as ‘mild repression’.

If none of the above thresholds are met, then the year in question will automatically be

search tool did not present entries for the entire period observed by this thesis. Although La Nación was a newspaper that somewhat supported Augusto Pinochet’s regime in Chile in the past, currently its online news source presents a satisfactory balanced reporting of protests. Folha de São Paulo currently has a mean of 301,299 subscriptions of weekly and weekend subscriptions and it met the other criteria. (Folha de São Paulo, 2014. Available at: http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/institucional/circulacao.shtml) No data of the ‘views and visits’ of these websites was available.

20 considered as ‘non- repressive’.

In order to account for the lack of availability and bias that might occur in the collection of news media data, the Political Terror Scale (PTS) will be used to supplement the data. Taking into consideration that such scale represents an annual measure of state terror and that would not quite fit this thesis’ level of analysis, the PTS will only serve as a general check on this thesis’ findings on the level of repression against non-violent protests. The explanation of their scoring scale—which compiles the accounts of Amnesty International and the U.S State

Department—is as follows:

5: Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals. 4: Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas. 3: There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted. 2: There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare. 1: Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare (Gibeny, et al., 2012).

b. Independent Variables and Intervening Variable

Level of Threat

Regarding the independent variable present in H1 (“The higher the perception of the level of threat, the higher the repression of non-violent protests”), another compilation of data found in local newspapers’ accounts of the events will be needed. In this case, the data analyzed

21 will be: the frequency counts of protests; the number of participants;6 and the motivation

(claim) for each protest. This last point is important because it can expose a recurrent issue that is in the center of public discontent and can, therefore, be used as a proxy of threat perception by the government. The more recurrent a particular claim is at demonstrations, the bigger the threat it might represent to a government since it would be example of public dissatisfaction, which could put the government´s legitimacy at stake. It is also important to keep record of the different claims raised by protests because it might be the case that a given claim receives more repression than other, exposing the government’s perception of threat in relation to that specific claim.7

Moreover, a given administration might interpret large protests directed against the state´s policies, or the government itself, as a threat to that government´s legitimacy and authority.

Such political behavior can disturb society and threaten those within power. Thus, by level of threat this literature refers to the level of threat that political oppositions, protests, strikes etc. might represent to the ruling government when protesting (Davenport, 1995b; Reagan &

Henderson: 2002).

After a preliminary research it was found that the claims behind the social demonstrations could be broadly divided between ‘Education’, ‘Anti-Government’—where generalized dissatisfaction is included--, ‘Housing’, ‘Local Issues’ such as insatisfaction in relation to real estate development etc., ‘Transport’ and ‘Union demonstrations’. In order to assess the level of threat, the scale will be coded as follows:

6 In case there is more than one media report of the same event, the number of participants present will be a mean from the data collection. 7 Naturally, there are certain claims that could be more or less sensitive to a specific government and/or elite. Therefore, a specific claim cannot be generalized as threatening to all study cases.

Table iii: Operationalization of ‘Level of Threat’

A protest will be coded as ‘Not a Threat’ when:

- It is the 1st–122nd protest with the same claim in a given year;8 and, - It has between 1–1000 people in a single event. A protest will be coded as ‘Mild Threat’ when: - It is the 123th–365th protest with the same claim in a given year;9 and, - It has between 1–1000 people in a single event;

Or; - It is the 1st–12th protest with the same claim in a given year;10 and, - It has between 1001–100,000 people in a single event. A protest will be coded as ‘Significant Threat’ when: - It is the 13th or higher protest (coded as mild threat) with the same claim in a given year;11 and, - It has between 1001–100,000 people in a single event. Or; - When any given protest has more than or equal to 100,001 people in a single event. Or; - When it is the 366th or higher protest with the same claim in a given year;12 and, - 1–1000 people in a single event.

The logic behind the scale is simple. Up to 122 protests in a year (roughly one protest every three days maximum), with a small number of participants with the same claim is not very threatening and its potential to disrupt society is low.

From the 123th until the 365th protest with the same claim (what could mount up to one protest per day with a given claim) and with a small number of participants it could already

8 910 11 12 For the purposes of this research a given year will be measured through a 365-day period and not through a calendar year. For an example: If the first protest with a given claim happened on 3 September 2012, this thesis will consider events up and including 2 September 2013 to evaluate how many events under the same claim happened in the period of 365 days.

23 represent a mild threat to the government. The same happens to protests between the 1st—

12th protest with the same claim in a given year that have a medium range of participants

(1000—100,000 people), which represents an average of one medium protest, with relevant potential to disrupt society’s daily lives and gather great attention to a cause, with the same issue per month.

A demonstration will be coded as ‘significant threat’ if it is the 366th or higher protest with the same claim with a small public (representing a mean of more than one protest per day per year); or if it is the 13th or higher demonstration with the same claim and with a medium number of participants (indicating a mean of more than one protest per month); or if it has over 100,001 people present, regardless of how many demonstrations with the same claim happened before it.

Finally, for every event status (‘not a threat’, ‘mild threat’, ‘significant threat’) we will identify the existence or absence of repression (‘no repression’, ‘mild repression’, ‘great repression’)13 in order to identify whether the threat of a given protest is related to the reaction to it. Furthermore, the variable that accounts for the ‘level of threat’ and the variable that accounts for the ‘level of repression’ will be tested for their correlation (via a simple

‘bivariate correlation’ in SPSS) to observe the relationship between the variables and support this thesis’ findings.

Elite Continuity

In ordert to analyze the independent variable present in H2—elite continuity—this thesis mainly draws from established literature regarding each of the cases. Media and NGOs’ reports are also observed to supplement this data.

13 The coding for the ‘Levels of Repression’ can be found on table i, page 18 of this thesis.

More specifically, elite continuity is measured by analyzing whether sectors and families that had the biggest influence during the military dictatorship years (including those that somehow supported the regime), still exert a great level of influence over politics.

Naturally, there is a wide range of possible ways to measure elite continuity, however due to the time and resource constraints not all methods are equally practicable. Therefore, in order to develop a small-n comparative case study approach, this thesis identifies a low/medium/high score for elite continuity for each of the three countries.

A low score for elite continuity will be given for cases in which elites that had some influence during the authoritarian years have little or no overt influence on policies that could be related to the repression of non-violent protests.

A medium score for this variable will represent an indication of continuity of the power dynamics between elites in the country: around the same families and business defending their interest, but with no clear interests at stake that could connect them to the repression of demonstrations.

Lastly, a high score will be given for a country that evidently has elites influencing policies related to the government’s repressive behavior in order to protect their interests, including with names related to the past Authoritarian years being in charge.

Existence of a Militarized Police and lack of accountability

Lastly, regarding H3—“The existence of a militarized police force increases the likelihood of the repression of non-violent protests. This likelihood further increases if there was a lack of accountability regarding the perpetrators of the repression under the authoritarian rule”—its independent variable, namely the existence of a militarized police, is confirmed or dismissed

25 by the analysis of scholars, media and NGOs’ reports as well as through the investigation of the division of the police body in each of the countries.

The presence of a militarized police (that is, the independent variable) is identified through qualitative research of the nomenclature used as well as the police structures of each of the cases. As part of this effort, this thesis identifies those countries that have modern forms of a gendarmerie, which is, simply put, a militarized body responsible for civilian police duties and are most commonly not under Civilian control (Emsley, 1999).

This hypothesis has an intervening variable (lack of accountability/lack of prosecution of dictatorship´s perpetrators) that is accounted for through an analysis of media/NGOs reports and the literature to investigate whether each of the cases held the perpetrators of the authoritarian years accountable or not. More specifically, this intervening variable will be operationalized through the observance of what kind of transitional justice, if at all, each of the three cases experienced when moving from the authoritarian regime to democracy, and what results in terms of accountability did these methods of transition bring to the country where it was established.

Transitional justice is a set of both judicial and non-judicial procedures that can be implemented in countries that have the need to address extensive human rights violations committed in its history. Transitional justice may be done through different paths which include but are not limited to:

Criminal prosecutions, particularly those that address perpetrators considered to be the most responsible.

Reparations, through which governments recognize and take steps to address the harms suffered. Such initiatives often have material elements (such as cash payments or health services) as well as symbolic aspects (such as public apologies or day of remembrance).

Institutional reform of abusive state institutions such as armed forces, police and courts, to dismantle—by appropriate means—the structural machinery of abuses and prevent recurrence of serious human rights abuses and impunity.

Truth commissions or other means to investigate and report on systematic patterns of abuse, recommend changes and help understand the underlying causes of serious human rights violations (ICTJ, 2014).

There is no magic formula when it comes to transitional justice and different countries might apply other measures, or even no measure at all, when addressing past massive human rights abuses. Accountability is a big part of the path towards full transitional justice and reconciliation since it helps reaffirm legal order and motivates higher trust in State institutions.

Accountability might be achieved through the criminal prosecution of the human rights violators and has a better effect if combined with other measures. Although other tools such as truth commissions are also very important for the process, not holding perpetrators accountable may have crucial outcomes for the country’s future.

A history of unaddressed massive abuses is likely to be socially divisive, to generate mistrust between groups and in the institutions of the State, and to hamper or slow down the achievement of security and development goals. It raises questions about the commitment to the rule of law and, ultimately, can lead to cyclical recurrence of violence in various forms (ICTJ, 2014).

Thus, albeit relevant for the reconciliation process of a country, these other tools of transitional justice—truth commissions and reparations etc.—do not signal enough accountability and H3 argues that the possible lack of accountability of a country might exacerbate the response of militarized police to non-violent protests. This is so because an environment full of impunity in relation to past crimes might act as a motivator for new crimes to be committed. Once again, because of time and resource constraints, it is not possible to address all the possible variations of this variable. Nevertheless, in order to explore this hypothesis, three levels are identified: low, medium and high.

A low score is given to a country that has no militarized police (regardless of where it is on the transitional justice process). A country is scored as medium if a militarized police exists, but the country has done a lot to hold human rights violations perpetrators from the dictatorship accountable. Lastly, a high score is given to a country that has active militarized police and has not held criminal prosecutions related to its authoritarian years.

c. Limitation of the Data

The data was collected from three different news media sources: La Nación for the Chilean accounts; La Diaria for Uruguayan cases and Folha de São Paulo for Brazil. In the two first study cases, Chile and Uruguay, these news media sources cannot be considered the main news vehicle of each country. There were other newspapers and sources that could be selected as such. However, some of the news media that would have a bigger reach (number of subscriptions and/or sales) and, therefore, could be preferable to the selected sources, did not have data available for the time period selected: January 2011 to December 2013. In the case of Brazil, Folha de São Paulo is amongst the main newspapers of the country, being usually the first in the number of sales and subscriptions.14

Also, it must also be acknowledged that the time period investigated (1 January 2011 up to and including 31 December 2013) may also represent a limitation to the data and analysis since this short period observed could simply represent an anomaly in both the occurrence of demonstrations and in the repressive behavior of Brazil, Chile and Uruguay.

Furthermore, although the present research was careful when selecting media that were as bias free as possible, it must be acknowledged that a complete unbiased publication is almost impossible to identify in news media. A study of political positioning was made to access and help account for possible bias. None of the sources utilized herein used presented an overt

14 Footnote 4, page 19 has more information about subscriptions and the reasoning behind the selection of each of the media sources.

28 level of bias of any major concern. Nonetheless, one must keep in mind that news media reporting bias is possible, which could affect the compiled data.

Another limitation present was that, in many cases, the media reports did not include the number of participants involved and, therefore, those reports were not considered for the analysis of this thesis since once the number of participants is key for one of the hypothesis

(Foweraker & Krznaric, 2001).

With regards to the analysis of elite continuity (variable present in H2), it must be acknowledged that information on which elites had and still have influence over government policies is an information associated to the background of politics and, thus, is not easily accessed and analysed. In order to mitigate that, this thesis will analyse media and NGOs’ reports as well as scholar’s work.

Finally, regarding the intervening variable on H3 some acknowledgements of the limitation of the information available must be made. Some of this thesis’ findings might soon be outdated because Brazil`s Truth Commission is expected to release a report containing recommendations for the government in December 2014.

Analysis

IV. CASE STUDIES

i. Contextual Factors

The following section provides historical context for each of the three cases with regards to the military dictatorship, transition to democracy and recent protests while providing context for the variables studied in this thesis. The section for each country touches upon the scenario prior to the military dictatorship, the authoritarian stage itself, the recent protests and it presents some information regarding the variables herein analysed, including the levels of repression observed in Brazil, Chile and Uruguay between 2011 and 2013. At the end of the section for each study case there is a brief summary of the country in light of the three hypothesis put forward by this research.

a. Brazil

Antecedents of the authoritarian years

As it is known, Brazil is a young republic having only left the Portuguese Empire in 1889 through a political-military uprising (Ouro Preto, 1986). Nonetheless, its recent political history is eventful. Its 1946 Constitution guaranteed free, fair and competitive elections and after the resignation of the legitimately elected President Jânio Quadros in August 1961 after only seven months as Head of State, it was legally expected that his Vice-President, João

Goulart would be nominated as President given that the country was under a Presidential system. However, at the time of the resignation, João Goulart was visiting communist China and the strong Brazilian military class accused him of being a communist and prevented him from assuming office (Lewandowski, 1998).

After much negotiating between the Military and João Goulart´s supporters, the political elite of the country decided to change the system from Presidential to Parliamentarian in which

João Goulart was its Head of State. A public plebiscite was held a year later and the former system was restituted and the fears of Brazil joining the communist block intensified

(Carvalho, 1990).15

In mid-March 1964 the Brazilian President announced the nationalization of private petroleum refineries and the expropriation of many lands to agrarian reform which only made the opposition grow in their fear. The Church and far-right conservative elites joined the military against the ‘communist’ President and a coup took place on 31 March 1964

(Carvalho, 1990).

Dictatorship

Some refer to what happened in the country as a mild dictatorship or as a military intervention with the purpose of pushing the country back on track instead of an actual dictatorship. Furthermore, the elite support for the coup was so strong that it created the idea of the regime being a civil-military dictatorship. Nonetheless, today the Government officially calls that period simply the “Military Dictatorship” (Gombata, 2013).

At the time, citizen’s mobilizations coming from the rural areas fuelled by some Marxist inclinations, scared the elites in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais that had (and still have) the greatest control and ownership of Brazilian land. Just before the coup d’état, one per cent of the population controlled over 50% of the arable land of the country and wanted to suffocate any movement that sought to change the status quo, highly beneficial for them. Consequently, the Brazilian elites, especially the ones closely connected to agrarian business, offered their full support to the military control of the country (Fontes, 2014).

15 At that time the world was going through the Cold War in which right and left, West and East and communist and liberal views of world intensified and were polarized. The United States of America and the USSR were the main actors of this arena and both competed for zones of influence (Carvalho, 1990).

During the first four years of the regime, the authoritarianism gradually intensified and changed the political atmosphere of the country. In order to give legitimacy to the political actions that violated the Constitution, many Institutional Acts were composed.16 These

Institutional Acts restricted the rights of Brazilians and cancelled the validity of some

Constitutional prerogatives which consequently put a hold on the democratic stage by even dissolving Congress and instituting a stage of ‘exception’ (Priori, 2004).

Social demonstrations were common in the first years of the regime, but there was increasing repression and many demonstrators were tortured, “disappeared” and deprived of basic human rights such as freedom of association. Although there are no final official numbers, it is estimated that over 350 people were killed or “disappeared”, 25,000 people were imprisoned on political grounds and over 10,000 were exiled (Folha de São Paulo, 2014).

The military tried to impose a social, political and economic model for Brazil which worked in the first years of the regime, but that lead to rapid inflation and subsequent social discontent. Faced with increasing social and economic pressures the military decided to gradually reopen the political arena by allowing opposition political parties to reform, which further destabilized the regime. The Amnesty Law of 1979 was part of the negotiation process between the elites, military and opposition and it is broadly believed that, without it, the transition back to democracy would have been much more turbulent. This law guaranteed that the dictatorship perpetrators and other criminals of the time would not be brought to

16 The Institutional Acts (Atos Institucionais in their native Portuguese) were norms and decrees created between 1964 and 1969. They were written by the Chief Commandants of the Aeronautic, Navy, Army or by the President and these acts were above any other norm or law of the country, including the Constitution. The most authoritarian of all Institutional Acts was the Institutional Act 5, which allowed the President to terminate political mandates, suspend political rights of any person, intervene in cities and states in any way he saw fit and forbade the protests with a political claim. Based on this Act many news media and people from the opposition suffered great censorship and repression which led many to exile abroad. Besides that torture was basically institutionalized and this act represents the hardening of the Regime. All Institutional Acts were extinguished since the end of the Military Regime (Government, s.d.; Priori, 2004).

Court to answer for their crimes. Pedro Estevam Serrano (2014) states that this was an ‘auto- amnesty’ produced by a society embedded in the dictatorship (In Folha de São Paulo, 2014).

Furthermore, Congress reopened and political liberties were guaranteed once more, which motivated people to take the streets in the historical social movement called ‘Diretas Já’17 which claimed for the right to fairly elect their President (Carvalho, 1990).

Transition back to Democracy, Accountability and Elites

Brazil made the transition from a military dictatorship to a democracy with relatively little fanfare at the instigation of its military administration. A new constitution was put in place and civil liberties were restored. However, the transition to democracy failed to address some entrenched governance problems, including political elitism, socioeconomic inequalities, a flawed judiciary, and the lack of accountability of state officials (Strzemp, 2013).

As mentioned before, the economic and social situation pressured the military and, in order to cede control on their terms, they started negotiating the transition back to democracy years before the final transition was made. The Amnesty Law, created in 1979, protected perpetrators of extensive and systematic human rights violations and has constrained the institution of a full democracy in the country ever since.

Moreover, the bargaining process included the country’s elites, most of whom were closely connected to the authoritarian regime and that would only support the transition if their interests were protected (Cancian, 2006). These process allowed many elites to be included in

17 ‘Diretas já’ was one of the largest social movements of the history of Brazil. This large civil unrest movement demanded direct presidential elections in Brazil in during the last years of the authoritarian regime. It started in 1983 and the demonstrations got larger with time, reaching over 1,500,000 people in São Paulo in 1984. The movement, and its growth, happened in parallel to the worsening of the economic situation of the country that reached an annual inflation rate of 239% in 1983. This led to a generalized dissatisfaction of the population and brought together unions, class entities and representatives of multiple political parties fighting for the same cause: direct presidential elections. Lower ranks of military were also greatly affected by the inflation and started to voice their discontent and sometimes even join the public demonstrations, which increased the loss of prestige that the regime had amongst the population (Mendonça, 2014).

34 the subsequent democracy in key positions inside Congress and the military with no accountability for their actions during the dictatorship (Gombata, 2013).

In 1984, the social movement ‘Diretas Já’ that called for direct presidential elections got stronger and their biggest demonstration preceded the vote in Congress, which would either allow direct presidential elections to be held once more or maintain the absence of direct elections for president. The bill did not pass on Congress, but the movement is considered to have been a catalyst for the re-democratization process in the country (Mendonça, 2014).

Although the movement did not reach its goals immediately, it had a great effect in the subsequent history of the country by showing that the Military Regime was no longer sustainable. In the transition process a new Constitution was promulgated in 1988. The new

Constitution guaranteed broad freedom of religion, association and expression (Freedom

House Org., 2014), but the clauses relating to the militarized police, Army, Military Judicial

System and Public Security were mainly left unaltered, mirroring the stipulations predicted by the authoritarian Constitution of 1967 (Tavares, 2014).18

As long as the Amnesty Law is not revised and perpetrators are not judicially held accountable, little is expected to effectively change in this regard. In 2010, the Inter-

American Court of Human Rights concluded that the Brazilian Amnesty Law had no judicial validity and should be revisited (Amnesty International Brazil, 2012). Furthermore, it is believed that the continuity of part of the authoritarian political elite in Brazilian politics made it even harder for a positive transition and reconciliation process to be properly instituted.

18 Article 144 of the Federal Constitution of 1988 states that both ostensive policing and the control of the rule of law are duties of the PMs. Furthermore, paragraph six of the same article state that they are subordinated to State Governments. Nonetheless, since they follow a very similar hierarchy to the Armed Forces, have similar training and only respond judicially to Military Courts, in practice they are under the Army framework (Senado Federal, 1988; (Poder Judiciario: Tribunal de Justica Militar, 2002)

Many examples of the continuity of elites and key dictatorship actors can be pointed out:

Aparecido Laerte Calandras was accused of being part of torture sessions and killings and, after the transition, was promoted to the role of Commissioner of the Civil Police of São

Paulo; Nilton Cerqueira was member a key military in the authoritarian years and had influential family in Rio de Janeiro, after the regime was dissolved he became the Secretary of Public Safety in Rio de Janeiro (Folha de São Paulo, 2014).

Furthermore, many companies in Brazil (both domestic and foreign companies) helped the authoritarian regime by providing information about employees that could connect them to the resistance, especially related to class unions (Estado de São Paulo, 2014). Up to this day, these companies are controlled by the same big shareholder families.

Also, it is important to state that during the protests (which are discussed below) the political, business and media-related elites linked to past perpetrations tried to delegitimize the demonstrations in order to try to avoid greater mobilization (Roque, 2014).

Those are only a few examples of an extensive list of influential people that directly benefited from the past regime and the transition back to democracy and many of these families remain central to the discussion of public security and legislation around protests in the country.

Given that a good part of the perpetrators and allied elites were not only not held accountable, but also remain in powerful positions, it is possible to affirm that there is a great level of elite continuity in the country.

Clearly the initial reconciliation process was not very positive. Nonetheless, some positive development were achieved since the mid-90s:

[T]he first significant institutional effort by Brazil towards accountability was a law—Act 9140—passed in 1995 that acknowledged the deaths of 136 missing persons. The 1995 law also established a Special Commission on Deaths and Disappearances. In its final report, delivered in 2007, the Special Commission documented 479 cases of forced disappearance; acknowledged

state responsibility; and created a framework for compensating victims’ families.

Another commission—the “Amnesty Commission”—was charged in 2001 with granting reparations for victims of abuses not covered by the first commission. As of mid-2010, financial compensation had been awarded in over 12,000 cases (ICTJ, 2014).

Finally, after much pressure from civil society, the law that established the National Truth

Commission was passed. The Commission aims at shedding light to what truly happened in those years by reopening criminal cases and hearing testimonials from perpetrators and victims. It is widely reported that the creation of the Commission was only possible at this point because President Dilma Roussef herself was a victim of the military dictatorship in

Brazil (Comissão da Verdade, 2012).

The Commission will produce a report with non-binding recommendations to local and federal governments to both help on the reconciliation process and assure that those human rights violations will never happen again. This is already a great advance in terms of reconciliation and progress, but since the Commissions only has recommendatory powers there is the unfortunate expectation that it will only serve rhetorical purposes (Comissão da

Verdade, 2012). Gombata (2013) defends such an argument and states that the recent efforts related to the creation of federal and local Truth Commission will only serve as part of a symbolic reconciliation.

The feeling that the Brazilian Commission will only have rhetorical value is supported by many different classes and key stakeholders in the country. During his testimony, General

Ustra—one of the perpetrators of the human rights violations during the previous regime— stated that the Brazilian Military should be the ones giving their testimony, but he was the one giving it because “the terrorists were elected to key roles in the democracy that was preserved”, allowing them to be bulletproof to any prosecution and remain in power in the country. Finally, “while this impunity is maintained we cannot say that we closed the

37 transition cycle. The Brazilian society and State must send a clear message that this is not admissible, that these crimes are unforgiveable” (Roque, 2014).19

There is an ongoing debate around the validity of the Amnesty Law. However, recently the

Supreme Court of Brazil upheld the constitutionality of the bill when the Brazilian Bar

Association challenged the coverage of such law in relation to torture which, in the Bar

Association’s interpretation, should be exempt from amnesty according to the Brazilian 1988

Constitution (Roniger, 2011).

Thus, despite some commendable efforts, until 2014 Brazil has not yet achieved judicial accountability or a strong truth and reconciliation process in relation to the human rights abuses perpetrated during the military years (ICTJ, 2014).

Protests and the Police

Since the return to democracy in 1985, the country has enjoyed competitive elections and a reasonable level of democracy although some human rights violations have occurred since then. This experience with democracy can be observed through the Freedom House20 (2013) scale:

19 Translated from the original in Portuguese: "Enquanto essa impunidade for mantida nós não podemos dizer que fechamos o ciclo da transição. A sociedade brasileira e o Estado precisam mandar uma mensagem clara de que isso não é admissível, de que esses crimes não são passíveis de perdão” (Roque, 2014). 20 According to the Freedom House Organization, their rating process is “based on a checklist of 10 political rights questions and 15 civil liberties questions. The political rights questions are grouped into three subcategories: Electoral Process (3 questions), Political Pluralism and Participation (4), and Functioning of Government (3). The civil liberties questions are grouped into four subcategories: Freedom of Expression and Belief (4 questions), Associational and Organizational Rights (3), Rule of Law (4), and Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights (4). Scores are awarded to each of these questions on a scale of 0 to 4, where a score of 0 represents the smallest degree and 4 the greatest degree of rights or liberties present. The political rights section also contains two additional discretionary questions: question A (For traditional monarchies that have no parties or electoral process, does the system provide for genuine, meaningful consultation with the people, encourage public discussion of policy choices, and allow the right to petition the ruler?) and question B (Is the government or occupying power deliberately changing the ethnic composition of a country or territory so as to destroy a culture or tip the political balance in favor of another group?). For additional discretionary question A, a score of 1 to 4 may be added, as applicable, while for discretionary question B, a score of 1 to 4 may be subtracted (the worse the situation, the more that may be subtracted). The highest score that can be awarded to the political

Figure i: Freedom Score- Brazil (2001-2013)

Freedom Score- Brazil (2001-2013) 7

4 Freedom Rating Civil Liberties

3 Political Rights Freedom Level Freedom

1 1= best

7= worst

2008 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2001 Source: Freedom House Org, 2014

As it can be seen above, Brazil has never reached the best freedom score (1) on this scale since its inception, but this is not necessarily a reflection of the atmosphere in the country.

Although Brazilians were not completely satisfied and occasional protests occurred,21 since the ‘caras pintadas’ (‘painted faces’) movement of 1992 that asked for the impeachment of then President Fernando Collor,22 the country had not seen any mass mobilization that took

rights checklist is 40 (or a total score of 4 for each of the 10 questions). The highest score that can be awarded to the civil liberties checklist is 60 (or a total score of 4 for each of the 15 questions). The scores from the previous survey edition are used as a benchmark for the current year under review. In general, a score is changed only if there has been a real world development during the year that warrants a change (e.g., a crackdown on the media, the country’s first free and fair elections) and is reflected accordingly in the narrative. In answering both the political rights and civil liberties questions, Freedom House does not equate constitutional or other legal guarantees of rights with the on-the-ground fulfillment of these rights. While both laws and actual practices are factored into the ratings decisions, greater emphasis is placed on the latter (Freedom House Org., 2014). 21 Since the end of the dictatorial years, the country didn´t have great mass mobilizations. The exception were local and usually defined issues and, with a bigger frequency but not great numbers, union strikes and marches that claimed for better labor conditions, wages and rights. 22 The ‘Caras Pintadas’ movement lead by the National Student Union (União Nacional de Estudantes-UNES-in its Portuguese origin), gathered thousands of people, mostly students and young civilians to ask for the

39 the streets to protest until the ones that swept the streets in June 2013. In the analyzed period

(2011–13), it can be observed that the number of non-violent protests occurrences suffered an enormous increase. From only 28 non-violent protests in 2011, the country met its peak of peaceful demonstrations in 2013 with 400 occurrences.

What motivated people to take the streets was manifold, but what sparked general commotion was the so-called ‘Movimento Passe Livre’ (MPL, ‘Free Pass Movement’). This movement had been advocating for free transport for students for many years and that lead the protests against a R$0.2023 transit-fee increase across the country (MPL, 2013). Nonetheless, the MPL was only the catalyst of the protests and soon the claims taking the streets were either aimed against the Brazilian State or the local Government.

Table iv: Protests by type of claim- Brazil Brazil Total Number of Protests 465 # Housing 17 # Education 0 # Anti Government 189 # Transport 53 # Local Issue 185 # Union 21

Source: Folha de São Paulo (01/01/2011- 31/12/2013)

During the investigated period Brazil received score 4 for both Amnesty International and US

State Department accounts, compiled by the Political Terror Scale.24 Through this scale it was identified that for 2011 and 2012,25 “civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of

impeachment of President Fernando Collor. The main dissatisfactions of the general public in relation to Collor´s government were the multiple corruption issues and unpopular economic policies. The name of the movement, ‘Caras Pintadas’ (‘Painted Faces’ in English) is such because their participants would paint their faces in green and yellow and sayings such as ‘For a’ (‘Out’ in English) and ‘Impeachement’ (Rohãn, 2012). 23 R$ 0.20 was averagely equivalent to US$ 0.09 in the first semester of 2013 (Money Convertor, 2013). 24 The criteria behind the PTS scale can be found on page 21. 25 Unfortunately, the Political Terror Scale does not present scores for the year 2013.

40 life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas” (PTS, 2014).

This is partially supported by the many news accounts that exposed a disproportional degree of repression of non-violent demonstrations that could both symbolize a threat to the government or not.26 The original scale put forward by the present research is compatible with this view of repression of non-violent protests and in it Brazil was ranked as

‘significantly repressive’ towards non-violent protests in 2013 and 2011 and as ‘not repressive’ in 2012.

Table v: ‘Level of Represion’ of protests- Brazil Brazil 2011 2012 2013 Total 28 37 400 No Repression 19 35 278 Mild Repression 2 0 17 Significant Repression 8 2 103

Source: Folha de São Paulo (01/01/2011- 31/12/2013)

As it can be seen above, 103 out of 400 events were significantly repressed in 2013. This number (103) entries meets the 20% threshold for that year and, therefore, that year is considered to have been ‘significantly repressive’ towards peaceful demonstrations. Out of the demonstrations in 2011, eight out of 28 events were classified as ‘significantly repressive’, which also meets the threshold for that particular calendar year. The two

‘significantly repressed’ events that occurred in 2012 do not meet the threshold and this year is considered as ‘not repressive’.

All demonstrations that were met with repression involved the participation of the militarized police. According to the former Human Rights Minister for Brazil, Maria do

26 In appendix b of this thesis is the full table with the compiled accounts of protests and their level of repression.

Rosário, the police model that still exists in Brazil is a vestige of the military dictatorship:

‘we continue with a police model that we inherited from the dictatorship and the manuals with which the policemen are formed, as well as their training regarding people approach during demonstrations and in the streets, are a legacy of that regime’ (Rosario In Artigo 19,

2014).27 Also, the training of the military police is not adequate to protest policing since they are embedded in a war like rationale.

Tatsch (2010) builds on that argument by saying that the bargained transition allowed police institutions to stay in the margins of the transformations occurring in the country.

Furthermore, Tatsch argues that the ‘militarized police are organized and trained like the

Army, which has the purpose of destroying the enemy. Whereas the function of the police is to defend the citizens’ rights guaranteed by the Constitution’ (Tatsch, 2010).28

In Brazil, the militarization of the police is also associated to the high levels of violence in the country. According to a report by the Violence Studies Research Center from the São Paulo

University, on average 1185 people are killed during confrontations with the police in the states of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro alone (Carta Capital, 2013), and most police officers are never ‘prosecuted for abuses, and those charged are almost never convicted’ (Freedom

House Org., 2014).

Brazil’s in light of the three hypothesis

This thesis has three hypothesis that will be further analysed on the section that follows the countries’ backgrounds. Nonetheless, it is important to briefly present each of the countries in light of these hypothesis.

27 Translated from the original in Portuguese: ‘Continuamos com um modelo de polícia que herdamos da ditadura e os manuais com os quais os policiais são formados, bem como as práticas de abordagem das pessoas nas manifestações e nas ruas, são resquícios daquele regime’ (Rosario In Artigo 19, 2014). 28 Translated from the original in Portuguese: ‘As polícias militares são organizadas como o Exército, que tem a função de destruir o inimigo. Já a função da polícia é defender os direitos existentes na Constituição’ (Tatsch, 2010).

With regards to hypothesis 1 --“The higher the level of threat, the higher the likelihood for the repression of non- violent protests”— we found the following through some simple statistical analysis in SPSS:

Table vi: SPSS Crosstabulation for Brazil (Brazil_LevelofThreat * Brazil_LevelofRepression Crosstabulation) Count Brazil_LevelofRepression Total No Repression Mild Repression Significant Repression Not a Threat 244 15 73 332 Brazil_LevelofThreat Mild Threat 66 1 27 94 Significant Threat 23 3 13 39 Total 333 19 113 465

Source: SPSS

After running some simple correlation for the Brazil cases, it was found that the correlation between the level of threat and the level of repression are not significant. Nonetheless, the

Pearson coefficient met was .089 indicating that (although not significant) there is a positive relationship between the variables. 29

In relation to hypothesis 2-- “Elite continuity increases the likelihood of repression of non- violent protests in the new democratic regime”, as seen at the previous sections, not only the perpetrators and allied elites were not held accountable, but part of them still remain in powerful positions. Thus, this thesis gives a high score for elite continuity in Brazil.

Finally, given Brazil’s presence of a Military Police force in its police structure, the fact that such body responds to the Army (not being under civilian control) and Brazil’s lack of accountability regarding past human rights violations, following the operationalization presented in a previous section, the country scores high in existence of a militarized police

29 The SPSS output for this bivariate correlation can be found on this thesis’ appendix.

43 and lack of accountability which is part of hypothesis 3—“The existence of a militarized police increases the likelihood for the repression of non- violent protests. Such likelihood increases if there was a lack of accountability regarding the perpetrators of the repression under the authoritarian rule”.

b. Chile

Antecedents of the authoritarian years

As Brazil, the Republic of Chile is also young if compared to European nations, having gained its independence from Spain only in 1818. In its first century and a half the Republic enjoyed a democratic rule (Freedom House Org., 2000). However, such regime stability was also partially due to an overly centralized and verticalist political structure where mass politics was highly controlled from the higher offices in the country.

Chile presented an anomaly in comparison to other democracies since its military forces historically had a great deal of autonomy. Furthermore, the country was controlled in the hands of few powerful families (elites). Such culture gradually increased the political polarization in Chilean society (Carruthers, 2001).

The polarization intensified when, in 1970, Salvador Allende was elected, succeeding

Eduardo Frei´s moderate presidency based on social and economic policies, and started to implement a government that shared aspects with socialism, which created great discontent amongst the elites.

In time, it is relevant to note that, although Allende was elected in free and fair elections, he did not have a great deal of electorate support—he took office holding 36.2% of the votes

compared to 34.99% for the conservative candidate, in an election system where the winner

would take it all and no second rounds were held (Bresnahan, 2002).

Similar to what happen in Brazil, the anti-Marxist sentiment mobilized the elites and the

military and, on September 11, 1973 a military coup overthrew the Allende government.

Carruthers (2001) states that

[C]lass and ideological positions hardened, making consensus difficult and coalitions less feasible. Instability peaked under Salvador Allende, elected president in 1970. Allende sought to increase mass support for his socialist project with an unprecedented effort to open space for broad citizen participation. However, in a climate of embedded verticalism and deepening class polarization, his gestures triggered radicalism across the spectrum. Leftist land and factory seizures prompted counter-mobilization in the centre [sic] and the right, plunging the country into economic decay, strikes, protests, guerrilla opposition, violence and militarization (Carruthers: 2001, p. 344).

Dictatorship

Faced with this chaotic scenario, the Military, led by General Augusto Pinochet took power

to constrain popular conflict and restore normality. In order to achieve that the military

regime

undertook a forceful and radical restructuring of the Chilean polity, economy and society. Practicing the classic ‘politics of anti-politics’, the regime tightly closed political space and eliminated potential opposition, legitimizing repression as a necessary defense against communist subversion. Labour [sic] unions, civic associations and opposition parties were weakened or destroyed, their leaders killed, exiled or disappeared (Carruthers: 2001, p. 345).

This regime proposed a neoliberal order and ideology for Chile and, in the social arena,

released ten years of extreme repression that arbitrarily imprisoned and disappeared

thousands of civilians suppressing the civic culture and reforming land and class dynamics

according to the elites´ interests (McQuade, 1987).

Pinochet

established iron control over the armed forces as well as the government, although insisting that they were separate entities. He made himself not only the chief executive of the state but also the commander in chief of the military. He shuffled commands to ensure that loyalists controlled all the key posts (Hudson, 1994).

Compared to the case of the Brazilian dictatorship, the authoritarian years of Chile have received broader attention across the globe. This might be because of the more overt support from the US to the coup (Carruthers, 2001) and other variables that do not directly concern this research and thus, will not be addressed by this dissertation.

Amongst one of the broadly known aspects of this dictatorship is the high rate of people that were killed, tortured and forced into exile by the violent actions of the carabineros (Chilean militarized police). The number of dead or missing surpassed 3000 people during the authoritarian years (BBC News, 2009; Wright, 2005; Folha de São Paulo, 2014).

Furthermore, the junta (military government led by General Pinochet) suspended the 1925

Constitution. All political dissidence was fiercely repressed and systematic human rights violations shocked the world (Stern, 2004).

The first phase of the dictatorship (1973–75) was mainly destructive, aimed at rapid demobilization, depoliticization, and stabilization. The armed forces treated the members of the Popular Unity- UP-30 as an enemy to be obliterated, not just as an errant political movement to be booted from office. The military commanders closed Congress, censored the media, purged the universities, burned books, declared political parties outlawed if Marxist or in recess otherwise, and banned union activities (Hudson, 1994).

Besides human rights violations, the regime held multiple social and economic reforms in the country and many of the current political and social characteristics of Chile were molded during the authoritarian years.

Amongst the most controversial one was the reform of the educational system, which allowed education to be privatized and the quality of the overall public education to diminish

30 Unidad Popular (UP in its Spanish acronym) was the biggest leftist coalition in Chile prior to the Authoritarian years. This coalition, composed by Marxist, Socialist and Communist parties supported Salvador Allende’s government and thus, were a threat to the Military regime (Collier & Sater, 1996).

significantly. Also, already feeling an increasing level of pressure from grassroots

movements that had no leftist inclinations a new Constitution was constructed.

Furthermore, another main reform of the Military regime was the agrarian reform. In order to

break with any Socialist policy started in the Allende government,31 the Military redistributed

large farms to influential and rich families allied with the regime (Jarvis, 1985). The overall

aim was to concentrate power and resources on the hands of the Army and a few families.

Transition Back to Democracy, Accountability and Elites

In the southern cone of Latin America, and especially in the transition of […] Chile, the manner in which the first elected government has dealt with past human rights violations has been so entangled with political transition that it is difficult to talk about one without having to deal with the other (Correa: 1991, p. 1455).

Carruthers (2001) affirms that the strategy aimed at disarticulating civil mobilization ended

up backfiring when, by trying to silence Marxists and leftists, the protest arena was emptied,

which allowed new popular mobilizations to be born.

The neoliberal state’s withdrawal from multiple social and economic activities further opened space for emerging citizen’s groups, as hundreds of grassroots organizations sought to fill the void with independent initiatives in education, health care, nutrition, microproduction, credit, and so on (Carruthers: 2001, p. 345).

These new popular mobilizations started pressuring the regime that could no longer sustain

its repression. Mass demonstrations took the streets asking for new elections. The

Constitution of 1980 paved the path for a plebiscite held in 1988 that would decide whether

Pinochet would have an eight year extension to his rule. Pinochet lost the plebiscite and was

ousted in March 1990 (Bizarro, 2005; Arriagada, 1988).

31 ‘At the time of the military coup, about 60 percent of Chile's irrigated land and 50 percent of total agricultural land was in control of the public sector. Land reform had started in the 1960s with expropriations of large landholdings (those larger than eighty basic irrigated hectares—BIH), and the encouragement of small farms (about 8.5 BIH) managed by their owners. The Allende administration favored large-scale farms under cooperatives and state-farm management over private ownership of agricultural land’ (Hudson, 1994).

Differently than the manner in which the transition and the bargaining process was done in

Brazil, Chile was able to convict 76 perpetrators of human rights violations soon after the return to democracy (Folha de São Paulo, 2014).

As part of its transition process, an Amnesty Law was also approved but years later General

Pinochet had an extradition request sent to England, where he resided, so that he would come back to Chile and face trial, along with other perpetrators. This was only possible because the immunity granted to them by the Amnesty Law was revoked. Nonetheless, in the end of the regime a great part of the elite was able to be included in the government and the carabineros were maintained (Carruthers: 2001, p. 346).

Furthermore, in the bargaining process, a balance between judicial prosecution and the reform of the military was struck. ‘This balance, (they argued), helped guarantee the success of the Chilean transition by insulating the armed forces from overt political pressures’

(Hudson, 1994).

Although a good effort was made to try to hold some perpetrators accountable and start the reconciliation process in the country, it is possible that some legacies of that time remain entrenched in the society, hurting the human rights of the Chilean people, especially in relation to their right to protest. These possible legacies must be revised in order for the country to fully enjoy and respect human rights (La Nación, 2013).

Carruthers (2001) provides a sobering picture that indicates that

[o]n the one hand, they demonstrate that threatened communities have been able to resuscitate a sense of participation, in spite of a depoliticized political climate. The environment is now a legitimate issue of public debate, firmly on the policy agenda. However, the law’s participatory mechanisms tend to exclude precisely the groups most directly affected by proposed developments. In practice, it remains largely a closed, negotiated process between the private sector and the ruling elite. The problem of agency capture is magnified by the absence of democratic channels and authentic pluralism. Environmental participation in Chile’s democracia de acuerdos has become instead an empty promise, masking incestuous co-operation between the state and the entrepreneurial interests, who typically see their projects approved along favoured [sic] lines (Carruthers: 2001, p. 351).

The authoritarian years brought economic development, but were also responsible for many human rights violations and for alienating the masses from politics and from power, that remained in the hands of a few elites.

As they were before the end of the Authoritarian rule, Carruthers (2001, p. 353) states that

“politics in Chile is extremely elitist both in structure and in practice. A handful of leading lights from each party [controls] the political proceedings, setting the agenda and paying only tactical heed to the opposition and even less to the human rights and other social movements”.

Regarding elites, Chile has an interesting dynamic. Although it is not so common, the country has examples of business and politics being mixed: former President, Sebastián Piñera and his family are amongst Chilean main elites and, apart from formal involvement with politics, he was also an owner of a television network, is a big shareholder of Chile’s main industries and also owns a football club (El País, 2014).

Masonic lodges and other social/political groupings controlled by elites also exercise significant control of the business environment. Nonetheless, it cannot be affirmed that elites would have a very strong influence on the response of non-violent demonstrations since, as

Hudson (1994) argues: ‘with the return to democracy, social organizations recovered the ability to pressure Congress and the national government’. Furthermore,

the new government opted for explicit solicitation of the opinions of important interest associations on some of the policies it was considering. It also fostered negotiations between top labor and business leaders over issues such as labor law reforms, minimum wage and pension levels, and overall wage increases for public employees. These negotiations led to several national agreements between state officials and business and labor leaders, thereby inaugurating a new form of top-level bargaining previously unknown in Chile (Hudson, 1994).

Thus, although elites in Chile still play a role in influencing policies (even those contrary to popular interests) as we will see more clearly in the next section, elites of this country are not considered to have largely remained in power for the purposes of this analysis.

Protests and the Police

The government tries to defeat the social protest in order to artificially sustain a domination model that is profoundly cracked and that the great majority of the population rejects (Silva, 2010).32

This quote reflects the desire of the remaining elite to control the popular demonstrations, reproducing a lighter model of dominance over the civil rights of the Chilean people.

As presented by the previous section, since the dictatorship years, there was little or no expressive mass mobilization and, straight after the end of the military regime any minor protest would be ‘discretely’ dismantled. Little attention was given to demonstrations in

Chile until 2006, when thousands of high school students took the streets in the called

‘Penguins Revolution’ that had few mildly violent clashes with Chilean gendarmerie forces

(uniformed national police body), the carabineros, and that was terminated in three months

(La Tercera, 2006).

Overall Chile’s experience with democracy after the authoritarian regime can be observed through the Freedom House (2013) scale:33

32 Translated from the original in Portuguese: “O governo tenta derrotar o protesto social para sustentar artificialmente um modelo de dominação profundamente rachado e que a imensa maioria da população rechaça” (Silva, 2001). 33 The methodology for the Freedom House scores can be found on the Brazil section on page 38 of this thesis.

Figure ii: Freedom Score- Chile (2001-2013)

Freedom Score- Chile (2001-2013) 7

5 Freedom Rating 4 Civil Liberties

3 Political Rights Freedom Level Freedom 2

1 1= best

7= worst

2005 2002 2003 2004 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2001 Source: Freedom House Org, 2014 After the ‘Penguins Revolution’ the only demonstrations that drew attention were, again, the students’ revolt that started in 2011 (Gideon, 2011). Many social organizations and unions were together in this historical string of protests that lasted more than five months and demanded improvements in the education system (Silva, 2011).

Those protests were commonly met with tear gas and water cannons and marked the recent political history of Chile (Gideon, 2011). Some media reports compared the type of repression the students were suffering with the one committed thirty years ago during the dictatorship (La Diaria, 2011).

Overall, as it can be observed further below, ‘Education’ was the main claim behind the demonstrations in the country in the three analyzed years, and that happened because the quality of education in the country fell while the tuition fees went up and some unpopular policies were being taken in relation to education. Students, professors and families advocated for a deep and comprehensive reform of education in the country (La Nación,

2013).

After the first demonstrations started to attract large portions of the young population, and the elites began to fear what it could represent, the government tried to pass a prohibition of protests that was called Hinzpeter Law (named after President Piñera’s main supporter

Rodrigo Hinzpeter, Minister of Interior), and this law was approved. The students and lower classes of the population continued to denounce the excessive repression practiced by the carabineros, under the command of government leaders, which are members of the political and industrial elites of the country (Martinez, 2011). Such disproportional repression caught the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights’ attention that criticized the

disproportional force used against the students, which included horses and water cannons. [And the Commission] reaffirmed that the right to protest and the freedom of expression are fundamental rights and that the use of force in protests must be only used in exceptional occasions (La Nación, 2011).34

The second largest claim, in absolute numbers of protests, is ‘Local issue’ which, in the case of Chile was very much connected to polemic policies towards energy at the Argentinian border.

Table vii: Protests by type of claim- Chile

Chile Total Number of Protests 91 # Housing 4 # Education 46 # Anti Government 9 # Transport 2 # Local Issue 26 # Union 4

Source: La Nación (01/01/2011-31/12/2013)

34 Free translation from the original in Spanish “La Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos también criticó la desproporcionada fuerza utilizada contra los estudiantes, que incluyó caballos y carros lanza agua. Recordó que el derecho de manifestación y la libertad de expresión son fundamentales y que el uso de la fuerza en las protestas “debe ser excepcional” (La Nacíon, 2011).

During the observed period, Chile received score 2 for both Amnesty International and US

State Department accounts on the political terror scale, compiled by PTS (2013)35. Through this scale it was identified that for 2011 and 2012,36 “there was a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare” (Political Terror Scale, 2013).

Such levels of repression are not fully compatible with the observance of many news accounts compiled at the original ranking put together by this research that found that, for

2011 there was overall ‘significant repression’ against non-violent demonstrations (10 out of

28 events, meeting and surpassing the threshold of 20%), especially the ones that advocated better education and that could be interpreted as being a threat to the government.37 The years of 2012 and 2013 were coded as being overall ‘not repressive’ towards non-violent demonstrations.

Table viii: ‘Level of Repression’ of protests- Chile Chile 2011 2012 2013

Total 28 32 31 No Repression 15 22 24 Mild Repression 3 9 5 Significant Repression 10 1 2

Source: La Nación (01/01/2011- 31/12/2013)

Although almost 70% of all protests in Chile between 2011 and 2013 had ‘non repressive’ responses from the police, in over 14% of the entries the carabineros ‘significantly repressed’ the non-violent demonstrations.

The carabineros are a police force that have as their main mission the maintenance of order and the rule of law in the country. Originally they are under the control of the Ministry of

35 Information on the criteria for the Political Terror Scale can be found on page 21. 36 Unfortunately, the Political Terror Scale does not present scores for year 2013. 37 The full compiled scale can be found in the appendix of the thesis.

National Defense (headed by the armed forces ),38 have their own Undersecretariat at the

Ministry, and, although in 2011 they started to officially report to the Ministry of the Interior and Public Security in an effort to distance the carabineros’ control from the three branches of the armed forces, this paramilitary force remains to be considered as a branch of the Army

(Hudson, 1994). This is especially so because this uniformed police, besides not being under civilian judicial scrutiny, follows a military-like training in which it is trained to combat the

“enemy” and not to protect the rights of civilians (Hudson, 1994).

Chile in light of the three hypothesis

With regard to hypothesis 1 --“The higher the level of threat, the higher the likelihood for the repression of non- violent protests”— we found the following through some simple statistical analysis in SPSS:

Table ix: SPSS Crosstabulation for Chile (Chile_LevelofThreat * Chile_LevelofRepression Crosstabulation) Count Chile_LevelofRepression Total No Repression Mild Repression Significant Repression Not a Threat 41 14 2 57 Chile_LevelofThreat Mild Threat 16 3 11 30 Significant Threat 4 0 0 4 Total 61 17 13 91

Source: SPSS

Some simple statistics showed that the correlation between the level of threat and the level of repression are not significant. Nonetheless, for the Chilean cases, the Pearson coefficient was

38 Ministério de Defensa Nacional in the original name in spanish.

.184, which means that, while not significant, there is a positive relationship between the variables.39

In relation to hypothesis 2-- “Elite continuity increases the likelihood of repression of non- violent protests in the new democratic regime”--, Chile is scored as medium with relation to elite continuity, since it would be too much of a stretch to connect current elites and their interests to the repression of peaceful events and the interests of the authoritarian years.

With regards to hypothesis 3--“The existence of a militarized police increases the likelihood for the repression of non- violent protests. Such likelihood increases if there was a lack of accountability regarding the perpetrators of the repression under the authoritarian rule”--, in order to assess the appropriate score for the existence of a militarized police and the intervening factor of having held perpetrators accountable, this thesis considered the judicial prosecutions related to the military years and the current carabineros structure in the police force. Thus, with regards to these variables, Chile is scored as medium since it has held its perpetrators accountable, but presents an active police force that it is not effectively under

Civilian control.

c. Uruguay

Antecedents to Authoritarian Years

The Republic of Uruguay was proclaimed in 1828 and, different to the experiences of Brazil and Chile, after its institution, the country experienced decades of revolts and internal conflict before enjoying some stability in the beginning of the 20th century (Bielous, 2000).

39 The SPSS output for this bivariate correlation can be found on this thesis’ appendix.

Two parties—Colorado and Blanco—competed for power since their inception and had their fiercest battle in polls during the 1950s and 60s when the economic situation in the country was deteriorating. During those decades the leftist insurgency—called the Tupamaros

National Liberation Front—intensified, causing civil unrest and a strengthening of the conservative elite. In order to contain the Tupamaros the military organized a coup d’état in

1973 (Freedom House Org., 2013).

Dictatorship

The regime had a rather peculiar characteristic. It had the support of the then Uruguayan

President, Juan María Bordaberry that wanted to restore the normal state of social and economic settings. Together with the Military he closed the Senate and the Lower Chamber.

A couple of years later the President dissolved all parties, but the Military rejected that and a conflict inside the regime itself was created (Bielous, 2000).

The Military withdrew their support from Bordaberry, who then had no choice but to let his

Vice President, Alberto Demicheli, take office. Under Demicheli the Institutional Acts 1 and

2 were passed, giving all power to the Military and imposing a strict curfew.

At the time, Uruguay was internationally known as the ‘torture chamber of Latin America’ because of its large number of arbitrary imprisonments and for having, at the time, the highest proportion of political prisoners in the region (Amnesty International, 1979).

In 1980 the regime sensed that it was losing power, especially because they were losing support from the few existing industrial elites since the economy was not performing as desired. The Military felt the need to legitimize their rule in order to maintain the head office so they proposed a constitutional plebiscite. This plebiscite was rejected by 56% of the population of Uruguay, which allowed the reopening of the political arena and political debate to resurface (Bielous, 2000).

The regime had its end in 1984, when presidential elections were allowed and Julio María

Sanguinetti of the Colorado Party, who had Military support and close connections to the elites, won (Caetano & Rilla, 1987).

Transition back to Democracy, Accountability and Elites

The connection between the newly elected President and the Military allowed the 1986

Amnesty Law, which was also called ‘Expiry Law’, to be approved. According to Freedom

House (2013), this law “granted members of the armed forces immunity for human rights violations committed during the years of dictatorship”. Furthermore, the law allowed the

Executive, and not the Judicial branch, to decide which cases would go to trial.

In a similar way to Brazil, during the negotiations to restore democracy many bargains were made, some of which did not allow for a thorough accountability of the perpetrators.

Moreover, just like Brazil,

[d]ue to the negotiated transition to electoral democracy, civilian political elites approached the transitional dilemma of balancing normative expectations and political contingency by promulgating legal immunity, for years avoiding initiatives to pursue trials or launch an official truth commission […] A constellation of national and transnational factors (including recurrent initiatives by social and political forces) eventually opened up new institutional ground for belated truth-telling and accountability for some historical wrongs—and yet, attempts to challenge the blanket legal impunity failed twice through popular consultation and in a recent parliamentary vote (Roniger: 2011, p. 693).

After President José Mujica passed a law in 2011 to scrap Uruguay’s Amnesty Law, the

Uruguayan Supreme Court ruled out his decision since it would have retroactive powers, which are incompatible with their Constitution (Roniger, 2011). Nonetheless, as mentioned above, there are loopholes in the Expiry Law that has allowed some high-ranking authorities to be prosecuted.

When in the 1990s (before Mujica`s time at the Presidency) another Colorado party candidate—Dr. Jorge Battle—was elected, the satisfactory economic situation allowed the party to discuss the implementation of an

honest accounting of the human rights situation under the former military regime, while showing equally firm determination to reduce spending and privatize state monopolies. In 2001, crises in the rural economy and an increase in violent crime, as well as growing labor unrest, set off alarms in what was still one of Latin America’s safest countries (Freedom House Org., 2013.)40

Since the return to democracy, the country’s attempts at holding human rights violators during the Military years accountable lacked consistency. Since 2005 around 20 military men went to Court and were found guilty. Even former President Juan María Bordaberry was tried and convicted for crimes related to the kidnapping and killing of parliamentary leaders.41

‘Mr. Bordaberry’s conviction notwithstanding, Uruguay has largely avoided prosecutions on the scale of Argentina or Chile, where hundreds of former military and police officialls have been tried for crimes against humanity’ (Garces, 2011)42.

It is evident then, that although quite some progress was made regarding the accountability of the crimes committed during the Military regime, there is still some support for a revision and total annulment of the Amnesty Law. This movement got stronger with the 2011 recommendation of the Inter-American Court that Uruguay should terminate the bill

(Roniger, 2011).

Regarding the country’s Truth Commissions,

15 years passed in Uruguay before an official truth commission on past human rights violations was established in 2000 to draw up an authoritative and agreed-upon version of state crimes committed under the authoritarian dictatorship. This delay was more akin to Brazil’s experience, where a truth

40Available at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/uruguay-0. Accessed February 12, 2014. 41 Human rights organizations have that these killings are related to ‘Operación Condor’ (‘Operation Condor’), ‘a secret pact between South America’s dictatorships to eliminate political opponents who had fled to neighboring countries’ (Garces, 2011). 42 Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/obituaries/former-uruguayan-dictator-juan-maria- bordaberry-dies/2011/07/17/gIQAX54RKI_story.html. Accessed February 12, 2014.

commission promised towards the end of the Lula government was finally announced by President Dilma Rousseff in 2011. Uruguay’s transitional path reflects the decision of the political class leading the process of re- democratization to draw a line under the past without addressing normative expectations of truth and accountability, the initial success of these policies and the attempts by sectors of civil society to undo them. (Roniger: 2011, p.695)

As with the other two study cases, but in a smaller scale, after the transition, parts of the

Uruguayan elites managed to stay where they were before the coup and still have considerable say in policy making, although this is very limited to their field of influence (eg local trade) (Roniger, 2011).

Different than what can be observed in other Latin American countries such as Brazil,

Uruguayan politicians from the Conservative side ‘only rarely had business careers, apart from ranchers in the National Party. Rather, most made their living as lawyers and as public servants’, while ‘[t]he leaders of Uruguay's leftist parties were drawn from a somewhat wider spectrum of backgrounds than the Colorados and Blancos. Among the leaders of the former were many white-collar workers, especially educators, and a few labor union leaders’

(Hudson & Meditz, 1990).

The leader of one of the most influential political parties of the country (the Colorado Party) and one of the main land owners of the country, Pedro Bordaberry, is the son of the authoritarian leader of the Uruguayan Dictatorship Juan Maria Bordaberry, convicted for his crimes. Pedro Bordaberry and his zone of influence control businesses worth over millions of euros and have great political influence, but they are, in reality, an exception in Uruguay and focus their influence in topics directly related to their businesses’ profit (Martinez, 2014).

The biggest part of Uruguayan elites tend not to get overly involved with politics. ‘Compared with their counterparts on the Argentine pampas, Uruguay's latifundistas (large landholders) never achieved the same level of social and political preeminence’ (Hudson & Meditz, 1990).

Business elites were a bit more involved with national policies than landowners (although still in a smaller degree than in neighbouring countries), but since most industries were controlled by the State, there are not as many traditional families running business in the country as in other Latin American countries.

Furthermore, ‘foreign multinational corporations were less active in Uruguay than in many other Latin American countries because of the small size of its domestic market’ (Hudson &

Meditz, 1990).

A specific kind of elite deserves special attention on the Uruguay case: the Armed Forces.

‘As Uruguay returned formally to democratic rule in 1985, the armed forces continued to exercise a degree of tutelage over national affairs, despite their (official) depoliticized role’

(Hudson & Meditz, 1990).

Some, such as Martin Weinstein (In Hudson & Meditz, 1990), believed that the Armed

Forces would continue to exert an important influence over government, especially in relation to state actions on human rights and that the military could even ‘assume a tutelary role in areas such as economic policy and labor relations’. Contrary to this believe, the influence of the armed forces’ elites in those two areas was not concretized (Hudson & Meditz, 1990).

Taking this scenario into consideration, keeping in mind that business and some political elites in Uruguay had already distanced themselves from the military in the final years of the regime and adding the fact that modesty is ‘a quintessential Uruguayan trait’, exposed through its ‘Republican ideal of equality’ (El Pais, 2014), it is possible to argue that elite continuity in Uruguay has not been so clear since the return to democracy.

Protests and the Police

Since the return to democracy there have been very few incidents of repression of non-violent protests. In reality there were very few social demonstrations that fall under the concept of non-violent demonstration put forward by this research, especially if compared to Brazil’s amount of events. The Uruguayan experience with democracy after the authoritarian years is exemplified through the Freedom House (2013) scale:

Figure iii: Freedom Score- Uruguay (2001-2013)

Freedom Score- Uruguay (2001-2013) 7

Freedom Rating 4 Civil Liberties 3

Freedom Level Freedom Political Rights

1 1= best

7= worst

2005 2002 2003 2004 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2001 Source: Freedom House Org, 2014 As it can be observed, the country is considered a full democracy by such scale and the overall population enjoys their civil and political rights. “Workers exercise their right to join unions, bargain collectively, and hold strikes. Unions are well organized and politically powerful. Strikes are sometimes marked by violent clashes and sabotage” (Freedom House

Org., 2013).43

43 More information on the criteria behind the Freedom House scores can be found on page 38 of this thesis. Freedom House Org., 2014. Available at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1999/uruguay. Accessed February 12, 2014.

For the observed period, namely 2011–2013, the PTS has given the country score 1 which means that Uruguay is “under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare” (Political Terror

Scale, 2012).44

Delgado (2011) explains that Uruguay has been living a long siesta45 of demonstrations and that it was very unlikely that the country would have massive scale protests, because there is very little vertical and horizontal contagion of popular dissatisfactions and because the elites have a good control of the country’s general atmosphere (Delgado, 2011).

For the period under analysis—January 2011 to December 2013—the only evident incidents of clashes with the government were related to protests organized by labor classes and unions. Moreover there is the indication that the small number of clashes that were met with some repression involved the interests of business elites.

Table x: Protests by type of claim- Uruguay Uruguay Total Number of Protests 25 # Housing 0 # Education 2 # Anti Government 8 # Transport 0 # Local Issue 7 # Union 8

Source: La Diaria (01/01/2011-31/12/2013)

Santos (2013) believes that we might observe a change on this rather small number of demonstrations since there is a ‘trend’ of new social fights surfacing especially in the worker class (mining, infrastructure and commodities industries), but that will depend on their

44 More information on the criteria behind the PTS can be found on page 21. PTS, 2014. Available at: http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/about.php. Accessed February 12, 2014. 45 A ‘siesta’ is the popular name given to a short nap taken mostly after lunch time in some Latin countries.

62 capacity to bring the problems from the industries to the cities, articulate their claims with other unions and society strata and work around the elites’ interests.

The independent scale compiled by this research finds a result very similar to the scores presented by PTS and Freedom House Organization. Following this thesis’ criteria for the level of repression, Uruguay presents a ‘not repressive’ response in all three years analysed.

As it can be observed from the table below, no demonstration was significantly repressed during the analyzed years and the large majority of the events (24 out of 25 events in total) had no repression at all. Nonetheless, parts of the society are concerned with some isolated events of police repression of civil rights committed on the basis of the Police Procedures

Law, which allows the Police to use force with little or no judicial control and is considered unconstitutional by many (La Diaria, 2013).

Table xi: ‘Level of Repression’ of protests- Uruguay

Uruguay 2011 2012 2013

Total 3 2 20

No Repression 3 2 19 Mild Repression 0 0 1

Significant Repression 0 0 0

Source: La Diaria(01/01/2011-31/12/2013)

With regards to the police structure of the country, the Uruguayan National Police is structured differently than what was observed with the two other cases. Namely, it reports to the Ministry of Interior, indicating that it is under civilian control (Andrade, 1985). Besides that,

[t]he government has effective mechanisms to investigate and punish abuse and corruption. The armed forces under the Ministry of National Defense are responsible for external security and have some domestic responsibilities as guardians of the outside perimeter of six prisons. There were no reports of

impunity involving the police and security forces during 2012 (US State Department, 2012).

Civilian control was made clear with the 1980 Constitution. Article 168 gave the Uruguayan

President, through the Minister of Interior, the responsibility for the public order maintenance, while Article 173 gave the President the power to nominate the Head of different police departments, following a different approach than the one traditionally observed in the Armed Forces (Uruguay Government, 1980).

Although there is no militarized police acting on the traditional control of the rule of law, the

Uruguayan police structure includes two paramilitary police bodies: the Republican Guard and the Metropolitan Guard. Both are located at the capital, Montevideo, and have tasks related to guard duties and ceremonial events. Nonetheless, both might be summoned for the support of the regular police in case a given situation (violent riot etc.). These bodies have equipment suited for confrontational situations that the regular police who oversee daily life do not possess (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989; Ingleton, 1979; English,

1994).

Uruguay in light of the three hypothesis

In relation to hypothesis 1 --“The higher the level of threat, the higher the likelihood for the repression of non- violent protests”— we found the following through some simple statistical analysis in SPSS:

Table xii: SPSS Crosstabulation for Uruguay (Uruguay_LevelofThreat * Uruguay_LevelofRepression Crosstabulation)

Uruguay_Level Uruguay_Level ofRepression ofThreat Uruguay_LevelofRepressio Pearson Correlation 1 -.089 n Sig. (2-tailed) .672

N 25 25 Pearson Correlation -.089 1 Uruguay_LevelofThreat Sig. (2-tailed) .672 N 25 25

Source: SPSS

As with the other two study cases, the correlation between the level of threat and the level of repression is not significant. Interestingly enough, different than what was observed with the cases of Brazil and Chile, the Pearson coefficient found for the Uruguayan cases was -.089, which indicates that, while not significant, there is a negative relationship between the variables.46

With regards to hypothesis 2-- “Elite continuity increases the likelihood of repression of non- violent protests in the new democratic regime”--, this thesis understands that there is an average elite interest in influencing (or standard actual capability of influence) and, thus, has given Uruguay’s elite continuity a medium score.

Following the scoring criteria provided for independent variable ‘existence of a militarize police’ and for intervening variable ‘lack of accountability’ and taking into consideration

Uruguay’s police structure and the path taken so far towards transitional justice, Uruguay is scored as low in variables related to hypothesis 3 ---“The existence of a militarized police increases the likelihood for the repression of non- violent protests. Such likelihood increases if there was a lack of accountability regarding the perpetrators of the repression under the authoritarian rule”--.

46 The SPSS output for this bivariate correlation can be found on this thesis’ appendix.

V. ANALYSIS OF HYPOTHESES

Taking into consideration the broad historical and political similarities that Brazil, Chile and

Uruguay share, the standard theory regarding protest and repression declares that these countries should respond in similar ways to similar challenges. Nonetheless, this is not what was observed between 1 January 2011 and 31 December 2013.

Based on the criteria developed by this thesis,47 in 2011 Brazil and Chile were considered to be ‘significantly repressive’ towards non-violent protests while Uruguay was considered as

‘not repressive’.48 2012 was considered as an overall ‘not repressive’ year towards demonstrations in all three countries.49 Finally, in 2013 it is only Brazil that is no longer in the ‘not repressive’ category, being considered ‘significantly repressive’ due to its actions towards non-violent demonstrations.50

In order to attempt to understand this variation in the level of repression between the cases, this thesis set out to test one hypothesis present in established literature around the topic and two other hypotheses related to possible subtle political legacies in the countries. The following table provides a summary for the level of repression (dependent variable) and this thesis’ findings can be seen further below:

47‘Significantly repressive’ year ≥ 20% of all entries for the calendar year being labelled as ‘significantly repressive’. If the ‘significantly repressive’ threshold is not met, the second threshold is for the ‘mildly repressive’ behavior which has to meet ≥ 33% of the total number of protests of a given year under the ‘mild repression’. Finally, if none of these thresholds are met, a given year will be considered as being ‘non- repressive’. The same thresholds are used when establishing the overall level of repression of a given country for the whole observed period. As a reminder, this thesis considered as ‘not repressive’ those protests that were met by no coercive tactics and in which there were no injuries/ arrests. The ‘mild repression’ category was used when there was either the use of coercive tactics or there were injuries/ arrests. Finally, protests coded as being ‘significantly repressive’ were the ones in which coercive tactics were used and in which there was the occurrence of injuries and/or arrests and/or deaths. 48 2011 was coded as an overall ‘significantly repressive’ year for Brazil and Chile because eight out of the 28 protests in Brazil and ten out of 28 protests in Chile on that year were ‘significantly repressed’, meeting the threshold of 20%. On the same year, Uruguay responded ‘non-repressively’ to all of its three protests. 49 In 2012, none of the countries met the threshold for being considered as ‘significantly repressive’ or ‘mildly repressive’. 50 In 2013 Brazil ‘significantly repressed’ 103 of its 400 events, meeting once again the threshold.

Table xiii: ‘Level of Repression’ per year and country

Level of Repression Country 2011 2012 2013 Overall Brazil Sig. Repression No Represion Sig. Repression Sig. Repression Chile Sig. Repression No Repression No Repression No Repression Uruguay No Repression No Repression No Repression No Repression

Hypothesis 1—“The higher the level of threat, the higher the likelihood for the repression of

non-violent protests”.

Based on the data collected from the three news media sources (Folha de São Paulo for

Brazil; La Nación for Chile; and La Diária for Uruguay), an SPSS crosstabs and simple

bivariate correlation were performed in order to allow us to observe the relationship between

the level of threat51 that the demonstrations represented to the government and the level of

repression that they received. The following tables provide an interesting overview of the

data collected:

Table xiv: ‘No Repression’ of protests and ‘Level of Threat’

No Repression Brazil Chile Uruguay Total Occurrence 333 61 24 Number of 'Not a Threat' Protests that suffered ‘No Repression’ 244 41 20 Number of 'Mild Threat' Protests that suffered ‘No Repression’ 66 16 4 Number of ' Significant Threat' Protests that suffered ‘No Repression’ 23 4 0

Source: Folha de São Paulo; La Nación; La Diaria (01/01/2011- 31/12/2013)

51 The operationalization of the independent variable ‘level of threat’ was presented on the operationalization section. In any case, ‘no threat’ protest= 1st–122nd protest with the same claim in a given year and between 1– 1000 people in a single event; ‘mild threat’ protest= 123th–365th protest with the same claim in a given year and between 1–1000 people in a single event, or 1st–12th protest with the same claim in a given year and between 1001–100,000 people in a single event; ‘significant threat’ protest= 13th or higher protest (coded as mild threat) with the same claim in a given year and between 1001–100,000 people in a single event, or 366th or higher protest with the same claim in a given year with between1–1000 people in a single event, or any given protest has more than or equal to 100,001 people in a single event.

Table xv: ‘Mild Repression’ of protests and ‘Level of Threat’

Mild Repression Brazil Chile Uruguay

Total Occurrence 19 17 1 Number of 'Not a Threat' Protests that suffered ‘Mild Repression’ 15 14 1 Number of 'Mild Threat' Protests that suffered ‘Mild Repression’ 1 3 0 Number of ' Significant Threat' Protests that suffered ‘Mild Repression’ 3 0 0

Source: Folha de São Paulo; La Nación; La Diaria (01/01/2011- 31/12/2013)

Table xvi: ‘Significant Repression’ of protests and ‘Level of Threat’

Significant Repression Brazil Chile Uruguay

Total Occurrence 113 13 0 Number of 'Not a Threat' Protests that suffered ‘Significant Repression’ 73 2 0 Number of 'Mild Threat' Protests that suffered ‘Significant Repression’ 27 11 0 Number of 'Significant Threat' Protests that suffered ‘Significant Repression’ 13 0 0

Source: Folha de São Paulo; La Nación; La Diaria (01/01/2011- 31/12/2014)

Let us start by observing Brazil´s examples: out of the 39 protests coded under ‘significant

threat’, 13 were ‘significantly repressed’, three were ‘mildly repressed’ and 23 were ‘not

repressed’, while out of the 332 protests coded as ‘not a threat’, 73 were ‘significantly

repressed’, 15 were ‘mildly repressed’ and 244 suffered ‘no repression’. This indicates that

hypothesis 1 cannot be completely accepted, given that ‘significant threatening’ protests

received ‘no repression’, while ‘not threatening’ protests were ‘significantly repressed’.

Chile’s accounts support this difficulty in completely accepting hypothesis 1, since 14 of their

‘non-threatening’ protests encountered ‘mild repression’, while all four of its ‘significantly

threatening’ events suffered ‘no repression’.

For its part, Uruguay also has examples that fail to offer support for this hypothesis: all four

of their ‘mildly threatening’ demonstrations received ‘no repression’ at all.

The following table provides an overview of this imperfect relationship. Both the

independent variable (level of threat, named as LevelofThreat_all3countries on the table

below), the dependent variable (level of repression, named as

LevelofRepression_all3countries on the table below) can be observed:

Table xvii: SPSS Crosstabulation for all three countries (LevelofThreat_all3countries * LevelofRepression_all3countries Crosstabulation) Count LevelofRepression_all3countries Total

No Repression Mild Repression Significant Repression Not a Threat 305 30 75 410 LevelofThreat_all3countries Mild Threat 86 4 38 128

Significant Threat 27 3 13 43 Total 418 37 126 581 Source: SPSS

Thus, it is clear that not all the totality of protests that represented ‘significant threats’ were

‘significantly repressed’, while not all ‘non-threatening’ demonstration were met by a lack of

repression, indicating that the relationship between the threat of a protest and the repression it

suffers is not perfectly proportional. This is not to say that the hypothesis is completely

invalid. In order to further evaluate hypothesis 1, a simple correlation between the level of

threat of protests and the level of repression was ran on SPSS. The following table presents

the findings:

Table xviii: SPSS correlation between ‘Level of Threat’ and ‘Level of Repression’ LevelofThreat_all LevelofRepressio 3countries n_all3countries Pearson Correlation 1 .106* LevelofThreat_all3countries Sig. (2-tailed) .010 N 581 581 Pearson Correlation .106* 1 LevelofRepression_all3countri Sig. (2-tailed) .010 es N 581 581 *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

The above table shows the results for all countries tested together. The Pearson correlation coefficient, which indicates the strength of a given relationship, can vary between -1 and 1, ranging respectively from a perfectly negative relationship (which in this case would be: the less threatening a protest is, the more severely it will be repressed) to a perfectly positive relationship (which in this hypothesis would mean: the more threatening a protest is, the greater the repression).

The Pearson’s correlation coefficient for this relationship is .106, meaning that there is a minor positive relationship between the level of threat of a given protest and the level of repression it receives. The table also shows that this result is statistically significant at the five per cent significance level (2-tailed), which strengthens the findings reached from the calculation.

Thus, the assumption that the higher the level of threat, the higher the level of repression, is strengthened. It is important to point out, nonetheless, that Pearson’s correlation coefficient does not present the actual direction of relationship, which means that the relationship could also be: the higher the level of repression, the higher the level of threat.

At the individual country level, the correlations between the level of repression and the level of threat were not found to be significant at the five per cent level (2-tailed). Nonetheless, taken together, the SPSS findings for all three countries and the qualitative analysis done above allow us to partially accept hypothesis 1—“The higher the level of threat, the higher the likelihood for the repression of non-violent protests”. Furthermore, although it is intuitive to assume that costs and benefits will be taken into consideration when a given government is choosing whether or not to repress a non-violent demonstration, in reality this hypothesis

(although accepted) plays a smaller role than expected.

Hypothesis 2—“Elite continuity increases the likelihood of repression of non-violent protests in the new democratic regime”

The following table summarizes the aforementioned dependent (level of repression) and independent (elite continuity) variables:

Table xix: Summary of ‘Elite Continuity score and overall ‘Level of Represision’

Country Elite Continuity Score Overall Level of Repression Uruguay Medium ‘Not Repressive’ Chile Medium ‘Not Repressive’ Brazil High ‘Significantly Repressive’

This hypothesis is somewhat connected to the one before since there is a “view that police response to protest is a reaction to the threats directed at elites’ political and financial interests”. Therefore there is “continued relevance of elite interests in shaping some element of police response to collective gatherings” (Warner & McCarthy: 2013, p.2).

The deals cut when each of country was going through the re-democratization process guaranteed that key people, families and groups remained in power. Furthermore there is some indication that the continuity of elites in and around the government has a relationship with the likelihood of repression of non-violent protests in democracies.

The reason behind it is simple: elites would incite support or/and allow the repression of non- violent demonstrations if their interests were being jeopardized or targeted by the demonstrations.

As observed in the tables presented above, Uruguay has the smallest number of protests

(only 25 incidents) and repression (only one case of ‘mild repression’ and no case of

‘significant repression’), having an overall score of ‘no repression’ for the years observed.

Nonetheless, in relation to this specific independent variable (elite continuity) the country scored as medium given that a part of the Uruguayan elites were able to maintain their

71 powerful positions in government and in society as a whole, although being rather limited to their field of influence (Roniger, 2011).

For its part, Chile also scored medium for elite continuity as some big industrialist groups and traditional ruling elites managed to maintain at least part of their influence. Moreover they highly benefit from the status quo of some of the claims raised by protests (especially the ones pro-education), and likely have been affected by the recent protests. Nonetheless, differently than Uruguay, Chile has presented a more repressive response to its protests, having been scored as ‘significantly repressive’ in 2011 although it the country fits in the overall ‘not repressive’ level of the scale.

On the other hand, Brazil shows a great degree of elite continuity in decision making and other influential positions, both in the government and in society (especially in the three most economically important states: Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais and São Paulo). Furthermore, some of the military were reabsorbed in the re-democratization process—part of them still hold senior positions in the government, including in areas related to public security, which allows Brazil to be scored as having a high level of elite continuity. Given that some of the elites that managed to remain had influence over police policies and that Brazil presented an overall ‘significantly repressive’ response to protest, it is possible to suspect that the hypothesis that “elite continuity increases the likelihood of repression of non-violent protests in the new democratic regime” has some validity.

Nonetheless, overall this hypothesis cannot be fully accepted nor can it be completely dismissed in light of the evidence found, since countries that have been scored at the same level of elite continuity (Chile and Uruguay with a medium score) have presented distinct levels of repression across the years. At the same time, the country that scored the highest

72 with regards to this variable—Brazil—indeed had the highest degree of repression, both in absolute numbers as well as proportionally.

Elite continuity seems to have an impact, and the fact that there are no cases of “low continuity” means that isolating this effect is unfeasible. Indeed, it appears that there is more evidence for the acceptance of this hypothesis than against it: Brazil has high elite continuity, and the highest repression (both in absolute number and proportionally) out of the three cases. Chile has some continuity of powerful people, and although being labelled as generally

‘not repressive’, it has also been scored as ‘significantly repressed’ in 2011. Uruguay has medium but weak elite continuity, and the least repression. It might be the case that level of influence of these elites matter more than the level of elite continuity itself, nonetheless it would be premature to reach this conclusion now.

Thus, in order to fully positively support this hypothesis, much more research on the (pre- and post-military dictatorship) elite and government composition and spheres of power would be requested, especially because the influence of non-government officials in policy making is hard to be tested. At this point, it would be irresponsible to either confirm or dismiss this hypothesis completely, but it is important that this is considered as a piece of the puzzle around the repression of protests.

In any case, a great deal of caution is recommended in case one tries to expand it to other countries and time periods as the dynamics between these elites, government and society might be different and it is rather complex trying to identify which families and individuals actively control which arena.

Hypothesis 3—“The existence of a militarized police increases the likelihood for the repression of non-violent protests. Such likelihood increases if there was a lack of accountability regarding the perpetrators of the repression under the authoritarian rule”

The following table provides a summary of the score of each country in relation to the independent and intervening varibles (existence of a militarized police and accountability, respectively) and the dependent variable (level of repression):

Table xx: Summary of ‘Existence of a Militarized Police/ Lack of Accountability score and overall ‘Level of Represision’

Country Existence of a Militarized Overall Level of Repression Police/ Lack of Accountability Uruguay Low ‘Not Repressive’ Chile Medium ‘Not Repressive’ Brazil High ‘Significantly Repressive’

There is general support in the case studies for the relationship between the existence of a militarized police and the repression of non-violent protests.

Both the carabineros in Chile and the Policia Militar52 in Brazil (the uniformed militarized police forces of those countries) have been denounced by Amnesty International and the Inter

American Commission on Human Rights for their excessive use of force when handling protests.

The main issue with having this type of police-- such as the gendarmeries and other militarized police forces-- as the main law enforcement unit of a country is that they are trained under the mentality of confrontation and not respectful civic policing. Furthermore, in practice these police forces are not under full control of civilian bodies and do not even respond to civilian judicial courts.

52 Military Police in free translation to english.

In both of the countries with militarized police, we observe that even some of the non-violent protests that represented ‘no threat’ were ‘significantly repressed’ by the gendarmeries of

Brazil and Chile, confirming their unsuitability to handle non-violent protests. Their abuse of force is evident across both countries.

Meanwhile, the non-existence of a militarized police in Uruguay (which halted the military policing of civil activities, and now has a civil police force in charge of these activities),53 and the distinct lack of repression of Uruguayan demonstrations, suggests that having a high capacity to violently repress protests goes a long way in determining the level of repression inflicted.

The evidence gathered from Brazil and Chile, enhanced by the strong indication of relationship presented by the Uruguayan experience, make a strong case for this hypothesis to be supported.

Furthermore,

societies that have undergone periods of civil unrest, repression and human rights violations often face a tortuous process of coming to terms with the legacy of atrocities. They hold contrasting views of what happened and find it difficult to reconstruct consensus, all the while debating whether and how to make those responsible accountable for their past deeds. Furthermore, they must decide whether to push for justice, ask forgiveness from the victims, require expiation from the perpetrators, select policies of compensation and material and moral reparations, and introduce plans to honour [sic] the memory of the dead, through which they may eventually reach a stage of reconciliation (Roniger: 2011, p. 264).

Based on the argument in the quote and research presented in previous sections regarding the observed cases, we can point out that there is a satisfying level of evidence that supports the effects of the intervening variable (namely, the accountability in relation to crimes committed during the Authoritarian years) in the hypothesis. This is because the three cases had three

53 And only summons the elite units mentioned in previous section in extreme cases.

75 different experiences with the accountability of the military years and also present different levels of repression of non-violent demonstrations.

All three countries had Amnesty Laws, which allowed a conservative bargaining process to be done. However, despite of it Chile was able to convict a large number of its perpetrators, including its main leader Augusto Pinochet and had an early start (when compared to its

South American counterparts) on the reconciliation process. Uruguay has not annulled its

Amnesty Law as of yet, but was able to hold some of he Dictatorship’s perpetrators accountable and has had an active Truth Commission.

At the other end of the spectrum is Brazil, which, despite International Organizations’ recommendations, is resistant to the revision and annulment of the Amnesty Law and only set up its Truth Commission in 2012 (largely so that it can maintain the protection of some of the ruling elites who got amnesty during the bargaining process). The lack of accountability of past human rights violations committed by the Military provides the current (militarized) police with a sense of security that they answer to no one when it comes to prosecuting their wrongdoings. The logic is once again simple: the Military, in practice and on paper, answer only to themselves and, since no one was held accountable in the past, is very likely such impunity will repeat itself and the Military as well as the militarized police are free to commit any atrocity they see fit for their agenda and beliefs. Given that in Brazil the PMs are the ones involved in protest policing and they have this impunity mindset based on the lack of accountability of the Authoritarian years, they feel free to respond to protests in any manner they like.

The difference between the three countries regarding the transition period, their police forces and their behavior regarding protests shed light on the fact that having a militarized police

76 might indeed increase the likelihood of repression of non-violent protests and not having proper accountability and transition process might aggravate such a relationship.

As observed before, Uruguay had the least repressive responses to protests (‘not repressive’ in 2011, 2012 and 2013) and, with regards to militarized police and accountability, Uruguay scored low since it does not have a militarized police and has gone through a good deal of reconciliation process, including holding some past perpetrators accountable for their crimes during the Dictatorship, as was the case with former president Bordaberry.

With regards to Chile, only in 2011 the country was considered as ‘significantly repressive’.

In the two following years the country fell under the ‘not repressive’ category and, although

Chile still has a militarized police that has disproportional violent responses to protests at times, the country’s efforts towards reconciliation make it receive medium as the score for

‘the existence of a militarized police and accountability’.

Finally, Brazil has made some recent progress towards reconciliation, such as the creation of the National Truth Commission. Nonetheless, the country was unable to bring to justice any of the perpetrators of its Dictatorship which makes the country score high in ‘the existence of a militarized police and accountability’. Out of the three, Brazil is the only one to have met the threshold for overall ‘significantly repressive’ response to non-violent protests twice, in

2011 and 2012.54

Taken together, it is possible to identify a certain relationship between a low score in ‘the existence of a militarized police and lack of accountability’ and the overall ‘no repression’ of protests in a country, such as it is the case of Uruguay. Furthermore, a medium score was also related to an overall ‘non-repressive’ behavior in Chile. Lastly, a high score in ‘the existence

54 For the three years together, Brazil had a rate of 24.3% (out of a 465 total) events being ‘significantly repressed’, meeting the 20% threshold for a year (or the whole) period to be considered as ‘significantly repressive’.

77 of a militarized police and accountability’ corresponds to the most repressive of the three cases, as seen in the Brazil case.

Thus, this hypothesis, and its intervening variable have strong support from the evidence put forward on this research, indicating that, although not perfect, there is a relevant relationship between the existence of a militarized police and the intervening variable, namely the lack of accountability.

Put simply, the existence of a militarized police, influenced by the lack of accountability in relation to past human rights violations, is related to an increase in the likelihood of a protest being repressed. Nonetheless, it is important to point out that the exact degree of this relationship is hard to evaluate.

Final Remarks

VI. FINAL REMARKS

The relationship between regime type, repression and protests has received a lot of scholarly attention, however, the literature on the repression of non-violent protests by democracies still requires further development.

For an example, the existing literature seems to suggest that countries that have similar political and social structures would behave in a similar way when challenged by similar social demonstrations. Moreover, the level of threat that a given protest represents is frequently cited as having a close relationship to the level of repression it suffers. This thesis challenged these assertions by testing examining the South American puzzle.

The cases of Chile, Brazil and Uruguay typify this puzzle. Each behaves differently when deciding to repress non-violent protests, despite their similarities.

Brazil has presented the most violent response to non-violent protests with use of rubber bullets, tear gas, arbitrary arrests and intimidating dispersion tactics and was overall

‘significantly repressive’. Chile was mostly ‘non-repressive’ towards demonstrations (with the exception of the education protests in 2011, which were largely repressed). And Uruguay has demonstrated an overall peaceful response to demonstrations.55

This thesis examined this variety of responses. This was done by evaluating the hypothesis in the existing literature (namely the relationship between the level of repression and the level of threat that a given protest poses to the government), and by postulating novel hypotheses examining the relationship between the level of repression and subtle dictatorial political legacies (specifically elite continuity and the presence of a militarized police force).

55 Brazil: ‘significantly repressive’ in 2011, ‘not repressive’ in 2012 and ‘significantly repressive’ in 2013, being overall considered to be ‘significantly repressive’ for having met the 20% threshold of events under that label. Chile: ‘significantly repressive’ in 2011, ‘not repressive’ in 2012 and 2013, being overall considered to be ‘not repressive’. Uruguay: ‘not repressive’ in 2011, 2012 and 2013, being overall considered as being ‘not repressive’.

What was found was that the threat explanation (H1) cannot be considered a perfect explanation as it fails to explain why some ‘non-threatening’ protests are ‘significantly repressed’ while some ‘significantly threatening’ demonstrations are ‘not repressed’ at all.

The level of threat and the amount of repression were found to be only slightly correlated, providing enough support for this hypothesis to be partially accepted. Therefore this hypothesis has some validity, but does not tell the whole story.

The legacies of the authoritarian regimes that each of these cases experienced were then analyzed for their impact on protest repression. It was found that there was a limited connection between the amount of elite continuity and the level of repression (H2), however the existence of a militarized police force (that is, a gendarmerie- like body performing civil policing duties) was found to be highly associated with the use of violent force against peaceful demonstrators, especially when taken into consideration the lack of accountability of a given country in relation to past human rights violations (H3). Although slightly different for each country, the deals cut during the transition from dictatorship to democracy meant that human rights violators remained in positions of influence (in varying degrees) and/or the police force still clings to its former ideology as untouchable and unaccountable. The strength of this ideology is further reinforced by the progress of the reconciliation process in each country.

Thus, it was found that some authoritarian skeletons in each countries’ closets might still haunt the present. There is a considerable indication that the existence of the militarized police is connected to an increase in the level of repression in a given country and that might even be accentuated if the country in question has had no accountability in relation to past crimes; elites might still play a role in the repression of peaceful marches if they perceive their interests as being threatened; and last but not least, the threat posed by a demonstration is a useful heuristic but is not enough to explain the repressive behavior of a country against a

81 peaceful demonstration. To reach these conclusions, a small-n comparative case study methodology was performed, supported by some simple quantitative analysis (bivariate correlation done through SPSS).56

Firstly, the contextual factors and background of each of the case studies were presented so to provide a better understanding of their dynamics. Then, data from news media were analyzed and an original scale of protest repression was developed. Afterwards, the three hypotheses57 were analyzed and tested, making use of the aforementioned scale of repression. This process revealed that, while intuitively pleasing, the hypothesis in the existing literature cannot fully account for the observed realities in these countries. Indeed, it appears that dictatorial legacies have important and significant impacts on police practices, which calls for greater research and more understanding.

Despite these revelations, this thesis is not without its limitations. Some protests could not be considered due to the lack of figures provided by the news media and due to the relatively small observed period, the relationships discovered may not be wholly representative

(however the chances of this are slim). Furthermore, it is possible that the studied puzzle was an anomaly only applicable to the period observed, South American countries or perhaps countries that have emerged from dictatorships about three decades ago, as are thes case herein studied.

Despite these limitations however, it is possible to draw some general conclusions and this thesis helps to expand the existing literature around the topic.

The issues discussed by this thesis and its findings have relevant consequences for policy, particularly in terms of truth and reconciliation programmes, police structures and the study

56 The output for the SPSS ran tests can be found on appendix a of this thesis. 57 Hypothesis 1:“The higher the level of threat, the higher the likelihood for the repression of non-violent protests”; Hypothesis 2: “Elite continuity increases the likelihood of repression of non-violent protests in the new democratic regime”; and Hypothesis 3: “The existence of a militarized police increases the likelihood for the repression of non-violent protests. Such likelihood increases if there was a lack of accountability regarding the perpetrators of the repression under the authoritarian rule”.

82 of political elites. There are ongoing debates around the tradeoffs between militarized police and their (war) mentaility and discipline against risks of corruption (eg the militarized peacemakers police units- UPPs in their Portuguese acronym- in Rio de Janeiro that have been inserted into slums and poor communities to control the rule of law and fight organized crime), not to mention that policymakers might benefit of better understanding the relationship between past and ongoing reconciliation processes and current behavior of the militarized police and its consequent repression of citizens.

Although there is insufficient evidence to completely prove or disqualify any of the hypotheses contained herein, this thesis has provided another stepping stone for this important literature by indicating that the explanation of the repression of non-violent protests is rather complex and that, in order to understand it one must consider many different variables.

Further developments for this literature could include a careful quantitative study of other interesting puzzles such as the presented by this thesis to provide further support for the hereby proposed hypothesis. Also simply expanding the sample size, both of terms of n

(entries) and observed period, would be very enriching for the literature and for further policy implications. Moreover, this literature could benefit from the development of studies around the influence of civil elites in decision making.

In summary, the real revelation of this thesis goes beyond the violent repression of non- violent protests. What it does is to show that, although the days of dictatorial tyrants and

“disappearances” are considered to be over, these historical blights continue to impact the citizens of Latin America in perverse and often violent ways. There is no clear or easy way to discharge these authoritarian legacies, however research like this one represents a small step in the right direction.

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX A: SPSS OUTPUT

1. All three study cases together

i. SPSS correlation between ‘Level of Threat’ and ‘Level of Repression’ for all three cases Correlations LevelofThreat_ LevelofRepressi all3countries on_all3countrie s Pearson Correlation 1 .106* LevelofThreat_all3countries Sig. (2-tailed) .010 N 581 581 Pearson Correlation .106* 1 LevelofRepression_all3coun Sig. (2-tailed) .010 tries N 581 581

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

ii. SPSS Crosstabulation for all three countries (LevelofThreat_all3countries * LevelofRepression_all3countries)

LevelofThreat_all3countries * LevelofRepression_all3countries Crosstabulation Count LevelofRepression_all3countries Total No Repression Mild Repression Significant Repression Not a Threat 305 30 75 410 LevelofThreat_all3countries Mild Threat 86 4 38 128 Significant Threat 27 3 13 43 Total 418 37 126 581

2. Brazil

i. SPSS correlation between ‘Level of Threat’ and ‘Level of Repression’ for Brazil

Correlations Brazil_Levelof Brazil_Levelof Repression Threat Pearson Correlation 1 .089 Brazil_LevelofRepression Sig. (2-tailed) .056

N 465 465 Pearson Correlation .089 1 Brazil_LevelofThreat Sig. (2-tailed) .056 N 465 465

ii. SPSS Crosstabulation for Brazil (Brazil_LevelofThreat * Brazil_LevelofRepression

Brazil_LevelofThreat * Brazil_LevelofRepression Crosstabulation Count Brazil_LevelofRepression Total No Repression Mild Repression Significant Repression Not a Threat 244 15 73 332 Brazil_LevelofThreat Mild Threat 66 1 27 94 Significant Threat 23 3 13 39 Total 333 19 113 465

3. Chile i. SPSS correlation between ‘Level of Threat’ and ‘Level of Repression’ for Chile

Correlations Chile_LevelofR Chile_LevelofT epression hreat Pearson Correlation 1 .184 Chile_LevelofRepression Sig. (2-tailed) .081 N 91 91 Pearson Correlation .184 1 Chile_LevelofThreat Sig. (2-tailed) .081 N 91 91

ii. SPSS Crosstabulation for Chile (Chile_LevelofThreat * Chile_LevelofRepression

Chile_LevelofThreat * Chile_LevelofRepression Crosstabulation Count Chile_LevelofRepression Total No Repression Mild Repression Significant Repression

III

Not a Threat 41 14 2 57 Chile_LevelofThreat Mild Threat 16 3 11 30 Significant Threat 4 0 0 4 Total 61 17 13 91

4. Uruguay

i. SPSS correlation between ‘Level of Threat’ and ‘Level of Repression’

Correlations Uruguay_Level Uruguay_Level ofThreat ofRepression Pearson Correlation 1 -.089 Uruguay_LevelofThreat Sig. (2-tailed) .672 N 25 25 Pearson Correlation -.089 1 Uruguay_LevelofRepressio Sig. (2-tailed) .672 n N 25 25 ii. SPSS Crosstabulation for Uruguay (Uruguay_LevelofThreat * Uruguay_LevelofRepression

Uruguay_LevelofThreat * Uruguay_LevelofRepression Crosstabulation Count Uruguay_LevelofRepression Total No Repression Mild Repression Not a Threat 20 1 21 Uruguay_LevelofThreat Mild Threat 4 0 4 Total 24 1 25

APPENDIX B: DATA COMPILATION

CITY DAT # OF Threat in CLAI PEP NON RUBB FIRE WAT INJU ARRE LEVEL Website link E PARTICI relation to MS/ PER LET ER ARM ER RED STED OF PANTS # of REAS SPR HAL BULL CAN PEOP PEOPL REPRES participan ONS AY BOM ETS NON LE E SION ts BS Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti nt 3/12/1390517-com-23-mortos-e-protesto- Vila Velha- 27.12. Not a govern Repressi espirito-santo-procura-desaparecidos.shtml Brazil ES 13 200 Threat ment YES YES NO NO NO YES NO on Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/1 nt 2/1390289-moradores-ateiam-fogo-em-sede- Humaitá, 25.12. Mild local Repressi da-funai-e-entram-em-conflito-com-policia- Brazil AM 13 3,000 Threat issues NO YES YES NO NO YES NO on no-amazonas.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/12/1390076-sem-teto-levantam- São Paulo, 24.12. Not a Repressi acampamento-do-viaduto-do-cha-para-

Brazil SP 13 950 Threat housing NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on passar-as-festas-em-ocupacao.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/12/1389616-protesto-de-sem-teto- São Paulo, 23.12. Not a Repressi surpreende-visitantes-da-paulista-

Brazil SP 13 120 Threat housing NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on natalina.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/esporte/2013/ São Paulo, 21.12. Not a govern Repressi 12/1388975-torcedores-da-portuguesa-

Brazil SP 13 350 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on protestam-na-avenida-paulista.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 nt 3/12/1388667-cerca-de-500-pessoas- Rio de 20.12. Not a Transpo Repressi protestam-contra-aumento-da-tarifa-no-

Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 500 Threat rt YES NO NO NO NO YES NO on rio.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/1 anti No 2/1388663-contra-prisoes-do-mensalao-15- 20.12. Not a govern Repressi manifestantes-lavam-estatua-da-justica-no-

Brazil Brasília, DF 13 15 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on stf.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Rio de 17.12. Mild local Repressi 3/12/1387049-indigenas-e-estudantes-fazem-

Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 40 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on novo-ato-e-ocupam-a-reitoria-da-uerj.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/12/1386539-alunos-da-gama-filho- Rio de 16.12. Mild local Repressi protestam-no-rio-para-exigir-volta-as-

Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 200 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on aulas.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti nt 3/12/1385679-protesto-de-black-blocs- São Paulo, 13.12. Not a govern Repressi termina-com-oito-detidos-na-av-

Brazil SP 13 70 Threat ment YES YES NO NO NO NO YES on paulista.shtml

Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 nt 3/12/1384500-novo-protesto-antimendigos-

Florianópoli 12.12. Mild local Repressi enfrenta-resistencia-em-florianopolis.shtml Brazil s, SC 13 50 Threat issues YES YES YES NO NO YES YES on http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/12/1384043-sem-teto-desocupa-viaduto- São Paulo, 11.12. Mild Repressi do-cha-e-segue-protesto-no-centro-de-

Brazil SP 13 6,500 Threat housing NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on sp.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/1 anti No 2/1383533-manifestantes-distribuem-sacos- 10.12. Not a govern Repressi de-farinha-no-senado-e-pedem-cpi-do-caso-

Brazil Brasília, DF 13 10 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on perrella.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti No 3/12/1383388-grupo-faz-manifestacao-em- São Paulo, 10.12. Not a govern Repressi frente-a-estacao-do-metro-na-zona-leste-de-

Brazil SP 13 30 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on sp.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti nt 3/12/1382690-pm-prende-grupo-que- Rio de 08.12. Not a govern Repressi protestava-contra-clinton-em-

Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 20 Threat ment YES NO NO NO NO NO YES on copacabana.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/1 anti No 2/1382540-em-tom-de-campanha-no- Sorocaba, 07.12. Not a govern Repressi interior-de-sp-aecio-diz-que-visitara-oito-

Brazil SP 13 20 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on estados-ate-o-fim-do-ano.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti nt 3/12/1379922-protesto-na-zona-sul-do-rio-

Rio de 02.12. Not a govern Repressi termina-com-quatro-pessoas-detidas.shtml Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 60 Threat ment YES NO NO NO NO NO YES on No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 02.12. Mild local Repressi 3/12/1379574-protesto-bloqueia-parte-da-

Brazil SP 13 40 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on marginal-pinheiros-em-sp.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/12/1379338-grupo-fica-seminu-em-ato- São Paulo, 01.12. Mild local Repressi pela-liberdade-da-nudez-no-ibirapuera-em-

Brazil SP 13 11 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on sp.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 28.11. Mild local Repressi 3/11/1377798-motoboys-fazem-protesto-

Brazil SP 13 1,000 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on por-motofaixa-em-sp.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/11/1376098-moradores-do-butanta-fazem- São Paulo, 25.11. Mild local Repressi protesto-em-frente-a-batalhao-da-

Brazil SP 13 50 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on policia.shtml São Paulo, 19.11. Mild local No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Brazil SP 13 60 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO Repressi 3/11/1373624-manifestacao-bloqueia-

on marginal-tiete-em-sp-e-causa-72-km-de-

lentidao.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/11/1368984-manifestacao-interdita- São Paulo, 08.11. Mild local Repressi parcialmente-avenida-vinte-e-tres-de-

Brazil SP 13 50 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on maio.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/11/1368984-manifestacao-interdita- São Paulo, 08.11. Mild local Repressi parcialmente-avenida-vinte-e-tres-de-

Brazil SP 13 25 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on maio.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/11/1368942-jovens-fazem-greve-de-fome- Rio de 06.11. Mild local Repressi pela-liberacao-de-manifestantes-presos-no-

Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 2 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on rio.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 nt 3/11/1368397-protesto-fecha-terminal-

São Paulo, 07.11. Not a Transpo Repressi campo-limpo-por-mais-de-uma-hora.shtml Brazil SP 13 50 Threat rt YES NO NO NO NO YES NO on No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/saopaulo/201 São Paulo, 07.11. Mild local Repressi 3/11/1368203-protesto-de-trabalhadores-

Brazil SP 13 39 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on bloqueia-loja-na-oscar-freire.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti nt 3/11/1367416-dois-sao-detidos-durante-

Rio de 05.11. Not a govern Repressi manifestacao-no-centro-do-rio.shtml Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 200 Threat ment YES NO NO NO NO NO YES on Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti nt 3/11/1367405-policia-detem-cinco-pessoas- São Paulo, 05.11. Not a govern Repressi apos-confusao-durante-ato-na-avenida-

Brazil SP 13 100 Threat ment NO NO NO NO YES YES YES on paulista.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti No 3/11/1367327-cerca-de-200-pessoas-fazem- Rio de 05.11. Not a govern Repressi manifestacao-no-centro-do-rio-de-

Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 200 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on janeiro.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Rio de 02.11. Mild local Repressi 3/11/1366073-manifestantes-fazem-velorio-

Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 70 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on simbolico-de-amarildo-na-rocinha.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 nt 3/11/1365532-manifestantes-bloueiam-

São Paulo, 01.11. Not a Repressi marginal-tiete-no-sentido-ayrton-senna.shtml Brazil SP 13 100 Threat housing NO YES NO NO NO NO NO on http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/10/1365192-grupo-faz-protesto-contra-o- São Paulo, 31.10. Mild local Repressi aumento-do-iptu-em-frente-a-casa-de-

Brazil SP 13 250 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on haddad.shtml

VII

Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti nt 3/10/1364963-manifestacao-de-artistas-

Rio de 31.10. Not a govern Repressi reune-300-no-centro-do-rio.shtml Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 500 Threat ment YES NO NO NO NO YES NO on http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/1 anti No 0/1364897-policiais-federais-promovem-dia- Fortaleza, 31.10. Not a govern Repressi das-bruxas-em-protesto-contra-

Brazil CE 13 150 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on planalto.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/1 anti No 0/1364897-policiais-federais-promovem-dia- 31.10. Not a govern Repressi das-bruxas-em-protesto-contra-

Brazil Recife, PE 13 20 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on planalto.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 30.10. Mild local Repressi 3/10/1364473-protesto-contra-aumento-do-

Brazil SP 13 20 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on iptu-encerra-sessao-na-camara-de-sp.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/ilustrada/2013 Rio de 29.10. Mild local Repressi /10/1363889-servidores-do-minc-fazem-

Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 200 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on manifestacao-no-rio.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/10/1363784-sem-teto-liberam-br-040-e- Contagem, 29.10. Mild local Repressi pm-faz-desapropriacao-tranquila-em-

Brazil MG 13 200 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on minas.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 29.10. Mild local Repressi 3/10/1363690-apos-protesto-de-15-pessoas- Brazil SP 13 15 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on raposo-e-liberada.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti nt 3/10/1363214-black-blocs-fazem-ocupacao- Rio de 28.10. Not a govern Repressi na-esquina-do-governador-do-rio.shtml Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 12 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO YES YES on http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/ilustrada/2013 No /10/1362843-manifestantes-impedem- Cachoeira, 26.10. Mild local Repressi debates-de-colunistas-da-folha-em-festival- Brazil BA 13 30 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on literario-na-bahia.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti nt 3/10/1362468-protestos-registram- Porto 25.10. Not a govern Repressi confrontos-em-porto-alegre-campinas-e- Brazil Alegre, RS 13 300 Threat ment NO YES NO NO NO NO NO on natal.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 nt 3/10/1362468-protestos-registram- Campinas, 25.10. Mild local Repressi confrontos-em-porto-alegre-campinas-e- Brazil SP 13 100 Threat issues NO YES NO NO NO NO YES on natal.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 25.10. Significant anti No 3/10/1362337-comerciantes-fecham-as- Brazil SP 13 2,000 Threat govern NO NO NO NO NO NO NO Repressi portas-durante-protesto-no-centro-de-

VIII

ment on sp.shtml

http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti No 3/10/1361677-grupo-faz-novo-ato-por- São Paulo, 24.10. Not a govern Repressi melhoria-no-transporte-na-zona-sul-de- Brazil SP 13 50 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on sp.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ribei No raopreto/2013/10/1361372-manifestantes- Ribeirão 24.10. Mild local Repressi sao-impedidos-de-entrar-na-prefeitura-de- Brazil Preto, SP 13 150 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on ribeirao-preto-sp.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti nt 3/10/1361144-ato-por-passe-livre-no-recife- 23.10. Not a govern Repressi tem-confronto-e-adolescentes- Brazil Recife, PE 13 70 Threat ment YES NO YES NO NO YES YES on apreendidos.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 nt 3/10/1361118-protesto-do-mpl-tem- São Paulo, 23.10. Mild local Repressi principio-de-tumulto-na-regiao-do- Brazil SP 13 200 Threat issues YES NO NO NO NO S NO on grajau.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/2013 23.10. Mild local Repressi /10/1360826-em-novo-protesto-petroleiros- Brazil Cubatão, SP 13 900 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on bloqueiam-rodovia-no-litoral-paulista.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti No 3/10/1360151-pms-cercam-consulados-dos- Rio de 21.10. Not a govern Repressi eua-e-de-angola-durante-protesto-no- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 200 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on rio.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/2013 nt /10/1360112-trabalhadores-paralisam-bosch- Campinas, 21.10. Mild local Repressi em-campinas.shtml Brazil SP 13 3,200 Threat issues YES YES NO NO NO NO YES on Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/2013 anti nt /10/1359912-conflitos-entre-policiais-e- 21.10. Significant govern Repressi manifestantes-deixam-oito-feridos-no- Brazil Cubatão, SP 13 2,500 Threat ment YES YES NO YES NO YES NO on rio.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 21.10. Mild local Repressi 3/10/1359738-manifestantes-encerram- Brazil SP 13 300 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on protesto-na-zona-sul-de-sp.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/10/1359533-candidatos-que-se-atrasaram- São Paulo, 20.10. Mild local Repressi para-concurso-publico-protestam-no-centro- Brazil SP 13 60 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on de-sp-diz-pm.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/10/1359293-ativistas-de-defesa-dos- São Roque, 19.10. Mild local Repressi animais-bloqueiam-raposo-tavares-na-altura- Brazil SP 13 500 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on de-sao-roque-sp.shtml

http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti Mild 3/10/1358667-manifestantes-invadem-e- Porto 18.10. Not a govern Repressi picham-escritorio-dos-eua-em-porto- Brazil Alegre, RS 201 8 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO YES on alegre.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/10/1358554-motorista-avanca-com-carro- São Paulo, 18.10. Mild local Repressi em-cima-de-alunos-que-fechavam-entrada- Brazil SP 13 300 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on da-usp.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 17.10. Mild local Repressi 3/10/1358301-protesto-ocupa-duas-faixas- Brazil SP 13 20 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on da-av-paulista-no-sentido-consolacao.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/2013 Rio de 17.10. Mild local Repressi /10/1358270-petroleiros-reunem-poucos- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 200 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on manifestantes-em-protesto-no-rio.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Mild 3/10/1358001-manifestantes-fecham- São Paulo, 17.10. Not a Repressi viaduto-do-cha-prefeita-em-exercicio- Brazil SP 13 300 Threat housing NO NO NO NO NO YES NO on reclama-de-vandalismo.shtml anti Mild http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 16.10. Not a govern Repressi 3/10/1357385-em-protesto-grupo-ocupa- Brazil Curitiba, PR 13 40 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO YES on camara-de-vereadores-em-curitiba.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ribei nt raopreto/2013/10/1356957-manifestantes-e- Araraquara, 15.10. Not a Transpo Repressi pm-se-confrontam-em-protesto-por-onibus- Brazil SP 13 50 Threat rt NO YES NO NO NO NO YES on em-araraquara.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 nt 3/10/1356879-em-protesto-grupo-de-sem- São Paulo, 15.10. Not a Repressi teto-tenta-invadir-predio-da-camara-de- Brazil SP 13 300 Threat housing YES NO NO NO NO NO NO on sp.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ribei No raopreto/2013/10/1356305-servidores-do-hc- Ribeirão 14.10. Mild local Repressi fazem-protesto-por-aumento-em-ribeirao- Brazil Preto, SP 13 300 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on preto-sp.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/10/1356355-secretaria-municipal-de- Rio de 14.10. Not a Transpo Repressi transporte-do-rio-e-invadida-por- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 50 Threat rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on manifestantes.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Rio de 12.10. Not a Transpo Repressi 3/10/1355802-motoristas-de-vans-fazem- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 70 Threat rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on protesto-na-zona-oeste-do-rio.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti No 3/10/1355514-manifestantes-fazem- São Paulo, 11.10. Not a govern Repressi passeata-pela-regiao-central-de-sao- Brazil SP 13 100 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on paulo.shtml

http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/10/1355166-manifestantes-fazem-ato- São Paulo, 11.10. Mild local Repressi contra-aumento-de-iptu-na-camara-de- Brazil SP 13 400 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on sp.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 11.10. Mild local Repressi 3/10/1355104-protesto-de-estudantes-fecha- Brazil SP 13 200 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on entrada-da-usp.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/10/1354917-professores-municipais-e- Rio de 10.10. Not a Repressi estaduais-fazem-passeata-em-direcao-a- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 150 Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on alerj.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/10/1354264-protesto-de-estudantes-da- São Paulo, 09.10. Not a local Repressi usp-bloqueia-pista-da-av-brigadeiro-luis- Brazil SP 13 500 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on antonio.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/esporte/folha nt nacopa/2013/10/1353529-professores-e- 08.10. Not a local Repressi estudantes-invadem-arena-pantanal-em- Brazil Cuiabá, MT 13 50 Threat issues NO YES NO NO NO NO YES on protesto.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 nt 3/10/1353245-manifestantes-atacam- Rio de 07.10. Mild Repressi consulado-dos-eua-no-rio.shtml Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 30,000 Threat union NO YES NO NO NO NO YES on Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 nt 3/10/1352847-carro-explode-durante- São Paulo, 07.10. Not a local Repressi protesto-e-fere-quatro-na-zona-oeste-de- Brazil SP 13 100 Threat issues NO YES NO NO NO YES NO on sp.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/10/1352847-carro-explode-durante- São Paulo, 05.10. Not a local Repressi protesto-e-fere-quatro-na-zona-oeste-de- Brazil SP 13 60 Threat issues NO YES NO NO NO YES NO on sp.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ribei No raopreto/2013/10/1351166-em-greve- Ribeirão 03.10. Not a local Repressi carteiros-fazem-passeata-e-reivindicacoes- Brazil Preto, SP 13 50 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on em-ribeirao-preto.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/10/1350964-indios-chegam-ao- São Paulo, 02.10. Not a local Repressi monumento-as-bandeiras-apos-protesto-na- Brazil SP 13 500 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on av-paulista.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 02.10. Not a local Repressi 3/10/1350508-pms-fazem-protesto-na-sede- Brazil SP 13 350 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on do-governo-de-sp-por-reajuste-salarial.shtml São Paulo, 01.10. Not a local No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Brazil SP 13 300 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO Repressi 3/10/1350162-estudantes-invadem-reitoria-

on da-usp-durante-manifestacao.shtml

http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 9/1349231-profissionais-da-educacao-sao- retirados-da-camara-do-rio-em-meio-a- confusao.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 nt 9/1349169-policia-militar-chega-a-camara- Rio de 28.09. Not a local Repressi do-rio-para-retirar-professores-ha- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 300 Threat issues YES YES NO NO NO YES YES on confusao.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ribei No raopreto/2013/09/1349044-marcha-das- Ribeirão 28.09. Not a local Repressi vadias-tem-seios-a-mostra-e-protesto-em- Brazil Preto, SP 13 150 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on igreja-em-ribeirao.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 27.09. Not a Repressi 3/09/1348412-pm-usa-bombas-e-consegue- Brazil SP 13 70 Threat housing NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on liberar-transito-na-marginal-tiete.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 No 9/1348389-professores-da-rede-municipal- Rio de 27.09. Not a Repressi do-rio-decidem-manter-greve-e-ocupacao-da- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 600 Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on camara.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 nt 3/09/1348268-protesto-termina-com- Porto 26.09. Not a Transpo Repressi predios-depredados-e-prisoes-em-porto- Brazil Alegre, RS 13 250 Threat rt YES NO NO NO NO NO YES on alegre.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 No 9/1348040-professores-invadem-a-camara- Rio de 26.09. Not a Repressi do-rio-e-cancelam-votacao-do-plano-de- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 600 Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on carreira.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 26.09. Not a local Repressi 3/09/1347698-apos-protesto-indios-liberam- Brazil SP 13 200 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on rodovia-dos-bandeirantes-em-sp.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ribei No raopreto/2013/09/1347071-em-novo-ato- Ribeirão 25.09. Not a local Repressi servidores-de-ribeirao-preto-paralisam- Brazil Preto, SP 13 100 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on atividades-na-autarquia-de-agua.shtml Mild http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 20.09. Not a local Repressi 3/09/1345437-vias-do-centro-e-da-zona-sul- Brazil SP 13 40 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO YES on de-sp-sao-liberadas-apos-protestos.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 Rio de 20.09. Not a Repressi 9/1345098-professores-ocupam-sede-da- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 60 Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on prefeitura-do-rio.shtml Rio de 19.09. Not a anti Mild http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 100 Threat govern NO NO NO NO NO NO YES Repressi 9/1344709-manifestacao-contra-cabral-

XII

ment on termina-de-maneira-pacifica-no-rio.shtml

Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 nt 9/1344073-protesto-em-recife-acaba-com- 18.09. Not a Transpo Repressi 16-detidos.shtml Brazil Recife, PE 13 250 Threat rt NO YES NO NO NO NO YES on http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 anti No 9/1344047-descontentes-com-o-stf- São Paulo, 18.09. Not a govern Repressi manifestantes-fazem-protesto-em-sao- Brazil SP 13 30 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on paulo.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/09/1344010-manifestacao-e-obras- Guarulhos, 18.09. Not a local Repressi provocam-15-km-de-lentidao-na-ayrton- Brazil SP 13 200 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on senna.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Fortaleza, 18.09. Not a local Repressi 3/09/1344006-mst-invade-crm-do-ceara-em- Brazil CE 13 150 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on protesto-a-favor-de-medicos-cubanos.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 anti nt 9/1342003-sem-mascaras-protesto-de-rua- Rio de 13.09. Not a govern Repressi no-rio-tem-mais-pms-que- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 100 Threat ment NO NO YES NO NO NO YES on manifestantes.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/09/1341481-protesto-de-motoristas-de- Rio de 12.09. Not a Transpo Repressi vans-gera-caos-no-transito-no-centro-do- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 300 Threat rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on rio.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 Rio de 12.09. Not a govern Repressi 9/1341267-manifestacao-pacifica-pede- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 150 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on liberdade-para-presos-no-rio.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 12.09. Not a local Repressi 3/09/1341008-manifestantes-bloqueiam- Brazil SP 13 50 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on faixa-da-av-paulista-no-centro-de-sp.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 Rio de 12.09. Not a local Repressi 9/1340981-professores-fazem-protesto-nas- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 30 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on escadarias-da-alerj.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 São Paulo, 11.09. Not a local Repressi 9/1340714-grupo-faz-protesto-contra-a- Brazil SP 13 30 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on folha-diante-da-sede-do-jornal.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 nt 3/09/1339183-policia-usa-bombas-em- Porto 09.09. Not a Repressi protesto-de-professores-na-casa-de- Brazil Alegre, RS 13 70 Threat union NO YES NO NO NO YES NO on governador-gaucho.shtml Manaus, 07.09. Not a local No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 Brazil AM 13 200 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO Repressi 9/1338769-turistas-e-policiais-sao-maioria-

XIII

on em-protesto-fracassado-em-manaus.shtml

Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 anti nt 9/1338690-mascarados-depredam-onibus-e- Salvador, 07.09. Not a govern Repressi entram-confronto-com-a-pm-em- Brazil BA 13 200 Threat ment NO YES NO NO NO NO YES on salvador.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 anti Mild 9/1338586-sete-de-setembro-em-natal-tem- 07.09. Significant govern Repressi servidores-em-greve-e-protesto-do-grito-dos- Brazil Natal, RN 13 2,000 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO YES on excluidos.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 anti nt 9/1338557-policia-bloqueia-ruas-em-curitiba- 07.09. Not a govern Repressi para-evitar-passagem-de-manifestantes.shtml Brazil Curitiba, PR 13 400 Threat ment NO NO YES NO NO YES YES on Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 anti nt 9/1338549-pm-e-manifestantes-entram-em- Rio de 07.09. Not a govern Repressi confronto-no-rio-cinco-foram-detidos.shtml Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 100 Threat ment NO NO NO NO YES YES YES on http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/09/1338301-apos-invadir-predio-mtst- São Paulo, 06.09. Not a Repressi fecha-marginal-na-volta-a-paraisopolis-em- Brazil SP 13 800 Threat housing NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on sp.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 No 9/1337728-nova-chefe-da-presidencia-em-sp- São Paulo, 06.09. Mild local Repressi estreia-com-manifestacao-na-av- Brazil SP 13 2,500 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on paulista.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti nt 3/09/1337736-apos-fechar-ruas-no-centro- São Paulo, 05.09. Not a govern Repressi protesto-de-black-blocs-fecha-a-av- Brazil SP 13 30 Threat ment NO YES NO NO NO NO YES on paulista.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 05.09. Significant govern Repressi 3/09/1337301-manifestantes-encerram-ato- Brazil SP 13 2,500 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on e-avenida-paulista-e-liberada.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/09/1337276-manifestantes-voltam-a- Cosmópolis, 05.09. Not a local Repressi fechar-pedagio-de-cosmopolis-sp-apos-2- Brazil SP 13 50 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on meses.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 nt 9/1336774-movimentos-sociais-protestam- São Paulo, 04.09. Not a local Repressi contra-cartel-do-metro-em-sp.shtml Brazil SP 13 700 Threat issues NO YES NO NO NO YES NO on http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 Rio de 03.09. Not a local No 9/1336124-manifestantes-querem-barrar- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 20 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO Repressi proibicao-de-mascaras-em-protestos-no-

XIV

on rio.shtml

http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/09/1335725-professores-protestam-na- Embu das 02.09. Not a local Repressi regis-bittencourt-em-embu-das-artes- Brazil Artes, SP 13 200 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on sp.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 01.09. Not a local Repressi 3/09/1335371-moradores-do-morumbi- Brazil SP 13 300 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on fazem-protesto-por-mais-seguranca.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 01.09. Not a local Repressi 3/09/1335371-moradores-do-morumbi- Brazil SP 13 150 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on fazem-protesto-por-mais-seguranca.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 nt 3/08/1335223-manifestacao-feminista-reune- São Paulo, 31.08. Not a local Repressi 800-e-ocupa-centro-de-sp.shtml Brazil SP 13 800 Threat issues NO YES NO NO NO YES NO on http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 anti No 8/1334918-protesto-de-black-blocs-contra-o- Rio de 30.08. Not a govern Repressi governador-sergio-cabral-fecha-ruas-no- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 60 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on rio.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 30.08. Mild local Repressi 3/08/1334708-protestos-reunem-1500- Brazil SP 13 1,500 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on pessoas-e-fecham-vias-do-centro-de-sp.shtml Belo No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Horizonte, 30.08. Not a local Repressi 3/08/1334595-apos-protestos-estacoes-de- Brazil MG 13 200 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on onibus-operam-normalmente-em-bh.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ribei No raopreto/2013/08/1334458-manifestantes- Ribeirão 30.08. Not a local Repressi fecham-a-anhanguera-por-30-minutos-em- Brazil Preto, SP 13 150 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on ribeirao-preto.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 30.08. Not a local Repressi 3/08/1334344-apos-protesto-anchieta-e- Brazil Cubatão, SP 13 50 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on liberada-por-manifestantes.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 29.08. Mild Repressi 3/08/1334191-protesto-por-moradia-acaba- Brazil SP 13 1,600 Threat housing NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on em-frente-ao-palacio-dos-bandeirantes.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/08/1333359-comerciantes-fecham- São Paulo, 28.08. Not a local Repressi marginal-pinheiros-contra-obras-do- Brazil SP 13 50 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on metro.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/08/1333204-por-moradias-manifestantes- São Paulo, 28.08. Mild Repressi realizam-protestos-e-bloqueiam-avenida-em- Brazil SP 13 1,500 Threat housing NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on sp.shtml

Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 anti nt 8/1332965-confusao-entre-manifestantes-e- Rio de 27.08. Not a govern Repressi policiais-em-manifestacao-no-rio.shtml Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 60 Threat ment NO YES YES NO NO YES NO on http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/08/1332369-medicos-brasileiros- Fortaleza, 26.08. Not a local Repressi protestam-em-fortaleza-contra- Brazil CE 13 100 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on estrangeiros.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/08/1331676-apos-tumulto-no-transito- Rio de 24.08. Not a local Repressi protesto-contra-remocoes-no-horto-termina- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 100 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on no-rio.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 No 8/1331569-contra-bufe-milionario- Fortaleza, 24.08. Not a local Repressi manifestantes-fazem-buchada-no-palacio-no- Brazil CE 13 70 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on ceara.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 nt 8/1331308-black-blocs-lancam-pedras- São Paulo, 23.08. Not a local Repressi contra-a-editora-abril-policia-usa-bombas-e- Brazil SP 13 200 Threat issues NO YES NO NO YES NO YES on gas-lacrimogeneo.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 Rio de 22.08. Not a local Repressi 8/1330699-manifestantes-protesta-contra-o- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 150 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on desaparecimento-do-pedreiro-amarildo.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/08/1330553-cerca-de-500-pessoas- São Paulo, 22.08. Not a local Repressi ocupam-plenario-da-camara-para- Brazil SP 13 500 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on audiencia.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 22.08. Mild local Repressi 3/08/1330157-motoristas-de-vans-escolares- Brazil SP 13 1,100 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on protestam-em-sao-paulo.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 Rio de 21.08. Not a Repressi 8/1329753-professores-protestam-nas-ruas- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 300 Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on do-centro-do-rio.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 No 8/1329721-servidores-em-greve-acampam- 21.08. Not a Repressi em-frente-a-residencia-oficial-da- Brazil Natal, RN 13 300 Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on governadora-do-rn.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/esporte/folha No nacopa/2013/08/1329696-manifestantes- Rio de 21.08. Not a local Repressi protestam-em-frente-a-odebrecht-no-rio- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 30 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on contra-venda-do-maracana.shtml anti Mild http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 São Paulo, 21.08. Not a govern Repressi 8/1329513-manifestantes-voltar-a-protestar- Brazil SP 13 30 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO YES NO on contra-alckmin-no-centro-de-sp.shtml

XVI

Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 nt 3/08/1329139-batalhao-de-choque-cerca- Rio de 20.08. Mild Repressi prefeitura-do-rio-durante-protesto-de- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 4,000 Threat union NO YES NO NO NO YES NO on professores.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/08/1329081-policiais-federais-fazem- São Paulo, 20.08. Not a local Repressi protesto-em-frente-a-superintendencia-em- Brazil SP 13 100 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on sp.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 nt 8/1328969-protesto-termina-em-novo- Rio de 20.08. Not a local Repressi conflito-no-rio.shtml Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 100 Threat issues YES YES NO NO YES NO NO on http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/esporte/2013/ No 08/1328619-torcedores-do-corinthians- São Paulo, 19.08. Not a local Repressi fazem-protesto-apos-emerson-dar-selinho- Brazil SP 13 5 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on em-amigo.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 No 8/1328348-domingo-na-ocupacao-da- Rio de 18.08. Not a local Repressi camara-do-rio-tem-ioga-e-lavagem-das- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 40 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on escadarias.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 No 8/1328329-professores-fazem-enterro- Rio de 18.08. Not a Repressi simbolico-de-cabral-em-protesto-na-orla-de- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 1,000 Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on copacabana.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 No 8/1328207-manifestantes-fazem-vigilia-na- Rio de 17.08. Not a local Repressi frente-da-casa-do-prefeito-do-rio-eduardo- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 150 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on paes.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 nt 3/08/1327899-manifestantes-queimam- 16.08. Not a local Repressi segundo-onibus-e-um-carro-em-osasco.shtml Brazil Osasco, SO 13 150 Threat issues NO YES NO NO NO YES YES on http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 No 8/1327764-professores-estaduais-protestam- Rio de 16.08. Not a Repressi por-melhores-condicoes-de-trabalho-no- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 1,000 Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on rio.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 nt 3/08/1327171-manifestantes-e-policiais- Fortaleza, 15.08. Not a local Repressi entram-em-confronto-em-protesto-em- Brazil CE 13 300 Threat issues NO YES YES NO NO YES NO on fortaleza.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/08/1327134-manifestantes-protestam- São Paulo, 15.08. Not a local Repressi contra-pm-e-fecham-ruas-no-centro-de- Brazil SP 13 150 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on sp.shtml

XVII

http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 anti Mild 8/1326860-policiais-do-choque-cercam-a- Rio de 15.08. Not a govern Repressi camara-do-rio-para-evitar-acesso-de- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 250 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO YES on ativistas.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 anti nt 8/1326653-ato-contra-cabral-termina-mais- Rio de 14.08. Not a govern Repressi uma-vez-em-confronto-no-rio.shtml Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 200 Threat ment NO YES NO NO NO YES NO on http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 8/1326621-pm-de-sp-usa-bombas-contra- protestos-na-camara-e-na-assembleia.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 8/1326433-manifestantes-queimam-boneco- Significa de-alckmin-em-protesto-em- anti nt sp.shtmlhttp://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder São Paulo, 14.08. Significant govern Repressi /2013/08/1326580-manifestantes-ocupam- Brazil SP 13 3,000 Threat ment NO YES NO NO NO YES YES on auditorios-da-assembleia-de-sp.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 Manaus, 14.08. Not a local Repressi 8/1326618-protesto-do-mpl-reune-30- Brazil AM 13 30 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on pessoas-em-manaus.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 São Paulo, 14.08. Not a govern Repressi 8/1326580-manifestantes-ocupam- Brazil SP 13 600 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on auditorios-da-assembleia-de-sp.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 anti nt 8/1326372-protesto-contra-cartel-do-metro- São Paulo, 14.08. Not a govern Repressi reune-200-pessoas-em-sp-diz-pm.shtml Brazil SP 13 1,000 Threat ment NO YES NO NO NO NO YES on http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 No 8/1326319-protesto-contra-tarifa-reune- 14.08. Not a Transpo Repressi apenas-cinco-e-vira-panfletagem-em- Brazil Curitiba, PR 13 5 Threat rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on curitiba.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ribei No raopreto/2013/08/1325999-policiais-civis- Ribeirão 13.08. Not a local Repressi fazem-protesto-em-praca-no-centro-de- Brazil Preto, SP 13 300 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on ribeirao-preto.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 13.08. Not a local Repressi 3/08/1325822-vendedores-de-hot-dog- Brazil SP 13 15 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on protestam-no-centro-de-sao-paulo.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 anti nt 8/1325551-policiais-e-manifestantes-tem- Rio de 12.08. Not a govern Repressi novo-confronto-no-palacio-guanabara.shtml Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 300 Threat ment YES YES NO NO NO YES NO on São Paulo, 09.08. Not a local No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Brazil SP 13 150 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO Repressi 3/08/1324529-apos-protestos-manifestantes-

XVIII

on liberam-vias-em-sao-paulo.shtml

http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 No 8/1323987-manifestantes-tentam-entrar-na- Rio de 09.08. Not a local Repressi camara-do-rio-para-acompanhar-cpi-mas- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 50 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on sao-barrados.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/08/1323818-ato-de-servidores-da-saude- São Paulo, 08.08. Not a local Repressi prejudica-pacientes-do-sirio-libanes-diz- Brazil SP 13 70 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on hospital.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 08.08. Not a local Repressi 3/08/1323500-passeata-de-policiais-interdita- Brazil SP 13 300 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on avenida-no-centro-de-sp.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 nt 8/1323185-policia-prende-manifestante-em- Rio de 07.08. Not a local Repressi protesto-contra-tv-globo-no-rio.shtml Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 30 Threat issues YES NO NO NO NO NO YES on No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 07.08. Not a local Repressi 3/08/1323183-pilotos-da-tam-protestam-em- Brazil SP 13 200 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on congonhas-contra-demissoes.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/08/1322970-deficientes-fazem-protesto-na- São Paulo, 07.08. Not a local Repressi prefeitura-grupo-quer-mais- Brazil SP 13 200 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on acessibilidade.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 Fortaleza, 07.08. Not a local Repressi 8/1322722-cid-gomes-tenta-negociar-mas-e- Brazil CE 13 50 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on vaiado-por-manifestantes-em-fortaleza.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti No 3/08/1322730-em-ato-contra-alckmin- São Paulo, 06.08. Not a govern Repressi manifestantes-usam-coxinha-para-provocar- Brazil SP 13 70 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on pms.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti nt 3/08/1322356-apos-protesto-das-centrais- São Paulo, 06.08. Not a govern Repressi sindicais-av-paulista-e-liberada.shtml Brazil SP 13 200 Threat ment NO YES NO NO NO YES NO on Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 nt 3/08/1321838-protesto-a-favor-da-telexfree- São Paulo, 05.08. Not a local Repressi interdita-faixas-da-paulista.shtml Brazil SP 13 200 Threat issues NO YES NO NO NO NO YES on http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Belo anti No 3/08/1321574-manifestante-faz-greve-de- Horizonte, 04.08. Not a govern Repressi fome-no-quarto-dia-de-ocupacao-a-camara- Brazil MG 13 50 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on de-bh.shtml

XIX

http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/08/1321536-apos-4-meses-ato-pede- São Paulo, 04.08. Not a local Repressi justica-por-morte-de-mulher-em- Brazil SP 13 30 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on higienopolis.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/08/1321529-rodovia-e-liberada-em-franco- Franco da 04.08. Not a local Repressi da-rocha-apos-interdicao-por- Brazil Rocha, SP 13 50 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on manifestantes.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 anti No 8/1321373-manifestantes-gritam-contra-pt- São Paulo, 03.08. Not a govern Repressi lula-e-comunismo-em-frente-a-reuniao-do- Brazil SP 13 30 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on foro-de-sp.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 03.08. Not a govern Repressi 3/08/1321355-manifestantes-acampam-em- Brazil SP 13 15 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on frente-a-sede-do-governo-de-sao-paulo.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 8/1321039-protesto-contra-alckmin-e-cabral- Significa reune-400-no-centro-de-sao-paulo.shtml anti nt http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 02.08. Not a govern Repressi 3/08/1321355-manifestantes-acampam-em- Brazil SP 13 400 Threat ment YES YES NO NO YES YES NO on frente-a-sede-do-governo-de-sao-paulo.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti nt 3/08/1320416-manifestantes-protestam- São Paulo, 01.08. Not a govern Repressi diante-de-delegacia-veja-video-de- Brazil SP 13 500 Threat ment NO YES NO NO NO YES YES on tumulto.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 anti nt 8/1319992-policia-militar-retira- Rio de 31.07. Not a govern Repressi manifestantes-do-plenario-da-camara-dos- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 40 Threat ment YES NO NO NO NO NO YES on vereadores-do-rio.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 31.07. Not a govern Repressi 3/07/1319713-manifestacao-dos-medicos- Brazil SP 13 275 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on interdita-pista-da-av-paulista-em-sp.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti nt 3/07/1319698-confronto-entre-sindicalistas- 31.07. Not a govern Repressi termina-com-dois-baleados-e-28-detidos-em- Brazil Vitória, ES 13 70 Threat ment YES NO NO YES NO YES YES on vitoria-es.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti nt 3/07/1319689-segundo-dia-de-protesto-de- Salvador, 31.07. Not a govern Repressi medicos-tem-paralisacao-em-21-estados-e- Brazil BA 13 500 Threat ment YES NO NO NO NO YES NO on df.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 Rio de 31.07. Not a govern Repressi 7/1319563-manifestantes-ocupam-esquina- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 30 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on de-cabral-ha-mais-de-62-horas-no-rio.shtml

No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 31.07. Not a Repressi 3/07/1319482-termina-passeata-de- Brazil SP 13 100 Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on aeroviarios-na-zona-sul-de-sp.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 31.07. Not a Repressi 3/07/1319482-termina-passeata-de- Brazil Recife, PE 13 50 Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on aeroviarios-na-zona-sul-de-sp.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/07/1319326-grupo-protesta-perto-de- São Paulo, 30.07. Not a local Repressi delegacia-apos-prisao-de- Brazil SP 13 50 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on manifestantes.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 3/07/1319262-protesto-volta-a-ter- vandalismo-e-confronto-em-sp-20-sao- detidos.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti nt 3/07/1319214-manifestantes-depredam- São Paulo, 30.07. Not a govern Repressi bancos-e-loja-de-carros-pm-usa- Brazil SP 13 150 Threat ment NO YES NO NO NO NO YES on bombas.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/2013 No /07/1318962-tam-demite-ate-mil- São Paulo, 30.07. Not a local Repressi funcionarios-apos-corte-na-oferta-de- Brazil SP 13 300 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on voos.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 anti No 7/1318900-apesar-de-apelo-manifestantes- Rio de 30.07. Not a govern Repressi permanecem-em-frente-ao-predio-de- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 10 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on cabral.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Belo No 3/07/1318606-movimentos-sem-teto- Horizonte, 29.07. Not a Repressi ocupam-hall-da-prefeitura-de-belo- Brazil MG 13 75 Threat housing NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on horizonte.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/07/1318469-contra-prisoes-no-denarc- São Paulo, 29.07. Not a local Repressi delegados-fazem-passeata-no-centro-de- Brazil SP 13 200 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on sp.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 29.07. Not a Repressi 3/07/1318426-protesto-termina-na-rodovia- Brazil Cubatão, SP 13 100 Threat housing NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on conego-domenico-rangoni-sp.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 Rio de 29.07. Not a govern Repressi 7/1318396-manifestantes-viram-a-noite-em- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 30 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on protesto-contra-cabral-no-rio.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti nt 3/07/1318235-manifestantes-fazem-novo- Rio de 28.07. Not a govern Repressi ato-no-rio-contra-o-governador-sergio- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 60 Threat ment NO YES NO NO NO YES NO on cabral.shtml

XXI

http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/07/1318044-apos-dois-anos-de-morte-de- São Paulo, 28.07. Not a local Repressi vitor-gurman-familiares-protestam-em- Brazil SP 13 150 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on sp.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 No 7/1317922-foco-de-protesto-em-copacabana- Rio de 27.07. Not a local Repressi gera-tensao-entre-manifestantes-e- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 100 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on peregrinos.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti nt 3/07/1317766-policia-detem-8-apos- São Paulo, 27.07. Not a govern Repressi manifestacao-violenta-na-avenida- Brazil SP 13 300 Threat ment NO YES NO NO NO NO YES on paulista.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 anti nt 7/1316805-manifestantes-se-deslocam-pelo- Rio de 25.07. Not a govern Repressi leblon-no-rio-em-protesto-contra-o- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 700 Threat ment YES NO YES NO NO YES YES on governador.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 João Pessoa, 24.07. Not a govern Repressi 3/07/1316245-apos-protesto-manifestantes- Brazil PB 13 50 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on ocupam-assembleia-em-joao-pessoa.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 anti No 7/1316183-estudantes-medicos-e- Salvador, 24.07. Not a govern Repressi marisqueiros-protestam-antes-de-evento- Brazil BA 13 100 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on com-dilma-em-salvador.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/07/1315311-protesto-rebatiza- Salvador, 23.07. Not a Transpo Repressi monumento-da-familia-de-acm-em- Brazil BA 13 50 Threat rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on salvador.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/07/1315053-membros-do-movimento- Salvador, 22.07. Not a Transpo Repressi passe-livre-ocupam-a-camara-de- Brazil BA 13 14 Threat rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on salvador.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/esporte/2013/ Rio de 21.07. Not a local Repressi 07/1314508-poucos-manifestantes-fazem- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 30 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on ato-em-frente-ao-maracana.shtml São No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Bernardo do 20.07. Not a Transpo Repressi 3/07/1314262-manifestantes-fazem- Brazil Campo, SP 13 20 Threat rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on churrascao-em-protesto-na-grande-sp.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti nt 3/07/1314048-apos-tres-horas- São Paulo, 19.07. Not a govern Repressi manifestantes-encerram-protestos-na- Brazil SP 13 350 Threat ment NO YES NO NO NO YES NO on avenida-paulista.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 19.07. Not a Transpo nt 3/07/1314003-manifestantes-entram-em- Brazil Natal, RN 13 1,000 Threat rt YES YES YES NO NO YES NO Repressi confronto-com-a-pm-durante-ato-em-

XXII

on natal.shtml

Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 nt 3/07/1313871-protesto-em-vitoria-es- 19.07. Not a local Repressi termina-com-38-detidos.shtml Brazil Vitória, ES 13 400 Threat issues NO YES YES NO NO NO YES on Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 nt 3/07/1313253-retirada-de-manifestantes- 18.07. Not a Transpo Repressi termina-em-confronto-na-camara-de- Brazil Natal, RN 13 30 Threat rt YES NO NO YES NO NO NO on natal.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 Fortaleza, 18.07. Not a local Repressi 7/1312913-dilma-e-recebida-com-protestos- Brazil CE 13 100 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on de-indios-e-medicos-em-fortaleza.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 Fortaleza, 18.07. Not a govern Repressi 7/1312913-dilma-e-recebida-com-protestos- Brazil CE 13 200 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on de-indios-e-medicos-em-fortaleza.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 anti nt 7/1312881-madrugada-de-caos-assusta- Rio de 18.07. Not a govern Repressi moradores-da-zona-sul-do-rio.shtml Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 500 Threat ment NO YES YES NO NO YES NO on Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 anti nt 7/1312770-manifestantes-na-rua-de-sergio- Rio de 17.07. Not a govern Repressi cabral-entram-em-confronto-com-a-policia- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 200 Threat ment YES YES YES NO NO YES NO on no-rio.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/07/1312263-protesto-bloqueia-avenida- São Paulo, 17.07. Not a local Repressi que-da-acesso-a-terminal-na-zona-norte-de- Brazil SP 13 100 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on sp.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 16.07. Significant govern Repressi 3/07/1312128-protesto-de-profissionais-da- Brazil SP 13 3,000 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on saude-termina-e-paulista-e-liberada.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Rio de 16.07. Not a govern Repressi 3/07/1312063-aposentados-do-aerus-fazem- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 200 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on novo-protesto-no-centro-do-rio.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti No 3/07/1311289-rodovia-interditada-por- Campo 15.07. Not a govern Repressi manifestantes-em-mato-grosso-e- Brazil Verde, MT 13 70 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on liberada.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 15.07. Not a Repressi 3/07/1311167-manifestantes-acampam-em- Brazil SP 13 300 Threat housing NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on frente-a-prefeitura-de-sao-paulo.shtml Rio de 14.07. Not a anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 200 Threat govern NO NO NO NO NO NO NO Repressi 3/07/1311027-manifestantes-protestam-em-

XXIII

ment on frente-a-sede-do-governo-do-rio.shtml

http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti No 3/07/1310857-grupo-faz-protesto-em- Rio de 13.07. Not a govern Repressi casamento-de-filha-de-empresario-de- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 30 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on onibus-no-rio.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Rio de 13.07. Not a Transpo Repressi 3/07/1310832-manifestantes-protestam-em- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 50 Threat rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on frente-a-sede-do-governo-no-rio.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/07/1310754-manifestantes-acampam-em- Fortaleza, 13.07. Not a local Repressi obra-contra-construcao-de-aquario-em- Brazil CE 13 300 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on fortaleza.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 12.07. Not a govern Repressi 3/07/1310613-ruas-da-regiao-central-de-sp- Brazil SP 13 50 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on sao-liberadas-apos-novos-protestos.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 3/07/1310023-noite-de-conflitos-entre- manifestantes-e-a-pm-no-rio-termina-com- 46-detidos.shtml / Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti nt 3/07/1310113-policia-do-rio-prendeu-50- Rio de 12.07. Not a govern Repressi pessoas-por-participarem-das- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 500 Threat ment NO YES NO NO NO YES YES on manifestacoes.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ribei No raopreto/2013/07/1309840-ato-revela-mais- Ribeirão 12.07. Not a local Repressi um-problema-financeiro-da-prefeitura-de- Brazil Preto, SP 13 50 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on ribeirao-preto.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 12.07. Not a local Repressi 3/07/1309950-sindicalistas-fazem-protesto- Brazil SP 13 300 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on em-todo-pais-mas-adesao-e-baixa.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 11.07. Not a local Repressi 3/07/1309936-rede-globo-vira-alvo-de- Brazil SP 13 400 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on manifestantes-em-sp-e-rs.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti nt 3/07/1309843-regis-bittencourt-e-liberada- Embu das 11.07. Significant govern Repressi na-grande-sp-apos-protesto-e- Brazil Artes, SP 13 1,500 Threat ment NO YES NO NO NO YES NO on confronto.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti nt 3/07/1309796-manifestacao-reune-3000- Porto 11.07. Significant govern Repressi pessoas-no-centro-de-porto-alegre.shtml Brazil Alegre, RS 13 3,000 Threat ment YES YES NO NO NO NO YES on 11.07. Significant anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Brazil Goiânia, GO 13 5,000 Threat govern NO NO NO NO NO NO NO Repressi 3/07/1309648-reitoria-de-universidade-e-

XXIV

ment on invadida-em-goiania-ato-reune-5000.shtml

http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti No 3/07/1309643-paulista-e-liberada-apos- São Paulo, 11.07. Significant govern Repressi quase-4-horas-grupo-segue-para-a- Brazil SP 13 7,000 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on republica.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti nt 3/07/1309631-manifestantes-entra-em- Rio de 11.07. Significant govern Repressi confronto-com-o-choque-durante-ato-no- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 2,500 Threat ment YES NO NO NO NO NO YES on rio.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti No 3/07/1309579-protesto-fecha-vias-e- Manaus, 11.07. Not a govern Repressi restringe-circulacao-de-onibus-em-manaus- Brazil AM 13 500 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on am.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ribei No raopreto/2013/07/1309526-donos-de-vans- Ribeirão 11.07. Not a local Repressi fazem-protesto-na-gestora-do-transporte- Brazil Preto, SP 13 50 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on em-ribeirao.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ribei anti No raopreto/2013/07/1309526-donos-de-vans- Ribeirão 11.07. Not a govern Repressi fazem-protesto-na-gestora-do-transporte- Brazil Preto, SP 13 200 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on em-ribeirao.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti No 3/07/1309523-ato-de-trabalhadores-reune- Campo 11.07. Significant govern Repressi 35-mil-em-campo-grande-ms-segundo-a- Brazil Grande, MS 13 35,000 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on pm.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 11.07. Significant govern Repressi 3/07/1309484-manifestante-bloqueiam- Brazil Natal, RN 13 6,000 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on rodovias-em-ao-menos-oito-estados.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Rio de 11.07. Not a govern Repressi 3/07/1309446-manifestantes-fecham-centro- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 50 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on de-operacoes-dos-correios-no-rio.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti No 3/07/1309275-protestos-se-juntam-e- São Paulo, 10.07. Not a govern Repressi mantem-bloqueio-parcial-na-paulista-em- Brazil SP 13 160 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on sp.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/2013 No /07/1308869-protesto-de-estivadores- 10.07. Not a local Repressi paralisa-carregamento-de-13-navios-no- Brazil Santos, SP 13 200 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on porto-de-santos.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 09.07. Not a local Repressi 3/07/1308713-grupo-protesta-pela-morte-de- Brazil SP 13 300 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on mc-daleste-na-zona-leste-de-sp.shtml

XXV

http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/07/1308067-protesto-de-empregados- São Paulo, 08.07. Not a local Repressi domesticos-ocupa-duas-faixas-da-av- Brazil SP 13 200 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on ipiranga.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/esporte/2013/ São Paulo, 07.07. Not a local Repressi 07/1307673-protesto-antes-de-classico-pede- Brazil SP 13 40 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on saida-de-juvenal-do-sao-paulo.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti No 3/07/1307649-professores-da-uerj- Rio de 07.07. Not a govern Repressi protestam-na-esquina-da-casa-do- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 20 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on governador-sergio-cabral.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 06.07. Not a local Repressi 3/07/1307540-protesto-contra-ocupacao-da- Brazil Ilhabela, SP 13 200 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on cidade-reune-200-pessoas-em-ilhabela.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 06.07. Not a local Repressi 3/07/1307520-cerca-de-300-deficientes- Brazil SP 13 300 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on auditivos-protestam-na-av-paulista.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 06.07. Not a local Repressi 3/07/1307512-grupo-protesta-na-praca-da- Brazil SP 13 200 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on se-pela-morte-de-menino-boliviano.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 nt 3/07/1307124-protesto-contra-pedagio-em- 05.07. Mild local Repressi vitoria-termina-com-dez-pessoas- Brazil Vitória, ES 13 3,000 Threat issues YES NO NO NO NO YES YES on presas.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/07/1306478-bloqueios-de-estradas- Florianópoli 04.07. Not a Transpo Repressi diminuem-e-capitais-tem-protestos-por- Brazil s, SC 13 200 Threat rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on melhor-transporte.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Mild 3/07/1306478-bloqueios-de-estradas- 04.07. Not a Transpo Repressi diminuem-e-capitais-tem-protestos-por- Brazil Vitória, ES 13 400 Threat rt NO YES NO NO NO NO NO on melhor-transporte.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Juazeiro, No 3/07/1306179-ponte-entre-bahia-e- BA/Petrolin 04.07. Significant Transpo Repressi pernambuco-e-liberada-apos-9-horas-de- Brazil a, PE 13 2,000 Threat rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on protestos.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 04.07. Not a local Repressi 3/07/1306152-protesto-de-policiais-bloqueia- Brazil SP 13 50 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on trafego-da-av-paulista-no-centro-de-sp.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 04.07. Not a govern Repressi 3/07/1306152-protesto-de-policiais-bloqueia- Brazil SP 13 300 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on trafego-da-av-paulista-no-centro-de-sp.shtml Campinas, 04.07. Not a local No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Brazil SP 13 300 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO Repressi 3/07/1306081-protesto-bloqueia-por-cinco-

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on horas-estrada-que-da-acesso-a- viracopos.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 nt 3/07/1305958-pm-detem-cerca-de-30- Campinas, 03.07. Not a Transpo Repressi manifestantes-apos-protesto-em- Brazil SP 13 250 Threat rt NO YES NO NO NO NO YES on campinas.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti nt 3/07/1305875-grupos-ocupam-predios- 03.07. Not a govern Repressi publicos-em-mais-um-dia-de-protestos-pelo- Brazil Vitória, ES 13 200 Threat ment YES NO NO NO NO YES NO on pais.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Belo No 3/07/1305875-grupos-ocupam-predios- Horizonte, 03.07. Not a Transpo Repressi publicos-em-mais-um-dia-de-protestos-pelo- Brazil MG 13 250 Threat rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on pais.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti No 3/07/1305875-grupos-ocupam-predios- 03.07. Not a govern Repressi publicos-em-mais-um-dia-de-protestos-pelo- Brazil Brasília, DF 13 200 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on pais.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti No 3/07/1305875-grupos-ocupam-predios- Salvador, 03.07. Significant govern Repressi publicos-em-mais-um-dia-de-protestos-pelo- Brazil BA 13 3,000 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on pais.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti No 3/07/1305875-grupos-ocupam-predios- Fortaleza, 03.07. Significant govern Repressi publicos-em-mais-um-dia-de-protestos-pelo- Brazil CE 13 2,000 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on pais.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Belo anti nt 3/07/1305875-grupos-ocupam-predios- Horizonte, 03.07. Not a govern Repressi publicos-em-mais-um-dia-de-protestos-pelo- Brazil MG 13 800 Threat ment YES NO NO NO NO YES NO on pais.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti No 3/07/1305875-grupos-ocupam-predios- 03.07. Not a govern Repressi publicos-em-mais-um-dia-de-protestos-pelo- Brazil Goiânia, GO 13 1,000 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on pais.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 03.07. Significant govern Repressi 3/07/1305852-av-paulista-e-liberada-apos- Brazil SP 13 5,000 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on protestos-que-reuniram-5000-pessoas.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 nt 3/07/1305506-protesto-em-cosmopolis- Cosmópolis, 03.07. Not a local Repressi resulta-em-depredacao-da-prefeitura-e- Brazil SP 13 500 Threat issues NO YES NO NO NO NO YES on confronto.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/educacao/201 Guarulhos, 03.07. Not a local Repressi 3/07/1305320-por-melhorias-alunos-da- Brazil SP 13 20 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on unifesp-ocupam-sala-no-campus-de-

XXVII

guarulhos.shtml

http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Mild 3/07/1305179-novo-protesto-por-reducao- 02.07. Not a Transpo Repressi de-tarifa-reune-cerca-de-300-em-curitiba- Brazil Curitiba, PR 13 300 Threat rt NO NO NO NO NO NO YES on pr.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/07/1305179-novo-protesto-por-reducao- 02.07. Not a Transpo Repressi de-tarifa-reune-cerca-de-300-em-curitiba- Brazil Aracajú, SE 13 500 Threat rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on pr.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/07/1305167-manifestantes-se-dispersam- Rio de 02.07. Mild local Repressi no-complexo-da-mare-av-brasil-e- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 5,500 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on liberada.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti Mild 3/07/1304846-apos-mais-de-24-horas- 02.07. Not a govern Repressi choque-libera-acesso-ao-porto-de-santos- Brazil Santos, SP 13 200 Threat ment NO YES NO NO NO NO NO on sp.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 nt 3/07/1305506-protesto-em-cosmopolis- Cosmópolis, 03.07. Not a local Repressi resulta-em-depredacao-da-prefeitura-e- Brazil SP 13 500 Threat issues NO YES NO NO NO NO YES on confronto.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/educacao/201 No 3/07/1305320-por-melhorias-alunos-da- Guarulhos, 03.07. Not a local Repressi unifesp-ocupam-sala-no-campus-de- Brazil SP 13 20 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on guarulhos.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Mild 3/07/1305179-novo-protesto-por-reducao- 02.07. Not a Transpo Repressi de-tarifa-reune-cerca-de-300-em-curitiba- Brazil Curitiba, PR 13 300 Threat rt NO NO NO NO NO NO YES on pr.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/07/1305179-novo-protesto-por-reducao- 02.07. Not a Transpo Repressi de-tarifa-reune-cerca-de-300-em-curitiba- Brazil Aracajú, SE 13 500 Threat rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on pr.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/07/1305167-manifestantes-se-dispersam- Rio de 02.07. Mild local Repressi no-complexo-da-mare-av-brasil-e- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 5,500 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on liberada.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti Mild 3/07/1304846-apos-mais-de-24-horas- 02.07. Not a govern Repressi choque-libera-acesso-ao-porto-de-santos- Brazil Santos, SP 13 200 Threat ment NO YES NO NO NO NO NO on sp.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 02.07. Not a govern Repressi 3/07/1304806-central-sindical-faz-protesto- Brazil SP 13 30 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on em-frente-ao-aeroporto-de-congonhas.shtml

XXVIII

http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 3/07/1304725-com-menos-gente-e-pautas- variadas-protestos-atingem-dez- estados.shtml ; No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 01.07. Not a local Repressi 3/07/1304558-grupo-bloqueia-a-paulista-em- Brazil SP 13 300 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on ato-contra-morte-de-menino-boliviano.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 3/07/1304725-com-menos-gente-e-pautas- variadas-protestos-atingem-dez- estados.shtml ; http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti No 3/07/1304559-manifestantes-fazem- São Paulo, 01.07. Not a govern Repressi protesto-contra-a-corrupcao-em-sao- Brazil SP 13 100 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on paulo.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/07/1304725-com-menos-gente-e-pautas- 01.07. Not a Transpo Repressi variadas-protestos-atingem-dez- Brazil Santos, SP 13 60 Threat rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on estados.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/07/1304725-com-menos-gente-e-pautas- 01.07. Not a local Repressi variadas-protestos-atingem-dez- Brazil Vitória, ES 13 1,000 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on estados.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 3/07/1304725-com-menos-gente-e-pautas- variadas-protestos-atingem-dez- estados.shtml ; anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 01.07. Not a govern Repressi 3/07/1304671-cerca-de-300-manifestantes- Brazil Brasília, DF 13 300 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on fazem-protesto-em-brasilia.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti No 3/07/1304725-com-menos-gente-e-pautas- Florianópoli 01.07. Not a govern Repressi variadas-protestos-atingem-dez- Brazil s, SC 13 40 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on estados.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti No 3/07/1304725-com-menos-gente-e-pautas- Manaus, 01.07. Not a govern Repressi variadas-protestos-atingem-dez- Brazil AM 13 200 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on estados.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/07/1304725-com-menos-gente-e-pautas- Fortaleza, 01.07. Not a local Repressi variadas-protestos-atingem-dez- Brazil CE 13 80 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on estados.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Fortaleza, 01.07. Not a govern Repressi 3/07/1304725-com-menos-gente-e-pautas- Brazil CE 13 100 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on variadas-protestos-atingem-dez-

XXIX

estados.shtml

http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti No 3/07/1304725-com-menos-gente-e-pautas- 01.07. Not a govern Repressi variadas-protestos-atingem-dez- Brazil Maceió, AL 13 200 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on estados.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 01.07. Not a govern Repressi 3/07/1304678-caminhoneiros-bloqueiam- Brazil Santos, SP 13 200 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on acesso-ao-porto-de-santos-sp.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 30.06. Significant govern Repressi 3/07/1304155-em-manha-fria-marcha-por- Brazil SP 13 2,000 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on seguranca-reune-2000-em-sp.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 30.06. Not a govern Repressi 3/06/1303962-marcha-das-criancas-mobiliza- Brazil Brasília, DF 13 500 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on mais-de-500-pessoas-em-ato-no-df.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Nova No 3/06/1303960-apos-morte-de-casal- Rosalândia, 30.06. Not a local Repressi manifestantes-bloqueiam-rodovia-em-

Brazil TO 13 500 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on tocantins.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Taboão da 30.06. Not a local Repressi 3/06/1303951-manifestantes-bloqueiam-a- Brazil Serra 13 1,000 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on regis-shopping-fecha-cancelas.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 nt 3/06/1303943-passe-livre-faz-protesto-em- Salvador, 30.06. Not a Transpo Repressi salvador-pm-convoca-1600-policiais.shtml Brazil BA 13 250 Threat rt YES NO NO NO NO YES NO on http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti No 3/06/1303942-grupo-protesta-contra- São Luis, 30.06. Not a govern Repressi importacao-de-medicos-em-sao-luis-no- Brazil MA 13 100 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on ma.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/esporte/folha anti No nacopa/2013/06/1303934-a-8-horas-da-final- Rio de 30.06. Significant govern Repressi manifestantes-comecam-a-se-concentrar-no- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 3,500 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on rio.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/06/1303855-termina-protesto-de- São Paulo, 29.06. Not a local Repressi bolivianos-em-sp-ruas-do-centro-sao- Brazil SP 13 300 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on liberadas.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 29.06. Not a govern Repressi 3/06/1303775-manifestantes-bloqueiam- Brazil SP 13 300 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on trecho-da-av-paulista.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 29.06. Significant Transpo Repressi 3/06/1303676-nova-manifestacao-reune-500- Brazil Curitiba, PR 13 1,500 Threat rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on pessoas-em-curitiba-afirma-pm.shtml

XXX

Mild http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Cosmópolis, 28.06. Not a Transpo Repressi 3/06/1303505-mais-de-14-mil-pessoas-vao- Brazil SP 13 120 Threat rt NO YES NO NO NO NO NO on as-ruas-no-pais-pautas-sao-diversas.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 nt 3/06/1303505-mais-de-14-mil-pessoas-vao- 28.06. Significant Transpo Repressi as-ruas-no-pais-pautas-sao-diversas.shtml Brazil Natal, RN 13 10,000 Threat rt NO YES NO NO NO NO YES on No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 28.06. Not a local Repressi 3/06/1303382-manifestantes-bloqueiam-av- Brazil SP 13 60 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on paulista-protesto-e-contra-ato-medico.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 28.06. Not a govern Repressi 3/06/1303382-manifestantes-bloqueiam-av- Brazil SP 13 400 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on paulista-protesto-e-contra-ato-medico.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/06/1303330-manifestacoes-fecham- 28.06. Not a local Repressi rodovia-no-rio-e-provocam-lentidao-no- Brazil Maricá, RJ 13 200 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on transito.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Rio de 28.06. Not a govern Repressi 3/06/1303312-cerca-de-700-medicos-e-gays- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 400 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on fazem-manifestacao-no-centro-do-rio.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Rio de 28.06. Not a govern Repressi 3/06/1303312-cerca-de-700-medicos-e-gays- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 300 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on fazem-manifestacao-no-centro-do-rio.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Salvador, 27.06. Significant Transpo Repressi 3/06/1302718-onibus-sao-depredados-e- Brazil BA 13 2,000 Threat rt NO YES NO NO NO NO NO on policia-usa-bombas-contra-grupo-na-ba.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Rio de 27.06. Mild Transpo Repressi 3/06/1302507-nova-passeata-no-centro-do- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 2,000 Threat rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on rio-reune-cerca-de-2000-pessoas.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/esporte/folha Belo anti Mild nacopa/2013/06/1301684-marcha-em-belo- Horizonte, 26.06. Significant govern Repressi horizonte-ja-reune-50-mil-e-tem-13- Brazil MG 13 50,000 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO YES on presos.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 25.06. Not a govern Repressi 3/06/1301438-avenida-paulista-e-liberada- Brazil SP 13 50 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on apos-protesto-contra-a-pec-37.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Florianópoli 25.06. Not a govern Repressi 3/06/1301412-grupo-protesta-em-frente-a- Brazil s, SC 13 300 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on casa-do-governador-de-santa-catarina.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Rio de 25.06. Not a govern Repressi 3/06/1301133-manifestantes-lotam-galerias-

Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 200 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on da-camara-do-rio-de-janeiro.shtml

XXXI

http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/06/1300915-manifestantes-voltam-a- Cristalina, 25.06. Not a local Repressi fechar-rodovia-onde-mulheres-morreram-

Brazil GO 13 200 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on atropeladas-em-go.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti nt 3/06/1300764-manifestacao-em-porto- Porto 24.06. Significant govern Repressi alegre-reune-10-mil-e-repete-

Brazil Alegre, RS 13 10,000 Threat ment NO YES NO NO NO YES NO on confrontos.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 24.06. Significant govern Repressi 3/06/1300739-protesto-em-belem-tem-3000-

Brazil Belém, PA 13 3,000 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO YES on pessoas-e-ao-menos-tres-prisoes.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti nt 3/06/1300721-protesto-em-teresina-termina- 24.06. Not a govern Repressi com-ataque-a-camara-e-pms-feridos.shtml Brazil Teresina, PI 13 1,000 Threat ment NO YES NO NO NO YES YES on anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Rio de 24.06. Significant govern Repressi 3/06/1300264-passeata-no-rio-tem-clima-de- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 3,000 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on domingao-com-cerveja-e-churrasco.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Fortaleza, 23.06. Not a govern Repressi 3/06/1300208-acesso-a-aeroporto-em- Brazil CE 13 300 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on fortaleza-teve-bloqueio-parcial.shtml http://f5.folha.uol.com.br/fofices/2013/06/1 anti No 300065-duzentas-criancas-participam-de- 23.06. Not a govern Repressi manifestacao-em-frente-ao-congresso- Brazil Brasília, DF 13 200 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on nacional.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti No 3/06/1299909-manifestacao-reune-35-mil- São Paulo, 22.06. Significant govern Repressi em-protesto-contra-a-pec-37-na-av-

Brazil SP 13 35,000 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on paulista.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti No 3/06/1299855-apesar-de-adiado-ato-reune-3- 22.06. Significant govern Repressi mil-pessoas-na-esplanada-dos-ministerios- Brazil Brasília, DF 13 3,000 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on em-brasilia.shtml anti Mild http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Uruguaiana, 22.06. Significant govern Repressi 3/06/1299797-protesto-bloqueia-ponte- Brazil RS 13 2,000 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO YES on entre-uruguaiana-rs-e-argentina.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/06/1299775-marcha-das-vadias-faz- 22.06. Not a local Repressi manifestacao-para-o-fim-violencia-contra-a-

Brazil Brasília, DF 13 1,000 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on mulher-em-brasilia.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti No 3/06/1299759-protesto-com-1000-pessoas- São Paulo, 22.06. Not a govern Repressi bloqueia-avenida-celso-garcia-na-zona- Brazil SP 13 1,000 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on leste.shtml

XXXII

Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti nt 3/06/1299462-ato-em-curitiba-soma-15-mil- 21.06. Significant govern Repressi e-tem-inicio-de-confronto-em-frente-a- Brazil Curitiba, PR 13 15,000 Threat ment YES YES YES NO NO YES NO on estadio.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 21.06. Significant govern Repressi 3/06/1299397-protesto-contra-cura-gay- Brazil SP 13 1,100 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on reune-1000-em-sao-paulo.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ribei anti No raopreto/2013/06/1298916-manifestacao- Uberlândia, 21.06. Significant govern Repressi reune-40-mil-nas-ruas-de-uberlandia- Brazil MG 2103 40,000 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on mg.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti nt 3/06/1298817-manifestacao-reuniu-30-mil- 20.06. Significant govern Repressi em-brasilia-patriota-diz-estar-indignado.shtml Brazil Brasília, DF 13 30,000 Threat ment YES YES NO NO NO YES YES on Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti nt 3/06/1298816-manifestacao-no-rio-termina- Rio de 20.06. Significant govern Repressi com-confronto-e-62-pessoas-feridas.shtml Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 300,000 Threat ment NO YES YES NO NO YES NO on Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti nt 3/06/1298807-manifestacao-transforma- Campinas, 20.06. Significant govern Repressi campinas-sp-em-cenario-de-combate.shtml Brazil SP 13 35,000 Threat ment YES YES YES NO NO YES YES on Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti nt 3/06/1298800-protestos-no-macapa-ap- 20.06. Significant govern Repressi terminam-em-confronto-22-sao- Brazil Macapá, AP 13 1,100 Threat ment NO YES YES NO NO NO YES on detidos.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti nt 3/06/1298791-salvador-tem-jovem-baleado- Salvador, 20.06. Significant govern Repressi onibus-incendiados-saques-e-20-mil-nas- Brazil BA 13 20,000 Threat ment NO YES YES YES NO YES YES on ruas.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Belo anti No 3/06/1298786-belo-horizonte-mg-tem- Horizonte, 20.06. Mild govern Repressi manifestacao-tranquila-com-20-mil-nas-

Brazil MG 13 20,000 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on ruas.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ribei anti nt raopreto/2013/06/1298406-manifestacoes- Ribeirão 20.06. Mild govern Repressi levam-25-mil-as-ruas-em-ribeirao-preto- Brazil Preto, SP 13 25,000 Threat ment NO YES NO NO NO YES NO on sp.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti nt 3/06/1298770-em-joao-pessoa-protesto- João Pessoa, 20.06. Mild govern Repressi termina-de-forma-pacifica-e-com-poucas- Brazil PB 13 31,000 Threat ment YES NO NO NO NO NO YES on depredacoes.shtml

XXXIII

Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti nt 3/06/1298774-protestos-em-manaus-am- Manaus, 20.06. Mild govern Repressi reunem-85-mil-e-terminam-com- Brazil AM 13 85,000 Threat ment YES YES NO NO NO NO YES on detidos.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti nt 3/06/1298763-protesto-em-fortaleza-ce- Fortaleza, 20.06. Mild govern Repressi termina-com-confronto-e-61-detidos.shtml Brazil CE 13 3,000 Threat ment NO YES YES NO NO YES YES on Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti nt 3/06/1298593-manifestantes-entram-em- São Paulo, 20.06. Mild govern Repressi confronto-na-av-paulista-homem-fica- Brazil SP 13 70,000 Threat ment NO YES NO NO NO YES NO on ferido.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti Mild 3/06/1297954-protesto-na-periferia-pede- São Paulo, 19.06. Not a govern Repressi melhoria-no-transporte-moradia-e- Brazil SP 13 1,000 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on saude.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 19.06. Mild govern Repressi 3/06/1297874-cerca-de-4000-manifestantes- Brazil Niterói, RJ 13 5,000 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on fazem-protesto-em-niteroi-no-rio.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/multimidia/vid anti Mild eocasts/2013/06/1297635-manifestantes- São Paulo, 19.06. Mild govern Repressi queimam-bandeira-de-sp-durante-protestos- Brazil SP 13 50,000 Threat ment NO YES NO NO NO NO NO on veja.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 nt 3/06/1297439-cerca-de-50-mil-fecharam- Florianópoli 18.06. Mild Transpo Repressi pontes-em-florianopolis-estima-pm.shtml Brazil s, SC 13 50,000 Threat rt NO YES NO NO NO YES NO on anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Rio Branco, 18.06. Not a govern Repressi 3/06/1297372-centenas-de-pessoas-saem-as-

Brazil AC 13 300 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on ruas-na-capital-do-acre.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/06/1297256-protesto-reune-cerca-de-10- São Paulo, 18.06. Mild Transpo Repressi mil-pessoas-em-passeata-no-centro-de- Brazil SP 13 50,000 Threat rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on sp.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 nt 3/06/1297734-protesto-em-belem-reune-15- 17.06. Mild Transpo Repressi mil-em-principal-avenida-da-cidade.shtml Brazil Belém, PA 13 15,000 Threat rt YES YES NO NO NO YES YES on http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/06/1296735-ato-em-solidariedade-a- Juiz de Fora, 17.06. Mild Transpo Repressi protestos-reune-5000-em-juiz-de-fora- Brazil MG 13 5,000 Threat rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on mg.shtml

XXXIV

http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 3/06/1296834-protesto-em-sao-paulo-e-o- maior-desde-manifestacao-contra- collor.shtml ; http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/06/1296734-manifestantes-fecham-av- São Paulo, 17.06. Significant Transpo Repressi paulista-e-ponte-estaiada-em-protesto-em- Brazil SP 13 475,000 Threat rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on sp.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 17.06. Mild Transpo Repressi 3/06/1296700-protesto-em-curitiba-contra- Brazil Curitiba, PR 13 15,000 Threat rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on aumento-da-tarifa-reune-5000-pessoas.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti nt 3/06/1296688-protesto-contra-tarifas-leva- 17.06. Mild govern Repressi multidao-na-esplanada-dos-ministerios.shtml Brazil Brasília, DF 13 5,000 Threat ment YES NO NO NO NO NO YES on Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Belo nt 3/06/1296661-pm-usa-bombas-de-gas-e- Horizonte, 17.06. Mild Transpo Repressi balas-de-borracha-durante-protesto-em- Brazil MG 13 15,000 Threat rt NO YES YES NO YES YES YES on bh.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti No 3/06/1296647-protesto-contra-tarifas-de- Salvador, 17.06. Mild govern Repressi onibus-e-obras-da-copa-reune-5000-em- Brazil BA 13 10,000 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on salvador.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Rio de 17.06. Mild Transpo Repressi 3/06/1296640-protesto-contra-tarifas-leva- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 40,000 Threat rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on centenas-de-pessoas-as-ruas-do-rio.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 nt 3/06/1295491-manifestantes-protestam- 14.06. Mild Transpo Repressi contra-aumento-da-tarifa-de-onibus-no- Brazil Niterói, RJ 13 1,100 Threat rt NO YES NO NO NO YES NO on centro-de-niteroi.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti No 3/06/1295466-termina-protesto-na-avenida- São Paulo, 14.06. Mild govern Repressi paulista-contra-desapropriacoes-da-copa-do- Brazil SP 13 1,075 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on mundo.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/esporte/folha anti No nacopa/2013/06/1295019-manifestantes- 14.06. Not a govern Repressi provocam-tumulto-em-frente-a-estadio-de-

Brazil Brasília, DF 13 300 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on abertura-da-copa.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 nt 3/06/1295237-13-policiais-militares-foram- São Paulo, 13.06. Mild Transpo Repressi feridos-no-4-dia-de-protestos-em-sao-

Brazil SP 13 5,000 Threat rt NO YES YES NO NO YES YES on paulo.shtml São Paulo, 10.06. Not a local No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/educacao/201 Brazil SP 13 50 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO Repressi 3/06/1292569-alunos-do-colegio-

XXXV

on bandeirantes-vestem-saias-durante- protesto.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/06/1292347-familiares-e-amigos-de- São Paulo, 09.06. Not a local Repressi vitimas-da-violencia-protestam-na-zona- Brazil SP 13 500 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on oeste-de-sp.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 nt 3/06/1291867-apos-protesto-em-pinheiros- São Paulo, 07.06. Mild Transpo Repressi manifestantes-fecham-faixa-da-paulista.shtml Brazil SP 13 4,000 Threat rt NO YES YES NO NO YES NO on http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 3/06/1291109-ao-menos-30-pessoas-se- feriram-em-protesto-em-sp-dizem- Significa manifestantes.shtml ; nt http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 06.06. Mild Transpo Repressi 3/06/1291096-protesto-contra-aumento-da- Brazil SP 13 4,000 Threat rt NO YES YES NO NO YES NO on tarifa-de-onibus-afeta-o-transito-no-rio.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Rio de 06.06. Not a Transpo Repressi 3/06/1291096-protesto-contra-aumento-da- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 200 Threat rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on tarifa-de-onibus-afeta-o-transito-no-rio.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ribei No raopreto/2013/06/1289443-inseguranca-nas- São Carlos, 04.06. Not a local Repressi escolas-gera-ato-de-professores-em-sao- Brazil SP 13 40 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on carlos.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/05/1286590-comerciantes-da-feira-da- São Paulo, 29.05. Not a local Repressi madrugada-interditam-faixa-da-avenida-do- Brazil SP 13 300 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on estado.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 nt 3/05/1284936-marcha-das-vadias-reune- São Paulo, 25.05. Not a local Repressi cerca-de-300-pessoas-na-av-paulista-em- Brazil SP 13 1,000 Threat issues NO YES NO NO NO YES NO on sp.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti No 3/05/1284911-alunos-de-medicina- São Paulo, 25.05. Not a govern Repressi protestam-contra-importacao-de-medico- Brazil SP 13 800 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on sem-prova.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 anti nt 5/1282941-manifestantes-pedem-reforma- 22.05. Mild govern Repressi agraria-em-brasilia.shtml Brazil Brasília, DF 13 4,500 Threat ment NO YES NO NO NO YES NO on No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/educacao/201 São Paulo, 21.05. Mild Repressi 3/05/1282600-professores-municipais-de-sp- Brazil SP 13 4,500 Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on protestam-e-decidem-manter-greve.shtml

XXXVI

http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/05/1281102-cerca-de-400-fazem- São Paulo, 18.05. Not a local Repressi manifestacao-pelo-dia-antimanicomial-em- Brazil SP 13 400 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on sp.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/esporte/2013/ nt 05/1280848-protesto-contra-presidente-do- Salvador, 17.05. Mild local Repressi bahia-reune-6000-na-fonte-nova.shtml Brazil BA 13 6,000 Threat issues YES NO NO NO NO YES NO on No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 17.05. Mild Repressi 3/05/1280413-manifestacoes-fecham-vias-e- Brazil SP 13 2,000 Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on complicam-o-transito-no-centro-de-sp.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Fortaleza, 12.05. Not a local Repressi 3/05/1277486-em-protesto-mulheres- Brazil CE 13 50 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on bloqueiam-saida-de-pms-em-fortaleza.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 nt 3/05/1276931-protesto-de-professores- São Paulo, 10.05. Mild Repressi termina-com-pms-feridos-e-dois- Brazil SP 13 1,500 Threat union YES YES NO NO NO YES YES on detidos.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/esporte/folha No nacopa/2013/05/1275763-manifestantes- Rio de 09.05. Not a local Repressi protestam-contra-concessao-do- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 50 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on maracana.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/05/1272873-protestos-de-professores- São Paulo, 03.05. Mild Repressi fecham-av-paulista-e-viaduto-do-cha-em- Brazil SP 13 9,250 Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on sp.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/2013 Belo Monte, 03.05. Not a local Repressi /05/1272828-protesto-paralisa-obras-em- Brazil PA 13 150 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on belo-monte-pelo-segundo-dia.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 30.04. Not a local Repressi 3/04/1271497-grupo-protesta-e-pede-justica- Brazil SP 13 150 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on por-morte-de-dentista-na-grande-sp.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 27.04. Mild Repressi 3/04/1269846-ato-de-professores-fecha-a-av- Brazil SP 13 11,750 Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on paulista-por-uma-hora-e-meia-em-sp.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 27.04. Mild Repressi 3/04/1269846-ato-de-professores-fecha-a-av- Brazil SP 13 11,750 Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on paulista-por-uma-hora-e-meia-em-sp.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 26.04. Mild Repressi 3/04/1269505-professores-fazem-passeata- Brazil SP 13 3,500 Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on em-sp-e-bloqueia-a-rua-da-consolacao.shtml 24.04. Not a anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 Brazil Brasília, DF 13 60 Threat govern NO NO NO NO NO NO YES Repressi 4/1267986-protesto-contra-feliciano-tem-

XXXVII

ment on beijaco-e-casamento-gay-quatro-sao- detidos.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/2013 No /04/1267288-moradores-de-tucurui-no-para- 23.04. Not a local Repressi bloqueiam-transamazonica-em- Brazil Tucuruí, PA 13 100 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on protesto.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 nt 3/04/1265539-professores-protestam-e- São Paulo, 19.04. Mild Repressi fecham-os-dois-sentidos-da-av-paulista.shtml Brazil SP 13 1,500 Threat union YES NO NO NO NO YES NO on http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 Eldorado do No 4/1264143-mst-protesta-contra-pedido-de- Carajás/Mar 17.04. Mild local Repressi liberdade-de-condenado-por-massacre-no- Brazil abá, PA 13 2,000 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on pa.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 No 4/1264076-manifestantes-sem-terra- 17.04. Not a local Repressi marcham-em-brasilia-pelo-fim-da- Brazil Brasília, DF 13 500 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on impunidade-no-campo.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 11.04. Not a local Repressi 3/04/1260943-av-paulista-e-liberada-apos- Brazil SP 13 500 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on protesto-de-alunos-da-casper-libero.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 01.04. Not a govern Repressi 4/1255740-manifestantes-pedem-que-dilma- Brazil Brasília, DF 13 70 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on se-manifeste-sobre-feliciano.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Porto 31.03. Not a local Repressi 3/03/1255166-morte-de-5-taxistas-gera- Brazil Alegre, RS 13 100 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on protesto-no-rs-policia-investiga-o-caso.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Rio de 27.03. Not a local Repressi 3/03/1253642-manifestantes-protestam- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 500 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on contra-acao-no-antigo-museu-do-indio.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0 Rio de 25.03. Not a govern Repressi 3/1252406-no-rio-artistas-protestam-contra- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 600 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on permanencia-de-feliciano-em-comissao.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/2013 nt /03/1252365-comerciarios-protestam-contra- São Paulo, 25.03. Not a local Repressi informalidade-no-setor.shtml Brazil SP 13 600 Threat issues NO YES NO NO NO YES NO on anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/2013 Altamira, 21.03. Not a govern Repressi /03/1249985-indios-e-ribeirinhos-invadem- Brazil PA 13 60 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on canteiro-de-obras-de-belo-monte.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ribei Ribeirão 20.03. Not a local Repressi raopreto/2013/03/1249325-estudantes-de- Brazil Preto, SP 13 200 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on medicina-da-usp-protestam-em-evento-com-

XXXVIII

alckmin.shtml

http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/03/1247876-grupo-protesta-pedindo- São Paulo, 17.03. Not a local Repressi justica-pelo-atropelamento-de-ciclista-em- Brazil SP 13 100 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on sp.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti nt 3/03/1247628-manifestacao-reune-cerca-de-

Rio de 16.03. Not a govern Repressi 500-contra-a-privatizacao-do-maracana.shtml Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 500 Threat ment YES NO NO NO NO YES NO on http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/esporte/2013/ No 03/1244838-cerca-de-30-corintianos- São Paulo, 12.03. Not a local Repressi protestam-em-frente-ao-consulado-da- Brazil SP 13 30 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on bolivia-em-sp.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 10.03. Not a local Repressi 3/03/1243943-ciclistas-farao-protesto-na-av- Brazil SP 13 150 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on paulista-apos-atropelamento.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/esporte/2013/ No 03/1239824-protesto-de-organizadas-do- São Paulo, 02.03. Not a local Repressi corinthians-reune-cem-pessoas-na- Brazil SP 13 100 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on paulista.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/ilustrada/2013 No /03/1239392-artistas-protestam-em- Rio de 01.03. Not a local Repressi inauguracao-de-museu-com-presenca-de- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 13 60 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on dilma.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 21.02. Not a local Repressi 3/02/1234527-protesto-de-motoboys-segue- Brazil SP 13 60 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on para-av-reboucas-ha-registro-de-filas.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2013/ 18.02. Not a local Repressi 02/1232333-blogueira-cubana-e-recebida- Brazil Recife, PE 13 20 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on com-protesto-no-recife.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/02/1231946-pessoas-dancam-no-vao-do- São Paulo, 16.02. Not a local Repressi masp-para-protestar-contra-a-violencia-a- Brazil SP 13 120 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on mulher.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 01.02. Mild local Repressi 3/02/1224292-motoboys-liberam-av-paulista- Brazil SP 13 6,000 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on apos-protesto-contra-fiscalizacao.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 3/01/1213302-raposo-tavares-e-liberada- São Paulo, 11.11. Not a Repressi apos-manifestacao-mas-lentidao- Brazil SP 13 100 Threat housing NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on persiste.shtml Belo Monte, 08.01. Not a anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/2013 Brazil PA 13 25 Threat govern NO NO NO NO NO NO NO Repressi /01/1211683-obras-de-belo-monte-

XXXIX

ment on continuam-parcialmente-paralisadas.shtml

No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/119 Salvador, 10.12. Not a local Repressi 8859-manifestantes-ateiam-fogo-a-dois- Brazil BA 12 150 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on micro-onibus-na-bahia.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2012/1 anti No 2/1195833-palacio-do-planalto-e-alvo-de- 04.12. Not a govern Repressi protestos-de-agricultores-sindicalistas-e- Brazil Brasília, DF 12 150 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on indios.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 2/11/1193755-manifestacao-causa- Rio de 20.11. Not a local Repressi transtornos-no-aeroporto-tom-jobim-no- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 12 50 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on rio.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2012/1 21.11. Not a Repressi 1/1188843-mst-bloqueia-tres-rodovias-no-df- Brazil Brasília, DF 12 300 Threat housing NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on e-governo-classifica-ato-de-radicalismo.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2012/1 anti No 1/1182623-indios-protestam-contra-projeto- 08.11. Not a govern Repressi que-da-ao-congresso-poder-de-demarcar- Brazil Brasília, DF 12 250 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on terras.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2012/1 São Paulo, 25.10. Not a govern Repressi 0/1175020-em-ato-contra-mensalao-tucanos- Brazil SP 12 100 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on e-ex-mulher-de-costa-neto-batem-boca.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ribei No raopreto/2012/09/1157874-falta-dagua-faz- Ribeirão 22.09. Not a local Repressi grupo-protestar-em-frente-a-casa-da- Brazil Preto, SP 12 50 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on prefeita-de-ribeirao-preto.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 2/09/1150419-em-desfile-parentes- São Paulo, 08.08. Not a local Repressi protestam-contra-mortes-de-pms-em- Brazil SP 12 20 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on sp.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2012/0 anti No 9/1150245-ato-contra-corrupcao-em-sp- São Paulo, 07.09. Not a govern Repressi pede-punicao-para-condenados-do- Brazil SP 12 1,000 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on mensalao.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2012/0 anti No 9/1150245-ato-contra-corrupcao-em-sp- 07.09. Mild govern Repressi pede-punicao-para-condenados-do- Brazil Brasília, DF 12 10,000 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on mensalao.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti No 2/08/1145139-agentes-da-pf-em-greve- São Paulo, 29.08. Not a govern Repressi fazem-protesto-na-regiao-da-lapa-em- Brazil SP 12 100 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on sp.shtml

anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/2012 28.08. Not a govern Repressi /08/1144157-indios-protestam-contra-belo- Brazil Brasília, DF 12 40 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on monte-em-frente-ao-supremo.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 nt 2/08/1137752-ativistas-da-femen-sao-presas- São Paulo, 15.08. Not a local Repressi durante-manifestacao-em-sp-veja-fotos.shtml Brazil SP 12 3 Threat issues YES NO NO NO NO NO YES on http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti No 2/08/1135550-protesto-de-marronzinhos- São Paulo, 10.08. Mild govern Repressi complica-transito-mas-enche-banco-de- Brazil SP 12 1,500 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on sangue-em-sp.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 09.08. Not a govern Repressi 2/08/1134566-protestos-de-servidores- Brazil SP 12 400 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on federais-causa-lentidao-na-av-paulista.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/112 Rio de 29.07. Not a govern Repressi 8155-sindicato-dos-medicos-realiza-protesto- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 12 200 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on em-copacabana.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 28.07. Not a local Repressi 2/07/1127799-familiares-protestam-em-sp- Brazil SP 12 150 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on um-ano-apos-morte-de-vitor-gurman.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2012/0 Rio de 06.07. Not a govern Repressi 7/1116131-pelo-segundo-dia-dilma-enfrenta- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 12 20 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on protestos-de-estudantes.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/ambiente/110 Rio de 22.06. Not a govern Repressi 9214-protesto-interrompe-entrevista-sobre- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 12 2 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on resultados-da-rio20.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/ambiente/110 Rio de 21.06. Not a govern Repressi 8374-participantes-da-cupula-dos-povos- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 12 50 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on protestam-no-riocentro.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/ambiente/110 Rio de 20.06. Not a govern Repressi 8626-protesto-surpresa-contra-a-rio-20-vai- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 12 50 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on de-nudismo-a-poesia.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/ambiente/110 Rio de 16.06. Not a govern Repressi 5969-manifestantes-ocupam-praca-no- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 12 30 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on centro-do-rio.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/109 São Paulo, 31.05. Not a local Repressi 8483-protesto-interdita-trecho-da-av- Brazil SP 12 300 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on washington-luis-em-sp-ha-lentidao.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Rio de 20.05. Not a local Repressi 2/05/1093064-bombeiros-do-rio-protestam- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 12 14 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on por-salarios-e-contra-expulsoes.shtml São Paulo, 19.05. Mild local No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Brazil SP 12 1,700 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO Repressi 2/05/1092883-marcha-da-maconha-comeca-

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on em-sp-e-fecha-a-av-paulista.shtml

anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/108 São Paulo, 05.05. Not a govern Repressi 6127-protesto-bloqueia-parcialmente-a-rua- Brazil SP 12 250 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on augusta-em-sp.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2012/0 São Paulo, 17.04. Not a govern Repressi 4/1077187-mst-bloqueia-estrada-em-sao- Brazil SP 12 300 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on paulo-em-acao-pela-reforma-agraria.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/107 São Paulo, 04.04. Significant govern Repressi 1908-sp-registra-transito-acima-da-media-a- Brazil SP 12 100,100 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on dois-dias-do-feriado.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 2/03/1065012-protesto-por-melhoria-no- São Paulo, 21.03. Mild Transpo Repressi transporte-acaba-com-promessa-de- Brazil SP 12 1,500 Threat rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on reuniao.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ribei No raopreto/1057280-protesto-contra- 05.03. Not a local Repressi demissoes-na-citrovita-reune-200-em-matao- Brazil Matão, SP 12 200 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on sp.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 11.02. Not a local Repressi 2/02/1047465-grupo-entra-em-shopping-de- Brazil SP 12 300 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on sp-e-protesta-contra-o-racismo.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 04.02. Not a local Repressi 2/02/1044119-gays-protestam-em-sp-apos- Brazil SP 12 50 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on beijo-proibido-em-lanchonete.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/103 25.01. Not a Transpo Repressi 9479-estudantes-protestam-em-pe-contra- Brazil Recife, PE 12 500 Threat rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on aumento-da-tarifa-de-onibus.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti nt 2/01/1039294-apos-confronto-em-sp-grupo- São Paulo, 25.01. Not a govern Repressi encerra-protesto-na-cracolandia.shtml Brazil SP 12 400 Threat ment YES NO NO NO YES YES NO on http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 2/01/1037938-manifestacao-contra- São Paulo, 22.01. Not a local Repressi reintegracao-de-area-em-sp-fecha-a- Brazil SP 12 500 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on paulista.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/103 São Paulo, 22.01. Mild local Repressi 7885-manifestacao-na-paulista-contra-maus- Brazil SP 12 5,000 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on tratos-de-animais-reune-5000.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 2/01/1033499-estudantes-fazem-novo- 12.01. Not a Transpo Repressi protesto-no-pi-contra-reajuste-de- Brazil Teresina, PI 12 40 Threat rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on tarifa.shtml

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anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/102 São Paulo, 14.12. Not a govern Repressi 1112-garis-fazem-protesto-por-aumento- Brazil SP 11 200 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on salarial-no-centro-de-sp.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/102 nt 1051-cerca-de-800-manifestantes-fecham-a- 14.12. Not a local Repressi br-116-na-bahia.shtml Brazil Itatim, BA 11 800 Threat issues YES NO NO NO NO YES NO on Amambaí/P No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2011/1 ontaporã, 01.12. Not a local Repressi 2/1014945-tres-sao-presos-por-suspeita-de- Brazil MS 11 500 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on atacar-acampamento-indigena-no-ms.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 20.11. Not a local Repressi 1/11/1009324-marcha-da-consciencia-negra- Brazil SP 11 600 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on reune-600-em-sao-paulo.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 No 1/11/1004985-protesto-de-alunos-da-usp- São Paulo, 10.11. Mild local Repressi termina-sem-confronto-unesp-faz- Brazil SP 11 2,000 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on paralisacao.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 nt 1/10/998745-policia-detem-seis-durante- São Paulo, 29.10. Not a local Repressi protesto-de-camelos-na-regiao-do-bras- Brazil SP 11 80 Threat issues NO NO YES NO NO NO YES on sp.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2011/1 Rio de 12.10. Mild govern Repressi 0/989636-manifestantes-protestam-contra- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 11 2,500 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on corrupcao-no-rio-de-janeiro.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2011/1 anti nt 0/989594-em-brasilia-marcha-anticorrupcao- 12.10. Mild govern Repressi reune-20-mil.shtml Brazil Brasília, DF 11 20,000 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO YES NO on Belo anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/educacao/201 Horizonte, 27.09. Not a govern Repressi 1/09/981625-professores-em-greve-se- Brazil MG 11 25 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on acorrentam-na-assembleia-de-mg.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2011/0 07.09. Mild govern Repressi 9/971643-marcha-anticorrupcao-leva- Brazil Brasília, DF 11 1,200 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on milhares-as-ruas-em-brasilia.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 28.08. Mild govern Repressi 1/08/966575-2500-pessoas-protestam- Brazil SP 11 2,500 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on contra-a-violencia-no-morumbi-em-sp.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 11.08. Not a govern Repressi 1/08/958026-comerciantes-da-feira-da- Brazil SP 11 250 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on madrugada-voltam-a-protestar-em-sp.shtml anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/esporte/2011/ Rio de 30.07. Not a govern Repressi 07/952175-manifestantes-protestam-em- Brazil Janeiro, RJ 11 20 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on frente-ao-evento-da-copa-no-rio.shtml

XLIII

anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/944 São Paulo, 15.07. Not a govern Repressi 381-lojistas-da-regiao-da-25-de-marco-fazem- Brazil SP 11 700 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on protesto-contra-kassab.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/935 São Paulo, 28.06. Not a Repressi 911-sem-teto-protestam-em-sp-e-pedem- Brazil SP 11 550 Threat housing YES YES NO NO NO NO YES on rapidez-na-aprovacao-de-projetos.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 13.06. Not a local Repressi 1/06/929452-ciclistas-protestam-na-regiao- Brazil SP 11 100 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on da-sumare-apos-morte-de-empresario.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 anti nt 1/06/925004-marcha-da-maconha-e- 03.06. Not a govern Repressi proibida-no-df-e-vira-ato-por-liberdade.shtml Brazil Brasília, DF 11 500 Threat ment NO YES NO NO NO YES NO on anti No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/919 22.05. Not a govern Repressi 334-manifestantes-pro-maconha-marcham- Brazil Curitiba, PR 11 200 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on por-expressao-em-curitiba.shtml anti Mild http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 21.05. Not a govern Repressi 1/05/919065-pm-usa-bombas-de-gas-para- Brazil SP 11 700 Threat ment NO YES NO NO NO NO NO on dispersar-manifestacao-na-paulista.shtml Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 nt 1/04/905212-mtst-protesta-em-sp-e-se- São Paulo, 20.04. Not a Repressi reune-com-secretaria-da-habitacao.shtml Brazil SP 11 450 Threat housing NO YES NO NO NO YES NO on Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/898393 anti nt -protesto-em-brasilia-pede-aprovacao-do- 05.04. Mild govern Repressi novo-codigo-florestal.shtml Brazil Brasília, DF 11 15,000 Threat ment YES NO NO NO NO YES NO on Significa http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 nt 1/03/893605-protesto-interdita-avenida- São Paulo, 24.03. Not a Transpo Repressi paulista-no-sentido-consolacao.shtml Brazil SP 11 500 Threat rt YES YES NO NO NO YES NO on No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/multimidia/vid São Paulo, 10.03. Not a Transpo Repressi eocasts/887116-manifestantes-queimam- Brazil SP 11 200 Threat rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on boneco-de-kassab-veja-video.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 Porto 01.03. Mild local Repressi 1/03/883028-ciclistas-protestam-em-porto- Brazil Alegre, RS 11 1,750 Threat issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on alegre-rs-contra-atropelador.shtml No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 09.02. Not a Transpo Repressi 1/02/873155-termina-protesto-contra- Brazil SP 11 50 Threat rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on aumento-da-tarifa-do-metro-em-sp.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 27.01. Mild Transpo No 1/01/866971-passeata-contra-tarifa-de- Brazil SP 11 3,500 Threat rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO Repressi onibus-em-sp-segue-para-camara.shtml ;

XLIV

No http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 20.01. Mild Transpo Repressi 1/01/863813-grupo-encerra-protesto-apos- Brazil SP 11 3,500 Threat rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on percorrer-pista-da-avenida-paulista.shtml http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/multimidia/vid eocasts/2011/01/860334-protesto-contra- aumento-da-tarifa-de-onibus-em-sp-termina- Significa em-conflito-veja.shtml ; nt http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201 São Paulo, 13.01. Not a Transpo Repressi 1/01/863813-grupo-encerra-protesto-apos- Brazil SP 11 700 Threat rt YES YES YES NO NO YES NO on percorrer-pista-da-avenida-paulista.shtml

COUN CITY DAT # OF THREAT CLAI PEP NON RUBB FIRE INJU ARRE Level of Website link TRY E PARTICI IN MS PER LET ER WAT ARM RED STED Repressi PANTS RELATIO (REAS SPR HAL BULL ER PEOP PEOPL on N TO # ONS) AY BOM ETS CANN LE E OF B ONS PARTICI PANTS No http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/vivienda 11.12. Not a Local Repressi /suegras-y-nueras-lideraron-ruidosa-protesta- Chile Santiago 13 100 Threat issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on frente-a-vivienda/2013-12-11/115955.html http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/regiones/bio No -bio/coronel-4-mujeres-suben-a-torre-en- 03.12. Not a Local Repressi protesta-contra-termoelectrica/2013-12- Chile Bocamina 13 4 Threat issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on 03/175640.html http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci No on/psu-feuc-protesta-frente-al-mineduc-y- 03.12. Not a Educati Repressi exige-que-se-elimine-examen/2013-12- Chile Santiago 13 100 Threat on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on 03/162504.html http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/policial/ No con-6-marchas-en-6-ciudades-se-protesta- 27.11. Mild Local Repressi por-muerte-de-juan-pablo-jimenez/2013-11- Chile Santiago 13 2,500 Threat issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on 27/200956.html http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/policial/ Mild protesta-por-la-muerte-del-sindicalista-juan- 21.11. Not a Local Repressi pablo-jimenez-dejo-6-detenidos/2013-11- Chile Santiago 13 30 Threat issue NO NO NO NO NO NO YES on 21/113727.html 20.11. Not a Educati No http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci Chile Santiago 13 500 Threat on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO Repressi on/simce-secundarios-protestan-frente-al-

XLV

on mineduc/2013-11-20/113143.html

Mild http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/naciona 12.11. Not a Local Repressi l/municipales-en-paro-vuelven-a-protestar- Chile Santiago 13 20 Threat issue NO NO NO YES NO NO NO on en-la-alameda/2013-11-12/073324.html Significa http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/naciona nt l/detenidos-heridos-y-taco-de-proporciones- 03.11. Not a Local Repressi en-longotoma-por-protesta/2013-11- Chile Santiago 13 60 Threat issue NO NO NO YES NO YES YES on 03/191240.html http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/galerias/eco Anti No nomia/sector-publico-fotos-de-las-marchas- 22.10. Mild Govern Repressi en-santiago-y-valparaiso/2013-10- Chile Santiago 13 4,500 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on 22/140415.html http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/galerias/eco Anti No nomia/sector-publico-fotos-de-las-marchas- 22.10. Mild Govern Repressi en-santiago-y-valparaiso/2013-10- Chile Valparaiso 13 8,000 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on 22/140415.html http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/policial/ Anti No vecinos-de-renca-protestaron-contra-actuar- 17.09. Not a Govern Repressi de-carabineros-durante-el-11/2013-09- Chile Santiago 13 70 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on 17/091408.html http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/regiones/los- No lagos/chaiten-se-toman-la-carretera-austral- 23.08. Not a Local Repressi en-protesta-por-falta-de-electricidad/2013- Chile Chaitén 13 100 Threat issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on 08-23/104047.html Significa http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/regiones/aric Anti nt a-parinacota/arica-con-51-detenidos- 20.08. Mild Govern Repressi termino-protesta-contra-proyecto-minero- Chile Arica 13 2,500 Threat ment YES NO NO NO NO NO YES on los-pumas/2013-08-20/103217.html http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/regiones/val No paraiso/trabajadores-de-la-refineria-de- 06.08. Not a Repressi concon-protestan-por-falta-de- Chile Valparaiso 13 200 Threat Union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on seguridad/2013-08-06/112059.html http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/naciona No l/mapuches-cortan-alameda-en-protesta-por- 06.08. Not a Local Repressi asesinato-de-comunero/2013-08- Chile Santiago 13 150 Threat issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on 06/210021.html http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/transpo No rtes/cerca-de-300-colectiveros-de-puente- 06.08. Not a Local Repressi alto-protestan-por-alza-de-bencinas/2013-08- Chile Santiago 13 50 Threat issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on 06/093111.html No http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/santiag 05.08. Not a Local Repressi o/la-bulliciosa-protesta-a-las-afueras-del- Chile Santiago 13 650 Threat issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on minvu-en-imagenes/2013-08-05/171318.html

XLVI

http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci No on/u-central-funcionarios-protestaron-para- Parque 23.07. Not a Repressi exigir-que-se-libere-sede-retomada/2013-07- Chile Almargo 13 100 Threat Union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on 23/124733.html http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci Anti Mild on/nuevos-disturbios-tras-cacerolazo-en-la- 14.06. Not a Govern Repressi casa-central-de-la-u-de-chile/2013-06- Chile Santiago 13 200 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO YES on 14/080416.html No http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci Punta 11.04. Not a Educati Repressi on/estudiantes-tambien-se-manifestaron-en- Chile Arenas 13 300 Threat on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on regiones/2013-04-11/185155.html No http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci 11.04. Significant Educati Repressi on/estudiantes-tambien-se-manifestaron-en- Chile Valdivia 13 4,000 Threat on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on regiones/2013-04-11/185155.html No http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci 11.04. Mild Educati Repressi on/estudiantes-tambien-se-manifestaron-en- Chile Temuco 13 1,500 Threat on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on regiones/2013-04-11/185155.html No http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci 11.04. Mild Educati Repressi on/estudiantes-tambien-se-manifestaron-en- Chile Talca 13 2,000 Threat on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on regiones/2013-04-11/185155.html No http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci 11.04. Mild Educati Repressi on/estudiantes-tambien-se-manifestaron-en- Chile La Serena 13 3,500 Threat on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on regiones/2013-04-11/185155.html No http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci 11.04. Not a Educati Repressi on/estudiantes-tambien-se-manifestaron-en- Chile Antofagasta 13 600 Threat on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on regiones/2013-04-11/185155.html No http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci 11.04. Not a Educati Repressi on/estudiantes-tambien-se-manifestaron-en- Chile Iquique 13 200 Threat on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on regiones/2013-04-11/185155.html No http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci 11.04. Not a Educati Repressi on/estudiantes-tambien-se-manifestaron-en- Chile Arica 13 800 Threat on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on regiones/2013-04-11/185155.html http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/naciona No l/cuatro-jovenes-protestaron-contra- 27.03. Not a Local Repressi bachelet-fuera-del-centro-civico-de-el- Chile El Bosque 13 4 Threat issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on bosque/2013-03-27/230526.html Mild http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/salud/p 16.03. Not a Local Repressi rotesta-en-lo-prado-contra-proyecto- Chile Lo Prado 13 50 Threat issue NO NO NO YES NO NO NO on electrico-del-metro/2013-03-16/163445.html http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/terremo Anti No to-27-f/pobladores-de-la-villa-brasil-de-san- 27.02. Not a Govern Repressi joaquin-protestan-por-la- Chile San Joaquin 13 200 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on reconstruccion/2013-02-27/114616.html

XLVII

http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/policial/ Mild la-reina-vecinos-bloquean-vespucio-y- 02.01. Not a Local Repressi resisten-a-carabineros/2013-01- Chile La Reina 13 60 Threat issue NO NO NO NO NO NO YES on 02/081004.html http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/naciona No l/200-mujeres-protestaron-contra-la- 23.22. Not a Local Repressi violencia-en-la-alameda/2012-11- Chile Santiago 12 200 Threat issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on 22/230028.html http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/naciona Mild l/estudiantes-de-universidad-del-mar- Viña del 04.11. Not a Educati Repressi levantaron-barricadas-en-la-ruta-68/2012-11- Chile Mar 12 20 Threat on NO NO NO NO NO NO YES on 04/195525.html http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/municip Anti No ales-2012/protesta-silenciosa-recordo-a- 28.10. Not a Govern Repressi presos-del-73-en-el-nacional/2012-10- Chile Santiago 12 12 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on 28/141106.html No http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/policial/ 26.10. Not a Housin Repressi carabineros-enfrenta-bloqueo-de-pobladores-

Chile Puente Alto 12 18 Threat g NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on en-la-alameda/2012-10-26/111902.html http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/policial/ No grupo-sin-casa-en-bloqueos-parciales-de- 24.10. Not a Housin Repressi avenidas-en-santiago/2012-10-

Chile Santiago 12 50 Threat g NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on 24/073004.html Significa http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci nt on/estudiantes-masivo-acto-tras-marcha-con- 27.09. Mild Educati Repressi disturbios-desde-la-usach/2012-09-

Chile Santiago 12 70,000 Threat on NO NO NO YES NO YES NO on 27/132724.html No http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci 13.09. Mild Educati Repressi on/estudiantes-marcha-desde-la-usach-copo-

Chile Santiago 12 3,000 Threat on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on la-plaza-de-armas/2012-09-13/123821.html No http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/transpo 31.08. Not a Transpo Repressi rtes/transantiago-protesta-por-demora-y-

Chile Maipu 12 100 Threat rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on servicio-en-maipu/2012-08-31/074658.html http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci No on/estudiantes-estafados-por-credito-corfo- 29.08. Not a Educati Repressi marchan-por-centro-de-santiago/2012-08-

Chile Santiago 12 30 Threat on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on 29/205742.html Mild http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci 28.08. Mild Educati Repressi on/marchas-se-replicaron-desde-arica-a- Chile Antofagasta 12 3,000 Threat on NO NO NO NO NO NO YES on punta-arenas/2012-08-28/172720.html No http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci 28.08. Mild Educati Repressi on/marchas-se-replicaron-desde-arica-a- Chile La Serena 12 1,500 Threat on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on punta-arenas/2012-08-28/172720.html

XLVIII

No http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci 28.08. Mild Educati Repressi on/marchas-se-replicaron-desde-arica-a- Chile Rancagua 12 2,000 Threat on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on punta-arenas/2012-08-28/172720.html No http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci 28.08. Mild Educati Repressi on/marchas-se-replicaron-desde-arica-a- Chile Concepcion 12 4,000 Threat on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on punta-arenas/2012-08-28/172720.html No http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci 28.08. Mild Educati Repressi on/marchas-se-replicaron-desde-arica-a- Chile Valdivia 12 3,500 Threat on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on punta-arenas/2012-08-28/172720.html Mild http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci Punta 28.08. Mild Educati Repressi on/marchas-se-replicaron-desde-arica-a- Chile Arenas 12 1,100 Threat on NO NO NO NO NO NO YES on punta-arenas/2012-08-28/172720.html http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/transpo No rtes/indignados-del-transantiago-bloquearon- 27.08. Not a Transpo Repressi avenida-providencia/2012-08- Chile Tobalada 12 50 Threat rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on 27/092700.html Anti Mild http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/naciona 09.08. Not a Govern Repressi l/manifestantes-tinen-de-rojo-pileta-frente-a- Chile Santiago 12 13 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO YES on la-moneda/2012-08-09/130958.html http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/policial/ Anti Mild protesta-contra-ley-hinzpeter-frente-a-la-ani- 18.07. Not a Govern Repressi termina-con-8-detenidos/2012-07- Chile Santiago 12 15 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO YES on 18/133636.html http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci Mild on/escolares-toman-sede-de-konecta-en- 10.07. Not a Local Repressi apoyo-a-huelguistas/2012-07- Chile Santiago 12 20 Threat issue NO NO NO NO NO NO YES on 10/084604.html http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/vivienda Mild /con-al-menos-20-detenidos-termino- 07.07. Not a Local Repressi protesta-de-andha-chile/2012-07- Chile Santiago 12 100 Threat issue NO NO NO NO NO NO YES on 07/214346.html Mild http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci 01.06. Not a Educati Repressi on/estudiantes-se-tomaron-el-liceo- Chile Santiago 12 500 Threat on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on cervantes/2012-06-01/075022.html No http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/naciona 30.05. Not a Housin Repressi l/protesta-ciudadana-provoca-gran-taco-en- Chile Lampa 12 50 Threat g NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on lo-echevers/2012-05-30/085121.html No http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/naciona 17.05. Not a Housin Repressi l/pobladores-deponen-toma-del-instituto- Chile Santiago 12 30 Threat g NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on libertad/2012-05-17/142703.html No http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/fech- 16.05. Significant Educati Repressi cerca-de-100-mil-asistentes-en-marcha-de- Chile Santiago 12 101,000 Threat on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on santiago/2012-05-16/123925.html

XLIX

http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/naciona No l/manifestantes-de-andha-deponen-protesta- 05.05. Not a Local Repressi en-grua-a-60-metros-de-altura/2012-05- Chile Santiago 12 5 Threat issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on 05/172813.html No http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci 25.04. Significant Educati Repressi on/marcha-estudiantil-en-concepcion-sumo- Chile Santiago 12 4,000 Threat on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on 4-000-participantes/2012-04-25/183408.html http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci No on/estudiantes-resumieron-objetivos-2012- 21.04. Significant Educati Repressi en-acto-del-parque-almagro/2012-04- Chile Santiago 12 2,000 Threat on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on 21/174738.html No http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/policial/ 12.04. Not a Repressi protesta-por-viviendas-bloqueo-la-alameda- Chile Santiago 12 100 Threat Union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on en-estacion-central/2012-04-12/082208.html http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/naciona No l/mas-de-10-mil-personas-marcharon-en- 08.03. Mild Local Repressi santiago-por-el-dia-de-la-mujer/2012-03- Chile Santiago 12 20,000 Threat issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on 08/232816.html http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci No on/expulsadas-se-encadenaron-en-vuelta-a- 05.03. Not a Educati Repressi clases-del-carmela-carvajal/2012-03- Chile Santiago 12 11 Threat on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on 05/084029.html http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/naciona No l/arriesgada-protesta-en-reloj-de-la-estacion- 27.02. Not a Repressi central-bajaron-a-manifestantes/2012-01- Chile Santiago 12 4 Threat Union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on 27/124003.html http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/naciona Mild l/incidentes-en-plaza-de-armas-por-protesta- 19.01. Mild Educati Repressi contra-ley-anti-tomas/2012-01- Chile Santiago 12 1,500 Threat on NO NO NO NO NO NO YES on 19/201604.html http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci No on/jovenes-protestaron-desnudos-en-el- 24.12. Not a Educati Repressi centro-de-concepcion/2011-11- Chile Santiago 11 20 Threat on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on 24/173811.html No http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/politica/ 15.12. Not a Educati Repressi manifestantes-funan-acto-de-fundacion- Chile Santiago 11 100 Threat on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on jaime-guzman/2011-12-15/205705.html No http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci 09.11. Mild Educati Repressi on/estudiantes-marchan-por-valparaiso-sin- Chile Valparaiso 11 10,500 Threat on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on paso-al-congreso/2011-11-09/130340.html http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci No on/estudiantes-se-toman-la-casa-central-de- 04.11. Not a Educati Repressi la-universidad-austral/2011-11- Chile Santiago 11 50 Threat on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on 04/102951.html

No http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci Rio 28.10. Not a Educati Repressi on/secundarios-se-toman-ribera-del-rio- Chile Mapocho 11 30 Threat on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on mapocho/2011-10-28/074052.html http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci No on/universitarios-realizan-olla-comun-por- 05.10. Not a Educati Repressi cese-de-becas-alimenticias/2011-10- Chile Santiago 11 100 Threat on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on 05/153931.html Significa http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci nt on/escolares-marchan-por-providencia-hacia- 26.09. Mild Educati Repressi municipio-de-labbe/2011-09-26/091334.html Chile Santiago 11 1,200 Threat on NO NO NO YES NO YES NO on No http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci 24.09. Not a Educati Repressi on/grupo-de-estudiantes-protesta-frente-a- Chile Providencia 11 30 Threat on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on la-udi/2011-09-24/131308.html No http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci 13.09. Not a Educati Repressi on/estudiantes-rebeldes-intentaron-tomarse- Chile Maipu 11 40 Threat on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on la-sede-del-pc/2011-09-12/140829.html http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci No on/impactante-protesta-de-estudiantes-en- 22.08. Not a Educati Repressi puente-de-providencia/2011-08- Chile Providencia 11 11 Threat on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on 22/064824.html

Significa http://lanacion.cl/articulo/2011/8/en-familia/ nt 08.08. Mild Educati Repressi Chile Santiago 11 11,000 Threat on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on Significa http://lanacion.cl/articulo/2011/11/intereses-

nt de-clases/ 09.08. Mild Educati Repressi Chile Santiago 11 15,000 Threat on YES YES YES NO NO YES YES on Significa http://lanacion.cl/articulo/2011/11/intereses-

nt de-clases/ 09.08. Mild Educati Repressi Chile Valparaiso 11 11,000 Threat on YES YES NO NO NO YES YES on Significa http://lanacion.cl/articulo/2011/8/protestar-

nt es-humano/ 25.08. Mild Educati Repressi Chile Santiago 11 10,000 Threat on YES YES YES NO NO YES YES on Mild http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/policial/ 26.07. Not a Educati Repressi protesta-en-chilean-eagles-college-termina- Chile Santiago 11 200 Threat on NO NO NO NO NO NO YES on con-incidentes/2011-07-26/223051.html No http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/sin- 10.06. Mild Educati Repressi mayores-incidentes-termino-marcha-contra- Chile Santiago 11 10,000 Threat on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on hidroaysen/2011-06-10/232131.html

Significa http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/carabin nt eros-detuvo-a-15-personas-al-finalizar- 01.06. Mild Educati Repressi marcha-de-la-confech/2011-06- Chile Santiago 11 22,500 Threat on NO NO NO YES NO NO YES on 01/165809.html No http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/nueva- 19.05. Not a Local Repressi marcha-en-santiago-contra-hidroaysen-sin- Chile Santiago 11 500 Threat issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on mayores-incidentes/2011-05-19/092453.html Significa http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/marcha- nt contra-hidroaysen-en-la-capital/2011-05- 20.05. Mild Local Repressi 20/215800.html Chile Santiago 11 40,000 Threat issue NO NO NO YES NO NO YES on Significa http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/estudia nt ntes-masiva-marcha-termina-en-el-parque- 12.05. Mild Educati Repressi almagro/2011-05-12/104644.html Chile Santiago 11 15,000 Threat on NO YES NO NO NO NO YES on No http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/sin- 28.05. Mild Educati Repressi mayores-incidentes-termino-marcha-contra- Chile Santiago 11 30,000 Threat on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on hidroaysen/2011-06-10/232131.html Significa http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/sent reanudan-protestas-contra-hidroaysen/2011- 10.05. Not a Local Repressi 05-10/221658.html Chile Valparaiso 11 600 Threat issue NO YES NO NO YES NO YES on No http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/se- 10.05. Not a Local Repressi reanudan-protestas-contra-hidroaysen/2011-

Chile La Serena 11 200 Threat issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on 05-10/221658.html Mild http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/se- 10.05. Not a Local Repressi reanudan-protestas-contra-hidroaysen/2011-

Chile Santiago 11 350 Threat issue NO NO NO NO NO NO YES on 05-10/221658.html Significa http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/masiva- nt protesta-de-universitarios-por-mas- 28.04. Mild Educati Repressi financiamiento-para-la-educacion/2011-04- Chile Santiago 11 5,000 Threat on NO NO NO YES NO NO YES on 28/152959.html Mild http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/concepc 21.04. Not a Local Repressi ion-con-detenidos-termino-protesta-contra- Chile Santiago 11 30 Threat issue NO NO NO NO NO NO YES on visita-de-obama/2011-03-21/151418.html No nhttp://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/magall 11.01. Not a Local Repressi anicos-protestaron-frente-a-la-moneda-y- Chile Santiago 11 100 Threat issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on apelan-a-pinera/2011-01-11/150020.html No http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/multitu 09.01. Mild Local Repressi dinaria-manifestacion-en-magallanes-por- Chile Santiago 11 10,000 Threat issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on alza-de-gas/2011-01-09/191420.html

LII

COUN CITY DAT # OF Threat in CLAI PEP NON RUBB FIRE WAT INJU ARRE LEVEL Website link TRY E PARTICI relation to MS/ PER LET ER ARM ER RED STED OF PANTS # of REAS SPR HAL BULL CAN PEOP PEOPL REPRES participan ONS AY BOM ETS NON LE E SION ts BS No http://ladiaria.com.uy/informacion/ciclistas-

Urugu 18.12. Not a local Repressi coparon-ciudad.html ay Montevideo 13 100 Threat issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on anti No http://ladiaria.com.uy/informacion/clasificad

Urugu 10.12. Not a govern Repressi ores-marcharon-zona-exclusion-imm.html ay Montevideo 13 80 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on No http://ladiaria.com.uy/informacion/ambulant

Urugu 05.11. Not a local Repressi es-no-armaron-protestaron.html ay Montevideo 13 25 Threat issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on

No http://ladiaria.com.uy/index.php?id=80635 Urugu 07.11. Not a Repressi ay Montevideo 13 4 Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on

No http://ladiaria.com.uy/index.php?id=80543 Urugu Gualeguayc 04.11. Not a local Repressi ay hú 13 100 Threat issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on

No http://ladiaria.com.uy/index.php?id=79673 Urugu 09.10. Not a local Repressi ay Azucarlito 13 30 Threat issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on anti No http://ladiaria.com.uy/articulo/2013/9/dando Urugu 27.09. Not a govern Repressi -la-cara/ ay Montevideo 13 250 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on Mild http://ladiaria.com.uy/articulo/2013/9/y-van/ Urugu 25.09. Not a Repressi ay Montevideo 13 10 Threat union NO NO NO NO NO YES YES on No http://ladiaria.com.uy/articulo/2013/9/apura Urugu 13.09. Not a Repressi ndo-la-marcha/ ay Montevideo 13 450 Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on anti No http://ladiaria.com.uy/articulo/2013/9/apura Urugu 13.09. Mild govern Repressi ndo-la-marcha/ ay Montevideo 13 2,000 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on

No http://ladiaria.com.uy/index.php?id=78219 Urugu 05.09. Not a local Repressi ay Paysandu 13 150 Threat issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on

No http://ladiaria.com.uy/index.php?id=78116 Urugu 03.09. Not a educati Repressi ay Montevideo 13 150 Threat on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on http://ladiaria.com.uy/articulo/2013/8/las- Urugu Montevideo 25.08. 400 Not a anti NO NO NO NO NO NO NO No dos-marchas/

LIII ay 13 Threat govern Repressi ment on

anti No http://ladiaria.com.uy/index.php?id=76344 Urugu 19.07. Not a govern Repressi ay Montevideo 13 120 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on

No http://ladiaria.com.uy/index.php?id=76038 Urugu 11.07. Not a Repressi ay Aloef 13 30 Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on No http://ladiaria.com.uy/articulo/2013/5/forma Urugu 22.05. Mild Repressi s-de-gritar/ ay Montevideo 13 10,000 Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on anti No http://ladiaria.com.uy/articulo/2013/5/guard Urugu 08.05. Not a govern Repressi a-los-vidrios/ ay Montevideo 13 200 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on anti No http://ladiaria.com.uy/articulo/2013/9/dando Urugu 27.03. Not a govern Repressi -la-cara/ ay Montevideo 13 500 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on No http://ladiaria.com.uy/articulo/2012/4/bala- Urugu 19.03. Not a Repressi perdida/ ay Montevideo 13 150 Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on

anti No http://ladiaria.com.uy/index.php?id=79388 Urugu 15.02. Not a govern Repressi ay Montevideo 13 300 Threat ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on No http://www.ladiaria.com.uy/index.php?id=59

Urugu 15.05. Mild local Repressi 825 ay Montevideo 12 2,000 Threat issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on No http://ladiaria.com.uy/articulo/2012/1/para- Urugu 17.01. Mild local Repressi tomar-impulso/ ay Bella Unión 12 2,000 Threat issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on No http://www.ladiaria.com.uy/politica/480923-

Urugu 25.11. Not a Repressi protesta-encadenada ay Montevideo 11 3 Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on

No http://ladiaria.com.uy/index.php?id=52726 Urugu 23.11. Not a Repressi ay Fray Bentos 11 130 Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on No http://ladiaria.com.uy/articulo/2011/8/comu Urugu 23.08. Not a educati Repressi nidad-zorrilla/ ay Montevideo 11 200 Threat on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO on

LIV