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Russia in Latin America a Strategic Analysis

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Russia in Latin America a Strategic Analysis Russia in Latin America A Strategic Analysis BY DOUGLAS FARAH AND LIANA EUSTACIA REYES n recent years, Russian President Vladimir Putin has hardly veiled his desire to lead Russia back to superpower status. Putin’s rhetoric emphasizes a multipolar world where the United IStates is no longer the dominant power, and his actions present Russian global leadership as a viable alternative to the United States’. Increasingly visible is the multifaceted nature of Russia’s tactics for undermining U.S. power projection in multiple theaters, including Latin America. Leaders of the U.S. defense and intelligence communities have responded to Russia’s growing global assertiveness by repeatedly singling out Russia as the primary military and strategic threat to the United States, particularly following Russia’s recent annexation of Crimea and hostile activities in Ukraine. In March 2015, Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper labeled Russia a “threat actor” and an example of a nation where “the nexus among organized crime, state actors, and business blurs the distinction between state policy and private gain.”1 The 2015 National Military Strategy presented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that Russia “has repeatedly demonstrated that it does not respect the sovereignty of its neighbors and it is willing to use force to achieve its goals. Russia’s military actions are undermining regional security directly and through proxy forces.”2 The accuracy of these assessments of Russian intentions and capabilities can be documented throughout many parts of the world. Yet this lens is seldom used in analyzing the burgeoning Russian diplomatic and military presence in Latin America – particularly in Central America. The formal Russian state presence is accompanied by state business ventures, soft power overtures, increasing Russian organized criminal activity, and the reactivation of Cold War proxy networks. While seldom part of the strategic analysis of the new Russian state, there is clear evidence that Douglas Farah is President of IBI Consultants and a Senior Associate of the Americas Program at CSIS. Liana Eustacia Reyes is the Research Coordinator for IBI Consultants. PRISM 5, NO. 4 FEATURES | 101 FARAH AND REYES Latin America, considered an area of vital Russia and other extra-regional actors such as interest to the United States, is now an area of China and Iran strengthen the hands of a bloc intense Russian state interest and activity. of radical populist governments, is the long- As General John Kelly, commander of the standing U.S. goal of establishing functioning U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) democracies under the rule of law with stable noted in recent Congressional testimony, “it economic growth. The U.S. is simultaneously has been over three decades since we last saw facing a concerted effort by a significant alli- this type of high-profile Russian presence” in ance of Latin American governments to erase Latin America.3 In his command’s 2015 any trace of U.S. military and security doctrine, Posture Statement Kelly added that: weaken economic and cultural ties, and por- tray any and all U.S. policy decisions as seek- Periodically since 2008, Russia has pur- ing to recolonize Latin America. sued an increased presence in Latin The once-shared hemispheric values of a America through propaganda, military functioning democratic system are being arms and equipment sales, counterdrug replaced by a toxic mix of anti-democratic val- agreements, and trade. Under President ues, massive corruption, and a doctrine that Putin, however, we have seen a clear return draws on totalitarian models, embraces mul- to Cold War tactics. As part of its global tiple terrorist groups, and includes an explicit strategy, Russia is using power projection in justification for the use of weapons of mass an attempt to erode U.S. leadership and destruction against the United States.5 challenge U.S. influence in the Western This article is not intended to cover the Hemisphere. .While these actions do not full range of Russian commercial, diplomatic, pose an immediate threat, Russia’s activi- and military activity in Latin America, which ties in the hemisphere are concerning and was recently done by R. Evan Ellis of the U.S. underscore the importance of remaining Army War College.6 Rather, it aims to illumi- engaged with our partners.4 nate the nexus described by Clapper, the stra- This is not to say that Russia in Latin tegic objectives behind that nexus, and the real America presents an imminent military threat and potential threat the nexus poses to U.S. to the United States. But Russian officials have interests. A brief case study on Central America been brazen about their desire to undermine is included to provide a more in depth view of and confront the United States in the Western Russian expansion in the hemisphere. Hemisphere, its main sphere of influence, to Russia’s Expansion in the West: Past counter what Russia perceives as U.S. interfer- and Present ence in Russia’s border territories. In the cur- rent Latin American context Russia has made During the Cold War, the Soviet Union relied greater progress toward their goals than is usu- on its allies Cuba and Nicaragua (the latter for ally acknowledged. only a decade), but Russia now has at least While the U.S. position remains preemi- seven unconditional allies in the region.7 Most nent – due to geographic proximity, cultural of its allies are among the least democratic and ties, and trade ties – it is eroding more quickly most repressive states in the hemisphere. than is often understood. Also eroding, as 102 | FEATURES PRISM 5, NO. 4 RUSSIA IN LATIN AMERICA During the past two years Russia has expanded the world stage, consistently sides with anti- its dealings with these nations at a rapid pace. U.S., totalitarian governments such as Russia, The dominant organization of Latin Syria, North Korea, and Zimbabwe. The bloc American nations allying with Russia is the also supports organizations designated as ter- Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our rorists by the United States and Europe, such America (known by the Spanish acronym, as the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces ALBA);8 a bloc of nations, many of whose of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias leaders had long-standing ties with the former de Colombia – FARC), Hezbollah, and the Soviet Union. They share Russia’s perception Basque separatist ETA. It is worth noting that of the United States as an imperialist nation the U.S. Treasury Department has formally bent on dominating and interfering with the designated at least six senior Venezuelan offi- sovereignty of others that must be suppressed.9 cials for materially supporting the FARC and The ALBA nations have increasingly become an the FARC’s cocaine trafficking activities.11 alliance of highly criminalized states that, on Presidency of the Nation of Argentina of the Nation Presidency Argentinian President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and Russian President Vladimir Putin toast during his first visit to Argentina (July 2014). PRISM 5, NO. 4 FEATURES | 103 FARAH AND REYES Russia’s ALBA allies include several of hold them accountable for human rights viola- Latin America’s most important countries, tions or electoral fraud.13 In return, these Latin including Venezuela, whose late President American allies are shielding Russia from Hugo Chávez used Venezuela’s oil wealth to international isolation, providing political and become Russia’s main weapons client in the diplomatic support, and an important regional region; and Argentina, whose mercurial presi- media network that blankets the continent. dent Cristina Fernández de Kirchner signed a The media network offers coordinated 2014 “strategic partnership” agreement with messages of unstinting support for Putin and Putin and who regularly posts on her Twitter Russia’s aggressive actions in Europe while account high praise for the Russian president. casting the United States as a global aggressor. While not formally a member of ALBA, At the same time, these countries are increas- Fernández de Kirchner has led Argentina to ing Russia’s access to the hemisphere’s ports become one of the most fanatical and vocal and airspace, and ultimately, increasing supporters of the ALBA bloc, both financially Russia’s sphere of influence in a region where and politically (even hosting ALBA’s ten year the United States has seldom been so directly anniversary summit),12 while vociferously challenged.14 backing Russia at every opportunity. Although the Putin government, unlike the Soviet government’s high point, is under Russia’s expanded outreach to the ALBA bloc significant economic stress and as a result has helps insure that Russia’s Latin American allies little to offer in terms of material support, it have a powerful friend on the United Nations generously promises mega projects that rarely Security Council to veto any efforts to hold come to fruition. Additionally, Russia has them accountable for human rights violations signed dozens of memoranda of understand- or electoral fraud ing with Latin American countries that are vague and, if consistent with past behavior, likely to be left unfulfilled. In Central America, Russia’s leading allies But a careful review of Russia’s activities in are Nicaragua and El Salvador. In Nicaragua, the region shows that, despite limited former and current Sandinista President resources, Russia has focused on delivering in Daniel Ortega (1979-1990 and 2007- present) a few key areas, all designed to directly chal- is known for having made his nation a Soviet lenge the United States in areas where it has and Cuban proxy during the Cold War. In El seldom faced competition before: Salvador, President Salvador Sánchez Cerén, a ■■ The sale of weapons: In addition to hun- former Marxist guerilla commander, has cre- dreds of thousands of the most technologi- ated an inner circle that is mostly comprised cally advanced AK-47 assault rifles, sales of Soviet-trained insurgents who fought U.S.- include tanks, helicopters, supersonic com- backed forces in the nation’s civil war.
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