European Federalists: a Legacy of Youth Empowerment

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EUROPEAN FEDERALISTS: A LEGACY OF YOUTH EMPOWERMENT

AND THE EUROPEAN YOUTH CAMPAIGN, 1951-1958

A University Thesis Presented to the Faculty

California State University, East Bay

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Art in History

Tracey Boyle

May 2020

Abstract

After the Second World War, Europe lay in ruins. European Federalists aimed to rebuild

Europe by uniting it. They wanted individual national governments to cede authority to a

European union that could provide stimulus to economic growth and stop nationalistic rivalries from bringing war to Europe again. Ideally, they planned to create the United

States of Europe with a constitution and parliament.

The European Union (EU) became possible in 1993 due to the hard work and endless networking of eleven European Federalists considered “founding fathers” of the

EU. Two of these men, Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, were responsible for the precursor to the EU, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1950.

Extensive personal networking and back-door negotiations were needed to achieve this humble start to the European Union.

My thesis argues that after the Second World War, European Federalists also worked in a cultural, on-the-ground manner to generate support among citizens for EU structures. They calculated political and social pressure from voters would force

European leaders to unite. They encouraged dialogue and debate among citizens in the hopes that this education and civic mindedness would contribute to European integration.

They focused on youth outreach, youth education and youth travel between European nations by creating the European Youth Campaign from 1951-1958.

However, Federalist aims to unite Europe were not the only forces shaping early

EU structures. Individual countries retained their nationalistic agendas and often placed

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these above the goal of European integration. The ultimate design of Federalist structures and Federalist youth programs reflected a compromise with nationalistic policies. This thesis puts Federalist activities in their historical framework to reveal this compromise.

This thesis takes an in-depth view of the European Youth Campaign (EYC). The

EYC targeted youth and cultural institutions to generate support for the EU. This youth organization demonstrated a deeper, cultural approach to fending off Soviet influence and promoting European integration. I analyze the activities and management of the EYC.

This thesis argues that youth were not simple pawns in European politics. Partly due to the EYC, youth became a dynamic force in European politics and international relations.

To understand the evolution of the EYC, this thesis reviews the effective strategies the EYC took from prior Federalist organizations during the interwar and resistance period. European leaders began to appreciate the need for policies aimed at youth to tackle large political and social problems. Communist youth festivals prodded the European Federalists to develop their own youth outreach. England during the

Second World War and Occupied Germany were fertile ground for the networking and discussions on education reform that led to the formation of the EYC. The use of archival resources on the EYC and the focus on youth and culture in this thesis is an important contribution to European Union studies.

EUROPEAN FEDERALISTS: A LEGACY OF YOUTH EMPOWERMENT

AND THE EUROPEAN YOUTH CAMPAIGN, 1951-1958

Tracey Boyle

Approved: Date:

Electronic Signature Available May 15, 2020 Professor Bridget Ford

Electronic Signature Available May 15, 2020 Professor Elizabeth McGuire

Acknowledgments

In memory of my loving parents and grandparents: John T. Boyle for always believing in me and giving me vision; Sandra L. Boyle for her good humor, sacrifice and unswerving help along the path of life; and Lester and Lucille Pease, part of the “Greatest

Generation,” for their infinite love and wisdom.

With many, many thanks to my husband Nocair Bensalah for his constant love and support; to our children, Adam, Annissa and Kylie Bensalah who always filled my world with wonder, possibility and love; and to my brother Chris Boyle for always being there for my family.

I would like to also acknowledge the work of historians before me who had access that I didn’t to archives throughout the U.S. and Europe on the European Youth

Movement and European Federalist Organizations. Walter Lipman did an amazing job compiling and annotating early documents on the Federalists. Historians are constantly building on the work of each other and being inspired by each other.

I would like to thank Professor Kevin Kaatz, Professor Bridget Ford, Professor

Elizabeth McGuire and Professor Linda Ivey for all their professional wisdom and encouragement. The faculty and staff in the Department of History at California State

East Bay were invaluable. I want to give a special thanks to Wanda Washington for her support.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction ...... 1

2. History of Federalist Aims and National Interests...... 12

3. Precedents of Federalist Youth Movements ...... 33

Wartime England and De-Nazifying Education ...... 34

Lessons from the Resistance ...... 37

Cultural Outreach of the European Movement ...... 42

Cold War Rivalries ...... 46

4. The European Youth Movement...... 55

5. Conclusion ...... 82

Bibliography ...... 94

Primary Sources ...... 94

Secondary Sources ...... 98

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List of Tables

1. EM Poll on National Support for a European Union, 1950 ...... 85

2. 1950 German Poll on European Unity taken by EM ...... 86

3. 1952 Netherlands Poll on European Unity taken by EM ...... 86

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Chapter 1: Introduction

WWII devastated Europe physically, financially and morally. To preclude further destruction and war, European leaders wanted to stanch nationalistic rivalries at home while limiting the influence of the United States and the Soviet Union. Many Europeans viewed a united Europe as the only viable third path of economic growth and stability.

European Federalists argued for a democratic supranational organization uniting Europe and creating this third path. The Federalists endlessly debated if the supranational organization should be a confederation or a federation. A confederation is a union or cooperation between sovereign states who retain their individual power whereas a federation is a single government to whom sovereign states cede power. The most fervent Federalists called for a United States of Europe with a parliament and constitution. The continent began negotiations to build a European Union and debated its future structure.

Nationalistic interests and rivalries impeded efforts at integration. France was suspicious of Germany and many countries resented British and American over-reach.

England hesitated to join a European Federation, clinging to its special alliance with the

United States and the British Commonwealth. As its former colonies struggled for independence, France alternately defined French citizenship as strictly European or including overseas territories. Many countries had significant Communist parties and refused to alienate these citizens or provoke the Soviet Union, which opposed any kind of

European organization.

Following years of haggling and the defeat of the European Defense Council,

European Federalists were discouraged from the prospect of achieving full political unity.

The Federalists set a more practical goal of economic cooperation among a few nations.

The 1950 Schuman Declaration achieved this limited economic cooperation in establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). It was the first success of the European Federalists.

The European Union (EU) evolved from this small economic organization, composed of elites who acted with little direct input from common citizens. Negotiations behind closed doors and tight networks of alliances were critical to the establishment of the ECSC. European historian Albrecht Rothacher writes of the achievement of the

ECSC, “[G]radual, imperceptible . . . progress was legitimized by economic need . . . not by popular referenda.”1

This thesis presents evidence that the European Federalists experimented with outreach to youth groups and utilized a cultural, bottom-up approach to promote the EU.

They tried to rally the public around the idea of European integration through education.

The dominant European Federalist organization after the Second World War, the

European Movement (EM) implemented the European Youth Campaign (EYC) from

1951-1958 to mobilize youth support for European integration.

1 Albrecht Rothacher, Uniting Europe: Journey Between Gloom and Glory (London: Imperial College Press, 2005), 14.

The EM was launched in October 1948, with Duncan Sandys elected as President.

Its origins can be seen in the many Federalist dialogues on European unity between the two world wars. The European Movement created the Council of Europe in 1949 which was a notable achievement of the Federalists. The EM fought unsuccessfully for the direct election of a European Parliament by all European citizens and for a European

Constitution. The EM still functions today and self-reflects that their goal after the war was “. . . [t]o transform the relations between the European States and its citizens. To achieve this goal, the European Movement always put the citizen at the heart of community construction.”2

The European Movement created the European Youth Campaign in 1951. The goal of the European Youth Campaign was to promote the ideal of European unity and citizenship to youth. The program was directed at 16-20 years old students but there were some activities for every segment of the population. EYC branches worked closely with local groups and had complete discretion over their agendas. Consequently, activities in different nations and regions varied. EYC groups promoted everything from poster contests among schools to large student rallies in support of unity. They also promoted travel and educational interaction among college students across European nations. Organizers of the EYC claimed their liberal-democratic approach to mobilizing young people was very different from the mass youth organization and propaganda associated with both fascism and Soviet communism. Europe looked to its younger

2 “European Movement International, Who We Are History,” European Movement International, accessed April 2019, https://europeanmovement.eu/who-we-are/history/.

generation to create real changes in intra-European relations and international relations.

Thus, the European Federalists were involved in direct outreach to the public and in particular to youth.

This thesis provides a detailed, comprehensive look at the EYC's everyday activities, organization, and funding. The direct impetus for the EYC came from

Communist Youth Festivals and this will be investigated. As European historian Emily

Marker notes, “An ongoing conversation about youth and education . . . was unfolding across metropolitan, European and colonial space.”3 National colonial administrators, educators and politicians began to develop youth outreach programs as part of larger policies and this influenced the development of the EYC. This thesis will explore this larger conversation about youth and education and how it shaped the EYC.

Primary sources include archival resources on the EYC found at the Hoover and the digital libraries of the EU, the Harry S. Truman Library, The University of

Luxembourg’s European History Library, British Diplomatic Oral History Programme, and the U.S. Department of State Library. This thesis also draws upon secondary works directly citing materials in the European archives of the EU and the Georgetown

University Library. Extensive primary source documents compiled by Federalist historian Walter Lipgen allows analysis of Federalist organizations and methodologies during the Second World War. Media coverage of European youth rallies and public

3 Emily Marker, “France between Europe and Africa: Youth, race, and envisioning the postwar world, 1940-1960” (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2016), 81.

opinion towards integration provide valuable insight. Memoirs of influential diplomats in the Federalist movement inform this study as well. American foreign policy documents enable exploration of shifting U.S. policy objectives over this period. Secondary sources include several articles, theses and books about the cultural Cold War, American policy towards the European Union, the early organizations of European unity, and the history of the Federalists.

In a literature review of the European Union, very little coverage of early EU cultural activities explores youth groups. Yet historians and political scientists have noted that studies of governments, institutions and treaties is not enough and more emphasis needs to be placed on culture, people and ideas and informal networks.4 European historian Lennaert van Heumann writes, “The role such actors played . . . in European integration remains for a large part cloaked in mystery and their history has yet to be written.”5 This thesis contributes to this literature. There is a lack of analysis and material on the European Youth Campaign and youth mobilization in support of

Federalism. Not yet widely understood for its historical significance, the evolution of

EYC methods from early Federalist organizations will be addressed in this thesis.

4 Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte Leucht and Michael Gehler, eds., Transnational Networks in European Integration: Governing Europe, 1945-1983 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

5 Lennaert van Heumen, “An Atlantic or European Union?” in The Informal Construction of Europe, eds. Lennaert van Heumen and Mechtchild Roos (London: Routledge, 2019), 95.

A review of the literature on the EYC, and youth groups within the context of the

Cold War reveals limited work. Richard J. Aldrich writes, “The use of covert operations for the specific promotion of European unity has attracted little scholarly attention and remains poorly understood.”6 Christina Norwig looked at the EYC and the important role youth played in the process of European integration.7 Brian A. McKenzie examined how the EYC operated in Ireland and how it intersected with Irish nationalism and the

Catholic Church. He argued that the concept of youth “operated as a mechanism of cultural reconstruction in the postwar period.”8 Joel Kotek presented evidence that

American and British involvement in youth outreach was a response to systematic

Communist infiltration of youth front organizations all through Europe but particularly in

Britain since 1919.9 Marker looked at the EYC, colonial education policy, the mobilization of youth in France and the construction of national identity.10

This thesis will assess the effect of the EYC and the role of youth within

European Integration by especially focusing upon the EYC’s legacy of educational

6 Richard J. Aldrich, “OSS, CIA and European unity: The American Committee on United Europe, 1948- 60,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 8,1 (1997): 184-227.

7 Christina Norwig, “A First European Generation? The Myth of Youth and European Integration in the Fifties,” Diplomatic History 38, 2 (2014): 251-260.

8 Richard Jobs, Riding the New Wave: Youth and the rejuvenation of France after the Second World War (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2007).

9 Joel Kotek, “Youth Organizations as a Battlefield in the Cold War,” Intelligence and National Security vol. 18, no. 2 (2003): 168-191.

10 Emily Marker, “France between Europe and Africa: Youth, race, and envisioning the postwar world, 1940-1960” (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2016).

reform, encouragement of student travel, and development of a European university system. Informal networks of student leaders involved in the EYC played major roles in the later development of the European Communities and the European Union.

When looking at the historiography of European integration, initial studies supported the Federalist narrative that a supranational organization would cure all ills for

Europe. This orthodox view held that Federalism was an inevitable outcome, due to the many socio-economic links growing between European nations in the new world order.

Historian Walter Lipgens, a Federalist-leaning scholar at the European University

Institute, organized the collection and publication of many original documents on

Federalists’ activities. He argued that gains in European unity came mainly from

Federalist actions. In the 1970s, as more archives opened, histories became less overtly celebratory. Historian Alan Milward was noteworthy for his analysis emphasizing the self-serving nature of national interests.11 He argued that the new instruments of

European Unity did not replace nation states; rather, these instruments ironically strengthened them.

This thesis argues that the emerging unity of Europe was not just a function of

Federalists agendas. By placing the events in their historical context, the thesis shows how national interests shaped the emerging organizations of European unity. This thesis also explores how national interests shaped the activities of the EYC.

11 Fernando Guirao, Frances Lynch, and Sigfrido M. Ramirez Perez, Alan S. Milward and a Century of European Change (London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2012).

The historiography of the U.S. role in Europe after WWII focused for many years solely on U.S. goals. Orthodoxy held that the U.S. saved Europe from economic ruin and the Communist threat due to massive monetary aid, defensive agreements and world leadership role. The revisionist view argued that the U.S. was imperialist and self- serving. The U.S. helped Europe only to impose the American culture and agenda.

Historian Alan Milward led the way in looking at how U.S. policy towards the European

Union was affected by the European Union itself. In other words, U.S. success in helping

Europe lay in its flexibility to accommodate and meet the needs of diverse national and local interest groups in Europe. This thesis will provide evidence to support this view by looking at how U.S. efforts to promote the European Federalists were shaped and constrained by Europeans.

My thesis has the following structure. In chapter 2, the history of the concept of

Federalism and the growing activity of the European Federalists is traced. Nationalistic interests continually threatened efforts to integrate Europe. Federalists utilized extensive networks developed during the Second World War with each other and the U.S. to work around nationalistic roadblocks. To further their cause, the Federalists boldly pushed new cultural approaches. They spread their message through press, radio and large emotional rallies. The cultural approaches and informal networks described in this thesis tend to be very specific to their time period. Thus, the historical timeline and context is necessary for understanding cultural approaches to Federalism.

Chapter 3 investigates the focus on youth and education developing throughout the early 20th century. This focus sparked the creation of the EYC. “Wartime England

and De-Nazifying Education,” looks at the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education

(CAME). CAME was a group of exiled education administrators in Britain during the

Second World War who met weekly to develop a common European history and educational philosophy for youth to overcome the effects of Racial Nazi Theory. The organization was a forerunner for the European Movement’s youth policy. Members of

CAME were often members of the EM. Within CAME proceedings, European

Federalists were already interacting with Americans who would later support the funding of the EYC.

“Lessons from the Resistance” examines the legacy of wartime organizations of

European Federalists and resistance fighters. They exhibited an increasing focus on youth, propaganda and culture. Many of the effective strategies developed by these groups informed the design of the EYC. Used by the Resistance for military and relief operations during war, youth groups had earned a reputation for effective outreach. In fact, many Resistance leaders served in earlier wartime youth groups, so they appreciated their value.

“Cultural Outreach of the European Movement” looks at how the European

Movement implemented a general policy of cultural outreach. As the EM set up the

European Youth Campaign, it also pursued complimentary policies. Emotional public rallies and polls increased press coverage, and creation of a European flag reflected the surge in EM activity.

“Cold War Rivalries” examines Communist Youth Festivals as the direct impetus for the European Youth Campaign. The Soviet Union successfully garnered youth

support through international outreach while suppressing student activism in Soviet

Occupied Germany. American administrators in the Allied Occupied Zone and European

Federalists were unprepared to compete. European leaders were fearful that students from colonial countries would be attracted to Communism and incited to rebel. They designed national educational policies to placate colonial student grievances and maintain better relationships with colonial countries struggling for independence. The EYC was developed to promote an alternative vision to European youth to complement cold war strategies.

Chapter 4 describes the European Youth Campaign in close detail. Its structure, agenda, activities and financing are discussed. This thesis will show how the political climate in Occupied Germany and the work of French education administrators there heavily influenced the development and structure of the EYC. The EYC focused on small-scale educational events to deliberately contrast its democratic outreach from that of Fascists and Communists. Effective managerial methods and outreach strategies taken from earlier Federalist organization are shown to be operational in the EYC. National interests and even the interests of the Catholic Church influenced the way each country implemented the EYC. This thesis argues that students were empowered and not indoctrinated. EM policy that disagreed with student priorities such as using the EYC to promote the European Defense Council are shown to be a watershed for EYC student leadership becoming more activist in setting EYC agenda.

Chapter 5 assesses the effect of the EYC. This chapter looks at EM attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of its own strategies and outreach. The EM conducted

referendums and polls on European integration throughout Europe which will be examined. The Federalists’ goal of uniting all of Europe under one European constitution as a liberal democracy as the United States of Europe clearly did not materialize.

Nevertheless, the Concert of Europe, the ECSC and the ultimate development of the

European Communities (EC) and the European Union are clear achievements for

European Federalists and major historical milestones. That nationalistic interests were served in the creation of these Federalist achievements does not detract from their importance.

Federalists attempted to instill value for democracy, education and open- mindedness in youth leaders. They opened important themes for general public discussion like the definition of “being European.” They helped develop a common educational approach and university system. Cultural diversity was celebrated as a strength on which European unity would rest.

This thesis argues that through programs like the EYC, young students made friendships and traveled throughout Europe. After the Second World War, youth hostels, youth work camps, and ease of travel expanded young people’s minds and sense of a common Europe. Many EYC youth were valuable members of the EC and EU negotiations. As a consequence, youth realized empowerment as a vehicle of international relations, a phenomenon unique to the twentieth century.

Chapter 2: History of Federalist Aims and National Interests

This chapter explores the evolution of the Federalist movement. It highlights the development of the informal networks used by European Federalists and American supporters to establish the European Movement. The idea of a united Europe predated the European Union by several centuries. The term Federalist often refers to those

Europeans working to achieve integration during and after the First and Second World

Wars. The history of the idea of European unity and the Federalist movement should inform our understanding of European integration after the Second World War.

The concept of uniting Europe was used by powerful nations and ambitious men to justify conquests and defend territory throughout European history. Many mighty empires--Roman, Byzantine, Frankish and the Holy Roman Empire--ruled over

“European” territory. Karl Martell, Charlemagne, King Otto and many Popes all appealed to European solidarity to rally military support. Germanic tribes and empires referred to Europe when defending against Islamic forces in the name of Christian religion. The King of Bohemia, George of Podebrady, wanted to establish a Christian

European Parliament and other common European institutions with Hungary, Poland,

Bohemia, Bavaria, France, Italy and Spain to counter the Islamic Turks in 1464.

Many philosophers, politicians and writers called for political European unity during the Enlightenment to end European wars. French salons debated supranational political structures, along with ideas of reason, individuality and science. Plans appeared in different countries arguing that sovereign states should cede some or all authority to an

organization of Europe. In 1693, William Penn wrote a resolution for peace to establish a

European Parliament. In 1708, Charles-Irénée Castel suggested a European union of independent states for collective self-defense. The founding of the United States inspired many European philosophers. For example, Wojciech Jastrzebowski first used the term

“United States of Europe” in 1831 in his proposal for peace. In 1849, Victor Hugo encouraged a “United States of Europe” at the Paris Peace Conference.

According to such thinkers, a European Union would fend off dictators or absolute monarchs who wished to control all of Europe, such as Napoleon. However, plans to unite Europe remained philosophical debates with little agreement. Without mass followings or political power, philosophers failed to see proposals for European union gain influence.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, plans to coordinate the economies of some European countries attracted more attention. Some economic plans of limited scope were implemented. In 1883, the Zollverein custom union organized in

Prussia. In 1885 Polish writer Theodore Szymanowski developed a proposal for a united

Europe with a customs union and a single currency. The Belgium-Luxembourg Union created a common currency between the two nations in 1921. In 1937 the Van Zeeland

Plan called for liberation of trade among European countries. In contrast to earlier political and theoretical Federalist plans, these limited economic plans generated some limited support among the public, business leaders and national politicians due to their immediate monetary benefit.

After the First World War, the terms Federalism and Federalists became common usage for a small group of intellectuals horrified by the war and seeking to contain nationalism through European unity. However, they only agreed on the need to inhibit nationalism. They created a variety of political and economic plans for Europe and radically different political groups to achieve European unity. Some focused on the heritage of Europe, which they defined through art and culture, Greek and Roman influences, and Christianity.12 Others developed a more international stance, wanting world organizations to control nationalism.

This interwar period was the most promising time for European Federalists to organize a United States of Europe without the interference of other countries. In 1929,

French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand, an avid Federalist, called for a Federal Union of

Europe at the League of Nations. Though debated by European and world leaders, heads of state clung to nationalistic goals and ultimately squashed the idea of unity.

Count Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi was a leading force behind the Federalist idea of political unity, writing the Pan-Europa manifesto in 1923 establishing the Pan-

Europa Union. He argued forcibly and intelligently for a united Europe and was responsible for generating support for European integration in the U.S. public and government. Coundenhove argued that a united Europe would prevent future wars and secure Europe’s place alongside Russian, the U.S. and Asia as a world economic and political power. Coundenhove contended that questions of borders and identity plagued a

12 Walter Lipgens, A History of European Integration (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982).

united Europe from the very conception of the idea. He argued that culture united Europe.

He envisioned European culture as Christian.

The design of the power structure uniting Europe raised serious contention among

Federalists. A confederation of nation states normally addresses just one issue within a loose framework that maintains large amounts of national sovereignty. A federation more closely unites several nations into one political and social entity and entails ceding national authority to a supranational organization. Count Coudenhove suggested that a federation addressed Europe’s needs and would best prevent wars and a resurgence of nationalism. He wrote that federations are made of citizens while confederations are made of nation states.13 Coudenhove remarked upon nationalism that the “true religion of nationalism is hero-worship whereas nations are made from the interactions of men with their great leaders. Just as religion separated from the state as society progressed, nationalism can separate from the state.”

In his autobiography Pan-Europe, Coudenhove wrote that Pan Europe could only be achieved with U.S. and British support. He scheduled his first trip to the U.S. in 1925, giving speeches in support of European integration. Warmly received in the U.S., he created the “American Co-operative Committee of the Pan-European Union.” Back in

Vienna, he organized the Pan-European Congress. In 1942, he fled the war and returned to the U.S. Coudenhove worked as a professor, developed an informal network of

13 Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, “Confederation or Federation?” Le Monde, January 20, 1953, 1.

academic and political support for a United Europe and held the 5th Pan-European

Congress in exile in New York.14

The Second World War challenged the existence of Europe. The war years motivated many European Federalists to drop differences over plan details and reach out to each other and the world to save Europe. Italian Altiero Spinelli was a leader among the resistance groups. In 1941, Spinelli wrote Towards a free and United Europe advocating a supranational European federation and a European constitution. This document characterized the goals of most wartime resistance groups trying to keep

Federalism alive.

In 1944, the International Conference of Resistance Fighters led by Spinelli produced a paper, the Geneva Declaration, outlining a structure for Europe after the war.

Participants included organized resistance from France, Holland, Italy, Norway, Poland,

Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Germany. The Geneva Declaration maintained that only in a Federation would Europe be free from totalitarianism and nationalism, and free from further German military action. The Geneva Declaration presented plans for a common European market.

During the war, Hungarian Prime Minister Pal Teleki requested American help to establish a European federation after the war. Nations in Central Europe considered several federated plans to combat Russian and Prussian expansionist pressures.

According to Central European historian Edward Tuleya, growing public opinion

14 Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, Crusade for Pan-Europa: Autobiography of a Man and a Movement (New York: G. P. Putman’s Sons, 1943).

supported the view that the small sovereign state system proved inadequate to meet the challenges.15 Although generating many ideas and philosophies, European Federalists had failed to prevent further war or gain momentum with the public. Central European historian J. Alex Bouchek writes, “How much thought, unfortunately all in vain, has been devoted over the past century to the solution of the difficult Central European political and demographic structure.”16

During the Second World War, men like Jean Monnet, a ‘founding father” of the

EU, were building personal and logistical networks among like-minded Federalists and

U.S. supporters. Monnet worked securing military supplies, engaging in secret intelligence and allocating food between the allies. This became the basis for Federalist and U.S. cooperation after the war in creating a united Europe.17 He used these connections to help establish the European Coal and Steel Community. European historian Albrecht Rothacher writes, “Jean Monnet was a visionary who made things happen through tireless networking.”18 Paul Henri Spaak, another “founding father” and leader of the exiled Belgian government, worked establishing his own network of

15 Edward Andrew Tuleya, "Federation: Past and Present Aspirations of the Slovaks" (PhD Diss., American University, 1974).

16 J. Alex Boucek, review of Toward a New Central Europe: A Symposium on the Problems of the Danubian Nations, by Francis S. Wagner, Canadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne Des Slavistes 15, no. 1/2 (1973): 220-21.

17 Jean Monnet, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1978).

18 Albrecht Rothacher, Uniting Europe: Journey Between Gloom and Glory (Imperial College Press, 2005), 14.

informal contacts with exiled leaders and Britain. These networks would later prove to be invaluable in working around nationalist impediments to European unity. Both these men used these networks to organize the European Movement, the European Youth

Campaign and American funding via the American Committee for a United Europe.

Britain’s Federalists focused on the establishment of the Federal Union in 1938.

At its height, the Federal Union carried thousands of members.19 Historian Martin

Dedman records that England produced a remarkable amount of pro-Federalist literature from the years 1938-1940, particularly under the Federal Union Research Institute.20

The 1938 best-selling, mass-produced book Union Now by Federal Union member

Clarence Streit brought the topic of Federalism front and center to the public. The challenge of the Second World War even prompted a failed British proposal for a Franco-

British union, uniting both countries under one common citizenship in 1940.

Winston Churchill, another “founding father” of the EU gave a 1943 speech strongly supporting a United Europe and declaring it would be the first practical business after the war with Japan. He proclaimed, “It is my earnest hope . . . that we shall achieve the largest common measure of the integrated life of Europe that is possible without destroying the individual characteristics and traditions of its many ancient and historic

19 Bruno Formicolo, “Federal Union: When Britain tried to Create a European Federation,” created June 23, 2017, https://mycountryeurope.com/history/federal-union- britain-federation/.

20 Martin Dedman, The Origins and Development of the European Union 1945-1995: A History of European Integration (London: Routledge, 1996).

races.”21 Winston Churchill called for a United States of Europe. Despite having the support of high-placed government leaders like Churchill, the Federalist movement still lacked solid support from the British government and most European national government officials.

After the war, national interests dominated over goals to unite Europe in national politics all over Europe. England survived the Second World War due to close military cooperation with the United States. England developed an extensive network of personal and logistical ties with the USA. The national leaders of England focused on this special

Atlantic relationship with the U.S. Their national goal was to cement themselves as a superpower reinforced by their leadership in the British Commonwealth of Nations and the Sterling Area. They differentiated England from other European countries and their interest in Federalism dwindled.

The British government cooled towards Federalism to avoid antagonizing the

Soviet Union who very determinedly fought European attempts to unite or coordinate in any way. Many other national leaders also failed to openly promote Federalism to avoid aggressive Soviet tactics to deter European unity. Countries such as Italy and France had large Communist parties who viewed Federalism as an attack on Russia. National

European politicians avoided alienating these segments of their voters by remaining detached from Federalist agendas.

21 Winston Churchill, “March 21, 1943 Radio Broadcast,” in The War Speeches of Winston Churchill. Volume 2, ed. Charles Eade (London: Cassel & Company LTD, 1965), 425-437.

Nationalistic interests underscored the German question which plagued Europe, and particularly France, on how to safely allow Germany back as a sovereign nation with its large size, economy and power. France resented the past military aggression of

Germany and wanted war reparations. In Germany, Federalist organizations were used to advocate for the economic revival of the German economy.22 Federalists in Spain were mainly attracted by the democratic nature of the Federalist message rather than a desire to unite with Europe. They exploited Federalist resources in their struggle to win the civil war against their repressive government. Spanish national leaders used Federalist organizations to promote their own national interests in fighting Franco

National leaders had to balance European unity against policies towards former empires. Countries all over the world began to demand independence and national self- determination. The postcolonial period presented many challenges to governments that were not always easy to reconcile with Federalism. Nations wanted to retain access to the economic resources of their former colonies. National pride made them slow to admit that their time as world leaders had faded. The East Indian Empire had given the

Netherlands international standing and access to economic resources. But the small size of the Netherlands meant economic coordination and unity with Europe was a prerequisite for economic success in the postcolonial era. France too wanted to maintain overseas empires but faced many challenges. France struggled to define French

22 “Europa-union: Resolution of the first ordinary congress, 22 May 1949,” In Documents on the History of European Integration, Vol 3, edited by Walter Lipgens and Wilfred Loth, 524-528. New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988.

citizenship, torn between a white, Christian European identity or a multi-racial, multi- ethnic identity based on French colonies in Asia, the Middle East and Africa.

Nationalistic agendas emanated from French leader Charles De Gaulle. De Gaulle lived overseas during much of the war and never came face to face with complete destruction like many of his countrymen. He returned determined to re-establish France as a world leader. De Gaulle declared nationalistic ambitions for German lands and industrial inputs. France resented the way Britain treated France in Syria and resented the appearance of U.S. domination. De Gaulle wrote, “France’s power may be momentarily weakened, she can and must play a major part in this formidable situation . . . [t]he reparations and guarantees that she requires after so many trials . . . and that it is necessary above all to re-create the old Europe.”23 He significantly hindered the progress of Federalists and confounded U.S. policy to aid European integration.24

After the war, Federalists not only fought European nationalistic interests but found support from the U.S. suddenly diminished.25 U.S. President Roosevelt strove to create peace with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin who rejected the idea of a European Union.

Consequently, Roosevelt dropped the idea of a federated Europe in exchange for the

Soviets’ support for a United Nations in the 1943 negotiations. This caused alarm among

23 Charles De Gaulle, “Europe Against the Communist Danger, 29 June/9 July 1947,” in Documents on the History of European Integration, Vol. 3, eds. Walter Lipgens and Wilfried Loth (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 48-51.

24 Geir Lundestad, “Empire” by Integration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

25 Armin Rappaport, “The United States and European Integration: The First Phase,” Diplomatic History vol. 5, no. 2 (Spring, 1981), 121-125.

Federalists and Europeans who feared Russia would then dominate individual European nation states easily.

Churchill saw the future of Europe slipping out of European hands. He fought to have France brought into the peace negotiations as a fourth partner. Historian Walter

Lipgen argues that this state of powerlessness permanently weakened the Federalist movement. Despite many Federalists placed in high positions in European governments,

European unity was not being achieved. National government officials were not swayed by the Federalists.

East-west tensions grew as the Soviet Union began repressing Eastern and Central

Europe. The 1947 Truman Doctrine to fight communism and contain the Soviet Union marked a turning point in U.S. support for European integration. U.S. policy increasingly favored European unity to check the spread of communism. In order to address the economic devastation of Europe, the Marshall Plan announced over $22 billion in economic aid to sixteen European countries.26 This alienated the Soviet

Union.27 Although eligible for aid themselves, the Soviet Union refused to participate or to allow Central European participation in the Marshall Plan. As the Soviet Union asserted control over East Germany and Eastern and Central Europe, West Germans and

26 Department of State Bulletin, June 15, 1947. In Recent American Foreign Policy: Basic documents 1941-1951, edited by Francis O. Wilcox and Thorsten V. Kaliharvi, 1159-1160. Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1952.

27 Xenia J. Eudin, “Moscow’s Views of American Imperialism” The Russian Review vol. 13, no.4 (October 1954): 277-279.

Federalists had to accept the division of Germany and embrace the idea of uniting only

Western Europe. 28 This fundamentally altered the Federalists’ envisioned path. Cold war realities intruded on Federalist goals.

To encourage European integration, the U.S. inserted into the Marshall Plan the caveat that a supranational European organization coordinate aid between the European countries.29 U.S. policy makers argued that this made economic sense and it prodded

Europe to unite. British leader Ernest Bevin set up the Organization for European

Economic Cooperation (OEEC) to accommodate this U.S. demand. But the British fought the appointment of Paul-Henri Spaak, a dedicated Federalist, to head the OEEC.30

Robert Marjolin, Secretary-General of the OEEC, says that during this time,

European countries were preoccupied with their immediate national problems. He is quoted as saying the OEEC was a turning point in the history of Europe and “Had it not been for the Marshall Plan and the OEEC work, which derived from the Marshall Plan, I

28 Katerina Koivumaa, “Several Identities, or One Single Identity?” Perspectives no. 10 (Summer 1998): 21-37.

29 Memorandum of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, August 7, 1948. Annex B, p. 11., Collection: Truman and the Marshall Plan. Series: State Department File. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.

30 Richard M Bissell Jr., economic adviser under the Truman administration, administrator for program, E.C.A. 1948-51, Interviewed by Theodore A. Wilson and Richard D. McKinzie, East Hartford, Connecticut, July 9, 1971, Oral Interviews, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.

don’t think a basis would have existed for a European Customs Union.”31 Richard Bissel of the Truman administration writes of the OEEC, “The purpose was to force decision making on the Europeans and to preclude the possibility of the U.S. making, paternalistically, too many decisions for them . . . [i]t set the tone for the actions and positions of the U.S. . . . not to impose a U.S. position.”32

European Federalists received encouragement from the U.S. government and creation of the Marshall Plan. Federalists regretted the missed opportunity to unite

Europe after the First World War and decided to press forward aggressively. Churchill,

Spinelli, Van Zeeland and many of the other “founding fathers” of the EU established the

Congress of Europe in 1948, attended by over 750 national leaders. The Congress of

Europe adopted the basic text, Message to Europeans, drawn up by the Swiss Federalist,

Denis de Rougemont. The emphasis of Rougemont was on the cultural aspects of the

European Union and EU citizenship.33

31 Robert Marjolin, Secretary-General of the OEEC, 1948-1955, Interviewed by Philip C. Brooks, Paris, France, May 30, 1964, Oral Interviews, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.

32 Bissell, Richard M. Jr., Economic adviser under the Truman administration, Administrator for program, E.C.A.1948-51, Interviewed by Theodore A. Wilson and Richard D. McKinzie, East Hartford, Connecticut, July 9, 1971, Oral Interviews, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.

33 “Congress of Europe: The Hague-May 1948: Resolutions. London-Paris: International Committee of the Movements for European Unity, 1948,” Virtual Centre for Knowledge about Europe (CVCE) - European Commission, Accessed April 2019, http://www.cvce.eu/obj/message_to_europeans_the_hague_10_may_1948-en-b14649e7- c8b1-46a9-a9a1- cdad800bccc8.html.

The European Movement was a product of diplomacy and networking during the

Congress of Europe by Duncan Sandys, Winston Churchill’s son-in-law. Churchill inspired Sandys to use his considerable networking and diplomacy skills to establish the

United Europe Movement (UEM) in 1947. The UEM included European delegates and

Canadian and American observers. The UEM laid much of the groundwork for the organization of the European Movement (EM), strengthened informal Federalist networks and formalized American support. Despite having the endorsement of high- placed government leaders like Churchill, the Federalist movement still lacked solid engagement from most national government officials. European historian Wurm reflects,

“Though regarded abroad as one of the most prominent European groups, it had little influence on the British government.”34

Sandys suggested uniting the UEM with organizations on the continent, including the Union Europeenne de Federalistes (UEF), the European Parliamentary Union (EPU), the Independent League and the Conseil Francais. In this way, the International

European Movement was created in November 1947. Members of the International

European Movement participated in Churchill’s Congress of Europe in 1948.

Afterwards, Sandys officially changed the name of the International European Movement to the European Movement. Leadership of the EM then included many of the leaders from the Congress of Europe.

34 Clemens A. Wurm, “Great Britain: Political Parties and Pressure Groups,” in Documents on the History of European Integration, eds. Walter Lipgens and Wilfred Loth (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 639.

The EM chartered the Council of Europe, the European Center of Culture in

Geneva and the College of Europe in Bruges. The Council of Europe had ten founding member states: Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands,

Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The European Convention on Human Rights is its most well-known achievement.

The Council of Europe exhibited many flaws that limited its productivity including it excluded Germany. Observers noted that often members seemed to be using the forum to promote their particular cause, for example socialism, rather than

Federalism.35 Frode Jakobsen, a participant to the Council of Europe in Strasberg recalled, “. . . [f]or those who were at Strasberg this meeting was something of a disappointment.”36

The Council could achieve little with each member having veto power. Sessions often degenerated into argument. European historian Martin Dedman declared, “The evidence suggests that the Council of Europe . . . represented a dead-end for organized

Federalist movements’ influence.”37 Press coverage and public opinion acknowledged that the Federalist ideal had given way to the reality that each nation was negotiating

35 Clarence C. Walton, "The Hague Congress of Europe: A Case Study of Public Opinion," The Western Political Quarterly 12, no. 3 (1959): 738-52.

36 Frode Jakobsen, “Between Federalism and Functional 1950,” in Documents on the History of European Integration, eds. Walter Lipgens and Wilfred Loth (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 617-620.

37 Martin Dedman, The Origins and Development of the European Union 1945-1995: A History of European Integration (London: Routledge, 1996), 30.

deals based on national interests. The Council of Europe appeared as a dead-end for

Federalism at this point.

While the Council of Europe floundered, France forged ahead with other economic plans. Reflecting French nationalist goals, the 1949 Monnet Pan centered on

French steel replacing German Steel on the market and French access to German coal.

The French also wanted ownership of disputed territory with Germany. The author of the plan was the head of the French General Planning Commission, Jean Monet. He was a dedicated Federalist yet determined to achieve what was in France’s best interest. The

U.S. didn’t support the Monnet Plan because it penalized Germany and excluded England and many other European nations. U.S. policy sought world peace and stability through an international organization that would include unified Europe with British participation and leadership.

However, U.S. policy changed as it became obvious Britain would not participate in a supranational structure and the Korean conflict erupted urging progress.38 For the

U.S., European integration was a tool against Soviet expansion. European Federalists had to accept that going forward, the British would often be absent. This was particularly difficult for Socialist Federalists who feared conservative right-wing Federalists could gain power without the counterbalance of the British. Historian Oliver Daddow asserts

38 M. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952, Studies in Economic History and Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

that “British foreign policy in 1950 convinced the Americans that they would have to look elsewhere for leaders in Europe.”39

The Monnet plan was modified by the Schuman Declaration to reflect German and French cooperation in the coal and steel industries. The 1950 Schuman Declaration led to the Treaty of Paris and the establishment of The European Coal and Steel

Community (ECSC) in 1952. A common market for coal and steel and a high authority capable of making economic and social policy was founded. The ECSC was established with six founding members: West Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The New York times reported the without American backing the

Schuman plan would have stood little chance of success.40 The U.S. provided critical financial incentives towards its adoption.

The ECSC became the first successful Federalist structure in Europe because it was designed to meet the national interests of the six-member nation states and not just the goals of Federalists. The ECSC was the first organization which allowed Germany to participate as a full member. Participation boosted the world image and moral of

Germany. French dominance of the design of the ECSC in opposition to British and

American goals empowered France. France resented the interference of England and the

U.S. France also addressed fears of German power by having leadership within the

39 Oliver J. Daddow, Britain and Europe since 1945: Historiographical perspective on integration (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2004), 81.

40 Harold Callender, “Schuman Plan a Step Toward United Europe,” New York Times, March 25, 1951, B5.

ECSC. Belgium and the Netherlands had worked tirelessly towards a Federalist organization, creating the Benelux Union of 1944 which coordinated economic activity between Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. However due to the small size of these countries, the union had limited benefit. In the ECSC they found partners in France and Germany. Italy faced economic devastation and needed the economic advantages of the ECSC.

Federalists achieved a modified, mainly economic win with the ECSC. This exemplified Monnet’s method. Other Federalists pushed for more direct democracy, but

Monnet wanted to start with economic integration and let it spillover into political and social areas. According to European historian O’Conner, Monnet’s method partly evolved from his experience watching nationalist rivalries in the Council of Europe.

The European Defense Council (EDC) and the European Political Community

(EPC), advanced as part of the same ECSC agreement, were defeated. The EDC proposed a common European army. The EPC supranational political body included a “People’s

Chamber” of representatives directly chosen by the people. The defeat of the EDC and

EPC represented a defeat for European integration. The French National Assembly vetoed the EDC in 1952. Europe maintained serious reservations about a European army with Germany and giving up complete national sovereignty. No amount of American pressure could change that.

The defeat of the EDC scared European Federalists and American policymakers.41

The U.S. began to take a more hands-off approach to the European Union according to historians like Meek.42 Developing a federal Atlantic union seemed equally unattainable.

In 1954 the NATO treaty was strengthened and included Germany as U.S. policy began to focus on a different way to ensure cooperation between the U.S. and Europe.

In 1957, the Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community

(EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Commission (Euratom) with the original six members of the ECSC. The EEC consisted of a common market, with free movement of goods, services, capital and workers, governed by a Council of Ministers, Commission,

Court of Justice, Assembly and Economic and Social Committee. Euratom failed however the EEC successfully deepened ties between the original six members of the

ECSC.

The financial backing of the U.S. crucially supported the achievements of the

Federalists. The U.S. could not enforce its will on Europe any more than the Federalists could. Frustrated with European attempts to unite themselves, the U.S. developed and extended NATO to include Germany. The defeat of the EDC hastened the extension of

41 Mark Gilbert, “Partners and Rivals: Assessing the American Role,” in European Union History: Themes and Debate, eds. W. Kaiser and A. Varsori (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 169-189.

42 Allison Meek, “The ghost of the EDC: The United States and European integration, 1955–1960” (PhD diss., University of Toronto, 2000).

NATO.43 U.S. support to the Federalists could only exist within the natural limits set by the political, social and economic climate. European historian Berghahn asserted that the

U.S. faced two culture wars: one against the Soviet Union and one against Europeans’ negative views of American culture and materialism.44 Both hampered U.S. goals to unify Europe. The European nations and European Federalists framed the context within which U.S. policy could act.

Historians originally judged the impact of the Federalists on the eventual construction of the EU as very successful. However, a review of the chronological history shows that the Federalists’ immediate impact was compromised by national agendas and internal differences. Recent historians of European Integration such as

Patrick Pasture argue that the “political impact of exiles on the post-war reconstruction was marginal.”45 The Federalist structures survived because they met national interests.

The Congress of Europe was torn by bickering just as the Federalists were torn by differences. England led the Federalist movement only to abandon it. Churchill called for a United States of Europe but then the English government opposed prominent

43 Leon Fuller, “U.S. Policy Toward Europe-Post-EDC,” September 10, 1954, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Western European Security, vol. V, part 2, Office of the Historian, U.S. State Department, accessed January 2020, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v05p2/d39.

44 Volker R. Berghahn, America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe: Shepard Stone between Philanthropy, Academy, and Diplomacy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2001).

45 Patrick Pasture, Imagining European Unity since 1000 AD (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2015).

Federalists’ participation in the OEEC. Federalist Monnet’s functional approach evidenced in the ECSC succeeded over the complete democratic political and social union envisioned by Federalist resistance groups. Count Coudenhove-Kalergi was portrayed as a Nazi in attempts to discredit his ideas. Construction of a European identity overcame historical inter-European prejudices but introduced a white, Christian identity that excluded former colonies. The Congress of Europe existed as both a highlight of

Federalist achievement and a dead-end for Federalist goals.

However, Federalists remained flexible when confronted with nationalistic agendas, Soviet subterfuge and moral questions. They used their extensive informal networks created during the war with each other and Americans to establish Federalist organizations. To further the cause of European integration, they created public pressure on national leaders and obtained American financial support. They founded the European

Movement which in turn created the European Youth Campaign. Their experimentation with cultural and youth outreach and education will be shown to be one of their biggest legacies in the following chapters.

Chapter 3: Precedents of Federalist Youth Movements

As European historian Emily Marker notes, the twentieth century witnessed “. . . an ongoing conversation about youth and education that was unfolding across metropolitan, European and colonial space.”46 National leaders recognized that youth groups and cultural policies were productive compliments to public policy. Wartime

Federalist groups learned many effective methods of operating and generating support including youth outreach and popular propaganda. Wartime youth groups had proven valuable and created the base for Federalist networks after the Second World War.

Communist Youth Festivals successfully generated youth support tipping the Cold War balance. National colonial administrators, educators and politicians developed youth outreach programs as part of larger economic and political programs.

Political and religious groups initially began organizing youth groups between the wars. Youth organizations had an international component, encouraging youth interaction across borders and social classes.47 Youth associations increasingly included education focused on practical methods and self-education, and training in citizenship.

Communist Youth International, World Scouts and the YMCA were just a few examples.

46 Marker, “France between Europe and Africa: Youth, race, and envisioning the postwar world, 1940-1960,” 81.

47 Aline Coutrot, “Youth Movements in France,” Journal of Contemporary History vol. 5, no 1 (1970): 23-35.

Young people aspired to become involved in their own future and solve Europe’s problems. The origins of the focus of the European Federalists on youth outreach can be traced back through several paths. Wartime England and Occupied Germany were fertile ground for the discussions that led to the development of the EYC. This chapter explores this larger conversation about youth and education and how it affected the EYC.

Wartime England and De-Nazifying Education

During the war, Britain was full of exiled leaders from all over Europe who were busy making post-war plans, including national and colonial education administrators.

The Board of Education of the United Kingdom felt a unique opportunity existed for allied cooperation on practical matters of education. They called for regular meetings between the exiled education administrators and British educational leaders. Re- establishing educational systems immediately after war loomed as a huge task especially given the shortage of funds, teachers and physical infrastructure.

These exiled leaders faithfully assumed the war would be won and that they would return to positions of educational power. They all met weekly to discuss problems such as finding textbooks and qualified teachers. In the process they developed an

“educational fellowship” that would prove useful in later negotiations for European

Integration.

The first meeting of these exiled leaders was in November 1942. It reflected a more casual visit among friends, an informal network of like-minded individuals. Within

weeks, these casual meetings became more institutionalized. The group called themselves CAME, the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education. Educators from

Belgium, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Norway, Poland and Yugoslavia were the original members. Many more countries joined later. France became a very active member. The Soviet Union refused to join CAME, calling it an intrusion into private national affairs. However, leaders from the Soviet Union often observed meetings.

CAME meetings continued from 1942-1945. They strove to create a common

European textbook and teaching approach. Individual nationalistic histories often conflicted with each other and maintained old nationalist grievances. They sought to develop one history of Europe that could be taught in all European countries. Materials focused on Europe’s common culture. They endlessly debated what unified and defined

Europe. They targeted art, culture, religious legacies and Roman law. CAME advocated the development of personal and cultural ties among European nations in the fields of art, literature, science and education. 48

The legacy of Hitler worried CAME members. They prioritized de-nazifying education. European educators focused on confronting the lasting effects of state racism.

Norwegian CAME delegate Alf Sommerfelt illustrated the legacy and misconceptions of

European racism with his true anecdote of a British couple who adopted a French infant and began learning French to communicate with the child. CAME members feared

48 C.H.D. “Co-operation in Education, Science and Culture: The Work of UNESCO,” The World Today vol. 2, no. 7 (1946): 339-348.

young people had been permanently marked by Nazi racial theory. Discussions addressed the need to correct misconceptions about race, especially in young people, in order to avoid further prejudices and wars. They believed ending racial prejudices created good citizens.

CAME members fought the view that Europe was made of many different races.

They stressed that there was only one European race which exhibited cultural diversity.

Being German or Norwegian for example was not a racial category but a cultural and linguistic one to be celebrated under the wide umbrella of European culture. Cultural diversity was to be lauded as a strength on which to rest European unity. This approach could ultimately also support a less racial approach to colonial policy.

The policies of Nazi Germany took education, culture and science and turned them against humanity. Nazis implemented intellectual isolationism and attacked the minds of youth, malforming them into war machines. Resistance leaders fought against the Nazi elimination of their intellectuals and cultural institutions. Based on their experiences, CAME members believed that peace could only be achieved through intellectual cooperation, open-mindedness, an appreciation of diversity and world education.49

In 1944, the United States became a member of CAME. William Fulbright, representing the U.S. government, made a presentation to CAME in the hopes of

49 H. H. Krill De Capello. "The Creation of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization." International Organization 24, no. 1 (1970): 1-30.

expanding CAME into an international organization after the war with full membership of all countries. He hoped this international education organization could operate under the banner of the United Nations.

American policy promoted European cooperation on matters of education and culture after the war. Fulbright said that the U.S. government recognized the importance of international cooperation in education and culture to ensure peace. Under Fulbright’s pressure, CAME transformed into the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural

Organization (UNESCO). Later William Fulbright raised U.S. support for the cause of

European Federalism. He promoted the European Movement in the United States and helped generate American funding for the EYC.

The European Movement’s documents and goals after the war reflected the

Legacy of CAME’s work on educational reform. Members of CAME later held national education posts in governments throughout Europe. Many were members of the EM and helped designed the EYC. The priorities of CAME mirror the goals of the EM and the

EYC.

Lessons from Resistance Groups

Federalist organizations operating during the Second World War provided many lessons on cultural outreach to the leaders of the European Movement when after the war the EM began designing the European Youth Campaign. These earlier Federalist organizations grew from resistance groups and exiled leaders. They utilized local

leaders, local issues, local publications and community meetings in local centers such as pubs. Resistance leaders hoped to strengthen democratic participation in local towns and create popular support for Federalism. They focused on education and propaganda.

Resistance groups used umbrella organizations to unite members of other parties and thus increased their own membership. This increase in membership put pressure on national leaders to unite. Larger membership numbers in Federalist organizations and effective propaganda convinced Americans to increase support and funding. Resistance groups built local and informal networks of like-minded individuals for military success and to spread their message of Federalism.

Historian Walter Lipgens, with the help of historian Wilfried Loth, has compiled comprehensive studies on the organizations and documents of the early Federalists. This thesis references the incredible collection of original documents they compiled. His extensive and thorough compilations have yielded numerous examples of Federalists developing a popular, cultural approach to generating support for the EU.

The Swiss Europa-Union started in 1933 as a coalition of local Swiss groups. It progressively grew stronger with regularly scheduled outreach to the community. It had

“. . . [i]ts own monthly magazine, a steadily rising membership and a regular programme of lectures in every town.”50 When looking at the archives of the European Youth

Movement in later chapters of this thesis, we will see similar methods based on very local

50 Walter Lipgens, A History of European Integration (Oxford: University Press, 1982), 117.

outreach, of weekly lectures in towns and local monthly magazines reflecting local interests and points of view about Federalism. This method of reflecting local people’s opinions of Federalism contrasts with the previous approach of elite intellectuals discussing Federalism in small, aristocratic circles among themselves.

The goal of the Swiss Europa-Union was “. . . [e]ducating people . . . with insight for decisions for the future must be made in the heads and heart of individuals.”51 The monthly periodical Europa ran articles on local problems and the Federalist answers to these problems. Weekly discussion groups, usually meeting in the local pub, covered articles written by local leaders. Due to its success, the Swiss Europa-Union established a special task force to help Federalist organizations in other European countries regroup after the war.

In France 1944, La Federation, a Federalist Catholic organization, had as its objective “. . . [t]he transformation of all fields of life in a Federalist sense.”52 This mirrors the EYC philosophy to bring Federalism to where youth live, learn and work.

Federalist wartime groups stressed popular, wide-spread propaganda as an effective tool. In Belgium, Federalist progaganda became coordinated under the organization Mouvement d’Action et de Propagande (MAP) which published a monthly

51 Lipgens, A History of European Integration, 122.

52 “L Federation: Policy statement on foreign affairs, Feb. 1947,” in Documents on the History of European Integration, eds. Walter Lipgens and Wilfred Loth (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 41-43.

magazine with 15,000 subscribers and worked closely with the Swiss Europa-Union. 53

The newspaper In de Beweging and Verenigd Europa “ . . . [r]eported on the extensive grass-roots activity of MAP, based on the conviction that a Europe united by politicians was not sufficient unless it also commanded popular loyalty.”54 At Ghent University in

Belgium a student group was founded hoping to use student networks, newspapers and links as the impetus for a European community of students.

The Federal Union based in England also emphasized cultural outreach and education through all levels of society. Its basic guidelines referred to educating the general public in the meaning of and need for federation. It acted as an umbrella group for large numbers of small youth groups whether socialist, democratic, church-affiliated or school-related who all had an interest in promoting Federalism. Lipman writes,

Great stress was laid in FU policy on the principle of educating the public so as to form a mass movement transcending party ties, with such influence on the electorate that as many federal-minded MPs as possible would be elected to the parliament.55

Umbrella organizations were successfully used in many wartime groups. The

Movimento Federalista Europeo (MFE) was a Federalist movement in Italy that

53 Klemens Blott, “Belgian Political Parties and Pressure Groups in the Discussion on European Union,” in Documents on the History of European Integration, eds. Walter Lipgens and Wilfred Loth (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 271-277.

54 Verenigd Europa no. 3 (January 15, 1949): p. 1, in Documents on the History of European Integration, eds. Walter Lipgens and Wilfred Loth (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 276.

55 Lipgens, A History of European Integration, 151.

according to its founding documents sought to “. . . [u]nite men and women of all parties.”56 Federalists had many political and economic differences, but their message proclaimed that Europe was based on culture and that national diversity was to be embraced under the banner of Europe and not destroyed. P.J. Oud, Federalist Mayor from the Netherlands declared, “Nationalities must gradually learn that they are the special feature of the European system and must form part of a European harmony.”57

Youth became a focus of outreach because they were themselves becoming active in the building of Europe’s future and European integration. Many Federalist groups claimed young people were their biggest members. Young people started on their own the Federalist organization Europaische Gemeinschaft in 1946 in the West German cities of Munster, Cologne, Bonn, Krefeld, Aachen, and Bielefeld. They reached out to prominent Federalists such as Dr. Salinger for help in becoming stronger and more effective.58 All over Germany, groups of young people organized in support of

Federalism. The Social Republican Working Group based in Frankfurt with members’ ages averaging around twenty-five years old.

56 “Movimento Federalista Europeo: ‘Essential Aspects’ Jan. 1946,” in Documents on the History of European Integration, eds. Walter Lipgens and Wilfred Loth (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 151-159.

57 P.J. Oud, “Hasty innovations are always unfortunate, 5 July 1949,” in Documents on the History of European Integration, eds. Walter Lipgens and Wilfred Loth (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 423-426.

58 “Europaische Gemeinschaft: ‘Basic Thoughts’ September 1946,” in Documents on the History of European Integration, eds. Walter Lipgens and Wilfred Loth (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 472-476.

Federalist in these resistance groups believed that educating youth about their civic rights and responsibilities under a united Europe was necessary to build Federalist

Europe. Many European Federalists were themselves part of youth groups during the

First World War, where they first developed the informal networks later used to integrate

Europe.59 They developed great hope for what European youth could achieve if unburdened by national racism and prejudices. Most Federalist resistance leaders joined the European movement where their knowledge of local outreach and strategies to design effective propaganda were utilized in the EYC.

Cultural Outreach of the European Movement

This thesis argues that the European Movement (EM) reached out to youth through the European Youth Campaign as part of a bigger cultural effort to generate support for the European Union. While promoting the EYC, the EM also undertook wide- spread cultural outreach to all levels of society. This approach was based on previous work in cultural outreach by the Federalists. Urgency and fear of failure propelled this embracing of a popular, cultural approach. In 1950, the French Council of the European

59 C. Van Der Bruggen and Louis C. Picalausa, “Belgian Youth Movements and Problems,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political Science and Social Science vol. 247, (September 1946): 111-116.

Movement wrote, “The hour is grave. We are at a dead end of history and can only extricate ourselves by a gigantic effort of imagination and will.” 60

The Congress of Europe was organized in 1948 by EM leaders to begin concrete work on uniting Europe and to provide a “new and powerful impetus to the campaign.”61

It called for European Universities, European cultural centers, European Court of Human

Rights and European research facilities that would result in an “awakening of the conscience of Europe.”62 The European Cultural Center founded a European Book Club with an annual prize, a European Association of Music Festivals, and the European community of Cultural Clubs. Documents produced by the Congress of Europe devoted much attention to youth, children and mothers. The Congress came to the consensus that the future of Europe depended on the coming generations and aimed to encourage travel and exchanges between young people.63

The Cultural Resolution of the Hague emphasized the need for wide dissemination of propaganda. They hoped “. . . [t]o promote an awareness of European

60 “Leaflet issued by the French Council of the European Movement, April 1950,” in Documents on the History of European Integration, Vol. 3, eds. Walter Lipgens and Wilfried Loth (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 114-119.

61 Clarence C. Walton, "The Hague "Congress of Europe: A Case Study of Public Opinion," The Western Political Quarterly 12, no. 3 (1959): 738-52.

62 “Cultural Resolution of the Hague Congress (May 7-10, 1948),” Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l'Europe, University of Luxembourg, February 2020, https://www.cvce.eu/obj/cultural_resolution_of_the_hague_congress_7_10_may_1948- en-f9f90696-a4b2-43fd-9e85-86dee9fb57a5.html.

63 “Cultural Resolution of the Hague Congress (May 7-10, 1948).”

unity through all media of information, by press, publications, film and radio and also through all educational institutions for school-children, university students and workers.”64 The use of radio was novel and very effective in spreading their message of

Federalism.

They also initiated an extensive campaign to create a European university system.

Hours were devoted in discussion with faculty, department heads and administration of universities throughout Europe to develop a plan for cooperation to develop a European post-secondary system. The development of a supranational European university system was meet with suspicion by many professors who tried to steer clear of politics and thwarted first attempts to create a supranational European university.65

The Congress convened a summit in Lausanne in 1949 focused on culture and education in order to increase competitiveness. Europe’s lagging economic, scientific and industrial strength compared to the Soviet Union, the United States and Asia concerned European leaders and Federalists. The U.S. had developed atomic weapons and the Soviet Union was close to developing them. A united Europe could better compete economically on the world stage. Europe required an educated youth to achieve this economic growth and scientific research. A European university system could assist in achieving these economic goals.

64 “Cultural Resolution of the Hague Congress (May 7-10, 1948).”

65 Lars Lehmann, “The controversy surrounding the idea of a European supranational university,” in The Informal Construction of Europe, eds. Lennaert van Heumen and Mechtchild Roos (London: Routledge, 2019), 82.

Following its charter at the Congress of Europe, EM leaders created the Council of Europe in 1949. Most European nations sent representatives to attend the parliamentary structures of the Council of Europe. The Council of Europe’s function was to uphold human rights, democracy and respect for law. It was hoped this would be the start of a European government but that never materialized. However, the Council of

Europe exists today functioning to uphold human rights.

Ernest Bevin, EM leader, designated Strasbourg as the capital for the Council for symbolic reasons. Germany and France fought over Strasbourg many times throughout history. This sensitivity to public perception reflected the EM propaganda campaign.

Federalism could replace nationalistic rivalry and war. To create ceremonial celebrations and displays of European unity, they developed symbols of “united Europe.” The EM created a new flag to represent all of Europe, twelve golden stars on a blue background which is still used today by the EU.

When the Council of Europe first met in 1949 in Strasbourg, the new flag hung on all the streets and buildings. At night, dignitaries from the Council spoke in the streets to the people. The city was landscaped to look inviting and journalists from all over the world were invited to see this display of Federalism in action.

The Europe Movement reached directly out to voters in a big way. They organized elections all over Europe. Sometimes held in small towns and sometimes held in larger regions, these referendums on European integration occurred frequently. It created the illusion that a participatory democracy uniting Europe was one vote away.

Constant press coverage of these referendums furthered the Federalist cause. Historian

O’Connor writes,

The Bolsward referendum was one component of a larger phenomenon in the 1950s that witnessed Europeans casting nearly one million votes specifically on the topic of European unity. The European Movement (EM), with the help of local officials, from 1950 to 1953 staged six local referendums in cities and towns in West Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands.66

The European Movement utilized referendums to display concrete voter support for Federalism. However, these voting events had their counterpart as the Cold War heated up. Communists also conducted referendums in Western Europe to prove there was no support for Federalism and to block European integration.

Cold War Rivalries

Development of Federalist youth organizations in Western Europe was partly a cold war response to the Communist World Youth Festivals which started in 1947 and lasted until 1997. Soviet historian Gleg Tsipursky writes about the Soviet state sponsorship of cultural events for Soviet youth to encourage their loyalty and commitment to communism. This included music, theater, dancing, art and other cultural

66 Eric K. O'Connor, "Democracy in the Dark: The Origins of Popular Political Participation in European Unity, 1949-1975” (PhD Diss., The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 2014), 73.

events through the Komsomol, the Soviet youth organization. Elements of this approach in domestic Soviet youth policy extended to international youth policy.

Cold War historian Kotek argued that the Soviets first perfected the use of front organizations and the use of moles in other non-Communist organizations during the V11

Congress of the Communists International in 1918. His book examined how students were utilized as political-ideological weapons in the Cold War. Communists dominated the International Union of Students and the World Federation of Democratic Youth.

Communists efforts successfully infiltrated student organizations in England. Kotek wrote, “The USSR spared no expense in capturing the spirit of young people.”67

When the first International Youth Festival convened in 1947, it began as a celebration against the Nazi occupation but quickly became an arm of Soviet propaganda.

At the time the U.S. had not established the CIA or any international cultural program. It wasn’t until 1948 that the Mundt-Smith Act set up an international cultural and propaganda program for the U.S.

When Festival representatives asked the U.S. to participate, the government declined due to the anti-Communist witch hunt unfolding domestically. The first

International Youth Festival occurred in Prague with 17,000 participants. Aimed at youth, it consisted of games, music concerts, parades, exhibits, films and 75 athletic competitions. Only a small number of attendees were political. Most festival goers were

67 Joel Kotek, Students and the Cold War (Great Britain: Macmillan Press LTD, 1996), x.

just youth on a holiday. The International Union of Students and the World Federation of

Democratic Youth sponsored the event.

The U.S. pavilion and displays were hand-made by students. They appeared amateur and poor in quality, reflecting negatively on the United States. The Soviet displays emerged as professional and pleasing and drew much praise. The U.S. faced criticism for missing the perfect opportunity to present its ideology and way of life to the world. Everyone criticized the poor showing of the U.S., even the American press. The festival offered a platform to youth from colonial areas to express their grievances and this frightened countries like France. France struggled to maintain access to the resources, glory and legacy of its former empire.

The second festival convened in 1949 in Budapest with 10,400 participants from

60 countries. Observers noted in newspaper interviews that the theme of the festival was

‘peace offensive’ but it unfolded as a venue to highlight Soviet superiority. Targeting youth with sports, cultural events, sightseeing, boat trips, cultural dances and speeches, the Soviet message successfully impacted the world. The U.S. display at the festival was designed by American Communists and highlighted racial inequalities, poverty and the persecution of American Communists that existed in the United States. The U.S. realized it was in a propaganda war and losing.

The third Youth Festival occurred in Berlin in 1951 attended by over a million and half people from 104 countries. The Communists spent over 48 million dollars in preparation. Over 150 events transpired on any given festival day. A parade of young

Communists that lasted over 8 hours highlighted the festival and intimidated allied

administrators by its fervor. Major Communist propaganda offensives against the

Schuman Plan rolled out at this festival. The festival constituted a huge success for the

Communists.

This Festival shocked allied administration officials in Berlin. They attempted to counter with some activities and propaganda of their own on the Western side of Berlin and they hampered travel into East Berlin. Allied officials feared the festival would turn into a peaceful way to overtake allied parts of the city and reunite Germany under the

Soviet Union. They realized the ability to organize students now played a potentially game changing role in international relations.

Allied administrators in Occupied Germany despaired about the Soviet repression of students in East Germany who had resisted Communist efforts to transform the educational system. Soviet administrators imprisoned East German students to get rid of bourgeoisie elements and make room for workers. When university admissions became determined by political test, protesting students demanded that education should not serve political interests. Soviet education administrators repressed student voice and rebellion.

Historian John Connelly asserts that “by the early 1950s, after hundreds of their number had been arrested, East German students once again conformed to clichés of apolitical passivity.”68

68 John Connelly, “East German Higher Education Policies and Student Resistance, 1945- 1948,” Central European History Vol. 28, No. 3 (1995): 259-298.

Bucharest hosted a Communist Youth Festival in 1953 and Warsaw hosted a festival in 1955, each with 30,000 participants. Another large youth festival occurred in

1957 in Moscow with 34,000 young people,69 highlighting the good attributes of the

Soviet Union and proving U.S. criticism of the Soviet Union wrong.70 State department officials said of the festivals, “The primary aim is to enlist world youth in support of

Moscow’s foreign policies.”71

Complimenting the Communist Youth Festivals, many smaller staged events and parades to spread the Communist message evolved. Upon examination of footage of a

Communist youth parade at the Berlin East Gate in 1950, signs are visible that declare

“Yankee go home” and “Say no to the Marshall Plan.”72 U.S. and European leaders feared that these festivals and staged events would be ways for Communists to establish connections and informal networks in Western Europe and the U.S. Apprehension grew that Communist festivals would influence youth coming from colonial areas.73 Wanting

69 Max Frankel, “Voices of America in Moscow: Though few in number, they have made a sharp imprint on the Soviets' youth festival,” New York Times, Aug 11, 1957.

70 Max Frankel, “Moscow warns on 'alien' ideas brought in during youth festival: Soviet youth told to fight penetration,” New York Times, Aug 18, 1957.

71 Max Frankel, “U.S. Calls Festival Soviet Propaganda,” New York Times, Apr 11, 1957.

72 “Rally by Communist youth in Berlin, East Germany. HD Stock Footage,” CriticalPast, accessed January 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MaWujE2bX3Y.

73 Paul Seabury, "The Youth Festival in Budapest," Columbia Journal of International Affairs 4, no. 1 (1950): 75-77.

to create their own tools for mass youth outreach, they called for an international, anti-

Communist student group that could organize festivals and youth events. This led to the development of the British National Union of Students and the U.S. backed International

Student Conference.

The Cultural Cold War impacted the evolution of thinking towards colonial youth.74 Britain’s policy towards colonial students changed significantly after the Second

World War as they grappled with the Cold War and a declining empire.75 Riots in 1948 destabilized Accra and the British government feared the riots were planned with student

Communists in London. Historian Lee notes the apprehension that colonial “student organizations had become politicized was definitely on the rise.”76

British educational administrator Mary Trevelyan developed educational policies towards Commonwealth students after the Second World War aimed at tackling international problems. She wrote, “. . . [T]heir visit to Britain is to strengthen their feelings of loyalty to and pride in the Commonwealth.” 77 She stressed that young people should be developing friendships and understanding that cross international boundaries

74 Christopher Sutton, “Britain, Empire and the Origins of the Cold War Youth Race,” Contemporary British History 30,2 (2017): 221-241.

75 J.M. Lee, "Commonwealth Students in the United Kingdom, 1940-1960: Student Welfare and World Status," Minerva 44, no. 1 (2006): 1-24.

76 J.M. Lee, "Commonwealth Students in the United Kingdom, 1940-1960: Student Welfare and World Status," 13.

77 Mary Trevelyan, “The Welfare of Overseas Commonwealth Students in the United Kingdom,” Journal of the Royal Society of Arts 110, no. 5069 (1962): 338-339.

and political rivalries in order to strengthen ties in the future between Britain and

Commonwealth counties. She advocated for youth to create relationships based on equality and in doing so, help resolve problems within the Commonwealth.

After the disaster of the Suez in 1956, Britain began extensive youth and cultural outreach and propaganda to unite the Commonwealth and contain Communism.

Encouraging British youth to travel overseas and act as ambassadors characterized this strategy. The British government founded the Commonwealth Youth Trust which financed scholarships, work camps, welfare centers and travel.78

France also witnessed large numbers of African youth enrolled in French schools after the Second World War. These African students developed their own student unions and became active in policy towards former colonies. Many students aggressively advocated for national self-determination and Pan-African unity with anti-France tendencies. The French government agonized that these groups were infiltrated by

Communists.

After WW11, French leaders didn’t want to lose control of their colonies or their image as a world power. France was concerned with colonial youth being attracted to

Communist youth groups that advocated anti-France policies. Past colonial policy based on inequitable race relations and natural resource extraction created a divisive legacy.

78 J.M. Lee, "Commonwealth Students in the United Kingdom, 1940-1960: Student Welfare and World Status," 18.

Colonial subjects endured poverty and little access to education. Calls for independence and self-determination grew in French territories.

To combat this, French politicians tried to reimagine French citizenship as multi- racial, multi-ethnic and multi-religious in order to entice African youth to identify with

France. In this way French colonies in Africa, the Middle East and Asia could remain a part of France.79 This directly opposed the original image embedded in the Federalist view of “one shared European culture” which was perceived of as Christian and white.

According to Marker,

“Franco-African youth programs, student exchanges, and colonial education reform more broadly, sought to develop a shared political identity and build social solidarity among young people who had previously been taught to focus on their differences rather than their common interests.”80

French politicians appealed to French youth as the only ones capable of breaking religious and racial divides in order to maintain relations with French colonies. France invested heavily in public and religious education both in former colonies and in France.

This education impressed upon young people the meaning of citizenship and their responsibilities under the French Union (France and all her overseas territories). Formal

79 Emily Marker, “France between Europe and Africa: Youth, Race, and Envisioning the Postwar World, 1940-1960” (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2016).

80 Marker, “France between Europe and Africa: Youth, Race, and Envisioning the Postwar World, 1940-1960,” 19.

education was to be supplemented by character-building organizations such as the scouts, youth camps and sports clubs.

The British and French governments responded to the Communist challenge by reaching out to colonial youth with education programs. European governments asserted youth bridged international divides caused by prejudices and political tension with their perceived open-mindedness and ability to find common ground. Many British and

French educational leaders were also members of the European Movement or worked closely with European Federalists. The conversations and strategies around the Cold War and international youth influenced the European Federalists and the creation of the

European Youth Movement.

Chapter 4: The European Youth Campaign

Drawing upon archival research, this chapter describes the structure, financing, orientation and activities of the European Youth Campaign. The European Movement created the EYC to reach out to youth to spread the message of Federalism. The EM hoped to overcome previous failures and advocated for the Federalist agenda before its opportunity disappeared. The Communist youth festivals also impelled action. The EM designed the EYC using successful strategies from earlier Federalist organizations, such as setting issues in a local context. EM leaders wanted to reach youth where they lived, ate, played and studied.

The European Movement and its creation, the European Youth Campaign, were both products of the diplomacy of the “founding fathers” of the EU and leading

Federalists such as Duncan Sandys. Honorary presidents of the EM included Leon Blum,

Winston Churchill, Alcide De Gasperi, Paul-Henri Spaak, Robert Schuman, Count

Coudenhove-Kalergi and Konrad Adenauer. The EM hosted public debates, educational initiatives, cultural outreach, and published the monthly journal Nouvelles de l’Europe. It received funding from private individuals, governments, and the American Committee for a United Europe (ACUE). The European Movement utilized this money to provide a budget for the European Youth Campaign.

The ACUE itself was a creation of constant European Federalists’ pressure on

Americans for support. According to Rappaport, the Honorary Presidents and organizations of the EM made regular speaking tours and engagements in the United

States in order to drum up support. Duncan Sandys requested that the ACUE be initiated as a supplement to the EM and provide needed funding to avoid bankruptcy. Count

Coudenhove-Kalergi and Winston Churchill also personally requested the founding of the

ACUE. European historian Arnold Zurcher noted in a 1958 article that American support for European integration and youth campaigns was attributed to the successful canvassing of Europeans like Count Coudenhove-Kalergi.81 The formation of the ACUE was heavily endorsed by Senator Fulbright who was already a staunch European integration supporter.82

Paul van Zeeland, a founder of the EM and the EYC, argued on one of his many

ACUE speaking engagements in the United States that Americans should give money to the EM not just to make a better Europe but eventually a better world.83 The ACUE philosophy asserted that supporting a United Europe, a European Army and a European government is the best way to defeat communism.84

81 Arnold J. Zurcher, “American Policy toward European Union,” The Polish Review vol. 3, no. 4 (1958): 3-15.

82 American Committee for a United Europe Papers, folder 90, box 2, Georgetown University Library, Washington, in Rapport, Armin, "The United States and European Integration: The First Phase." Diplomatic History 5, no. 2 (1981): 144.

83 ACUE Luncheon materials in Ritz-Carlton Hotel in New York, October 4, 1949. ACUE Papers, American Committee on United Europe records, Box no. 1, Folder no. 1, Hoover Institution Archives.

84 Statement by the Directors of the ACUE dated January 30, 1951. ACUE Papers, American Committee on United Europe records, Box no. 1, Folder no. 1, Hoover Institution Archives.

The ACUE began in 1948 as a private U.S. organization with 660 members the first year. Membership dues and donations were the initial source of funds sent to

European Federalists and the EYC. Private members pledged $100-$2500 annually and it was tax deductible. The ACUE’s statement of purpose in 1952 declared that the

“ACUE is a group of private citizens in the U.S. who believe it essential for the security and prosperity of Europe and the United States that the countries of Free Europe achieve unity.”85 This statement was signed by 20 board of directors, 312 private individuals,

156 heads of colleges and universities and prominent businessmen, union representatives, scientists, and institutions like the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation. The

ACUE’s goal was to “. . . arrange discreet American financial assistance for the European supporters of such Federalist initiatives as the Council of Europe, the Schuman Plan and the European Army.” 86

The ACUE funding of the EM and EYC was kept concealed at the request of the

Europeans themselves. Spaak had asked that American funding be kept hidden in order not to offend those Europeans who resented American influence. Funding was also secluded to avoid protest from anti-socialist and conservative Americans. ACUE administrator Cord Meyer recalls, “European political and cultural leaders who solicited

85 Statement of Purpose, ACUE, April 1, 1952, ACUE Papers, American Committee on United Europe records, Box no. 1, Folder no. 1, Hoover Institution Archives.

86 U.S. government funds eventually displaced private donations. Giles Scott-Smith and Hans Krabbendam, The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe, 1945-1960 (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 47.

our aid … made it a condition that there be no publicity, since the Communist propaganda machine could exploit any overt evidence of official American support as proof that they were puppets of the American imperialists.”87

ACUE funding was critical to the European Movement and prevented its bankruptcy. After experimenting with youth rallies in the late 1940s, the European

Movement established the European Youth Campaign in 1951. The EYC operated until

ACUE funding stopped in 1958.

French pro-Europe activists were especially instrumental in the EYC’s creation.

The EYC’s international headquarters were located in Paris. Leaders of the EYC had direct contacts with the French Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Overseas

France. The work of French education administrators in Occupied Germany focused on

European Federalism, small group education and student exchanges between Germany and France heavily influenced the inception of the EYC.

The EYC was established after the American High Commissioner in Occupied

Germany, John McCoy and Shepard Stone, the American Director for Public Affairs in

Occupied Germany, reached out to French educators to organize youth events in Western

Germany. They had been shaken by the success of the Berlin Communist Youth

Festival.88 All those involved in the initial discussions on the creation of the EYC were

87 Aldrich, “OSS, CIS and European Unity,” 194.

88 Brian McKenzie, “The European Youth Campaign in Ireland: Neutrality, Americanization, and the Cold War, 1950-1959,” Diplomatic History 40,3 (2016): 421- 444.

associated with French Federalist educators and American administrators in Occupied

Germany. 89 Jean Moreau, the first chairman of the EYC worked as a youth officer in

Occupied Germany. The second chairman of the EYC, Philippe Deshormes, held the position of director at youth refugee camps in Occupied Germany.

Federalists attempted to organize youth outreach in previous years, but lack of money was insurmountable. Americans provided desperately needed funds after seeing the success of the Communist Youth Festivals. The EYC organized the Loreley-Camp event in its first year and although this was in response to a Communist rally, organizer

Jean Moreau emphasized that the “martial trappings of parades and uniforms” were not used.90 The EYC Training manual stated that the EYC origins were “to organize a

European Youth assembly of several tens of thousands of participants, in order to awaken the Europeans spirit, and a European patriotism.”

Initially the EYC began as a one-year campaign focused on France and Germany.

Leaders expected to reach 60,000 young people through an assembly in France stressing

“unity from European diversity, and the necessary force of a European patriotism.”91 The

EM and ACUE stipulated that if the first year of the EYC was successful, further support

89 J.H. Retinger, J. H., and John Pomian, Joseph Retinger--memoirs of an Eminence Grise (London: Sussex United Press, 1972), 237.

90 “Youth of Europe Meets on Rhine; Camp on Lorelei Rock Intended to Counteract Coming Red Rally in East Berlin,” New York Times, July 23, 1951.

91 Camp-Stage Europeen de Formation de Cadres, Tremezzo Italy, 10-20 July 1955, American Committee on United Europe records, Box no.5, Folder no. 8, Hoover Institution Archives.

would be forthcoming. Sensitive to the criticism of U.S. dominance and not wanting to alienate young student Communists, ACUE funding remained concealed. According to

Historian Richard Aldrich, EM leader Paul-Henri Spaak made necessary adjustments to obscure ACUE funds to the EYC within the EM budget.92

The EYC conducted a propaganda and educational campaign through large festivals and parades bringing together hundreds young people. They generated

Federalist materials to display at cultural events, film festivals and theaters. They organized educational conferences, debates and lectures. They promoted student travel and exchange programs. The EYC worked with educational ministers to create a curriculum and textbooks on a single European history. Eventually EYC activities spread to fifteen European countries, including Turkey

Many of the EYC’s youth activities mirrored activities seen in the adult European

Movement. The EM’s Committee on Central and Eastern Europe had its EYC counterpart in programs of outreach to exiled Central and Eastern Europe youth, incorporating them in EYC rallies whenever possible. For example, on March 17, 1953 a

European Conference of young people from Central and Eastern Europe was planned to take place in Paris. Similarly, the Coal and Steel Community had its counterpart in the

EYC exchanges of young miners and steelworkers between Germany and France. Young stock breeders and agriculturalists from all over Europe were invited to EYC meetings to

92 Richard J. Aldrich, “OSS, CIA and European Unity: The American Committee on United Europe, 1948- 60,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 8,1:184-227.

discuss EU agricultural policy and the Green Pool, a European policy of price stability and co-operation. EYC leaders enacted programs for young engineers to network across borders, particularly French and German. Finally, plans to coordinate the youth sections of the Chambers of Commerce were generated.

The mission of the EYC was to motivate students not just to believe in European integration but to become active citizens promoting union in their local communities and national elections. Dr. K. Rickenback, President of the Swiss branch of the Bund

Europeaicher Jugend, stressed that “The task before young people of today was that of playing an active part.”93 A Greek Federalist minister, Macoas, remarked that a

European Union would quickly become a reality if youth in their enthusiasm were to take an active part. Through EYC activities, youth were to learn their civic responsibilities and be ready to advocate for the supremacy of the European idea.

Georges Rencki, Director for Political Activities of the European Youth

Campaign, said the EYC was part of the “. . . [l]ong and difficult fight against

Communists, nationalists—and that other big enemy of ours—public apathy.”94

Historian of the Irish EYC, Brian Mackenzie wrote that European resignation and passive defeatism were identified as a concern by the US state department. A news

93 News of the European Youth Campaign, 10 March 1953. American Committee on United Europe records, Box no.4, Folder no. 2, Hoover Institution Archives.

94 Georges Rencki, Excerpts from Advance Text of Speech, New York, ACUE Luncheon in Ritz-Carlton Hotel in New York, October 4, 1949. ACUE Papers, American Committee on United Europe records, Box no. 1, Folder no. 1, Hoover Institution Archives.

reporter of the time reflected, the youth “. . . [m]ust now show whether they have recognized the value of working in freedom to achieve peace, which is the only path towards advancement, social prosperity and greater fulfilment.”95

The activities, management and organization of the EYC did not take place in secrecy. The goal was to increase public knowledge of pro-Federalist youth activities.

Growing public support and acceptance of Federalism was designed to apply pressure on national leaders to promote a Federalist platform. One young EYC member organized a

BBC radio broadcast in which he discussed with Her Majesty the Queen of England the activities of the European Youth Campaign.

Press regularly received invitations to activities and information sheets describing

EYC programs, successes and goals. Press conferences occurred almost weekly in all countries. For example, on the 5th of March 1953, a press conference transpired to make public the goals and activities of all local organizations taking part in the Belgian branch of the EYC for that year. Young people displayed their pro-Federalist exhibits in the lobbies of newspapers to increase coverage. Bibliographies of the press coverage on

European integration were compiled in each country. They requested journalists attend all festivals and the opening day of a commonly planned event called Europe Week.

Members of the press who were sympathetic to the Federalism played a very active role in the EYC. They developed propaganda, press releases and radio content.

95 Peter Timmerman, “The New Order,” The Regional Daily Newspaper Saabrüucker Zeitung, March 6, 1950.

When travelling on international speaking tours, National Secretaries of the EYC were accompanied by journalists. Radio was often used to broadcast lectures or have question- and-answer sessions with Pro-Federalist panelists. Members of the press conducted classes and lectures to teach young people involved with newspapers how to write about

European Unity effectively. Mr. Pellegrini from the Newspaper Liberal Stampa explained how the press could keep the youth informed so that they could achieve some useful work for European unity. Mr. Sletten, a speaker in the Norwegian EYC stated in a

EYC newsletter that “the importance creating, through public opinion, political conditions which would simplify the work of continental unification . . . should be the role of young journalists.”96 Student press attended training courses together, as in

France where over 300 such students convened for five days in Caen, France.

The EM scheduled regular meetings of its EYC governing board in Paris throughout the year. The governing board meetings included four or more ranking members of the European Movement, the seven-member Executive Council of the EYC, the International Secretariat of the EYC, the Secretary General, the Head of Department and the Head of Administration.

In Paris at the EYC international secretariat, they established the Department of

Youth Movements, the Department of Schools, the Department of Student Exchange, the

Department of Mass Media and the Department of Logistics. Each department was

96 “Norwegian Section,” Newsletter no. 21, June 8, 1953, News of the European Youth Campaign. American Committee on United Europe records, Box no.4, Folder no. 2, Hoover Institution Archives

assigned delegated based on the following formula: youth movements (18 delegates), schools (12 delegates), student exchanges (6 delegates), and mass media (6 delegates).

One to Three delegates from each country grouping were to serve in each department.

The countries were grouped as follows: 1) Germany; 2) Belgium, Luxembourg, and

Holland; 3) Denmark, Norway and Sweden; 4) France: 5) Great Britain and Ireland; 6)

Greece and Turkey: 7) Spain and Central and Eastern Europe. Switzerland, Austria, Italy,

Netherlands, and Scandinavia also participated later.

Each country had its National Secretary who oversaw the coordination of all EYC events in that country. The goal was to interact with as many local organizations as possible and to contact youth not already affiliated with a group. Primary administration and planning for programs took place at the country level, with authority for planning delegated at even lower levels under the leadership of the youth themselves. Each town organized its own local Youth Action Committees. This resulted in effective events specific to each location’s needs and concerns. National Secretaries were free to implement the programs as they saw fit.97

This structure of the EYC followed the European pattern established by the

European Cultural Centre of the Congress of Europe to work through existing

97 Camp-Stage Europeen de Formation de Cadres, Tremezzo Italy, 10-20 July 1955, American Committee on United Europe records, Box no.5, Folder no. 8, Hoover Institution Archives.

institutions.98 It exemplified a lesson learned from earlier successful Federalist organizations. Framing Federalism in a local context using local problems proved an effective strategy to increase membership. EYC groups addressed local concerns and offered Federalist solutions to local problems.

Each National Secretary reported back to the International secretariat on 3-10 events held that week in their country. These combined reports from National EYC

Secretaries contained as many as 50 events every two weeks. The archives contain these reports, training manuals, copies of speeches and statements by leaders.99 The newsletters are written in English, cover two-week periods at a time, and have subheadings for each country where activities of the week are listed. The Newsletters cover the events of the EYC but also cover significant gatherings of other youth organizations that are included under the umbrella of the EYC and have pro-Federalist events.

Countries, regions and population segments encompassed in the EYC newsletters included Switzerland, Luexembourg, Saar, Austria, Sweden, Turkey, Norway, Denmark,

Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Scandinavia, Germany, Netherlands, Greece, Great

Britain, and exiles from Spain and Central and Eastern Europe. The inclusion of Turkey mirrored the reach of the Marshall Plan. Many activities were jointly sponsored by the

98 D. McNeil, "The European Cultural Centre and Its Activities," The World Today 9, no. 8 (1953): 360-67.

99 “News of the European Youth Campaign. March-December 1953” Hoover Archives, Box 4 Folder 2, Hoover Institution Archives.

EYC and other local youth or cultural groups. The EYC planned events with colleges, municipal councils, student bodies, political youth groups, high schools, family centers, trade unionists, church groups, travel agencies, and youth sports. 100

The entries in the newsletters sometimes read like propaganda to prove to the

ACUE, the funders of the project, how much young Europeans loved the idea of

Federalism and that their money was being well spent. A few small samples of this include: “Impressed by the great interest in European affairs among youth (Denmark);”

“They were enthusiastic in discussing European problems (Norway);” “Those present applauded his Federalist point of view (Brest);”and finally “In young Turkish circles it is considered that Spaak’s visit to Turkey will accomplish marked results in the realm of

European propaganda.”

The EYC focused mainly on small-scale educational events, discussions, and debates. EYC leaders “. . . [h]oped this strategy would have a more lasting impact on participants and also distinguish their liberal-democratic approach to youth from the mass youth rallies associated with both fascism and Soviet communism.”101 Educational events typically brought together 50-100 students. Lecture topics were academic and encouraged critical thinking. The following list displays a small sample of the wide variety of topical issues covered in educational lectures and debates: the Federalist doctrine; France and

100 News of the European Youth Campaign, 10 March 1953 - 30 December 1953, American Committee on United Europe records, Box no.4, Folder no. 2, Hoover Institution Archives.

101 Norwig, “A First European Generation?” 255-256.

Europe; Future prospects for European political unity; the importance of the EDC; proletarianism-cancer of the contemporary world; NATO, China and Europe; history of

Federalism: functionalism vs. Federalism; the role of Germany; attitudes of Scandinavian countries; the benefits of agricultural economic coordination; and the role of youth in

Federalism. Different points of view were debated. A simple ideological framework was not presented.

By its second year in existence, 1952, there were 1899 EYC sessions and conferences, 900 cinema shows, 1.8 brochures, 21 exhibitions, and 2400 minutes of radio time for the cause of European Unity.102 In December 1952, 300 students demonstrated in Menton, on the French-Italian border, in favor of European integration.

EYC events involved youth from various countries coming together for several days of activities to interact with high level national politicians and Federalists. The

EYC sponsored cultural events, film festivals and theatre companies. Although aimed mainly at older college students, there were activities targeted at high school and younger children. Local EYC chapters developed games to play in school, essay contests and poster contests. EYC groups participated in local fairs and agricultural trade shows, setting up their traveling display on the benefits and history of Federalism. Local EYC chapters also designed charity and disaster relief projects needed in their regions.

Leaders of the EYC often conducted weekly broadcasts on radio which at the time was a

102 P. Agee and L. Wolf, Dirty work: The CIA in Western Europe, 1st edition (Secaucus, N.J.: L. Stuart, 1978).

new medium successfully reaching virtually every family.103 Some EYC chapters particularly in France worked closely with national educational departments in the development of teaching materials.104 EYC leaders targeted outreach to young people not affiliated with any organization with programs such as “Operation onslaught” which brought films, traveling exhibits and lectures to rural, isolated youth .

The large number of educational activities reflected a youth engaged in open and frank discussion of the problems and benefits of European unity. Young people actively contributed to the development of programs, materials and press. They were not just consumers of material or indoctrination. They were being educated, and they were learning the skills to apply their education to make them better citizens. The EYC goal aspired to achieve the “training of the European citizen.” EYC training manuals insisted that thoughtful education would avoid purely emotional and spectacular demonstrations among youth, thereby producing a longer-lasting effect. Leaders of the EYC fostered an

“awakening of a European patriotism.”105 Students debated how best to design national

103 Arch Puddington, Broadcast Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2000).

104 News of the European Youth Campaign, Weekly Reports, 10 March 1953 - 30 December 1953, American Committee on United Europe records, Box no.4, Folder no. 2, Hoover Institution Archives.

105 Camp-Stage Europeen de Formation de Cadres, Tremezzo Italy, 10-20 July 1955, American Committee on United Europe records, Box no.5, Folder no. 8, Hoover Institution Archives.

education systems and methods of teaching European history. Institutes for European

Studies were established, and student exchange programs flourished.

A variety of political affiliations collaborated with the EYC, including Christians, socialists, liberals, trade unionists, social democrats and conservatives. To avoid charges of indoctrination, the EYC provided a forum for open discussion. Discussions included anti-Federalist participants and speakers. Differences in approaches to Federalism were openly debated to increase mutual understanding. For example, Miss Ursula Branston, head of the foreign affairs section of the British Conservative Party’s Research

Department, delivered speeches about the reservations Great Britain had towards

European Union at EYC public lectures in 1953.106

The EYC training manual referred to established large youth movements already organized, specifically the World Assembly of Youth (WAY) and the International

Socialists Youth (IUSY), who approved of the creation of the EYC as they were having misunderstandings between themselves. Representatives of the youth movements WAY and IUSY even suggested leaders for the EYC. This project did not proceed without their knowledge but rather with their active participation. According to EYC reports, “The action to be undertaken will evidently be supported by their (WAY and IUSY) advice and their effective participation, along lines adapted to each particular case.” In return for their cooperation, WAY and IUSY wanted to discuss the possibility “the granting of a

106 News of the European Youth Campaign, Weekly Reports, 10 March 1953 - 30 December 1953, American Committee on United Europe records, Box no.4, Folder no. 2, Hoover Institution Archives.

free territory to the European youth. On this territory might be erected the first European youth city with an autonomous statute.”107

Thus, the EYC acted as an umbrella group, an effective strategy gleaned from early Federalist organizations. It reduced duplication of efforts and enabled membership to grow. National secretaries reached out to all types of youth groups in their country.

Even those opposed to Federalism were invited to join events and contribute to the debate. They were not required to relinquish membership in their old group in order to participate in EYC activities.

An example of an EYC event that united small, diverse educational organizations was the adult education conferences held in Switzerland from 18th of May to the 21st

1953. Those groups who participated are too numerous to list but included: International

Settlements Federation, the Netherlands Adult Education Colleges, the Committees for

Coordinating Adult Education in the Scandinavian countries, the French Federation of

Maison des Jeunes et de la Culture, the family and youth centers, the French Social

Centers, the Central Organization of the Jegendpflege in Germany, the Umataia Society, the Communita Association, the Italian Organization for Workers Leisure Time, the

Community Centers of Great Britain, the Austrian People Universities and the Belgian

Workers Educational Associations.

107 Camp-Stage Europeen de Formation de Cadres, Tremezzo Italy, 10-20 July 1955, American Committee on United Europe records, Box no.5, Folder no. 8, Hoover Institution Archives.

The use of informal networks, an effective strategy gleaned from earlier

Federalists organizations, was utilized in EYC programs. They aspired to build relationships between students from different countries to create empathy and friendships. They hoped to overcome traditional prejudices between countries by building bridges of understanding between youth.

One way to prompt network development was through travel. Travel among young people was encouraged both on their own and through official EYC programs.

Travel agencies were invited to visit students and answer questions about traveling to other countries, including economic concerns. EYC youth leaders participated in making travel arrangements to conduct EYC business. For example, a EYC newsletter from

February 1953 reported that 200 young people attended an EYC meeting in Great Britain to discuss the “necessity for making preparations for trips abroad and . . . receiving young people from other countries.” Travel was not just confined to college students. In

France, 1953, with the cooperation of UNESCO, 150 secondary school age children from all over Europe spent a week in Brest.

The EM aimed to create networks of future Federalist leaders and press corps through EYC activities. Many events consisted of meetings for youth leaders to create networks across national borders. Newsletter no. 21 documented a conference of 100 youth leaders from 16 different European countries who met in Geneva from May 23-27.

Austria hosted the Third Congress of the European Student Press which “enabled the contacts already established between the various young student publications to be strengthened.” As quoted in the Newsletter of the EYC no. 19, the EYC knew “the

importance which must be attached to exchanges between young people.” Young EYC leaders frequently experienced first-hand interaction with established powerful leaders and politicians. Young leaders participated in EYC activities developing leadership skills.

This included skills in political campaigning and methods to organize other youth. The newsletters described Italian classes on how youth could play an active part in electoral campaigns.

The cornerstone of the European Movement was that European diversity should be celebrated. They endeavored to develop the trait of open-mindedness to end prejudices. The EYC promoted fun social events with other youth from different countries. The young people would take turns telling stories from their countries, doing dances or having campfires. They learned to empathize with people from other nationalities and recognize that common problems existed. They forged friendships and mutual understanding for other cultures.

Although they focused smaller educational exchanges, large festivities to gain the attention of the United States, the press and European Leaders were also planned. In

1953 alone numerous large-scale EYC events took place. A European Fortnight was organized in Belgium. Youth draped Roulers in flags and posters proclaiming the need for European Unity. The European Youth Exhibit displayed in Nantes. Europe Days were held in Lancaster. In Austria approximately 25,000 young Austrians, Germans,

French, Saarlanders, Belgians and Dutch demonstrated. A large conference of Central and Eastern European students convened in Paris. An Agricultural show was promoted in Toulouse. An International Fair took place at the Forum in Copenhagen. In Austria,

15,000 young socialists from Austria, Germany, Denmark and Great Britain marched in the city of Weissenbach am Attersee. Large festivities in Caen and Germany transpired with 800 students.

The press covered three very emotional demonstrations that year. In Belgium

500 young people held a torchlight procession walking toward Germany and Holland and pledged never again to have civil war. In November, on the Luxembourg frontier, 1800

EM and EYC participants put up over 100 signposts. They read, “You come from

Europe, you stay in Europe-another country-still Europe.” The EYC convened a

“Congress of European Youth” in the Hague in October that was attended by more than

5000 youth and student leaders who walked through the town with flags and torches. The flag they waved was the new European flag of the Council of Europe and this was its first presentation.108

Concurrent with unfolding world events, the EM updated EYC goals to reflect ongoing international political debates. As the Spanish resistance fought for freedom and appealed to the EM for help, the EYC reached out to embrace Spanish youth. With the colonial system being challenged and dismantled, EYC educational events centered on reaching out to colonial youth. Topics such as special trades zones for former colonies became common. A ‘heartfelt appeal for Turkey’ was launched by the EYC campaign reflecting EM goals at the time. Young exiles from Poland, Czechoslovakia,

108 Newsletter no. 29, News of the European Youth Campaign, Weekly Reports, October 14, 1953, American Committee on United Europe records, Box no.4, Folder no. 2, Hoover Institution Archives

Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Ukraine and

Byelorussia attended the conference to support Eastern and Central European Youth.

They started a committee of young exiles to reestablish democracy in their countries and become part of a United Europe.

During the polarizing world debates on the European Defense Council (EDC),

The EM advocated strongly for the EDC. They encouraged the EYC to promote this topic in propaganda, debates and lectures. However, this policy supporting the EDC proved a failure for a variety of reason. First the EDC itself failed to materialize as

France voted against it. Second, supporting the EDC costs the EYC the membership of many young people who opposed a European Army and American interference.

The failure of the EDC raised doubts about the effectiveness and methods of the

European Movement and the European Youth Campaign. EYC leaders decided to create even bigger shows of youth support for Federalism to put more pressure on European leaders. EYC officials stated, “The rejection of the EDC signifies for many Europeans the failure of the European idea. In light of the dejection in European milieus, a powerful show of youth’s support for Europe takes on a new importance.”109 They committed to redoubling local outreach and interacting with young people where they “. . . live, work

109 “Note sur les objectifs et méthodes des ‘Etats-Généraux de la Jeunesse d’Europe’ 1957,” s.n. 19 janvier 1955, 1. AHUE ME-1458, in Marker, France between Europe and Africa, 256.

and learn.”110 Andre Philip and Joseph Retinger, two EYC leaders, maintained that the emphasis on promoting military had scared youth away. They decided to back away from military issues in the future.

European historian Christina Norwig described EYC action groups called

“drumfire” created to walk through towns showing their support of the EDC. The

Communists used the negative image of “drumfire” in their anti-Federalist propaganda to portray the EYC’s purpose as militarizing youth. Communist youth drew swastikas on

“drumfire” posters. Norwig noted that some Federalist posters started referring to a united Europe as the true Fatherland, another negative connotation that harked back to

Hitler. This negative public image was solidified when some 5000 young people presented a petition at the Council of Europe that argued European integration be defended by self-sacrifice.111 This negative imagery disturbed youth and adults who hoped to escape nationalistic, militaristic and destructive ideas.

Norwig writes that in particular Socialist youth disagreed with promotion of the

EDC and felt like American funds were “buying” their support for a policy they did not agree with. Young people pushed back. Rather than passively submitting to an agenda they disagreed with or simply leaving the EYC, students were active in reframing the agenda of the EYC. EYC members demanded more emphasis on Europe as a third way

110 “Note sur les objectifs et méthodes des ‘Etats-Généraux de la Jeunesse d’Europe’ 1957,” s.n., 19 janvier 1955, 1. AHUE ME-1458 in Marker, France between Europe and Africa, 256.

111 Norwig, “A First European Generation?” 257-259.

and more outreach to youth from former colonies. Eurafrica became a regular theme as students focused on moral and racist concerns in the greater international arena, especially in France.

The debate in France between integrating Europe and strengthening a Greater

French Union with overseas Africa extended to youth groups. There were verbal fights and physical confrontations between the French EYC and opposing youth groups over the

EDC and European Army.112 French nationalist and Gaullist hecklers attended French

EYC events. French Federalist promoted ways to extend EYC activities to French

African youth and developed special committees to look at colonial issues in order to diffuse this tension.

Historian Emily Marker investigated the EYC influence upon young French

Africans living in France as they developed their own youth movements. She argued,

“The dominant position of French leaders in the European movements also fostered a

Eurafrican perspective within pro-Europe circles and institutions.”113 African students themselves were torn between France and Pan-African Organizations. By 1957 Eurafrica was a priority of the French section of the EYC and its magazine. Youth and youth

112 Newsletter No. 32, November 30, 1953, News of the European Youth Campaign, Weekly Reports, American Committee on United Europe records, Box no.4, Folder no. 2, Hoover Institution Archives

113 Emily Marker, “France between Europe and Africa: Youth, race, and envisioning the postwar world, 1940-1960” (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2016).

leaders in the EYC had successfully changed the tenor of discussion on European integration to fit their outlook.

A closer look at the branch of the EYC in Ireland is interesting for several reasons. First, it demonstrates how national interests shaped EYC agendas. Ireland and the Catholic Church used the EYC in pursuit of their own goals. For Ireland, an ex- colony of Britain, the policy of interacting with Britain as an equal in a European organization was desirable. They also aspired to display a cooperative face to compensate for their neutrality during the Second World War. They feared Europe would unite and leave them behind economically

In 1952 British EYC leaders appealed to Ireland on the feasibility of launching an

Irish branch. The EYC reached out to the Irish ambassador to the Vatican and

Archbishop McQuaid for help. The Irish EYC’s grand opening was fully attended by the

Irish press in 1953. The Irish EYC acted as an umbrella group for many smaller organizations including the Catholic boy scouts, Irish Students’ Association, City of

Dublin Youth Service Board, Irish Association of Catholic University Students, Society of St. John Bosco, and Catholic Women’s Federation for the Promotion of Community

Development.114

EYC plans for the initial year included an essay competition and collaboration between young farmers of Ireland and Europe. It served the national interest of Ireland to

114 Brian McKenzie, “The European Youth Campaign in Ireland: Neutrality, Americanization, and the Cold War, 1950-1959,” Diplomatic History 40,3 (2016): 433.

protect and developed its agricultural sector, so consequently the state promoted agricultural EYC events. EYC agricultural student exchange programs were developed.

One of their biggest events was a conference for over 100 EYC youth leaders in May

1956 at University College, Galway. Titled “The Social Implications of a United

Europe,” it exhibited all the hallmarks of an EYC event. It was educational and provided close contact with high-profile adult EM leaders. The venue encouraged the development of friendships, mutual understanding, and informal networks. They also hosted an

International Rural Youth Conference in 1957.

Irish goals for the EYC were to stem the spread of communism, promote agriculture, address the partition of their country, and gain access to the U.S. economy, leaders and money. Organizers declared “If the Council of Europe was to survive the interest of the people must be awaken.”115 They hoped that European integration would solve the problem of the division of Ireland without a war with England. Ireland sought to join a European organization that increased its stature in the world. Ireland was isolated due to its civil war and neutrality during the war, and the USSR blocked Irish entry into the UN until 1956. Facilitating a pro-U.S. policy of Communist containment by starting an EYC branch created more contacts for Ireland with America. Finally, the

EYC operated with abundant American cash that could be diverted to a wide variety of projects.

115 Eleanor Butler, “Ireland’s Role in Europe, 20 July 1950,” in Documents on the History of European Integration, eds. Walter Lipgens and Wilfred Loth (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 796-798.

The Catholic Church in Ireland opposed Communist influence in Ireland but had little money for programs. Heavily financed, the EYC provided funds to establish anti-

Communist efforts in Ireland. Compared to all other groups in Ireland, the EYC was wealthy and created many links with Europe. An Irish politician noted when attending events in Europe, “That Catholic political parties and individuals are among the most convinced believers and active workers in the cause of European integration and strongly influenced by the Pope in this.”116

One of the most important and lasting influences of the EYC in Ireland were the networks developed among elite youth. These networks of educated Irish students were very instrumental in pushing through the application for Ireland to join first the European

Communities and later the European Union. Historian Brian McKenzie explained that the “EYC was a collection of youth leaders. Participants were building networks among like-minded . . . individuals.” 117

This was the dominant legacy of all EYC programs in Europe: A network of younger generation, European-minded leaders many of whom played a role in the later success of the European Communities, the European Union and other major European policies. Members of the EYC saw themselves as members of the first European generation. Europe looked to youth to drop racism and nationalism from the past and to

116 Michael Kennedy and Eunan O’Halpin, Ireland and the Council of Europe: From Isolation towards Integration (Germany: Koelblin-Fortuna-Druck, 2000), 96.

117 McKenzie, “The European Youth Campaign in Ireland: Neutrality, Americanization, and the Cold War, 1950-1959,” 438.

build a liberal participatory democracy. Young people were integral to the success of

European integration. The EYC did not produce quick results. The EYC aspired to broad goals of increasing intellectual debate, education and civic mindedness and encouraging European unity and peace. The results of such a program were bound to be difficult to measure.

This chapter examined in-depth the EYC. After the Second World War, the

Austrian foreign minister, Dr. Karl Gruber, appealed to youth in the EYC to become the pioneers of European integration.118 The time was ripe for intensive efforts when the

U.S. finally dropped its accommodating attitude towards the Soviet Union and made funds available to Europe. The EM realized that past Federalist efforts had failed. They organized the EYC in 1951 in their push for European integration before their opportunity disappeared. The EYC archives demonstrate that those strategies identified as successful in earlier Federalist organizations were utilized in the design and organization of the EYC.

EYC activities exemplified local, grassroots efforts. They reached out to youth where they lived, worked and played. They developed a conversation about European integration within a local context. They focused on educational and propaganda activities. Interaction and apprenticeships with the press were heavily emphasized. They utilized umbrella organizations to highlight common aspirations, increase membership

118 News of the European Youth Campaign, Weekly Reports, 10 March 1953 - 30 December 1953, American Committee on United Europe records, Box no.4, Folder no. 2, Hoover Institution Archives.

and reduce the focus on differences. They leveraged these large membership numbers and dramatic press events to create pressure on European leaders to unite.

The EYC evaluated its efforts positively, claiming effectiveness and far-reaching appeal. EM leaders stated that it “had been very important in training young leaders and it considered that this action must be continued and that the maximum support should be given both to the educational activities and to the political.” Jean-Paul David, a French

Federalist Mayor, said, “He was glad to see that the work of the EYC had been expanded considerably in all European countries.” 119

119 Newsleter No. 19, News of the European Youth Campaign, Weekly Reports, 10 March 1953 - 30 December 1953, American Committee on United Europe records, Box no.4, Folder no. 2, Hoover Institution Archives.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

During the Second World War, resistance fighters and exiled leaders gained significant ground for the Federalist movement. Resistance fighters organized grassroots organizations based on local contexts inclusive of youth. They perfected strategies later utilized by Federalist organizations after the war, like the European Movement. Harold

Brugmans, founding member of the Union of European Federalists wrote, “After the high expectations of the resistance period and the deep disappointment of the first years after the liberation, a new force is gradually asserting itself in Europe—that of Federalism.

The core of the movement consists of young.”120

A significant international conversation around youth took place in the twentieth century. Leaders developed youth policies to address political issues such as colonial calls for independence. CAME and UNESCO started as groups of exiled educators who wanted to plan for postwar educational problems and combat a racist legacy. The USSR organized international youth with great success, to the embarrassment and dread of the

United States. Amid all this political activity surrounding youth, it is not surprising that the European Movement initiated the European Youth Campaign in 1951. But how effective was the EM and the EYC in integrating Europe?

120 Harold Brugmans, “Europe Actie: ‘The Only Way Out,” June 15, 1947,” in Documents on the History of European Integration, eds., Walter Lipgens and Wilfred Loth (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 372-378.

Some historians have argued that all this activity was not instrumental in the EU structures that ultimately developed. European historian Patrick Pasture writes, “Recent scholarship seriously questions the impact of either exiles or resistance movements and argues that their strong stance in the historical representation of European integration is largely a myth developed later.”121 Attempts to integrate Europe faced many challenges.

Nationalistic tendencies even appeared among Federalist leaders. The very same

Federalists who advocated in one negotiation or radio broadcast for integration would then go into another negotiation and push a nationalistic agenda. The 1950 Schuman

Plan, the first steppingstone towards European integration, was actually written to favor

French nationalist interests to the detriment of Germany.

However, this thesis has shown that Federalist leaders’ strength was to remain flexible in the face of all obstacles and in this way keep the Federalist dream alive. Their biggest success was youth programs like the European Youth Campaign which planted the seeds for future integration. The EYC promoted many events from 1951-1958 but its immediate success in that time period is hard to assess.

121 Patrick Pasture, “Imagining European Unity since 1000 AD” (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2015), 157.

There is antidotal evidence that it was effective. Paul van Zeeland, a founder of the EM, argued that every day he met a citizen who declared “the idea that he was no longer a British citizen but a citizen of Europe.”122 Georges Rencki of the EYC declared,

If the idea of European federation has great popular appeal, this is largely due to the efforts of a number of private organizations which are carrying on the fight for a united Europe to the people. One very substantial such organization is called the European Youth Campaign. This organization, with headquarters in Paris, works with young people in all non-Communist countries of Europe. Through its intensive program of studies, publications, conferences and public demonstrations, the EYC has become in the last few years one of the realities of Europe’s international political life.123

The European Movement organized many opinion polls to gauge the public’s support of the EU and to put pressure on National leaders. The newspaper coverage of some of these polls reflected a real “get out the vote” effort on the part of Federalists.

Banners and European flags decorated polling towns. Dinner was provided for election officials. Shopkeepers handed out advertisements on their products to remind voters to

122 ACUE Luncheon materials in Ritz-Carlton Hotel in New York, October 4, 1949. ACUE Papers, American Committee on United Europe records, Box no. 1, Folder no. 1, Hoover Institution Archives.

123 Excerpts from Advance Text of Speech by Georges Rencki, New York, ACUE Luncheon in Ritz-Carlton Hotel in New York, October 4, 1949. ACUE Papers, American Committee on United Europe records, Box no. 1, Folder no. 1, Hoover Institution Archives.

vote. One newspaper article from a polling town reads,” the Dutch Council of the

European Movement . . . has been working to awaken the spirit of the vote.”124

The EM propaganda campaign included staging votes in various municipal councils and towns. Examples of such polls include one in Breisach and one in Castrop-

Rauzel in July 1950 which showed over 90% approval for a European federal state.125 In the archives there are copies of numerous opinion polls taken in various European countries which were collected by the EYC and the EM.126 See Table 1, Table 2 and

Table 3 below.

Table 1: EM Poll on National Support for a European Union, 1950. “Would you be for a Yes Do European Union not including free movement Know of workers and no custom duties?” 2500 people polled per country. France 56% 32% Germany 68% 24% Italy 71% 21% Holland 51% 43% Norway 64% 25%

124 “Bolsward and Delft will vote on Europe Tomorrow,” Newspaper of the North, Tuesday, December 16, 1952, page 5. PDC, editors Europa Nu, accessed January 2019, https://www.europa-nu.nl/id/vgxzcc99z9yw/bolsward_en_delft_stemmen_morgen_over?

125 Christopher Stillemunkes, “The Discussion on European Union in the German Occupation Zones,” in Documents on the History of European Integration, eds., Walter Lipgens and Wilfred Loth (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 555.

126 European Polls, ACUE Papers, American Committee on United Europe records, Box no. 1, Folder no. 1, Hoover Institution Archives.

Table 2: 1950 German Poll on European Unity taken by EM. German town Percentage Favorable towards European Unity Castro-Rauxel 95.7% in favor out of 73% voting Breisach 95.6% in favor out of 80% voting

Table 3: 1952 Netherlands Poll on European Unity taken by EM. “Do you want a European Percentage Favorable constitution?” Delft 93% yes out of 75% voting Bolsward 97% yes out of 88% voting

EM leaders organized a test referendum on integration in Roulers and Verviers,

Belgium on Dec 20, 1953. Participants were asked, “Do you support a European union, with European authority combining political and economic interests guaranteed by a

European constitution?” In Roulers, the result was 83% saying yes out of 66% voting.

In Verviers the result was 74% saying yes out of 63% voting.127 Of course the accuracy, sample bias, circumstances or veracity of these polls is unknown. It was certainly in the

EMs interest to collect and disseminate only those polls which showed support for their fund-raising efforts.

127 European Polls, ACUE Papers, American Committee on United Europe records, Box no. 1, Folder no. 1, Hoover Institution Archives.

However, some of the polls listed in the EM and EYC archives are also reported in newspapers of the time. For example, the 1952 poll in the Netherlands cited above also appeared in Newspaper of the North, Tuesday 16 December 1952.128 The newspaper reported that the people voting seemed happy and supportive. This result is in contrast to a 1947 article in The World Today that wrote there seemed little chance of realizing a

United States of Europe and that the governments of Netherlands, Sweden, Norway and

Denmark made it clear they did not want any form of European federation.129

Certainly, the immediate results of the EYC varied by country. In Spain,

European historian Carlos Gomez argues that Federalist youth movements were not successful in promoting the idea of Federalism but were successful in promoting the idea of democracy.130 In France, the EDC faced defeat despite a massive youth campaign supporting it. The French Federalists “conducted a spectacular campaign to enlist public support in Europe for the idea of a federal pact…This had little success though.” 131

128 “Referendum in Delft and Bolsward in December 1952,” Newspaper of the North, December 16, 1952, PDC, editors Europa Nu, accessed January 2019, https://www.europa-nu.nl/id/vgxzl29bnwyv/referendum_in_delft_en_bolsward_in.

129 D.K.M.K., “The United States of Europe,” The World Today vol. 3, no. 4 (April 1947): 155-169.

130 Carlos Lopez Gomez, “The Appeal and Limitations of Federalism. The Union of European Federalists and Spanish Transition to Democracy,” in The Informal Construction of Europe, eds. Lennaert van Huemen and Mechthild Roos (London: Routledge, 2019).

131 Wilfred Loth, “Introduction,” in Documents on the History of European Integration, eds. Walter Lipgens and Wilfred Loth (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988).

Further numerous fights and confrontations occurred between EYC youth and anti-

Federalist youth in France. The EYC operated successfully in Ireland. No other youth group accessed so much money or so many ties with organizations in Europe

EYC efforts succeeded in Germany where unity with Europe required accepting the Cold War division of their country. Belgium mayor Max Brauer noted, “Young people who are often indifferent towards our political parties are spontaneously welcoming, and prepared to give their support to, the new European idea.”132

All three historians of the EYC, Norwig, Marker and Mckenzie agree that targeting youth was an effective strategy for creating a new European consciousness.

Norwig argues that youth was “unhinged from its original nationalistic context and translated to serve the idea of European unity.” 133 Youth historian Richard Ivan Jobs presents evidence of the importance of youth in laying the cultural foundation for the transformation of the Common Market into the European Community.134

Through programs like the EYC, young students embarked to travel around

Europe and initiate friendships. After WW11, the EYC worked to increase youth hostels,

132 Max Brauer, “The results of the European Congress in Brussels, March 6, 1949,” in Documents on the History of European Integration, eds. Walter Lipgens and Wilfred Loth (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 521-524.

133 Christina Norwig, “A First European Generation? The Myth of Youth and European Integration in the Fifties,” Diplomatic History 38,2 (2014): 251-260.

134 Richard Ivan Jobs, "Youth Movements: Travel, Protest, and Europe in 1968," The American Historical Review 114, no. 2 (2009): 376-404.

youth work camps, and ways to make European travel easier in the hopes of expanding young people’s minds. According to Jobs,

In the postwar period there was a complex top-down and bottom- up process of policies and demand regarding youth mobility which led to the emergence by the 1960s of a vast new travel culture; this, in turn, helped give shape to Western Europe as a democratic and “Europeanized’ social space.135

Travel to other European countries promoted international understanding among young people. Young travelers developed their own community of personal relationships based on the cultural travel that contributed to European unity. German Youth were specifically targeted to participate in youth travel and exchange programs in order to overcome fear, mistrust and guilt left over from the war.136

The EYC ended activities when funding stopped in 1958. But Federalist efforts to educate youth did not end. Today the Council of Europe runs a Youth program that started in the early 1960s. Its goal is to educate Youth on the European Union, to promote the idea of European Unity, to promote democratic participation and respect for human rights and to encourage youth participation in governing units. It provides opportunities for student exchanges, student leadership classes and provides a magazine, discounts and other benefits to young people. They developed European Citizenship training kits and hope to train the leaders of the future. Educating and engaging the youth

135 Richard Jobs and David M. Pomfret, eds. Transnational Histories of Youth in the Twentieth Century (New York: Palgrave, 2015), chapter 6.

136 Jobs and Pomfret, eds, Transnational Histories of Youth in the Twentieth Century.

is seen as effective in halting any government’s attempt to take over young people.137

The EU is currently promoting a program called EU 2020 Horizon Constructing Active

Citizenship with European Youth. This is the consequential legacy of the EYC.

Another important legacy of the EYC is their efforts to produce European educational materials and a university system. National college systems originally balked at coordinating because they did not want to be politicized. Student pressure helped changed that. The College of Europe in Bruges continues to train top EU personnel today. The European University Institute [EUI] in Florence founded in 1971, has produced European networks of academics, researchers, and students. The European

Union aims to create a network of 20 universities by 2024 in which students earn one degree by studying in several EU countries.

Those young leaders and organizers in the EYC often went on to have meaningful roles in the European Communities. One such person is Fausta Deshormes. Between

1954 and 1958 she worked as the editor in chief of the Italian EYC bulletin Giovane

Europa. She moved to Brussels in 1958 with her husband, Philippe Deshormes, the

Secretary General of the EYC. She became a major advocate for women’s rights, environmental protection and consumer information. She directed the promotion of

137 Laurence Eberhard, “The Council of Europe and Youth. Thirty Years of Experience.” (France: Council of Europe Publishing, 2002).

teaching and scientific research on European integration and organized the 1970

European Youth Forum and Conference.138

This thesis addressed the gap in coverage of youth outreach in the formation of the European Union. It detailed the use of the European Youth Campaign as a response to Communist youth outreach. European historian Misha Honeck writes, “Despite the relative invisibility of children and youth in the history of foreign relations, there are important lessons to be learned from tracing the footprints that young people left in the dynamic, interconnected, and volatile world of the Cold War.”139 Within this historic timeframe, organizing youth was an attempt to organize transnational citizenship. This thesis has shown how European Federalists promoted youth travel, youth leaders, youth education, youth activism and youth informal networks to unite Europe.

Communications, transportation, student programs, infrastructure and changes to laws and borders to facilitate student exchanges and youth travel have increased the power of youth in international relations. Youth were not just pawns of adults, or symbols of hope but international actors in their own right. They effectively changed the direction of the

EYC to reflect their values and priorities.

138 “Fausta Deshormes La Valle champion for women’s rights in Europe,” Posted on February 20, 2013 European University Institute, Historical Archives of the European Union. Accessed February 28, 2020. https://www.eui.eu/Research/HistoricalArchivesOfEU/News/2013/02-18- FaustaDeshormesLaVallechampionforwomensrightsinEurope

139 Mischa Honeck and Gabriel Rosenberg, “Transnational Generations,” Diplomatic History vol. 38, no. 2 (April 2014), 233-239.

The EYC developed out of the European Federalists’ attempts to revive and integrate Europe. Their original goals included the direct election of a European

Parliament by all European citizens and a European Constitution. These goals clearly never materialized. Nationalist rivalries and international tensions forced the Federalists to adopt a more piece-meal approach to European integration. The path to European unity has been complex and incomplete. The immediate impact of EYC activities was limited by the realities of international politics. However, the Federalist were successful and integral to the building of today’s EU structures if indirectly through their creation of the EYC. The building of wide-reaching memberships by the EM and EYC and large emotional public events gave national leaders the green light to start coordinating with other nations. As Churchill said, “until public opinion expresses itself more definitely, governments hesitate.”

EYC programs reached out to youth to build active, educated citizens who would vote and participate in a democratic government. The long-term effects of the EYC are evidenced in the legacy of informal networks, educational systems and educated leaders supporting the European Communities and the European Union and advocating for more participatory democracy. The idea that European unity rested on the strength of

European diversity traces directly back to the debates, philosophies and student exchange programs of the EYC. The EYC transformed national identity in the long run in Europe by creating a broader vision of Europe in the hearts and minds of young people and by helping to transform the role youth played in international relations in the 20th century.

Based on their generational consciousness, youth continued to play a transforming role in

international relations in the 60s, 70s and beyond. European Federalists did not create structures of mindless youth indoctrination but created forces that ultimately transformed and advocated for critical thinking and democracy.

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