DOCSLIB.ORG

The Independent Counsel Statute

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Independent Counsel Statute The Politics of Prosecution: The Independent Counsel Statute Committee on Federal Legislation The following report was completed in August 1998, prior to the release of the report of Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr in September 1998. INTRODUCTION The Independent Counsel law, originally enacted in 1978 as the Eth- ics in Government Act, will expire in 1999. Between now and then, Con- gress will have to determine whether to renew this controversial statute as it is presently configured, to renew it with modifications, or to let it lapse. On December 9, 1997, the Committee on Federal Legislation of the Asso- ciation of the Bar of the City of New York sponsored a panel discussion at the Association House entitled "The Politics of Prosecution: The Future of the Independent Counsel Statute." Before a public audience of several hundred, crucial questions about the Independent Counsel statute were debated by six individuals central to its history: Archibald Cox, Harvard Law School Professor, a former Solicitor General and Watergate Special Prosecutor; Elliott Richardson, Attorney General under President Nixon who appointed Mr. Cox as Special Prosecutor and who resigned rather than obey President Nixon's order to fire him; Alexia Morrison, Indepen- dent Counsel in the investigation of Reagan Justice Department official Theodore Olson; the Honorable Lawrence E. Walsh, former United States THE RECORD 574 INDEPENDENT COUNSEL District Judge and Independent Counsel in the Iran/Contra Investiga- tion; Samuel Dash, Georgetown Law Professor, Chief Counsel for the Sen- ate Watergate Committee, an original proposer of the Ethics in Govern- ment Act and currently Ethics Advisor to Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr; and Robert B. Fiske, Jr., the original Special Counsel in the Whitewater Investigation. The topic could not have been more timely. The panel discussion took place on the very day that Attorney General Janet Reno announced her refusal to appoint an independent counsel in the campaign finance controversy surrounding President Clinton's re-election in 1996. In the weeks following the forum, public debate surrounding the Independent Counsel statute and its politicization intensified as Mr. Starr began to probe the President's relationship with Monica Lewinsky and as Indepen- dent Counsels began to investigate Interior Secretary Bruce Babbit and Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Alexis Hermann. All of the Panelists believed that the statute should be renewed in 1999. They differed, however, as to what changes, if any, should be made. The Committee on Federal Legislation agrees with the Panelists that the statute should be renewed. The Committee also believes, as do some Pan- elists, that substantial modifications to the statute are needed. Specifi- cally, the Committee recommends that the statute be narrowed to cover only allegations of criminal activity involving abuse of power by high government officials while in office, and allegations of crimes committed in connection with the electoral process. In addition, the Committee also recommends changes in the process for selecting the panelists who ap- point the Independent Counsel and reducing the list of government offi- cials subject to Independent Counsel investigations. Part I of this report describes the background and legislative history of the Independent Counsel statute and the history of its use. Part II describes the views of our Panelists in light of this history and of their own participation in it. Part III sets forth the Committee's views of the statute's most significant problems, and recommendations for change. h BACKGROUND A. The Watergate Scandal: Genesis of the Independent Counsel Statute On June 17, 1972, five men equipped with burglary tools, cameras and electronic surveillance equipment-including James W. McCord, se- curity director for the Committee to Re-elect the President-were arrested SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1998 * VOL. 53, NO. 5 575 FEDERAL LEGISLATION inside the Democratic National Committee's Watergate headquarters.1 Two others with connections to the Administration, E. Howard Hunt and Gordon Liddy, were also quickly implicated. During their trial in January 1973, the possibility arose that White House officials might have been involved in the break-in or in an elaborate cover-up. An ensuing Senate committee investigation led to the resignation of several top White House aides and the Attorney General, John Mitchell. On May 18, 1973, at the Senate's request and under Department of Justice regulations, Attorney General Elliott R. Richardson appointed Archibald Cox-a Harvard law professor and former Solicitor General-as "special prosecutor." In late June, a White House aide, Alexander Butterfield, dis- closed the existence of a secret tape recording system in the Oval Office, giving rise to suspicions that President Nixon himself had recorded con- versations linking him to the cover-up. The Senate Committee subpoe- naed several of the tapes, which Nixon refused to produce, claiming ex- ecutive privilege. The courts upheld the privilege. Cox also issued a sub- poena ordering the President to deliver the Oval Office tapes, which Nixon also defied. Nixon offered, instead, to provide Cox with transcribed sum- maries of the tapes in lieu of the originals. Cox refused and pressed his demand for the tapes. What happened next has gone down in history as "the Saturday Night Massacre." On the evening of October 20, 1973, having declined tape summaries, Cox was ordered by President Nixon to cease his attempts to obtain the tapes. Cox refused and publicly accused the President of disobeying a court order. Nixon responded by directing Attorney General Richardson to fire Cox. Richardson resigned his office rather than obey. It then fell to Deputy Attorney General William Ruckleshaus to fire Cox. Ruckleshaus also resigned rather than obey. Cox was ultimately dismissed late that night by Acting Attorney General Robert Bork. Although Nixon unquestionably enjoyed the legal power to remove the special prosecutor-an executive branch official-the political fall- out ultimately destroyed his Presidency. An outraged Senate pressed its inquiry. Leon Jaworski succeeded Cox as special prosecutor. Large parts of the tapes were eventually made public and revealed that Nixon had ac- tively obstructed justice. Faced with imminent impeachment proceedings, he resigned on August 9, 1974. 1. The information in this section is drawn from Jonathan Schell's The Time of Illusion (Vintage Books, 1975) and The American Constitution: Its Origins and Development, 7th Ed., Vol. II (editors: Kelly, Harbison, and Belz). THE RECORD 576 INDEPENDENT COUNSEL B. Ethics in Government Act of 1978 2 1. Legislative History The public outcry over Watergate in general, and Cox's firing in par- ticular, fueled numerous congressional hearings on proposals for "remov- ing politics from the administration of justice."3 Discussions centered on a statutory process requiring the appointment of a special prosecutor from outside the Department of Justice to investigate and, if necessary, pros- ecute high-level public officials suspected of criminal activity. After years of hearings and debates, Congress concluded that these temporary out- side counsels should be appointed by a special court and could be re- moved by the Attorney General only in limited instances. In October 1978, the Ethics in Government Act ("the Act") was en- acted. Its legislative history identified four specific justifications for the creation of the office of "statutory special prosecutor": (1) The need to avoid conflicts of interest or appearances thereof that would compromise the public's confidence in the adminis- tration of justice. As Archibald Cox testified: "The pressures, the divided loyalty are too much for any man, and as honor- able and conscientious as any individual might be, the public could never feel entirely easy about the vigor and thorough- ness with which the investigation was pursued. Some outside person is essential." (2) The presumed reluctance of the President or Attorney Gen- eral to appoint a special prosecutor in the early stages of an investigation. (3) The possibility that a special prosecutor may uncover addi- tional crimes that would otherwise go undetected or unprosecuted. (4) The hope that a special prosecutor will deter abuses of power such as the Watergate break-in and related obstructions of jus- tice. The 1978 Act required the Attorney General to conduct a preliminary investigation upon receipt of "specific information" that any high-level 2. Information in this section is derived from legislative history found in 1978 U.S. Code of Congressional and Administrative News ("U.S.C.C.A.N.") at page 4216 etseq. 3. Id. at 4218. SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1 998 * VOL. 53, NO. 5 577 FEDERAL LEG ISLAT ION official covered by the Act had violated any federal criminal law other than a petty offense. After a 90-day investigation period, the Attorney General was required to report to the Special Prosecutor Division of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ("Special Di- vision"), 4 and submit a memorandum which explained why the claim involved was "so unsubstantiated that no further investigation or pros- ecution was warranted," or explained why further investigation was war- ranted and called for the appointment of a special prosecutor. A decision by the Attorney General not to seek appointment of a special prosecutor was not reviewable. If on the other hand, the Attorney General called for a special prosecutor,
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Katz •Fi Variations on a Theme by Berger
    Catholic University Law Review Volume 17 Issue 3 Article 4 1968 Katz – Variations on a Theme by Berger Samuel Dash Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview Recommended Citation Samuel Dash, Katz – Variations on a Theme by Berger, 17 Cath. U. L. Rev. 296 (1968). Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol17/iss3/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Katz-Variations on a Theme by Berger SAMUEL DASH* Introduction Nearly forty years of controversy concerning government electronic eaves- dropping on private conversations apparently was settled last year when the Supreme Court decided Berger v. New York' and Katz v. United States.2 The effect of these decisions locks both government electronic bugging and wiretapping practices within the requirements of the search and seizure provisions of the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution. Berger specifically held unconstitutional a New York statute authorizing court-ordered electronic eavesdropping on private conversations, on the ground that it did not require adherence to the appropriate standards or limitations compelled by the search and seizure provisions of the fourth amendment. The Court emphasized that the statute's outstanding omission was its failure to maintain adequate probable cause standards for judicial review of an eavesdropping application. The requirement of a specific description of the conversation to be overheard was a standard particularly found lacking.
    [Show full text]
  • Samuel Dash Papers [Finding Aid]. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress
    Samuel Dash Papers A Finding Aid to the Collection in the Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Library of Congress Washington, D.C. 2009 Contact information: http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.mss/mss.contact Catalog Record: https://lccn.loc.gov/mm2005085201 Additional search options available at: https://hdl.loc.gov/loc.mss/eadmss.ms010147 Prepared by Melinda K. Friend with the assistance of Daniel Oleksiw, Kimbery L. Owens, and Karen A. Stuart Finding aid encoded by Library of Congress Manuscript Division, 2009 Collection Summary Title: Samuel Dash Papers Span Dates: 1748-2004 Bulk Dates: (bulk 1965-2002) ID No.: MSS85201 Creator: Dash, Samuel Extent: 87,000 items Extent: 253 containers plus 2 classified Extent: 101 linear feet Language: Collection material in English Location: Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. LC Catalog record: https://lccn.loc.gov/mm2005085201 Summary: Lawyer, educator, and author. Correspondence, memoranda, legal material and opinions, writings, speeches, engagement file, teaching file, organization and committee file, clippings, photographs, appointment calendars, and other papers relating primarily to Dash's legal career after 1964, and more particularly his role in governmental investigations. Selected Search Terms The following terms have been used to index the description of this collection in the LC Catalog. They are grouped by name of person or organization, by subject or location, and by occupation and listed alphabetically. People Clinton, Bill, 1946- Clinton, Bill, 1946- --Friends and associates. Clinton, Hillary Rodham. Curran, James J.--Trials, litigation, etc. Dash, Samuel. Dash, Samuel. Intruders : unreasonable searches and seizures from King John to John Ashcroft. 2004. Dash, Samuel. Justice denied : a challenge to Lord Widgery's report on Bloody Sunday.
    [Show full text]
  • FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE August 3, 2012
    WLF News Release Washington Legal Foundation Advocate for freedom and justice® 2009 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 202.588.0302 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE August 3, 2012 FORMER ATTORNEYS GENERAL URGE DISMISSAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO FOREIGN SURVEILLANCE STATUTE (Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, No. 11-1025) A bipartisan group of six former Attorneys General yesterday urged the U.S. Supreme Court to throw out a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of a 2008 federal statute that expanded the authority of federal officials to engage in overseas electronic surveillance. In a High Court brief drafted by the Washington Legal Foundation (which also joined in the brief), the group argued that allowing the case – filed by individuals and organizations that are not permissible surveillance targets – to proceed to trial threatens to interfere with efforts to protect national security. WLF’s brief was written with the substantial pro bono assistance of Megan Brown, Claire Evans, and Matthew Dowd of Washington, D.C.’s Wiley Rein LLP. The former Attorneys General who signed the brief were John D. Ashcroft, William P. Barr, Benjamin Civiletti, Edwin Meese III, Michael B. Mukasey, and Dick Thornburgh. The brief was filed in support of the Obama Administration, which has asked the Supreme Court to overturn a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reinstating the suit. WLF and its clients argued in their brief that the appeals court erred in concluding that the plaintiffs have suffered a cognizable injury and thus have standing to assert their claims. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), adopted by Congress in 1978, governs the conduct of “electronic surveillance” for national security purposes.
    [Show full text]
  • The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny
    American University Washington College of Law Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals Scholarship & Research 2001 The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny Angela J. Davis American University Washington College of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Law and Politics Commons, and the Legal Profession Commons Recommended Citation Davis, Angela J., "The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny" (2001). Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals. 1397. https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev/1397 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Scholarship & Research at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny AngelaJ. Davis' INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 395 I. DISCRETION, POWER, AND ABUSE ......................................................... 400 A. T-E INDF-ENDENT G E z I ETu aAD RESPO,\SE....................
    [Show full text]
  • Special Counsels, Independent Counsels, and Special Prosecutors: Options for Independent Executive Investigations Name Redacted Legislative Attorney
    Special Counsels, Independent Counsels, and Special Prosecutors: Options for Independent Executive Investigations name redacted Legislative Attorney June 1, 2017 Congressional Research Service 7-.... www.crs.gov R44857 Special Counsels, Independent Counsels, and Special Prosecutors Summary Under the Constitution, Congress has no direct role in federal law enforcement and its ability to initiate appointments of any prosecutors to address alleged wrongdoings by executive officials is limited. While Congress retains broad oversight and investigatory powers under Article I of the Constitution, criminal investigations and prosecutions have generally been viewed as a core executive function and a responsibility of the executive branch. Historically, however, because of the potential conflicts of interest that may arise when the executive branch investigates itself (e.g., the Watergate investigation), there have been calls for an independently led inquiry to determine whether officials have violated criminal law. In response, Congress and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) have used both statutory and regulatory mechanisms to establish a process for such inquiries. These responses have attempted, in different ways, to balance the competing goals of independence and accountability with respect to inquiries of executive branch officials. Under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Congress authorized the appointment of “special prosecutors,” who later were known as “independent counsels.” Under this statutory scheme, the Attorney General could request that a specially appointed three-judge panel appoint an outside individual to investigate and prosecute alleged violations of criminal law. These individuals were vested with “full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers of the Department of Justice” with respect to matters within their jurisdiction.
    [Show full text]
  • The Special Counsel's Report: What Do Current DOJ Regulations
    Legal Sidebari The Special Counsel’s Report: What Do Current DOJ Regulations Require? March 7, 2019 In light of media reports that Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller III is close to concluding his investigation of Russian interference in the 2016 election, the extent to which the findings and conclusions of the Special Counsel’s investigation will be released to Congress and the public after being submitted to the Attorney General has attracted attention. The reporting requirements applicable to the Special Counsel’s investigation indicate a significant degree of deference to the Special Counsel regarding the content of his report to the Attorney General. Governing Department of Justice (DOJ) regulations also give significant deference to the Attorney General regarding release of information related to the report, although the regulations mandate that he report certain information to Congress at the conclusion of the Special Counsel’s investigation. Some Members of Congress have proposed legislation to ensure that certain information related to the Special Counsel’s investigation is made available to Congress and the public. This Sidebar examines the current legal obligations of the Special Counsel and Attorney General to report information relating to the investigation to Congress and the public. It also provides historical examples of reports issued for other such investigations. A companion Sidebar addresses potential legal issues that may arise if Congress seeks to compel release of information about the investigation, including issues involving executive privilege and the publication of grand jury information. Reporting Requirements Under the Current Special Counsel Regulations Under the current legal framework, there is no statute providing for Special Counsel investigations or specifying information arising from such investigations that must be disclosed to Congress or the public.
    [Show full text]
  • Barr Will Not Be Independent of President Trump Or
    Attorney General Nominee William barr President Trump announced that he intends to nominate William Barr to be attorney general. Barr served as attorney general under President George H.W. Bush from 1991-1993. Since then, he has been a telecommunications executive and board member, as well as in private legal practice. BARR WILL NOT BE INDEPENDENT OF PRESIDENT TRUMP OR RESTRAIN Trump’s ATTACKS ON THE RULE OF LAW Threat TO THE MUELLER INVESTIGATION Barr authored a controversial memo attacking part of the Mueller investigation. In June 2018, Barr sent the Department of Justice a lengthy memo arguing that Mueller shouldn't be able to investigate Trump for obstruction of justice. The memo, which Barr reportedly shared with the White House as well, raises serious concerns that Barr thinks Trump should be above the law. Barr has already been asked to defend President Trump in the Mueller investigation. President Trump repeatedly criticized Attorney General Jeff Sessions for failing to rein in Special Counsel Robert Mueller, and clearly a priority for the president is appointing an individual to lead the Justice Department who will protect him from investigations. President Trump has reportedly asked Barr in the past whether he would serve as Trump’s personal defense attorney and has inquired whether Barr, like Sessions, would recuse himself from the Mueller investigation. Barr is already on record minimizing the seriousness of allegations surrounding Trump and Russia. In reference to a supposed Clinton uranium scandal that gained traction in right-wing conspiracy circles, it was reported that “Mr. Barr said he sees more basis for investigating the uranium deal than any supposed collusion between Mr.
    [Show full text]
  • JUNE 10, 2019 Chairman Nadler, Ranking Member Collins, the Last
    STATEMENT OF JOHN W. DEAN U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HEARINGS: “LESSONS FROM THE MUELLER REPORT: PRESIDENTIAL OBSTRUCTION AND OTHER CRIMES.” JUNE 10, 2019 Chairman Nadler, Ranking Member Collins, the last time I appeared before your committee was July 11, 1974, during the impeachment inquiry of President Richard Nixon. Clearly, I am not here as a fact witness. Rather I accepted the invitation to appear today because I hope I can give a bit of historical context to the Mueller Report. In many ways the Mueller Report is to President Trump what the so-called Watergate “Road Map” (officially titled “Grand Jury Report and Recommendation Concerning Transmission of Evidence to the House of Representatives”) was to President Richard Nixon. Stated a bit differently, Special Counsel Mueller has provided this committee a road map. The Mueller Report, like the Watergate Road Map, conveys findings, with supporting evidence, of potential criminal activity based on the work of federal prosecutors, FBI investigators, and witness testimony before a federal grand jury. The Mueller Report explains – in Vol. II, p. 1 – that one of the reasons the Special Counsel did not make charging decisions relating to obstruction of justice was because he did not want to “potentially preempt [the] constitutional processes for addressing presidential misconduct.” The report then cites at footnote 2: “See U.S. CONST. ART. I § 2, cl. 5; § 3, cl. 6; cf. OLC Op. at 257-258 (discussing relationship between impeachment and criminal prosecution of a sitting President).” Today, you are focusing on Volume II of the report.
    [Show full text]
  • Independent Counsel Investigations During the Reagan Administration
    Reagan Library – Independent Counsel Investigations during the Reagan Administration This Reagan Library topic guide contains a description of each Independent Counsel investigation during the Reagan Administration. “See also” references are listed with each description.. The Library has a White House Counsel Investigations collection with series for all of these investigations, and often has a specific topic guide for each investigation. Links to both types of related material is included here. INDEPENDENT COUNSEL INVESTIGATIONS DURING THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION: INDEPENDENT COUNSEL INVESTIGATION OF SECRETARY OF LABOR RAYMOND DONOVAN Special Prosecutor Leon Silverman Counsel to the President, White House Office of: Investigations, Series II Topic Guide: Investigation of Raymond Donovan During January 1981, the FBI conducted a standard background investigation of Secretary of Labor designate Raymond J. Donovan. Summaries of the investigation were furnished through the Assistant Attorney General's Office of Legislative Affairs, Department of Justice, to the U.S. Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, the President Elect’s Transition Office and later to the White House Counsel’s Office. This first report contained some allegations regarding Donovan’s ties to organized crime. Based on this information, his confirmation was held up for several weeks in which Donovan testified in Congress multiple times and vigorously maintained his innocence. He was confirmed as Secretary of Labor on February 4, 1981. Throughout 1981, the Senate Committee
    [Show full text]
  • In Search of the Solicitor Generalâ•Žs Clients
    LECTURE In Search of the Solicitor General's Clients: A Drama with Many Characters* By DREW S. DAYS m** I want, first, to express my sincerest appreciation for the invitation to deliver the Ninth Judge Mac Swinford Lecture at the University of Kentucky College ofLaw. It is a pleasure for me to get out ofWashing­ ton for a change - to begin with, to remind myself of what life is like "outside ofthe Beltway." I also saw this as an opportunity to see friends here at the law school whom I can no longer plan on encountering each year at the annual meeting ofthe Association ofAmerican Law Schools, since I am on leave from my law faculty. But, most importantly, there is a certain "rightness," I think, in being here as the Fortieth Solicitor General, since the first person to occupy my position was Benjamin H. Bristow, a Kentuckian.1 Benjamin H. Bristow, the first Solicitor General ofthe United States, was one of the leading lawyers of his generation. A Kentuckian, he served as a colonel during the Civil War. He later became United States Attomey for the District of Kentucky, where he was renowned for his vigor in enforcing the federal Civil Rights Acts.2 Before becoming Solicitor General in 1870, he practiced law with his fellow Kentuckian and future Supreme Court Justice, the first John Marshall Harlan.3 • This is an edited and embellished version ofthe Ninth Judge Mac Swinford Lecture, delivered at the University ofKentucky College ofLaw on November 10, 1994. •• Solicitor General of the United States. 1 BIOGRAPIDCAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STAlES ExEcunvE BRANCH, 1774­ 1971, at 35-36 (Robert Sobel ed, 1971).
    [Show full text]
  • Presidential Obstruction of Justice
    University of Chicago Law School Chicago Unbound Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 2018 Presidential Obstruction of Justice Daniel Hemel Eric A. Posner Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Daniel Hemel & Eric Posner, "Presidential Obstruction of Justice," 106 California Law Review 1277 (2018). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Presidential Obstruction of Justice Daniel J. Hemel* & Eric A. Posner** Federal obstruction of justice statutes bar anyone from interfering with official legal proceedings based on a “corrupt” motive. But what about the president of the United States? The president is vested with “executive power,” which includes the power to control federal law enforcement. A possible view is that the statutes do not apply to the president because if they did they would violate the president’s constitutional power. However, we argue that the obstruction of justice statutes are best interpreted to apply to the president, and that the president obstructs justice when his motive for intervening in an investigation is to further personal, pecuniary, or narrowly partisan interests, rather than to advance the public good. A brief tour of presidential scandals indicates that, without anyone noticing it, the law of obstruction of justice has evolved into a major check on presidential power. Introduction .......................................................................................... 1278 I. Analysis ............................................................................................ 1283 A. Obstruction of Justice ........................................................ 1283 1. Actus Reus..................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Partners in Leadership
    I " r []J::; year::; UJ enjamin Civiletti was bone tired. At thirty-eight years of age, he was heading up the litigation department at one of Baltimore's most presti- gious law firms. The hours were long and the work challenging, yet Civiletti yearned for a change of pace. "I had been at Venable for thirteen years and I was starting to repeat myself," Civiletti says. "I had always appreciated public service, and I thought it was a good time to go in a different direction." That direction led Civiletti to the nation's capital, where President Jimmy Carter appointed him assistant attorney general of the United States. Civiletti earned this coveted Justice Department appointment as a result of experience trying cases with colleagues of Attorney General Griffin B. Bell. It was 1977, and Civiletti embarked on a four-year journey of public service to the country that saw him rise to deputy attorney general and ultimately to the top job of attorney general of the United States in 1979. He argued before the Supreme Court for the right of the government to denaturalize Nazi war criminals, and was the first attorney general to appear before the International Court of Justice at The Hague. "I thought it would be fun," Civiletti recalls of his decision to leave his practice and join the ranks of public servants. Looking back on his time in the Justice Department, he notes that the thrill of having access to the White House was tempered by the enormous responsibility of making decisions that affected the entire country.
    [Show full text]