The Politics of Prosecution: The Independent Counsel Statute Committee on Federal Legislation The following report was completed in August 1998, prior to the release of the report of Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr in September 1998. INTRODUCTION The Independent Counsel law, originally enacted in 1978 as the Eth- ics in Government Act, will expire in 1999. Between now and then, Con- gress will have to determine whether to renew this controversial statute as it is presently configured, to renew it with modifications, or to let it lapse. On December 9, 1997, the Committee on Federal Legislation of the Asso- ciation of the Bar of the City of New York sponsored a panel discussion at the Association House entitled "The Politics of Prosecution: The Future of the Independent Counsel Statute." Before a public audience of several hundred, crucial questions about the Independent Counsel statute were debated by six individuals central to its history: Archibald Cox, Harvard Law School Professor, a former Solicitor General and Watergate Special Prosecutor; Elliott Richardson, Attorney General under President Nixon who appointed Mr. Cox as Special Prosecutor and who resigned rather than obey President Nixon's order to fire him; Alexia Morrison, Indepen- dent Counsel in the investigation of Reagan Justice Department official Theodore Olson; the Honorable Lawrence E. Walsh, former United States THE RECORD 574 INDEPENDENT COUNSEL District Judge and Independent Counsel in the Iran/Contra Investiga- tion; Samuel Dash, Georgetown Law Professor, Chief Counsel for the Sen- ate Watergate Committee, an original proposer of the Ethics in Govern- ment Act and currently Ethics Advisor to Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr; and Robert B. Fiske, Jr., the original Special Counsel in the Whitewater Investigation. The topic could not have been more timely. The panel discussion took place on the very day that Attorney General Janet Reno announced her refusal to appoint an independent counsel in the campaign finance controversy surrounding President Clinton's re-election in 1996. In the weeks following the forum, public debate surrounding the Independent Counsel statute and its politicization intensified as Mr. Starr began to probe the President's relationship with Monica Lewinsky and as Indepen- dent Counsels began to investigate Interior Secretary Bruce Babbit and Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Alexis Hermann. All of the Panelists believed that the statute should be renewed in 1999. They differed, however, as to what changes, if any, should be made. The Committee on Federal Legislation agrees with the Panelists that the statute should be renewed. The Committee also believes, as do some Pan- elists, that substantial modifications to the statute are needed. Specifi- cally, the Committee recommends that the statute be narrowed to cover only allegations of criminal activity involving abuse of power by high government officials while in office, and allegations of crimes committed in connection with the electoral process. In addition, the Committee also recommends changes in the process for selecting the panelists who ap- point the Independent Counsel and reducing the list of government offi- cials subject to Independent Counsel investigations. Part I of this report describes the background and legislative history of the Independent Counsel statute and the history of its use. Part II describes the views of our Panelists in light of this history and of their own participation in it. Part III sets forth the Committee's views of the statute's most significant problems, and recommendations for change. h BACKGROUND A. The Watergate Scandal: Genesis of the Independent Counsel Statute On June 17, 1972, five men equipped with burglary tools, cameras and electronic surveillance equipment-including James W. McCord, se- curity director for the Committee to Re-elect the President-were arrested SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1998 * VOL. 53, NO. 5 575 FEDERAL LEGISLATION inside the Democratic National Committee's Watergate headquarters.1 Two others with connections to the Administration, E. Howard Hunt and Gordon Liddy, were also quickly implicated. During their trial in January 1973, the possibility arose that White House officials might have been involved in the break-in or in an elaborate cover-up. An ensuing Senate committee investigation led to the resignation of several top White House aides and the Attorney General, John Mitchell. On May 18, 1973, at the Senate's request and under Department of Justice regulations, Attorney General Elliott R. Richardson appointed Archibald Cox-a Harvard law professor and former Solicitor General-as "special prosecutor." In late June, a White House aide, Alexander Butterfield, dis- closed the existence of a secret tape recording system in the Oval Office, giving rise to suspicions that President Nixon himself had recorded con- versations linking him to the cover-up. The Senate Committee subpoe- naed several of the tapes, which Nixon refused to produce, claiming ex- ecutive privilege. The courts upheld the privilege. Cox also issued a sub- poena ordering the President to deliver the Oval Office tapes, which Nixon also defied. Nixon offered, instead, to provide Cox with transcribed sum- maries of the tapes in lieu of the originals. Cox refused and pressed his demand for the tapes. What happened next has gone down in history as "the Saturday Night Massacre." On the evening of October 20, 1973, having declined tape summaries, Cox was ordered by President Nixon to cease his attempts to obtain the tapes. Cox refused and publicly accused the President of disobeying a court order. Nixon responded by directing Attorney General Richardson to fire Cox. Richardson resigned his office rather than obey. It then fell to Deputy Attorney General William Ruckleshaus to fire Cox. Ruckleshaus also resigned rather than obey. Cox was ultimately dismissed late that night by Acting Attorney General Robert Bork. Although Nixon unquestionably enjoyed the legal power to remove the special prosecutor-an executive branch official-the political fall- out ultimately destroyed his Presidency. An outraged Senate pressed its inquiry. Leon Jaworski succeeded Cox as special prosecutor. Large parts of the tapes were eventually made public and revealed that Nixon had ac- tively obstructed justice. Faced with imminent impeachment proceedings, he resigned on August 9, 1974. 1. The information in this section is drawn from Jonathan Schell's The Time of Illusion (Vintage Books, 1975) and The American Constitution: Its Origins and Development, 7th Ed., Vol. II (editors: Kelly, Harbison, and Belz). THE RECORD 576 INDEPENDENT COUNSEL B. Ethics in Government Act of 1978 2 1. Legislative History The public outcry over Watergate in general, and Cox's firing in par- ticular, fueled numerous congressional hearings on proposals for "remov- ing politics from the administration of justice."3 Discussions centered on a statutory process requiring the appointment of a special prosecutor from outside the Department of Justice to investigate and, if necessary, pros- ecute high-level public officials suspected of criminal activity. After years of hearings and debates, Congress concluded that these temporary out- side counsels should be appointed by a special court and could be re- moved by the Attorney General only in limited instances. In October 1978, the Ethics in Government Act ("the Act") was en- acted. Its legislative history identified four specific justifications for the creation of the office of "statutory special prosecutor": (1) The need to avoid conflicts of interest or appearances thereof that would compromise the public's confidence in the adminis- tration of justice. As Archibald Cox testified: "The pressures, the divided loyalty are too much for any man, and as honor- able and conscientious as any individual might be, the public could never feel entirely easy about the vigor and thorough- ness with which the investigation was pursued. Some outside person is essential." (2) The presumed reluctance of the President or Attorney Gen- eral to appoint a special prosecutor in the early stages of an investigation. (3) The possibility that a special prosecutor may uncover addi- tional crimes that would otherwise go undetected or unprosecuted. (4) The hope that a special prosecutor will deter abuses of power such as the Watergate break-in and related obstructions of jus- tice. The 1978 Act required the Attorney General to conduct a preliminary investigation upon receipt of "specific information" that any high-level 2. Information in this section is derived from legislative history found in 1978 U.S. Code of Congressional and Administrative News ("U.S.C.C.A.N.") at page 4216 etseq. 3. Id. at 4218. SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1 998 * VOL. 53, NO. 5 577 FEDERAL LEG ISLAT ION official covered by the Act had violated any federal criminal law other than a petty offense. After a 90-day investigation period, the Attorney General was required to report to the Special Prosecutor Division of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ("Special Di- vision"), 4 and submit a memorandum which explained why the claim involved was "so unsubstantiated that no further investigation or pros- ecution was warranted," or explained why further investigation was war- ranted and called for the appointment of a special prosecutor. A decision by the Attorney General not to seek appointment of a special prosecutor was not reviewable. If on the other hand, the Attorney General called for a special prosecutor,