2 IPRIS Maghreb Review MAY 2010

after almost two decades of sanc- in a massive military build-up is its tions, largely obsolete or in a state improved relationship not only with An appetite of disrepair, but prior to the arms neighboring countries but also with embargoes, the country was one of Israel and the West. On the other the most outlandish weapons buyers hand, Libya has been confronted with for arms? globally. During the 1970s and 1980s, new challenges, such as Islamist ter- Libya topped the list of all arms im- rorism and irregular migration, which Libya’s re- porting countries on a per capita ba- might provide a rationale for certain sis, and even in absolute terms, it was arms purchases. Moreover, other emergence on one of the most important purchasers Maghreb countries such as Algeria of weapons in the world. As a result and , have engaged in rela- the international of its huge arms acquisitions, by the tively large-scale weapons acquisi- early 1980s, Libya was estimated tions in recent years, in particular of arms market to have the highest ratio of military advanced fighter aircraft, which might equipment to manpower globally. Its fuel Libya’s military procurement. most important supplier by far was With respect to the arms deals which Derek Lutterbeck the USSR, accounting for around 75% the Libyan leadership has negotiated Deputy Director and Holder of the of all of Libya’s military imports, fol- or concluded in recent years, there is Swiss Chair, Mediterranean Academy of lowed by France with some 10%. at least one clear continuity with the Diplomatic Studies, Malta While defense analysts estimate Lib- past in that its traditionally most im- ya’s military requirements over the portant suppliers, Russia and France, coming years at anywhere between have been at the forefront in securing Once considered a ‘pariah state’ and $5 and $10 billion, it remains unclear arms deals with the Gaddafi regime. shunned for its support of terrorist what the main driving factors behind In mid-2007, France concluded the activities, Libya has in recent years future Libyan arms acquisitions might first major arms deal with Libya since undergone a remarkable transfor- be, and whether Libya will resume its the lifting of the embargoes: the sale mation, at least at the international position as one of the most prolific of Milan-type anti-tank missiles worth level. One particularly notable as- weapons purchasers in the world. around €300 million. A potentially pect of Libya’s reintegration into the Predictions in the case of Libya are all much more spectacular arms deal ‘international community’ has been the more difficult as during the pre- was announced a few months later the efforts of several states to se- embargo period, Libya’s military pur- when Colonel Gaddafi paid a state cure large-scale arms contracts with chases seemed driven less by specific visit to France. During the visit, the the Gaddafi regime. Indeed, since the external threats, and more by Colonel two countries agreed to hold ‘exclu- lifting of the UN and EU arms embar- Gaddafi’s international ambitions, in sive negotiations’ over the following goes in 2003/2004, Libya is commonly particular his pan-Arab leadership six months over major weapons sys- considered one of the most promis- aspirations, as well as his fierce anti- tems, including 14 Rafale fighter jets, ing arms export markets in the world. Zionism. One factor which currently 35 military helicopters, and a radar Not only are its weapons holdings, might work against Libya engaging defense system, worth an estimated IPRIS Maghreb Review | 2

€4.5 billion. The Rafale deal has, how- in particular in the areas of immigra- the rentier state put an end to the ever, still not been concluded. tion control and counter-terrorism. distribution of wealth strategy upon France’s main competitor thus far has which Algeria had heavily relied on to been Russia. Similarly to its relation- maintain loyalty amongst its citizens. ship with Algeria, Russia has been The share of socially marginalized using the instrument of Soviet-era youth was growing rapidly, and de- debt cancellation in order to secure Algeria’s mands of the middle class for more arms deals with Libya. In April 2008, economic freedom became more in- Vladimir Putin became the first Rus- Islamists sistent. sian leader to visit Tripoli, and offered The Algerian state-class eventually to cancel Libya’s Soviet era debt, es- responded to the civil disturbances timated at some $4.5 billion in return between of October 1988 with a reform of the for major weapons and infrastructure Party Law. As a consequence, over 60 contracts. While at the time, the two inclusion and parties were founded, including some countries failed to reach an agree- Islamist parties like the Islamic Salva- ment on arms sales, in early 2010 the exclusion tion Front (FIS) and the Movement for Russian media reported that Russia the Society of Peace (MSP). The first and Libya were close to concluding a Rachid Ouaissa local elections in June 1990 resulted $2 billion arms deal over 16-19 Su- Director, Center for Near and Middle in a FIS victory, and in the first ballot 35 and Su-30 combat aircraft, an ad- of the first free parliamentary elec- Eastern Studies, University of Marburg vanced air defense system, as well as tions just one year later, the FIS even a range of other military equipment. managed to win approx. three million Italy as well has been active on the The rise of the Islamist movement in votes, i.e. 47% of the total vote. Libyan arms market, although in Algeria and its evolution as a political The FIS was home to two social this case arms exports have been and social force to be reckoned with forces with different and, to some driven first and foremost by the grow- must be ascribed to the failure of a extent, competing interests – on the ing concern with irregular migration developmental strategy based on the one hand, it brought together mem- through Libya towards Italy. In 2006, ongoing flow of oil rents. bers of the blocked middle class, and Italy agreed to provide Libya with ten In the 1960s and 1970s, Algeria wit- on the other it was comprised of the military helicopters for border control nessed the emergence of a broad marginalized urban lower class. Both purposes, and two years later the two middle class due to Algeria’s then groups were attracted by the FIS radi- countries signed a contract on the developmental path. The enormous cal discourse, and at the same time sale to Libya of a maritime patrol air- public sector was a springboard of the movement also advocated eco- plane. upward mobility, with the added pos- nomic programs gearing towards the The growing number of arms deals sibility of being directly co-opted into social advancement of the middle which have been concluded or dis- the ranks of the state-class. Hence- class. While the middle classes hoped cussed with the Libyan regime are, of forth, it was possible to gain access to to wrench reforms from the govern- course, a telling sign that the former the state apparatus by participating ment by integrating themselves into pariah state has, in a rather short pe- in mass organizations, the party or the movement, members of the lower riod of time, come to be viewed as a bureaucracy. With the help of the oil class deemed the state-class to be respectable partner. However, this rent, Algeria’s state achieved consid- hopelessly corrupt and thus insisted rehabilitation has occurred despite erable social progress: the creation of on their elimination – by force, if nec- Libya’s still poor human rights re- jobs, the increase of purchasing pow- essary. However, due to the politi- cord and oppressive political regime. er, low prices for consumer goods cal and social heterogeneity of their Even though in European countries, through government subsidies, uni- supporters and the diametrically there has been some limited criticism versal health care, and an education opposite expectations of these two of the military rapprochement with system ensuring the schooling and groups, it was extremely difficult for Libya, in particular of the (potential) training of many young Algerians. All a movement such as the FIS to orga- Rafale sales, the huge commercial this boosted living standards and the nize and structure itself like a mod- interests which are at stake seem to prosperity of the population. ern political party. In view of this, as trump any human rights concerns. Yet, following the oil crisis of the a consequence of the abortion of the Human rights considerations seem mid-1980s, Algeria, like many rentier elections and the outbreak of the sub- to be further sidelined by the increas- states, fell into debt and consequently sequent civil war, it was doomed to ingly shared security concerns be- faced the difficulty of upholding its fail and was finally banned. tween Western countries and Libya, system of co-optation. The crisis of It was only after the economic recov- IPRIS Maghreb Review | 3

ery of the Algerian government, which tion during the riots in the Kabilye first countries with which the then was due to credits from the West and region in 2001 and its active support European Economic Community en- the increase of oil prices, that the for a third term of President Boutef- tered into contractual relations in the army gained a military victory over lika are indicators that the new Alge- late sixties, but, more importantly, by the Islamists. The state offered the rian middle class is prepared to work the advanced status the country was middle class remunerative economic for participation in rent distribution granted by the EU in late 2008. Of all options and at the same time co- rather than engage itself in the quest the EU’s Arab Mediterranean part- opted moderate Islamists - first and for democracy and political liberal- ner countries, Morocco is the first to foremost the MSP - into rent distribu- ization. Under the conditions of rent have been awarded such an upgrade tion channels. In the 1997 parliamen- abundance, it is thus almost natural which, according to Moroccan Foreign tary elections, the MSP, which had that these groups are being co-opted Minister Taib Fassi Fihri, is “proof of already been involved in the govern- into the central state authority. This is confidence […] in Morocco’s efforts in ment since 1996 as a junior partner, all the more so in a system where the terms of political reforms, consolida- won 69 seats in the National Assem- state-class is economically and po- tion of the rule of law, a better justice bly and, thus, became the third force litically sufficiently strong to co-opt a system, economic reforms, social co- in Parliament. In the 2002 elections, weak(er) junior partner, thereby aim- hesion and the fight against poverty”. the MSP won only 38 parliamentary ing at generating greater legitimacy The decision to deepen political and seats, as opposed to the 51 seats it to itself. economic relations even further, obtained in the last elections, held on and the recent EU-Morocco summit May 19, 2007. held in early March in Granada, are Whereas the FIS was a very hetero- an indication of the general percep- geneous party, the MSP is character- tion institutions and policy-makers ized by a relative homogeneity and is in Brussels seem to have of the lat- dominated by a rising middle class. Morocco’s est developments in Morocco. But Therefore it is comparatively easier are these perceptions really justi- for it to operate within the political advanced status fied? What is the impact of political center and work towards more mod- and economic reform, as hinted at so erate positions. Its members belong emphatically by Fassi Fihri in October to the generation that witnessed the or “the spirits 2008? crisis of the rentier state and as a re- First things first: Eleven years into sult have no interest in conflict with that I called…” Muhammed VI reign, Morocco’s politi- the state and its security apparatus, cal system, formally a constitutional but rather hope for better upward mo- monarchy, is still authoritarian in Tobias Schumacher bility opportunities. Therefore, they nature. Although the country already are much more willing to forego radi- Senior Research Fellow, CIES, witnessed three major elections since cal action and would prefer to align ISCTE-IUL, Lisbon 2002, electoral processes still do not themselves with the ruling elite. Un- provide elected officials with effec- doubtedly, the MSP members’ capital At a time when the media is preoc- tive power to rule, nor do they enable is their good education, as they strive cupied with the analysis of the global anti-regime parties to win and trans- – grosso modo – for prestige and high financial crisis and the rescue of the late a potential victory into govern- incomes. Several examples from Asia Euro, it is often overlooked that the ment formation. Apart from regular have shown that the role of this class EU conducts business as usual in recourse to sophisticated measures as agents of a political democratic many other policy areas. This applies that range from vote buying and ger- culture is however seen as controver- to EU external relations and, thus, the rymandering to direct state inter- sial. In other words: this new middle EU’s Mediterranean policy vis-à-vis vention, all of which are destined to class has little interest in a democrat- its Arab Mediterranean partners, the ensure the “appropriate” outcome ic development, but rather in a state- bilateral dimension of which has re- of elections, the makhzen – the royal run capitalization, as its members mained largely unaffected by the cur- establishment – still permeates all see their status and upward mobility rent dynamics. Undoubtedly, the most layers of political and economic life. as being intrinsically linked to the for- prominent example in this regard are The King himself interferes regularly tification of government functions. EU-Morocco relations, which are the in the work of both the executive and Against this backdrop, it is unsur- most advanced in the framework of the legislature and has succeeded in prising that the MSP’s commitment the EU’s bilateral relations with Arab establishing a façade behind which all to more democracy in Algeria has partners. This is reflected not only by members of government, as well as been rather limited. Its policy posi- the fact that Morocco was among the the entire state bureaucracy, depend IPRIS Maghreb Review | 4

on him. So-called royal commissions, Without Borders, which ranks Moroc- Index ranks Morocco in 130th place equipped with more prerogatives than co in 127th place, down from the 89th and points particularly to the growing individual ministries, are flourishing, position in 2002. The latest example disparity between urban and rural ar- and in the economic sector, the King of censorship came in the form of the eas, and inequality between men and remains the most important player, closure of the weekly journal Heb- women – a situation that is aggra- effectively controlling the oil, milk domadaire, one of the pioneers of in- vated by the ongoing, though gradu- and sugar markets, as well as 25% of dependent media in Morocco, on the ally decreasing dependence of GDP the Casablanca stock market capital- grounds of allegedly unpaid taxes and growth on rainfalls. ization. social contributions. Interestingly, In view of these developments, two Although Moroccan civil society is this closure occurred shortly before a observations stand out: first, Mo- comparatively well developed in re- meeting of journalists organized un- rocco’s true status, after all, certainly gional terms, King Muhammed VI der the Union for the Mediterranean cannot be seen as advanced; second, has throughout the last eleven years was to be held. This meeting was sud- given that the actual political and eco- created a system in which non-gov- denly put on hold at the last minute nomic situation in Morocco obviously ernmental organizations had to sub- due to the intervention of Moroccan did not preclude the EU from grant- scribe to the Royal Palace’s views in authorities. ing the country an advanced status, it exchange for its support. This has Also, the reference to the consolida- is almost certain that other regimes limited civil society’s room for ma- tion of the rule of law and the sup- in the region will demand and surely neuver considerably, and the King in- posedly greater social cohesion does, obtain the same treatment in the near creased his grip on civil society even in fact, reflect Fassi Fihri’s wishful future. What this means with respect further by creating “royal NGOs” and thinking rather than reality: the judi- to the advanced status as an EU for- establishing the Muhammed V Foun- ciary is still subordinate to the Royal eign policy tool itself, the prospects dation (M5) as well as the National Palace and is regularly being used for democracy, good governance and Initiative for Human Development by the latter as one of the most im- the rule of law in Europe’s southern (INDH), both of which serve not only portant means of repression and in- neighborhood and the persistence of to impose royal positions, but also to timidation. As demands for constitu- authoritarianism, is however beyond marginalize other NGOs completely. tional reform are frequently nipped doubt. Or, to put it in the words of This practice goes hand in hand with in the bud, inequality is increasing, Goethe’s sorcerer’s apprentice: “the ongoing constraints to freedom of ex- with the gap between the haves and spirits that I called…” pression, as is reflected in the World- the have-nots widening. The United wide Freedom Index of Reporters Nations’ latest Human Development IPRIS Maghreb Review | 5

The unresolved Western Sahara conflict and its repercussions1

Yahia Zoubir Professor of International Relations, Euromed Management, France

The second round of informal talks between the Moroc- precisely because of this conflict. The issue has poisoned can government and the Polisario Front, the Sahrawi na- relations between Algeria, the main sponsor of Sahrawi tionalist representative, conducted under self-determination, and Morocco, which claims the terri- (UN) auspices and in the presence of Algeria and Mauri- tory it has illegally occupied since 1975. Even if it very rarely tania as observer countries, makes the headlines, was held on February 10th Even if it very rarely makes the the Saharawi conflict and 11th 2010. Announced has a significant impact as a preliminary informal headlines, the Saharawi conflict on the development of meeting to the fifth round of the region. Indeed, the direct negotiations between has a significant impact on the lack of regional inte- the Western Saharan inde- gration weighs heav- pendence movement and development of the region. Indeed, ily: trade between the Morocco, these discussions the lack of regional integration Maghreb states repre- succeeded four sessions of sents only 1.3% of their direct talks, which began in weighs heavily: trade between the global trade, the lowest June 2007, without producing regional trade in the any tangible results. At least Maghreb states represents only world. Economists in for the informed analyst, the the United States have latest meeting would likely 1.3% of their global trade, the shown that an inte- hold few differences from grated Maghreb mar- the previous ones – which lowest regional trade in the world. ket and a free trade was indeed the case – even if Economists in the United States have area would have highly the international context has beneficial results for changed somewhat since the shown that an integrated Maghreb the populations of this arrival of Barack Obama to region. In addition, the the White House. The West- market and a free trade area would land border between ern Sahara conflict, defined Algeria and Morocco as “forgotten conflict” or “fro- have highly beneficial results for the has been closed since zen conflict,” is approaching August 1994, seriously its 35th year, and it has had populations of this region. affecting the economic significant damaging effects. life of the city of Oujda, A proposed regional trading bloc, L’Union du Maghreb Arabe which depended heavily on trade with and tourism from (UMA, Arab Maghreb Union), inaugurated with great fan- Algeria. Morocco has repeatedly called on the Algerian fare in February 1989, has been in hibernation since 1996, authorities to reopen the border, but Algiers has decided

1 This article is an updated version of an earlier article. See Yahia Zoubir, “The Western Sahara conflict: regional and international repercussions” (Concerned African Scholars Bulletin, No. 85, Spring 2010). IPRIS Maghreb Review | 6

that reopening the border without a comprehensive agree- ing a closed-door meeting, to include human rights moni- ment, which would include the settlement of the conflict in toring in the prerogatives of the UN Mission for Western Western Sahara, would be useless, no matter the cost of Sahara (MINURSO) – the only United Nations peacekeeping a non-integrated Maghreb. Furthermore, not surprisingly, force that does not have as part of its mandate the protec- tension between Algeria and Morocco has led to a rather tion of human rights. The same request had been made in costly and dangerous arms race. 2009 but France opposed it in April 2009. On April 30, 2010, In addition the conflict has generated other tensions. Be- France once again, opposed the inclusion of the protection sides tense relations between Algeria and Morocco, it has of human rights in MINURSO’s mandate. Therefore, UNSC affected relations between France (which defends the Mo- Resolution 1920, which has extended MINURSO’s mandate roccan monarchy’s irredentist claims) and Algeria, as well for another year, does not contain any mention of human as relations between Spain (the former colonial power in rights. In the meantime, the violations of human rights in Western Sahara) and Morocco, on the one hand, and, on the the occupied Western Sahara have in fact amplified despite other hand, between Spain and Algeria. The United States, their denunciations by respectable human rights organi- which during the Cold zations, such as Amnesty War allowed the occupa- International or Human tion of the former Span- The alleged technical difficulties Rights Watch. ish colony by Morocco, The lack of resolution of has also suffered some to ensure a referendum have the Saharawi conflict boils of the consequences in down to two main points: its policy in the Maghreb: been mere pretext to allow the conflicting positions of Its repeated calls for Morocco to continue its Moroccans and Sahrawis, Maghreb integration and on the one hand and geopo- improvement in Algeri- colonization of the territory. If litical considerations on the an-Moroccan relations other hand. These geopo- have proven fruitless, es- today powers like the United litical interests have been pecially at a time when it the main impediment to the is consolidating its secu- States, France and Spain, resolution of the conflict rity arrangements in the because they strengthened Maghreb-Sahel region. support, albeit to different the obstinate position of the Only a geopolitical analy- degrees, the concept of Moroccans who argue that sis can explain the dead- due to external support lock that has persisted “autonomy for the Sahrawi they will only negotiate the in Western Sahara con- “autonomy” proposal which flict. The alleged techni- people”, they have failed to enjoys the implicit con- cal difficulties to ensure sent of France, the United a referendum have been impose it because international States, and Spain, regard- mere pretext to allow less of UN resolutions that Morocco to continue its law is unequivocally on the side refute any preconditions for colonization of the terri- of the Sahrawi people. the negotiations. tory. If today powers like Despite the acceptance of the United States, France the peace plan by Morocco and Spain, support, albeit to different degrees, the concept and the Polisario Front in 1991, all attempts to organize of “autonomy for the Sahrawi people”, they have failed to the referendum on self-determination of the last colony in impose it because international law is unequivocally on the Africa have failed. Since 2001, Morocco has continuously side of the Sahrawi people. opposed the inclusion of the option of independence to any The conflict has increased even more in intensity as younger referendum process based on self-determination. Today, generations of Sahrawis have resorted to active, continued Moroccans consider the referendum process altogether as peaceful resistance which has succeeded in alerting the an “obsolete practice”. They are comforted in their posi- international community on human rights issues. The case tion owing to the backing they receive from France and the of the militant Amenatou Haidar is a perfect illustration. United States in the Security Council. The UNSC refused In fact, the hunger strike she undertook in November-De- to impose a solution that includes the option of indepen- cember 2009 and the diplomatic implications that ensued dence, as inscribed in UN resolutions. In 2003, the UNSC have had such reverberations that the Personal Envoy of failed to impose the Baker Plan II, owing to US volte-face the Secretary General of the UN, Christopher Ross, asked but also because France made clear it would veto such im- the UN Security Council (UNSC) on January 28, 2010, dur- position. Recently, France, the US (under Bush) and then IPRIS Maghreb Review | 7

Spain made no doubt as to their support for the proposal stein, Austria, on August 10th and 11th 2009. Unsurprisingly, Morocco made in 2007 of supposedly granting Sahrawis no progress was made despite a fairly positive statement “autonomy” within the Moroccan Kingdom. Implicitly, issued at the end of the meeting. The two parties however these countries have recognized Morocco’s occupation over agreed to pursue yet another informal round of discussions Western Sahara, although adopting an official position that in Armonk, near New York. According to Ban Ki-moon, the indicates that they do not recognize Morocco’s sovereignty. meeting would be “based on guidelines provided by resolu- Thus, since the adoption on April 30, 2007, of UN resolution tion 1871 (2009) and other previous resolutions of the Se- 1754, Moroccans have reiterated their position that they curity Council”. But the reality on the ground was and still would not negotiate anything other than their own propos- is favorable to Morocco, not only because it has consoli- al, insisting that they have garnered support from France dated its colonization of the territory, but it also exploits il- and the United States under the administration of George legally with no fear of punishment the natural resources of W. Bush, as well as under the current Barack Obama ad- Western Sahara, primarily phosphates and fisheries. The ministration, following Hill- European Union is complicit in ary Clinton’s declarations in this exploitation through the Morocco in November 2009. Since 2001, Morocco has fisheries agreement with Mo- During all the meetings they continuously opposed the rocco, which includes Western held with Polisario represen- Sahara, notwithstanding the tatives, Moroccan officials inclusion of the option opinion that the European Par- refused to discuss the Sah- liament has expressed on the rawis’ counter-proposal, thus of independence to any reasonableness of EU policy; bypassing UN resolutions in fact, it deemed EU fishing in which insist on “negotiations referendum process based Western Saharan waters to be without preconditions and illegal. In view of Morocco’s in- in good faith… with a view to on self-determination. transigence and the support it achieving a just, lasting and Today, Moroccans consider receives from external actors, mutually acceptable political it is thus not surprising that the solution, which will provide the referendum process second informal meeting held for the self-determination in New York to prepare for the of the people of Western Sa- altogether as an “obsolete 5th round failed, like the previ- hara…” The Sahrawis’ coun- ous ones, to produce any tan- terproposal submitted to the practice.” They are gible results. Given that neither UN in 2007, which is more in side has accepted the proposal line with international law, comforted in their position of the other as the sole basis for does not reject outright the owing to the backing they future negotiations, it is obvious Moroccan option, but insists that short of unforeseen devel- that the autonomy proposal receive from France and opments, the status quo will be considered only as a third undoubtedly persist. option (independence and the United States in the The UN is responsible for the integration being the others) decolonization of Western Sa- as part of talks between the Security Council. hara, but the key to breaking two parties. The Polisario has the stalemate and implement- also committed itself to accepting the results of the refer- ing the legal solution lies in the hands of France and the endum whatever they are and to negotiate with the King- United States which, even if they do not recognize Mo- dom of Morocco, under the auspices of the United Nations, rocco’s sovereignty over the territory, allowed the latter to the guarantees that it is prepared to grant to the Moroc- consolidate its control over it. The ingredients that have led can population residing in Western Sahara, as well as to to the status quo are in fact contained in UN resolutions, the Kingdom of Morocco, in terms of Morocco’s political, which while reaffirming the right to self-determination for economic and security interests in Western Sahara, in the the Saharawi people encourage the latter to seek with Mo- event that the referendum on self-determination would roccans, the colonizers, a “mutually acceptable” political lead to independence. solution. In other words, each party has a veto, even if Mo- The perpetuation of this impasse is inevitable despite the rocco has the advantage. optimism of US diplomat, Christopher Ross, appointed in France, regardless of its official position, considers West- January 2009 to serve as UN Secretary General Ban Ki- ern Sahara as an integral part of Morocco. Since 1975, suc- moon’s Personal Envoy. Prudent, Ross had first arranged cessive governments have never hidden their opposition to for an informal meeting between the two parties in Dürn- an independent Sahrawi state that would purportedly fall IPRIS Maghreb Review | 8

under Algeria’s influence. In addition, the emergence of an ger supports or endorses the Moroccan autonomy plan ... independent Sahrawi state is seen as a destabilizing factor Instead, the administration has returned to the pre-Bush for the Moroccan Kingdom, in which France has consider- position that there could be an independent Polisario state able political, economic, military and cultural interests. in Western Sahara”. US officials refused to confirm or deny With nearly 70% of total Foreign Direct Investments in Mo- such reports, stating only that the US encourages the par- rocco, France is the largest trading partner and major in- ties to engage in discussions under the UN auspices. Un- vestor. France’s steadfast support of Morocco’s irredentist doubtedly, by referring to international law, which in the claims has inevitably complicated further Algerian-French case of Western Sahara would include the option of inde- relations. The French government is of the conviction that pendence, Obama seemed to abide by the values he prom- the resolution of the conflict is between Algiers and Ra- ised to uphold. However, as UNSC Resolution 1920 makes bat, an attitude that irritates Algiers, which considers the clear, the United States does not seem to have undertaken conflict to be a question of decolonization and self-deter- any shift in policy toward Western Sahara. What is certain is mination. that the administration is torn between continuing to sup- The United States, too, supports the position of Morocco, a port a traditional ally and setting a new course that would reliable ally in the Arab world. A priori, the US does not op- contradict the interests of that ally. The conflicting pro- pose the right to self-determination of peoples, but in the nouncements in Obama’s letter and those issued by Hill- case of Western Sahara, geopolitical considerations deter- ary Clinton during her visit to Morocco in November 2009 mine US attitudes toward the question. There were times, highlight the policy constraints of the Obama administra- as under the administration of George Bush senior, in the tion. During her visit to Marrakesh in November 2009 to at- late 1980s, when the US was open to the idea of an inde- tend the Forum for the Future, Hillary Clinton responded to pendent Sahrawi state. Then, in 2003, the US, supported the question as to whether the Obama administration had the second Baker Plan, under which the Saharawi were to changed its position on the autonomy plan by saying that, have autonomy for a period of five years before the holding “our policy has not changed, and I thank you for asking the a referendum on self-determination that would include the question because I think it’s important for me to reaffirm three options, of which independence was one, inscribed here in Morocco that there has been no change in policy”. in UN resolutions. Moroccans have objected to such a ref- In another interview, she was asked, what she meant by erendum in spite of the numerical advantage of Moroccan her affirmation that there was “no change in the Obama settlers in the territory. At the time, the Bush administra- administration’s position as far as the Moroccan autonomy tion had promised Algerians that if they and the Sahrawis plan in the Sahara is concerned”. Her response was: “Well, accepted the plan, the United States would impose that so- this is a plan, as you know, that originated in the Clinton ad- lution in the Security Council. However, perhaps not wish- ministration. It was reaffirmed in the Bush administration ing to aggravate the rift with the French over the issue of and it remains the policy of the United States in the Obama Iraq, coupled with the threat of veto from France, pushed administration. Now, we are supporting the United Nations the United States to renege on its promise. The Bush ad- process because we think that if there can be a peaceful ministration supported the Moroccan autonomy proposal resolution to the difficulties that exist with your neighbors, despite its illegality – for what gives Moroccans the right to both to the east and to the south and the west that is in offer autonomy to Sahrawis – and its utter ambiguity. everyone’s interest. But because of our long relationship, It would be naive to believe a reversal of the US position in we are very aware of how challenging the circumstances this conflict under the current Obama administration de- are. And I don’t want anyone in the region or elsewhere to spite the seeming shift in attitude towards the autonomy have any doubt about our policy, which remains the same”. proposal. There have been some signs indicating that the This being said, the US displayed a tougher stand toward Obama administration may not be decidedly biased in favor Morocco during the hunger strike of Haidar. The US was of Morocco. Indeed, in June 2009, it appeared that the US instrumental in resolving the case, thus making it possible no longer supported unequivocally the Moroccan autonomy for Haidar to return to Western Sahara. However, power- plan; Obama’s evading the mention of the autonomy plan in ful lobbies, including the American Jewish Committee in his letter to King Mohamed VI was interpreted as a reversal Washington have urged the US Senate to support Morocco; in US policy on the question. A passage in the letter was numerous Senators, in turn, pushed the White House re- particularly revealing: “I share your commitment to the solve the conflict along the Moroccan proposal. UN-led negotiations as the appropriate forum to achieve With this in view, one of the major questions to be asked a mutually agreed solution... My government will work is whether the White House, despite the seemingly even- with yours and others in the region to achieve an outcome handed approach, will succumb to the Senate’s pressure to that meets the people’s need for transparent governance, endorse Morocco’s illegal annexation of Western Sahara, confidence in the rule of law, and equal administration of at the risk of alienating Algeria, a major US partner in the justice”. Citing diplomatic sources, the report in which the war against terrorism in the region, and an important oil letter was quoted suggested that “the United States no lon- producer. IPRIS Maghreb Review | 9

Timeline of Events

23 May 2010 (Algiers): money laundering, assassinations and terrorism. Algeria UAE Minister of Economy Sultan Bin Saeed Al Gaddafi also reiterated his suggestion of dividing Mansouri, who led the UAE delegation to the Switzerland among France, Italy and Germany 3 May 2010 (Algiers): eighth Joint UAE-Algerian Committee meeting, Nourredine Cherouati was named as head of Al- held talks with Algerian ministers and senior of- 5 May 2010 (Tripoli): geria’s state energy firm Sonatrach, an appoint- ficials on ways to further promote cooperation on Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, son of , ment aimed at restoring stability to the company tourism, banking, finance, investment and indus- said Libya plans to erase visa restrictions for after a serious corruption probe. try. many countries, to advance tourism, and to diver- sify the economy. He added that a constitution is 6 May 2010 (Algiers): 25 May 2010 (Algiers): vital to Libya’s prosperity. Finance Minister Karim Djoudi said Algeria is pre- New fatwas should follow the spirit of established pared to buy 100% of Orascom Telecom Algeria religious laws, said Maghreb religious scholars 6 May 2010 (Tripoli): (OTA). and authorities who met to discuss religion and The head of Libya’s National Oil Corporation said security. Participants voiced support for freedom that Libya is eager to invest in a new oil refinery in 15 May 2010 (Jijel): of thought, but said the issue of renegade imams Indonesia and is ready to supply crude oil. Security forces killed three suspected Islamic issuing extremist fatwas needed to be addressed. militants and captured another during an opera- 6 May 2010 (Tripoli): tion in a forest in eastern Algeria. Authorities be- 25–28 May 2010 (Algiers): At the 9th session of the joint Libyan-Ghanaian lieve the men belonged to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic South-African President Jacob Zuma visited Alge- committee, the Secretary of the Libyan General Maghreb. ria to attend the 5th session of the South Africa- People’s Committee for External Relations and Algeria Presidential Binational Commission. The International Cooperation, Moussa Koussa, and 17 May 2010 (Tehran): Nuclear Cooperation Agreement on the Peaceful Ghana’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alhaji Mu- President participated in the Use of Nuclear Energy was signed, as well as a hammed Mumuni, signed an agreement that 14th Summit of Heads of State and Government of Memorandum of Understanding between the Pe- covers the consolidation of bilateral cooperation the Group of 15 (G-15). troleum Oil and Gas Corporation of South Africa between the two countries in the fields of energy, (PetroSA) and Sonatrach. agriculture, animal and sea resources and joint 17-19 May 2010 (Algiers): investment. A cooperation program between Algeria and the 28 May 2010 (Algiers): World Tourism Organization for 2010-2015 was President Abdelaziz Bouteflika made changes to 6-7 May 2010 (Ljubljana): signed on the sidelines of the 50th meeting of the his government, with Chakib Khelil losing the post During an official visit to Slovenia, Prime Minister WTO Commission for Africa. as energy minister to diplomat and former minis- al-Baghdadi Ali al-Mahmudi, accompanied by the ter Youcef Yousni. Minister of Economy and a business delegation, 18 May 2010 (Algiers): met with local authorities to discuss economic The 8th session of the Algeria-United Arab Emir- 31 May-1 June 2010 (Nice): cooperation. ates joint committee of cooperation was held un- President Abdelaziz Bouteflika attended the 25th der the chairmanship of Finance Minister Karim Africa-France Summit. Several incidents have 8 May 2010 (Tripoli): Djoudi and the UAE Minister of Economy Sultan raised tensions between France and Algeria The Ambassador of the European Union to Libya, Bin Saeed Al Mansouri. lately, such as the French probes into the assas- Adrianus Koetsenrujter, said that a 7th round of sination of Algerian opposition figure Ali Mecili at talks between the EU and Libya has been sched- 18 May 2010 (Geneva): his home in Paris in 1987 and the murder of seven uled for June 8 and 9 in Tripoli and will lead to The Minister of Health, Population and Hospitals French monks in Algeria in 1996. the signing of a framework agreement for coop- Reform, Said Barkat, and the Regional Director of eration and partnership by late 2010. The EU will the World Health Organization (WHO) for Africa, soon open an embassy in Tripoli. Louis Gomez Sambo, agreed on the need to el- evate the level of WHO representation in Algeria. Libya 8-9 May 2010 (Tripoli): Participants from France, Spain, Portugal, Ger- 3 May 2010 (Tripoli): many, Norway, Italy, United Kingdom, The Neth- Muammar Gaddafi accused Switzerland of be- erlands, Belgium, Bulgaria and Turkey attended a having a criminal-like organization involved in meeting to review the conditions of migrant Afri- IPRIS Maghreb Review | 10

can communities in Europe and ways to promote solidarity on the Darfur crisis. The request has to 12 May 2010 (Geneva): their contribution to the building of African unity. do with the presence of the Justice and Equality Mauritania was elected to the United Nations Hu- Movement (JEM) rebel group’s members in Libya. man Rights Council. 10 May 2010 (Geneva): A coalition of 30 non-governmental organizations, 24 May 2010 (Tripoli): 14 May 2010 (Nouakchott): including many from Africa and from Libyan vic- The 13th session of the Libya-Burundi Joint Com- Former President Ely Ould Mohamed Vall was tim groups, appealed to US and EU representa- mission opened under the co-chairmanship of the chosen to lead a new political party, the Alter- tives at the UN to block Libya from winning a seat secretary of the Libyan General People’s Commit- native Forces Party for Democracy and Liberty on the UN Human Rights Council. tee for Social Affairs Ibrahim Cherif, and the Bu- (PFADL). rundian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Coopera- 12 May 2010 (Geneva): tion Augustine Nzanza. 16 May 2010 (Nouakchott): Libya was elected to the United Nations Human A Mauritanian court began with the trials of 19 Rights Council. 26 May 2010 (London): suspected members of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic New sanctions on Iran will create difficulties but Maghreb, including three men suspected of kill- 17–19 May 2010 (Tripoli): the Islamic Republic will be able to live with them, ing four French tourists in 2007. A Vietnamese delegation from the National As- said Shokri Ghanem, the chairman of Libya’s Na- sembly’s Committee for External Relation Affairs, tional Oil Corporation. 23 May 2010 (Tripoli): led by its chairman Nguyen Van Son, paid a visit to Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Naha Libya with the purpose of strengthening ties be- 28 May 2010 (Tripoli): Mint Hamdi Ould Mouknass expressed her coun- tween both parliaments. Gabonese leader Ali Bongo Ondimba visited Libya try’s willingness to promote relations with Libya and was received on arrival by Muammar Gaddafi. during a visit with the purpose of discussing the 19 May 2010 (Ankara): The two leaders discussed strategies to strength- implementation of recommendations of their joint The Libyan General Office for Sanitation and In- en the and projects for creating the commission. vestment and the Turkish Agency for Support and United States of Africa. Promotion of Investment hosted their first eco- 31 May-1 June 2010 (Nice): nomic forum. 29 May 2010 (Tripoli): Mauritanian President Some members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting attended the 25th Africa-France Summit. Top- 19 May 2010 (Tripoli): Group released from prison last March denounced ics such as the institutional crisis in Africa, and The Leader of the Revolution Muammar Gaddafi violence and are now committed to discrediting security, particularly the fight against terrorism was named African Leader of the Year 2009 by the al-Qaeda. Muammar Gaddafi’s younger son, Said and drug, arms and human trafficking, were ad- Africa Renaissance Coalition. al-Islam, is an important player in this process. dressed.

20 May 2010 (Tripoli): The US and Libya signed a pact to facilitate trade and investment between the two nations, mark- ing the latest step in the thaw of past hostilities. The US-Libya Business Association, which is led Mauritania Morocco by oil companies such as Chevron Corp. and BP, called the pact a “milestone” in the relationship 10 May 2010 (Nouakchott): 3 May 2010 (New York): that would help strengthen economic and diplo- The Coordination of the Democratic Opposition Foreign Minister Taib Fassi Fihri met several for- matic ties. (COD), which groups a dozen political parties, eign ministers participating in the 2010 Review called for a massive demonstration to hasten the Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the 23 May 2010 (Tripoli): departure of President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz. Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Secretary of the Libyan General People’s Con- The opposition accused the President of disre- gress (GPC) for Foreign Affairs, Chehoumi Sulei- garding institutions and ruining the economy. 6-7 May 2010 (Tunis): man, met with an Italian parliamentary delega- Prime Minister Abbas El Fassi led his country’s tion. The two parties discussed ways of developing 10 May 2010 (USA): delegation through the 16th Tunisian-Moroccan relations. The Mauritanian diaspora in the United States High Joint Committee, where a set of agreements organized a demonstration to protest against were signed, namely on trade, environment, tech- 24 May 2010 (Misurata): the statement whereby Prime Minister Moulaye nology and water resources. The director of Sudan’s National Intelligence and Ould Mohamed Laghdaf announced his intention Security Services (NISS), Mohamed Atta Al-Moula to generalize the use of Arabic at all levels of the 11-12 May 2010 (Rabat): Abbas, met with Muammar Gaddafi to convey a administration and educational system. They ar- Macedonian Prime Minister Nikola Gruevsky vis- verbal message from President Omar Hassan Al- gue that this will be “cultural genocide” against ited Morocco for the first time. He met his coun- Bashir stressing the need for more support and African Mauritanians. terpart Abbas El Fassi, the Speaker of the House IPRIS Maghreb Review | 11

of Representatives, , and the 9 May 2010 (Tunis): President of the Assembly of Councilors, Mo- The party of President Ben Ali won 90.67% of the hamed Seik Bijadila. Several agreements were seats in local government elections across the signed with the purpose of strengthening eco- 1 May 2010 (Ottawa): country. nomic cooperation During an official visit to Canada, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, , met with his 10-11 May 2010 (Tunis): 17 May 2010 (Rabat): Canadian counterpart Lawrence Cannon. Both The 2nd Maghreb Businessmen’s Forum, held in Prime Minister Abbas El Fassi claimed, in a mid- stressed the political will to promote partnership collaboration with the Maghreb Employers’ Union term report to parliament, that advances in em- opportunities. Kamel Morjane also met with the (UME) and the Tunisian Union of Industry, Trade ployment, education and maternal health had Canadian International Trade Minister Peter Van and Handicrafts (UTICA), said regional integration been made. Opposition politicians allege that the Loan, with the Speaker of the House of Commons, could be improved. report fails to acknowledge government failures, Peter Milliken, and with Tunisian expatriates in particularly in housing and unemployment. Canada. 11 May 2010 (Brussels): The 8th session of the Tunisia-European Union 18 May 2010 (Riyadh): 5 May 2010 (Cairo): Association Council convened under the co-chair- Foreign Minister Taib Fassi Fihri met with Saudi The Secretary of State in charge of Maghreb, Arab manship of Foreign Minister Kamel Morjane and King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud. Taib Fassi and African Affairs, Abdelhafidh Harguem, led a his Spanish counterpart Miguel Moratinos. The Fihri delivered a written message from King Tunisian delegation to the ministerial meeting of Council decided to strengthen EU-Tunisian rela- Mohammed VI, which is part of the constructive the Arab Peace Initiative Committee. Abdelhafidh tions through an advanced statute. consultations between the two kingdoms regard- Harguem emphasized Tunisia’s position towards ing current international and regional issues and the Palestinian cause and its support to all ini- 12-14 May 2010 (Tunis): the broader interests of the Islamic and Arabic tiatives and efforts designed to reach a just and Syria’s Prime Minister Mohamed Néji el Otri led worlds. comprehensive settlement, in accordance with his country’s delegation through the Tunisian- international law. Syrian 11th session of the High Joint Commission. 18 May 2010 (Rabat): Prime Minister Abbas El Fassi called on Spain to 5 May 2010 (Tunis): 13-14 May 2010 (Tianjin): reopen dialogue in order to “end the occupation” Prime Minister received Foreign Affairs Minister Kamel Morjane headed of Ceuta and Melilla. The minister also asked Ma- Pakistan’s Deputy Foreign Afffairs Minister Naw- the Tunisian delegation in the 4th ministerial drid to commit itself to a “futuristic vision” for the abzada Malik Amad Khan, who said that the meet- meeting of the Arab-Chinese Cooperation Forum, “common interest” and “good neighborliness” ing represented an opportunity to discuss the whose opening session was chaired by the Pre- between the two countries. development of the excellent relations between mier of the State Council of the People’s Repub- Tunisia and Pakistan and to boost them. lic of China Wen Jiabao. Morjane pointed at the 19 May 2010 (Dubai): progress of Arab-Chinese relations and the need Foreign Minister Taib Fassi Fihri met with Vice- 5 May 2010 (Tunis): to further elevate them to the level of a strategic President and Prime Minister of the UAE and rul- Foreign Affairs Minister Kamel Morjane received partnership. er of Dubai, Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum. Latifa Akharbach, the Moroccan Secretary of Taib Fassi Fihri delivered a written message from State for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation. Akhar- 15 May 2010 (Tunis): King Mohammed VI which is part of the construc- bach, who visited Tunisia as part of the meeting Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi received tive consultations between the two countries re- of the 12th session of the Tunisian-Moroccan Fol- Shamshad Akhtar, the World Bank Vice-Presi- garding current international and regional issues low-up and Co-ordination Committee, expressed dent for the Middle East and North Africa. Akhtar and the supreme interests of the Islamic and Ara- Morocco’s will to strengthen Tunisian-Moroccan said that talks provided an opportunity to review bic worlds. relations with a view to serve the two peoples’ in- the existing cooperation program and the World terests. Bank’s commitments in Tunisia. 25 May 2010 (Rabat): Foreign Minister Taib Fassi Fihri urged the UN 7 May 2010 (Tunis): 18 May 2010 (Tunis): High Commissioner for Refugees to check up President met with Moroc- President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali met with Chi- on Western Saharans living in refugee camps can Prime Minister Abbas El Fassi, who pointed nese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi to discuss Tuni- in neighboring Algeria under the control of the out that the meeting had allowed a review of the sian-Chinese relations and current international Polisario Front. progress of bilateral co-operation and joint reflec- issues. The Chinese official emphasized both tions on the outcome of the Tunisian-Moroccan countries’ similar views on major regional and in- 31 May-1 June 2010 (Nice): 16th session of the High Joint Commission, as well ternational issues. Prince Moulay Rachid represented King Moham- as on several regional, Arab and international is- med VI in the 25th Africa-France Summit. sues. 18 May 2010 (Tunis): Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi received Japanese Deputy-Foreign Minister Kenichiro IPRIS Maghreb Review | 12

Sasae. According to the Japanese dignitary, the ited Tunisia, where she was received by Prime 25 May 2010 (Tunis): meeting focused on economic relations and Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi, Minister of Minister of Trade and Handicrafts Ridha Ben other topics of common interest such as climate Development and International Cooperation Mosbah announced that Tunisia’s foreign trade change. , Governor of the Cen- has posted an upward trend in the first four tral Bank , and several other months of 2010 in “almost all sectors”. 20 May 2010 (Tunis): members of government. The visit was part of Religious Affairs Minister Boubaker El Akhzouri ongoing consultations. 26 May 2010 (Tunis): received Seikh Ravil Gainoutdine, the Chairman Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi received of the Russian Shura Council of Muftis. A memo- 24 May 2010 (Tunis): Adoum Gargoum, Deputy Minister of Camer- randum of understanding was signed providing Foreign Affairs Minister Kamel Morjane re- oon’s Foreign Relations Ministry in charge of the exchange of legislative and legal texts ruling ceived Nadejda Guerassimova, the Deputy relations with the Islamic World. The meeting Islamic affairs and of expertise and experiences Speaker of the Duma, Russia’s lower represen- focused on economic relations. in matters of training imams and preachers. tative house. Guerassimova expressed Russia’s attachment to strengthening cooperation rela- 21-22 May 2010 (Tunis): tions with Tunisia in several sectors, notably in- Shamshad Akhtar, World Bank Vice President vestment, energy, environment, tourism, youth for the Middle East and North Africa region, vis- and sports.

Reading List

Rabah Aissaoui, “Algerian Nationalists in the French Political Arena and Beyond: The Etoile Nord-Africaine and the Parti du Peuple Algérien in Interwar France” (The Journal of North African Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1, March 2010): 1-12.

Mohammed Hachemaoui, “Permanences du Jeu Politique en Algérie” (Politique Étrangère, Vol. 74, No. 2, Summer 2009): 309-321.

Larbi Sadiki, “Wither Arab ‘Republicanism’? The Rise of Family Rule and the ‘End of Democratization’ in Egypt, Libya and Yemen” (Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 15, No. 1, March 2010): 99-107.

Andrea Liverani, Civil Society in Algeria: The Political Functions of Associational Life (London: Routledge, 2008).

Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and Daniel Zisenwine (eds.), The Maghrib in the New Century: Identity, Religion, and Politics (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2007).

Yahia Zoubir and Haizam Amirah-Fernández (eds.), North Africa: Politics, Region, and the Limits of Transformation (London: Routledge, 2008).

EditorS | Paulo Gorjão • Tobias Schumacher assistant editors | Diogo Noivo • Kai Thaler DESIGN | Atelier Teresa Cardoso Bastos PRINTING | Europress

Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security (IPRIS) Rua Vitorino Nemésio, 5 - 1750-306 Lisboa PORTUGAL http://www.ipris.org email: [email protected]

IPRIS Maghreb Review is a publication of IPRIS. The opinions expressed are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of IPRIS.