IPRIS Maghreb Bulletin 2

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IPRIS Maghreb Bulletin 2 2 IPRIS Maghreb Review MAY 2010 after almost two decades of sanc- in a massive military build-up is its tions, largely obsolete or in a state improved relationship not only with An appetite of disrepair, but prior to the arms neighboring countries but also with embargoes, the country was one of Israel and the West. On the other the most outlandish weapons buyers hand, Libya has been confronted with for arms? globally. During the 1970s and 1980s, new challenges, such as Islamist ter- Libya topped the list of all arms im- rorism and irregular migration, which Libya’s re- porting countries on a per capita ba- might provide a rationale for certain sis, and even in absolute terms, it was arms purchases. Moreover, other emergence on one of the most important purchasers Maghreb countries such as Algeria of weapons in the world. As a result and Morocco, have engaged in rela- the international of its huge arms acquisitions, by the tively large-scale weapons acquisi- early 1980s, Libya was estimated tions in recent years, in particular of arms market to have the highest ratio of military advanced fighter aircraft, which might equipment to manpower globally. Its fuel Libya’s military procurement. most important supplier by far was With respect to the arms deals which DEREK LUTTERBECK the USSR, accounting for around 75% the Libyan leadership has negotiated Deputy Director and Holder of the of all of Libya’s military imports, fol- or concluded in recent years, there is Swiss Chair, Mediterranean Academy of lowed by France with some 10%. at least one clear continuity with the Diplomatic Studies, Malta While defense analysts estimate Lib- past in that its traditionally most im- ya’s military requirements over the portant suppliers, Russia and France, coming years at anywhere between have been at the forefront in securing Once considered a ‘pariah state’ and $5 and $10 billion, it remains unclear arms deals with the Gaddafi regime. shunned for its support of terrorist what the main driving factors behind In mid-2007, France concluded the activities, Libya has in recent years future Libyan arms acquisitions might first major arms deal with Libya since undergone a remarkable transfor- be, and whether Libya will resume its the lifting of the embargoes: the sale mation, at least at the international position as one of the most prolific of Milan-type anti-tank missiles worth level. One particularly notable as- weapons purchasers in the world. around €300 million. A potentially pect of Libya’s reintegration into the Predictions in the case of Libya are all much more spectacular arms deal ‘international community’ has been the more difficult as during the pre- was announced a few months later the efforts of several states to se- embargo period, Libya’s military pur- when Colonel Gaddafi paid a state cure large-scale arms contracts with chases seemed driven less by specific visit to France. During the visit, the the Gaddafi regime. Indeed, since the external threats, and more by Colonel two countries agreed to hold ‘exclu- lifting of the UN and EU arms embar- Gaddafi’s international ambitions, in sive negotiations’ over the following goes in 2003/2004, Libya is commonly particular his pan-Arab leadership six months over major weapons sys- considered one of the most promis- aspirations, as well as his fierce anti- tems, including 14 Rafale fighter jets, ing arms export markets in the world. Zionism. One factor which currently 35 military helicopters, and a radar Not only are its weapons holdings, might work against Libya engaging defense system, worth an estimated IPRIS Maghreb Review | 2 €4.5 billion. The Rafale deal has, how- in particular in the areas of immigra- the rentier state put an end to the ever, still not been concluded. tion control and counter-terrorism. distribution of wealth strategy upon France’s main competitor thus far has which Algeria had heavily relied on to been Russia. Similarly to its relation- maintain loyalty amongst its citizens. ship with Algeria, Russia has been The share of socially marginalized using the instrument of Soviet-era youth was growing rapidly, and de- debt cancellation in order to secure Algeria’s mands of the middle class for more arms deals with Libya. In April 2008, economic freedom became more in- Vladimir Putin became the first Rus- Islamists sistent. sian leader to visit Tripoli, and offered The Algerian state-class eventually to cancel Libya’s Soviet era debt, es- responded to the civil disturbances timated at some $4.5 billion in return between of October 1988 with a reform of the for major weapons and infrastructure Party Law. As a consequence, over 60 contracts. While at the time, the two inclusion and parties were founded, including some countries failed to reach an agree- Islamist parties like the Islamic Salva- ment on arms sales, in early 2010 the exclusion tion Front (FIS) and the Movement for Russian media reported that Russia the Society of Peace (MSP). The first and Libya were close to concluding a RACHID OUaissa local elections in June 1990 resulted $2 billion arms deal over 16-19 Su- Director, Center for Near and Middle in a FIS victory, and in the first ballot 35 and Su-30 combat aircraft, an ad- of the first free parliamentary elec- Eastern Studies, University of Marburg vanced air defense system, as well as tions just one year later, the FIS even a range of other military equipment. managed to win approx. three million Italy as well has been active on the The rise of the Islamist movement in votes, i.e. 47% of the total vote. Libyan arms market, although in Algeria and its evolution as a political The FIS was home to two social this case arms exports have been and social force to be reckoned with forces with different and, to some driven first and foremost by the grow- must be ascribed to the failure of a extent, competing interests – on the ing concern with irregular migration developmental strategy based on the one hand, it brought together mem- through Libya towards Italy. In 2006, ongoing flow of oil rents. bers of the blocked middle class, and Italy agreed to provide Libya with ten In the 1960s and 1970s, Algeria wit- on the other it was comprised of the military helicopters for border control nessed the emergence of a broad marginalized urban lower class. Both purposes, and two years later the two middle class due to Algeria’s then groups were attracted by the FIS radi- countries signed a contract on the developmental path. The enormous cal discourse, and at the same time sale to Libya of a maritime patrol air- public sector was a springboard of the movement also advocated eco- plane. upward mobility, with the added pos- nomic programs gearing towards the The growing number of arms deals sibility of being directly co-opted into social advancement of the middle which have been concluded or dis- the ranks of the state-class. Hence- class. While the middle classes hoped cussed with the Libyan regime are, of forth, it was possible to gain access to to wrench reforms from the govern- course, a telling sign that the former the state apparatus by participating ment by integrating themselves into pariah state has, in a rather short pe- in mass organizations, the party or the movement, members of the lower riod of time, come to be viewed as a bureaucracy. With the help of the oil class deemed the state-class to be respectable partner. However, this rent, Algeria’s state achieved consid- hopelessly corrupt and thus insisted rehabilitation has occurred despite erable social progress: the creation of on their elimination – by force, if nec- Libya’s still poor human rights re- jobs, the increase of purchasing pow- essary. However, due to the politi- cord and oppressive political regime. er, low prices for consumer goods cal and social heterogeneity of their Even though in European countries, through government subsidies, uni- supporters and the diametrically there has been some limited criticism versal health care, and an education opposite expectations of these two of the military rapprochement with system ensuring the schooling and groups, it was extremely difficult for Libya, in particular of the (potential) training of many young Algerians. All a movement such as the FIS to orga- Rafale sales, the huge commercial this boosted living standards and the nize and structure itself like a mod- interests which are at stake seem to prosperity of the population. ern political party. In view of this, as trump any human rights concerns. Yet, following the oil crisis of the a consequence of the abortion of the Human rights considerations seem mid-1980s, Algeria, like many rentier elections and the outbreak of the sub- to be further sidelined by the increas- states, fell into debt and consequently sequent civil war, it was doomed to ingly shared security concerns be- faced the difficulty of upholding its fail and was finally banned. tween Western countries and Libya, system of co-optation. The crisis of It was only after the economic recov- IPRIS Maghreb Review | 3 ery of the Algerian government, which tion during the riots in the Kabilye first countries with which the then was due to credits from the West and region in 2001 and its active support European Economic Community en- the increase of oil prices, that the for a third term of President Boutef- tered into contractual relations in the army gained a military victory over lika are indicators that the new Alge- late sixties, but, more importantly, by the Islamists. The state offered the rian middle class is prepared to work the advanced status the country was middle class remunerative economic for participation in rent distribution granted by the EU in late 2008.
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