Military Spending Gap 18-22 the Modernization Gap 23-25 U.S
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The Changing Gulf Balance and the Iranian Threat Anthony H. Cordesman [email protected] Working Draft August 3, 2016 1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW Anthony H. Cordesman Web version: Email: [email protected] Washington, DC 20036 Phone: 1.202.775.3270 www.csis.org/burke Acknowledgements: This analysis draws in part on analytic work relating to missile warfare by Dr. Abdullah Toukan, and the work of Charles Ayers and Joseph Kendall in preparing and updating the graphic analyses and force comparisons 2 Table of Contents Title Pages The Changing Gulf Balance 4-7 The Iranian Threat: An Uncertain Mix of Positives and Negatives 8-17 The Military Spending Gap 18-22 The Modernization Gap 23-25 U.S. and Outside Allied Forces: The Other Forces Impacting on the Regional Balance 36-50 Comparative Military Manpower 51-54 The Challenge of Asymmetric Warfare: Intimidation, Deterrence, and Warfighting from Iran and Non-State Actors 55-69 The Land Balance in the Gulf 70-81 The Air Balance in the Gulf 82-97 The Naval Balance in the Gulf 98-103 Closing the Gulf: The Iranian Naval-Missile-Air Threat to Maritime Traffic 104-125 Missile Forces and Threats 126-138 Missile Wars and Missile Defense 139-145 The Uncertain Nuclear and WMD Threat 146-164 3 The Changing Gulf Balance 4 The Changing Gulf Balance - I • The classic military balance in the Gulf region is driven by an accelerating arms race between Iran and its Arab Gulf Neighbors. The Arab countries are decisively winning this arms race. • This aspect of the balance is also shaped by outside forces, particularly by the level of U.S. commitment and power projection capability to assisting its Arab security partners, although Russia and China are potential wild cards. • The balance, however, is also increasingly shaped by internal conflicts and divisions in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen and the impact of “failed state wars” on the relative strategic influence of Iran versus other Arab states and U.S. •It is also shaped by Iran’s steadily improving capabilities for asymmetric warfare in supporting pro-Iran elements in Arab states, in developing the capability to threaten maritime traffic in and near the Gulf, and to pose a ballistic and cruise missile threat to its Arab neighbors that compensates for its limited conventional capabilities. 5 The Changing Gulf Balance - II • The threat of violent religious extremism, and the growing impact of non- state actors both pose another major set of threats, and make counterterrorism and counterinsurgency increasingly important aspects of the military balance. • The P5+1 (JCPOA) nuclear agreement with Iran delays, but does not end the nuclear and WMD competition between Iran and its Arab neighbors and the U.S. • The end result seems to be a high level of mutual deterrence between regional states, mixed with extremist challenges by non-state actors which do not show any such restraint. This does not, however, prevent threats to use force by state actors in “wars of intimidation,” low level incidents, or proxy wars in competing to support other forces. • It is also a complex mix of different and asymmetric forces, and possible approaches to warfighting, creates a significant risk that Arab-Iranian conflicts can start or escalate through miscalculation in unpredictable ways. 6 The Changing Gulf Balance - III • The risk of conflict is also driven by the actions of non-state actors and violent extremists and the uncertain internal stability of many regional states. • These internal stability risks are compounded by sectarian, ethnic, and tribal tensions, particularly ethnic tensions between Arabs, Persians, and Kurds, and Sunnis and Shi’ites. • There has been a massive regional increase in internal security activity, forces, and costs. The data on these aspects of the balance are so suspect, however, that it is not possible to assess the trend and scale in quantitative terms. • The “civil balance” in terms of the nature of politics, quality of governance, corruption, economic development and sharing of wealth, social changes from factors like hyperurbanization, massive population growth and youth employment problems, has generally deteriorated since the uprisings of 2011, and is now affected by massive cuts in petroleum export and tourism income and limited investment. 7 The Iranian Threat: An Uncertain Mix of Positives and Negatives 8 Iran: Threat or “Competitor” Non-Military Competition · Ideology, religion, and political systems · “Terrorism” and violent extremism vs. “counterterrorism” · Energy, sanctions, and global economic impacts · Arms control, arms exports, and arms imports · International diplomacy Military Competition · W eapons of mass destruction · Conventional forces · Asymmetric and irregular warfare · P roxy use of state and non-state actors · Threat and intimidation Nations and Sub-Regions of Competition · G u l f Cooperation Council countries · Y emen · I r a q · Jordan · Syria · Lebanon · Israel · Gaza and West Bank · P akistan · Turkey · Afghanistan · Central Asia · Europe · R u s s i a · C h i n a · Japan and Asia · V enezuela, Cuba, Brazil 9 Assessing the Full Range of Competition 10 Rhetoric vs. Reality • Reinforcement of Supreme Leader and political rhetoric vs. often solid military assessments and study of western and outside positions. • Statements can defeat all attacks versus focus on defense in depth • Capability to “close the Gulf” vs. steadily upgrading asymmetric capabilities and real world limits. • Nuclear denial vs. nuclear efforts; exaggeration of missile capabilities. • Claims of modernization versus real world limits and failures. • Real but exaggerated progress in Asymmetric warfare. • Exaggerated claims to military production and technology versus limited reality • Claimed focus on US and Israel versus focus on Israel and GCC • Denial/Understatement of links to non-state actors: Hamas, Hizbollah, Iraqi militias, Afghan Northern Alliance 11 Key Positives • The US is Iran’s “Secret Ally:” Invasion of Iraq and aftermath; Messing up Syria from the start, Uncertain & slipping nuclear “redline,” faltering effort in Afghanistan, loss of allied confidence, in Egypt. • Success in Lebanon, growing Syrian dependence, ties to Iraqi Shi’ites, presence in Western Afghanistan and role with Hazaras. • Lack of progress and coherence in GCC forces. • Instability of Yemen and Shi’ite populations in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, other GCC states, Yemen. • Asymmetric warfare progress, reposturing, Al Quds, cyber, etc. • Missile and nuclear progress. • Real progress in modernization, adaptation, selective imports. • Integration of regular and revolutionary forces. •Restructuring of Basij, internal security forces. 12 US Destruction of Iraq’s Major Forces - I 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0 Combat Combat Main Battle Main Battle Aircraft: Aircraft: Tanks: 2003 Tanks: 2012 2003 2012 Iran 1565 1663 283 336 Iraq 2200 336 316 3 Source: Adapted from IISS, The Military Balance 2013, various editions and Jane’s Sentinel series. 13 US Destruction of Iraq’s Major Forces – 2003 vs. 2013 14 The Limited Recovery of Iraq’s Forces: 2003 vs. 2016 15 Key Negatives • Unstable Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, Uncertain Hamas. • US-led progress, C4I/ISAR, and training progress in GCC forces; Broad Arab treatment of Iran as threat. • Rising Sunni versus Shi’ite tensions; limits to Shi’ite acceptance of Supreme Leader, any form of Iranian control or proxy role. • High level of effectiveness in limits to arms, technology, and production imports. •Lack of Power projection assets, maneuver capability, sustained air capability, and geography of Gulf • Sanctions/delays in nuclear program, impact on military spending, stability. • Lack of nuclear and other WMD weapons, long-rang precision strike capability. Israeli, Pakistani, US nuclear/missile forces in being; US conventional long-range strike capability. • Instability of Yemen and Shi’ite populations in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, other GCC states, Yemen. • Limits to asymmetric warfare progress, reposturing, Al Quds, cyber, etc. 16 Key Potential Pivots Shaping the Future • Iran deploys functional nuclear forces. •US or Israeli preventive strikes. • Missiles with terminal guidance, extreme accuracy. (w/ or w/o ,missile defenses. • Serious (Shi’ite) unrest in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. • US tensions with GCC states (and Egypt/Jordan). Excessive US force cuts, spending crisis • Iran access to most modern Russian and Chinese arms: advanced fighters, S- 300/S-400 etc. • Major clash in Gulf • Assad victory or defeat in civil war; clear polarization of Iraq. • Serious Iranian political upheavals, power struggle. • Hostile Iranian involvement in post-2015 • Real Iran-Iraq-Syria-Hezbollah axis. • New Arab-Israel Conflict. 17 The Military Spending Gap 18 Military Spending • Trends sharply favor Arab states even if impact of U.S. and European spending on power projection is ignored. • Estimates are uncertain. Iran and other Gulf states may conceal significant security spending off budget. But, unlikely to affect trends or scale of difference. •Iran has advantage from low-cost conscription, control of state industries. • Lack of coordination, standardization, and interoperability by Gulf states greatly reduces impact of their advantage in spending. • But, Iran’s programs have uncertain management, and Iran has massive disadvantage because of lack of access to modern and high performance arms imports. • Arab Gulf states can surge arms imports and funding of outside power projection support in a crisis. Iran cannot – to date. 19 Comparative Military Spending: