Military Spending Gap 18-22 the Modernization Gap 23-25 U.S

The Changing Gulf Balance and the Iranian Threat Anthony H. Cordesman [email protected]

Working Draft August 3, 2016

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW Anthony H. Cordesman Web version: Email: [email protected] Washington, DC 20036 Phone: 1.202.775.3270 www.csis.org/burke Acknowledgements:

This analysis draws in part on analytic work relating to missile warfare by Dr. Abdullah Toukan, and the work of Charles Ayers and Joseph Kendall in preparing and updating the graphic analyses and force comparisons

2 Table of Contents

Title Pages The Changing Gulf Balance 4-7 The Iranian Threat: An Uncertain Mix of Positives and Negatives 8-17 The Military Spending Gap 18-22 The Modernization Gap 23-25 U.S. and Outside Allied Forces: The Other Forces Impacting on the Regional Balance 36-50 Comparative Military Manpower 51-54 The Challenge of Asymmetric Warfare: Intimidation, Deterrence, and Warfighting from Iran and Non-State Actors 55-69 The Land Balance in the Gulf 70-81 The Air Balance in the Gulf 82-97 The Naval Balance in the Gulf 98-103 Closing the Gulf: The Iranian Naval-Missile-Air Threat to Maritime Traffic 104-125 Missile Forces and Threats 126-138 Missile Wars and Missile Defense 139-145 The Uncertain Nuclear and WMD Threat 146-164

3 The Changing Gulf Balance

4 The Changing Gulf Balance - I

• The classic military balance in the Gulf region is driven by an accelerating arms race between Iran and its Arab Gulf Neighbors. The Arab countries are decisively winning this arms race. • This aspect of the balance is also shaped by outside forces, particularly by the level of U.S. commitment and power projection capability to assisting its Arab security partners, although Russia and China are potential wild cards. • The balance, however, is also increasingly shaped by internal conflicts and divisions in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen and the impact of “failed state wars” on the relative strategic influence of Iran versus other Arab states and U.S. •It is also shaped by Iran’s steadily improving capabilities for asymmetric warfare in supporting pro-Iran elements in Arab states, in developing the capability to threaten maritime traffic in and near the Gulf, and to pose a ballistic and cruise missile threat to its Arab neighbors that compensates for its limited conventional capabilities.

5 The Changing Gulf Balance - II

• The threat of violent religious extremism, and the growing impact of non- state actors both pose another major set of threats, and make counterterrorism and counterinsurgency increasingly important aspects of the military balance. • The P5+1 (JCPOA) nuclear agreement with Iran delays, but does not end the nuclear and WMD competition between Iran and its Arab neighbors and the U.S. • The end result seems to be a high level of mutual deterrence between regional states, mixed with extremist challenges by non-state actors which do not show any such restraint. This does not, however, prevent threats to use force by state actors in “wars of intimidation,” low level incidents, or proxy wars in competing to support other forces. • It is also a complex mix of different and asymmetric forces, and possible approaches to warfighting, creates a significant risk that Arab-Iranian conflicts can start or escalate through miscalculation in unpredictable ways.

6 The Changing Gulf Balance - III

• The risk of conflict is also driven by the actions of non-state actors and violent extremists and the uncertain internal stability of many regional states. • These internal stability risks are compounded by sectarian, ethnic, and tribal tensions, particularly ethnic tensions between Arabs, Persians, and Kurds, and Sunnis and Shi’ites. • There has been a massive regional increase in internal security activity, forces, and costs. The data on these aspects of the balance are so suspect, however, that it is not possible to assess the trend and scale in quantitative terms. • The “civil balance” in terms of the nature of politics, quality of governance, corruption, economic development and sharing of wealth, social changes from factors like hyperurbanization, massive population growth and youth employment problems, has generally deteriorated since the uprisings of 2011, and is now affected by massive cuts in petroleum export and tourism income and limited investment.

7 The Iranian Threat:

An Uncertain Mix of Positives and Negatives

8 Iran: Threat or “Competitor”

Non-Military Competition · Ideology, religion, and political systems · “Terrorism” and violent extremism vs. “counterterrorism” · Energy, sanctions, and global economic impacts · Arms control, arms exports, and arms imports · International diplomacy

Military Competition · W eapons of mass destruction · Conventional forces · Asymmetric and irregular warfare · P roxy use of state and non-state actors · Threat and intimidation

Nations and Sub-Regions of Competition · G u l f Cooperation Council countries · Y emen · I r a q · Jordan · Syria · Lebanon · Israel · Gaza and West Bank · P akistan · Turkey · Afghanistan · Central Asia · Europe · R u s s i a · C h i n a · Japan and Asia · V enezuela, Cuba, Brazil 9 Assessing the Full Range of Competition

10 Rhetoric vs. Reality • Reinforcement of Supreme Leader and political rhetoric vs. often solid military assessments and study of western and outside positions. • Statements can defeat all attacks versus focus on defense in depth • Capability to “close the Gulf” vs. steadily upgrading asymmetric capabilities and real world limits. • Nuclear denial vs. nuclear efforts; exaggeration of missile capabilities. • Claims of modernization versus real world limits and failures. • Real but exaggerated progress in Asymmetric warfare. • Exaggerated claims to military production and technology versus limited reality • Claimed focus on US and Israel versus focus on Israel and GCC • Denial/Understatement of links to non-state actors: Hamas, Hizbollah, Iraqi militias, Afghan Northern Alliance

11 Key Positives

• The US is Iran’s “Secret Ally:” Invasion of Iraq and aftermath; Messing up Syria from the start, Uncertain & slipping nuclear “redline,” faltering effort in Afghanistan, loss of allied confidence, in Egypt. • Success in Lebanon, growing Syrian dependence, ties to Iraqi Shi’ites, presence in Western Afghanistan and role with Hazaras. • Lack of progress and coherence in GCC forces. • Instability of Yemen and Shi’ite populations in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, other GCC states, Yemen. • Asymmetric warfare progress, reposturing, Al Quds, cyber, etc. • Missile and nuclear progress. • Real progress in modernization, adaptation, selective imports. • Integration of regular and revolutionary forces. •Restructuring of Basij, internal security forces. 12 US Destruction of Iraq’s Major Forces - I

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 Combat Combat Main Battle Main Battle Aircraft: Aircraft: Tanks: 2003 Tanks: 2012 2003 2012 Iran 1565 1663 283 336 Iraq 2200 336 316 3

Source: Adapted from IISS, The Military Balance 2013, various editions and Jane’s Sentinel series. 13 US Destruction of Iraq’s Major Forces – 2003 vs. 2013

14 The Limited Recovery of Iraq’s Forces: 2003 vs. 2016

15 Key Negatives

• Unstable Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, Uncertain Hamas. • US-led progress, C4I/ISAR, and training progress in GCC forces; Broad Arab treatment of Iran as threat. • Rising Sunni versus Shi’ite tensions; limits to Shi’ite acceptance of Supreme Leader, any form of Iranian control or proxy role. • High level of effectiveness in limits to arms, technology, and production imports. •Lack of Power projection assets, maneuver capability, sustained air capability, and geography of Gulf • Sanctions/delays in nuclear program, impact on military spending, stability. • Lack of nuclear and other WMD weapons, long-rang precision strike capability. Israeli, Pakistani, US nuclear/missile forces in being; US conventional long-range strike capability. • Instability of Yemen and Shi’ite populations in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, other GCC states, Yemen. • Limits to asymmetric warfare progress, reposturing, Al Quds, cyber, etc. 16 Key Potential Pivots Shaping the Future • Iran deploys functional nuclear forces. •US or Israeli preventive strikes. • Missiles with terminal guidance, extreme accuracy. (w/ or w/o ,missile defenses. • Serious (Shi’ite) unrest in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. • US tensions with GCC states (and Egypt/Jordan). Excessive US force cuts, spending crisis • Iran access to most modern Russian and Chinese arms: advanced fighters, S- 300/S-400 etc. • Major clash in Gulf • Assad victory or defeat in civil war; clear polarization of Iraq. • Serious Iranian political upheavals, power struggle. • Hostile Iranian involvement in post-2015 • Real Iran-Iraq-Syria-Hezbollah axis. • New Arab-Israel Conflict. 17 The Military Spending Gap

18 Military Spending

• Trends sharply favor Arab states even if impact of U.S. and European spending on power projection is ignored. • Estimates are uncertain. Iran and other Gulf states may conceal significant security spending off budget. But, unlikely to affect trends or scale of difference. •Iran has advantage from low-cost conscription, control of state industries. • Lack of coordination, standardization, and interoperability by Gulf states greatly reduces impact of their advantage in spending. • But, Iran’s programs have uncertain management, and Iran has massive disadvantage because of lack of access to modern and high performance arms imports. • Arab Gulf states can surge arms imports and funding of outside power projection support in a crisis. Iran cannot – to date.

19 Comparative Military Spending: 1997-2009

90,000

80,000

70,000

60,000

50,000

40,000

30,000

20,000

10,000

0 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004* 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Bahrain 387 427 472 342 355 352 350 191 559 498 550 552 697 Kuwait 3,827 3,614 3,401 3,933 3,614 3,720 3,720 1,275 4,539 3,640 4,002 6,810 6,650 Oman 2,126 1,913 1,701 2,232 2,551 2,445 2,657 2,764 3,210 3,410 3,298 4,657 4,060 Qatar 1,382 1,382 1,488 1,275 1,807 2,020 2,020 2,232 2,327 2,430 1,090 1,750 1,750 UAE 3,614 3,933 4,039 3,189 2,976 2,976 2,976 1,701 2,817 9,888 10,292 13,730 15,470 Saudi Arabia 22,323 23,386 19,878 23,386 26,256 23,599 23,599 20,515 27,000 30,810 34,020 38,200 41,200 GCC Total 33,659 34,655 30,979 34,357 37,559 35,112 35,322 28,678 40,452 50,676 52,142 65,699 69,827 Yemen 437 421 456 529 570 547 596 940 1,001 858 927 1,490 1,550 Iraq 1,982 1,382 1,488 1,488 1,488 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Iran 4,996 6,165 6,060 7,972 2,232 3,189 3,189 3,720 6,590 6,759 7,310 9,590 10,000 Gulf Total 41,074 42,623 38,983 44,346 41,849 38,848 39,107 33,338 48,043 58,290 60,379 76,779 81,377

20 Derived from IISS, Military Balance, various editions The Military Spending Gap – Less US, UK, France

$60,000

$50,000

$40,000

$30,000

Defense USD) Millions (in Defense Spending $20,000

$10,000

$0 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Saudi Arabia Iraq Yemen Iran

Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, 1999-2013 21 The Military Spending Gap in 2015

140

120

100

40 2015 Defense 2015 Defense Spendingin billions of USD

0 Saudi GCC Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Iran Iraq Jordan Yemen Arabia Total 2015 Military Spending 1.53 4.43 9.88 5.09 81.9 14.4 117.23 15.9 21.1 1.3 1.89

Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, 2016 22 The Modernization Gap

23 Military Modernization • The gap between Iran and the Arab Gulf states is even greater in terms of arms transfers than in military spending, and has grown sharply in favor of the Arab states in recent years. • The broader failure of the GCC to achieve standardization and interoperability has been offset by the fact the two key Arab Gulf powers – Saudi Arabia and the UAE – have made massive and interoperable arms imports from the U.S. • U.S. forward basing in Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait aids their militaries, and compensates for some of their weaknesses. • Far more is involved than arms import spending. A review of key Iranian force elements shows many weapons are obsolete, obsolescent, or of relatively low quality. Many date back to the Shah or were worn during the fighting in the Iraq-Iraq War. Non-operational rates are often high, and sustainability in combat low. •Iran’s problems are made worse by a lack of access to upgrades to its systems, modern munitions, sensors, battle management, and IS&R equipment and sub-systems. These have a critical cumulative effect. 24 The New Arms Order Gap: Iran vs. GCC

180,000

160,000 Orders from U.S. Equal= 140,000 $30.5B in 2007-2010 $26.6B in 2011-2014 120,000

100,000

80,000 MillionsUSD of

60,000

40,000

20,000

- Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE GCC Iraq Iran Yemen Total Arabia 2011-2014 56,400 500 4,000 8,800 6,200 9,100 85,000 21,700 - 200 106,900 2007-2010 29,600 500 3,300 3,000 1,000 13,500 50,900 5,600 700 900 58,100

Source: Catherine A. Theohary, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2007-2014, Congressional Research Service, December 21, 2015, pp. 37-38. “0” represents any value below $50 million or nil. All data are rounded to the nearest $100 million . 25 The New Arms Delivery Gap: Iran vs. GCC

60,000

50,000 Deliveries from U.S. Equal = $10.1B in 2007-2010 40,000

30,000 Millions USD of

20,000

10,000

- Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE GCC Iraq Iran Yemen Total Arabia 2011-2014 16,000 400 1,600 3,100 900 6,800 28,800 6,600 100 100 35,600 2007-2010 10,900 500 1,300 500 200 2,000 15,400 2,600 500 400 18,900

27 The GCC Advantage in Suppliers: 2007-2010

35,000

30,000

25,000

20,000

15,000 Millions USD of

10,000

5,000

- Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar U.A.E. Iran Iraq Yemen Arabia All Others 100 - - - - - 200 200 100 All Other European 1,500 - - - - 1,500 100 500 300 Major West European 14,800 - - 2,800 700 1,700 - 500 100 China - - 300 - 100 100 - 100 - Russia - - 700 - - - 400 400 400 U.S. 13,200 500 2,300 200 200 10,200 - 3,900 -

Total Arms Transfers Deliveries by Supplier (2007-2014) 18,000

16,000

14,000

12,000

10,000

8,000 Millions USD of 6,000

4,000

2,000

- Saudi Saudi Bahrain Bahrain Kuwait Kuwait Oman Oman Qatar Qatar U.A.E. U.A.E. Iran Iran Iraq Iraq Yemen Yemen Arabia Arabia '07-'10 '11-'14 '07-'10 '11-'14 '07-'10 '11-'14 '07-'10 '11-'14 '07-'10 '11-'14 '07-'10 '11-'14 '07-'10 '11-'14 '07-'10 '11-'14 '07-'10 '11-'14 All Others - 100 ------100 300 100 - 100 - All Other European 700 700 - 100 - - - 100 - 100 300 1,200 200 400 - - 100 100 Major West European 4,300 5,700 - - - - 500 2,300 200 700 500 1,300 100 500 - - - - China 600 500 - - - 100 - - - - 100 - - 100 - - - - Russia - - - - - 100 - - - - 300 300 200 2,200 400 100 200 - U.S. 5,300 9,000 500 300 1,300 1,400 200 700 - 100 800 4,000 2,000 3,100 - - - -

60,000

50,000

40,000

30,000 Millions USD of 20,000

10,000

- Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar U.A.E. Iran Iraq Yemen Arabia All Others 100 - - 1,000 - 300 - 3,400 - All Other European 2,200 100 - 300 900 700 - 1,500 100 Major West European 6,500 - 100 4,400 5,200 600 - 400 - China 600 ------200 100 Russia - 100 400 - - 100 - 7,900 - U.S. 47,000 300 3,500 2,300 100 7,400 - 8,300 -

MBT 1,663+: 150 M60A1; 100 Chieftain Mk3/Mk5; 540 T-54/T-55/Type-59/Safir-74; 168M47/M48 (480 T-72Z? 75+ T-62? 150 Zulfiqar?) LT TK 80+: 80 Scorpion; RECCE 35 EE-9 Cascavel New AIFV 610: 210 BMP-1; 400 BMP-2 with 9K111 APC (T) 340+: 140 Boragh with 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 200 M113; BMT-2 Tanks? Cobra APC (W) 300+: 300 BTR-50/BTR-60; Rakhsh OAVs? SP 292+: 155mm 150+: 150 M109;; 175mm 22 M107; 203mm 30 M110 TOWED 2,030+; 105mm 150: 130 M101A1; 20 M-56; Attack 122mm 640: 540 D-30; 100 Type-54 (M-30); 130mm 985 M-46; 152mm 30 D-20; Copters? 155mm 205: 120 GHN-45; 70 M114; 15 Type-88 WAC-21; 203mm 20 M115 AIRCRAFT • 10 Cessna 185; 2 F-27 Friendship; 4 Turbo Commander 690 PAX 1 Falcon 20 SP Arty ATK 50 AH-1J Cobra TPT 173: Heavy 20 CH-47C Chinook; Medium 75: 50 Bell 214; 25 Mi-171; Light SHORAD 78: 68 Bell 205A (AB-205A); 10 Bell 206 Jet Ranger (AB-206) S? MANPAD 9K36 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin); 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; Misaq 1 (QW-1 Vanguard); Misaq 2 (QW- 18); 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch – reported); HN- 54 SP 180: 23mm 100 ZSU-23-4; 57mm 80 ZSU-57-2

31 Reliance on Aging/Mediocre Systems – Air

FTR 184+: 20 F-5B Freedom Fighter; 55+ F-5E Tiger II/F- 5F Tiger II; 24 F-7M Airguard; 43 F-14 Tomcat; 36 MiG- 29A/U/UB Fulcrum; up to 6 Azarakhsh reported FGA 110: 64 F-4D/E Phantom II; 10 Mirage F-1E; 30 Su- 24MK Fencer New D; up to 6 Saegheh reported Fighters? ATK 10: 7 Su-25K Frogfoot; 3 Su-25UBK Frogfoot (incl 4+ Su-25K/UBK deployed in Iraq; status unclear) ASW 5 P-3MP Orion ISR? ISR: 6+ RF-4E Phantom II* TKR/TPT B-707; ε2 B-747 Tankers? TPT 117: Heavy 12 Il-76 Candid; Medium ε19 C-130E/H Hercules; Light 75: 11 An-74TK-200; 5 An-140 (Iran-140 Faraz) (45 projected); 10 F-27 Friendship; 1 L-1329 Jetstar; 10 PC-6B Turbo Porter; 8 TB-21 UCAVs? Trinidad; 4 TB-200 Tobago; 3 Turbo Commander 680; 14 Y-7; 9 Y-12; PAX 11: 2 B-707; 1B-747; 4 B-747F; 1 Falcon 20; 3 Falcon 50 HELICOPTERS S-300/S- MRH 2 Bell 412 400? TPT 34+: Heavy 2+ CH-47 Chinook; Medium 30 Bell 214C (AB-214C); Light 2+: 2 Bell 206A Jet Ranger (AB-206A); some Shabaviz 2-75 (indigenous versions in production);some Shabaviz 2061

32 Reliance on Aging/Mediocre Systems – Air Defense

Air Defense Force SAM 529+: 250 FM-80 (Crotale); 30 Rapier; 15 Tigercat; 150+ MIM-23B I-HAWK/Shahin; 45 S-75 Dvina (SA-2 S-300 In Guideline); 10 S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon); 29 9K331Tor-M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet) (reported) Delivery MANPAD FIM-92A Stinger; 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail) S-400?

Army SP HQ-7 (reported) MANPAD 9K36 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin); 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail); Misaq 1 (QW-1 Vanguard); Misaq 2 (QW-11); Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch - reported); HN-54

33 Reliance on Aging/Mediocre Systems – Naval

FSGM 2 Jamaran (UK Vosper Mk 5 – 1 more undergoing sea trials) with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CSS-N-8 Saccade) AShM, 2 single lnchr with SM-1 SAM, 2 triple 324mm Mk32 ASTT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform FSG 5 Upgrades? 3 Alvand (UK Vosper Mk 5) with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CSS-N-8 Saccade) AShM, 2 triple Mk32 Does it 324mm ASTT, 1 114mm gun matter? 2 Bayandor (US PF-103) with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CSS-N-8 Saccade) AShM, 2 triple 324mm Mk32 ASMs? ASTT, 1 76mm gun PCFG 14 Kaman (FRA Combattante II) with 1–2 twin lnchr SSMs? with C-802 AShM, 1 76mm gun MSI 2 Riazi (US Cape) Air/UAVs? LSM 3 Farsi (ROK) (capacity 9 tanks; 140 troops) LST 4 Hengam each with up to 1 hel (capacity 9 tanks; 225 troops) LSL 6 Fouque

34 The GCC Threat to the GCC • Vast lead in military spending and arms imports • Support from US, Britain, France But, • Failure to create effective structures within the GCC for command, force planning, defense support. far too much a matter of façade and rhetoric. • Lack of national unity, common facilities, de facto dependence on U.S. Far too much a Saudi-UAE alliance with Oman on the outside. • Poor mission focus with limited coordination • Poor adaptation to asymmetric/irregular warfare, effective cooperation in counterterrorism, internal security. • Lack of integration, standardization, operational intreroperability • Problems in large-scale exercises and training; military realism • Problems in jointness – including security services, police, and intelligence – and combined arms. • Lack of balanced force development: Manpower quality and sustainability 35 U.S. and Outside Allied Forces: The Other Forces Impacting on the Regional Balance

36 The Role of Outside Forces

• The balance is not simply regional. The U.S., Britain, France, and Turkey regularly support the Arab Gulf states, and they and other European states play an active role in Iraq and the coalition against ISIS. • The U.S, Britain, and France all have bases in the Gulf region. • The U.S. has a massive lead in global military spending and the deployment of new weapons and technology in spite of limited recent cuts in baseline spending. • The West has given the Arab Gulf states a massive lead over Iran in modern weapons and imports of military technology. • The U.S. role is not determined by the forces it deploys in the region at any given time, but by its power projection capabilities. •The U.S. offers the Arab Gulf states a monopoly over Iran in access to satellite intelligence and advanced battle management and IS&R systems, and major assistance through common military exercises.

37 SIPRI Estimate of Global Military Spending: 2014-2015

National Share of Total for Top 15 Spenders

Source: SIPRI, Trends in Global Military Expenditure, April 5, 2016, https://www.google.com/search?q=sipri+military+spending&ie=utf-8&oe=utf- 38 8, ISIS Estimate of Global Military Spending: 2015

Source: IISS, The Military Balance, 2016, p. 19. 39 US Defense Budget: FY2001-FY2021 Budgets Since 9/11

Proposed Outyear Topline for Base Budget

Source: (OSD) Comptroller,Defense Budget Overview, February 2016, p. I-5 40 US Deployments Directly Affecting the Gulf: Early 2016 - I

ARABIAN SEA: US Central Command • Navy • 5th Fleet: 1 DDGHM; 1 LHD; 1 LPD; 1 LSD; Combined Maritime Forces • TF 53: 1 AE; 2 AKE; 1 AOH; 3 AO

BAHRAIN: US Central Command • 3,250; 1 HQ (5th Fleet); 2 AD bty with MIM-104E/F Patriot PAC-2/3

BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY: US Strategic Command • 550; 1 Spacetrack Optical Tracker at Diego Garcia; 1 ground-based electro optical deep space surveillance system (GEODSS) at Diego Garcia US Pacific Command • 1 MPS sqn (MPS-2 with equipment for one MEB) at Diego Garcia with 5 logistics and support ships; 1 naval air base at Diego Garcia, 1 support facility at Diego Garcia

DJIBOUTI: US Africa Command • 1,200; 1 tpt sqn with C-130H/J-30 Hercules; 1 spec ops sqn with MC-130H; PC-12 (U- 28A); 1 CSAR sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk; 1 naval air base

EGYPT: MFO 692; 1 ARNG recce bn; 1 ARNG spt bn

INDIAN OCEAN: US European Command • US Navy • 6th Fleet: 1 DDGHM IRAQ: US Central Command • Operation Inherent Resolve 3,500; 1 inf div HQ; 1 mne coy; 1 atk hel coy with AH-64D Apache; MQ-1B Predator

ISRAEL: US Strategic Command • 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Mount Keren

JORDAN: US Central Command • Operation Inherent Resolve 1 FGA sqn with 12 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 1 AD bty with MIM- 104E/F Patriot PAC-2/3

KUWAIT: US Central Command • 13,000; 1 armd bde; 1 ARNG (cbt avn) hel bde; 1 spt bde; 1 atk sqn with 12 A-10C Thunderbolt II; 4 AD bty with MIM-104E/F Patriot PAC-2/3; 1 (APS) armd bde set; 1 (APS) inf bde set

Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, 2016, pp. 50-52 41 US Deployments Directly Affecting the Gulf: Early 2016 - II

MEDITERRANEAN SEA: US European Command • US Navy • 6th Fleet: 4 DDGM; 1 LHD; 1 LPD; 1 LSD; 1 LCC

MIDDLE EAST-UN: UNTSO 2 obs

PACIFIC OCEAN: US Pacific Command • US Navy • 3rd Fleet: 8 SSBN; 17 SSGN; 10 SSN; 4 CVN; 9 CGHM; 18 DDGHM; 6 DDGM; 4 FFHM; 3 MCO; 2 LHD; 1 LHA; 3 LPD; 3 LSD; US Pacific Command • US Navy • 7th Fleet: 1 FFHM

GULF: US Central Command • Navy • 5th Fleet: 2 DDGM; 10 PCO; 6 (Coast Guard) PCC; Combined Maritime Forces • CTF-152: 4 MCO; 1 AFSB

QATAR; US Central Command • 8,000: 1 bbr sqn with 6 B-1B Lancer; 1 ISR sqn with 4 RC-135 Rivet Joint; 1 ISR sqn with 4 E-8C JSTARS; 1 tkr sqn with 24 KC-135R/T Straotanker; 1 tpt sqn with 4 C-17A Globemaster; 4 C-130H/J-30 Hercules; 2 AD bty with MIM-104E/F Patriot PAC-2/3; US Strategic Command • 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar

SAUDI ARABIA: US Central Command • 350

TURKEY: US European Command • 1,550; 1 FGA sqn with 6 F-15C Eagle; 6 F-15E Strike Eagle; 1 atk sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II; 1 CISR UAV sqn with MQ-1B Predator UAV; 1 spec ops flt with AC-130U Spectre; 1 air base at Incirlik; 1 support facility at Ankara; 1 support facility at Izmir; US Strategic Command • 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Kürecik; NATO • Active Fence: 2 AD bty with Patriot PAC-2/3

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: US Central Command • 5,000: 1 ftr sqn with 6 F-22A Raptor; 1 FGA sqn with 12 F-15E Strike Eagle; 1 ISR sqn with 4 U-2; 1 AEW&C sqn with 4 E-3 Sentry; 1 tkr sqn with 12 KC-10A; 1 ISR UAV sqn with RQ-4 Global Hawk; 2 AD bty with MIM-104E/F Patriot PAC-2/3

Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, 2016, pp. 50-52 42 US Army Global Power Projection: 2016

Source: U.S. Army, February 2016, http://www.asafm.army.mil/offices/BU/BudgetMat.aspx?OfficeCode=1200

43 US Navy and Marine Corps Global Power Projection: 2016

Source: U.S. Navyy, February 2016, http://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Pages/Fiscal-Year-2017.aspx 44 US Air Force Global Power Projection: 2016

45 Source: U.S. Air Force, February 2016, http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/budget/ US and Allied Air Operations in Iraq/Syria : 2014-2016

As of 4:59 p.m. EST July 12, the U.S. and coalition had conducted a total of 13,803 strikes (9,273 Iraq / 4,530 Syria). U.S. has 10,577 strikes in Iraq and Syria (6,294 Iraq / 4,283 Syria) Rest of Coalition has 3,226 strikes in Iraq and Syria (2,979 Iraq / 247 Syria) The countries that participated in the strikes included: In Iraq: (1) Australia, (2) Belgium, (3) Canada, (4) Denmark, (5) France, (6) Jordan, (7) The Netherlands, and (8) UK In Syria: (1) Australia, (2) Bahrain, (3) Canada, (4) France, (5) Jordan, (6) The Netherlands, (7) Saudi Arabia, (8) Turkey (9) UAE and (10) UK As of Apr. 16, U.S. and partner nation aircraft have flown an estimated 91,821 sorties in support of operations in Iraq and Syria.

Source: U.S. Department of Defense, http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve. , 46 Illustrative Coalition of the Actually Deployed – ISIS/Syria War

Air Deployments in U.S.-Led Coalition Fighting ISIS in Syria and Iraq, and Russian Air Units in Syria: November 2015,

United States United Kingdom Russia Turkey Cyprus Syria (Incirlik Air Base) (RAF Akrotiri) (Basel al-Assad Air Base) „Ñ6 F-15C Eagle Ftr ac „Ñ8 Tornado GR4 FGA ac „Ñ12 Su-24M Fencer FGA ac „Ñ12 A-10C Thunderbolt II Atk ac „Ñ1 Sentinel R1 ISR ac „Ñ4 Su-30SM FGA ac „Ñ1+ AC-130U Atk ac Kuwait „Ñ4 Su-34 Fullback FGA ac „ÑMQ-1B Predator CISR UAV (Ali al Salem AB) „Ñ10 Su-25SM Frogfoot Atk ac Jordan „ÑMQ-9A Reaper CISR UAV „Ñ 2 Su-25UBM Frogfoot (Mowafaq al Salti Air Base ) Qatar Atk ac „Ñ6 F-16V Fighting Falcon FGA ac (Al Udeid Air Base) „Ñ1 Il-20M ELINT ac Kuwait „Ñ1 RC-135W Rivet Joint ELINT ac „Ñ12 Mi-24P Hind Atk hel United States „Ñ 6 Mi-8AMTSh Hip TPT hel (Ahmed al Jaber Air Base) „Ñ12 A-10C Thunderbolt II Atk ac Netherlands (Ali al Salem Air Base) Jordan „ÑMQ-1B Predator CISR UAV (Mowafaq al Salti Air Base ) „ÑMQ-9A Reaper CISR UAV „Ñ 4 F-16AM Fighting Falcon Ftr ac Qatar (Al Udeid Air Base) Australia „Ñ6 B-1B Lancer Bbr ac UAE „Ñ4 RC-135V/W Rivet Joint ELINT ac (Minhad Air Base) UAE „Ñ6 F/A-18A Hornet FGA ac (Al Dhafra Air Base) „Ñ6 F-22A Raptor Ftr ac Canada „Ñ12 F-15E Strike Eagle FGA ac Kuwait (to be withdrawn) „ÑU-2S ISR ac (Ahmed al Jaber Air Base) RQ-4B Global Hawk ISR UAV „Ñ6 CF-18A Hornet FGA ac „Ñ2 CP-140A Aurora MP ac France Jordan Italy (Mowafaq al Salti Air Base) Kuwait „Ñ3 Mirage 2000D FGA ac (Ahmed al Jaber Air Base) „Ñ3 Mirage 2000N FGA ac „Ñ4 Tornado IDS FGA ac (ISR only) UAE „ÑMQ-1B Predator ISR UAV (Al Dhafra Air Base) „Ñ6 Rafale FGA ac „Ñ1 Atlantique 2 MP ac

IISS estimate in the 2016 edition of the Military Balance as of November, 2015, pp. 312 and 315 47 Illustrative Coalition of the Semi Deployed - Yemen

Deployments in Saudi-UAE.-Led Coalition Fighting ISIS in Syria and Iraq: November 2015, and Russian Air Units in Syria

IISS estimate in the 2016 edition of the Military Balance as of November, 2015, p. 315. 48 The “Wild Cards” in Outside Support

• Uncertain U.S. domestic politics, future security commitments, and willingness to act decisively under pressure. Focus on terrorism threat versus other threats. • Declining European military spending and uncertain future power projection capabilities, particularly as they affect Britain and France. • Impact of China’s expanding forces, role in Indian Ocean, new Silk Road(s) and port facilities, and basing rights in Djibouti. • Growing Russian tension with U.S. and West, future Russian arms sales to and alignments with Iran, use of power projection capabilities. • Future Character and Role of Turkey. • The impact on the Gulf of the civil wars and fighting against ISIS in Syria and Iraq, future roles of Iran, Kurds, and broader Sunni-Shi’ite tensions. •Impact on the Gulf of any future Israeli conflict with Hezbollah, Palestinians. • Impact of a major political upheaval in any Gulf State. • Outcome of the fighting in Yemen,

49 Playing the “Wild Card:” Russian Forces Used or Deployed in Syria Through July 2016

Source: Adapted from Wikipedia and reporting in the New York Times and Washington Post. 50 Comparative Military Manpower

51 Military Manpower • Does reveal one key area of Iranian superiority: Total land force manpower. • But, • No metric is used more often in media or has less meaning. Largely irrelevant unless tied to function, quality, training, and readiness. • Most data represent nominal authorized totals, may or may not relate to reality. • Conscripts often poorly trained, supported. Lack effective ability to fight modern weapons. • Paramilitary and internal security forces differ wildly in quality from elite forces to the equivalent of armed lamp posts. • Uncertain, but real move towards giving junior officers and NCOs more authority and independence. • Promotion sometimes not tied to valid performance; family or political. •Reserves generally too low in quality to matter in most contingencies. •Arab Gulf Forces often dependent on civilian contractors for sustainability and support.

52 Comparative Military Manpower: 2016

600000

500000

400000

300000

200000

100000

0 Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Yemen Army 350000 54000 75000 6000 11000 25000 8500 44000 60000 Guard 125000 100000 6400 12000 Air 30000 4000 20000 1500 25000 5000 1500 4500 3000 Air Def. 3000 16000 2000 Navy 18000 3000 13500 700 2000 4200 1800 2500 1700

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016.

Note: Given current civil war, accurate and current force counts for Yemen are difficult to determine. Therefore, unless otherwise noted, force numbers from Yemen are drawn from the 2015 IISS Military Balance. 53 Comparative Paramilitary Manpower: 2016

160000

140000

120000

100000

80000

60000

40000

20000

0 Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Yemen Navy 18000 3000 13500 700 2000 4200 1800 2500 MOI Forces Militias 100,000 20000 Coastguard 4500 260 500 400 1200 Border Guard 9000 10500 Special Security 500 Police 36000 9000 Facilities Security Force 9000 Guard 2000 6600 4000 Other 50000 50000 Basij

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016 54 The Challenge of Asymmetric Warfare:

Intimidation, Deterrence, and Warfighting from Iran and Non-State Actors

55 Asymmetric/Irregular Warfare • There is no clear dividing line between terrorism, asymmetric warfare, and conventional warfare. • There also is no clear line at which deterrence and intimidation move from limited or deniable acts of violence to war. • Cyber and Internet warfare have become key components of the balance. Strategic communications/propaganda/political/ideological/warfare are often dominated by civilians. • Coalition warfare is increasingly coalitions of willing and able state and non-state actors. • Ideological, religious, political, and economic warfare may rely on the balance of deterrence and warfighting capability without using force or suddenly trigger its use in asymmetric forms. • Laws and restraint are steadily weakening. Civilians and human shields have become de facto weapons of war. • As Russian has shown, power projection can become a key form of asymmetric warfare. 56 The Growing Role of Non-State Actors • Range from serious Non-State Forces to “Lone Wolf” attacks. • Large-scale mass killings, IEDs and bombings • Insurgents, however, are not “terrorists,” but asymmetric forces • Emerging sectarian and ethnic forces forces play a growing role, particularly Hezbollah, Iraqi Shi’ite and Sunni PMFs, Sunni Arab rebel groups in Syria, and various Kurdish Forces. • Quasi-state actors also play a growing role through train and assist missions, embedded advisors, volunteers, groups like Iranian Al Quds force. • Civilians increasingly play a role as both non-state actors and as hostages and human shields. • Contractors and support personnel are de facto non-state actors if they support combat operations. • So are covert Special Forces, personnel, and intelligence forces like the CIA and MOIS. 57 Non-State “Armies - I

ISIS, ISIL/Daesh Kurdish Pesh Merga

60,000 maximum including volunteers with little combat capability 90,00-150,000 with police 20,000-35,000 fighters 10,000-15,000 inIraq MBT T-54; T-55; T-62 RECCE EE-9 Cascavel MBT M1A1 Abrams†*; T-55; T-62; T-72AV; T-72M1 AIFV 2+ EE-11 Urutu RECCE BRDM-2 APC (T) MT-LB; YW-701 (Type-63) AIFV BMP-1; BTR-4* APC (W) M1117 ASV; Wer’wolf MkII APC PPV HMMWV; M1114 (up-armoured HMMWV); ILAV APC (T) M113*; MT-LB Cougar 6x6; Otokar APV; IAG Guardian; Streit Spartan; APC (W) M1117 ASV* Caiman; Maxxpro; Reva; up to 14 Dingo 1 PPV ILAV Cougar*; Dzik-3* ARTY ARTY SP 122mm 2S1 SP 122mm 2S1 TOWED 87.6mm 1+ 25 pdr: 122mm 6+ D-30 TOWED 122mm D-30; 130mm M-46/Type-59; 155mm MRL 107mm Type 63 (tch); 122mm BM-21 (inc mod); M198* HM20 MRL 107mm Type-63; 122mm BM-21 MOR 60mm M224; 81mm M252; 120mm M120; 130mm MOR 120mm M120 M-46/Type-59; 152mm D-20 AT AT MSL • MANPATS 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); MSL ● MANPATS HJ-8; 9M14 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn); 9K135 Kornet (AT-14 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K135 Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan); Milan Spriggan); up to 60 Milan RCL 73mm SPG-9; 90mm M-79 Osa (reported); 106mm RCL 73mm SPG-9; 88mm Breda Folgore; 84mm up to 43 M40A1* Carl Gustav; up to 1,000 AT-4; 105mm M40 AD RL 110mm up to 400 Panzerfaust 3 SAM • MANPAD FN-6; 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; AD 9K34 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin) GUNS GUNS SP 14.5mm ZPU-1 (tch); ZPU-2 (tch); ZPU-4 (tch) SP 14.5mm ZPU (tch); 23mm ZSU-23-4; ZSU-23 (tch); 20mm 53T2 Tarasque (tch); 23mm ZU-23-2 (tch/on MTLB); 57mm S-60 (tch) 57mm ZSU-57; S-60 (tch) TOWED 23mm ZU-23; 57mm S-60 TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-1; ZPU-2; ZPU-4: 20mm 53T2 Tarasque; 57mm S-60 ARV 1+ Type-653 AIRCRAFT Reported access to KRG transport/utility helicopters Rpugh estimate based on IISS, Military Balance, 2016, pp. 490-492 58 Non-State “Armies - I

Hezbollah

7,000-10,000 actives (4,000-8,000 in Syria 20,000 reserves

MBT T-72 ARTY• MRL 122mm BM-21; 240mm Fadjr 3; 330mm Fadjr 5; 610mm Zelzal 2 (reported) AT • MSL • MANPATS 9K111 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K115-2 Metis-M (AT-13 Saxhorn 2); 9K135 Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan); Milan MSL • SRBM Fateh 110/M-600 (reported); SS-1D Scud C (reported); SS-1E Scud D (reported) AD • SAM• MANPAD some possible UAV some* UCAV some

Rpugh estimate based on IISS, Military Balance, 2016, pp. 490-492 59 Most Likely Iranian Threats Are Not Formal Conflicts

• Direct and indirect threats of using force. (I.e. Iranian efforts at proliferation) • Use of irregular forces and asymmetric attacks. • Proxy conflicts using terrorist or extremist movements or exploiting internal sectarian, ethnic, tribal, dynastic, regional tensions. • Arms transfers, training in host country, use of covert elements like Quds force. • Harassment and attrition through low level attacks, clashes, incidents. • Limited, demonstrative attacks to increase risk, intimidation. • Strike at critical node or infrastructure.

60 The Broader Patterns in Iranian Activity

Related States/ Target/Operating Iranian Actors Non-State Actors Country

Revolutionary Guards Iran Iraq Al Qaeda force Syria Israel Vevak/other intelligence Hezbollah Egypt Arms transfers Hamas Kuwait Military and security advisors Mahdi Army Bahrain Clerics, pilgrims, shrines Yemeni Shi’ites Syria Commercial training Bahraini Shi’ites Yemen Finance/investment Saudi Shi’ites Lebanon Investment/training companies Afghanistan Education: scholarships, teachers Venezuela Cultural exchanges Athletic visits

61 Blending Conventional and Asymmetric: Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps - I

• Close ties to Supreme Leader, steadily emerging power base relative to regular forces, in terms of impact on industry, role in Gulf and ballistic/cruise missiles. • Estimates of total manning differ sharply, as do estimates of detailed order of battle. • Has range of different land-air-sea components plus Al Quds Force for support of foreign forces, and Basij for defense in depth and internal security. • Estimate based largely on IISS 2016 Military Balance: • Controls Iran’s IRBM, MRBM, and SRBM missile forces, longer range UAVs/UCAVs/cruise missiles. • 100,000+ in land forces with heavy reserve elements, and external defense, and power projection roles. Nominal order of battle is 31 provincial corps HQ (2 in Tehran), 3 special operations divisions, 2 armored divisions, 3 armored brigades, 8+ light infantry divisions, 5+ light infantry brigades, 1 airborne brigade. (Equipment holdings not estimated separately.) • Naval branch has 15,000 men plus 5,000 Marines with 1 Amphibious Brigade. Has some shore batteries plus HY-2 (CSS-C-3 Seersucker) and other land-based anti-ship missiles. Has 46 missile patrol boats with mix of C-701 (Kosar); C-704 (Nasr); C-802;and HY-2 (CSS-C-3 Seersucker) missiles, 35 larger patrol boats without missiles, 32 smaller patrol boats, speedboats with high explosives in prow, 4 LST landing ships (2 can lay mines). • Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Air Force controls Iran’s strategic missile force. Has 1 brigade with Shahab-1/2, 1 battalion with Shahab-3; Ghadr-1; Sajjil-2 (in development). Force has 22+ MRBMs: 12+ Shahab-3/Ghadr-1 (mobile); 10 Shahab-3/Ghadr-1 (silo); some Sajjil-2, and 18+ SRBMs including Fateh 110; 12-18 Shahab-1/2 (ε200–300 missiles) and some Zelzal. • Basij Resistance Force -- up to 1,000,000 men on mobilization. The IISS describes this as Paramilitary militia, with claimed membership of 12.6 million; perhaps 1 million combat capable; in the process of closer integration with IRGC Ground Forces.

Source: Adapted from various sources including IISS, Military Balance 2016, and IHS Janes, Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - The Gulf States, 62 “Iran, Strategic Weapon Systems,” April 12, 2016. Blending Conventional and Asymmetric: Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps - II

• IHS Jane’s indicates:

• Commanded by Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari.

• Land forces train for both conventional and asymmetric warfare, and “mosaic warfare” in irregular defense in depth tactics for attrition warfare. They have some 100,000 personnel, two armored divisions, five mechanized divisions, up to 18 infantry divisions, as well as independent brigades, special forces elements, paratroop units in some 31 detachments. Armor has T-54/55/69/72 tanks, APCs. 48th "Fath" Brigade secures Iran’s Kurds. 33 province-based special units known as Saberin (Patients), able to conduct long-range operations of various types for a prolonged period of time, and with limited logistic support.

• Naval Branch has some 20,000 personnel, trained in asymmetric warfare, including up to four naval infantry brigades with limited sealift capabilities. Equipped withspme313 vessels including 10 Houdong missile patrol boats with C-802 anti-ship missiles, morethan 40 other fast attack craft (with unguided rockets, missiles and some with mine-laying capabilities), coastal defense of anti-ship missiles, up to 20 midget-submarines and swimmer delivery vehicles. Based on islands and coastal areas like Siri Island, Farsi, Halileh, Abu Musa, Khorramshahr, Larak, and Bandar Abbas. Coastal defence forces have naval guns and HY-2 'Seersucker' land-based anti-ship missiles in five to seven sites along coast.

• IRGCAF has five brigades. Deploys 250 FROG 7, 200 Oghab, 250 Shahin-2, 500 Nazet/Iran130, Fateh 110, Fateh A-100, Fath-110D1, 200 Tondar 69, 250 Shahab-1, 50 Shahab-2, 25 Shahab-3, 18 BM-25,Qaim-1, and Emad.

• Some 600,000 Basij regularly train for internal security and defense in attrition forms of defense in depth.

Source: Adapted from various sources including IISS, Military Balance 2016, and IHS Janes, Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - The Gulf States, 63 “Iran, Strategic Weapon Systems,” April 12, 2016. The Iranian Al Quds/Qods/Jerusalem Force

• Part of IRGC, but reports directly to Supreme Leader. • Commander is Major General Qasem Soleimani • 2,000 to 30,000 personnel? More likely to be smaller, more elite. • Origin is support Kurds against Saddam in Iran-Iraq War. Has steadily expanded into support of Lebanese Hizbollah, and roles in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Latin America. • Supported creation of Hizbollahs in other countries. • May be organized into regional directorates: Europe and U.S , Iraq, Israel/Lebanon/Jordan/Palestinian, Afghanistan/India/Pakistan, Turkey, North Africa, FSU/Latin America? • Roles include combatants, forward advisors, train and assist, arms transfers, intelligence. Played key role in IED supply in Iraq in 2003-2011 • Coordinates with IRGC, and evidently with MOI/Vevak

64 Iranian Influence

Source: New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/03/30/world/middleeast/middle-east-alliances-saudi-arabia-iran.html?_r=0

65 The “Shi’ite Crescent”

66 Bahrain’s Vulnerability

Ethnic groups: Bahraini 46%, non-Bahraini 54% (2010 census)

Languages: Arabic (official), English, Farsi, Urdu

Religions: Muslim (Shia and Sunni) 81.2%, Christian 9%, other 9.8% (2001 census)

Population: 1,281,332 July 2013 est. country comparison to the world: 157 note: includes 235,108 non-nationals

Age structure: 0-14 years: 20% (male 130,097/female 126,067) 15-24 years: 15.9% (male 113,973/female 89,602) 25-54 years: 56.2% (male 472,537/female 247,873) 55-64 years: 5.2% (male 43,884/female 23,352) 65 years and over: 2.6% (male 16,262/female 17,685) (2013 est.) \

67 Yemen and the Gate of Tears

68 Amphibious Ships & Landing Craft

25 Ferries and cargo vessels can provide substantial additional lift if can secure 20 ports

0 Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Yemen Amphibious Ships 1 1 Landing Craft 23 16 9 5 1 28 3

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from IISS, The Military Balance, various editions, Jane’s Sentinel series, and material provided by US and Saudi experts.. 69 The Land Balance in the Gulf

70 The Land Balance • IRGC has superior manpower and mass, as well as large artillery forces. Arab Gulf states have better weapons, more armor. • Iraq no longer has the forces to directly challenge Iran, but Iran would have to attack through Iraq by land to reach Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, and would be exposed to massive precision air attacks. • Neither side’s forces are designed, well-organized, or trained to sustain long-range maneuver warfare. • Iran has limited forced entry amphibious warfare training, and any amphibious force could face a major air and naval threat. • The balance in joint warfare favors the Arab Gulf states in defensive warfare, particularly with U.S. precision air strike support. • But, the “Kuwaiti hinge” is vulnerable. • Much depends on Iraq’s future military relations with Iran. • The uncertain unity of GCC and Arab Gulf forces makes teffective collective defense uncertain. • The land threat also includes violent extremist and non-state actors. Civil conflicts are a real threat. 71 Iran’s Strategic Depth

72 7272 Comparative Land Force Manpower

1000000

900000

800000

700000

600000

500000

400000

300000

200000

100000

0 Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Yemen Paramilitary 40000 145000 24500 11260 7100 4400 71200 Guards 100000 6400 12000 IRGC 125000 Reserves 350000 23700 Army 350000 54000 75000 6000 11000 25000 8500 44000 60000

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016. Note: Kuwait’s Reserves include all branches of their military. Their actual ground reserve manpower is lower, but by how much is not available to IISS. Also, Iran’s 1,000,000 man Basij Resistance force is not included because it would skew the balance of forces. 73 Comparative Land Force Combat Units - I

SF Company 60 Independent Infantry Company SF Regiment Guard Regiment

50 SF Battalion Commando Battalion Guard Battalion Security Brigade 40 Airborne Brigade SF Brigade Commando Brigade 30 Mechanised Brigade Armoured Brigade Guard Brigade 20 Infantry Brigade Commando Division Motor Division Mechanised Division 10 Armoured Division Infantry Division

0 Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Yemen

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016. Includes IRGC 74 Comparative Land Force Combat Units - II

Units (size and type) Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Yemen Infantry Division 8 4 Armoured Division 2 1 Mechanised Division 4 Motor Division 2 Commando Division 1 1 Infantry Brigade 17 1 1 2 27 Guard Brigade 1 1 1 Armoured Brigade 10 4 1 3 1 1 2 12 Mechanised Brigade 16 5 3 3 2 11 Commando Brigade 6 SF Brigade 1 2 1 Airborne Brigade 2 1 Security Brigade 1 Guard Battalion 1 Commando Battalion 1 SF Battalion 1 Guard Regiment 1 SF Regiment 1 Independent Infantry Company SF Company 1

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016. Includes IRGC and coastguard forces

75 Comparative Armor

Ground Forces Land Equipment 9000

8000

7000

6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

0 Iraq Iran GCC Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait Saudi Arabia UAE Yemen AIFV 240 610 1,667 25 40 0 432 765 405 200 APC 2,502 640 3,981 200 190 206 260 1,573 1,552 258 LT TK/RECCE 73 115 790 22 92 174 11 310 181 130 MBT 270 1,663 1,771 180 30 117 293 730 421 880

MBT LT TK/RECCE APC AIFV

Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, 2016. All numbers from Yemen are taken from IISS, Military Balance, 2015 due to lack of date from 2016 due to the ongoing conflict. 76 Comparative Main Battle Tanks

Comparative Main Battle Tanks 2000

1800

1600

1400

1200

1000

800

600

400

200

0 Iraq Iran GCC Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait Saudi Arabia UAE Yemen MBT 270 1,663 1,771 180 30 117 293 730 421 880

MBT

Comparative Modern Tanks 900

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0 Iraq Iran Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait Saudi Arabia UAE Yemen M-1A2 218 200 M-60A1 150 6 50 M-60A3 180 73 290 Challenger 2 38 Leclerc 340 M-84 75 T-72 120 480 70 OF-40 36 Zulfiqar 150

Zulfiqar OF-40 T-72 M-84 Leclerc Challenger 2 M-60A3 M-60A1 M-1A2

Artillery, Rockets, Mortars 10,000

9,000

8,000

7,000

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

0 Iraq Iran Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait Saudi Arabia UAE GCC Yemen Self-propelled artillery 48 292 82 28 24 106 224 181 645 25 Towed Artilliery 60 2,030 36 12 108 0 110 93 359 310 Multiple Rocket Launchers 3 1,476 9 6 0 27 60 74 167 294 Mortars 950 5,000 24 45 101 78 437 227 912 642

Mortars Multiple Rocket Launchers Towed Artilliery Self-propelled artillery

• Army not structure for sustained maneuver outside Iran. •Limited land/air and air/sea capabilities. • Ethnic and/or sectarian limits on occupation and influence. • Iraq, Syria, Hezbollah, Hammas, Hazara not proxies • Land movement must sweep through Iraq to “Kuwaiti hinge” or Ar Ar in Saudi Arabia. • Very limited amphibious forced entry capability with no credible air cover. • “Closing the Gulf” triggers major war Iran must lose, shuts on trade to Iran. • Al Quds, arms transfer, volunteers, and training either need strong host country partner or are spoiler functions. • “Spoiler function” more irritant than way of achieving goals. • Proliferation breed proliferation, missile breed missiles and missile defenses. •Intimidation leads to added reliance on US.

80 The Kuwaiti “Hinge”

81 The Air Balance in the Gulf

82 82 The Air Balance

• The Arab Gulf states have a decisive advantage in combat aircraft numbers and quality, munitions quality, battle management, AC&W, and IS&R. • This advantage is reinforced by U.S. ad European power projection, stealth,” real time targeting, and precision strike capabilities. • Iran’s surface-to-air missile systems and land-based sensors are equally limited relative to Gulf Arab and U.S. Systems. • Iran’s present vulnerabilities could give Arab and U.S. forces both air superiority and survivable deep strike capabilities in a matter of days. • Iran’s infrastructure and military bases have many critical point targets that are vulnerable to civilian precision strike. • Iran’s efforts to produce it own aircraft and surface-to-air missile systems have had very limited results, although Iran has been able to keep systems operable and make useful modifications of its own. • Iran’s ballistic and cruise missile systems offer a potential counter to Arab Gulf and Western airpower, but now lack the required combination of precision strike capability and conventional warhead lethality to be effective. • Russian and increasingly China can offer far more modern air and land-based air defense systems. The Russian sale of the TOR-M and S300 are cases in point.

83 Gulf Air Bases

84 Air/Missile Threats

•Precision air strikes on critical facilities: Raid or mass attack. •Terror missile strikes on area targets; some chance of smart, more accurate kills. •Variation on 1987-1988 “Tanker War” •Raids on offshore and critical shore facilities. •Strikes again tankers or naval targets. •Attacks on US-allied facilities •Use of UAVs as possible delivery systems (conventional or Unconventional munitions) But: •Weak capability, high vulnerability to counterstrikes, poor escalation ladder •High risk of US and allied intervention. •Limited threat power projection and sustainability. •Unclear strategic goal. 85 Range of Iran’s Air Power

86 Comparative Gulf Fixed Wing Combat Air Strength

Fixed Wing Combat Air Strength 400 40% to 60% of Iranian inventory 350 is not

300 operational

250

200

150

100

0 Iraq Iran Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait Saudi Arabia UAE Yemen

Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, 2016. All numbers from Yemen are taken from IISS, Military Balance, 2015 due to lack of date from 2016 because of the ongoing conflict. Note: Only armed or combat-capable aircraft are counted, not trainers, recce or other aircraft. Iraq has 6 Cessna AC-208Bs 87 fulfilling dual recce and attack roles. Furthermore, 40-60% of Iran’s force are not operational. Comparative Fighter/Attack Aircraft in 2016

Comparative Fighter/Attack Aircraft in 2016 600 400500 200300 1000 Iraq Iran GCC Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait Saudi Arabia UAE Yemen Typhoon-2 53 53 Tornado ADV Tornado IDS 69 69 Mirage 2000 79 12 67 Mirage F-1E 10 MiG-29 36 16 MiG-25 MiG-21/21U 18 Su-25 7 10 Su-24 30 31 Su-20/22 F-18 39 39 F-16 4 123 21 24 78 F-15S 70 70 F-15C/D 81 81 F-14 43 F-7M 24 F-5 B/E/F 75 12 12 10 F-4D/E 64 Jaguar S/B L-159 ALCA 9 Saegheh 6 Azarakhsh 6

Azarakhsh Saegheh L-159 ALCA Jaguar S/B F-4D/E F-5 B/E/F F-7M F-14 F-15C/D F-15S F-16 F-18 Su-20/22 Su-24 Su-25 MiG-21/21U MiG-25 MiG-29 Mirage F-1E Mirage 2000 Tornado IDS Tornado ADV Typhoon-2

88 Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, 2016; and the Jane’s Sentinel series Comparative High Quality Fighter/Attack Aircraft High Quality Fighter/Attack Aircraft 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 Iraq Iran GCC Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait Saudi Arabia UAE Yemen Typhoon-2 53 53 Tornado ADV Tornado IDS 69 69 Mirage 2000 79 12 67 MiG-29 36 16 MiG-25 Su-25 7 10 Su-24 30 31 Su-20/22 F-18 39 39 F-16 4 123 21 24 78 F-15S 70 70 F-15C/D 81 81 F-14 43 F-7M 24 F-5 B/E/F 75 12 12 10 F-4D/E 64 Saegheh 6

Saegheh F-4D/E F-5 B/E/F F-7M F-14 F-15C/D F-15S F-16 F-18 Su-20/22 Su-24 Su-25 MiG-25 MiG-29 Mirage 2000 Tornado IDS Tornado ADV Typhoon-2

0 Iraq Iran Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait Saudi Arabia UAE Yemen CH-2000 8 Cessna 208B 3 8 SB7L-360 2 Da-20 Falcon ELINT RF-4E 6 Mirage 2000 RAD 7 E-3A AWACS Tornado IDS 69 P-3MP Orion 5 P-F3 Orion

P-F3 Orion P-3MP Orion Tornado IDS E-3A AWACS Mirage 2000 RAD RF-4E Da-20 Falcon ELINT SB7L-360 Cessna 208B CH-2000

0 Iraq Iran Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait Saudi Arabia UAE Yemen Da-20 Falcon 3 P-3F 3 RF-4E 6 Mirage 2000 RAD 7 Cessna 208B 8 8 SB7L-360 2 E-3A 5 Tornado GR1A 12

Tornado GR1A E-3A SB7L-360 Cessna 208B Mirage 2000 RAD RF-4E P-3F Da-20 Falcon

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Saudi Iraq Iran Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait UAE Yemen Arabia AH-1F 12 L-159 2 Mi-28NE 9 RH-53D 3 Mi-25 24 Mi-35 16 8 AS-332 Exocet 7 Commando Exocet 8 SH-3D 10 AH-1E 16 AH-1J 50 SA-342 HOT 11 13 AS-532 Exocet 3 10 AS-560C3 AS-565 15 7 AH-64 16 39 30

AH-64 AS-565 AS-560C3 AS-532 Exocet SA-342 HOT AH-1J AH-1E SH-3D Commando Exocet AS-332 Exocet Mi-35 Mi-25 RH-53D Mi-28NE L-159 AH-1F

Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, 2016. All numbers from Yemen are taken from IISS, Military Balance, 2015 due to lack of date 92 from 2016 because of the ongoing conflict. Gulf Armed Helicopters in 2016

Armed Helicopters 90 120 83 83

80 78

100 70

60 80

60 39 40

32 30 25 40 22 20 16

2010 8

0 Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Yemen 0 Iraq Iran Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait Saudi Arabia UAE Yemen Helicopters 73 65 34 39 16 29 109 102 8

Bahrain 8 I Hawk MIM-23B 60 RBS-70 27 guns 18 FIM-92A Stinger 15 Oerlikon 35 mm 7 Crotale 12 L/70 40 mm

Iran 16/150 I Hawk SA-7/14/16, HQ-7 1,700 Guns 3/10 SA-5 29 SA-15 ZSU-23-4 23mm 45 SA-2 Guideline S o me QW-1 Misaq ZPU-2/4 23mm 29 TOR-M1 ZU-23 23mm Some HN-5 M-1939 37mm 5/30 Rapier S-60 57mm 10 Pantsyr (SA-22) ZSU-57-2 Some FM-80 (Ch Crotale) 15 Tigercat Some FIM-92A Stinge r ______Iraq Gulf

Kuwait 5 / 24 I Hawk Phase III 12 Aspide 12 Oerlikon 35mm 5/40 Patriot PAC-2 12 S t a rburst Aspide Land- Stinger

Oman None Blowpipe 26 guns 8 Mistral 2 SP 4 ZU-23-2 23 mm Based 12 Panstsyr S1E 10 GDF-005 Skyguard 35 mm 34 SA-7 12 L-60 40 mm 6 Blindfire S713 Martello Air 20 Javelin 40 Rapier

Defenses Qatar None 10 Blowpipe ? 12 FIM-92A Stinger 9 Roland II 24 Mistral 20 SA-7 In 2011 ______Saudi Arabia 16/128 I Hawk 40 Crotale 1,220 guns 4-6/16-24 Patriot 2 500 Stinger (ARMY) 92 M-163 Vulcan 20 mm 17/73 Shahine Mobile 500 Mistral (ADF) 30 M-167 Vulcan 20 mm (NG) 16/96 PAC-2 launchers 500 FIM-43 Redeye 850 AMX-30SA 30 mm 17 ANA/FPS-117 radar 500 R e d e ye (ADF ) 128 GDF Oerlikon 35mm 73/68 Crotale/Shahine 73-141 Shahine static 150 L-70 40 mm (in store) 130 M-2 90 mm (NG)

UAE 2/6/36 I Hawk 20+ Blowpipe 62 guns 20 Mistral 42 M-3VDA 20 mm SP Some Rapier 20 GCF-BM2 30 mm Some Crotale Some RB-70 Some Javelin Some SA-18 Yemen Some SA-2, 3 Some 800 SA-7 530 guns Some SA-6 SP Some SA-9 SP 20 M-163 Vulcan SP 20mm Some SA-13 SP 50 ZSU-23-4 SP 23 mm Some SA-14 100 ZSU-23-2 23 mm 150 M-1939 37 mm 50 M-167 20mm 120 S-60 57 mm 40 M-1939 KS-12 85 mm

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from IISS, The Military Balance, Periscope, JCSS, Middle East 94 Military Balance, Jane’s Sentinel and Jane’s Defense Weekly. Some data adjusted or estimated by the author. Comparative Land-Based Air Defenses: 2016

Country Major SAM Light SAM AA Guns Bahrain Total: 6 Total: 7+ Total: 24 6 MIM-23B I-HAWK 7 Crotale 12 Oerlikon 35mm RBS-70 12 L/70 40mm FIM-92A Stinger Iran Total: 205+ Total: 529+ Total: 1,122+ 150+ MIM-23B I-HAWK/Shahin SP HQ-7 (reported) ZU-23 23mm 10 S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon) 250 FM-80 Crotale Oerlikon 37mm 45 S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline) 30 Rapier 100 ZSU-23-4 23mm 15 Tigercat 80 ZSU-57-2 57mm 29 9K331 Tor- M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet ) (reported) ZPU-2 14.5mm FIM-92A Stinger ZPU-4 14.5mm 9K32 Strela- 2 (SA-7 Grail) 300 ZU-23-2 23mm S300 in Delivery 9K36 Strela- 3 (SA-14 Gremlin ) 92 Skyguard 35mm Misaq 1 (QW-1 Vanguard ) M-1939 37mm Misaq 2 (QW-18) 50 L/70 40mm 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch ) (reported) 200 S-60 57mm HN-54 300 M-1939 85mm Iraq Total: N/A Total: 3+ Total: Unknown 3+ 96K6 Pantsir- S1 (SA-22 Greyhound ) ZU-23 23mm M1097 Avenger S-60 57mm 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch ) Kuwait Total: 40 Total: 24+ Total: 12+ 40 MIM-104D Patriot PAC-2 FIM-92A Stinger 12+ Oerlikon 35mm Starburst 12 Aspide 12 Skyguard/Aspide Oman Total: N/A Total: 62+ Total: 26 8 Mistral 2 4 ZU-23-2 23mm 14+ Javelin 10 GDF-005 35mm 9K32 Strela- 2 (SA-7 Grail) 12 L/60 40mm 40 Rapier Qatar Total: N/A Total: 33+ Total: N/A 24 Mistral 9 Roland II Blowpipe FIM-92A Stinger 9K32 Strela -2 (SA-7 Grail) Saudi Arabia Total: 394 Total: 940+ Total: 1,380 128 MIM-23B I-HAWK 40+ Crotale 122 M163 Vulcan 20mm 108 MIM-140D/F Patriot PAC-2 GEM/PAC-3 400 M1097 Avenger 850 AMX-30SA 30mm 73 Shahine 500 Mistral 128 GDF Oerlikon 35mm 68 Crotale/Shahine FIM-92A Stinger 150 L/70 40mm (stored) 17 AN/FPS-117 Radar 130 M2 90mm UAE Total: Unknown Total: 50+ Total: 62 MIM-23B I-HAWK Blowpipe 42 M3 VDAA 20mm Patriot PAC-3 Mistral 20 GCF-BM2 30mm Crotale RB-70 50 96K6 Pantsir -S1 Rapier Javelin 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse ) Yemen* N/A N/A N/A 95 Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, 2016; and the Jane’s Sentinel series Major Surface-to-Air Missile Systems - I

96 Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, 2016; and the Jane’s Sentinel series Major Surface-to-Air Missile Systems - II

97 Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, 2016; and the Jane’s Sentinel series Illustrative Iranian UAV Projects /Assets

Prime Designation Development / Operation Payload Endurance Range Ceiling Mission Manufacturer Production Wt. (hr.) (ft.) Unknown Stealth Underway / Deployed 700 km R/S* Underway HESA Ababil Complete / Deployed 45 kg 1.5+ 150 km 14,000 Multiple (Swallow) Underway variants for R/S* - attack – ISR** Shahbal Group, Shahbal Underway 5.5 kg 12 km 4,500 R/S* Sharif Univ. Asr-e Talai Mini-UAV Underway Surveillanc Factories e FARC Sobakbal Underway / Deployed 0.35 kg 2 2.7 - 19,686 Surveillanc Underway 13.5 mi e Qods Mohajer II/III Complete / Deployed Multirole Aeronautics (Dorna); Underway aka Industries Mohajer IV Lightning (Hodhod); Bolt Saeqeh I/II; Target Tallash drone - aka I/Endeavor; Target Tallash II 3000 Hadaf 3000

Iran is developing a range of UCAVs, and has made recent claims to a long-range “stealth” UCAV bomber

Source: Adapted by Adam C. Seitz from AIAA Aerospace 9 Worldwide UAV Roundup; available at: http://www.aiaa.org/Aerospace/images/articleimages/pdf/UAVs_APR2009.pdf. 98 *R/S: Reconnaissance / Surveillance; **ISR: Intelligence / Surveillance / Reconnaissance Key Targets that Illustrate Iran’s Vulnerability

• Critical dependence on refineries with high cost, long lead facilities and on imports of product. • Minimal power grid that can be crippled or destroyed selectively on a regional or national basis. • Gas production and distribution facilities needed by Iran’s domestic economy. • Key bridges, tunnels, overpasses and mountain routes for road and rail traffic. • Gulf tanker loading facilities, oil storage and and tanker terminals – for mining or direct attack. • Key military production facilities • Command and control centers. • Communications grids. • Airfield and air bases. • IRGC land, air, and naval facilities. • Coastal naval bases and port facilities.

99 The Naval Balance in the Gulf

100 The Naval Balance

• There really is no naval balance in so limited an AOR, just a naval component to joint naval-air-missile warfare. • Surface, submarine, and air-sea warfare dominated by U.S. naval and air presence; • Arab Gulf states have superior modern surface ships. • Iran has lead in asymmetric warfare, land-based anti-ship missiles. . • Mine warfare is a key issue. Iran has over 6,000 mines and stocks of smart mines; can use virtually any surface ship to emplace them. • Submarines and submersibles, dispersing smaller ships will allow Iran to operate for a while, but capability is uncertain, as is value of such operations. • Both sides face reality that any major conflict can escalate to broader land and air, shut off or sharply cut petroleum exports. • Arab-U.S. joint warfare advantage less clear if Iran can lock the conflict into a low level irregular war of attrition where decisive escalation is difficult. • Balance would shift if Iran could gain basing in Yemen.

10 1 Naval Threats • Low intensity naval war of attrition, random acts of mining, raids, etc. •Iranian effort to “close the Gulf.” • Iranian permissive amphibious/ferry operation. • Variation on 1987-1988 “Tanker War” • Raids on offshore and critical shore facilities. • “Deep strike” with air or submarines in Gulf of Oman or Indian Ocean. • Attacks on US and allied (ally) facilities But: • Very weak air-sea capabilities, vulnerable escalation ladder. •High risk of US and allied intervention. •Limited threat power projection and sustainability. •Unclear strategic goal.

102 Total Naval Forces

350

300

250

200

150

100

0 Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Yemen Support 50 21 2 2 6 2 5 2 Amphibious Ships 17 1 1 1 Landing Craft 11 16 9 4 5 1 28 3 Mine 5 7 2 1 Other Patrol 108 32 70 6 42 42 16 6 39 Missile Patrol 68 9 4 10 4 7 20 Corvettes 7 4 2 2 9 Frigates 4 1 3 Destroyers 3 Submarines 29 2 10

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016. Includes IRGC and coastguard forces 103 Key Combat Warships and Submersibles in 2016

120

100

0 Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Yemen Missile Patrol 68 9 4 10 4 7 20 Major Surface Combatants 7 1 3 Submarines 29 2 10

Submarines Major Surface Combatants Missile Patrol

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016. Includes IRGC and coastguard forces

104 Missile-Armed Combat Warships

0 Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Yemen Corvettes 7 4 2 2 9 Frigates 4 1 3 Destroyers 3 Patrol Boats with Guided Missiles (PBG) 8 Fast Patrol Craft with Guided Missles with CIWS 2 missile or SAM (PCFGM) Fast Patrol Craft with Guided Missles (PCFG) 14 9 4 2 4 7 6 Fast Patrol Boat with Guided Missles (PBFG) 54 12

Source: Adapted from IISS, The Military Balance, Periscope, JCSS, Middle East Military Balance, Jane’s Sentinel and Jane’s Defense Weekly. Some data adjusted or estimated by the author. 105 . Closing the Gulf:

The Iranian Naval-Missile-Air Threat to Maritime Traffic

106 Closing the Gulf

• Far better for political leverage and intimidation than in actual fighting. • So critical to world economy may well lead to immediate military intervention; so critical to Gulf economies that will push Arab states to decisive escalation to force Iran to halt. • U.S. and Arab Gulf can achieve rapid air superiority, put Iranian targets at risk. Iranian conventionally armed missiles now too inaccurate to be real counter threat. • Even conflict contained to Gulf affects exports and imports of Iran as well as Arab Gulf states. • Also pushes all Arab Gulf states to act together. • Limited military action and attrition might work, but still presents major risk of escalation. • The key issue is can every incident or clash be controlled, what happens if Iran’s leadership feels it faces a critical threat to its survival.

107 Most Alternative Routes Have Little or No Surplus Capacity or Are Not Operating

EIA: http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/images/Oil%20and%20Gas%20Infrastructue%20Persian%20Gulf%20%28large%29.gif 108 IRGC Naval Forces The IRGC has a naval branch consists of approximately 20,000 men, including marine units of around 5,000 men.

The IRGC is now reported to operate all mobile land-based anti-ship missile batteries and has an array of missile boats; torpedo boats; catamaran patrol boats with rocket launchers; motor boats with heavy machine guns; mines as well as Yono (Qadir)-class midget submarines; and a number of swimmer delivery vehicles.

The IRGC naval forces have at least 40 light patrol boats, 10 Houdong guided missile patrol boats armed with C-802 anti-ship missiles.

The IRGC controls Iran’s coastal defense forces, including naval guns and an HY-2 Seersucker land- based anti-ship missile unit deployed in five to seven sites along the Gulf coast.

The IRGC has numerous staging areas in such places and has organized its Basij militia among the local inhabitants to undertake support operations.

IRGC put in charge of defending Iran's Gulf coast in September 2008 and is operational in the Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, and could potentially operate elsewhere if given suitable sealift or facilities.

Can deliver conventional weapons, bombs, mines, and CBRN weapons into ports and oil and desalination facilities.

Force consists of six elements: surface vessels, midget and unconventional submarines, missiles and rockets, naval mines, aviation, and military industries.

Large numbers of anti-ship missiles on various types of launch platforms.

Small fast-attack craft, heavily armed with rockets or anti-ship missiles.

109 Source: Adapted from IISS, The Military Balance 2011, various editions and Jane’s Sentinel series Iranian Gulf Military Installations

Bandar-e Khomeini (30°25'41.42"N, 49° 4'50.18"E)

Bandar-e Mahshahr (30°29'43.62"N, 49°12'23.91"E)

Khorramshahr (30°26'2.71"N, 48°11'34.25"E)

Khark Island (29°14'48.01"N, 50°19'48.88"E)

Bandar-e Bushehr (28°58'2.58"N, 50°51'50.74"E)

Asalouyeh (27°27'21.08"N, 52°38'15.55"E

Bandar-e Abbas (Naval base: 27° 8'35.79"N, 56°12'45.61"E; IRGCN missile boat base: 27° 8'30.91"N, 56°12'5.58"E; IRGCN torpedo & MLRS boat base: 27° 8'21.13"N, 56°11'53.28"E; Hovercraft base and nearby naval air strip: 27° 9'15.68"N, 56° 9'49.97"E)

Jask (25°40'40.90"N, 57°51'4.54"E)

Bostanu (27° 2'58.22"N, 55°59'3.22"E)

Chabahar IRGCN base. It is the farthest east of all of Iran’s military port facilities.

Qeshm (26°43'10.09"N, 55°58'30.94"E)

Sirri Island (25°53'40.20"N, 54°33'7.82"E)

Abu Musa (25°52'22.32"N, 55° 0'38.62"E) Occupied by Iran but claimed by the UAE. Suspected to house a small number of IRGCN forces. Also known to house HAWK SAMs and HY-2 “Silkworm” anti-ship missiles.

Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb (GT: 26°15'54.33"N , 55°19'27.75"E; LT: 26°14'26.08"N, 55° 9'21.18"E) Occupied by Iran but claimed by the UAE. Home to heavily fortified airstrips and AA guns.

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from IISS, The Military Balance, various editions, Jane’s Sentinel series, and material provided by US and Saudi experts.. 110 Abu Musa

111 Source: Google maps Key Iranian and Gulf Ships for Asymmetric Warfare

A wide range of civilian ships, including small craft and ferries, and aircraft can easily be adapted for, or used as is, for such missions

112 Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from IISS, The Military Balance, various editions; Jane’s Sentinel series; Saudi experts Patrol Boats

200

180

160

140

120

100

0 Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Yemen Fast Patrol Boat (PBF) 51 6 25 32 3 7 58 10 Patrol Boats 42 20 64 33 20 31 9 59 28 PTG 15 Off-shore Patrol Craft (PCO) 2 4 1 Coastal Parol Craft (PCC) 4 3 Riverine Patrol Boat (PBR) 6 Patrol Boats with Guided Missiles (PBG) 8 Fast Patrol Craft with Guided Missles with CIWS 2 missile or SAM (PCFGM) Fast Patrol Craft with Guided Missles (PCFG) 14 9 4 2 4 7 6 Fast Patrol Boat with Guided Missles (PBFG) 54 12

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016. Includes IRGC and coastguard forces 113 Missile Armed Patrol Boats

0 Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Yemen Patrol Boats with Guided Missiles (PBG) 8 Fast Patrol Craft with Guided Missles with CIWS 2 missile or SAM (PCFGM) Fast Patrol Craft with Guided Missles (PCFG) 14 9 4 2 4 7 6 Fast Patrol Boat with Guided Missles (PBFG) 54 12

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016. Includes IRGC and coastguard forces

114 Midget Submarines IS-120 Qadir “midget” submarine Number in Service: 16 Displacement: 120 tons Speed: 11 kts surfaced/8 kts submerged Max Depth: Unknown Armament: 2 x 533 mm torpedoes. Can carry mines instead of torpedoes. Some reporting indicates that MANPADs are carried aboard. Electronics: I Band surface search or navigation Sonar: Active/Passive Nahong-class: Number in Service: 1 Displacement: 100 tons Speed: 8kts Max Depth: 200 m Armament: 2 x 533 mm torpedoes in drop collars. Can also carry 4 MDM-6 or EM-52 smart mines. Electronics: Surface search or navigation radar. Sonar: Bow-mounted active/passive sonar. EW: ESM mast similar to Russian “Stop Light” type. Note: The Nahong is reportedly stationed in the Caspian Sea, but can be transported overland to the Gulf.

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from IISS, The Military Balance, various editions, Jane’s Sentinel series, and material provided by US and Saudi experts.. 115 Mine Warfare Ships

0 Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Yemen Ocean Mine Sweeper (MSO) 1 Ocean Mine Hunter (MHO) 2 Coastal Mine Hunter (MHC) 3 Coastal Mine Countermeasures (MCC) 4 Inshore Mine Sweeprs (MSI) 2 Coastal Mine Sweepers (MSC) 3

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016. Note: A wide range of civilian and military ships, including small craft and aircraft can easily be adapted or used as is for mine laying, including the use of free floating mines

116 Amphibious Ships & Landing Craft

0 Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Yemen Amphibious Ships 17 1 1 1 Landing Craft 11 16 9 4 5 1 28 3

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016. Note: Ferries and cargo vessels can provide substantial additional lift if can secure ports.

117 Hormuz: Breaking the Bottle at the Neck

• 280 km long, 50 km wide at narrowest point. •Traffic lane 9.6 km wide, including two 3.2 km wide traffic lanes, one inbound and one outbound, separated by a 3.2 km wide separation median •Antiship missiles now have ranges up to 150 km. •Smart mines, guided/smart torpedoes, •Floating mines, small boat raids, harassment. •Covert as well as overt sensors.

118

Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/hormuz_80.jpg; DOE/EIA, World Oil Transit Chokepoints, February 2011, 118 EIA Estimate Hormuz: Depth in 9/2012:

Hormuz is the world's most important oil chokepoint

Its daily oil flow of almost 17 million barrels in 2015, up from between 15.5- 16.0 million bbl./d in 2009- 2010.

Flows through the Strait in 2015 were roughly 57% percent of all seaborne traded oil,

Or almost 20 percent of oil traded worldwide.

119 The Entire Gulf: Breaking the Bottle at Any Point

Source: EIA, Country Briefs, World Oil Transit Chokepoints, January 2008 120 Map of Arabian Sea

121 Location of Gulf Oil Fields

Hunbli

122

122 Source: M. Izady, 2006 http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/maps.shtml The Saudi Petro-Target Base

123

Source: https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=SAU; DOE/EIA, September 2104, 123 The UAE Petro-Target Base

124

Source: https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=ARE; DOE/EIA, May 2015, 124 Avoiding Hormuz: Limited Options • Most potential options to bypass Hormuz are currently not operational. Only Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) presently have pipelines able to ship crude oil outside of the Persian Gulf and have additional pipeline capacity to circumvent the Strait of Hormuz. At the end of 2013, the total available unused pipeline capacity from the two countries combined was approximately 4.3 million bbl/d • Saudi Arabia has the 746-mile Petroline, also known as the East-West Pipeline, which runs across Saudi Arabia from its Abqaiq complex to the Red Sea. The Petroline system consists of two pipelines with a total nameplate (installed) capacity of about 4.8 million bbl/d. The 56- inch pipeline has a nameplate capacity of 3 million bbl/d, and its current throughput is about 2 million bbl/d. The 48-inch pipeline had been operating in recent years as a natural gas pipeline, but Saudi Arabia converted it back to an oil pipeline. The switch increased Saudi Arabia's spare oil pipeline capacity to bypass the Strait of Hormuz from 1 million bbl/d to 2.8 million bbl/d, but this is only achievable if the system operates at its full nameplate capacity. • Saudi Arabia also operates the Abqaiq-Yanbu natural gas liquids pipeline, which has a capacity of 290,000 bbl/d. However, this pipeline is currently running at capacity and cannot move any additional oil. • The UAE operates the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (1.5 million bbl/d) that runs from Habshan, a collection point for Abu Dhabi's onshore oil fields, to the port of Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman, allowing crude oil shipments to circumvent the Strait of Hormuz. The pipeline can transport more than half of UAE's total net oil exports. The government plans to increase this capacity in the near future to 1.8 million bbl125 /d.

Source: http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=18991; DOE/EIA, World Oil Transit Chokepoints, December 1, 2014 125 Iran’s Equally Vulnerable Petro Facilities - I

Kharg Island, the site of the vast majority of Iran's exports, has a crude storage capacity of 20.2 million barrels of oil and a loading capacity of 5 million bbl./d.

Lavan Island is the second-largest terminal with capacity to store 5.5 million barrels and loading capacity of 200,000 bbl./d.

Sirri Island serves as a loading port for the Sirri Blend that is produced in the offshore fields off the island. Its storage capacity is 4.5 million barrels.19

Neka is Iran's Caspian Sea port that was built in 2003 to receive crude oil imports from the Caspian region producers under swap agreements. The port has a storage capacity of 1 million barrels and can handle 100,000 b/d of crude oil, according to FGE.20 The terminal, which has not operated since 2011, was previously used to facilitate swap agreements with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. Under these agreements, Iran received crude oil at its Caspian Sea port of Neka, which was processed in the Tehran and Tabriz refineries. In return, Iran exported the same amount of crude oil through its Persian Gulf ports.21 There have been talks to revive the swaps, but it is unclear when they might restart.

The export terminals Bandar Mahshahr and Abadan (also known as Bandar Imam Khomeini) are near the Abadan refinery and are used to export refined product from the Abadan refinery.

Bandar Abbas, located near the northern end of the Strait of Hormuz, is Iran's main fuel oil export terminal Iran has an expansive domestic oil network including more than 10 pipelines that run between 63 and 630 miles in length.

126 EIA, Country Briefs, “Iran,” June 15, 2016, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=IRN Iran’s Equally Vulnerable Petro Facilities - II

Refineries Gas Infrastructure

127 EIA, Country Briefs, “Iran,” June 15, 2016, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=IRN Missile Forces and Threats

128 The Missile Balance

• There really is no naval balance in so limited an AOR, just a naval componen to joint naval-air-missile warfare. • Surface, submarine, and air-sea warfare dominated by U.S. naval and air presence; • Arab Gulf states have superior modern surface ships. • Iran has lead in asymmetric warfare, land-based anti-ship missiles. . • Mine warfare is a key issue. Iran has over 6,000 mines and stocks of smart mines; can use virtually any surface ship to emplace them. • Submarines and submersibles, dispersing smaller ships will allow Iran to operate for a while, but capability is uncertain, as is value of such operations. • Both sides face reality that any major conflict can escalate to broader land and air, shut off or sharply cut petroleum exports. • Arab-U.S. joint warfare advantage less clear if Iran can lock the conflict into a low level irregular war of attrition where decisive escalation is difficult. • Balance would shift if Iran could gain basing in Yemen.

129 Estimates of Iran’s Uncertain Missile Forces 2010-2014- I

130 Estimates of Iran’s Uncertain Missile Forces 2010-2014 - II

131 Estimates of Iran’s Uncertain Missile Forces 2010-2014 -III

132 Estimates of Iran’s Uncertain Missile Forces in 2015-2016 - I

IISS Estimate: • IRGC Controls Iran’s IRBM, MRBM, and SRBM missile forces, longer range UAVs/UCAVs/cruise missiles. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Air Force (IRGCASF) controls Iran’s strategic missile force. • Has 1 brigade with Shahab-1/2, 1 battalion with Shahab-3; Ghadr-1; Sajjil-2 (in development). • Force has 22+ MRBMs: 12+ Shahab-3/Ghadr-1 (mobile); 10 Shahab-3/Ghadr-1 (silo); some Sajjil-2, and 18+ SRBMs including Fateh 110; 12-18 Shahab-1/2 (ε200–300 missiles) and some Zelzal Jane’s IHS Estimate: • IRGCASF), consists of five brigades, as follows: • 15th Ghaem Missile Brigade, equipped with short-range missiles such as Fajr. • 5th Ra'ad Missile Brigade equipped with Shahab-3/4, based in the Karaj area, northwest of Tehran. • 7th Al-Hadid Missile Brigade equipped with Shahab 1 and 2 (Scud B and C) missiles, based in the Karaj area; facilities under the control of this brigade are said to include the Imam Ali Missile Site in Khorramabad, western Iran. • 19th Zulfeqar Missile Brigade, equipped with Nazeat and Zelzal short-range missiles, based in the Karaj area. • 23rd Towhid Missile Brigade, based at Khorramabad. • Deployed Missiles Include: • 200 Oghab Tactical missile 200 (40 Km) • 250 FROG 7 Tactical rocket system (70 Km) • 500 Nazeat/Iran 130 Tactical missile (140-300 Km) • ? 200 Tondar 69 (CSS-8/M-7) Ballistic missile (150 Km) • ? Fateh 110 Ballistic missile (160-250 Km)

Source: Adapted from various sources including IISS, Military Balance 2016, and IHS Janes, Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - The Gulf States, 133 “Iran, Strategic Weapon Systems,” April 12, 2016. Estimates of Iran’s Uncertain Missile Forces in 2015-2016- II

• ? Fateh A-110 Ballistic missile (250-300 Km) • 250 Shahab-1 (SS-1c 'Scud B') Ballistic missile (300 Km) • 50 Shahab-2 (SS-1d 'Scud C') Ballistic missile (500 Km) • ? Fateh-110-D1 (Fateh 313) Ballistic missile (500 Km) Precision strike • ? Qiam 1 Ballistic missile (700 Km) • 25 Shahab-3 (No-dong 2) Ballistic missile (1,100-1,400 Km) • ? Emad Ballistic missile (1,700 Km) • 250 Shahin-2 Tactical missile (2,000 Km) • ? BM-25 (Zelzal) ballistic missile (18 reported) (2,500 Km Other Claimed or Developing Types Include: • ? Khalij Fars (150-300 Km) Anti-ship variant of Fateh 110 • ? Hormuz-1 (300 Km) anti-radiation homing • ? Hormuz-2 (300 Km) electro-optical guidance • ? Qadr F (1,600 Km) • ? Ghadr-1 (1,800 Km) • ? Shahab 3A (1,500-1,800 Km) • ? Shahab 3B (2,000-2,500 Km) • ? Qadr H ( 2,000 Km) improved MRV • ? Qadr S (2,000 Km) cluster munitions warhead • ? KH-25/Soumar cruise missile (2,000-3,000 Km) • ? Seiji-2 (ex-Ashura) ballistic missile (2,000-2,200km) • ? ICBM

Source: Adapted from various sources including IISS, Military Balance 2016, and IHS Janes, Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - The Gulf States, 134 “Iran, Strategic Weapon Systems,” April 12, 2016. Arab Gulf Missile and Artillery Rocket Forces

Bahrain: 9 M270 MLRS artillery rocket fire units with 30 ATACMS missiles. Egypt: 26 M270 MLRS artillery rocket fire units plus; 48 BM-24 240mm artillery rocket fire units in storage. Missile forces include 42+ launchers: 9 FROG-7, 24 Sakr-80 and 9 Scud-B. Iraq: 3 TOS-1/1A artillery rocket launchers Israel: Israel is “widely believed” to have a nuclear armed missile capability – with 3 Jericho squadrons with Jericho 1 SRBMs and Jericho 2 IRBMs, and Dolphin-class SSKs with land-attack cruise missiles. Jordan: 12 227mm HIMARS and 2+ 273mm WM-80 artillery rockets. Kuwait: 27 9A52 Smerch artillery rockets. Oman: N/A Qatar: 4 ASTROS II Mk3 127mm artillery rocket launchers. Saudi Arabia: 60 ASTROS II Mk3 127mm artillery rocket launchers. Ballistic missiles include 10+ DF-3 (CSS-2) IRBM fire units with 40 missiles, and some DF-21 (CSS-5 – variant unclear) MRBM fire units. UAE: 20 227mm HIMARS and 6 9A52 Smerch artillery rockets. Yemen: The following forces were reported before Saudi Arabia claimed to have largely destroyed them in its April 2015 bombing campaign: 12 FROG-7 launchers, 10 SS-21 Scarab (Tochka) launchers; and 6 Scud-B (33 missiles).

Sources: Based on Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa,” in The Military Balance, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, 303-362; material form HIS Jane’s as adjusted by the authors. 135 Iran: Major Open Source Missile and WMD Facilities

Source: NTI, http://www.nti.org/gmap/?country=iran&layers, September 2012 136 Range of Deployed Missiles

Source: AFP, https://www.google.com/search?q=Iran+missile+range+maps&tbm=isch&imgil=6feBjAG6bPEEMM%253A%253B4PgfBV6eI_2DnM%253Bhttp%25253A%25252F%25252Fwww.137 nbcnews.com%25252Fid%25252F6643614%25252Fns%25252Fworld_news%25252Ft%25252Fnew-concern-iran-developing-long-range- missile%25252F&source=iu&pf=m&fir=6feBjAG6bPEEMM%253A%252C4PgfBV6eI_2DnM%252C_&usg=__YWqUhbXUBBDGOqaM_CLOxS9P8LU%3D&biw=1239&bih=726&v ed=0ahUKEwiSgdiouP_NAhWFej4KHTlHBQ4QyjcIKw&ei=JBGOV5LfKYX1-QG5jpVw#imgrc=i0Bz7UEiTqz2IM%3A Iranian Missile Range

Source: Stratfor, http://www.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://digitaljournal.com/img/1/2/2/8/5/5/i/5/7/1/o/iran_missile_map.jpg&imgrefurl=http://digitaljournal.com/image/57146&h=36 4&w=400&sz=56&tbnid=nAmeBGGgErdwGM:&tbnh=90&tbnw=99&zoom=1&docid=fih86K5v8K5dAM&sa=X&ei=A947T_D9Ncbr0gHIvMjRCw&ved=0CDUQ9QEwA 138 w&dur=235 How Estimates of Range-Payload Vary: Shehab 3

139 Missile Attack Range and Density

Source: Adapted from Mark Gunzinger and Christopher Dougherty, Outside-In Operating from Range to Defeat Iran’s Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threats, CBSA, Washington DC, 2011.. 140 Missile Attack Timing

142 Source: Digital Globe And “2012 Annual Defense, Report,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, ,12 December 2012, p., 47 Ras Tanura

143 Source: Google maps Desalination Plant

144 Source: Google maps Missile Wars and Missile Defense

145 Missile Defenses

• Many of the Arab Gulf states already have Patriot systems that provide limited point defense capability against most Iranian ballistic missile missiles, and cruise missiles. • Qatar and the UAE have indicated they will acquire THAAD theater missile defense systems with wider area coverage. • The U.S. has deployed two AEGIS/Standard missile defense ships, provides radar coverage, and has indicated it will provide satellite launch warning and vector data. • The GCC has discussed an integrated missile defense system with an initial emphasis on AEGIS/Standard. • No clear architecture for a missile defense system has been publically proposed, and there has been no open discussion of a layered system to cover artillery rockets of the kind proposed by Israel. • Experts differ on Iran’s ability to create penetration aids, and launch salvos of missiles and rockets that could saturate Arab Gulf and U.S. defenses. • Reliable public data are not available on the ability to discriminate between systems that could hit key target categories vs. misses, between newer and older missile types, and single out precision-guided Iranian systems once deployed. • Costs are an issue. Advanced anti-missile missiles are far more costly than older Iranian ballistic missiles. • Low flying cruise missiles pose a very different challenge. • There has been no open discussion of the level of mutual deterrence provided by the overall balance of ballistic and cruise missiles. land-based air and missile defenses, and air strike capabilities. • Iran may acquire some missile defense capability from Russia with the TOR-M and S300 and obtain more advanced systems. • The Arab Gulf states may acquire more offensive missiles, and/or obtain “extended deterrence” through U.S. ballistic or cruise missile deployments.

146 Sea Based Air Defenses U.S. Navy’s Role in Missile Defense Network

Role of the U.S. Navy Aegis System: • Will provide an efficient and highly mobile sea-based defense against Short and Medium – Range Ballistic Missiles in their midcourse phase. • The system will allow the BMD Command to move its defense capabilities close to the enemy sites. • The system will have the Engagement & Long Range Tracking Capability • Intercepting Short to Medium Range Ballistic Missiles in the midcourse phase of the flight with Standard Missile – 3. • Serves as a forward deployed sensor, providing early warning and long range search & track capabilities for ICBMs and IRBMs.

Contributions: •Will extend the battle space of the BMDs and contribute to an integrated layered defense. The Naval Aegis system extends the range of the Ground Missile defense (GMD) element by providing reliable track data used to calculate firing solutions. • Aegis BMD will coordinate engagements of short and medium range ballistic missiles with terminal missile defense systems. • As tracking information is shared among these systems, the BMDS will have the opportunity to follow the engagement of a target during the midcourse segment with coordinated terminal engagements.

(Source: Missile Defense Agency. (MDA) Department of Defense. “Testing Building Confidence”, 2009 ) 147 148 8/3/20 16 GCC Missile Defense Upgrades

Country TBMD System

UAE • The UAE is so far the first GCC country to buy the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) missile system. • On Dec 31, 2011 Pentagon announced that the UAE will be buying 2 full THAAD batteries, 96 missiles, 2 Raytheon AN/TPY-2 radars, and 30 years of spare parts. Total Value $3.34 billion. • In 2008 the UAE ordered Patriot PAC-3: 10 fire units, 172 missiles, First delivery 2009. Kuwait July 2012, Pentagon informed Congress of a plan to sell Kuwait $4.2 billion in weapon systems, including 60 PAC-3 missiles, 20 launching platforms and 4 radars. This will be in addition to the 350 Patriot missiles bought between 2007 and 2010. In 1992, Kuwait bought 210 of the earlier generation Patriots and 25 launchers. Kuwait bought a further 140 more in 2007. Saudi Arabia In 2011 Saudi Arabia signed a $1.7 billion US contract to upgrade it’s Patriot anti-missile system.

Qatar The U.S. is building a Missile Warning Facility in Qatar that would utilize an AN/TPY-2-X Band Radar.

(Source: Anthony Cordesman and Alexander Wilner, “Iran and the Gulf Military Balance -1” July 11, 2012)

149 Two Tier Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) – THAAD & PAC 3 Endo and Exo-Atmospheric Engagements using Shoot-Look-Shoot Hit-to-Kill Upper Tier Need to destroy as many 1st Intercept Missile Launchers as possible, pre-boost phase, in order to reduce number Mid-Course Phase Upper Tier of incoming warheads. 2nd Intercept

Shoot-Look-Shoot IRAN

Lower Tier Missile Launch 1st Intercept Shoot-Look-Shoot THAAD Launcher Lower Tier 2nd Intercept PAC-3 Launcher Arabian Gulf Qatar UAE Qatar: Missile Early Warning Radar TBMD System Defense against

THAAD : UAE SRBMs (<1000 km) and MRBMs (1000 - 3000 km) Saudi Arabia PAC-3 : UAE, SRBMs (300 – 1000 km) Kuwait, Saudi 150 8/3/20 Arabia 16 Ballistic Missile War Between Iran the U.S. and the Gulf States Space Defense Support Sensor Program in Boost Phase

Iranian Shahab 3 Launched against Israel Early Warning & Long Range Search & Track Capabilities IRAQ IRAN against Iranian MRBMs

KUWAIT Midcourse & Terminal Missile Defense

BAHRAIN

QATAR

Sea-Based EW & SAUDI-ARABIA Terminal Defense

Gulf of Air Defense Oman UAE PAC-3 Early Warning THAAD Radar OMAN AWACS

151 8/3/20 16 The Uncertain Nuclear and WMD Threat

152 The Nuclear and WMD Balance

• The successful “Implementation Day” phase of the UN/P5+1 nuclear agreement with Iran has deprived it if its known near-term ability to deploy a meaningful nuclear weapons force. • Israel, India, Pakistan, the U.S. and Russia, however, are all nuclear powers. • Iran has kept all of its past weapon design technology, many key production capabilities, and remains on the edge of the nuclear threshold. The problem is deferred, not solved. • Precision-guided conventional missiles may, however, offer Iran a safer and more usable alternative. • Arab state ability to actually develop and produce nuclear weapons is uncertain. But Pakistan might sell them, and/or the U.S. might offer extended deterrence. • Iran and the larger Arab states are capable of developing and producing genetically engineered biological weapons. There are no reports of such activity, but they are very easy to conceal. • Iran has reported that it is a chemical weapons state. It has said it no longer has such weapons, but has not provided a detailed inventory or indication of what happened to them.

153 Missiles and States with Nuclear Weapons

SRBM : Short Range Ballistic Missile MRBM : Medium Range Ballistic Missile IRBM : Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile ICBM : Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 154 The Impact of the JCPOA Key Positives •Lost near-term capability to produce fissile material. • Now under tight and demanding inspection regime. • No-expiration date to non-proliferation, ten years of effective controls unless withdraws. • Drop in oil prices sharply cuts benefits. Key Negatives • Retains nuclear technology and weapons design data, centrifuge upgrade capability: “Semi Threshold State.” • Missile developments continue. • Some covert capabilities: Design, simulation, components. • Major increase in export capability, several $billion in income released. • Uncertain “snap back” of sanctions. • Easing of access to other arms sales 155 What Happened on “Implementation Day”

• Verifiably dismantled and stored under IAEA seal more than 13,000 centrifuge machines, including its more advanced centrifuges, leaving Tehran with 6,104 first-generation IR-1 machines, of which 5,104 were to be allowed to continue to enrich uranium to low levels (3.67 percent U-235) for energy production purposes. The remaining 1,044 centrifuges were located at the underground site in a mountain at Fordo , which can only be used for medical isotope production. • Agreed to limit uranium enrichment to the agreed levels for 10 years, after which the two sides agreed that Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity would remain constant for several years, but the Iran could slowly phase in more advanced centrifuges to slowly replace it IR-1s. • Shipped over 8.5 tons of all forms of low enriched uranium material to Russia, leaving Iran with a working stockpile of just 300 kilograms of uranium enriched to no more than 3.67 percent U-235— far less than necessary to enrich further for one bomb. The stockpile cap and prohibition on enrichment above 3.67 percent will remain in place for the next 15 years. • Removed the core of the Arak reactor and fill the channels with cement, rendering it inoperable. The world’s six major powers, also known as the EU3+3 or P5+1, worked with Iran on a new design, which will optimize medical isotope production. The changes will also significantly lower the output of weapons-grade plutonium to less than one kilogram per year—far below the amount necessary for one weapon. China agreed to approved the modified design. • Allowed the IAEA’s monitoring and inspections authority to be strengthened, in addition to the standard IAEA monitoring already in place. This included the implementation of Iran’s Additional Protocol agreement with the IAEA, which gave the U.N. nuclear watchdog short-notice access to virtually any site the agency believes may be involved in illicit nuclear activities, even military facilities. Iran was also required to implement Code 3.1 of Iran’s existing comprehensive safeguards agreement, which requires earlier notification of nuclear activities and facility design changes. • Iran began allowing continuous IAEA monitoring of enrichment activities at the Natanz and the Fordo facilities and centrifuge production. The monitoring will continue for 20 years. Iran also agreed to allow the IAEA to begin continuous monitoring of all of its uranium mines and mills, a requirement that will last for 25 years.

156 Lashkar A’bad Sites circled in red unknown pre-mid 2002

Ardekan

Gachin

157

157 Iran: The Broader Target List: 54+

Source: Adapted from list by Nuclear Threat Initiative, September 2012, http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/iran/facilities/. 158 Natanz Upgrades in 2012

Source: Google http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2060213/Google-releases-satellite-images-Iranian-cities-UN-says-used-nuclear- weaponisation.html/ 159 Bunkered underground Vehicle Entrance Ramp production halls (before burial)

Admin/engineering office area 160

160 DigitalGlobe Quickbird commercial satellite image 20 SEP 02 Bunkered underground Vehicle Entrance Ramp Centrifuge cascade halls (after burial)

Helicopter pads New security wall

Dummy building concealing tunnel entrance ramp

Admin/engineering office161 area

161 DigitalGlobe Quickbird commercial satellite image 21 JUL 04 Natanz: Effective Concealment

162 Heavy Water Reactor Facility at Arak in 2011

Source: Google http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2060213/Google-releases-satellite-images-Iranian-cities-UN-says-used-nuclear- weaponisation.html/ 163 Fordow: 3,000 Centrifuges in a Mountain

Source: Ynet News:http://www.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.ynetnews.com/PicServer2/13062011/3669116/AFP0661600-01- 08809249_wa.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/ 164 Razed Test Site (?) At Parchin

Source: ISIS and CNN, http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/05/30/cleanup-at-irans-parchin-site/ 165 165 Iranian Counter Vulnerabilities: • Highly populated, state dominated, corrupt economy with high military spending and major state interference. • Halting all oil exports critical to Iran. EIA reports that, • Pre-sanctions, Iran exported approximately 2.2 million bbl./d of crude oil. Iranian Heavy Crude Oil is Iran's largest crude export followed by Iranian Light. In 2011, Iran's net oil export revenues amounted to approximately $95 billion. Oil exports provide half of Iran's government revenues, while crude oil and its derivatives account for nearly 80 percent of Iran's total exports. • Kharg Island, the site of the vast majority of Iran's exports, has a crude storage capacity of 20.2 million barrels of oil and a loading capacity of 5 million bbl./d. Lavan Island is the second-largest terminal with capacity to store 5 million barrels and loading capacity of 200,000 bbl./d. Other important terminals include Kish Island, Abadan, Bandar Mahshar, and Neka (which helps facilitate imports from the Caspian region). • Iran is the second-largest oil consuming country in the Middle East, second only to Saudi Arabia. Iranian domestic oil demand is mainly for diesel and gasoline. Total oil consumption was approximately 1.8 million bbl./d in 2010, about 10 percent higher than the year before. Iran has limited refinery capacity for the production of light fuels, and consequently imports a sizeable share of its gasoline supply (Imports 300,000 bbbl of gasoline per day.). Iran's total refinery capacity in January 2011 was about 1.5 million bbl./d, with its nine refineries operated by the National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution Company (NIORDC), a NIOC subsidiary. • Refineries and gas distribution critical to economy. Are highly vulnerable. • Natural gas accounts for 54 percent of Iran's total domestic energy consumption. • Key aspects of transportation and power grid are highly vulnerable. Today’s precision strike assets allow to know out key, repairable links or create long term incapacity. They have become “weapons of mass effectiveness.” • EIA reports Some power plants are running as low as 10 percent of their nameplate capacity as Iran's electricity infrastructure is largely in a state of dilapidation and rolling blackouts become endemic in summer months. The amount of generation lost in distribution is a central indicator of the disrepair of the electricity network, with upwards of 19 percent of total generation lost during transmission. • Limited and vulnerable air defenses with only one modern and very short-range air and cruise missile defense system. Will remain vulnerable to stealth, cruise missiles, and corridor suppression of enemy air defenses unless can get fully modern mix of radars, C4I/BM assets, and S-300/400 equivalent. • Needs imports of food and product. • Rail system vulnerable. Can use smart mines on all ports. • Naval embargo presents issues in maritime law, but can halt all Iranian traffic, “inspect” all incoming shipping. • “No fly zone” would affect operations, especially if include helicopters. Warning could affect civil aviation.

166 8/3/20 16 Source: See http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=IR & cabs/OPEC_Revenues/Factsheet.html for energy data. 167 Nuclear Capability and Risk Tehran: 1 Megaton Tel Aviv: 20 Kilotons

Population: 410,000+ Area: 52 km2 (20 sq mi)

Population: 8.3 million urban,14 million wider area Urban: 730 km2 (280 sq mi) Wider Area: 1,274 km2 (492 sq mi)

168 Maps based on estimates by dr. Abdullah Toukan Countervalue Targeting of Iran

169 Iran’s Ethnic Vulnerability to Nuclear Strikes

170