Iran's Ballistic Missiles
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Winning the Salvo Competition Rebalancing America’S Air and Missile Defenses
WINNING THE SALVO COMPETITION REBALANCING AMERICA’S AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSES MARK GUNZINGER BRYAN CLARK WINNING THE SALVO COMPETITION REBALANCING AMERICA’S AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSES MARK GUNZINGER BRYAN CLARK 2016 ABOUT THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS (CSBA) The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments is an independent, nonpartisan policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking and debate about national security strategy and investment options. CSBA’s analysis focuses on key questions related to existing and emerging threats to U.S. national security, and its goal is to enable policymakers to make informed decisions on matters of strategy, security policy, and resource allocation. ©2016 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. All rights reserved. ABOUT THE AUTHORS Mark Gunzinger is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Mr. Gunzinger has served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces Transformation and Resources. A retired Air Force Colonel and Command Pilot, he joined the Office of the Secretary of Defense in 2004. Mark was appointed to the Senior Executive Service and served as Principal Director of the Department’s central staff for the 2005–2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. Following the QDR, he served as Director for Defense Transformation, Force Planning and Resources on the National Security Council staff. Mr. Gunzinger holds an M.S. in National Security Strategy from the National War College, a Master of Airpower Art and Science degree from the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, a Master of Public Administration from Central Michigan University, and a B.S. in chemistry from the United States Air Force Academy. -
Design Characteristics of Iran's Ballistic and Cruise Missiles
Design Characteristics of Iran’s Ballistic and Cruise Missiles Last update: January 2013 Missile Nato or Type/ Length Diameter Payload Range (km) Accuracy ‐ Propellant Guidance Other Name System (m) (m) (kg)/warhead CEP (m) /Stages Artillery* Hasib/Fajr‐11* Rocket artillery (O) 0.83 0.107 6; HE 8.5 ‐ Solid Spin stabilized Falaq‐12* Rocket artillery (O) 1.29 0.244 50; HE 10 Solid Spin stabilized Falaq‐23* Rocket artillery (O) 1.82 0.333 120; HE 11 Solid Spin stabilized Arash‐14* Rocket artillery (O) 2.8 0.122 18.3; HE 21.5 Solid Spin stabilized Arash‐25* Rocket artillery (O) 3.2 0.122 18.3; HE 30 Solid Spin stabilized Arash‐36* Rocket artillery (O) 2 0.122 18.3; HE 18 Solid Spin stabilized Shahin‐17* Rocket artillery (O) 2.9 0.33 190; HE 13 Solid Spin stabilized Shahin‐28* Rocket artillery (O) 3.9 0.33 190; HE 20 Solid Spin stabilized Oghab9* Rocket artillery (O) 4.82 0.233 70; HE 40 Solid Spin stabilized Fajr‐310* Rocket artillery (O) 5.2 0.24 45; HE 45 Solid Spin stabilized Fajr‐511* Rocket artillery (O) 6.6 0.33 90; HE 75 Solid Spin stabilized Falaq‐112* Rocket artillery (O) 1.38 0.24 50; HE 10 Solid Spin stabilized Falaq‐213* Rocket artillery (O) 1.8 0.333 60; HE 11 Solid Spin stabilized Nazeat‐614* Rocket artillery (O) 6.3 0.355 150; HE 100 Solid Spin stabilized Nazeat15* Rocket artillery (O) 5.9 0.355 150; HE 120 Solid Spin stabilized Zelzal‐116* Iran‐130 Rocket artillery (O) 8.3 0.61 500‐600; HE 100‐125 Solid Spin stabilized Zelzal‐1A17* Mushak‐120 Rocket artillery (O) 8.3 0.61 500‐600; HE 160 Solid Spin stabilized Nazeat‐1018* Mushak‐160 Rocket artillery (O) 8.3 0.45 250; HE 150 Solid Spin stabilized Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org. -
Page 1 of 73 CONSOLIDATED LIST of FINANCIAL SANCTIONS
CONSOLIDATED LIST OF FINANCIAL SANCTIONS TARGETS IN THE UK Page 1 of 73 CONSOLIDATED LIST OF FINANCIAL SANCTIONS TARGETS IN THE UK Last Updated:24/03/2014 Status: Asset Freeze Targets REGIME: Afghanistan INDIVIDUALS 1. Name 6: ABBASIN 1: ABDUL AZIZ 2: n/a 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a. DOB: --/--/1969. POB: Sheykhan Village, Pirkowti Area, Orgun District, Paktika Province, Afghanistan a.k.a: MAHSUD, Abdul Aziz Other Information: UN Ref TI.A.155.11. Key commander in the Haqqani Network under Sirajuddin Jallaloudine Haqqani. Taliban Shadow Governor of Orgun District, Paktika Province, as of early 2010. Listed on: 21/10/2011 Last Updated: 17/05/2013 Group ID: 12156. 2. Name 6: ABDUL AHAD 1: AZIZIRAHMAN 2: n/a 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a. DOB: --/--/1972. POB: Shega District, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan Nationality: Afghan National Identification no: 44323 (Afghan) (tazkira) Position: Third Secretary, Taliban Embassy, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates Other Information: UN Ref TI.A.121.01. Listed on: 23/02/2001 Last Updated: 29/03/2012 Group ID: 7055. 3. Name 6: ABDUL AHMAD TURK 1: ABDUL GHANI 2: BARADAR 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a. Title: Mullah DOB: --/--/1968. POB: Yatimak village, Dehrawood District, Uruzgan Province, Afghanistan a.k.a: (1) AKHUND, Baradar (2) BARADAR, Abdul, Ghani Nationality: Afghan Position: Deputy Minister of Defence under the Taliban regime Other Information: UN Ref TI.B.24.01. Arrested in Feb 2010 and in custody in Pakistan. Extradition request to Afghanistan pending in Lahore High Court, Pakistan as of June 2011. -
Hezbollah's Missiles and Rockets
JULY 2017 CSIS BRIEFS CSIS Hezbollah’s Missiles and Rockets An Overview By Shaan Shaikh and Ian Williams JULY 2018 THE ISSUE Hezbollah is the world’s most heavily armed non-state actor, with a large and diverse stockpile of unguided artillery rockets, as well as ballistic, antiair, antitank, and antiship missiles. Hezbollah views its rocket and missile arsenal as its primary deterrent against Israeli military action, while also useful for quick retaliatory strikes and longer military engagements. Hezbollah’s unguided rocket arsenal has increased significantly since the 2006 Lebanon War, and the party’s increased role in the Syrian conflict raises concerns about its acquisition of more sophisticated standoff and precision-guided missiles, whether from Syria, Iran, or Russia. This brief provides a summary of the acquisition history, capabilities, and use of these forces. CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & middle east INTERNATIONAL STUDIES program CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 1 ezbollah is a Lebanese political party public source information and does not cover certain topics and militant group with close ties to such as rocket strategies, evolution, or storage locations. Iran and Syria’s Assad regime. It is the This brief instead focuses on the acquisition history, world’s most heavily armed non-state capabilities, and use of these forces. actor—aptly described as “a militia trained like an army and equipped LAND ATTACK MISSILES AND ROCKETS like a state.”1 This is especially true Hwith regard to its missile and rocket forces, which Hezbollah 107 AND 122 MM KATYUSHA ROCKETS has arrayed against Israel in vast quantities. The party’s arsenal is comprised primarily of small, man- portable, unguided artillery rockets. -
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy August
THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY n AUGUST 2020 n PN84 PHOTO CREDIT: REUTERS © 2020 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. FARZIN NADIMI n April 22, 2020, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force (IRGC-ASF) Olaunched its first-ever satellite, the Nour-1, into orbit. The launch, conducted from a desert platform near Shahrud, about 210 miles northeast of Tehran, employed Iran’s new Qased (“messenger”) space- launch vehicle (SLV). In broad terms, the launch showed the risks of lifting arms restrictions on Iran, a pursuit in which the Islamic Republic enjoys support from potential arms-trade partners Russia and China. Practically, lifting the embargo could facilitate Iran’s unhindered access to dual-use materials and other components used to produce small satellites with military or even terrorist applications. Beyond this, the IRGC’s emerging military space program proves its ambition to field larger solid-propellant missiles. Britain, France, and Germany—the EU-3 signatories of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, as the 2015 Iran nuclear deal is known—support upholding the arms embargo until 2023. The United States, which has withdrawn from the deal, started a process on August 20, 2020, that could lead to a snapback of all UN sanctions enacted since 2006.1 The IRGC’s Qased space-launch vehicle, shown at the Shahrud site The Qased-1, for its part, succeeded over its three in April. stages in placing the very small Nour-1 satellite in a near circular low earth orbit (LEO) of about 425 km. The first stage involved an off-the-shelf Shahab-3/ Ghadr liquid-fuel missile, although without the warhead section, produced by the Iranian Ministry of Defense.2 According to ASF commander Gen. -
The Iranian Missile Challenge
The Iranian Missile Challenge By Anthony H. Cordesman Working Draft: June 4, 2019 Please provide comments to [email protected] SHAIGAN/AFP/Getty Images The Iranian Missile Challenge Anthony H. Cordesman There is no doubt that Iran and North Korea present serious security challenges to the U.S. and its strategic partners, and that their missile forces already present a major threat within their respective regions. It is, however, important to put this challenge in context. Both nations have reason to see the U.S. and America's strategic partners as threats, and reasons that go far beyond any strategic ambitions. Iran is only half this story, but its missile developments show all too clearly why both countries lack the ability to modernize their air forces, which has made them extremely dependent on missiles for both deterrence and war fighting. They also show that the missile threat goes far beyond the delivery of nuclear weapons, and is already becoming far more lethal and effective at a regional level. This analysis examines Iran's view of the threat, the problems in military modernization that have led to its focus on missile forces, the limits to its air capabilities, the developments in its missile forces, and the war fighting capabilities provided by its current missile forces, its ability to develop conventionally armed precision-strike forces, and its options for deploying nuclear-armed missiles. IRAN'S PERCEPTIONS OF THE THREAT ...................................................................................................... 2 IRAN'S INFERIORITY IN ARMS IMPORTS ................................................................................................... 3 THE AIR BALANCE OVERWHELMINGLY FAVORS THE OTHER SIDES ........................................................... 4 IRAN (AND NORTH KOREA'S) DEPENDENCE ON MISSILES ........................................................................ -
Iran and the Gulf Military Balance - I
IRAN AND THE GULF MILITARY BALANCE - I The Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions FIFTH WORKING DRAFT By Anthony H. Cordesman and Alexander Wilner Revised July 11, 2012 Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy [email protected] Cordesman/Wilner: Iran & The Gulf Military Balance, Rev 5 7/11/12 2 Acknowledgements This analysis was made possible by a grant from the Smith Richardson Foundation. It draws on the work of Dr. Abdullah Toukan and a series of reports on Iran by Adam Seitz, a Senior Research Associate and Instructor, Middle East Studies, Marine Corps University. 2 Cordesman/Wilner: Iran & The Gulf Military Balance, Rev 5 7/11/12 3 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................. 5 THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................................... 6 Figure III.1: Summary Chronology of US-Iranian Military Competition: 2000-2011 ............................... 8 CURRENT PATTERNS IN THE STRUCTURE OF US AND IRANIAN MILITARY COMPETITION ........................................... 13 DIFFERING NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES .............................................................................................................. 17 US Perceptions .................................................................................................................................... 17 Iranian Perceptions............................................................................................................................ -
China's New YJ-18 Antiship Cruise Missile: Capabilities And
October 28, 2015 China’s New YJ-18 Antiship Cruise Missile: Capabilities and Implications for U.S. Forces in the Western Pacific Author: Michael Pilger, Research Fellow, Security and Foreign Affairs Acknowledgments: James Acton, Christopher Carlson, Jeffrey Engstrom, Robert Haddick, Christopher Twomey, and Christopher Yeaw provided helpful insights and reviewed drafts of this paper, but do not necessarily agree with or endorse the assessments and statements contained herein. Errors and views are the author’s own. Disclaimer: This paper is the product of professional research performed by staff of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, and was prepared at the request of the Commission to support its deliberations. Posting of the report to the Commission’s website is intended to promote greater public understanding of the issues addressed by the Commission in its ongoing assessment of U.S.- China economic relations and their implications for U.S. security, as mandated by Public Law 106-398 and Public Law 108-7. However, the public release of this document does not necessarily imply an endorsement by the Commission, any individual Commissioner, or the Commission’s other professional staff, of the views or conclusions expressed in this staff research report. Introduction In April 2015, the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence confirmed that China has deployed the YJ-18 antiship cruise missile (ASCM) on some People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy submarines and surface ships.1 The YJ-18’s greater range and speed than previous Chinese ASCMs, along with its wide deployment across PLA platforms, would significantly increase China’s antiaccess/area denial capabilities* against U.S. -
Iran's Extensive Cruise Missile Program Requires U.S. Action
BACKGROUNDER No. 3460 | JANUARY 6, 2020 CENTER FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE Iran’s Extensive Cruise Missile Program Requires U.S. Action Peter Brookes n an unprecedented attack in September 2019, KEY TAKEAWAYS Iran struck the expansive Saudi oil processing facility at Abqaiq and the oil fields at Khurais The recent Iranian attack on Saudi I with armed drones and cruise missiles. The attack cut Arabia’s largest oil facility and one of its Saudi oil production by 50 percent.1 largest oil fields affected 5 percent of the world’s oil supply. The strike on Saudi Arabia’s largest oil facility and one of its largest oil fields affected 5 percent of the world’s oil supply.2 It also shook global energy markets, caused a spike in oil prices, and significantly affected It also reflects an underappreciated evo- lution and growth in Iran’s air power and the world’s spare oil capacity. military prowess in the Middle East. It was a significant demonstration of Iranian mil- itary force against an important regional rival that had the potential to escalate into a broader conflict The threat of Iranian cruise missiles and in the Middle East with untold consequences. There their proliferation merit immediate U.S. has been much attention placed on Iran’s missile attention and action to protect American programs, especially its space launch vehicles and bal- forces and advance U.S. interests. listic missiles, but the use of cruise missiles—alongside drones— in this attack reflects an underappreciated This paper, in its entirety, can be found at http://report.heritage.org/bg3460 The Heritage Foundation | 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE | Washington, DC 20002 | (202) 546-4400 | heritage.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. -
How Iran's Involvement in Yemen Could Draw America Into the War by Farzin Nadimi
MENU Policy Analysis / PolicyWatch 2710 How Iran's Involvement in Yemen Could Draw America into the War by Farzin Nadimi Oct 17, 2016 Also available in Arabic ABOUT THE AUTHORS Farzin Nadimi Farzin Nadimi, an associate fellow with The Washington Institute, is a Washington-based analyst specializing in the security and defense affairs of Iran and the Persian Gulf region. Brief Analysis Along with Iran's heightened anti-American rhetoric and local naval deployments, the recent Houthi missile attacks against U.S. vessels raise fears that Tehran's clients may take the war into a new and more dangerous phase. s the Yemen war enters its twentieth month, the fighting has escalated beyond the country's confines, with A Iranian-backed Houthi rebels firing what appeared to be Iranian antiship cruise missiles at foreign vessels operating around the Bab al-Mandab Strait. The U.S.-flagged, Emirati-operated supply ship Swift was struck on October 1, and U.S. Navy ships were unsuccessfully targeted in subsequent days. In response, U.S. forces struck Houthi-controlled portions of Yemen's coast, destroying three surveillance radars of undisclosed type that were reportedly active during the missile attacks. While U.S. military sources have yet to confirm the type of weapons fired at their ships, the prime suspect is the C- 802 Noor, a cruise missile system that Iran has reportedly provided to its traditionally anti-American Houthi clients. Two other possibilities cannot be ruled out yet. The first is the C-801, an older cruise missile in the Yemeni navy's arsenal, which could have fallen into rebel hands given that the Houthis are allied with former elements of the country's armed forces and have taken over significant territory. -
Durham Research Online
Durham Research Online Deposited in DRO: 28 March 2018 Version of attached le: Accepted Version Peer-review status of attached le: Peer-reviewed Citation for published item: Bahgat, Gawdat and Ehteshami, Anoushiravan (2017) 'Iran's defense strategy : the Navy, ballistic missiles and cyberspace.', Middle East policy., 24 (3). pp. 89-103. Further information on publisher's website: https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12292 Publisher's copyright statement: This is the accepted version of the following article: Bahgat, Gawdat Ehteshami, Anoushiravan (2017). Iran's Defense Strategy: The Navy, Ballistic Missiles and Cyberspace. Middle East Policy 24(3): 89-103, which has been published in nal form at https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12292. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving. Additional information: Use policy The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that: • a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. Please consult the full DRO policy for further details. Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971 https://dro.dur.ac.uk Iran’s Defense Strategy: Naval Forces, Ballistic Missiles and Cyber Capabilities Gawdat Bahgat and Anoushiravan Ehteshami The inauguration of the second Rouhani Administration has intensified the debate on the Islamic Republic’s defense posture and its relations with neighboring countries and the United States. -
Iran with Nuclear Weapons
The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc. (IFPA), now in its thirty-third year, provides innovative ideas and assesses options and strategies to meet the security challenges/threats of the post 9/11 era. IFPA conducts studies, workshops, and conferences on national security and foreign policy issues and produces innovative reports, briefings, and publications. IFPA’s products and services help government policy- makers, military and industry leaders, and the broader public policy communities make informed decisions in a complex and dynamic global environment. With core staff offices in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Washington, D.C., the Institute maintains a global network of research advisors and consultants. Dr. Jacquelyn K. Davis Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. September 2008 TABLE OF CONTENts Executive Summary i Introduction 1 Chapter 1: The Deterrence Dynamics of an Iran with Nuclear Weapons 5 Does the Nature of the Regime Matter? 13 Model 1: A Defensive Iran 14 Model 2: An Aggressive Iran 18 Model 3: An Unstable Iran 22 Chapter 2: Considerations Influencing Decision-Making about Iran’s Nuclear Posture 25 A Defensive Iran’s Nuclear Posture, Doctrinal Priorities, and Force Posture 30 An Aggressive Iran That Flexes Its Muscles 34 An Unstable Iran and the Potential Need to Deter Rogue Elements and Non-State Organizations 36 Chapter 3: Nuclear Weapons Operationalization 39 Model 1: A Defensive Deterrent. 45 Model 2: An Offensive Deterrent for an Aggressive Iran 47 Model 3: An Unstable Iran and the Need to Deter Regime or Rogue Elements 50 Chapter 4: Implications for U.S. Strategic and Operational Planning 54 Iran as Catalyst for a New Deterrence Dynamic among Nuclear States 58 Israel and the Challenge of Catalytic Warfare 63 Of Dyads, Triads, and the Need for a New Deterrence Paradigm Relating to a Nuclear Iran 66 Chapter 5: Updating U.S.