Iran's Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities

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Iran's Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities Iran’s Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities Praeger Security International Advisory Board Board Cochairs Loch K. Johnson, Regents Professor of Public and International Affairs, School of Public and International Affairs, University of Georgia (U.S.A.) Paul Wilkinson, Professor of International Relations and Chairman of the Advisory Board, Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St. Andrews (U.K.) Members Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies (U.S.A.) The´re`se Delpech, Director of Strategic Affairs, Atomic Energy Commission, and Senior Research Fellow, CERI (Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques), Paris (France) Sir Michael Howard, former Chichele Professor of the History of War and Regis Pro- fessor of Modern History, Oxford University, and Robert A. Lovett Professor of Mili- tary and Naval History, Yale University (U.K.) Lieutenant General Claudia J. Kennedy, USA (Ret.), former Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army (U.S.A.) Paul M. Kennedy, J. Richardson Dilworth Professor of History and Director, International Security Studies, Yale University (U.S.A.) Robert J. O’Neill, former Chichele Professor of the History of War, All Souls Col- lege, Oxford University (Australia) Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland (U.S.A.) Fareed Zakaria, Editor, Newsweek International (U.S.A.) Iran’s Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities The Threat in the Northern Gulf Anthony H. Cordesman and Martin Kleiber Published in cooperation with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C. PRAEGER SECURITY INTERNATIONAL Westport, Connecticut • London Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Cordesman, Anthony H. Iran’s military forces and warfighting capabilities : the threat in the Northern Gulf / Anthony H. Cordesman and Martin Kleiber. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978–0–313–34612–5 (alk. paper) 1. Iran—Military policy. 2. National security—Iran. 3. Iran—Armed Forces. I. Kleiber, Martin. II. Title. UA853.I7C634 2007a 355´.033255—dc22 2007029599 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 2007 by Center for Strategic and International Studies All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2007029599 ISBN-13: 978–0–313–34612–5 First published in 2007 Praeger Security International, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com Printed in the United States of America The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984). 10987654321 Contents FIGURES ix CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1 INTENTIONS VERSUS CAPABILITIES IN A DIVIDED STATE 1 The Uncertain Voices of Iran’s Leaders 2 Iran’s Military Exercises 15 Iran’s ‘‘Traveling Circus(es)’’ of Security Voices 20 EXTERNAL SOURCES OF INSTABILITY 21 Strategic Uncertainty and the Gulf 23 The Problem of the United States and Israel 24 FOCUSING ON CAPABILITIES RATHER THAN ON INTENTIONS 25 CHAPTER 2: IRAN’S CHANGING ROLE IN REGIONAL SECURITY 27 CHAPTER 3: MILITARY SPENDING, ARMS IMPORTS, AND 30 MILITARY MANNING IRANIAN MILITARY SPENDING AND ARMS IMPORTS 30 IRANIAN MILITARY MANPOWER 35 CHAPTER 4: THE IRANIAN ARMY 40 IRANIAN TANK STRENGTH 41 Iran’s Most Modern Tanks 45 Holdings of Older Tanks 46 OTHER IRANIAN ARMOR 47 IRANIAN ANTI-ARMOR WEAPONS 53 IRANIAN ARTILLERY STRENGTH 54 vi CONTENTS Holdings of Tube Artillery 56 Multiple Rocket Launchers 59 Modern Targeting and Fire-Control Systems and Artillery Tactics 61 IRANIAN ARMY AIR-DEFENSE SYSTEMS 62 IRANIAN ARMY AVIATION 64 IRANIAN ARMY UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES 64 IRANIAN ARMY’S COMMAND,CONTROL,COMMUNICATIONS,COMPUTERS, 65 AND INTELLIGENCE FORCE TRENDS AND SUMMARY CAPABILITIES 66 CHAPTER 5: THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS CORPS 73 (PASDARAN) IRGC LAND FORCES 74 THE IRGC AIR FORCE 77 THE IRGC NAVAL FORCES 77 PROXY AND COVERT CBRN OPERATIONS 77 THE AL QUDS (QODS)FORCE 78 THE BASIJ 81 ROLE IN IRAN’S INDUSTRIES 82 OTHER PARAMILITARY FORCES 83 CHAPTER 6: THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE 84 IRANIAN AIR STRENGTH 85 Force Quantity 87 Force Quality 91 Mission Capability 92 Airlift and Support Capability 92 IRGC Air Units 92 Air Weaponry 93 IRANIAN AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT 93 IRANIAN AIR FORCE READINESS AND EFFECTIVENESS 94 IRANIAN LAND-BASED AIR DEFENSE 97 FORCE TRENDS AND SUMMARY CAPABILITIES 103 CHAPTER 7: THE IRANIAN NAVY 108 MAJOR SURFACE SHIPS 112 IRAN’S SUBMARINE FORCES 113 ANTI-SHIP MISSILES AND SMALLER MISSILE CRAFT 116 OTHER PATROL BOATS AND SURFACE CRAFT 119 IRANIAN MINE WARFARE CAPABILITIES 119 IRANIAN AMPHIBIOUS ASSETS 120 IRANIAN NAVAL AIR 121 THE ROLE OF THE NAVAL BRANCH OF THE IRGC 123 NAVAL FORCE DEPLOYMENTS 125 FORCE TRENDS AND SUMMARY CAPABILITIES 125 CONTENTS vii CHAPTER 8: PARAMILITARY, INTERNAL SECURITY, AND 129 INTELLIGENCE FORCES THE MINISTRY OF INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY 131 THE IRGC INTELLIGENCE BRANCH 131 THE BASIJ RESISTANCE FORCE 132 THE UNCERTAIN ROLE OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR 132 CHAPTER 9: IRAN’S LONG-RANGE MISSILE ARSENAL 134 SHAHAB-1/SCUD-B 136 SHAHAB-2/SCUD-C 139 SHAHAB-3 141 Missile Development 142 Uncertain Performance 144 Mobility and Deployment 147 SHAHAB-3A/3M/3D/IRIS 148 SHAHAB-4 149 SHAHAB-5 AND SHAHAB-6 150 SATELLITE LAUNCH VEHICLE 151 CSS-8 OR TONDAR 69 152 BM-25/SS-N-6 152 GHADR 101 AND GHADR 110 153 RADUGA KH-55 GRANAT/KH-55/AS-15 KENT 154 M-9 AND M-11 MISSILES 155 FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS 156 CHAPTER 10: IRAN’S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 157 PROGRAM: CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CHEMICAL WEAPONS 157 Official Estimates of Iranian Capability 158 Arms Control Estimates of Iranian Capability 159 NGO Estimates of Iranian Capability 160 BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 161 Possible Early Indicators That Iran Might Have a BW Program 162 The Uncertain Nature of Iran’s BW Program Since the Mid-1990s 163 Continuing Alarms and Excursions 163 The Possible Role of Outside Suppliers 163 POSSIBLE CBW WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY 164 CHAPTER 11: POSSIBLE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS 169 PROBLEMS IN ANALYZING IRAN’S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) 173 PROGRAM:ACASE STUDY Uncertainty and Credibility of Sources 175 Key Uncertainties in Iran’s Nuclear Developments 177 PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION 177 Uranium Enrichment 180 viii CONTENTS The Centrifuge Challenge 181 Laser Isotope Separation 186 Other Aspects of Iranian Activity 188 Iranian Commitment to Nuclear Power Programs 191 ACONTINUING PROCESS OF DISCOVERY 192 CHAPTER 12: IRAN’S STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES AND THE 195 POSSIBLE RESPONSE IRAN’S CONVENTIONAL WEAKNESSES AND STRENGTHS 196 Iran’s Limited Conventional Offensive Capabilities 196 Iran as a Defensive Power 198 Iran’s Conventional Forces and Iraq 198 IRAN AS AN ASYMMETRIC THREAT 199 The Iranian Threat in the Gulf 199 ‘‘Closing the Gulf ?’’ 200 Other Contingencies 201 IRAN’S USE OF STATE AND NONSTATE ACTORS AS PROXIES AND PARTNERS 202 ‘‘Proxies’’ and ‘‘Partners’’ 202 The Strengths and Weaknesses of Such Operations 203 The Iraq Option 204 IRAN AS A NUCLEAR POWER ARMED WITH LONG-RANGE MISSILES 209 Sanctions and Economic Vulnerability 210 Petroleum Sanctions 211 Petroleum and Product Sanctions 213 Financial Sanctions 214 If Iran Becomes a Serious Nuclear Power 215 IRAN AS A RELIGIOUS AND IDEOLOGICAL THREAT IN A REGION AND AN ISLAMIC 216 WORLD POLARIZED ALONG SECTARIAN LINES LIMITING IRAN’S CURRENT AND FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES FOR OPPORTUNISM 218 Actions by the United States, the EU, Other Outside Powers, and the UN 218 Actions by Iran’s Neighbors 221 THE WORST CASE:ISRAELI AND U.S. COUNTER-NUCLEAR STRIKES ON IRAN 222 The Problem of Targeting 223 Israeli Options 226 Possible Methods of Israeli Attack 226 Iranian Defense against Israeli (and U.S.) Strikes 231 Iranian Retaliation against Israel 232 U.S. Options against Iran 232 Possible U.S. Strike Methods 233 Possible U.S. War Plans: Attacking, Delaying, and Waiting Out 235 Iranian Retaliation against U.S. Strikes 235 NO SHORT OR EASY ROAD 241 NOTES 243 Figures FIGURE 1.1: IRAN’S FORCES RELATIVE TO THOSE OF OTHER MAJOR 2 NEIGHBORING MILITARY POWERS IN 2007 FIGURE 1.2: GULF MILITARY FORCES IN 2007—PART ONE 3 FIGURE 1.3: GULF MILITARY FORCES IN 2007—PART TWO 6 FIGURE 1.4: THE GROWING VOLUME OF GULF OIL EXPORTS, 2003–2030 25 FIGURE 2.1: IRAN 28 FIGURE 3.1: COMPARATIVE GULF MILITARY SPENDING 32 FIGURE 3.2: IRAN’S ARMS IMPORTS BY SUPPLIER, 1993–2005 33 FIGURE 3.3: COMPARATIVE GULF NEW ARMS DELIVERIES 34 FIGURE 3.4: COMPARATIVE GULF NEW ARMS IMPORT AGREEMENTS 35 FIGURE 3.5: COMPARATIVE TRENDS IN GULF TOTAL ACTIVE MILITARY 36 MANPOWER, 1979–2007 FIGURE 3.6: TOTAL ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER IN ALL GULF FORCES, 37 1990–2007 FIGURE 3.7: TOTAL GULF MILITARY MANPOWER BY COUNTRY BY SERVICE IN 2007 38 FIGURE 4.1: TOTAL ACTIVE ARMY MANPOWER IN ALL GULF FORCES 2007 41 FIGURE 4.2: TOTAL GULF OPERATIONAL ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES, 2007 42 FIGURE 4.3: TOTAL OPERATIONAL MAIN BATTLE TANKS IN ALL GULF FORCES, 43 1979–2007 FIGURE 4.4: MEDIUM- TO HIGH-QUALITY MAIN BATTLE TANKS BY TYPE, 2007 44 FIGURE 4.5: TOTAL OPERATIONAL OTHER ARMORED VEHICLES [LIGHT TANKS, 48 LIGHT ARMORED VEHICLES (LAVS), AIFVS, APCS, AND RECONNAISSANCE (RECCE)] IN GULF FORCES, 1990–2007 FIGURE 4.6: GULF OTHER ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES BY CATEGORY, 2007 49 x FIGURES FIGURE 4.7: ARMORED INFANTRY FIGHTING VEHICLES,RECONNAISSANCE
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