Public Service or Private Profit? British Railway Policy 1825-2020

The Clinker lecture 2020

Mark Casson University of Reading

1 Part I: Introduction

2 Key questions

• Railway history is strong on detail but does not always engage with wider issues. What sort of general questions can it address? • A previous generation of transport historians – Michael Robbins, Jack Simmons, Theo Barker, etc. – linked railways to the wider social, economic and political environment. They addressed two main types of question: – What was the impact of economy and society on the railway? – What was the impact of railways on the economy and society? • But they did not always answer these questions directly. • This lecture addresses another general question, focused on the ‘public service’ aspect of the railway system. It asks: – To what extent did railway managements pursue public service? – What was the impact of public service strategies on the service they provided?

3 Concepts and definitions

• Private profit: – Operating surplus net of interest and other charges = Dividends paid out to shareholders plus retained profit – Profit may be retained to exploit new opportunities, address new challenges, or build up reserves – Pursuit of profit is driven mainly by shareholder interests. Pensioners want stable dividends. Speculators want capital gains. – Managers want retained earnings to grow the business, but they don’t want profit at the expense of salaries. • Public service is a contested concept: it includes – meeting the transport needs of people and industries – providing value for money to customers – fair wages, secure employment and good working conditions – safety of passengers and workers, etc.

4 Some specific questions (and answers)

• Did the railways pursue a public service agenda? Yes. • Why did they do that? To begin with, because government regulation compelled it. Later because it helped to win government support • When, if at all, was public service on the railways at its zenith? 1914 • How good was the public service provided by the railways? Quite good at the zenith, but could have been even better • Did public service obligations reduce profitability? Yes, definitely. There was a trade-off. Public service increased operating costs and discouraged cost- saving changes that might damage the interests of customers, employees etc. • Did the speculative nature of construction in the Mania period impede the subsequent delivery of public service? Yes. It burdened the railways with high costs and left them with an inadequate system of cross–country routes. High costs and consequent low returns prevented later improvements, e.g. mainline electrification. • Did public service requirements have differential impacts? Yes: greater for passenger traffic than freight traffic, and for rural traffic than inter-city traffic. • Overall, was their public service role a cost or a benefit to railway companies? Pre-WW1 it was a cost; later a benefit. But it was more of a benefit to managers than to shareholders 5 Part II Basic chronology

6 Drivers of change on the railway system

• Public service issues were not the only factors impacting on the railway system. Technological, economic and social changes were important too: – Rapid technological innovation – Continued industrialisation – Improving living standards – Population growth, urbanisation and suburbanisation – Development of capital markets • We add to the list: – Government policy changes, particularly those driven by a public service agenda. • Charting changes year by year is difficult. Seven key phases are distinguished in the tables that follow

7 Seven phases of railway development: factors influencing railway performance

Period Phase Key factors affecting the national railway system 1825-45 Experimental Improved technologies (locomotives, track, etc.) increase phase productivity and quality of service Superior speed and reliability eliminate most road and canal competition 1845-70 Boom and bust Manias (1845, 1860-6) with intervening recession. Access to finance dictates which lines are built. Mergers generate regional companies with contested boundaries. 1870-1914 Maturity Major social and political change. Increased government regulation. Rise of trade union power. Some competition from trams and coastal shipping. 1918-1939 Consolidation Inter-modal competition: Growth of road and air transport . and survival Inter-company competition is relatively superficial 1945-1964 Nationalisation Cars for business and leisure travel. Labour shortages. wagon- load and parcels traffic switches to the road 1964-94 Rationalisation Motorways. Jet travel undermines holiday traffic 1994-2020 Privatisation Road congestion and parking charges stimulate passenger traffic and ‘parkway’ stations. Growth of London as a ‘world city’ 8 Phases of public service provision

Period Balance Remarks 1825-45 Private profit with limited Maximum fares per mile; Parliamentary public service constraints approval of new construction. Board of Trade regulation of operations 1845-70 Private profit with public Parliamentary trains (1844). Common carriage service obligations of goods (1854) 1870-1914 Private profit from delivery Safety regulations (signalling, braking, etc.); of a public service workmen’s trains, shorter working hours, etc. 1918-1939 Public service provision with Uneconomic lines retained profit incentives 1945-1964 Public service with limited Nationalisation with six regions. Standard steam budget constraints locomotives. Dieselisation (1955). Beeching cuts (1963-4) 1964-94 Public service with tight Freightliner (1965-8), HST (1976) Sectorisation budget constraints (1982) 1994-2020 Private profit with public Franchising, revenue attribution, separation of regulation track and train. Move towards subcontracting

Note: The dates are only approximate 9 Part III: Public service with private profit: 1870-1914

10 ‘Boom and bust’: the legacy

• The World’s First Railway System focused on the period 1845-70. It argued that the system was over-built by 30 per cent: too much track, and hubs in the wrong places. • Railway construction incurred fixed costs (independent of the traffic carried) and so did railway maintenance and operation. Excessive construction increased recurrent costs throughout the lifetime of the system. • As the network expanded, and geographical density increased, so competing routes proliferated. Competition between companies intensified; downward pressure on fares and rates made high recurrent fixed costs a serious problem. • Railways were committed to a high-fares policy. They charged maximum rates, which they considered too low. They encouraged local residents to travel long- distances over their own network rather than using shorter routes involving other company’s networks (e.g. travelling cross-country via London).

11

Government policy, 1870-1914

• The period 1870-1914 witnessed major social and political change (as highlighted by Peter Cain; see also Colin Divall). – The Reform Act of 1868 widened the franchise. – Gladstone became prime minister in 1868 and re-launched his railway regulation agenda (his last spell as PM ended in 1894). – Longer holidays and shorter hours for workers increased popular travel and stimulated the market for third-class travel. – Trades union act 1871 and subsequent employment legislation . Artisan trade unions became increasingly militant, followed by general unions later. – Local government reform. Municipal Corporations Act 1882 empowered local boroughs to undertake large projects. Agitation for better urban housing promoted suburban commuting.

12 Impact of policy on the railways, 1870-1914

• UK railways requiring compulsory purchase of land have always been regulated in the public interest, using a template developed for canals. • Once the novelty of railway speed wore off, standards of customer service were perceived to be poor. Punctuality, the quality of station accommodation and passenger safety needed improvement (derailments, crashes and murders). • The negative image of the railways encouraged Parliament to take a tough line. MPs believed that – competition was not sufficiently strong to drive improvement and that regulation would be required instead – regulation should rely on ‘sticks’ and not ‘carrots’: railway improvements should not be subsidised by the state • Impact on railway costs. Railway companies faced a ’double whammy’: – Generic impacts from increased wages, shorter hours, etc, and – Specific impacts from railway legislation on safety etc.

13 Marketing strategies 1870-1914

• To avoid fares being driven too low, companies tacitly agreed to compete on quality of service rather than price. • They developed new forms of traffic rather than competing for a larger share of existing traffic. • They adopted market segmentation. Five main types of traffic were targeted. – two were traditional: express passenger; coal and mineral; – three were new: holiday; commuter; and perishables (cattle, milk, fish, etc.). • Customer brands were developed, later supported by poster advertising, exploiting advances in colour printing. Each form of traffic was marketed in a slightly different way. • There was less emphasis on developing general passenger and freight, post and parcels. • Companies maintained their high fares policy on existing traffic. New traffic was more fare-sensitive. Low fares were therefore used to attract new traffic, e.g. lower-income passengers pursuing tourism and recreation. Commuting was encouraged using season tickets. 14 Tourism: market segments

Activity Journey UK destinations Seaside: sunshine & Workers’ day trips or Blackpool, Brighton, entertainment holiday weeks Llandudno. Scarborough Seaside; exclusive resort White collar and elite; Bournemouth, Torbay weekly stay Spa: recuperation Elderly elite; long stay Bath, Buxton, Harrogate, Llandrindod Wells Sporting: golf, shooting, Business & aristocratic Gleneagles, Aviemore walking elite; variable stay Landscape appreciation White collar and elite Lakes, Cornwall, Norfolk, variable stay Peak district Domestic pilgrimage Day-trip or short stay Canterbury, York

International: business trips Elite long-stay Continental ports and cultural appreciation

15 Comfort and convenience, 1870-1914

• Network coverage was an important aspect of a company’s brand. It was improved using jointly-owned cross-country lines and through-working arrangements (‘cooperation in order to compete’) • Speed and reliability were improved by new construction: doubling tracks, using flying junctions, avoiding lines, etc. Speed posed issues for comfort and safety: comfort was improved with corridor bogie coaches and safety with better interlocking of points and signals. • Through carriages on multi-portion express trains avoided passengers changing trains at busy junction stations (causing delays and congestion however) • Restaurant cars and sleeping cars were provided on long journeys; also special luggage facilities. • Express traffic was concentrated on long-distance primary routes. The ‘turnpike principle’ was used to minimise journey times to secondary destinations: the faster route was preferred to the shorter route. There was heavy infrastructure investment in competing primary routes 1890- 1910 to enhance line speeds and capacity (avoiding bottlenecks). • Improvements to stations and facilities were focused on primary rather than secondary lines, and on city termini and ports 16 Elite travel: dimensions of quality of service

Issue Passenger requirements Solutions Travel to station Convenient access to station; Stations in convenient locations easy to purchase ticket Luggage assistance Luggage in advance delivered to Porters, luggage vans hotel Convenient schedule After-breakfast departure; long Dining cars and sleeping cars journeys may be overnight Relaxing journey Comfortable facing window seat; Advance seat reservation system; smooth ride; scenery corridor stock with toilets Refreshments Meals and bar facilities Dining car, station buffets Ferry services Luxury shipping vessels Integrate station, transit lounges and harbour/pier Access to destination Smooth transfer to residential Station hotel or associated hotel accommodation Resort activities Golf course; lake cruise Concessionary rates for passengers; ownership or co-ownership of facilities

17 Part IV: The railways at their zenith

18 The zenith

• When was the zenith? • Not 1939; the big four (and the LNER in particular) were in poor final shape. The speed records achieved at this time were not representative of everyday travel experience. • Not before 1910, because the trunk system was not then fully complete. • So 1910-14: although there was already road competition, the railways themselves were carrying road traffic too. (Michael Harris: ‘there never was a zenith’.) • Three short case studies are presented here, focusing on the quality of passenger services

19 20 21 Source: Dreamstime.com, downloaded 04/10/2020 22 Inter-company relations

LNWR MR GWR LSWR GNR GER L&YR NER GCR LNWR N R R A R MR N N F R N F F R GWR R N N F LSWR F N GNR R R R R F A GER N R L&YR A F R F NER F F F F GCR R R F A F F

Key: F: Friend; R: Rival; N: Enemy; A: Ambiguous. Note: For simplicity this table excludes smaller companies and companies based mainly in Scotland and the south- east 23 Part V Decline and regeneration

24 Consolidation and survival, 1918-39

• Political change continued (e.g. women’s franchise). • Industrial exports declined (and hence freight traffic to ports) because of – war-time interruption, 1914-8 – return to the Gold Standard at pre-war parity, 1925 – post-war strikes, 1926 – Wall Street crash, 1929 – cheap coal exports from Germany and exhaustion of some Welsh mines. • Declining profits restricted internal funding of investment. LNER was in continual financial difficulties due to NE industrial decline (see Michael Bonania) • The Big Four mergers reduced competition between some routes (e.g. L&NWR and MR; GNR and GCR) and facilitated standardisation (economies of scale) (see Roy Edwards). • Inter-modal competition intensified: railways launched a drive for speed. East coast - west coast competition was exaggerated for publicity purposes. 25 Rationalisation, 1918-39

• Freight traffic was rationalised: fewer larger freight yards; some containerisation. But road continued to be perceived as a feeder to rail rather than a substitute for it. • Downgrading of some duplicate main lines to secondary status (e.g. GCR extension). But uneconomic secondary and branch lines remained open. • Successful lobbying led to licensing of buses and lorry services; but some large factories closed connecting spurs and established their own lorry fleets • Suburban electrification: LSWR lines a success; LBSCR lines converted to third rail; GNR suburban opportunities lost to tube lines; NER mainline scheme abandoned; LMS initiated little • Mainline electrification was deemed too expensive. Dieselisation was limited mainly to shunting and experimental locomotives.

26 Quality of management, 1918-39

• Internal disputes: locomotive management at LMS; tensions between board and management at GWR; but good leadership at SR. LNER decentralisation safeguarded the GER legacy • Scientific management saved fuel and other supplies but increased overhead costs of administration (e.g. York regional HQ) • Government loans: GWR was the main user, for station re-building, quadrupling track and dock improvements • Overall, There was a lot of talk but little action. Management seems to have focused on preserving infrastructure and running trains in order to give themselves operations to manage. • Uneconomic jobs were preserved. Public service provided a cover for this strategy: railways helped to mitigate the inter-war ‘unemployment problem’

27 Nationalisation 1948-94 (1)

• Nationalisation meant public ownership to passengers but workers control to some trade unionists • It was largely ‘business as usual’ for management. Apart from Scotland and the North-east, the regional structure of BR mapped reasonably well into the ‘Big Four’ (see Michael Bonavia and Terry Gourvish) • A post-war boom in holidays and post-war reconstruction distracted attention from long-run problems • Budgets were dictated by politicians. Government policies and ministers changed quickly. It was crucial to spend funds as soon as they were received. Hasty project planning could lead to cost over-runs later. • New locomotives had short working lives. A public service orientation to procurement resulted in many early diesel locomotives being unreliable. Some steam locomotives built under the Modernisation programme had a working life of no more than 8 years. • West coast modernisation was never fully completed. There was little other mainline electrification, apart from the extension of the Southern third-rail system. • In the 1960s the system was in constant flux. In the Liverpool area in 1964 passenger services were run simultaneously using steam, diesel and

electric power. 28 Nationalisation 1948-94 (1)

• Some of the Beeching cuts were overdue. But over- manning inflated the operating costs of marginal lines. Political and financial pressures meant that few lines were ‘moth-balled’ • Some significant innovations in later years: Freightliner (1965-8), HST (1976), Glasgow suburban electrification. • Management structures were reformed in the 1980s to give greater transparency and accountability and facilitate innovation, e.g. sectorisation (1982),

29 Privatisation: 1994-2020 (1)

• Privatisation was a fall-out from John Major’s confrontation with Euro-sceptics. It was not part of Thatcher’s vision of a ‘shareholder society’ • The Treasury believed that competition, combined with private sector marketing expertise, would improve customer service. They devised their franchising principles by analogy with other sectors (e.g. airlines, telecoms). • Fragmentation. Regulation of the system was fragmented between DfT, SRA, ORR. Operations were fragmented between franchisees, rolling stock owners and Railtrack, not to mention their numerous subcontractors • Early franchisees demanded large subsidies, so competition on routes was curtailed to make franchises more attractive. Some early franchises were held by teams of experienced railway managers, but bus, ship and air operators gradually took over. They were skilled in competitive bidding and lobbying.

30 Privatisation (2)

• Open access operators provided additional services over tracks already used by regular franchisees. They claimed to create additional customers, but incumbent franchisees alleged that they were simply ‘abstracting’ existing traffic. This issue has never been fully resolved. • Revenue attribution had perverse effects. Franchisee revenues were not directly collected (as originally planned) but imputed using the BR-legacy ORCATS system. This system ignored some key factors, such as the number of seats available on different types of train. Open access operators were regularly accused of ‘gaming’ the ORCATS system. • Delay attribution incurred heavy costs. Separation of ‘wheel and rail’ created an administrative burden of delay attribution, involving signal boxes, franchisee headquarters, and the Office of the Rail Regulator (ORR). • Performance incentives had perverse effects. Example: penalties for lack of punctuality were set so high, and penalties for cancellation so low, that late running trains were routinely cancelled, reducing the quality of service. • Other conflicts of interest Customer protection was the responsibility of the same department of government (SRA, DfT) that let the franchises; when a winner of a franchise realised that they had over-bid they economised on service quality (e.g. Northern Rail) or handed back the franchise (e.g. GNER). The regulators did little to protect the customers.

31 Privatisation (3)

• It is too early to assess the results of privatisation fully. • Passenger traffic has benefitted from road congestion, city-centre parking restrictions and population growth, e.g. inter-city travel by students, suburban commuting by office workers • New trains have been provided in London and the SE, and others have been cascaded to the regions • Standard fares are high compared to other countries. Many concessionary fares require compulsory reservations and off-peak travel. • Several bottlenecks on the network have been successfully removed. But some electrification schemes have been only partially completed. • Some lines have been re-opened.

32 Part VI Concluding reflections

33 Reminder of the specific findings

• Did the railways pursue a public service agenda? Yes. • Why did they do that? To begin with, because government regulation compelled it. Later because it helped to win government support • When, if at all, was public service on the railways at its zenith? 1914 • How good was the public service provided by the railways? Quite good at the zenith, but could have been even better • Did public service obligations reduce profitability? Yes, definitely. There was a trade-off. Public service increased operating costs and discouraged cost- saving changes that might damage the interests of customers, employees etc. • Did the speculative nature of construction in the Mania period impede the subsequent delivery of public service? Yes. It burdened the railways with high costs and left them with an inadequate system of cross–country routes. High costs and consequent low returns prevented later improvements, e.g. mainline electrification. • Did public service requirements have differential impacts? Yes: greater for passenger traffic than freight traffic, and for rural traffic than inter-city traffic. • Overall, was their public service role a cost or a benefit to railway companies? Pre-WW1 it was a cost; later a benefit. But it was more of a benefit to managers than to shareholders 34 Conclusion: Factors influencing the provision of public service Phase Prosperity Modal share Internal co- Social Overall Public of traffic operation conscience rating service 1825-45 L L L L L L 1845-70 H L L L M L 1870- H H H H VH H 1914 1918-39 L H H L M H 1945-64 L L A H M H 1964-94 L L A L L L 1994- H L L L L L 2020

Note: Prosperity: Rate of growth of GDP; Modal share: Estimated percentage of total traffic carried by rail; Social conscience: The attitude and ideology of regulators and policy-makers (not the same as cohesion in society). H: High; L: Low; M: medium; VH: very high 35 Appendix: Additional case studies and notes on specific topics

36 Great Central Railway

• Originally an E-W Line Manchester-Sheffield-Retford-Grimsby, the company expanded into the E Midlands and then further south. Its London extension to Marylebone in 1899 is a good test of whether there was shortage of capacity to London. It attacked the MR’s London passenger services and promoted the coal exports through Immingham. Much of the expansion was driven by Sir Edward Watkin who had interests in the Metropolitan Railway. • GCR system structure: Sheffield-Woodford spine with arms from Sheffield to Manchester and Cleethorpes, a neck to Doncaster, and legs from Woodford to London and to Banbury (connection to the GWR). Sheffield was the main hub; Leicester and Nottingham had few connections. A new loop through High Wycombe (joint with GWR) avoided congestion on the Metropolitan line. • The passenger capacity of new routes was well-used. Seven up & down restaurant car expresses per weekday London-Woodford-Rugby-Leicester-Loughborough- Nottingham-Sheffield-Penistone-Godley-Manchester/Stockport-Warrington- Liverpool • Cross-country traffic potential was also exploited. Six cross-country expresses per weekday Southampton/Barry/Weston-super-Mare-Woodford-Leicester-York- Newcastle/Manchester • Partnership was key on cross-country routes: GWR in the south and NER, CLC in the north (CLC partners were Midlands rivals MR, GNR, who were also rivals themselves; the common foe was LNWR which dominated lucrative Manchester traffic) 37 Midland Railway

• MR was created by an early merger of two competing companies, promoted by George Hudson. In the 1870s it pioneered popular rail travel and Pullman cars. Initially a land-locked company with competitors to east and west, it expanded in all directions. • It attacked Scottish traffic (LNWR), London traffic (GNR), cross-country traffic (GCR, GWR) and holiday traffic from industrial towns to the coast (GER). It also defended its coal trade in the East Midlands and South Yorkshire. • N-S trunk: London-Bedford-Kettering-Leicester-Trent-Clay Cross-Chesterfield-Sheffield-Rotherham- Normanton-Leeds-Settle-Carlisle. Approximate 2-hour intervals on expresses from London to Manchester/Liverpool, Leeds/Bradford and Glasgow/Edinburgh • SW-NE cross-country: Bristol/Bath-Gloucester-Worcester-Birmingham-Tamworth-Derby-...- Normanton-York. Derby-Birmingham-Bristol 12 expresses per day • Derby a hub for London-Manchester and Bristol-Sheffield/York; London down trains divided at Leicester for Erewash Valley, Derby and Nottingham. There were by-passes for Derby, Nottingham, Sheffield, Birmingham, Worcester, and loops through Melton Mowbray and Redditch. Many fast trains use Erewash valley to by-pass both Derby and Nottingham • Trains were divided and combined at Derby (detaching Bristol portions from up trains) and Leicester (detaching Nottingham portions from down trains) • E-W cross-country: Manchester-Chinley-Sheffield and Leicester-Melton Mowbray- Peterborough/Kings Lynn-Yarmouth • Operated suburban systems in Birmingham, Leeds/Bradford, Manchester (CLC) and finally London (LT&SR) • Operated secondary lines serving Huntingdon, Redditch, Northampton, Nuneaton, Wolverhampton, Lincoln, Dewsbury, Bradford, Lancaster, Morecambe, Ilkley, Colne. • Detached portions in South Wales: Hereford-Three Cocks, Swansea-Brynamman • Partnerships: S&DJR (LSWR), M&SWJR (LSWR); M&GNR(GNR), Severn & Wye (GWR). Working powers over Neath & Brecon, Stratford-on-Avon & Midland Junction, etc. 38 Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway

• The Manchester and Leeds Railway (‘Eleven Towns Railway’ or ‘Calder Valley main line’) was engineered by George Stephenson and opened in 1841. It quickly built branches to neighbouring towns and became the LYR in 1846. It subsequently absorbed several other regional and local lines. • It served the prosperous Lancashire cotton and Yorkshire woollen industries. Rather than invade new territory it fought to keep other companies out. It saturated its territory with lines, but nevertheless failed to deter the LNWR, MR and GNR. Invasion was most severe in West Yorkshire where the GNR allegedly exploited dissatisfaction with the Manchester- headquartered incumbent. • Access to York and Hull was controlled by the NER and to Preston and the north-west by the LNWR. • Main lines: Liverpool-Manchester-Todmorden-Sowerby Bridge-Halifax-Bradford/Leeds, hourly service; Manchester-Todmorden-Sowerby Bridge-Mirfield-Wakefield-Normanton-York/Goole- Hull/Harwich, 8 trains per day; Manchester-Bolton-Chorley-Preston- Barrow/Whitehaven/Windermere/Glasgow/Edinburgh, 4 trains per day. • Secondary route: Liverpool/Southport-Preston-Blackpool/Fleetwood/Blackburn-Accrington- Burnley-Todmorden/Colne. Some trains were run by the Midland over these routes • Loops: Liverpool-Wigan-Bolton-Manchester, Ramsbottom-Bacup-Rochdale; Oldham, Padiham. • Population and industry were densely distributed over almost the entire area covered by the company. Relatively frequent stopping trains ran on most of the lines. Timetabling was efficient, with good connections, but the company invested little in improvements. 39

Great Western Railway: pre-1910

• The London-Bristol main line was an early promotion which framed subsequent development. Brunel considered competition between gauges healthy, and standard gauge to have been a mistake. Parliament allowed broad gauge connectivity to reinforce regional monopoly. But broad gauge ended in 1892. • Cheltenham & Great Western Union was a significant early branch Swindon- Stroud-Gloucester-Cheltenham. Cheltenham capital was invested to match Bath – a rival spa. Once built, this deterred an Oxford-Cheltenham trunk line (never built), indirectly cost the GWR ownership of the Bristol & Gloucester line, and led to the infamous ‘change of gauge’ at Gloucester. A portion became part of the early main line to South Wales. • Severn Tunnel opened 1886 to appease South Wales coal-owners, but some freight traffic continued to go via Gloucester. • South Wales direct line:[Swindon]-Wootton Bassett-Badminton-Filton-[Newport], 1903 was designed as a Bristol avoiding line; be-devilled by flooding. • Exeter direct line: [Hungerford]-Patney-Westbury, 1900; Castle Cary-Curry Rivel- [Taunton], 1906. Speeded up holiday traffic in competition with the LSWR • GWR & GCR Jt. Committee: Northolt-High Wycombe and Princes Risborough- Ashendon Junction, 1905; Ashendon Junction –Bicester-Aynho Junction, 1910. Reduced congestion near London for both companies • Flying junctions, slip coaches

40 Great Western Railway in 1910

• The GWR served large but rather thinly populated territory; long and wide. Cross- country connectivity poor. Apart from holiday traffic, the London-Bristol main line was dominant. It had a limited presence in industrialised South Wales, where local lines were prominent. • Frequent main-line service from Paddington to Bristol (12 trains, 6 of which proceeded to Exeter and beyond); only 3 Exeter trains used the Westbury route; 6 trains to Birmingham (some continuing to Shrewsbury, Chester, Birkenhead); 5 to Cardiff and South Wales (including Pembroke Dock and Fishguard); 3 to Worcester/Hereford/Cheltenham (via Honeybourne); 3 to Weymouth via Yeovil. • Cross-country: The Welsh Borders route Bristol/Newport-Hereford-Shrewsbury- Crewe was largely controlled by the LNWR through their access to Crewe and the north. Main cross-country service was Bath/Chippenham-Trowbridge-Westbury- Southampton-Portsmouth. Also trains from Kent via Kensington. Birmingham- Stratford-on-Avon-Honeybourne-Cheltenham service was local. • Bristol was the major traffic hub. London & Swindon were important service centres. • The system had many short branches leading to small market towns. The junction station was often quite isolated: Staines, Windsor, Uxbridge, Marlow, Henley, Watington, Aylesbury, Abingdon, Lambourn, Faringdon, Highworth, Marlborough, Fairford, Cirencester, Calne, Tetbury, Bridport, Abbotsbury, Camerton, Blagdon, Clevedoon, Portishead, Minehead, Hemyock, Chard, Moretonhampstead, Ashburton, Kingswear, • Regular use of slip coaches 41 London & North Western Railway

• A successful pioneering railway, formed by merger of three early connecting trunk lines • Main line: London-Rugby-Stafford-Crewe-Preston-Carnforth-Carlisle, with a loop Rugby-Coventry- Birmingham-Wolverhampton-Stafford • Crewe hub: Chester-Holyhead, Runcorn-Liverpool, Stockport-Manchester/Stalybridge -Leeds, Derby (North Staffordshire), Whitchurch-Shrewsbury-Craven Arms-Hereford (part joint with GWR) • Interchange hubs: Preston (L&YR) Stafford (NSR, GNR), Birmingham (MR), Shrewsbury, Chester (both joint GWR) • Central Wales Line, Craven Arms-Swansea/Carmarthen. Also Abergavenny-Merthyr • Successful branches to Llandudno, Blaenau Festiniog, Kendal, Workington, Whitehaven, Blackpool, Fleetwood, Morecambe, Oldham, St Helens, Wellington, Walsall, Leicester, Leamington Spa, Bedford, Cambridge, Oxford, and Rickmansworth • Less successful branches to Afon Wen, Mold, Corwen, Banbury, Loughborough, Market Harborough, Wellingborough, Peterborough, Aylesbury and Dunstable • Trunk line: 30 Euston weekday departures to Scotland (Inverness, Aberdeen, etc.), Ireland (Dublin, Belfast via Holyhead, Fleetwood, Liverpool), Manchester & Liverpool, Shrewsbury via Stafford for Aberystwyth, Llandrindod Wells, Swansea. Through carriages to Southport, Windermere, Whitehaven, Pwllheli, Melton Mowbray (via Northampton), Blackburn, Buxton (via Ashbourne), Knutsford (via Middlewich), etc. • Cross-country: 7 weekday expresses Bristol/Newport-Hereford-Shrewsbury-Crewe with through carriages to Liverpool, Glasgow, etc. Chester served via LNWR Whitchurch branch • Divided trains and slip coaches widely used

42 Great Northern Railway

• The GNR was promoted during the Railway Mania as a ‘towns line’, London- Hitchin-Peterborough-Grantham-Newark-Retford-Doncaster-Selby-[York] with a Lincolnshire loop Peterborough-Spalding-Boston-Woodhall-Lincoln-Gainsborough- Doncaster. In Lincolnshire there was a branch Spalding-Boston-[Skegness]- [Mablethorpe]-Louth-Grimsby, a cross-country line from Nottingham-Sleaford- Boston, and several minor branches • From London the quickest routes to Lincoln and Grimsby were via Grantham. Sheffield was reached via Retford. • Agricultural Lincolnshire generated little passenger traffic. The only invaders were GNR/GER line Lincoln-Sleaford-Spalding-March and M&GNR lines Bourne-Spalding / Peterborough-Sutton Bridge-Kings Lynn-Cromer. The first was driven by GER’s access to coalfields and the second by the pursuit of holiday traffic. Lincolnshire was better connected to the E Midlands than to London • The GNR sought profit to the west, invading MR territory Grantham-Nottingham- Derby-Burton/Uttoxeter-Stafford and Wakefield/Leeds/Bradford/Shipley/Halifax/ Keighley and (with LNWR) Leicester/Melton Mowbray/Market Harborough. • Passenger services were relatively modest: Weekday departures from Kings Cross were 5 to Edinburgh (some to Dundee and Aberdeen), 5 to Leeds, Bradford and other West Yorkshire towns, 2 to Sheffield and Manchester via Retford and the GCR, 2 to York and one to Newcastle. Services in Lincolnshire were typically 5-6 trains per day calling at all stations. Services were most frequent in the urban areas. 43 Great Eastern Railway

• The GER system evolved slowly and covered East Anglia comprehensively. Its density was not so great as in more populous industrial areas, however. The GER monopolised the area, apart from the M&GN invasion of ‘Poppyland’, Norwich and the Broads (see below). The Agricultural Depression of the 1870s hit the area hard, and this encouraged the company to focus on its London and Essex commuter traffic. • There were two main lines from London to Norwich: Bishops Stortford-Cambridge-Ely-Thetford- Wymondham, and Witham-Marks Tey-Colchester-Ipswich-Tivetshall; also two to Yarmouth: from Norwich, and from Ipswich via Beccles (the East Suffolk line). • There was one main cross-country route: Harwich-Ipswich-Haughley-Bury St Edmunds-Ely-March- Spalding-Sleaford-Lincoln-Doncaster (joint with GNR from March) • Many branches joined up to afford through routes: Ely-Kings Lynn-Swaffham-Dereham; Kings Lynn- Heacham-Wells-Fakenham-County School-Dereham-Wymondham-[Norwich]; Swaffham-Thetford- Bury St Edmunds-Long Melford-Marks Tey; Bishops Stortford-Braintree-Witham; County School- Aylsham-Wroxham; Peterborough-March-Wisbech-Kings Lynn. The joining up of branch lines may have been intended to ‘ring fence’ East Anglia against attack from the Midlands but, if so, it failed The invading M&GNR largely replicated these secondary routes, especially on the Peterborough- Kings Lynn-Fakenham section. • There were 5 expresses per day to Norwich via Ipswich and 4 via Cambridge; 6 per day to Yarmouth, 3 each via Cambridge and Ipswich. The Cambridge route provided an option to change at Ely for March/Doncaster and Kings Lynn; the Ipswich route allowed Yarmouth portions to be detached for the East Suffolk line. Trains via Ipswich ran into Norwich Victoria and those via Cambridge into Thorpe in order to continue to Yarmouth. • There were 4 expresses over the joint line to York, 3 from London via Cambridge and one from Norwich. • Trains speeds were relatively slow; the fastest train to Norwich averaged under 40mph, while on the LNWR the fastest trains averaged 50mph. 44 London & South Western Railway: pre-1910

• The London-Southampton line (1840) was one of the early trunk lines that connected London to a major port. Its route via Basingstoke gave it the option of an extension to Exeter, which was reached in stages by 1860. • The Southampton line was later extended to Dorchester via Wimborne and Poole with running powers to Weymouth (1857). • The growth of Bournemouth as a resort led to the opening of a direct line from London via Ringwood and Christchurch in 1870. • As a late entrant to Devon & Cornwall, the L&SWR occupied sparsely populated territory to the north of GWR lines, where it strove to develop holiday traffic. Plymouth was reached via Okehampton in 1874, using working powers, and Padstow in 1899. • The L&SWR carried relatively little freight. The development of its London suburban network was quite lucrative, however. Its London terminus was relocated to Waterloo in 1848 and that station was enlarged several times thereafter.

45 London & South Western Railway in 1910

• The LSWR operated direct lines from London to Portsmouth via Guildford, to Southampton/Bournemouth /Poole/Weymouth and to Salisbury /Exeter/Plymouth, but only the Weymouth and Plymouth lines had express services. Portsmouth could also be reached vis Eastleigh. • Plymouth was served by 6 trains per day. On the Bournemouth line 6 trains ran through to Weymouth (2 with a Swanage portion), and 4 others terminated at either Brockenhurst, Bournemouth, Poole or Dorchester. Swanage was also served via Salisbury, and Weymouth via Wimborne. There was a through LNWR express from Manchester to Bournemouth. • Plymouth was served by 6 trains, one of which ran through to Ilfracombe. • On the ‘withered arm’ there were 8 trains Exeter-Barnstaple and 5 to Padstow. There were branches Barnstaple Junction -Torrington, Halwill-Bude, Bere Alston- Callington, Wadebridge-Bodmin, and Barnstaple-Lynton (narrow gauge). Some branch line services connected with local destinations (e.g. Plymouth) rather than London. • Cross-country services heading north included Portsmouth-Eastleigh-Salisbury, the S&DJR (Wimborne-Templecombe –Bath/Bridgewater/Burnham/Wells) and M&SWJR (Andover-Swindon-Cheltenham) • There were many short branches along the south coast: • There was an extensive network of London suburban services, one of which served Ludgate Hill via Kensington. 46 North Eastern Railway: pre-1910

• The North Eastern Railway sustained a near-monopoly of its territory in North and East Yorkshire, Cleveland and County Durham. It also controlled lines in Northumberland and the Scottish borders. • It grew by a sequence of early mergers and takeovers (that would later have been prohibited). The density of local railways was so great that mergers were effected to prevent price competition between competing routes. Newly-built new lines could expect to be taken over for a good price, and this probably encouraged more building. The system ‘matured’ from an early date. • The NER operated three main types of line: – A trunk line and a loop: the N-S East Coast mainline, Doncaster-York-Thirsk-Northallerton-Durham- Newcastle (the Great North of England line) and the Northallerton-Stockton-Sunderland-Newcastle loop (the Leeds Northern line and local lines) – two E-W lines, the Newcastle and Carlisle (a ‘land-bridge’ between the Tyne and Solway) and the Stainmore line, Middlesbrough-Darlington-Barnard Castle-Kirkby Stephen-Penrith/Tebay (an extension of the historic Stockton and Darlington Railway) – A dense network of local lines connecting mining districts to ports. • It carried four main types of traffic: – Express passenger trains from Scotland to the South – Iron ore from Cumbria to the Tees – Coal from mining districts to East-coast ports – Commuter traffic in Newcastle • Its control of docks in Hull, Middlesbrough, Hartlepool and Jarrow made it unpopular, and stimulated South Yorkshire coal owners to promote the Hull & Barnsley Railway, and the GCR to develop Immingham on the opposite shore of the Humber. Other ‘invasions’ failed, however; the North British failed to extend to Newcastle, and the GNR made no progress north of Doncaster. Instead the GNR and the NBR partnered with the NER in the East Coast Joint Stock consortium and in the financing of the Forth Bridge. • NER management, based in York, was highly professional in traffic management, electric traction and railway architecture. 47 North Eastern Railway

• The core the East Coast main line lay between Thirsk and Northallerton, used by trains from both London and Leeds going to Newcastle via both Darlington and Sunderland. Interchange was effected mainly at Thirsk. There were 20 expresses daily on the core; 12 direct from London to Newcastle, of which 4 were non-stop from York; plus one service from London to Hartlepool. There were 4 services from Manchester (3 LNWR and 1 MR), two of which used the Sunderland loop. There was one MR train from London St Pancras via Sheffield; a train from Bournemouth to Newcastle via the GCR and the Sunderland loop, and another train from Cardiff to Newcastle via the GCR. Between Newcastle and Edinburgh there were 7 expresses a day, supplemented by a reasonable service of all-station trains Newcastle-Alnmouth-Berwick. • From Newcastle-Carlisle 7 trains per day ran fast to Hexham, with connections to all-stations services. There were no expresses on the Stainmore line, just 5 stopping services. • Many local towns were connected to several adjacent towns, generating many local hubs, all controlled by the NER. Besides York, Darlington Newcastle and Hull (Paragon) there were Ferrybridge, Bishop Auckland, Barnard Castle, Driffield, Pickering, Market Weighton. There is little evidence of planned connections at these hubs, however. For a small sample of desirable connections the average waiting time was more than one hour; each line was timetabled according to local requirements that did include convenient connections.

48 South Eastern & Chatham Railway pre-1910

• The joint managing committee was formed in 1899 to administer a revenue-pooling agreement between two bitter rivals for traffic between London and the Kent coast. • The South Eastern Railway (SER) was authorised in 1836. Parliament induced it to share a terminus with the London-Brighton line at London Bridge. It joined that line by making a right-angle turn at Redhill, south of London, where it met a feeder line from Reading to the west. From Redhill the line ran north to London and due east Tonbridge-Paddock Wood- Ashford-Folkestone-Dover, where it connected with the Channel ferry. • The corner at Redhill was cut off by a new line London-Sevenoaks- Tonbridge in 1865. Access to London was improved by building two new stations – Charing Cross (1864) for the West End and Cannon Street (1866) for the city. • The London Chatham & Dover Railway (LC&DR) began life as the East Kent Railway. Its objective was improve rail services to the North Kent Coast. It expanded east Strood-Faversham-Ramsgate/Canterbury-Dover and west Swanley-Shortlands. It acquired the West End & Crystal Palace Railway to secure a London terminus at Victoria (1862) (adjacent to the Brighton station, and joint with the GWR). It also had a station in the city at Ludgate Hill (1865; also used by the GWR). The SER was now squeezed between two rivals – the Brighton line and the LC&DR. 49 South Eastern & Chatham Railway in 1910

• The SE&CR operated two main lines, both serving Ramsgate and Dover, one via Tonbridge, dividing at Ashford, and the other via Chatham, dividing at Faversham. It also had a main line Tonbridge-Hastings with a restricted loading gauge, and a secondary line Swanley-Otford-Maidstone-Ashford connecting its two main lines. It accessed the west and north via Reading. It operated a dense suburban network in SE London. • Most expresses served Dover and/or Ramsgate, some continuing along to coast to Deal. There were 10 expresses via Tonbridge, 7 via Chatham and 2 via Maidstone. The fastest trains connected with boats to Calais, Ostend, etc. from Dover or Folkestone; these ran via Tonbridge. Ten of the Tonbridge trains ran from Charing Cross, but none of the Chatham trains. 6 of the Chatham trains ran from Victoria, and two of the Tonbridge trains. Six expresses ran to Hastings, 4 from Charing Cross and 2 from Victoria. One of the Chatham trains ran from Holborn Viaduct. • This pattern of departures is either very sophisticated or somewhat arbitrary. It may be summarised as Charing cross for the SER Tonbridge route and Victoria for the LC&CR Chatham route, with one or two exceptions. This suggests that services had not been significantly rationalised since the management had been unified. This may reflect either respect for long-established passenger habits, or a reluctance to rationalise.

50 London Brighton & South Coast Railway

• The London-Brighton line was identified very early as a promising line but there was disagreement about the best route. An economical project via Dorking was rejected in favour of a flamboyant direct line via Redhill. • The LBSCR was formed by the merger of five adjoining lines in 1846. It evolved a simple triangular structure with London at the apex and the South Coast at the base. The W side, abutting the L&SWR, ran London-Dorking-Horsham-Ford-Littlehampton-Portsmouth/Gosport, and the E side, abutting the SE&CR, ran London-Eridge-Polegate-Eastbourne /Hastings. There was a E-W secondary route connecting these routes: Guildford-Horsham-Three Bridges-Eridge-Tunbridge Wells. The L&SWR competed for Portsmouth traffic, and the SECG for Hastings/Bexhill, but the Brighton main line was a monopoly. • Expresses from Victoria (27 daily) and London Bridge(14) served Brighton (21), Hastings (8), Eastbourne(6), Worthing (4), Portsmouth (4) and Newhaven (for the ferry to Calais)(3); some were two-portion trains dividing or slipping at Three Bridges or Haywards Heath. • Extensive use was made of Pullman coaches, which were advertised at relatively affordable fares. The non-stop Southern Belle reached Brighton in one hour, averaging 50 mph • The cross-country network was operated mainly as independent branches feeding into London, Brighton or Eastbourne. There were 7 trains per day through from Brighton to Portsmouth, calling at all stations. Midhurst was a 3-way inland hub serving Pulborough (for London by LB&SCR), Chichester (for Portsmouth by LB&SCR) and Petworth (for London & Portsmouth by L&SWR). The LB&SCR ran a daily service of 8 trains with London connections at Pulborough, while the L&SWR ran 9 trains with London connections at Petworth. Five of the LB&SCR trains ran through to and from Chichester. Connection from Pulborough at Midhurst were poor. Although the LB&SCR network was compact and well-connected, its rural connectivity was poor.

51 Small regional companies - 1

• Cambrian: Formed to promote regional development, and financed mainly by holiday traffic. Structure: Whitchurch-Ellesmere-Oswestry-Llanymynech /Shrewsbury -Welshpool-Moat Lane-Dovey Junction-Aberystwyth- Barmouth-Afon Wen-Pwllheli. Important branches Wrexham-Ellesmere; Barmouth-Dolgellau; Moat Lane-Builth Road-Three Cocks-Talyllyn- [Brecon/Merthyr]. Some routes were operated as a set of distinct adjoining sections, but there were generally good connections at local hubs. • North Staffordshire: Built by local interests to promote local industrial development. Strong emphasis on short journeys around the industrial centres of Stoke and Uttoxeter. Stoke-on-Trent was a 7-way hub Crewe – Uttoxeter-Burton/[Derby] line crossed the Macclesfield – Stone –[Stafford] line with branches to Tunstall, Biddulph, Market Drayton and Leek. Uttoxeter was a 5-way hub, with lines to Stoke, Derby, Leek, Ashbourne and Stafford (GNR). There was one semi-fast train per day Crewe-Derby. Fairly frequent local services on most lines, except Macclesfield-Leek- Uttoxeter (only 5 trains daily)

52 Small regional companies - 2

• Maryport & Carlisle: This short line in Cumbria (opened 1845) operated two main passenger services, both from Maryport, a small port, to Carlisle (7 trains daily) and Cockermouth (6). The route to Cockermouth involved two reversals and used working powers over the lines of two other companies. There was a short loop on the Carlisle route, from Aspatria through Mealsgate (a pit village) to Wigton, on which there were no through trains; 6 connecting trains ran from Mealsgate in which ever direction (mainly Aspatria) made the most convenient connection for either Maryport or Carlisle. There was both coal and ironstone mining in the area. • Hull & Barnsley. A coal-owner’s railway (opened 1885) designed to break an NER monopoly. It ran 2 expresses and 3 stopping trains daily from Cudworth, near Barnsley to Hull (Cannon Street), one of which ran through from Sheffield Midland. This service connected with branches from Carlton to Knottingley and Kirksmeaton to Wath (3 through trains daily on each). There were additional trains Howden-North Cave-Hull. Apart from the through train the emphasis was on very local traffic.

53 Note on alternative operating regimes

• There are six main modes of delivering services on a national railway system (ranked from state-control to free competition); all have been considered at some time, and four have been implemented in some way. • Unitary – State-ownership using alternative ‘divisional’ management structures (regional, route, type of traffic, etc.) and different degrees of subcontracting for specialist services – selected 1948-94 – Regulated private national monopoly (perpetual or fixed term) – considered in 1994 but rejected • Fragmented – Government franchising of monopolistic ‘divisional’ operators – de facto selected c.2015 – Government franchising of competing ‘divisional’ operators – tried but failed (1994-c.2015) – Regulated competition between ‘divisional’ operators – selected (1825-1947) – Unregulated competition between ‘divisional’ operators – considered in 1994 but rejected

54 Siting of stations

• Stations were conveniently located mostly where traffic was large and competitive. But overall, most large cities performed poorly as railway hubs, with inter-company interchange being weak • Total control of their termini was favoured by early railways; sharing with a competitor could lead to ‘traffic stealing’ (also ticket-touting and taxi congestion). • Through stations replaced some termini (e.g. Manchester Liverpool Road by Exchange and Birmingham Curzon Street by New Street). • Centrally-located stations were permitted by some civic authorities , e.g. York, Newcastle, Edinburgh. and some insisted they be joint, e.g. Chester, Shrewsbury. • Through suburban platforms developed, e.g. Manchester London Road, London Kings Cross and Paddington, and some were low-level, e.g. Glasgow Central. Nevertheless. • Relocation of city stations towards the centre promoted commuter traffic, especially in London. Local geography dictated exceptions, however, e.g. Bristol. • Grand termini with hotels featured in London, where several companies used multiple termini; typically City and West End. Underground connections substituted for a ‘grand central station’. North-south through trains in London ran undergound from Kings Cross to Ludgate Hill, and orbitally via Kensington. • Some seaside termini became an operational liability: Brighton, Bournemouth West, Plymouth Friary. Late conversions could be problematic, e.g. Exeter Queen Street, Ramsgate • Rural stations remained remote, even though land was cheaper. Farmers and gentry used private transport to the station; everyone else walked. Stations were often railheads for several villages, and named after the largest one rather than the nearest one. Rural bus services stole local passenger traffic. • Freight amenities on rural lines often had better than at rural stations on trunk lines because rural lines relied more heavily on agricultural traffic

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