Understan Ding Terrorism in Africa

UNDERSTAN How much of a threat is ISIS? DING BY TERRORISM HUSSEIN SOLOMON IN AFRICA: 6May 18, 2015 INTRODUCTION • Terrorism spreading and intensifying across Africa • Almost 3 terrorist incidents per day taking place • 22 African countries targeted by terrorists • This despite US AFRICOM activities, AMISOM in Somalia, French-West African Forces in Mali, as well as various national efforts at CT • Traditional CT with its emphasis on the military, its state-centric approach, its superficial and ahistorical approach to terrorism is counterproductive • Moreover, in an era of ISIS, these failures are compounded by the political correctness on the part of governments as well as the inability to truly build truly regional and global counter-terrorism regimes BETWEEN CLAN AND FAITH IN SOMALIA • Primacy of clan and sub-clan politics as opposed to “nation-state” contributing to the No. 1 spot Somalia enjoys on Failed State Index • Popular Somali proverb: “Me and my clan against the world; Me and my family against my clan; me and my brother against my family; Me against my brother” • At the same time various attempt to unite Somalis using Islam but against foreigners (destructive nation-building), e.g. Imam Ahmed Ibrahim al Ghazi (1506-1543) led Muslim Somalia against Christian Abyssinia (Ethiopia) and Sayyid Mohammed Abdulla Hassan’s jihad from 1900 to 1920 against British and Ethiopian colonizers to foster Somali nationalism and overcome clan differences AL SHABAAB • Al Shabaab also seeking to galvanize the Somali population behind them for a united and greater Somalia including Ethiopia’s Ogaden, Djibouti and North-Western Kenya • Most of Al Shabaab fighters (70%) emanate from the smaller Rahanweyn clan in Somalia, looked down by the so-called noble clans • Moreover current Somali political system guarantees political domination of the Hawiye • Rahanweyn using Islamic identity to mobilize other clans – political Islam is their vehicle to political power • Need for a more holistic CT perspective, than simply viewing Al Shabaab as the local franchise of Al Qaeda NIGERIA: EXPOSING THE LIMITS OF CT • Historical precedents to Boko Haram go all the way back to 1802. • Since 1945, religious conflict with ethnic overtones has been the bane of Nigeria. These include the Jos riot of 1946, the Kano riot of 1953, the Tiv uprising s of 1959 and 1960-1964, violence in the Western region in 1962, the civil war 1967-1970, the Maitatsine Crisis of 1980, the Ife/Modakeke war of 1981, the Fagge crisis in Kano in 1982, the Zangon Kataf conflict of 1992, the Mangul Bokkos conflict of 1992-1995, and the recurrent ethno-religious conflict in Jos starting in 2001 • 27% of the population in the largely Christian south live in poverty, while the figure for the large Muslim north is 72% NIGERIA: EXPOSING THE LIMITS OF CT • Textile mills in the north closing down – number of factories in Kano declined from 350 in 1987 to 103 in 2010 – cannot compete with cheaper Chinese imports. Nigerian-made textile wrap costs 1,500 naira (about US $10), whereas a similar imported wrap from China costs 550 naira • Endemic corruption and growing affluence of political elites • Since the end military rule in 1999, Nigerian politicians embezzled between US $4 billion and US $8 billion per annum. • Undermines legitimacy of the state, reinforcing the resonance of the Boko Haram discourse that the Nigerian state is taghut or evil amongst the country’s poor NIGERIA: EXPOSING THE LIMITS OF CT • The Nigerian case also calls into question the rather simplistic dichotomy between the terrorism of Boko Haram and the counter-terrorism of the Nigerian state • To put it differently, a narrow CT approach cannot explain why senior politicians and security officials, including members of President Jonathan’s own political party – the PDP – have been collaborating with members of Boko Haram • Has a lot to do with the issue of zoning, promises reneged and the sense of marginalization the north feels with the ending of military rule in 1999 • Problem of reinforcing identities: ethnic, regional, religious whilst the notion of being “Nigerian” has scant appeal MALI: CT ADDING FUEL TO THE FIRE • 2012 witnessed the capture of northern Mali by Ansar Dine (Defenders of the Faith) and their AQIM allies • CT does not seem to understand that Ansar Dine is not only Islamist in orientation but also a Tuareg nationalist movement • The call for Azawad is not new but can be traced back to the 15th century when the Tuaregs were dislodged by the encroaching Songhai Empire • Tuaregs sense of economic marginalization. Poverty rate in Mali averages 64%; for Timbuktu 77%, Gao 78.7% and Kidal 92% • French-West African forces oust Islamists but policy-makers not really considering ameliorating the structural conditions which have given rise to Tuareg resentment in the first place ENTER ISIS • 15,000 people from 80 countries have flocked to fight under the banner of ISIS in Iraq and Syria • Danger of sleeper cells as was recently seen in France • Potential of future conflict along religious lines – distinct possibility given the approximate growth of Muslims by 73% between 2010 and 2050 • Growth in Muslim population not the threat – what is the threat is that its taking place in societies with a history of sectarian strife or where there are scarcity of resources – think here of many African countries where societies are divided along ethnic, linguistic, religious and regional lines – e.g. Jos • Strategy of ISIS here seems to be to intensify cleavages, polarisation ISIS IN AFRICA • Two groups break off from AQIM to establish the Jund al Khilafah in Algeria under Grouri Abdelmalik aka Khaled Abu Suleimane and the Uqba Ibn Nafi Brigade responsible for the recent terrorist attack on Tunis • Libya – al-Battar Brigade • Sinai – Ansar Beit al-Maqdis • ISIS modus operandi – exploit existing grievances, utilize returning fighters as a force multiplier for existing local militias who have pledged allegiance to the group and in order to ensure command and control from ISIS central send one of the senior ISIS commanders as the leader of the local franchise • We saw this strategy in both Derna and Benghazi in Libya ISIS IN AFRICA • Local Islamist groups make a rational choice that their allegiance would translate into greater military assistance and greater funds • ISIS – has a war chest estimated at $2 billion and currently make an estimated $1 million per day from oil sales • Abubaker Shekau’s allegiance to ISIS has a lot to do with Boko Haram’s own regional ambitions • ISIS – expansion and penetration into Africa is not willy-nilly but strategic • Consider here the strategic significance of Nigeria and Tunisia • Nigeria – regional hegemon • Tunisia and what it means for secularism in the Islamic world GETTING ISIS WRONG • Viewing ISIS as some sort of deviation from mainstream Islam • ISIS is a natural outcome of much discourses in political Islam for the past 200 years • Abd al-Qadir • Muhammed Ahmad (the Mahdi) • Muhammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab • Maulana Abul Ala-Maududi • Hassan al Banna • ISIS and the “End of Days” – significance of the territory they control WHAT SHOULD BE DONE • Key is to prevent sub-state terrorism from morphing into international terrorism • Focus not only on military/intelligence responses but also developmental, governance approaches – key to make states more inclusive • We need to accept the fact that there are often legitimate grievances driving these movements and Islamist groups often extend their criticism of state elites into a criticism of Western-style secular governance generally • The criminalisation of the state apparatus must be prioritised – you cannot effectively wage a counter-terrorism campaign when people on the inside are working for the other side • Where CVE is undertaken the goal must NOT be to create a “pussy-cat” Islam • Accept the fact that this is going to be a generational struggle – prepare the public accordingly .

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