“Organizing for Performance: Coalition Effectiveness on the Battlefield”
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“Organizing for Performance: Coalition Effectiveness on the Battlefield” Rosella Cappella Zielinski Boston University Ryan Grauer University of Pittsburgh APPENDICES These appendices provide additional evidence in support of our theoretical claim that the interaction of coalitions’ command structures and co-belligerents’ resource contributions conditions their collective effectiveness. In Appendix I and Appendix II, we offer two extensions of the evidence reported in the main text. The first is an in-depth reporting of primary source documents shedding light on the nature of British thinking about, and interaction with the French regarding, coalition plans, operations, and conduct between August and November 1914. For reasons of space and narrative flow, the evidence offered in the main text is drawn almost exclusively from secondary sources; the information presented here “shows our work” with respect to our interpretation of the change in the functionality of Entente command arrangements and its effect on the coalition’s effectiveness over time. The second extension is an additional case study, drawn from the Eastern Front during World War I. We examine the command structure and effectiveness of the German and Austro- Hungarian coalition as the Central Powers fought the Russians during the Gorlice-Tarnow offensive. In terms of our typology, the Germans and Austro-Hungarians contributed qualitatively asymmetric forces to the fight and employed a U-form command structure to coordinate combined operations. Accordingly, the case complements those presented in the main text: the Entente case reflects co-belligerents increasing in quantitative (rather than qualitative) symmetry while operating almost exclusively through a M-form structure and the Axis case features co-belligerents that were consistently asymmetric in qualitative terms while varying their type of command structure. Together, these extensions offer considerable additional support for validity of our theoretical claim. In Appendix III, we provide the coding rules for the Belligerents in Battle data referenced in the main text; the data, which is used to create the statistics presented in the main test is available as a separate .xls file. The coding rules provide information regarding the creation of the data, including how we account for major battles, identify belligerents, count coalition members, and assign the regime type of coalition members as well as how we account for the presence of democratic coalitions, preexisting institutionalization, and battle outcomes. The data included accounts for the relevant characteristics of belligerents in 480 battles, fought in 62 interstate wars waged between 1900 and 2003. 1 Appendix I: British Intransigence and the Operation of the Entente M-Form Coalition In the main text, we argue that, with one brief exception, British and French forces consistently employed a M-form structure while varying in their relative resource contributions over the fall of 1914. In line with our theoretical expectations, there were fewer coordination problems in, and transaction costs incurred during, the period in which the British and French forces were more symmetric in their resource contributions to battle (First Ypres) than when their resource contributions were more asymmetric (First Marne). In making this claim in the main text, we present primarily secondary sources, with a few direct quotes from participants. In this section, we draw extensively from the documentary record to demonstrate three things: 1) the Entente’s command arrangement was consistently M-form throughout the time period we examine, with one short exception, 2) that exception occurred when the British willingly subordinated themselves to U-form command during the fighting of the First Battle of the Marne, and 3) the management of collective operations was both easier and more effective when our theory expects that it would be. To establish the veracity of our description of the Entente command structure as well as the congruence of our theoretical expectations and events in the historical record, we consulted Sir John French’s memoir of 1914 as well as official British records from the period. Our research focus solely on these records, as opposed to the both French and British documents, is theoretically and analytically justified. Joining a coalition requires the constituent partners—all rational, cost-minimizing actors—to negotiate limitations on their sovereign prerogatives (Wolford, 2015). Specifically, they must decide whether limits will be placed on national militaries’ rights to determine the size, disposition, and use of the troops and materiel they field. If such limits are to be put in place, co-belligerents must also decide who is empowered to make such determinations (Kreps, 2011: 15–20; Weitsman, 2013: 35–43). Because conclusion of such negotiations and subsequent adherence to any decisions made depends on the willingness of all parties to relinquish some of their sovereign rights, when a coalition is comprised of two co- belligerents, examining the choices and perceptions of one partner provides information on the whole. In this case, the foregoing means that the form of the Entente’s command structure depends on the degree to which the British relinquished their rights to control their forces during the fighting on the Continent. Regardless of the form of command structure the French perceived to be in operation, the actual nature of the arrangement depended on what the British believed it to be.1 If the British believed themselves to have relinquished national sovereignty over the size, disposition, and employment of their forces in the war against Germany, and afforded power over such decision making to a French commander-in-chief, then the Entente would have employed a U-form command system. If, however, the British believed themselves to have retained sufficient sovereign authority that Sir John French could treat directions from a French commander regarding the size, disposition, and employment of British forces as suggestions and requests rather than orders, the Entente would have in fact employed a M-form command system. Focusing solely on the content of British source documents thus permits us to demonstrate 1) the nature of the Entente command structure throughout the fall of 1914, 2) 1 There is evidence that French Commander-in-Chief, Marshal Joseph Joffre, thought he sat atop a U-form command structure and possessed the associated authority at the outset of the war (Greenhalgh, 2005: 26–28; Philpott, 1996: 18–19). 2 whether and to what extent that command structure changed during the fighting of the First Battle of the Marne, and 3) the relative efficiency and effectiveness of the adopted command structure(s) over time. As noted, to gather the requisite information, we consulted two types of records. The first is Sir John French’s memoir. In it, French recounts several conversations and transcribes the contents of several documents related to Entente command arrangements. Because historians have raised questions about the veracity of some specific interpretive claims made in the memoir regarding the achievements and faults of various individuals, and particularly the blame French casts on other officers, we focus almost exclusively on his transcriptions of orders and correspondence. The second resource we employ is the archival record of contemporaneous beliefs and decisions. The first group of records we consulted was the personal papers of Sir John French, held at the Imperial War Museum in London. Included in this record set (Documents.7813) are French’s diaries from the fall of 1914; French’s correspondence with Secretary of State for War Horatio Herbert Kitchener, First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill, and other British government officials; copies of cypher telegrams sent both by French to the War Office in London and by the War Office to French; and correspondence between French and France’s Grand Quartier General. We also examined the papers of Secretary of State for War Kitchener, held at The National Archives at Kew. Included in this record set (PRO 30/57/49 and PRO 30/57/51) are copies of telegrams sent from the War Office to French, some of which were present in French’s personal papers, as well as personal correspondence between Kitchener and French. The final set of records we consulted were the collected papers of various ministers and officials serving the Foreign Office during World War I (FO 800/56A). These documents allow us insight into the discussions held at the nexus of the British civil-military relationship during the opening months of World War I regarding precisely what Sir John French’s orders were, how much deference he was to show to Joffre, and how French carried out his responsibilities. They allow us to demonstrate the nature of the Entente command structure and how it conditioned Anglo-French coalition effectiveness during the fall of 1914. Turning to the documentary record, as noted in the main text, Sir John French was dispatched to serve as commander of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) with the explicit instruction that his command was to be an independent one (Greenhalgh, 2005: 17). French reports the complete version of the instructions he received prior to embarking for France on 14 August 1914 in his memoir. Because the initial instructions shed light on several key aspects of the British approach to coalition management and operations, they are worth quoting in full: Owing to the