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This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree (e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following terms and conditions of use: This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge. This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the author. The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the author. When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given. DEFINING EMOTION IN PSYCHOLOGY: WHAT A HISTORICAL EXAMINATION OF THE USE OF INTROSPECTION BY EARLY PSYCHOLOGISTS REVEALS ABOUT A CURRENT PROBLEM Anna Kennedy Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD in Psychology The University of Edinburgh 2015 DECLARATION I, Anna Kennedy, hereby declare that I am the author of this thesis and that the work presented herein is my own. This work has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification. Signature………………………. Date………. 2 ABSTRACT Research conducted on emotion by psychologists has produced numerous understandings of the concept and there is currently no consensus as to how it should be defined (Russell, 2012). Despite some general agreement among some theorists as to certain aspects, such as physiological response, eliciting events, and related facial expressions, it is a persistent issue and discussions as to how a solution may be found have recurred at various points throughout the history of psychology. Some work has been done to address the problem through the meta-analysis of various definitions and this has proved to be useful in showing the areas where psychologists might agree (e.g. Izard, 2010; Kleinginna & Kleinginna, 1981; Plutchik, 1980). There is an assumption, therefore, that with enough research and debate a solution will be found. However, this assumption neglects to take into account the changing ontological and methodological contexts through which emotion has been defined in psychological science. For this reason the current debates lack a broader contextualisation which could reveal what has influenced the production of particular definitions and the reasons why the problems of definition have come about. This thesis aims to address this gap in the literature by presenting a historical analysis of the understandings of emotion which were produced during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Although there has been a great deal of historical work produced which examines psychological theories from this time, there is little, apart from Dixon (2012) which is specifically aimed at contextualising this particular issue. In particular, this thesis will examine one respect in which emotion is often defined; as that of being a subjective experience. This understanding, whilst it most often seems to be the way in which people, if asked, define emotion (Davitz, 1970) has, historically, proved to be contentious in psychological science, perhaps because it is difficult to capture. The thesis describes the method of introspection and its use as a means to examine the subjective experience of emotion during the early years of psychology, and looks at what can be learned about the issue of definition through an understanding of the work conducted during that period. It is shown that introspective analyses often presented a picture of emotions as complex, idiosyncratic and individual experiences and that these characteristics contrasted with the assumptions of the emerging scientific psychology that emotion should be defined as structured, predictable and universal. The search for a concept of emotion which embodied the latter rather than the former characteristics is described, and it is demonstrated that the result was a variety of different conceptualisations. The thesis concludes that it is important not to view the current problem simply as one of academic differences over the veracity of definitions, but to contextualise it in relation to the psychologist’s search for a definition of emotion that assumes the characteristics of a scientific concept. 3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would first like to thank my supervisors, Dr Peter Lamont, Dr Sue Widdicome and Dr Alistair Isaac, for supporting me through various stages of the process of the development of the thesis. Thank you for spending time reviewing and commenting on my work and for helping me to stay focused. Thank you too to my friend, Jane Marriot, for her fabulous proof-reading. I am grateful for the financial support I have received from the University of Edinburgh, both for the Drever Trust Scholarship which enabled me to undertake my Masters and for the PPLS Career Development Scholarship that I was awarded and which meant that I could work on my thesis fulltime and also gave me the opportunity to develop my teaching skills. Thanks also to Funds for Women Graduates for their small grant which helped supplement my income in my final year. Thank you to my children – Alex, Matthew and Eva Kennedy – who, now that I have stopped studying, will have my attention as never before, and to Darron, who has patiently listened and advised over the last four years. Thanks also goes to my friends and family who have taken an interest in my work and encouraged me along the way. 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS Declaration .................................................................................................................... 2 Abstract ......................................................................................................................... 3 Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................ 4 Chapter 1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 8 1.1 The problem of defining emotion ................................................................................ 8 1.1.1 Lack of consensus on a definition of emotion ................................................. 9 1.1.2 Attempts to understand and address the problem ....................................... 12 1.1.3 The subjective experience of emotion ........................................................... 19 1.1.4 Aims of the thesis and research questions .................................................... 23 1.2 Emotion in the early nineteenth century ................................................................... 26 1.3 Introspection in the early nineteenth century ........................................................... 29 1.4 Outline of the chapters .............................................................................................. 32 Chapter 2 A historical approach ................................................................................... 35 2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 35 2.2 The need for a historical examination of concepts.................................................... 39 2.3 Sources ....................................................................................................................... 46 Chapter 3 The introspective observation of emotion from 1850 to 1900 ....................... 49 3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 49 3.2 Alexander Bain: Emotion as an element of the mind ................................................ 53 3.2.1 Bain's delineation of the mind using introspection ...................................... 55 3.2.2 The classification of the emotions ................................................................. 59 3.3 Herbert Spencer’s subjective psychology .................................................................. 63 3.3.1 Psychology as subjective and objective ......................................................... 64 3.3.2 Spencer's subjective descriptions of emotion ............................................... 66 3.3.3 The uses and limitations of introspection ...................................................... 68 3.4 William James: the experience of emotion ............................................................... 70 3.4.1 The importance of introspection in James's work ......................................... 71 3.4.2 James theory of emotion as “psychologist's reality” ..................................... 74 3.5 Introspection and emotion in late nineteenth century psychology .......................... 81 5 3.5.1 Introspection as the method of psychology .................................................. 82 3.5.2 The introspective characteristics of emotion ................................................ 84 3.6 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 87 Chapter 4 Emotion as described by physiology and evolution 1850-1900 ...................... 89 4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 89 4.2 Physiology of emotion ..............................................................................................
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