Wundt's "New Psychology"

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Wundt's Wundt's "New Psychology" Wilhelm Wundt(1832-1920) was the first professional to call himself a psychologist. He founded one of the first psychological laboratories in Leipzig, Germany, in 1879. Wundt believed the "only certain reality is immediate experience" (Blumenthal, 1975). If psychology were to be a science, then psychologists would have to collect data about experience. To do this, Wundt used procedures similar to those developed by the psychophysicists. He arranged controlled laboratory settings. He carefully administered stimulation such as sounds and sights. He gathered information about how quickly people responded to a stimulus (reaction time) and what they experienced. Wundt believed these experiments would lead to a consensus or agreement among scientists about the nature of experience. Wilhelm Wundt Wundt's approach was not unreasonable. It resembled the way most natural sciences developed in the 1800s. Science like botany and zoology began with careful observation and an effort to arrive at consensual validation (agreement among different observers). For example, biologists began with careful descriptions of plants and animals before trying to classify them. Wundt believed the same approach would work in psychology. Careful scientific observers could simply look inside themselves to see the mind in action, and they should be able to agree on the basic phenomena of psychology. After agreeing about basic observations, they could do a deeper analysis of what they had found. The technique of "looking inside" to gather data about the mind is called introspection . The problem with Wundt's program is fairly obvious to those of us in the modern world, where differences between people are taken for granted. Different people see different things when they look inside! This was not obvious to Wundt. He tended to assume that if people saw something in their minds different from what he did, under controlled laboratory conditions, they must be doing something wrong. Create PDF files without this message by purchasing novaPDF printer (http://www.novapdf.com) Introspection was the dominant technique in psychology for several decades, but as time went on, it showed itself to be an inadequate methodology for advancing science. There was no way to resolve differences of opinion about what people saw when they looked inside. For example, a major controversy erupted over the issue of imageless thought. Could a thought exist without an image? Some scientists looked inside and said yes, some thoughts exist without any picture or image in the mind. Others said no, there is always an image. Given such a disagreement— which always seemed to occur, with any important issue involving introspection—there was no way to arrive at a consensus about the nature of the human mind. That ultimately led to the downfall of introspection as a technique. James and Functionalism Another approach to psychology, formulated in the 1890s, was the functionalism of William James. James is often described as the father of American psychology. He regarded the mind as a process, a function of the organism. By the 1890s scientists were well acquainted with Darwin's basic idea that humans had evolved from simpler animals, and James related psychology to Darwin's theory. James argued that consciousness must have evolved because it was useful for something. In other words, it had a function. If we wanted to understand the origins and purpose of a psychological phenomenon, James suggested, we should ask what it was used for. James published Principles of Psychology (1890), which came in two large volumes, and Psychology: The Briefer Course (1892) , which came in one smaller volume. Also famous is James's work on the psychology of religion, The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902). Create PDF files without this message by purchasing novaPDF printer (http://www.novapdf.com) William James Because they are old enough not to be covered by copyright, books from this era can be reproduced on the web. The entire text of The Varieties of Religious Experience is on Michael Nielsen's Psychology of Religion web site at Psych Web at this URL: <http://www.psywww.com/psyrelig/james/toc.htm>. James is remembered as a great psychologist because he wrote well and because he had good judgment about what ideas would have lasting value. Many psychologists living a century or more after James found his insights "exciting" because they seemed so modern (Kimble, 1990). A reviewer of Principles of Psychology on Amazon.com called it "fresh as a morning flower." However, James himself did little research, and his examples came mostly from everyday life and from introspection, not from rigorous laboratory experiments. Witmer Starts Clinical Psychology From about 1900 to 1910, clinical psychology consisted of what we now call school psychology. Clinical psychologists diagnosed problems of school children and tried to help them. Increasing numbers of psychologists went into this field. By 1910 the most common specialty among applied psychologists was pedagogical psychology, which today would be called educational or school psychology. Lightner Witmer is often called the father of clinical psychology. Witmer started his career at the University of Pennsylvania in 1892 at the age of 25 and stayed there for the next 45 years. He founded the journal The Psychological Clinic in 1907. It was published until 1935, and during those 28 years it was the only clinical psychology journal. Witmer's first client, in 1896, was a "chronic bad speller" who turned out to need eyeglasses. After the boy was fitted with glasses, his spelling problems went away. This lesson was not lost upon Witmer, who routinely included vision and hearing tests in his tests of students. Create PDF files without this message by purchasing novaPDF printer (http://www.novapdf.com) Witmer was one of the many American psychologists who studied under Wundt during their formative years. The experience was not a happy one. Witmer later described himself as "disgusted" with Wundt's insistence that students repeat experiments until they came out the way Wundt expected them to. Rather than follow in Wundt's footsteps, Witmer turned to non- introspective methods, laying the way for behaviorism. At his clinic, Witmer emphasized diagnostic testing, followed by practical treatment. The treatment was not exclusively psychological. It ranged from mental testing to removing an abscessed tooth to family counseling, followed by retesting to see if there was an improvement in performance Watson and Behaviorism At the turn of the century, introspection was withering on the vine as an experimental method. By 1898 only 2.3% of psychology research articles made any mention of introspection. In 1905, William McDougall wrote a textbook defining psychology as "the study of behavior." By 1910, both structuralism (the descendent of Wundt's method) and functionalism (James's method) were widely regarded as obsolete methods for investigating psychology. Psychologists felt that their field had lost its original identity as the "science of consciousness." The time was right for a new conception of psychology, and John B. Watson, who coined the term behaviorism, provided a new identity. Watson agreed with McDougall that psychology should be defined as "the study of behavior," but Watson took a more extreme position. How common was introspectionism in psychology journals, by the turn of the century? How did Watson's position differ from McDougall's? McDougall...had no particular complaints against the old subject matter [mind and consciousness], but he thought that behavior, too, deserved attention... In 1913 Watson went a step further. Psychology should Create PDF files without this message by purchasing novaPDF printer (http://www.novapdf.com) study behavior, he said, and mind, the traditional subject matter, is now forbidden. (Epstein, 1987, p.333) John Watson In 1913 Watson declared he was a new type of psychologist: a behaviorist. Watson said the behaviorist would completely eliminate introspection from psychology. Psychologists could adhere to scientific method, studying only things that could be observed and measured. That, Watson suggested, would allow scientists to control human behavior as never before. Watson made a famous claim about the potential power of behaviorism: What did Watson declare in 1913? Give me a dozen healthy infants, well-formed, and my own special world to bring them up in, and I'll guarantee to take any one at random and train him to become any type of specialist I might select-doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant-chief, and yes, beggerman and thief. (Watson, 1913) Watson was a bit of a rebel from childhood on. He fought frequently as a teenager. He referred to his hometown church baptism, performed during his adolescence, as an "inoculation that did not take." Seeking to escape the confines of a small-town upbringing, Watson pursued higher education at Furman University in Greenville, South Carolina. At Furman University, Watson continued his rebellious ways. One of his professors (Meyer) threatened to "flunk the first student who handed in an exam upside-down" Watson, an honor student, took the dare. He handed in his final exam upside-down. Meyer flunked him, delaying Watson's graduation by an entire year. Create PDF files without this message by purchasing novaPDF printer (http://www.novapdf.com) However, Meyer also helped Watson. Meyer told Watson about new and exciting developments in psychology at the University of Chicago, where Meyer had recently spent a year. Watson decided that was just what he needed. He wrote to the president of the University of Chicago, declaring he would "never amount to anything" unless he got financial support to further his education. Apparently this tactic worked, because Watson obtained a fellowship. At the University of Chicago, Watson studied physiology, then he became interested in animal research. Functionalism was in full flower at the University of Chicago. But Watson never felt comfortable with introspective research.
Recommended publications
  • 'Introspectionism' and the Mythical Origins of Scientific Psychology
    Consciousness and Cognition Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2006) 634–654 www.elsevier.com/locate/concog ‘Introspectionism’ and the mythical origins of scientific psychology Alan Costall Department of Psychology, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth, Hampshire PO1 2DY, UK Received 1 May 2006 Abstract According to the majority of the textbooks, the history of modern, scientific psychology can be tidily encapsulated in the following three stages. Scientific psychology began with a commitment to the study of mind, but based on the method of introspection. Watson rejected introspectionism as both unreliable and effete, and redefined psychology, instead, as the science of behaviour. The cognitive revolution, in turn, replaced the mind as the subject of study, and rejected both behaviourism and a reliance on introspection. This paper argues that all three stages of this history are largely mythical. Introspectionism was never a dominant movement within modern psychology, and the method of introspection never went away. Furthermore, this version of psychology’s history obscures some deep conceptual problems, not least surrounding the modern conception of ‘‘behaviour,’’ that continues to make the scientific study of consciousness seem so weird. Ó 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Keywords: Introspection; Introspectionism; Behaviourism; Dualism; Watson; Wundt 1. Introduction Probably the most immediate result of the acceptance of the behaviorist’s view will be the elimination of self-observation and of the introspective reports resulting from such a method. (Watson, 1913b, p. 428). The problem of consciousness occupies an analogous position for cognitive psychology as the prob- lem of language behavior does for behaviorism, namely, an unsolved anomaly within the domain of an approach.
    [Show full text]
  • Running Head: a REVIEW and EVALUATION of an OPEN 1
    Running Head: A REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF AN OPEN 1 A Review and Evaluation of an Open-Source Mood Assessment, the Brief Mood Introspection Scale Rachael M. Cavallaro University of New Hampshire Victoria Bryan University of New Hampshire John D. Mayer University of New Hampshire A REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF AN OPEN 2 Abstract The Brief Mood Introspection Scale (BMIS) is an open-source, 16-item assessment of current mood regularly used in psychological research. The scale has two sets of scales: one pair of scales assesses mood using Pleasant-Unpleasant and Arousal-Calm dimensions; the other (less used alternative) assesses mood using Positive and Negative Affect. However, since its publication in 1988, there have been no systematic reports of its usage pattern, norms or of evidence for its validity. The present meta-analysis aims to (1) identify the nature of the studies that employed the BMIS (i.e. research areas and design), (2) establish the norms for the BMIS the scale means, standard deviations, and reliabilities, and (3) evaluate for the BMIS’s validity. One hundred and fifty studies that utilized the BMIS over a five-year timespan (2016-2011) were identified, including 27 studies that reported information pertinent to the scale’s norms. Our findings indicated that BMIS was primarily used in experimental research, and that its norms were similar to those from the original report. We make recommendations for use of Likert response scales and scoring conventions. A more qualitative review suggested that the Pleasant- Unpleasant mood scale had considerable evidence for its validity from its relation to criteria.
    [Show full text]
  • Wilhelm Wundt & Herman Ebbinghaus Wilhelm Wundt & Herman
    1 2 Wilhelm Wundt & Herman Ebbinghaus Wilhelm Wundt & Herman Ebbinghaus 1. Wundt 2. Ebbinghaus A. Biographical details A. Biographical details B. Career history B. Career history C. Psychological theories C. Psychological theories D. Impact on Psychology D. Impact on Psychology Setting the Scene… 3 4 (After Darwin, Descartes (d. 1650) – psychologists William James (1890) – we consist of a preferred the study we are not automata; material body & of learning to that of consciousness selects immaterial soul consciousness) (Newton) Copernicus (1543): J.-O. la Mettrie (1748) Charles Darwin (1859) Wilhelm Wundt Sigmund Freud heliocentric theory of the L’Homme Machine – (On the Origin of Species) (1879) established (1899) – unconscious universe – Earth, and humans are just more – evolution by common first lab for study of more important than human race, are not the complex animals descent of all creatures human psychology consciousness centre of the universe Opposing views… 5 6 Humans are special. We’re not just smarter monkeys. Reflective self- consciousness (subjective experience) is unique to humans. It is too Wilhelm Wundt remarkable to have evolved for no reason. It permits selection. It creates (1832-1920) our experience of the world. It makes us care whether we live or die. William James Wilhelm Wundt Humans are not special – we are not the center of the universe. We’re just more complex animals on a little planet in an uncaring universe. Consciousness is not special (in any useful way) – it doesn’t produce our behavior; our behavior issues from unconscious processes shared with animals and generated by brains. Consciousness is an epiphenomenon.
    [Show full text]
  • A Comprehension of Spinoza's God
    A Comprehension of Spinoza's God Through the Dichotomy of Labels Tania Norell LUNDS UNIVERSITET | CENTRUM FÖR TEOLOGI OCH RELIGIONSVETENSKAP TLVM77 Philosophy of Religion Master Thesis 30 credits Supervisor: Jayne Svenungsson, Professor of Systematic Theology Examiner: Jesper Svartvik, Professor of Theology of Religions Autumn term 2015 Lund University Sweden Lund University Tania Norell Abstract: The 17 th century philosopher Spinoza is known for his concept of God as One Substance, God or Nature and therefore considered as a monist and categorized as a naturalist. He has been labeled an atheist and God-intoxicated man, as well as a determinist and pantheist, which I perceive to be dichotomies. The problem, as I see it, is that Spinoza’s philosophy and concept of God has mainly been interpreted through a dualistic mind-set, traditional to philosophers and theologians of the West, but Spinoza has a monistic worldview, and this has consequences in regards to the comprehension of what Spinoza’s concept of God entails and what a relationship “with” God implies . The labels panentheist and necessitarianist are discussed and the label of theologian argued. The thesis methodology is constructive because the purpose is to provide a theoretical foundation that has the potential to be applied in dialogues about God between the vast varieties of believers and non-believers alike, as well as across boundaries of contradicting worldviews and academic disciplines, and this focus on functionalism is inspired by a theory that calls for the furthering of inter-disciplinary dialogue between the subject areas philosophy of religion and theology specifically. My personal worldview is that there might well be One Substance, God or Nature, but that does not necessarily mean that there is one truth that is valid, but rather that all truth claims may be of value.
    [Show full text]
  • Introspection Mark Engelbert and Peter Carruthers∗
    Advanced Review Introspection Mark Engelbert and Peter Carruthers∗ Two main questions about introspection are addressed: whether it exists, and whether it is a reliable source of self-knowledge. Most philosophers have assumed that the answers to both questions are positive, whereas an increasing number of cognitive scientists take the view that introspection is either nonexistent (with self-attributions of mental states being made on the same sort of interpretative basis as attributions of mental states to other people) or unreliable. A number of different models of self-knowledge are discussed, and the evidence bearing on the existence and reliability of introspection is reviewed. New experiments are required to tease apart some of the alternatives. 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. WIREs Cogn Sci 2010 1 245–253 hilosophers have traditionally assumed that the form of noninterpretative access is what is normally Phuman mind is largely transparent to itself.1–3 referred to as ‘introspection.’ (Some reserve the term The thesis of mental transparency can be divided into ‘introspection’ for those cases where one consciously a conjunction of two claims: (1) mental states are self- and deliberately pays attention to one’s mental states.4 presenting (if one is undergoing a given mental state, We will not follow this usage.) then one knows that one is) and (2) our knowledge of A distinction should be drawn between access mental states is infallible (if one believes that one is to our own mental states that is inferential and access undergoing a given mental state, then so one is). The that is interpretive. Many cognitive processes—in- scope of this thesis has generally been restricted to cluding perceptual processes like vision and language current mental events of judging, deciding, reasoning, parsing—are thought to be inferential in that they experiencing, imagining, and feeling, however.
    [Show full text]
  • An Introduction to Late British Associationism and Its Context This Is a Story About Philosophy. Or About Science
    Chapter 1: An Introduction to Late British Associationism and Its Context This is a story about philosophy. Or about science. Or about philosophy transforming into science. Or about science and philosophy, and how they are related. Or were, in a particular time and place. At least, that is the general area that the following narrative will explore, I hope with sufficient subtlety. The matter is rendered non-transparent by the fact that that the conclusions one draws with regard to such questions are, in part, matters of discretionary perspective – as I will try to demonstrate. My specific historical focus will be on the propagation of a complex intellectual tradition concerned with human sensation, perception, and mental function in early nineteenth century Britain. Not only philosophical opinion, but all aspects of British intellectual – and practical – life, were in the process of significant transformation during this time. This cultural flux further confuses recovery of the situated significance of the intellectual tradition I am investigating. The study of the mind not only was influenced by a set of broad social shifts, but it also participated in them fully as both stimulus to and recipient of changing conditions. One indication of this is simply the variety of terms used to identify the ‘philosophy of mind’ as an intellectual enterprise in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.1 But the issue goes far deeper into the fluid constitutive features of the enterprise - including associated conceptual systems, methods, intentions of practitioners, and institutional affiliations. In order to understand philosophy of mind in its time, we must put all these factors into play.
    [Show full text]
  • Introspecting in the Twentieth Century Maja Spener (University of Birmingham)
    Introspecting in the Twentieth Century Maja Spener (University of Birmingham) Forthcoming in Philosophy of Mind in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries, A. Kind (ed.), Routledge. This version of the paper is only a draft. For quotation please consult the published version. Introspection in the 20th century is a vast topic. Discussions involving introspection figured in the relatively new discipline of experimental psychology, as well as in various debates in philosophy of mind and epistemology. Introspection has been a focus of interest as a method of investigation and as a psychological and epistemic capacity itself. Over the course of the century, these theoretical interests did not always connect well, although they have intersected and influenced each other at different points. But there is no helpful sense in which one might talk of ‘the history’ of introspection in the 20th century if by that one means a straight line of development across ten or so decades of psychological and philosophical theorizing with, and about, introspection. Instead, there is a criss-crossing pattern of various storylines and what I shall do here is track a couple of different strands in the overall pattern to the exclusion of many others.1 In particular, I shall concentrate on philosophers’ and psychologists’ use of introspection, and the discussions surrounding such use. A story we are often told is that during the late 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, experimental psychology was synonymous with introspectionism, exemplified by the work of Wilhelm Wundt and E. B. Titchener. According to the story, these early psychologists took the subject-matter of psychology to be conscious states only and their main method of investigation was introspection.
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter 11: Behaviorism
    Chapter 11: Behaviorism Megan Davis, Nicole Pelley and Stephanie Quinlan Behaviorism (1892-1956) ● Psychology has been the study of the mind since the Greeks ○ The definition of the mind has been debated extensively ○ 20th century: Shift from what the mind was to what it did ■ Mind causes behavior ● New field of research ○ Psychology was redefined with help from animal psychology ○ People started believing humans evolved from animal forms ○ Had to rethink Descartes’ definition of the mind New Directions in Animal Psychology New Directions in Animal Psychology Animal psychology as Romanes begun it, used 2 methods: 1. Anecdotal Method → Collect data 2. Method of Inference → Interpret data Close examination in late 19th, early 20th century. Anecdote → Experiment From Anecdote to Experiment ● Experiment replaced anecdotes and informal, naturalistic experiments ● Aim of animal psychology - produce natural science and anecdote not the path to science ● Two important research programs: ○ Thorndike ○ Pavlov From Anecdote to Experiment Edward Lee Thorndike (1874-1949): ● Initially wanted to study children ● Not many readily available, took up animals ● Studied with William James ● Developed “connectionism” ○ Methodological and theoretical approach to animal learning ○ Formulation of an S-R psychology he called “connectionism” ○ Anecdotal method overestimated animal intelligence From Anecdote to Experiment Thorndike’s Puzzle Boxes ● Trap cat inside box ● Each box opened by cat in different way ● Rewarded with salmon for escaping ○ Ex. of instrumental
    [Show full text]
  • The Nature of Mid-Life Introspection with the Goal of Understanding the Fullness, Or Essence, of the Experience
    Copyright 2014, Lee DeRemer Abstract I explore the nature of mid-life introspection with the goal of understanding the fullness, or essence, of the experience. I use research from interviews with nine people who have had deeply personal, highly intentional mid-life introspection experiences. In these interviews I seek to appreciate the motivation of the individuals, the dynamics of the experience, the role of others, lessons learned, and the impact on interviewees’ approach to questions of meaning and purpose. I also interview the spouses of six of the participants to obtain additional perspective on each introspection experience. I employ a transcendental phenomenological methodology to discover whether any aspects of the mid-life introspection experience are common, regardless of differences in world view, background, gender, occupation, education level, or socioeconomic status. By learning the stories of each of these mid-life introspection experiences, I discover the nature of mid-life introspection and develop the following definition of mid-life introspection: a deeply personal quest for a fresh understanding of one’s identity, purpose, values, goals, and life direction, influenced but not necessarily constrained by one’s life history and present circumstances. This research will enable the reader to conclude, “I understand the nature of mid-life introspection and what to expect from a mid-life introspection experience.” The research also reveals a framework that depicts the mid-life introspection experience graphically and a collection of questions that can guide one’s own mid-life introspection. iii Dedication This paper is dedicated to three people. I am who I am because of them, and I am forever grateful.
    [Show full text]
  • Downloaded on 2017-02-12T06:33:32Z PROPERTY of the MIT PRESS for PROOFREADING, INDEXING, and PROMOTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Cork Open Research Archive Title Gamification as behavioral psychology Author(s) Linehan, Conor; Kirman, Ben; Roche, Bryan Editor(s) Walz, Steffen P. Deterding, Sebastian Publication date 2015-01 Original citation Linehan, C., Kirman, B. and Roche, B. (2015) 'Gamification as behavioral psychology' in Walz, S.P. and Deterding, S. (eds.) The Gameful World: Approaches, Issues, Applications. Cambridge, MA, USA : MIT Press, pp. 81-105. Type of publication Book chapter Link to publisher's https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/gameful-world version Access to the full text of the published version may require a subscription. Rights © 2014, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. All rights reserved. No part of this chapter may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher. Item downloaded http://hdl.handle.net/10468/3462 from Downloaded on 2017-02-12T06:33:32Z PROPERTY OF THE MIT PRESS FOR PROOFREADING, INDEXING, AND PROMOTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY 3 GAMIFICATION AS BEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY Conor Linehan, Ben Kirman, and Bryan Roche Those who advocate the benefits of a gamified or behavior, and introduce the field of behavioral psy- gameful world often advance a vision of the future in chology as an approach to understanding observed which all life and all work becomes increasingly behavior in gamified products. Behavior analysis is
    [Show full text]
  • Consciousness and Introspection in Plotinus and Augustine Suzanne Stern-Gillet University of Bolton, [email protected]
    CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk Provided by University of Bolton Institutional Repository (UBIR) University of Bolton UBIR: University of Bolton Institutional Repository Philosophy: Journal Articles (Peer-Reviewed) Philosophy 2007 Consciousness and Introspection in Plotinus and Augustine Suzanne Stern-Gillet University of Bolton, [email protected] Digital Commons Citation Stern-Gillet, Suzanne. "Consciousness and Introspection in Plotinus and Augustine." (2007). Philosophy: Journal Articles (Peer- Reviewed). Paper 1. http://digitalcommons.bolton.ac.uk/phil_journalspr/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at UBIR: University of Bolton Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy: Journal Articles (Peer-Reviewed) by an authorized administrator of UBIR: University of Bolton Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 1 CONSCIOUSNESS AND INTROSPECTION IN PLOTINUS AND AUGUSTINE Suzanne Stern-Gillet I. Introduction Philosophers of mind and philosophical psychologists no longer care to rely on introspection as a method for investigating the human mind. From the early years of the twentieth century, introspection has gradually disappeared from the methods favored by serious philosophers and psychologists. This fading away is the object of William Lyons‟ well-known 1986 book, The Disappearance of Introspection. Curiously, if introspection has all but disappeared from the armory of philosophers and psychologists, it has survived as an exegetical category. It continues to be used routinely in accounts of Descartes‟ epistemology, it is unquestioningly applied to Augustine‟s De Trinitate and Confessions, and it regularly slips from the pen of practically anyone who writes on Plotinus‟ concept of soul, theory of dual selfhood or, indeed, mysticism.
    [Show full text]
  • Neural Networks
    Neural Networks 1. Introduction Spring 2020 1 Neural Networks are taking over! • Neural networks have become one of the major thrust areas recently in various pattern recognition, prediction, and analysis problems • In many problems they have established the state of the art – Often exceeding previous benchmarks by large margins 2 Breakthroughs with neural networks 3 Breakthrough with neural networks 4 Image segmentation and recognition 5 Image recognition https://www.sighthound.com/technology/ 6 Breakthroughs with neural networks 7 Success with neural networks • Captions generated entirely by a neural network 8 Breakthroughs with neural networks ThisPersonDoesNotExist.com uses AI to generate endless fake faces – https://www.theverge.com/tldr/2019/2/15/18226005/ai-generated- fake-people-portraits-thispersondoesnotexist-stylegan 9 Successes with neural networks • And a variety of other problems: – From art to astronomy to healthcare.. – and even predicting stock markets! 10 Neural nets can do anything! 11 Neural nets and the employment market This guy didn’t know This guy learned about neural networks about neural networks (a.k.a deep learning) (a.k.a deep learning) 12 Objectives of this course • Understanding neural networks • Comprehending the models that do the previously mentioned tasks – And maybe build them • Familiarity with some of the terminology – What are these: • http://www.datasciencecentral.com/profiles/blogs/concise-visual- summary-of-deep-learning-architectures • Fearlessly design, build and train networks for various tasks
    [Show full text]