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The Memory of Comrade Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej Forever Alive in the Heart of the Party, of the Working Class, of the People”

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The Memory of Comrade Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej Forever Alive in the Heart of the Party, of the Working Class, of the People” RESEARCH NOTE The Death of a Leninist Dictator “The Memory of Comrade Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej Forever Alive in the Heart of the Party, of the Working Class, of the People” ✣ Marius Stan and Vladimir Tismaneanu Leninism is our beacon and strength and élan We are faithfully following the invincible Party We are building socialism in our land State anthem of the Romanian People’s Republic In Bucharest in August 1964, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, the party and state leader of Communist Romania, was experiencing a moment of total triumph. He was hosting important guests, including Anastas Mikoyan, the veteran Soviet official who was then head of the Presidium of the USSR’s Supreme Soviet; Li Xiannian, the first deputy prime minister of the Peo- ple’s Republic of China (PRC), who later served as Chinese president; and countless other magnates of the Communist world. They arrived in Bucharest to participate in the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of 23 August 1944, a historical watershed in Romanian history when King Michael and the leaders of the democratic political parties rid the country of general Ion An- tonescu’s fascist dictatorship. The Communist regime’s propaganda symboli- cally usurped and mystified this event as “having been organized and led by the Communist Party headed by the healthy nucleus from the prisons guided by Comrade Gheorghiu-Dej.”1 Significantly, Albania sent its own party and government delegation, headed by Politburo member and Deputy Prime Minister Hysni Kapo. This was an unmistakable indication that Romania had decided not to go along with the boycott of the Tirana regime imposed by the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev. Such a policy was a direct consequence of Romania’s April 1964 1. On the mystification of 23 August 1944, seeStefan ¸ Borbély, “Politics as Memory Distortion: A Case Study,” Caietele Echninox (Cluj), No. 1 (2001), pp. 123–133. Journal of Cold War Studies Vol. 19, No. 3, Summer 2017, pp. 202–214, doi:10.1162/JCWS_a_00759 © 2017 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 202 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/JCWS_a_00759 by guest on 02 October 2021 Research Note pledge to remain neutral toward the deepening fissures within the world Com- munist movement.2 In the same vein, despite the acerbic anti-Titoist rhetoric from Chinese and Romanian officials at the gathering, Gheorghiu-Dej also hosted a party and state delegation from Yugoslavia. That same month, Ana Toma, a member of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers’ Party (PMR), as well as Romania’s deputy trade min- ister and the wife of Securitate General Gheorghe Pintilie (nom de guerre “Pantiu¸sa”), a close friend of Gheorghiu-Dej, visited the PMR first secretary at the “Elias” party clinic. The 63-year-old party leader had been hospitalized in a special pavilion for a complete medical checkup. That same day, Pintilie told a close friend that “Comrade Dej is in great shape.” The friend’s name was Cristina Luca-Boico, the aunt of one of this article’s authors. In February 1965, Gheorghiu-Dej headed the PMR’s delegation to the meeting of the Warsaw Pact’s Political Consultative Committee. During the trip to Poland, members of the delegation, including the PMR’s chief ideo- logue, Leonte Rautu,˘ noticed Dej’s frailty. Later that month, Dej delivered his last important political speech at a gathering of the Bucharest party organiza- tion. He spoke slowly, with many interruptions, emphasizing the significance of the preparations for the PMR’s Fourth Congress. The Third Congress had taken place in 1960, attended by Khrushchev as head of the Soviet delega- tion and by the Beijing mayor, Peng Zhen, and had turned into a battlefield between the two competing world Communist centers. Witnesses described Dej as exhausted, weakened, cachectic. Despite his poor condition, he defended his political and economic strategies based on an opening to the West and rejection of Soviet hegemony within the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance. He insisted on the necessity of technological modernization and emphasized the need to import foreign licenses in order to avoid lagging far behind. In his memoirs, the former French resistance fighter and head of the State Planning Commission and deputy prime minister Ghe- orghe Gaston Marin maintains that Gheorghiu-Dej was determined to put an end to Soviet economic domination and allow for dynamic trade relations 2. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 383–384. For detailed analyses of Gheorghiu-Dej’s career as party leader, see Dennis Deletant, Communist Terror in Romania: Gheorghiu-Dej and the Police State, 1948–1965 (London: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, 1999); and Mihai Burcea andStefan ¸ Bosomitu, eds., Spectrele lui Dej: Incursiuni in biografia si regimul unui dictator (Iași: Polirom, 2012). On the early stage of Ceau¸sescu’s career, see Mary Ellen Fischer’s seminal volume, Nicolae Ceau¸sescu: A Study in Political Leadership (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), pp. 1–83. For a provocatively thoughtful perspective on Gheorghiu-Dej’s successor, see the section on “How Ceau¸sescu Came to Discover Kim Il Sungism,” in Daniel Chirot, Modern Tyrants: The Power and the Prevalence of Evil in Our Age (New York: The Free Press, 1994), pp. 236–240. 203 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/JCWS_a_00759 by guest on 02 October 2021 Stan and Tismaneanu with the West.3 Gaston Marin, one of Dej’s closest confidants, led the Ro- manian delegation in November 1963 to the funeral of the assassinated U.S. President John F. Kennedy and, a year later, paid an official visit to the United States, France, and other Western countries. In line with this approach, Ro- manian Prime Minister Ion Gheorghe Maurer visited France in 1964 and met with President Charles de Gaulle to inform him about Romania’s defiance of Soviet attempts at limiting its independence and sovereignty. March 1965 Despite being terminally ill, Gheorghiu-Dej voted in the elections for the Grand National Assembly (the figurehead Romanian parliament) at the be- ginning of March 1965 and delivered a short televised speech. His physical appearance during the speech left little doubt that he was in agony. At the last New Year’s Eve party held at Gheorghiu-Dej’s residence, as Ceau¸sescu disap- provingly recalled three years later, Gheorghiu-Dej did not invite his Politburo comrades and preferred to keep the party a private family event with one or two personal guests. During his final years he increasingly relied on Prime Minister Maurer, Deputy Prime Ministers Alexandru Bârladeanu˘ and Gaston Marin, and the party’s chief ideologist, Rautu.˘ In March 1965, Gheorghiu-Dej died as a result of a fast-spreading lung cancer. Rumors spread immediately that he had been irradiated during his February trip to Warsaw. The rumors were wholly unsubstantiated, but many Romanians found the dictator’s sudden demise perplexing and mysterious. The official medical communiqué, signed by Voinea Marinescu, the minis- ter of health and social assistance, as well as by such renowned doctors as N. Gh. Lupu, Tiberiu Spîrchez, Constantin Nicolau, Ioan Bruckner, Con- stantin Anastasatu, Leon Bercu, and Alexandru Dumitriu, director of the “Elias” Communist Party hospital, explained how the death occurred: During the second half of January 1965 Comrade Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej presented signs of a pulmonary infection with coughing and expectorations. Analysis of the sputum did not reveal anything out of the ordinary. X-rays showed an infiltrating process at the level of the right pulmonary hilum. Over the next ten days, clinical observation disclosed a fast liver growth accompa- nied by sub icterus. Clinical and laboratory analyses disclosed the presence of hepatic tumor formations. On 2 March 1965, microscopic examination of the 3. Gheorghe Gaston Marin, În serviciul Romanieiˆ lui Gheorghiu-Dej: Însemnari˘ din viata̦˘,(Bucharest: Editura Evenimentul românesc, 2000). 204 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/JCWS_a_00759 by guest on 02 October 2021 Research Note sputum showed the presence of neoplastic cells. The diagnosis based on clinical and laboratory data was pulmonary and hepatic neoplasm. Taking into account the gravity of the diagnosed illness, a group of renowned foreign experts, hep- atologists, pneumonologists, and oncologists was invited to Romania, and they confirmed the diagnosis. During the illness, the treatment applied to the patient was appropriate. Because of the aggressive nature of the disease and the spread of neoplasia, the illness continued to develop and determined a rapid and grave evolution associated with the installation of an intense icterus and hepato-renal deficiency. On 19 March, after 4:00 PM, the patient’s condition suddenly wors- ened. Despite all the care provided, the patient lapsed into a coma and died at 5:43 PM.4 Some clarifications are necessary at this point. Leon Bercu had been Gheorghiu-Dej’s personal physician since 1945. He had also been Ana Pauker’s physician until her political decline and excommunication in 1952. In later years, in private conversations with close friends, Bercu reported that he had been emphatically forbidden by Ceau¸sescu (then a Politburo member and Central Committee Secretary overseeing the party apparatus) to inform Lica Gheorghiu-Radoi˘ (Dej’s favorite daughter) about the gravity of her fa- ther’s disease. Lica Gheorghiu (1928–1987) and her children shared the res- idence with her father and their grandfather, who had adopted them. Her second husband, Gheorghe Radoi,˘ was a Central Committee member and deputy prime minister who had previously been director of the “Red Flag” truck factory in Bra¸sov. Ceau¸sescu and his aides were apparently worried that Lica could obtain from her father at the last minute a spectacular promotion for her husband in the party and government hierarchy.
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