The Unionization of School Administrators: a Study of Public Policy-Making and Labor Relations

DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 248 569 EA 016 647

AUTHOR Cooper, Bruce S.; Nakamura, Robert T. TITLE The Unionization of School Administrators: A Study of Public Policy-Making and Labor Relations. INSTITUTION Dartmouth Coll., Hanover, N.H. SPONS AGENCY National Inst. of Education (ED), Washington, DC. PUB DATE [83] GRANT NIE-G-78-0061 NOTE 398p. PUB TYPE Reports Research/Technical (143)

EDRS PRICE MFO1 /PC16 Plus Postage. DESCRIPTORS *Administrator Attitudes; Board of Education Policy; *Collective Bargaining; Educational Administration; Elementary Secondary Education; Labor Legislation; *Labor Relations; Management Teams; *Middle Management; Organizational Development; Organizational Theories; Policy Formation; Principals; *Professional Associations; Superintendents; Teacher Associations; Teacher Strikes; *Unions IDENTIFIERS Public Employment Relations Boards; Rodda Act (California 1975)

ABSTRACT This study offers a comprehensive analysis of the process of gaining and implementing public school administrators' right to unionize. The first two chapters consider why school administrators perceive the need for negotiation rights. Chapter I incorporates literature on the changing role, status, and work ethos of educational administration. Chapter II discusses four approaches to affiliation that administrators may take: with community, top \managers, teachers, or with one another in a union-like relationship. Chapter III surveys the process of public policy-making and its effects for school supervisors, focusing on the passage and implementation of California's Rodda Act. Chapter IV details the implementation of state labor laws by school districts and by state bodies in California and Florida. Chapter V analyzes the metamorphosis of school administrator associations from clubs to unions in response to state policies and presents comparative dataon administrator organizations in six districts. Chapter VI, which explores changes in the ideology and attitudes of school administrators as local bargaining develops, reports a survey revealing that union membership and collective bargaining among school middle Aministrators are strongly related to the level of agreement with top managerial opinions. Chapter VII speculates on future developments in unionization of school administratcrs and other public sector supervisors. (MJL)

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.THE UNIONIZATION OF SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS*

A Study of Public Policy - Making and Labor Relations

Bruce S. Cooper, Robert.T. Nakamura. Fordham University Dartmouth College School of Education Government Dept, 113 W. 60th St. Hanover, NH 03755 NtTIOC123 603-646-2555 212-841-5217/636-5625 802-333-4484

: This study was .supported by a- grant fromthe ntional Institute of Education, # 141.76-00101 Please do not print without written permission of the authors. TABLE OF CONTENTS

Author;Preface....pp. 1-16

Chapter I: LIFE IN THE MIDDLE....pp.1-35

Chapter II: DILEMMAS AND SOLUTIONS....pp.1-36

Chapter III: STATE LAW-MAKING ANDTHE RIGHTS OF ADMINISTRATORS TO BARGAIN...pp. 1-44

Chapter IV: IMPLEMENTING SCHOOLADMINISTRATOR BARGAINING RIGHTS....pp. 1-32

Chapter V: FROM "CLUBS" TO"UNIONS": The Impact of Policy Changes on AdministratorGroups....pp. 1-102

Chapter VI: IMPACT AND IMPLICATIONS....pp.1-55 Chapter VII: THE FUTURE....pp. 1-34 AUTHOR!:PREFACE

This book represents the first full-scale study of collective bargainingamong public school school principals

and other middle-rank.- supervisorssince extensive public

sector unionization began in the 1960's. Although a spate of research and books greetedpublic school teachersas they

joined the ranks of America's unionized workers (1), little major inquiry has been madeinto collective negotiations for public sector supervisors in general and school administrators in particular (2). The topic istreated as if it did not exist.

Takt a case in point. In 1968, during the bitter confrontation between representativesof the black community of Ocean Hill-Brownsville and the leadership of the school unions in New York City,news of the United Federation of

Teachers (UFT) so dominated the media that the public had the misconception that the teachers were the onlyeducators involved. Newspaper and later, scholarly studies, quoted

Albert Shanker, the UFT president, at length about the teacher's position. Books by the armsful detailed every move Shenker made as he dealt with blackleader Rhody McCoy,

Mayor John Lindsay, and various other spokespeople for the state legislature, Ford Foundation, and other groups supporting the experiment in "community control (3).' And when a series of strikes closed the public schools for its 1.2 million children, Shankerand the UFT gained most of the credit (or blame).

What seemed to escape the public eye and the analysis ofmany observers, however, was an event of great O. significance: the Council of Supervisory Associations

(CSA), representing the city's 2,700 public school administrators, led by the lateWalter. Degnan, joined its colleagues, the teachers, on the picket lines. No one seemed to notice the fact thata group of principles was on strike (4)!

In 1974, that samegroup, the CSA., began to organize nationally. It brought together similar school administrators from such cities as Chicago, San Francisco,

Baltimore, Boston, Washington, D.C., 'and St. Louis, as well as administrator associations from smeller communities, and met suburbs, to petition the AmericanFederation of Labor-

Congress of Industrial Organizations,AFL-CIO, for status as a national union affiliate. On July 9, 1976,in NewYork

City, the AFL-CIO chartered fifty such administrator associations as the nation's first supervisoryunion within the labor movement--the American Federation of School

Administrators (AFSA) (5). Again, withoutMuch notice, schobl supervisors have participated ina quiet revolution in American laborrelations: middle managers engaging in collective bargaining with boards of education under the banner of the AFL-CIO. By 1980, not only hadsome 12,000 principals and other

middle-level administrators gained affiliationwith AFSA through membership in their 72 locals,but nearly 21 percent

of the nation's school administrators were negotiating

collectively with boards ofeduw2tion, according toa survey

by the National Association of Secondary School Principals

(6). At last count, over 2,800 school districts had

recognized associationsof schooladministrators as the

official bargaining group for principals and other

supervisors (7). Issues settled at the negotiatingtable

.often included such traditional union concernsas salaries,

fringe benefits,_ and the creation ofsuch rights as formal

grievahce procedures,access to binding artitration, as well

as layoffpolicies stressing seniority. In short, school

supervisors are just now bargainingover the labor-

management concerns which have concerned other workers and managers for centuries.

Another important development has been overlooked.

Much of,',this growth in supervisory unionization--infact,

the bulk of it--has been theresultof IPmgmajorchanges in state labor relations policies. Twenty-one states hatelaws

that protect the right of supervisors in public jobs to be

represented by a bargaining agent or union. In addition,

even in some states without bargaining statutes, local

boards of eaucation in increasing numbers have decided,

voluntarily and without enabling legislation, to negotiate

3 with school administrators (8). So, besides the changes in local management-supervisor relations, we have also witnessed something ofa revolution in public sector labor policies--a sharp departure from the laws in the private sectorwhich deny legal protection to foremen and other supervisors in commerce and industry (9).

Finally, bargaining for school administrators has dramatically changed the internal workings of school systems. For almost a century, the school bureaucracy operatedunder the guiding principleof the so-called

"management" or "administrative team," the notion that principals, assistant principals, and other similar administrators were a structural extension of the superintendents' authority (10). It was somehow tacitly assumed that whatever the superintendent as chief executive officer decided, the principals would follow. Decisions whichwere made at the top were to be carried out by those in the middle with a modicum ofinterference. The idea that a principal should ever need, much less want, a collective, independent voice indetermining pay and working conditions was unthinkable. Such an idea verged on disloyalty, insubordination, if not mutiny itself.

But collective bargaining promises to change much of that. Now, for the first time, the tenetsof adversari,lism have challenged the management chain-of-command. While school middle administratorsmay follow orders as always in

4 performing their daily duties in the job, on matters 0 affectingtheir rights, jobs, and remuneration, they may

seek the right of bilateral decisionmaking, and procedural rights to settle differences betweenthemselves and their superiors, the school board andsuperintendent.

This study is intended to be a broad one, trying to oring together the reasons for bargaining, its legal and policy underpinnings,,. and the impact of such a change in labor relations policies. In addition the study is exploratory; it draws some tentative conclusions about1.1 how changes in personnelpolicies occur. Sinvewe confront fifty states, the Districtof-Columbia,and thousands of local school districts, it is impossible to write with absolute certainty about how superintendents, boards, and middle administrators interact. Laws vary fromplace to place; court cases affecting the status of administrators are different fromjuridiction to jurisdiction, time to time. In addition the situation is in flux, broad current changes in education, such as declining enrollment, havean impact on the need for collective bargaining among school administrators.

Despitethese difficulties, we can make some general statements about what is happening. Our research seems to indicate that an increasingnumber of middle level school administrators perceive the need for: (1) collective bargaining rights, (2) increasedsay-so in the operation of the school district, and (3) greater power in dealing with

the community, teachers, pupils, and the official school hierarchy.

Such changes are importantfor several reasons. First,

school administrators remain a vital cog in the school

system's machinery. They stand at the nexus of policy- making and policy-implementation, at the intersection

between to level policy formation andthose who must carry outthesit decisions in the schools. Hence, changes in the attitudes ofadministrators, particularly aroundissues of governanc*, are vital to the continuedimprovement of school operations.

Second, school administrators are not alone in their movement toward the establishment of collective rights. Similar movement can beseen in other types of public sector supervisors: policesergeants and lieutenants, fire lieutenants and captains, public hospital nursing supervisors, subway supervisors, and supervisors in state, county, and municipal government. In fact, in a majority of states, supervisors are moving toward unionization, making school administrators partof a significant trend. What we learn about school supervisors, their problems, needs, and collective actions, is applicable to some extent to other jobs.

Finally, the surge in supervisoryunionism in education and other public sectoremployment may have an impacton the private sector where supervisors are not protected in their

rightto bargain. Perhaps, as policy-makers, courts, and

employment relations commissions begin to recognize the

effect of collective bargainingin schools and other public

sector positions, they may begin to reconsider the ban'on

legal protectionfor factory supervisors, foremen, and so

forth. Similarly, the federal employment sector has not

permitted most of itssupervisors to unionize; excluded are

supervisors inthe armed forces, postal service, and the

hundredsof federal offices. Again, perhaps the precedent

at the state and local levels will spillover into the federal jobs sector..

The Aszociational Lifeof Principals as a Topic ofStudy- -

Thus the case of school administratorswho unionize poses a natural experiment to study the impact of unionizationon othersupervisory groupswho may develop similar rights. In any event, this study seeks to fill a void in our collecting understanding of a new and exciting area of labor activity. Prof. Cooper's. interest in supervisory unionization began almost a decade ago at a meeting at the University of ChicagoCenter for Industrial

Relations. Present were such scholars ofoccupations as Dan

Lortie and Seymour Sarason. The occasion was the planning of a national study of what the principal does, using a survey of administrators in a number of school districts.

7 I tWhen he asked naively about the role or principals as a

groin in influencing school policies,he was informed that this was outside theconcern of the study (11).

When we turned to the vast literature on the

principalship, we learned there,too,that most researchers

treated the topic psycho-socially, examining the worklife

of the model or typical;Administrator. He or she works in a

particular setting, not as an occupational groupwith

distinctneeds and problems. What often passed as

"research" on the principal as an individual actor were normative descriptions of administrativebehavior: that is, what good, effective leadersshould and should not do. Few treatedthe administrator as an occupational group and political force in the school district, much less on the state and national levels.

Sally, McPherson and Baehr, for example, inquired of

719 principals on "what principals do." While they found, interestingly, thatsuch conditions as size of school and ethnic composition of thestudent body and staff exerted important influenceson principals, we learn nothing about the relations among administrators nor the existence or impact of principals' associations on theschool district operations (12).

Another innovative study of the "manin the principal's office" was conducted by Harry Wolcott. Using ethnography, he observed closely a single principal ("Ed Bell") over a

8 1. long time period to record "certain aspects of human

behavior in order to constructexplanations of that behavior

in cultural terms (13)." For our purposes, the Wolcott study is limited; like the Salley research, this book focused almost exclusively on the daily. activities of

principals in their school buildings. The only hint of a

peer group outside the schoolcame in a section of Wolcott's

study entitled "peers, and socializers." Here Wolcott

explains that older'principals sometimes initiate younger ones into theole of administrator:

By reasonof their long tenure inthe school district, . seniorprincipals controlled a great deal of inter-personal information abouttheir subordinatem, theirpeers, and other long-term employees The extent and complexity of this network bOre resemblances to the extensivekinshipsystem which anthropologistshave often collected from informants duringfield studies (14).

Further, he found that the principals association provided exposure and outlets formore ambitious administrators, but little politicalpower for middle administratorsas a group.

Though Wolcott mentions that"the formal structure of their professional organization did provide a channel for politically mobile,cLeer-oriented principalswho wished to remain in their present professionalrole and still achieve greater visibility andpower, (15)" no mention is made of the impact of this professional association4sa political

12 force on school policies,programs, wages, and conditions of work'for administrators.

These abovementioned studies tend to isolate the

principal by role or station. Other research has surveyeda

large number of administritors, elicitingtheir feelings,

attitudes, and behaviors. But these too have failed to provide essential dataon the activities of principalsas an occupational group, thoughwe do learn about their attitudes toward collective negotiations. For example, the most revealing study wasexecutedby the National School Board

Association in 1976 in which a cross sectionofU.S. and Canadian principalswere queried concerning labor relations.

Forty-eight percent of those responding"said they regularly or occasionally find themselves seriouslyat odds with their superintendent andlor school board (16)." More dramatically, d6 percent of the responding principals reported that they were "in favor of state laws that will guarantee their right to bargain directlywith school boards and will forceschool boards to bargain in good faith with principals (17)."

Thus, the School Board study indicates._both the,pre- ,- conditions for collective action (basic /disagreementswith bosses) and the desire for statutory r ghts to collective negotiations among school administratrs in the U.S. and

Canada. Though such information is useful inexposing the inner feelings of administrators, it does not explain the

10 13 process of gaining and implementing the right to unionize, which is the purpose of this study. Our analysis is accomplished in stages:

STAGE 1: The Need for Collective Rights(Chapters I &

II).This first part ofthis researchcenters on the question: Why do school administrators,as professionals, perceive the need for negotiationsrights? Professor Cooper draws on the existingliterature for his analysis ofhow the principalship has becomea focus for the conflicting demands placed upon middle managementin education. Such analysis takes us into the very heartof the dilemmas of being "middle management,"caught between the top decision-makers

(who expect loyalty without always includingmiddle-rank supervisors in the deliberations) and various school constituencies, includingmilitant teachers, oftenannoyed parents, concerned community members, and active students.

This "life in themiddle" has been a recurring theme since the advent of large-scale social systems, as witnessed by the image of the army sergeant, the shop foremen, and other non-commissioned supervisors who take the heat from above and below, tottering at the nexus between policy and implementation.

STAGE II: The, ?assau and Implementations of Lawsand

Policies (Chapter III). Once the need for collective action is established, the public laws and policies

11 14 determinewhat course such collectivebargaining and union recognition may take. How are these labor laws passed?

What does the ,lassageor non-passage of these policies tell us about the making and implementing ofstatutes, especially when legislators expect one outcome and get another? Using data from California andFlorida, and his own experienceas a student of legislative policymakin67Professor Nakamura discusses the process of policy-makingand itsoutcomes for school supervisors.

STAGE III: OrganizationalImpact on Supervisory

Unionization (Chapters IV & V). Laws made in state capitals are implemented in local school districts. Since administratorassociationsareorganizations which live within a larger system, the schooldistrict, it is important to study the impact of changes in labor policy on local school districts and school administrator organizations.

Using comparative data from six local school districts,we trace the changesthat occur as various state policies enabling orprohibiting school administratorbargaining are put into action. What changes occur in local school administrator associations as they receive the right to unionize? What changes in affiliation patterns, interactions with the superintendent, and so forth can be established as a result of llective bargaining?

STAGE IV: Changes in Managerial Outlook (Chapter4gAP

12 16 it$01Aslocal bargaining develops,what changes occul in the

ideology and attitudes of school administrators? Using a selectedrandom sample of principals,assistant principals, supervisors, and superintendents in New Jersey,we examine the "managerial identification"of administrators to see if bargaining has affected their way of thinking about management. If the old view of school management holds, then principals and superintendentsshould basically agree on how the school district shouldbe run. If, on the other hand, bargaining has affectedtheir outlook, then perhaps principals (particularly ifthey bargain andare part of the

AFLCIO) see the worldin a much more "prolabor"way. Such data are valuable in assessingthe outcomes of collective bargaining and unionization.

STAGE V: The Implementation forManagement and School

Organization (Chapter141:100000410.Finally,we shall assess theoverall implications ofcollective bargaining among school administrators and supervisors. What might the future hold? Will the nationmove to a uniform federal law enabling (or denying) schooland other supervisors the right to bargaining? Will the private sector model prevail? Or will the current approach being used in 29 states and the District of Columbia beextended to all the states?

What are the implications of bargaining for our understanding of how school systems function? Some have

13 l ti argued that schools are holistic, rationale bureaucracies which function tocarry out systemic missions; othentlike

Bacharach and Lawler(18) maintain that organizations are actually coalitions of conflicting,fractured units that vie with one another tocontrol-Scarce resources.

Certainly the unionization ofschool administrators gives credence to the intra-organizationalpolitics implicit in the latter viewpoint. As scL'ol administrators struggle to hold on to their authority, professionalism,and access to decent treatment, they walk the fine line between acting like managers and employees. What is the future of middle management in education?This final section of the study speculates on the trends in collectivebargaining and school management.

Acknowledgement: This study was completed with the assistance of the National Institute ofEducation. The initial grantwas approved by Denis P. Doyle. It was managed by James Fox. We appreciate Denis's faithand Jim's patience andhelp, as the years dragged on and our study grew. We should also mention the helpof numerous people in the field who provided information and judgment, and who treated us with collegiality.

In New York City, we'd liketo express our appreciation to Peter O'Brien, President of the Council ofSupervisors and Administrators, and later head of the national AFL-CIO

14 17 union, the American Federation of School Administrators

(AFF....). Also we wish to acknowledge the help of the late

Walter Degnan, AFSA'sfirst leader, and thatof Al Morrison, the recently retiree president. All these men were

invaluable in providinga rational perspectiveon the school

administisator bargaining movement. Their attornee, John

Murray, and his predecessor, William W. Thompson,II, were patient in explaining the many legal concerns that

surrounded bargaining, grieving,and lobbying for the union membership.

We would also liketo thank the leadership of the New York City Local 1 of the CSA; in particular,President Ted Elsberg was generous with his time and help,as was Vice

President NicholasA. Neuhaus and Simpson Sasserath. As heads of the nation's largest middle administrator

bargaining unit, thesemen were essential to our understanding of the functionof administrator organizations with large staff,budgets, and resources.

In San Francisco, we interviewed and observed the

leaders of the administrators association;Roland Demarias,

President and Saul Madfes, Executive Director. Both

provided useful insightsinto the passage andimplementation of theRodda bill, California'sPublic Employment Relations Act.

In Cleveland, we visited the Association of

Administrators and Supervisors, a voluntarily recognized

15 18 bargaining unit, sinceOhio has no statute protecting the

rights of any public employee to negotiate. In particular, thanks to William Tomko for his help. Also, Ross Fleming of the Ohio Council of Administrative Personnel

Associations, the umbrellagroup of elementary andsecondary

principals in the state,was most supportive inour efforts to understandOhio education politics.

In Dade County (Miami), Florida,we interviewed the

head of the Dade County administrators gro?, Sandy

Rubinstein, who explainedto us the complex history oftheir

bargaining group which voluntarily"decertified" itself when

the state laws were aboutto revoke thegroup's bargaining protection, in exchange fora last, strong contract.

And inMinneapolis, we were assisted by an old friend

and colleague, Dr. ByronSchneider, a high school principal,

who provided access to the schools and insights into the

innerworkings of the city's threemiddlemanagement bargaining groups: the principals association, the central office middle administrators,and the confidential employees organizations. He also explained in some detail why his

bargainingassociation decided to affiliate with the

Teamsters union; after receiving a zero -zero -zero nay increase for threeyears (1978-81).

Though we had the help and confidence of all these people and manymore, the facts and conclusions inthis study remain the responsibilityof the authors. AVIZO .rezace)

1 See Myron Lieberman and Michael H.Moskow, COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS FOR TEACHERS (Chicago:Rand McNally and Co., 1966); Edward S. Shils and C. TaylorWhittier, TEACHERS, ADMINISTRATORS, AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (NewYork: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1968); and T.M. Stinnett; TURMOILIN TEACHING (New York: MacmillanCo., 1968). For a review of the vast and growingliterature on educator collective bargaining,see Bruce S. Cooper, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, STRIKES, AND FINANCIAL COSTSIN PUBLIC EDUCATION: A COMPARATIVE REVIEW (Eugene, Oregon:University of Oregon, Clearinghouseon Educational Management, 1982).

2 To date, few studies ofprincipals collective bargaining have been made. See Elliot Alexander, "Menin the Middle Seek Greater Value,T NATIONAL ELEMENTARYPRINCIPAL, 51, 2 (October 1971), PP. 48-53; and1DOe Schofield, COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONSAND THE ot PRINCIPAL (Arlington, Virginiaand Eugene, Oregon: National Association. of Elementary SchoolPrincipals and ERIC Clearinghouse on Educational Management, 1976).

3 See Mirian Wasserman, THESCHOOL FIX, NYC, USA (NewYork: Simon and Schuster, 1971).;Diane Ravitch,_THE GREAT SCHOOLWARS:

NEW YORK CITY, 1805-1973 (NewYork: Basic Books, 1974);7-f. David Roger, 110 LIVINGSTON STREET:(NewYork: Random House, 1968) and Richard Magat,COMMUNITY CONTROL AND THE URBANSCHOOL (New York: Praeger, 1970).

'Forexample, Ravitch in the GREATSCHOOL WARS fails to trace the actions of the principalsunion at all; the Council of Supervisory,Associationsdoes not evenappear in her index.

5 For - description of the foundingof the union, see Bruce S. Cooper, "CollectiveBargaining Comes to School Middle Management," PHI DELTA KAPPAN, 38...2 (October 1976),pp. 202-204.

20 6Dataprovided by telephoneon most recent survey.

7 See Bruce S. Cooper,"Collective Bargaining for School Administrators Four Years Later,"PHI DELTA KAPPAN (October 1979),pp. 130-131.

Ibid., p. 131.

9 For a review of theprivate sector lawson this subject, see N.L.R.B. v. Bell Aerosvace Co. Division of Textron Inc., 72-1598 (1974).

10 See "The Brewing--and,Perhaps, Still Preventable-- Revolt of School Principals,"THE AMERICAN SCHOOL BOARDJOURNAL, (January 1976),pp. 25-27.

11 The research .completedby this teamfas published as, Columbus Sally et al.,"What Principals Do:A Preliminary Occupational Analysis," inTHE PRINCIPAL IN METROPOLITAN SCHOOLS, edited by DonaldA. Erickson and TheodoreL. Railer (Berkeley, California:McCutchan, 1979),pp. 22.39.

12 ail., p. 37.

13 Harry Wolcott, THE MANIN THE PRINCIPAL'S OFFICE(New York: Holt, Rinehart andWinston, 1973),p. ix.

1 4Ibid.,p. 222.

15. p. 96.

16 National School Board Association, COLLECTIVEBARGAINING-- PRACTICES AND ATTITUDES OFSCHOOL MANAGERS, ResearchReport 1977-2 (Washington, D.C., 1977).

21 17 Ibid., pp. 25-26.

1 13SamuelB. Bacharach and Edward J. Lawler, POWER AND

POLITICS IN ORGANIZATIONS (San Frantisco: Jossey-Bass, 1980).

22 CHAPTER I

LIFE IN THE MIDDLE

At the outset of any study ofan occupational group,we need to know something-about how membersof that group view

themselves. This chapter sketches the conditionsthat shape

those conceptions. One fact shapes these conceptions more

than any other. Principals and other educational

supervisors are people whosejobs place them in the middle between well defined groups.

Nearly all accept the dictum: employees unionize;

managers do not. But whatabout "middle managers," that

diverse liroup- of front -line supervisors-and middle-rank.

administrators? Their lot is somewhatmore ambivalent and confusing. For while they often beara major responsibility

for implementing and interpreting organizational policies, and they could be considered "managerial,"they usually lack the real authority to make and significantly .change operating procedures. In that regard theysharewith workers some sense of powerlessness and vulnerability.

These supervisors, then, work without the influence of executive status and without the force of numbers and organization enjoyed by rank-and-file employees. And, perhaps most seriously, supervisors havefailed to create a comfortable occupational identity for themselves-being trapped somewhere between the rock of managerial

23 expectations and the hard place ofemployee-like status(1).

The ..abivalent place of supervisorscan be seen by examining the history of that status in the privatesector and then lookingat their fate in education. The right and legitimate place of supervisors inthe organizationalscheme of things hz4 been a topic offierce debatesince the 1930's when industrial foremen unionizedin large numbers,went out on strike against the automobile industry, and asserted their organizational independenceby establishing the 40,000-member Foreman's Association of America (FAA) (2). These, moves, of course, precipitatedrevisions in the Taft Hartley Act which taliffl supported the positionof those,contended. that supervisorsought not to uninize likeworkers. The dilemma of life in the middlewas not and is notconfined to school supervisors, and muchof what is said about other supervisors.also applies to them. Shop foremen,for example, have been described in the industrial psychologyliterature as being "Janus - like," with one face toward management, and the other toward labor (3). This "life intwo organizations

(4)" can make a supervisors, to quote Fritz J. Roethlisberger, both "master and victimor double talk (5). a

In the 1940's, in an attempt to overcome their status as "marginal (6)" and "forgotten men (7)," industrial supervisors formed unions under interpretations of tale

2 24 National Labor Relations Act of 1935. Such militancy was

not popular, however, among the nation'scorporate leaders,

who lobbied Congress. These industrialmanagers feared the

loss of control, productivitye andprofits, should foremen

divide their loyalties between the corporation and the

union. So successful was the managerial campaign that in

1947, Congress legislated the Taft-Hartleyact which denied

legal protection to supervisorsin the private sector--and

all but killed the unionization movementamong industrial supervisors (8).

Thequandry of life in the middle didnot end with the

passage of the Taft-Hartley, however. Seven years after

Congress passed the law, the problem of occupational

uncertainty persisted,as discussed byMann and Dent in the Harvard Business Review:

Whether the supervisor is a member of management is an unsettled question. Sometimes he seems to be, sometimes heseems not to be. The Taft-Hartley act has defined the supervisor as legally a member of management, but psychologically, there still remains an ambiguity that disturbsmanagement and supervisors as well. (9)

Hence, whil.. an era of unionism for America's industrial supervisors had all but ended with Taft-Hartley, the confusion over the appropriate role of supervisors has remained very muchan issue.

The Evolution of the Principalship:The road to collective bargaining was somewhatmore complex pd winding for public scnool principals' and other supervisors. For unlike

industrial foremen, publicschool principals andheadmasters

were clearly once managers, fielders of considerable

authority. over their schools. In the mid-nineteenth

century, for example, many principals wer "teaching

administrators," gaining double authority as classroom

instructors and school-wide leaders. In fact, the title

"principal" is a shortened version of the descriptor

"principal teacher," or one who is the head staff member (10).

Later, as school districtsgrew in size, the number of

students assigned to each school 'grew to such a point that

principal teachers beganto give up ,their teachingfunction.

There simply was notenough time to teach and administer to the increasing demands for central office leadership; demands on the principal'stime came from within the school (teachers and students) and from outside the school (parents, downtown central office and board of education).

During this phase, the principal assumed extensive managerial authority, including, in the words of historian

Paul Revere Pierce, "theefficient operation of elementary and secondaryschools," "the control oflocal administrative procedures" and "classroom instruction," and direction of the "local school community" and"professional staff.(1L)"

Hence, by the 1.5u's, the school principal could boast of clear managerial functions,acting to influence the program

4 for pupils in the scnool. Rarely could industrialforeman

argue that they had near the discretionover their immediate

environment that school supervisors had duringthis period.

A Changing EnvironmentShapes The Principalship: It was not

until the 1960's thatthe position of principalunderwent an enormous change in status, control,and legal constrictions.

Though it is impossible to tell precisely whatmight have

spurred some schooladministrators to seek theprotection of

collective bargaining, thev do appear to be affected by several changes in thework environment.

1. Diminished Job Status: Most supervisors seem to suffer from an incongruitybetween their job expectations

(as the historic leader of a school) and theirreal on-the-

job influence. Certainly, public school principals were

once fairly autonomous leaders withcontrol over the hiring,

firing, and disciplining of subordinates. Those were "good

old days," bygoneeras before teachers and school custodians

diminished the principal'spower, before central office moved the decision-making "downtown,"leaving the principal

to hold the responsibility far making things work without

the room andresources to make necessary changeson site.

It seems clear thatmany school administratorsnow lack the wherewithalto meet the, conflicting demands of their positions. As one bitter principal inNew York City put it,

If the (teachers] union had emasculated him

5 27 as a boss, the bureaucracy has emasculated him as administrator. It gives the orderson teacher placement, controlsthe flow of substitutes, shapes the curriculum,dispenses the budget, promulgates "circulars" by the thousands, and demands reports involume. . . Badgered by the union and the Board, bludgeoned by thecritics, buffeted by the community and its spokespersons, the principals' occupational psychology is to defend the statusquo and their own expertise (12).

In a sense, the three key relationships in the

administrators' work life have beendisrupted: with top administration, teachers,and community.

First, thepolitical control of education hasshifted

from the school to the district office. "-e "management

team" notion, so strong in the 1950's hasy.ven way to a

. reality in which 'principals sometimes find themselves isolated from the authority and solace of beingpartof

management. Second, the relationsbetween principals and teachers are no longer supportive and trusting in many school systems. Even thoughprincipals had once been

-classroom teachers themselves, these middle administrators

are no longer welcome in the teachers associations.-- Both

the National Education Association(NEA) and the American

Federation of Teachers (AFT)have become strong adv.lates of

teachers rights--leaving the principals and other

supervisors to fend for themselves. When Administrators were officially and dramatically ousted from the teachers

organizations, thewall between administrationand teachers

6 28 were formalized (13).

Now manyadministrators and principals feel that they

are given short shrift by school boards andsuperintendents

in their dealings with theteachers union. Boards yield to

the newfoundpower of the teachers, ignoring thefinancial

and occupational needs of principals. One Michigan principal states hiscase as follows:

School boards and their mouth piece superintendents had their chance to win us over and they flubbed it. They'vegiven us volumesofempty talk aboutour being "managers" but absolutely no authority to manage anything.. They've left us alone and unsupported while they've signed away everything to the teachers. And they've done it all directly--hardlyconsulting us. Now theydon't just want us live with their actions theyactually expect us to enforce them. For principals, the handwriting is on the wall in capital letters: "FORM YOUR OWN UNIONS, OR DIE ON THE VINE (14).

So not only are school superintendents and boardssomewhat distracted from the need ofprincipals, but the boards are seen as responding to the militant teachers and thus hamstringing middle administratorsstill further.

Third, the political relationship between school administrators and the school communityhas seriously deteriorated since the 1960's. At first, it was thepoor black and Hispanic communitieswhich distrusted the white- controlled schools and who marched,protested, and boycotted to make their voices heard. Principals were often a convenient symbol of public authority--and were thus

7 29 vulnerable targets. But, by the 1970's white families,

middle class people hadbecome similarly disconcerted about

the declining quality and soaring costs. Again, parents often went after the building administratoras theobvious

representation of the problems in the schools. What once

had been reverence, bordering on fear (the principal as "priest of the parish' was Ellwood P. Cubberly's phrase),

had turned to disdain and misunderstanding. The image of

the principal whichemerges from this critique was captured by Bernard Watson inhis description of themodern urban principal:

The popular pictureof the urban principal is thatof the man (and woman] in 'Mr the middle, caughtin a storm ofangry and frequently contradictorydemands. Beseiged bynoisydelegations of students, parents, teachers, orcommunity residents, he finds himself simultaneously to blame for poor facilities, toomuch homework, insufficient time for facultyplanning, and students' misconduct on theway to school (15).

This description isobviously overblown;yet it captures the

many administrators'perceptions aboutcompeting needs and demands.

Hence, changes in therelationship between principals and the important groups in their environment (the

superintendent/school board, teachers, and community) have

diminished the status of administratorsas leaders. Few would disagree that running a schoolwas easier when the

leader had authority, respect, and autonomy. While

8 30 certainly abuses occurredwhen a leader had such near total

power, the currentcondition of perceivedpowerlessness may

be worse. One might argue that it isoften better to have

someone in charge (nomatter how bad) than to havea vacuum where the key administrator'1s supposed to be.

A rush to unionization, byprincipals who saw the worst case" picture painted above, is understandable.

Collective bargainin- promisesto provide unity andpower in

numbers to replacea lost sense of individualpower, and it provides formal rules in the place ofpaternalistic familiarity.

2. Unclear Roles: The problemof deflated status is often compounded forschool supervisors by thepioliferation of new supervisory roles forspecialists that confusewhat is expected from supervisors who had (likethe principal) been generalists with wideresponsibilities. The problem of identity are twofold: the ambivalence of oldgeneralist and the narrowly defined (and often idiosyncratic)specialties of new supervisors. When school were smaller,simplerfolnd lesa bureaucratic, theadministrator ran his or her school. dith the increases in the function of education and its consolidation and centralization, a whole new set of supervisoryroles were generated. In fact, for every function,new or old (for example, psychological services, curriculum, special education, nutrition, vocational

9 31 education, testing, guidance, staff development, federal-

state relations), therewas often a supervisor and even an assistant supervisor. Further, these functions might often

be subdivided betweenelementary, secondary, and continuing

education, among the variousgeographic areas within the

single, large system, and among top, middle, and lower

levels within the same district--leading to even greater

specificity and specialization. Hence, itmighteven be

possible to hold the supervisorypositionof "Assistant

Coordinator for Elementary Mathematics for Special Needs Children in School District11%

Such differentiation of role prevents cohesive

occupational identity from emerging: When school

supervisoryjobs had clear visibility and histories (like

principal), it was possible to know whoone was, whatwas

expected, andwhat to look forward to. But, with the

proliferation of a hodge-podge ofpositions, in different

agencies, and withdifferent responsibilities, it becomes

virtually impossible for a clear community of interest-and

mutual protection to appear without some device like collective negotiations.

Hayford and Sinicropi, in their studyof public sector

supervisory unionization, noted still another problem

concerning the identityofsupervisors: the absence of definitions which allow for the separationof "supervisors"

from rank-and-file "employees,"particularly in the public

10 32 sector. The wrote:

. .Prior to the advent ofcollective bargaining upper level management seldom actedto draw a clear line between supervisorsand rank-and- file employees. Developments such as these have created a great deal ofrole ambivalence among public supervisors andhave led to the observation that the loyalties and attitudes held by these individuals often liemidway between the employee and upper level management (16).

But Hayford and Sinicropi failed to note yet another

possible problem, the difficultysome administrators may have inseparating their role from that oftopmanagement. As we have discussed earlier, school middle administrators are often not treated as truemanagers; yet unless theyare designated as a separate categoryofemployee (neither teachers nor top administrators), theyhave no basis for collective bargaining anda strong independent' voice.

To summarize, the role of supervisor is riddled with complexity. As schools have takenon greater responsibility for the near total life of thechild-- pre-school, inschool, adult, continuing education, and virtually all

"special needs" of pupils--the role of supervisor hasgrown immensely more diffuse. Suchdiversity has only worsened the alreadydifficult life of school supervisors as they attempt to make sense outof their occupational world, defend the rights on the job, and take collective action,if any.

11 33 3. A New Ethos. Once a supervisorwas so thankful to

be chosen to lead that heor she was intensely loyal to

management and to the enterprise. This sense of identification was particularly strong among educators, a,

gentat) profession founded-- on the service and helping

ethic. Thus, for teachers to unionizewas unheard of; for

principals, anathema. Educators, at all levels were

dedicated to children, humanity and society, or so the litiny went.

in the 1960's the milieuof gentility changed,and with it, the basic outlook. Men entered education in large

numbers. Women, too, became less willing to accept the

argument that they (as spinsters or, second-string bread- winners) needed lesspay than males in thesame and in other professions.. And the prevailingphilosophy of being an educator shifted from "doing itsolely for the children"to "doing for oneself"and other educators.

One detects a similar shift in attitude among administrators as well. Battered by the rising tide of teacher power, administrators sought to counter-balance their loss of status byparticipating in the new' ethosof unionization. For a variety of reasons this changewas not as dramatic as one mightsuppose. Many school administrators had been active in theirteachers associations (and unions) in prior career stages. During this period, these administrators had learned techniques of bargaining (for

12 34 teacners) , grieving, affiliating and exercising collective power. When these men andwomen were promoted to supervisor:

and administrators, they simplytransferred the attitude and

skills toorganizing their fellow administrators. As one interviewee in Detroit said,_

When I was the head of the teachers union, I helped to leadmy fellow educators through throesof forming a bargaininggroup and bargaining that first contract. When I became principal, I formed a new administrators' association, won the representation electionover all those other principal's clubs* andbecame the first president of .theOrganizationofSchool Administrators and Supervisors. In fact, we picked up votes from all those elementary, secondary, curriculum, and vocational school administrators, even. the centraloffice supervisors. (17)

One might argue that whathad once been a greatescape hatch for ambitious teachers, involvement in the teacher's

association, became a training ground for administrator

collective bargaining later. Also, a favorite crick ofthe

superintendent was to promotethe outspoken teacher leaders

to administration--thus silencingthem by bringing them into

the fold. But this technique backfired when activist teachers became activist administrators.

Second, administratorswere not forming bargaining groups in, a vacuum. Virtually all public employees and school employees were unionizing. Why would one automaticallyassume that principals would beany different?

13 35 Many saw themselvesas simply participating ina trend that had swept the country.

Th&rd, tria laws and policiesin many st4tes allowedand even encouraged' collective action. As we shall discuss at

length in Chapter III, a shift in the policy ethos was answered at the local level by increased demand for the rigilt to be represented in collective 'bargaining.

Superintendents and school boards became accustomed to

dealing with educators inbargaining relationships. In

fact, one large city schoolsuperintendent, in a moment of

candor, said that he *would rather deal withone, unified group ofadministrators thandozensofsmall opinion

leaders" representing elementary,junior high, senior high,

vocational education,principals, assistant principals,not

to mention central office supervisors, districtoffice

supervisors, and the variousother sub-groups like theblack

administrators, Jewish administrators'association, and pre- school directors.

Hence, there had been a clear change in the work ethos

that preceded and surrounded the advent of collective bargaining. Whether thischange "caused" unionization,or was part of a larger shift in working attitudes, is not clear. But what was obvious was that school supervisors worked under a different set of assumptions; tnese assumptions enabled school administrators to seek and receive the right to negotiatefor themselves.

14 36 Terminological Turmoil

Our research. indicates thedifficulty of life in the middle

for an increasing number ofschool administrators and

supervisors. Not all administrators unionized; infact, the majority have not But for an important minority locatedin large cities, and smaller districts in theindustrialized, populous metropolitan areas, collectivebargaining has become an avenue for redressing problems.

Before discussing bargaining and other ways of overcoming the role conflictdilemmas posed bysupervisory life, we define two terms: "sc2ervisor" avl "collective bargaining." Both terms are vital toour understand of the field of labor relations forschool principals.

Definition

A first step in the analysis ofany new phenomenon is a careful reviewand definition of terms and categories.

Without a clear understanding of this nomenclature, we cannot hope to understand theprocess of policy-making and change for school administrators. A number of terms have been used thus far, such as "collective *bargaining,"

"unionization," "supervisor," and "middle-level administrator."

In effect, two very different sets of terms are being combined: those which apply to labor relationsmainly from

15 37 the private sector and the traditional languageof school

administrator and organization. This section examines the traditional educational terminology . first; it then attempts

to apply them to the 'concepts of industrial and labor relations.

From Education

The terms super inrident--referring to the school district'schief executive officeror manager--and teacher-- meaning a professionally certified staffperson who spends mostof his or her time instructing children in the classroom--are both reasonably distinct and widely recognized categories. The terms for middle-level administratorsare more confusing. Except for 21ci.....zzarir and assistantprincipal, titles for these positionsareoften imprecise and confusing. One hears such terms as

"supervisor," "director," and "administrator," but their exact function and status in thehierarchy is not always clear. Most all principalsare technically "administrators" and "supervisors," though inlarger school systems, not all supervisors are necessarilyprincipals.

Fvrtnermore, the top executive, the superintendent, is also an administrator andoften belongs to a nationalgroup, the AmericanAssociation of School Administrators. Hence, the terms do not specify wha'.: level in the system an administrator or supervisor isoperating.

16 38 From Labor Relations

Up until recently it mattered little what rung a

particular job title occupied. In fact, all leaders from

tne assistant principal troughthe superintendent wanted to

be called "administrator "--,and the categorieswere of little

importance. But with advent of collectivenegotiations, the

inclusion or exclusion of various ranks becamecritical in

identifying the "communityof interest" (those placed

together for purposes ofbargaining based on similar job discriptionse and functions) and the proper "unit

etermination" (who should be inthe bargaining association nd who should be excluded).

Our researchand studiesby other scholars indicate thatmoststates include employees for purposes of bargaining based on their function--not their title alone.

'Hence a "teacher" isplaced into a bargaining unit with other teachers because of his or her function. In the parlance of labor relations, these educatorsbecome the

"rank-and-file employees" who are universally permitted to negotiate under state laws which allow public employeesto unionize.

Similarly, superintendentsare deemed "management" and are prohibited from engaging in collectiveaction with their school boards. Here then are the top and bottom of the bargaining system in education: teachers representing an

17 39 "employee" or *labor" position and superintendent actively

or passively functioning as the managerial agent for the board of education.

But what of the middle tiers,the principals, assistant

principals, centralofficesupervisors and directors? In

most states, these middle administratorsare excluded from

joining the teachers bargaining unit; furthermore, often they are not truly "managerial" in function. Hence, in states with collective bargainingfor administrators, they

form an independent, separatecategory for negotiations. But what to call thisgroup? We have found no adequate descriptor--one that is precise enough to meet the legal standards of unit determination, universal enoughto be recognizable by those who hold such jobs, and inclusive enough to fulfill the basic qualities ofthe job. "Administrator" is too broad-- including virtually everyeducator who does notmake a living teaching and whohas any leadership responsibilities.

"Supervisors" is toonarrow, since principals do much more than supervise. Yet the term has wideuse in the private sector and fits tidely into the three-tier system oflabor relations that is emerging in education: that of teacher- as-employee, principal-as-supervisor. - and superintend-,:nt-

As-manager. As such, the term "supervisor"has utility as a general label for mid-rankadministrators who may engage in bargaining separate from their bosses, the superintendents

18 40 and their subordinates, theteachers.

But in labor relations, the supervisor hashad a mixed and confusinghistory. In the private sector, supervisors

were given bargaining rights'as "employees" in the 1940s by

the courts, only to be lost:1n1947 with the passage of the Taft-Hartley act. This law, and subsequent court rulings, asserted that supervisorswere indeed "managerial employees" in that they "shared managerial authority," were

"representatives 'of management," or found themselves in a

"conflict of interest" inattempting to supervise employees who were also unionists.

In 1974, when a group ofbuyers in the Bell Aerospace

Companyattempted to form a bargaining unit and gain recognition, the National Labor RelationsBoard determined that such recognition and representationwas legal and appropriate under the Taft-Bartley law. But the United

States Supreme Court)ruled otherwise: that buyersmay not have a conflict of interestas unionists but that as buyers they do shape inmanagerial discretion in that they actas corporate representatives in purchasing materials and services for BellAerospace. The high Court explained:

. . th&Court concludedthat Congress had intended to exlude all true "managerial employees" from the protection of the [Taft- Hartley] Ac*. It explained that this exclusion embraced not only employees "so closely related to, or aligned witqf management as to place the employee in a position of conflict of interest between his

19 41 employeeoa the one hand and his fellow worker on the other, but also one who is formulating, determiningand effectuating his employers' policies or his discretion, independent of an employers' established policy, in the performance ofhis duties. (18)."

Sudh a broad definition of "-managerial activities" all but

eliminates the supervisor as a separate, identifiable job

category--thus denying this group the protection of

collective bargain]. representation. Bence, under this

strict interpretationo thelegislative intent of the the

Taft - Hartley law, one is eithera worker-employee with the

right to bargain, or asupervisor-manager-employer without such collective privile02.5;

The-public sector hastake a somewhat different tack, however. Twenty-nine states and theDistrict of Columbia have legislatively and judicially established the

"supervisor" as a separate and distinct occupational category--one protected in its right to seek union recognition. State public employmentpolicies function to define the "supervisor"apart from the rank-and fileand the manager. The NeW York statecase is a good example.

In 1971, the Board of Educationof the City of New York filed a petition with the NewYork Public Employment

Relations Board to havethe twelve-hundred principalsat thr elementary, junior high, middle,intermediate, senior high, and vocation high schools declared "managerial employees" and ineligible to participate in collective bargaining. This case, decided in 1973,provides a useful andfunctional

definition of supervisor as distinct from manager. Four

criteria were used by the PERB, anyone ofwhich was

sufficient to deem an administrator to be partof the

management group: (1) if they formulate policy; (2) if they participate in collective negotiations on management's behalf; (3) if they play a major in administerina the bargaining agreement;or (4) if they play a major role in personnel administration.

1. Formulation ofPolicy. Managers make policy; they determine and implement "theparticularobjectives of a government or agency thereof, in the fulfillment of its mission and the methods,means, and extent of achieving such- objectives," according to PERS. The New York City school board argued that principalsdid set and carry out objective in their buildings,. But PERKdecided that buildinglevel policymaking wasnot sufficient for an administrator to be rulesmanagerial. In PERB's statement:

. . their spheres of influencedo not extend utside their individual schools. Moreover, the fact that each school will reflect the uniquecomposition and needs of its students and communitypopulation, and its instructionalprogram is the result of a fundamental policy determinationat the City and at the Community Board level [and dieresis notldemonstrationof managerial discretionat the school level]. Accordingly, I find that the employer has not established that the principals satisfy the first statutory

criterion of managerialstatus (19).

21 , 43 In effect, according to thePERB ruling, a schoolmanager in

New York determines major,agency widepolicies; principals

control their school buildingsonly. And even there, PERB

argued, important decisionsare made by the school board for

the entire district and Ate imposed on the principal's domain--robbing these administrators of their true managerial status. Hence, since PERBmaintained that

principals are not managerial,they become "supervisory"and

are eligible for collective representationand negotiations.

2. Participation in CollectiveNegotiations. A second definition of manager involves collective bargainingitself. If an administrator has 'direct involvement in the preparation far collective negotiations . . or the negotiations process," then he or she is deemed managerial

under the New Yorkstate law, the Taylor law.. PERB examined the role of New YorkCityprincipals in the District's

negotiationswith the teachersunion. It found that

principals were sometimesconsulted by the Board's bargaining teamon some topics. Hence, PERB concluded:

The principals' advicewas requestedon only one ofmyriad negotiating topics. Second, they werepresent at the caucus (and would have functioned similarly at the negotiating sessions) as resource people, not in a decision-making capacity.(20) Sad principals sat at the bargaining table for school management, or acted as a major resource to the Board of

Education, then perhaps PCR3 might have labeled them

22 4 4 managers and banned them from bargainingthemselves. It was

clear in New York CIty,however, that the secondrequirement

under the Taylor law--directinvolvement in negotiations for

management--was not met, accordingto PER3, because of "the

de minimus nature and scope.pfprincipals' involvement."

Principals as supervisors--notmanagers--, assisted in

the preparation for collectivebargaining with teacherson

an informal an6 irregular basis; they consulted with the

board of education team butdid not sitL at the table. Thus,

PERK ruled that principalswere supervisors, not managers and could be representedin bargaining themselves.

3. Major Role in ContractAdministration. Managers also have an important role to play in implementing the contractual agreement betweenemployees (teachers) and the school district. Such behavior may involvebeing part of the grievance procedureon management's behalf, assigning teachers to duties, andconsulting with employees(teachers) "about school policy and the implementation of the agreement." PERBdetermined that principals were not managerial in New York City: that is, these administrators failed to fulfill the contact administration function in three ways:

First, it is true that principals are often thefirst step in the teachers grievance process': that is, teachers with a claim against the schooldistrict will usually file it with and against the principal as the representativeof

23 45 the school district. But, PERB contended:

Persons, usually supervisors, whose function is to observe the terms of the agreementare fulfilled, to play a role in the administration of agreement but do not exercise the requisite degree of independent judgment; the same istrue of supervisors who determine the first stepgrievance, since their participation is expected to follow "policy established at the higherlevel" (21)

PERB argued that to administer a grievance in a routine, Man flLb formal without the discretionto act on the grievance claim

is not to perform a managerial function. Hence, principals

did not posses sufficient authorityto adjudicate grievance,

only to receive andpass them along.

Second, the teachers' contractsdo permit. principals "a

modicum ofdiscretion in personnel andprogram assignments"

but not sufficientpower to be true managers. According to the PERB decisionon New York City, principals have long had

such independence in settingclass schedules, placing staff,

and operating the curriculum. Hence, under the Taylor law, being managerment entailed something more than the

traditional daily freedom of administration thatprincipals have long enjoyed.

Finally, principals do meet monthly with teacher union leaders; PERB stated, however,that "if it is the employer's contention that the principals satisfy the third criterion simplyby carryirig out their contractual obligation to consult with the United Federation of Teachers, that is

24 46 patently untenable." Therefore, these meetings dofunction in some smallway to alter the contract of the District's

"procedures or methodsof operation," but like grievance

procedures and staff assignment,are not sufficient enough to make the principal managerial.

4. Major Role in PersonnelAdministration. The Taylor law states thatmanagers play a significant role in

"personnel administration,".a responsibility which PERB has defined to mean:

Managerial status dependsupon the exercise bythe personnel involved ofbroad authority directly resultant from their intimate relationship "to the top" (e.g., to a board of educationor a.superintendent of schools), while supervisorystatus is manifested byan individuals relationship to (and direction over) "rank and file employees." (22)

In this case, the school board claimed that principalswere deeplyinvolved withpersonnel administration, "assigning subordinate supervisors, teachers, and other personnel; evaluating and rating personnel; effectively recommending disciplinary action;effectively recommending thehiring and discontinuing of services of certainpersonnel; and overseeing inservice trainingof teachers." But PER3 ruled that school boards hire, fire, and transfer teachers, in consultation with the superintendent, while the principal has little control except to act within the guidelines already established. PER3 wrote: "Deploymentof personnel to those specific tasks which will best utilize theiL

25 47 skills, talents, and interests has long beenconsidered the

hallmark of the effective supervisor." But school

ipervisors, at least inNew York City, have little control

over the personnel assignment and deployment in their

schools: either in assigning themto a school in the first

place or in disciplining themonce they arrive.

In summary, the term "supervisor" in this studymeans

that the administrator isneither a manager nor simply an

employee. Rather, this position implies a distinct role

which might be best understood interms ofwhat supervisors do not do:

1. They donot teach, since that role is reservedfor employees or teachers.

2. They do notestablish policies for the school district, a job for the boardand superintendent.

3. They do not actively and ckev-eini:/participate in collective bargainingon behalfof the school system with teachers and other employees.

4. They do nothave the authority to interpret or change the contract with teacherson behalf of the school board.

5. They do not make major personneldecisions such as assigning, promoting, hiring and firing teachers, though they may participate in the process and make recommendations. School supervisors, then, are staff members who have responsibility for the operationof their unit, school, division, but do not have the power to make districtwide personnelor policy decisions.

Collective larataim

Collective bargaining or negotiations isbut one part

of a total employeeemployer relationship. Another

important requirement is that it involve the use f bilateral or shared decision-makingin which the partiesare

involved on a somewhat equalbasis.

The crucial quality of this relationship lies with the definition and nature ofbilaterialism. If, Zor example, the employeegroup (schooladministrators) are consulted before salaries and rulesare set, would thisbe considered joint or shareddecisionmaking? Or mustthe mechanism for reaching employment decisions involve face to face negotiations, a writtenand signed contract, mechanisms for resolving conflicts and impasses, and the right to strike?

Some have argued for a strict definition ofcollective bargaining and unionism, one that resembles the definition used in the privatesector. It requires the following:

1. Management and labor must meet oftento confer in good faith aboutpay and other conditions of employment.

2. The parties must reach an agreement and produce a bindings writtencontract. 3. The parties must agree to settle disputes and

impasses throughan impartial arbitrationprocess.

4. iihen impassescannot be resolved, parties may strike or take othercollective action under law.

Others argue that collective bargaining is a state of mind, an approach in which parties of somewhat equal strength agree to share the responsibility for decisionmaking and implementation. There must be, using this argument, a sense of procedural justice, arrived at through a kind of industrial legislationor government. Under such a process, rules (*laws") aremade at the bargaining table, carriedout under contractadministration

(the "executive branch*),and adjudicated throughprocesses of appeal, grievance arbitration, and settlement (a

"juditial" function). Thus, bilateralism reallymeans the existence of two sideswhich can affect the results of rulemaking and which workunder the understandingthat they agree to agree (23).

Voslos, in his discussion of the U.S. Civil Service, stated the quality of collectivebargaining as follows:

Collective bargaining, then, is a dynamic process involving the constant interaction of two sets of institutional roles. The performance of these roles is constantly molded by the institutional goals and needs, and by a changing environment. (24)

4hion definition seems appropriate for the study of

28 50 school administrators and supervisors? Certainly lawmo.kers

never intended labor relations in the public Sector to be identical to those in the private domain. Somehow,

legislators and other opinionleaders have for nearly a

century argued that the relaiionshipbetween the public and its employees is special, 'preventing true collective

bargaining and the rightto strike from beingexercised.

The right to strike in particular has been highly

controversial in education. Some have argued morally that

school teachers and even administrators havea kind of god- giyen right to *deny their services shouldconditions become deplorable. Othershavedisagreed, stating that "highly abstract claims to natural rights always require close 'scrutiny since they are never demonstrable and often appear to be someone'sprivatevalue deified into an abstract claim (25) ."

But, without the right to strike, cancollective

bargaining really work? For if employees cannotcease work,

they cannot hope to force management to bargain inearnest, or so the argument goes. Thus, rather than strikingbeing

the death of good laborrelations, some have arguedthat the threat of walkouts brings a sense ofgreater employeeemployer equalityto the the negotiating table.

The moral argument alsoextends to the clients and the nature of services. After all, as Hetenyi believes, "the real losers are the children and the parents"--whoare

29 denied the benefits of education. Ultimately, of course, the entire community and societysuffer a loss andmay

become enemies ofpublic education (26). This argument comes close to the notion of "essential'' employees which

goes something like this:- Certaingroups should not be

permitted to go outon strike (and thus shouldnot really be

allowed to unionize) becausetheir servicesare vital if not essential to the survivaland safety of society.

One most often hears this line ofreasoning for police and fire department. Sometimes, one hears it applied to

teachers, as Hetenyi doesabove. Taft-Hartley alsogave the power to end strikes to thePresident, shoulda walkout of

-steer workersor defense contractors endangerthe well-being

of the entire society. But should thisargument be extended to teachers and administrators? Are their services "essential" to society?

Not in the immediatesense. Furthermore, it would be preposterous to believe thata walk-out of school principals

would stop thesystem. (.Some teachers haveeven argued that the educational process might benefit from less

administration.) Hence, either principalsgo out on strike with the teachers, ("trek jointlyheld concerns; or the labor

relations, and bargaining system for administrators and

supervisors must function without the threat of a strike (since one hardly exists anyway) . Can there be, then, a

system of unionization fora group in the absence of the

3u 52 right to walk off the job, should bargaining break downor become impossible? Is there, in effect, a workable definition of unionization in the public sector for

administrators which doesnot include the threatof strike?

In a number of states,and the majority of bargaining school districts, school administrators have gained

contracts with boards of educationthat permit theuse of an

alternative to strikes: binding arbitration. While arbitration may not be the perfect substitute for the walkout, it does allowa third party to settlea strike-

proned issues before itreaches the criticalstage.

Finally, some scholars have argued that collective bargaining itself--evenwithout the right to strike--

provides a prncess for decision-making thatavoids the need for walkouts. If the partiesare forced to keep talking, with outsidepressure from the community andparents, then the publicity may beenough to force good-faithnegotiating without strikes.

At any rate, there is an evolving definitionof school

administrator collectivebargaining which involves two

parties, sitting down at thebargaining table, workingout differences, and reaching a contractual agreement about how

supervisors should be paidand treated in 'he district. The advent of bilateraldecisionmaking, procedural justice, and a formalized set of rules becomes, then, the working definition being applied to school administratorsin this study. Though the definitionsmay vary from community to

community, generally one would find, to quote Vosloos, "the

constant interaction of two sets of institutional roles

(27)" to reach accordover how supervisory employees willbe remumerated and treatedon the job.

Summary.

This chapter has explained the nature of life in the

middle for a growing number of school administrators. It

has focused on the changing role, status, and workethos of

administration in education--whichhasmoved from being

service-and child- centered to being occupationally and

politically concerned. While thismaysound evil and

unacceptable, teachers and administrators felt that they

could no longer work for lovealone; that somehow the system must reward and protect them as employees, just the way professionals in other/positionsare supported.

Second, this chapter presenteda working definition of several key tetms: "supervisor" and "collective bargaining primarily. ItTias asserted thatno single term has emerged to describe the group under study. "Administrator" was too broad, including superintendentswho do notnegotiate for themselves as well as principals who do. "Supervisors," though widely used in the labor relations literature, is perhaps too narrow, since principalsdo much more than just supervise. Hence, we are left with "middle-level administrator" which is somewhat clumsy but does

differentiate the principals'level from the top managerial. tier.

These difficulties grow out of the shotgun marriage of

traditional education terminology (principal, teacner, administrator, executive) with labor relations language

(employee, manager, supervisor, andunit determination). It will take time before the language of these two disparate fields is melded into a common, workable nomenclature. In the meantime, whatemerges is a three-part system of labor relations in whichwe see (1) the teacher as employee, (2) the principal as supervisor, and (3) the sul.arintendentas manager or management While- this rings unnaturalfor those working in education, since teachers aremore that.

"employees," principals do more than "supervise," and superintendents do not always feellike real "managers,"we 'I have no Other easyway ofdelineating rolesnecessary for collective bargaining.

Perhaps, as always, systems turn to the courts for clarification: when policy-makingfails to specify a legal, working, and workable definition.

The Public Employment Relations Board of New York has provided us witha set of four determinants of "managerial" versus "supervisory" status. Managers according to PERB, formulate policies for the system, engage in direct and significantnegotiations with employees (teachers) , make

33 55 important interpretationsof the teacherscontract, and have

a central role in personneladministration (firing, hiring, and so on). When these criteria were applied to

administrators and supervisorsin New York Cityschools, not

one was occurring. Thus principals andother administrators

(middle-rank) were declaredsupervisory, not managerial,and

were permitted to continuecollective ba4gaiming. Obviously, not all states have such a rigorous

definitions. Some allowprincipals by title to bargain,

regardless of theirrole and function. Other places exclude

all principals bylaw-whether theyhave a significantrole

in the managementof the school districtor not.

Next, we attemptedto define collectivebargaining for

schooladministrators. We introduced the strict, private sector definition, one that requires employeesto enjoy the

right to strike, should bargaining andgrieving breakdown. Public sector definitions often attempt to allow

negotiations in theabsence of strikepower. When applied to principals, the definitions become

somewhat changed. First, school administrators hardly have

the numbersor power to make a strike stick. Instead, they must either join ranks with the teachers (as they did in 1968 in New York CIty), or use some other device. Some

authors have argued in this area that bargaining can be successful without strikes if principals have access to arbitrat3on, and if sufficient publicscrutiny and pressure

34 56 can force both school boards andunion to stay at the table and bargain in good faith.

At any rate, the field ofschool supervisory collective

bargaining isnew and evolving. This is true for theentire

area of public sector unionization. At first, law-makers

attempted to treat thepublic domaindifferently, arguing that such employeesas police, fire, and prison officials

were "essential" to the publicsafety and well being. But this argument failed to deter strikes; in fact, the

insistence thatgroups of workers could not walkoff the job

may have spurred them to doso. Now, anumber ofstates like Minnesota and Vermonthave passed laws that make strikes legal, after the parties have exhausted allother procedures for reachingagreement.

No state permitsadministrators to strike. Just as

importantly,many, principals do not wish to walk offthe job

and would not do so. Hence, collective bargainingin the

public sector mustmove toward other devices forgroups like school administrators which will permit collective bargaining to continue and succeed without resorting to strikes. This solution, like the field in general, will evolve out of the practicesof states and localities.

This.,chapter presentedthe dilemmas of being a school ki supervisor; the following poses several solutions, the primary one for our purposes being collectivebargaining.

35 1 For a good depictionof the problem,see Harry Edward, "The Impact of Private Sector Principles in the PublicSector::Bargaining Rights for Supervisorsand the Duty to Bargain,"in UNION POWER AND PUBLIC POLICY, ed. byDavid Lipsky (Ithica,New York: NYSSILR Cornell University,1975; Al Legget, THESUPERVISOR; KEY MAN IN LA= arLATIONS (Washington,D.C.: Labor ManagementRelations Ser4ice, 1970);Edward Rei.th and HaroldS. Rosen, "Problems in Representation ofSupervisdts," CALIFORNIAPUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS (March 1971),Ippl1-23; and Harry H.Rains, "Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector and theNeed for Exclusionof Supervisory Personnel," LABOR LAW JOURNAL (May1972),p. 284ff.

2 Charles P. Larrowe, "AMeteor on the IndustrialRelations Horizon: The Foreman's Association of America,"LABOR HISTORY, 2,3 (Fall 1961),pp. 259-93.

3 Robert Dubin (ed.), HUMAN RELATIONS INADMINISTRATION (New York:. Prentice-Hall,1955).p. 159ff.

!`Floyd C. Mann and James K.Dent, "The Supervisor:Member of Two Organizational Families," HARVARDBUSINESS REVIEW, 32,6, (December,1954).pp. 103-112.

5Fritz J. Roethlisberger, "The Foreman: Masterand Victim of Double Talk," HARVARD BUSINESSREVIEW, (1945),pp. 279-84.

6DeE.Wray, "Marginal Men of Industry:,The Foremen," AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, (January .1949),pp. 90-29'9;

- I Charles R. Walker, Robert H. Guest, and Arthur N.Turner, THE FOREMAN ON THE ASSEMBLY LINE (Cambridge,Mass.:_Harvard University Press, 1956).

8 See Larrowe, 22. cit.,p. 261ff and the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in N.L.R.B. v. Bell Aerosace Division of Textron; Inc. 72-1598 (1974). 58 9Mannand Dent, 22. fit.,p. 105.

10 Paul Revere Pierce, THEORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENTOF THE PUBLIC SCHOOL PRINCIPA"7IP(Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, 1935).;

11 Ibid., p. 1.

12 Bernard Bard, "New YorkCity Principals: Onthe Razor's Edge," SATURDAY REVIEW,January 24, 1970,.p. 58, 71.

13 For a discussion of theexclusion of schooladministrators in teacher bargainingunits, see Lieberman andMoskow, COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS FOR TEACHERS,pp. 154-174.

14 "The Brewingand,'erhaps, Still Preventable--Revolt of School Principals,"THE AMERICAN SCHOOLBOARD JOURNAL; (January 1976),p. 25.

15 Barnard Watson, "ThePrincipal Against theSystem," in TEE PRINCIPAL AGAINST THESYSTEM, Donald A. Ericksonand Theodore L. Railer (Eds.) (Berkeley, California: McCutnhen, 1979),p. 41.

16 Stephen L. Hayford andAnthony V. Sinicropi,"The Bargaining Rights Status of PublicSector Supervisors,"INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 15, 1 (February 1970),p. 50.

17 Interview with Martin Kalish,President, Organizationof School Admintatrators:AndSupervisors, May, 1977.

18 See N.L.R.B. v. BellAerosvece. p. 7.

19 The Matter of Board of Education of the District of the Cit Of New York Uon the A.lication for 12ejLipation of Persona as Manaerial or Confidential, Case No.

/-0144, New York State Public Employment Relations Iioand (May31, 1973: (PERB), pp. 403344044. 59 tramp*. I)

20 Ibid., p:Z034.

21 Ibid., ID:.4034-4035.

pp.'"4035-4036.

23 For a lengthy discuiSion of thecollective bargaining process as "industrial government,"see John Rogers Commons, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM (NewYork: Macmillan, 1957).

24WilliamB. Vosloo, COLLECTIVEBARGAINING IN THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE (Chicago:Public Personnel Association, 1966), 16-17.

25RobertBooth Foidler, "Public EmployeesStrikes and Political Theory," in COLLECTIVE BARGAININGIN GOVERNMENT, J.J.Loewenberg and- M.H. Moscoro, editors (EngelwoodCliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall? 1973),p. 291.

26 Laszlo Hetenyi, "Unionism inEducation:. The Ethics of It," EDUCATIONAL THEORY, Vol.28, No. 2 (Spring 1978),p. 92.

60 CHAPTER II

DILEMMAS AND SOLUTIONS

The roleof scnool administrator has been portrayedas one played in semi-isolation, one in which principals and other supervisors are adrift withoutclear loyalties, identification, or support. They are certainlynot alone in this regard,. superintendents oftencomplain of beingtrapped

between conflictingdemands of community,school board, city officials, and external government regulations. But as the previous chapter indicited, the school administrator lacks the power that the superintendenthas to shape his/herown role. Thischapter will note that school administrators mustresolve theirdilemma by choosing from among the conflicting demandsmade upon them bygroups powerful enough to enforce a role definition that administratorscan live with. Thus whileadministrators have little political power, they do have a. measure ofdiscretion in choosing which of several,very distinct, roles to adopt. For the principal, four alternativesseem. to exist, four ways by which these administrators can gain some identification and power. Each one involves a close affiliation or identification; each has itsown advantages and disadvantages. 'Thischapter presents and analyzes the four, focusing primarily affiliation with a collectiie bargaining group. The four types of organizational 61 affiliationare: (1) affiliation with the community whereby the administrator works closely with the lay constituency of the school; (2) affiliation with topmanagement or the "management team"wherein the principal findssupport froma closeworking relationship with the superintendent; (3) affiliationwith teachers in which the principal becomes a kind ofhead or master teacher, aone among equals;and (4) affiliation withother administrators in a union or bargaininggroupand engages in collective bargaining (1). All ofthese relationships help to overcome thebasic isolation andweakness of life in the.midcle;all provide a kind of identity and direction. And all havebeen or are beingused by various administrators in schools withsome success. Buteach is also unique, bringinginto play a different dynamic. By exploringthese four options,we hope to differentiate "bargaining" fromother avenues.

Affiliation withSchool Communities

Community involvement in education is a two edged sword. One edge is possibly harmful from the

administrator's view , an active communitycan threaten the authority of the administratoi'ldemanding a say in the operation ofthe school or program. The other edgemay be a tool foraugmenting an administrator's capacityto achieve his/her goals, a well organized, informed and vocalgroup of parents andother community laypeople can provide a

2 62 powerful tool for improving education and supporting the principal. A skillsful administrator, then,may be able to

convert a potential clash between publicand professional into resources for theimprovement of education.

The notion of affiliatingwith the community rests on

the assumption thatworkingwith and throughthe community

fulfills the original intent ofpublic education-wandgoes far to overcome the senseof isolation and helplessness.

If, for example, the superintendent and/or school board refuses to support theprincipal, he or she has recourse to the immediate schoolcommunity.

No data areavailable on the number of principals who have worked successfully withcommunity groups. Themodel of affiliation is, nonetheless, appealing from several

viewpoints. It has a long anddistinguished history among'

private schools. The heads of many nonpublicschools work "within an autonomous domain" created by a direct relationship betweentrustees and the chief administrators (2). It is perhapsunfair to compare public school

principali withtheir sounterparts in the private sector, for the administrators of voluntary associations work without many of the legal strictures that control public schools. The'difficulties and complexities of working within a "school system" are practicallyunknown except to the heads ofsome Roman Catholic schools.

63 But when public school principals work closely withan active community, that relationship approximates the conditionswithin the private school sector. The administrator has a group with whomhe or she can work, O. depend, and idertify with. Much time is spent by such principals considering the special needs of their

surrounding community. In return, the community provides the clout that a lone administrator cannothope to have. In a sense, principals with strong community support become their own superintendents of schools, thereby garnering

authority from thisrelationship while eliminatingmuch of the bureacratic constraints that bindtheusual urban building administieators.

The Chicago schoolsystem isa good example. In 1970

the creation or theLocal School Councilspermitted "parents and school patrons to share the process of arriving at decisions which affect local schools (3)." Of the membership, 60 percentare parents, but school personnel, public at.large members, and evenstudents are elected. The Councils oversee the selection of principals(by nominating them from 1 list ofeligible candidates),as well as matters related to "discipline, vandalism, and public conduct, curriculum, safety of children, physical condition of buildings, community problems, school budgets, school policies and procedures, selection of textbooks, and lunchroom problems (4)." Each cluster of schoolsalso has a

64 formal means-- district councils-- for publicizingproblems

to thoseat the top. From all accounts, an angry local

school council is difficultto ignore at the district and

school boardoffices. And duringthe history of these

councils, no nomination from the community boards for a principal has been overturned by the superintendent or school board.

Though more information isneeded on the activities of schoolcouncils and theirprincipals, we recognize the potential for channelingpublic support for education and forincreasingthepower of schooladministrators. A principal who is able to align him- or herselfwith the community, one which is organized and vocal, mayovercome some of the perceived weakness that lifein the middle.

But, as a model forfuture 'middle administrator affiliation and strength, the principal-community relationshiphas several serious weaknesses. It fragments the ranks of middle administrators;that is, it may work for a few principals but not for all. And each administrator is left more or less to his or her own devices. Thus, rather than strengthening the supervisory group, vis-a-vis the central office. the localistOr;,e0'.d..:*:!7V'e-' atomizes it.

The subjugation of professional administrators to the will of the "public"can, also, in the absence of strong collegial support, underminequality and lead to obsequious rather than stalwart leadershipin the schools. Similarly,

5 65 qualified principals can be forced out oftheir post--or be passed over for them in the first place--because of their racial incompatibility withtheir members of the community boards. Finally, a ;shoo' system withhundred of small, semiautonomous school boards returns us to the turn of the century when the nation hadover a hundred thousand small local school systems. 'he same lack of coordination and quality among districts might occur ifcommunity boardswere allowed to control the behaviorof each building administrator.

All things considered, the affiliationand alignment of school administrators withlocal communities and local governing groups is an intriguing idea for the futlre of school leadership. It was an option in earlier days when schools weremore local, small, and independent. For principals, it might be a mixed blessing. When it wedekS, it might provide a senseofbelonging, direction;: and support; when it doernot, it could lead to the tyranny of the people over the professionals in theschools. It does, as an innovations reinforce a much-heralded American value: local controlover public schools.

Affiliation with TotManagement

Textbooks on administration often extoll the "management team" concept (5). Its unity and rationality supportwhat we know aboutefficient school operations. Mark Hanson goes so far as to say thatwithout teamwork, the schools cannot operate. He advocates that the superintendent makeuse of the teamas "a problem-solving,

program developing, leadershipunit" by urging "members of theteam to shape and operate the criticalmanagement- information . system, budgeting system, the collective bargainingsystem" and so forth (6). Or put yet another way, "teamwork is the manifestation ofgroup effort, under the leadershipof a chief schoolexecutive, engaging in planning, performing,motivating and evaluatingas a unit- - not as independent categories ofleadership specialists and generalists. (7) ." Further, affiliation and identification with top management offerthe schoolprincipal an opportunity to associate withthose in control of the school system. Being a real teammember ;, if effective, overcomes the senseofimpotency and occupational isolation by plugging the middleadministrator into themanagement system of the organization.

But, the current structure ofmany urban and suburban school systems makes the "administrativeteam" more a myth than a reality. With some 3,700middle managers and about 200 top managers in the New YorkCity public schools, for example, it is hard toeven conceive of joint planning,real involvement, workable"teamwork" andprogram implementation.

With so much distance between staff at all levels and in thousands of work places (schools, office, divisions,

7 6 departments, districts), itappears difficult even to bring

administrators together for cooperativemanagement. And with somany levels within the massive school system,

leaders may hardly know the names of subordinates, like MP principals, much lesspretend to be team-members andattgmpt joint leadership.

Even supporters ofthe "Management team" confess that

real cooperation is problematic. Paul Salmon, head of the

American Association of SchoolAdministrators, the

superintendents' organization, placessome of the blame for the failure of the teamat the feet of the superintendent,

who is overcommitted and is often inaccessible tomiddle- level administrators. Further, he explains, "administrators

and supervisory specialists on the superintendent's

\ immediate staff often getbogged down with educational red

tape and tend to become independentoperators rather than

interacting components inthe management team (8)." Hence,

though leadersmay desire to unify their organizational

command, overlappihg jurisdictions,jumbled communications,

unclear role descriptions,and other indicators of confusion

prevent even a semblance of rationality and accountability

(9), Whatever the cause, administrators cannot always look

to their bosses for support, since these top managers are

often too busy and distracted to be concerned about them.

Further, the world of thesuperintendent is not the same as

that of the principal. Sometimes, the topmanagers must acts. in areasof salaries, rights to grievancemachinery, and other labor-likeareas.

If the future of middle management in education rests with building a true management or leadership, then A something should be doneto reorganize schoolsand to change the outlooks of school boards and superintendentsconcerning "managerial teamwork." Perhaps the best approach is

decentralization, or breakingthe system intosmaller, more autonomous parts. The cohesion found in some suburban and ruraldistricts indicates that a dozen or so school administrators can worktogether as a team ifthe social and political conditions allow.

Ideally, the superintendent could meetregularly with the administrative staff if thesystem were subdivided into

units about eight toten schools--nomore. Complaints could be heard and mechanisms for conflict resolution could be tried. Only then could the schoolprincipal be really part of a management team. Even with tha decentralization and smill size, however, it is unlikely that principals would receive enough miscretion and authority to counteract the other forces thAt tmr dow tjoimir mrsoitic. a-7 w$41,c wucl,.:14ci a

remain militant; the central office,distant and difficult to understand; and the final say-soon an increasing number of issues continues toresidewith the superi'itendent and board.

9 69 Thus, since final authority in school systems rests with the board of education,the management team might be

left handling the minutedetails while the board andcentral

superintendent retain controlover essential areas like

budget, personnel, and facilities--and the principals "manage" darn little. Perhaps the very notion of joint

management is unworkable, and is something of a ploy to squelch dissentamong middle administrators.

Another'approach to an administrative team effort is the useof system-widecouncils which represent various middle-level supervisoryand rank -and -file employee groups.

Theserepresentative bodies of lower andupper level employees would be granted certainpowers to recommend and even decide key issues which are important to the organization. The central office and school boardwould be bound to consider seriouslythese decisions, much theway

Congress and the ChiefExecutive currently enactlaws in the national arena. This'structure ofchecks and balances would in some ways guarantee that team governance--not justteam work--occurred. Whether elaborate mechanisms ofcooperative management would be acceptableto decision-makers in schools remains to be seen. It is unlikely, sincethe tradition in

American corporatelife has always for almost always) been to maintain the sanctity of the hierarchy, with board, management, supervisors, and employees holding their positions in roughly that order. It should be noted that

10 70 somewhatsimilar "syndicalist" approaches have enjoyed success in the People's Republic of China and in Cuba. In West Germany, the coal and steel industries, for example,

have elaborate systemsof codeterminationwhereby each level in the organization elects or appoints its own

representatives topolicy-making bodies. A General Assembly for shareholders; a works council (Betriebsrat) for blue- and white-collar employees, and a management board (Vorstand) for directors. Each group then sendsmembers to thesupervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) whidhoversees the operation of the firm(10).

A similar structure could.be established in American public schools. Members from teacher, supervisory;

superintendecy, and school boardlevels (and even also

representatives from thepublic, consumer, and students) would meet as a policy-making counciland would direct the management of the schoolsystem. Though such an arrangement is highly unlikelyin American schools;it does give meaning and depth to the notionof "managementteam"--parts of which might be useful. For example,some districts already have regular informal meetings of the presidents of various unions, parents groups, and administrators to iron out problems beforethey reach the criticalstage. Whichever configuration-- team management, participative managementor group decision-making-- isused, t.:\ future success of thesedevices rests with some

11 71 restructuring of the school system. The present school organization is often too large and awkward to permit real integration of administrative levels into anything resembling a real unit. Hence, the promise ofthe close

alliance between top and middlemanagement hardly satisfies

the basic difficultyof being trappedbetween top and bottom in the hierarchy. It is not thatmiddle administratorsand top managers are uncooperative in their daily work lives; rather the fundamental political problem for administrators as a group cannot be easily remedied by a littleinteraction with those at the top. There must be, we argue, some fundamental structural accommodation to theneeds of principals and othersupervisors. While workingmore closely with top management has potential it is not a panacea nor canshared management be achievedwithout ocemoireeospWre paying considerable costs. Finally, frog* theadministrators point of view, there is the problemthat middle and top administrators may not haVe the same needsand concerns. A decision-making system that does not recoginize the irP legitimacy4such differencescannot be expected to reconcile them.

Affiliation with Teachers Another solution would be for principals to seek affiliation and identification with teachers. This arrangement would accentuate thecloseness of teachers and administrators, making the principal a kind "head" or "coordinating" teacher. Perhaps the administratorwould be selected by the staff on a rotatingbasis, much theway some

universities selectdepartment chairs. This arrangement has been tried in some experimentalor alternative schools with some interesting results.

Head teachers, as one among equals, forgo much of the

bureaucratic authorityand pretense vestedin them by school boards. They govern instead throughmeans of consensus, teachersupport, andsometimespersonalcharisma (11). These administrators governwith the consent of the

governed--at least as far as therules of personnel and district operations willpermit.

Needless tosay, most schools arenot governed by an individual selected by the instructional staff. This position is tooimportant to the school board and the superintendent toentrust it to thewishes of a group of teachers (12). Furthermore,school laws and traditionleave

major promotions to theschool board, notteachers. But the notion of allowingthose who know localconditions bestthe

teachers--to select theirown leaders is intriguing; ithas sae democratic charm of permiLLitig haddz .a emerge from among the professionals theylead.

These teacher-administrators would quite likely identify with teachers,receiving their primary rewards and direction from them. Often, they would be less concerned

13 73 about central office directives and less attuned to other principals and supervisors in the system. They would realize that building a strongschool community would require undisputed loyalty to the teachers and the school community,even if it means running amuck withthe central office.

This mode of affiliation, principal-with-teachers, has a certain attraction. Teaching is an old, time-honored profession. Administratorswho function as part of the teachergroup might certainly gain a sense ofbelonging and worth. Since most school administrators have beenclassroom teachers anyway, thisemotional tie to staff is a comfortable one. Though little research has been doneon the reward of being a schoolprincipal, weshould assume that a warm interactionwith staffcan be a strong source of

job satisfactionand occupationalsupport. As a source of power in the school system,however, an affiliation, with teachers is oflimited value. Even if principals remainteachers at heart, theymay be prevented from joining the teachers union. At bargaining time andin

hearing grievances, administratorsmay well find themselves without representationand dueprocess if they depend solely on the teachers. Further, attemptsto be both a teacherand an administrator may increase the strain oftheir dual role, particularly when the central board holds the teacher- administrator accountable forconditions in the schoolover

14 74 which the administrator has only limitedcontrol. Finally, school administrators who identifyprimarily with teachers may be less willing to strivefor districtwide solidarity among school administrators. Hence, while the relationship could beuseful in solvingsome of the personal

feelings of anomieand weakness, it doeslittle to increase

the impact of middleadministrators as a group throughout the system. Again, one is remindedthat the interests of teachers are not identical to the concerns of principals:

each has a differentwork environment,different pressures, and different expectations. To lump teachers and

administrators togetherwould be to place administratorsat

a severedisadvantage. Teachers outnumber and out-vote

administrators.. is also likely that teachers would vote to oust administrators (even those whom them elect) from their organization v*Ibntheir interestswere in conflict.

Hence, as a usefulway to solve the problems of life in the middle, alignment with teachers has numerous

shortcomings. It is tenuous, when one fails toserve the interests of teachers, they will vote one out of office. Hence, the administrative function takes on a tenuous end unprofessional quality. Being a buildingadministrator with loyalties to teachers cuts principals offfrom other principals who may need their support in dealing with the board and superintendent. Affiliation withAdministrator Unions The final mode of affiliation andidentification is the central concern of this study: with other administrators. As already mentioned, unionizationsolves many of the problemsme,tioned in the previous three sections. It permits principals to formalize their relations with top management through collective negotiations, contract, grievance procedures,and other stipulations.

Second, the proence ofan administrators' bargaining group tends to offset some of the power of teachersunions, giving principal a similarunified voice in determining policy. Third, collective bargaining and grievance rights provide an alternative route of communicationsand appeal if top management shouldoverlook the needs andconcerns of administrators. Unionization, in effect,overcomes some of the occupationalisolation socommon to many supervisors. It gives administratorsboth ,a ready peer group and a welcome pressuregroup to lobby for their needs before the board, public, andlegislature. To summarize, collective bargaining faradministrators provides the followingadvantages:

1..)V %i VOvvielm07010 Indivi6kAal Wi1tia45 MOVVVAVVVVV.M.W.V.A.00509.61.1. 107,,,~41..MavumwdemftvolWVIWIR~ the '`traditional,supervisor faced theworld alone, attemptinc to overcome pies are fromabove and below, the unionized administrator hasa political organization to look out for his or her rights.

16 76 2. Formal 21:2Iection over informal concerns. Top

management 1:33 always claimedto "take care" ofsupervisors,

under unionization,a set of proceduresensures protection.

3. Political EresJureover apivaaal influence. The

traditional power that administrators wieldedwas that of

the trained, lone professionalspeaking and acting from a

body of expertise. Acknowledging changes inthe environment of school systems, administrators now seek political

approacheswhich unions have long used: lobbying; bargaining, Affiliating,and influencing.

Even as partof theunionmovement, however, school

middle administrators are seriously constrained and most CAS/1044 know it. They cannotstrike, as we have already discussed, 4 without thehelp of the teachers ,union. And even then, their small numbers prevent them from closing the schools.

Perhaps if the teachers joined the principalson the picket lines, then the clout ofsupervisorswould be sufficient to pressure boards of education. But our research indicates that teacaers associations rarely have much sympathy for their "brothers" and "sisters"in theadministrators1union-- particularly when increasedsalaries are at stake.

In fact, an administrators' strikta anise littim appeal to the publicwho would wonder why a group of prinotpais making $35,000need to strike in the firstplace. A serious limitation of collective bargaining for 4;14. administrators is belief-- held by the general 1 public and

17 many others in education-- that school administrators are

"managArialn and should not be acting like unionists.

Principals may respond by soft-pedallingtheir involvement with unions.

The Extent of SchoolAdministrator Bargaining

We have outlined the fourdifferent conceptions of the principal's role and focusedon the path of unionization. In this sectionwe will briefly survey the frequencywith which this path has beenchosen.

Since 1956 when Wisconsin passedthenation's first public sectorbargaining law, the number ofschool . - - administratOrs who are represented in collective bargaining has grown. The totals showa strong increasein both the number of school districtwhich negotiate With schoolmiddle administrators and thenumberof individual administrators involved. Further, some interestingtrends emerge in the location of these bariaininggroups.

Exact informationon the size of the bargaining trend was not available until 1974 when a survey of the fifty states and the District ofColumbia was made (13). It found a total of 1.0q1 re/cognized barge:ning A,. 4p116",141 groups 4 W%.1,44W%04. administratorsand supervisors,or about 8 percent of the nation's school districts. By 1978 the number of such associations represented in collective negotiations jumped by 68 percent to2,011. And by 1982, another increase was

18 7& seen to 2,874 school districts, another part of 43percent in four years.

By 1982 about 22percent of the some 13,000 operating school systems in the United States were bargaining

collectively with schooladministrators. While this percent is relatively small, it is stillan important trend. For many of these bargaining groups were large, being locatedin the major cities of the East and Great Lakes regions. In all, about28 percent of all school administrators and

supervisors engage in collective negotiations with their

school boards, according to a' survey by the National Association of SecondarySchool Principals (14).

Location and the Laws

Perhaps thebest way to present the data on

administrator bargainingtrends is by state and region. Thisapproach permitsus to relate the levels of bargaining

to the state labor policies which determine the status of

employees. We group the states ,Intothree categories, based on the relationship between state labor statutes and bargaining for supervisors: those with state legalmandates requiringschool boards to recognizeschool administrators; those 4LciLez permitting local school boards to recognize administrators voluntarily; and thosestates prohibiting school boards from bargainingwith supervisors. CATEGORY I: Superlrisorx Bargain Required. In these states the public employmentrelations laws (PERLs)mandate that if schooladministrators so chose by majority vote, then the board ofeducation must recognizetheir association as thebona fide representative of those deemed school supervisors. This requirement is usually part of the overall public sector law which defines "supervisor" as

"employee" and grantsthem bargaining rights--incontrast to

"management" which cannotnegotiate with the board. Table 1 shows that 18 states and the District ofColumbia which required recognitionasof 1982, at well as the increases between 1974 and 1982,and the percentage growth. TABLE 1

Extent of SchoolAdministrator Bargaining by State and EnablingPolicies, 1975-1982 Categcry I: aasompara.....r...SupetReuired (15states and District of Columbia).\

f.tatq 19.21 1978 1982

1. Alaska 6 39 43 2. California 0 3. Connecticut 3 5 132 141 161 4. District ofColumbia 1 5. Hawaii 1 1 1 6. Maine 1 1 14 15 19 7. Maryland 12 8. Massachusetts 24 28 100 240 9. Michigan 367 75 150 .10.-Ots', e of'k 256 I I* i XI. xl Y 11. NewHampshire 0 12. Nevada 1 21 0 2_ 11 13. New Jersey 310 14. New York 420 543 215 420 15. NorthDakota 654 0 6 12 16. Oklahoma 0 17. Tennessee 1 2 0 68 18. Vermont 4 75 19. Washington 6 9 55 80 96

ma,,.111=0 Total: 1,035 1,740 2.519 (+68%) (+45%)

21 81. When Category I (mandated bargaining) is comparedwith the other two categories to be presented shortly,one sees that the vast majority of supervisory bargaininggroups are located in stateswith laws requiring unionrecognition: 2,519 out of the total of2,874 or 89 percent. Clearly, legal support is an important concommitent of collective bargaining. Second, many of these states under Category I have witnessed intensive bargaining for school

administrators. This is best indicated.bythe percentage of total school districts in the statewhichengage in negotiations with localschool administrators.

-- Connecticut: 161 out of 167 districtsbargain (96%) Maryland,: 28 out of 31systems bargain (90%)

--Massachusetts: 367our 470 (78%)

.. Michigan: 256 our of 285 (90%)

--Minnesota: 215 of 240(90%)

--New Jersey: 543 of560 (97%)

--New York: 589 of720 (82%) --Hiltialon:.96 of 121 (79%)

In addition, two jurisdictionsin the United States, Hawaii and the District ofColumbia, have onlyono 4mhesni and recognize school administrators for purposes of collective bargaining; hence, they have 100 percent unionization for administrators and a single contract for the entire jurisdiction(Hawaii has onlyone school district 82 22 Third, these states withmandated collective bargaininj

for school administrators are not located in a particular

region but are dispersed throughout the nation. Figure 2

-shows the stateswith mandated bargaining, as contrasted with permitted anddenied status. Most of these mandated

states are located in the industrial areas of the New

England (Connecticut,Massachusetts, Maine), MiddleAtlantic

(New York, New Jersey) and Great Lakes (Michigan,

Minnesota), though these states are also scatteredacross

the nation in the Far West (Washington and California),and elsewhere.

Figure 2--Supervisory Bargaining

by Type --an4;tate CATEGORY II: Supervisory Permitted. In nine additional states, local school ,boards are allowed to bargain with school administrators and supervisors, though this recognition is not forced upon themby the state. In the absence of specified state legislation,schools boards act voluntarily and extra-legally, a local right sometimes supported by judicialdecisions at thestate level. Thus, if a groupof school principals and other administrators votesta'request collectivenegotiations with the local board ofeducation, the board may elect to grant bargaining representation or to refuse; in thelatter case, the administrator associationhas norecoursesince there is r' statutory provision protectingthe rightto unionize and bargain. Table 3 shows the nine stateswhere local boardshave opted to bargain, thenumber of local voluntarily recognized bargainingunits, and thetotals

(including the percentgrowth between 1974and 1982). TABLE 2

ixtent of SchoolAdministrator Collective Bargaining in "Permitted" States,1975-82.

State ... 1974 1978 1982 1. Colorado 0 2 6

2. Idaho 0 1 2 3. Illinios 6 11 15 4. Kansas 14 160 176 5. Missouri 5 10 19 6. Nebraska 0 1 4 7. Ohio 25 66 79

8. Pennsylvania 5 _ 8 31 9. Wisconsin 1 12 23

Total: 56 271 355

Percentage Change: (+384%) (+31%)

86 26 Except for Ohio, the other eight states have public

employment relations laws permitting teachers and other

"employees" to bargain butwhich are silenton the rights of

supervisors. Court rulings-havepermitted local management

groups to decide -whether to recognizemiddle-rank

administrators. Ohio has no PERL whatever; in the total

absence of statutes, thecourts have rules thata number of

employee and supervisorygroups may bargain voluntarily, if so recognized.

As was the case with Category I statesabove, many of

these states are located in the more urbanizedstates like

Illino, Missouri, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. Furthermore, manyof these--states have long union traditions, perhaps .

making it easy foradministrators to gain the protection of

collective baigaining. Certainly Ohio (the sate with the

most large cities in the United States), Pennsylvania, and

Wisconsin, have longhistories ofunion politics and

support. Itt appears that principals may be ,7zshing in on this same pro-union sentiment. Such cities z.f Milwaukee, Cleveland, Chicago, St. Louis, Kansas City,1ct5burgh, and Philadelphia are recognizedcenters of collective bargaining activity. From these urban areas,collective bargaining for administrators and othereducators appears to spread to neighboring communities inthe suburbs and beyond.

Thus, while a number of states do not have bargaining laws for supervisors in the public sector, dui to local options, bargaining nonethelessoccurs. If Category I and II are combined, one finds a total of 27 of50 states (or 58 percent) 'plus theDistrict of Columbia. Analyzing table 1 and 2 for the years 1974 and 1982, one notes a dramatic increase in the number" ofstates with collectivebargaining for administrators (from 17 to 27 .states) and the total number of local school boards which bargain, increases from 1,035 to 2,519 in eight years. The percentage growth, then is 59 percent for the number of states and 143 percent for

the total increasein local bargaininggroups.

CATEGORY III: lupervisorx Bargaining Denied. In the remaining 23 states, school administrators ato4 supervisors are not protected by statelaws; in fact, the policies have determined thatsupervisors (and many other public employees) cannot be recognized for the purpose of bargaining. This denial of bargainingrights comes in two different forms:

First, as is thecase in most Category IIIstates, the state legislature has not enacted a public employment relations law at all. In theabsence of statutes, state courts and attorneys general ruled that supervisors could not be protectedin their effort to negotiate. .

Second, unlike the cases above, the remaining states have passed PERL's which specifically legislate the

28 exclusion of supervisors from bargainingby declaring them

"managerial," usingmuch the same language as the private sector in the Taft-Hartley law and subsequent court decisions. As shown in Table 3, these states which deny bargaining statutorily.-are quite similar to the stateswith mandated bargaining (Eastern-New England: Rhode Island, Delaware), Great Lakes(Indiana) and elsewhere. Of the 22 states which deny bargaining to administrators, 11 are using "judicial" techniquesand 11,

"legislative" devices. The judicial denial stateare most often in South (Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Arkansas, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Kentucky, Texas, and West Virginia), whilethe legislative- denial states appear in virtually every region, right alongside mandated andpermitted states, shown in Figure 1.

29 89 TABLE 3

States which Deny ZchoolSupervisors

the Right to BargainingRepresentation 1982(11=22) judioiak* Toni p,aLrvrP. 1. Alab&ma 2.Arizona 3. Arkansas 4. Delaware 5. Florida 6. Georgia 7. Indiana 8. Iowa 9. K,antucky 10. LJuisana Mississippi 12. Montana 13. New Mexico 14. Nortli Carolina 15. Oregoa z 1(1 Rhode Island x 17. South Carolina 18. South Dakota 19. Texas 20. Utah 21. Virginia 22. Wyoming z

Total ibidioial Denials 11

Total Legislative Denials: 11

The "judicial" rulingswere madn in the absence of state enablingor denying legislation, The two approachesto denial shareone thing in common. While they do not and cannot ban associationsor groups (under the First Amendment everyene has a right to

"association'), the courts. andlegislatures can instruct school beards and superintendents not to negotiate with

representatives fromtheir various associations. One further commonality: states with legislated denials

Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Iowa; Montane,. New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Ielandv South Dakota, and Utah) also have k court-supported ban*on administrator recognition. Since the state PERL's usuallymake provision for thecreation of a Public. Employment Relationsboard orCommission (?ERB or PERC), moreovert -thei-e 'state executive agencies often support the judiaal.struoturesagainst bargaining for school supervisors. In effect, the judicialand executive branches bolster the denialof legal bargainingrepresentation as stated in the statelegislation.

Hence, while Southern and Midwestern states see no bargaining for administrators because state courts and attorneys general prevent them (in the -absenceof state

PERL'e), theseother s,ates witnese banson bargaining which originate in thelegislature and are continuedin the courts and PERB's.

Since )974/ supervisory collective bargaining in :Auc:ation -.both mandated and permitted--has increased by

140 percent. chilemost of this development has been in states with laws requiring school boards to recognizegroups ofadministrators, iftheseschool supervisors wish to bargain, there has been some growth in stateswithout bargaining laws butwith supportive school boards who

bargain voluntarilywith their middleadministrators.

Summary There appears to be a growing need among school administrators to identify with some grouptoaffiliate. In this chapter, we have reviewed at least four possible

relationships: with community, top managers, teachers, and one another IA a union -likearrangement.

These four types ofaffiliations share much in common. They all provide a relationship or groupresponse, overcoming the inherent weaknesses.of attempting"to go it alone." Like other occupational members, school administrators feel the need to band together formutual self-help. Cr as one principal said, "WE SHALLDIE ON THE VINE (15)."

But, these four approaches to affiliationand group power differ in at least two ways. First, the scope of affiliation varies. between administratorr who align themselves with school groups (teachers and local school community) and those involved with school district -wide organizations (principalsunions and "managementteam"). As shown in Figure 2 below, relationships with teaching staff

32 92 ta.

LIE= 2--Dimensions of AdministratorAffiliation

Formalization of Relations Soul of Relations

Low (ad hoc) High (cont;ractUal)

LOW (school-based) Principal as Principal asFait peso* "head teacher" of Community beemP41 bowie .1116Ini B. D

HIGH (diiiiiatbasid) Principal as part Principal as of "management team'union member (cells A and C) are concerned mainly with local issuesand weaken the district-wide influence ofadministrators.

Relations with central management and unions provide a district-wide orientation and may increase the clout of administrator as a unit.

0. h Second, affiliations vary by the level offormal at-1-0-n from relationsbased on rules, laws, policy, and contracts (high formalization) to those resting on ad hoc

34 94 arrangements, local situations, and changing issues (low

formalization). Again, it is assumed that formalized situations provide greater protection, opportunities for administrators to maintain control,and stability than ad hoc situations whiqh may work to administrators' disadvantages. For example, principals who work underan organized school communityor school hoard and those in

unions benefit froma set of rules that provide regularity

and predictablttiy; whileworking with teachers and as part of the top management structureare bo.a highly informal

situations. Beinga head teacherand beingpart of the

"management team" both attemptto obviate the importance of

formal rulessistingthat educators are really "one big

happy family." Being elected or selected by the community, or being part of a4ion,,on the other hand, rest on basic system of contractual-legalrelations.

It is, perhaps, too soon to tell which of these four modes of affiliation is best for improving the status of school administrators. , But beingone among equals with teachers (qell A) is lowon both formalizaion andscope; it probably holds the least promise for administrators, since the fc:s.us, is with'n a single school and its formal protections, few. Unionization, in contrast (cell D), provides a district-wide viewpoint and the legal and procedural protectionsdiscussed in the lastchapter. Cells B and C ("management team" and community relations) fall

35 95 somewhere in between, withtop management relationhaving a broad focus but little independent power, and community relations being highly local butsomewhat more formalized. All four of these modesheld some promise. In fact, a strong school administrator mayuse them all in different settings: (1) Being closelytied with his or her community in meeting the needs ofparticular children; (2) being affiliated withteachers in implementingthe curriculum and program in schools; (3) being identifiedwith management in implementing policies flr thedistrict; and (4) joiningan administrators union in negotiating a contract, setting salaries and benefits, and maintaining protection on the job. While it may not 4f be possible for administratorsto straddle quite so many fences, it does seem likelythat as thework environment becomes even more threatening and political, that some affiliation and unionization will continue, as our datain this chapterindicate.

36 1 For a different treatment of thissame theme, see Bruce S. Cooper, "The Future of MiddleManagement in Education," in THE PRINCIPAL IN METROPOLITANSCHOOLS, Donald A. Erickson and Theodore L. Reller,EditOrs (Berkeley,Calif.: McCutchan Publishing Co., 1978), pp. 272-299.

2 Otto Kraushaar, AMERICANNONPUBLIC SCHOOLS: PATTERNS IN DIVERSITY (Baltimore: Johns HopkinsUniversity Press, 1972),p. 175.

3 "Report on Local School Councilsto the Boilrd of Education," Recommendations (revised December9, 1970), Office of the Superintendent, Chicago PublicSchools, Document 70-1161;emphasis in the original.

4Ibid.

5 See, for example, Richard W.Saxe,. EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION TODAY: AN INTRODUCTION (Berkeley,Calif.: McCutbhan, 1980),pp. 276, 282, 275-276;Peter Drucker, MANAGEMENT:TASKS, RESPONSIBILITIES, PRACTICES (New York: Harper andRow, 1974),pp. 620-423; American Association of School'Administrators, PROFILES OF THEADMINISTRATIVE TEAM (Washington, D.C.i:theAssociation, 1971); Waino Aukeeand others, INSIDE THE MANAGEMENTTEAM (Danville, Ill.:Interstate, 1973); Ray Cross, "The AdministrativeTeam or Decentralization?"NATIONAL ELEMENTARY PRINCIPAL, Vol.54 (November-December,1974),p. 80-82; Wayne Doyle-, "Effects ofAchieved Status of Leaderon Productivity of Groups," ADMINISTRATIVESCIENCE QUARTERLY, Vol. 16 (March1971), pp. 40-50; Kenneth Erickson and WalterGmelch, SCHOOL MANAGEMENT TEAMS:-THEIR STRUCTURE,FUNOTION, AND OPERATION (Arlington,Va.: Educational Research Service,1977.

6' .E. Mark Zanson, EDUCATIONALADMINISTUTION AND ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR (Boston: kllyn and Bacon, 1979), pp. 266 -67, 274. 7 Ibid., p. 266.

8 Paul Salmon, "Are the AdministrativeTeam and Collective Bargaining Compatible?" COMPACT, Vol.12 (June 1972),p. 3.

9 The difficulty of competentadministration in large school bureaucracies is well known and oftendiscussed; see David Rogers, 110 LIVINGSTON STREET (New--York:Vintage, 1967); Wayne K. Hoy and Cecil G. Miskel, EDUCATIONALADMINISTRATION: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE, 2nd edition (New York: RandomHouse,' 1978); and David B. Tyack and Elizabeth Hansot, MANAGERSOF VIRTUE (New York: Basic Book, 1982), see particularly,pp. 213 -2b9.

1 °ErnieRoberts, WORKERS' CONTROL (London: GeorgeAllen and Unwin, 1973), and F.E. Emergy andEinar Thorsrub, FORM AND CONTENT IN INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY (London: Tavistock, 1969),pp. 42-52.

11 See Daniel L. Duke, THE.RETRANSFORMATIONOF THE SCHOOL: The Emergence of ComtemporaryAlternative Schools in the United States (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1978);Allen Graubard, FREE TEE CHILDREN (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973);Bruce S. Cooper, FREE SCHOOL SURVIVAL (Minneapolis: Burgess Books, 1973).

12 Teachers, furthermore,may not wish to take over the responsibility of running theirown schools and selecting their own leadership. See, for example, the findings of DanielL. Duke and others, "Teachers and SharedDecision Making: The Costs and Benefits of Involvement," EDUCATIONALADMINISTRATION QUARTERLY, Vol. 16, No...1 (Winter, 1980),pp. 93-106; and V. Crockenberg and W.W. Clark, "Teacher Participationin School Decision Making," PHI DELTA KAPPAN, Vol. 61 (October 1979),pp. 115-118.

13 Bruce S. Cooper, "Collective Bargainingfor School Administ- rators Four Years Later," PHI DELTA KAPPAN (October,1979), pp. 130-131. 98 14Surveyconducted by the National. Association of Secondary School Principalsand presented ina FACTSHEET, 1982.

15" .The Brewingand, Perhaps, StillPreventable--Revolt of the School Principals," THE AMERICAN SCHOOLBOARD JOURNAL (:anuary 1976),pp. 25-27. CHAPTER III

STATE LAW-MAKING AND THERIGHTS OF ADMINISTRATORS TO BARGAIN

Introduction

In the absence of state laws specifying bargaining

rights for school administrators, school boards are not compelled by law to bargain with administrator organizations. Of course, some school boards recognize administrator organizationseven when they are not legally required to doso. But as our research reported inChapter

II indicates) most unionizedgroups of school principalsare located in states where publicemployee laws guirantee them. the right to bargain. And even in those states where some school boards voluntarilyrecognize administrator units

(e.g. Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Illinois) state laws are supportive of unionizationfor teachers andserve to enhance the climate for collectivebargaining. As a practical matter, then, the likelihood that significant numbers of school administrators will become unionizeddepends on what state lawmakers do. This chapter and the next willlook at the experience ofone state, California, which moved from tae category of those states without administrator bargaining rights toa state which provides that right.

This chapter is concerned with the adoption and

100 implementation of California's RoddaAct becluse we believe that that experience tells us something aboutthe conditions

under which schooladministrators can win thelegal right to bargain.

An Analytic Focus. We are primarily interested in using the case of California to illustratea more general point about the adoption and implementationof collective bargaining laws that affect middle level school administrators. In all the states we visited, state policymakers considered schooladministrators to bea small and relatively unimportant group when compared with teachers. Thus the fateof school adminiStrators, in

collective bargaininglaws, was decided in large measureas an adjunct todecisions on politically important issues involving teachers and other large categories of public employees. It is this politicallymarginal status that shapes the statutory fate ofadministrators and influences

the conditions under which their legal status is defined during implementationof bargaining laws.

Our general pointabout California isa simple one. We shall snow that the policy coalitionsthat shape state laws in legislativearenas also influence the way that laws are implemented. In the case of administrators, there is no strong political consensus about their role. This means that no stable, and politically potent coalition ofgroups stands by establishing andsupporting bargainingrights for

2 101 school administrators in the same way that such agroup exists for teachers inmany states. That means that insofar

as administrators are considered, theyare considered at the

periphery of bargaining aroundmore important issues. Thus

bargaining rights for administrators, when they are established, are usually included as parts of larger political agreements. The coalition that initiallysupports

such larger packages, then, is onlyweakly committed to the

administrator portions. Such a coalition, then, will not pay much attention - -as a politically cohesive and effective group--to the fate of school administrators,once a law is adopted. 544.-rcuirLit-+1-5[1.17.1.

We believe that the political context posed by

California resembles that in many others states. The cast of characters issimilar: diverse employee groups (unions and other organizations representing the manydifferent types of educational employees), the familiar management groups (school boards associations and individual types of district), education specialists, and legislators who are active in education or labor and those who are only sporadically active.

The set of problems confrontingpolicymakers is also familiar: defining who is eligible to bargain, what they can bargain about (scope), and devising procedures for getting beyondan impasse. While the California experience nas its unique elements, we believe that our general

3 102 EXAMPLES OF POSSIBLE COALITION BUILDING STRATEGIES AND THEIR EFFECTS ON THE DEFINITION OF POLICY DURING IMPLEMENTATION

Subsequent Influence Influence an on Interpretations Type Ea1LELJELIE15 Darin Empl2mattation

(1) Coalitions That Dissolve Into Constituent Parts U on Passage-- OP Policy create #Policy has a laundry ...Separate groups coalitions list quality with lobby implementers (eg different many specific favor their inter- parts attracted and even conflicting pretations by separate provisions, in addi- :Implementers have provisions) tion there may be great discretion provisions that ase _to choose among written in vague conflicting provisic fashion to encompass and to resolve vague different interpretations

(2) Coalitions that Partially Dissolve.

*P6-1-idY create *Policy may have a sInsofar as the init: coalitions degree of vaaueness coalition groups in which some associated with the that remain agr( members are sat- reconciliation of on what they want t( isfied with statu- different groups achieve, they exert tory changes (sym- a uniform political bolic) while other force on implementer members want to diminishing their use statutes to discretion even thol achieve material the policy may be vi gains.

(3) Coalitionsthat Persist-- 1.Stable, . Policy may bea .*Dominant dma4nantcoa- specific, consis- coalition in lition an "iron triangle"re- tent statementof lationship withadminis- the consensusag- trative implementers,wi reed upon bythe legislative coalition, overseers OR the providing alternative coalition maysup- channels for porta relatively influence vale (direct lobbyingof vacue policy that implementers, tney can adjust capacity to threaten loss through lobbying of of implementers support or retaliation, or ability to changethe or through sub-Alla law). Sequent amend- findings about the ways in which coalitions are builtand how these shape the fateof administratorshave some value

foe understandingthe situation facingother states. Rationale. This chapter is organized into the

following sections. First, there is adescription of the

political environment inwhich school collectivebargaining

legislation is to beconsidered: a list ofthe actors, their beliefs, motivations and resources. Second, we will lookat the proximate causes of the initiativeto re-examine school labor relations laws and to seek a changein the statusquo (defined by the Winton Act, a "meet and confer" law). Third, we examine the coalition buildingstrategies engaged in by participants and its effectson the shape of the law finally adopted. This sets the stage for the next chapter which deals withthe implementation ofthe law.

The PoliticalEnvironment

The political environmentfaced by any issues isshaped by the actors who populate it, and thecharacteristics of the institutions in which it is decided (1). (..:hart 3r represents a political mapof this issue area. In this section we will briefly describe the institutionalcontext and the different sets ofactors active in school labor relations politicsat the legislative level. A POLITICAL MAPOF-SCHOOL,LOBBY06 GROUPSACTIVE ON RODDA ACT j

ACTORS GOALS BELIEFS RESOURCES Legislature--

Sen.Rodda Stable and staff system 1.Consensus of labor Formal rela7 among employer Position(chairman tions in of Sen.Educatiot and employee Committee)reputation education for fairnessan groups ona legislativecraftsmanship singlemeasure signals: its political feasibility and work-

ability dur- i. ing implementation SchoolManagement and EmployerGroups---

1. CaliforniaDesire to School 1.Bill should preserve Legislative Boards contain: perceptionthat the management boardsrepresent school Association a.limitations legitimateinterests preorga- and values(local (CSBA) on thescope of control,management 1i tives prerogatives,etc.); bargaining members in network ofboard b.strong many legislative statement tuencies; consti- ofmanagement expertise. rights c.preservation of management team (e.g. reservation of a category of managerial employeeslarge enough tohelp 105 in bargaining and theadministration 106 of agreements) continued...

ACTORS GOALS BELIEFS RESOURCES 2. ACSA (Associa- Preservationof 1.Same as Perception of legitimacy; tion of management school network of school superintendents Califor- prerogatives boards and other local officials capable nia A of influencing legislators through School constituencies; expertise Adminis- trators)

108 107 ACTORS GOALS BELIEFS RESOURCES School Employees Groups--

Teachers--

1. California To represent 1.A Bill that Teachers Large membership; school teachers provides for capacity to make campaign Association as a profession- contributiol --recognition to provide campaign workers; (CTA) al group and as of employees -, expertise. employees in right to bargain collective bar- --exclusive gaining; prevail representation over the compet --agency shop. ing CFT. --wide scope 2. California To represent 1.A comprehensive Strength in urban districts, Federation teachers as public employees of Teachers claims On otherAFL-CIO unions their union; bill (covering for support (CFT) to prevail all state, .municipal over CTA. and school employees). 2.In a more limited bills CFT prefers "fair share" arrangements over compulsory agency shop because of r. CTAs numerical preponderance. 3, Profesrional Collective 1.0ppose all col- Numerically smallgroup, Educations bargaining lective bargain- Group (PEG) allied with other Rightto Work is unprofessional ing bills for or anti-labor groups. teachers. 110 109 ACTORS GOALS BELIEFS RESOURCES

School employeei : continued

Non-education (or classified) school employees--

l.California To represent 1.Comprehensive Largest membership of classified School classified bill for all employees; legislative and Employees school public employees expert staffs. Association employees most desireable (CM:A) (including because it would supervisory not be overly employees); shaped to the prevail over unique needs rival SEIU of teachers. 2.In a bill limited to education, CSEA prefers a wider scope of bargaining, and the capacity to include supervisors.

2.Service To represent 1.A bill that Alliance.with other AFL-CIO Employees classified recognizes their unions. Interna- scool employees members rights tional and prevail over to bargain. Union,APL-CIO rival CSEA (SEIU)

112 111 The legislature. The California legislature, like the

U.S. Congress, has evolved practices in which committees

serve as specialized bodies whichconsider legislation prior

to attention by the wholehouse. In effect, themembers of

the committees are the most attentive decision makers in a .0* given issue area because they are the people whospecialize in the affairs ofthat area (2).

The California Legislatureconsists of the Assemblyand

the Senate. In tie issue area ofeducation, both tL Assembly and Senate educationcommittees have served as

respected arenas for the shapingof educational policy. The

leadership of these committees is respected 'for its expertise. They are, in turn, served by a highly professional staff of aidesand consultants.

In general, when the members of these committees can agree, when the important interestgroups agree, and whenno important outside interestsare involved, the recommendation of the educationcommittees will carry theday in their respective houses. The dynamic is simple. When members of the committee cannotagree, and when the interestgroup are in conflict, those who lose at thecommittee stage simply appeal to the nextstage (legislative floor deliberations, considerationby the other legislative house, etc.). One instrument of such controversies is for groups to provide information to the uninvolved about the advantages and disadvantages ofproposals. In this manner, the information

6 113 costs for non-expert participantsare cut by the willingness of the informed participants to sharetheir knowledge in a partisan manner. When informed participants are in agreement, such cutting of information costs for

peripherally involved legislators simply doesn'toccur(3). It The divi'Aon of laborby committees can cut two ways. While it functions to enhance the power of committeeslike

those in education whenthe scope of an issue isbelieved to

be limited to educationalmatters, it can have the opposite

effect when an issue is perceived to be broader, falling into the domain of othercommittees: So, when, as in the

area of school finance, the issue is seenas involving the policy interest of other, committees--like t ation and

government operations--thoseother committee5,and therelated.

interest groups thencluster around them havethe incentive and capacity to involve themselves and spread conflictto normally inattentivelegislators. School labor relations is

potentially an issue thatcan cut across committee lines.

For example, a proposal wasconsidered that would have regulated school employees as part of a larger public employees labor law. Thus Mile the educationcommittees and their associatedinterest groupscan have a great say in determining school labor policy, their preeminence is not guaranteed.

The Schobl Lobby. The groups that pay the most attention toan issue area are those whomembers derive

7 114 their incomesor status from that area. California's school lobby is heavily weighted in favor of the producers of education althougha few consumer groups also exist. California's school lobby is large, diverse, and blessed with abundant political resources. Its

effectiveness has beengreatest when it Lis been able to overcome its internal divisionsand work inconcert toward common ends (4).

The state's schoollobby, like that in otherstates, is internally divided on many of the questions raised by

collective bargaininglaws. The school lobbymirrors the

common divisions betweenlabor and managementas represented by the teachers, otherschool personnel, and school board and administrator groups. In addition, each side isdivided' by other conflicts, e.g. those between the National

EducationAssociation and American Federation of Teachers

affiliates, betweenrival non-educational school employee groups, betweenbig cityand rural or suburban school boards.

The issue of collectivebargaining effectivelycleaves school lobbygroups in the following ways. The management side is represented by the California School Soard

Association (CSBA), the Association of California School

Administrators (ACSA),and by lobbyist for individualschool districts (those from the largest cities are particularly active). Typically the management groups work relatively

8 115 closely with one another.

The labor side is divided between organizations

representing certificated (e.g. teachers and other

equcational employees who hold state certificates) and

classified employees(e.g. bus drivers* clericaland service

employees). The teachers are sought by the California Teachers Association and the California Federation of

Teachers. The two teachers unions--CTA and CFT--have

different characteristics. The California Teachecs Association (CTA) is the larger, an affiliate of the

National Education Association, and while its strength is

statewide, it is less strong in major cities. The smaller

statewideorganization is the California Federation of

Teachers (CPT), an affiliate of the AFLCIO, and its

strength.is primarilyin big cities like 'SanFrancisco and

Los Angeles. In addition, the interests ofsome powerful

local organizations(like the United Teachers ofLos Angeles

an organization with a mixed affiliation and separate identity) are frequentlyrepresented in Sacramento directly.

The classified employees are represented by two rival organizations too. The larger body is the CaliforniaSchool.

Employees Association (sometimes called "little CSEA" to avoid confusion with the hugh California State Employees c;0 Association). The smaller union is an AFL-affiliate, the

Service Employees InternationalUnion (SEIU).

9 116 A Political Map. In short, the environment ofschool

labor legislation isone that is normallyset in an arena

definad by the legislative education committees, and it is

peopled by legislative specialistsand by the school lobby. Rather than describe eachactor and their preferences in

detail, we have summarized their characteristicsand goals in Table 2.9. This chart is based on interviews with

participants, the legislative testimonyof organizations,

characterizations suppliedby long-time observers,and by

pumms. California legislative practices provide the education committees withgreat leverage over outcomeswhen the scope of conflict isecnfined to those things perceived as school matters. One means of limitingthe perception of relevant issues - 'narrowing thescope of conflict-- is for the committee to defineissues narrowly, and another is by securing internal agreement within the school lobbyso that few incentivesexist for participants to widenthe scope of conflict. Although the school lobby is unifiedon some matters, school labor issuesdivided them intomany separate groups representingmansgement and labor. Thus, in order for education committee leader to achieve their ends, they must define issuesas primarily concerned with educationand they must achievea relatively broad measure ofsupport from diverse schoolgroups.

The Proximate Causesfor a

10 117 Reexamination of the StatusQuo.

In order for a new law to be passed governing school relations, two thihgshad to happen. First, the school lobby had to agree that some changewas necessary. Second,

they had to agree on the same proposal. Failure to meet these conditions would produce aconflict that would go

beyond the bounds of theeducation committees andproduce an unstable and 'npredictablesituation.

It should be clear, from the previous description of the school lobby, that any widespread judgment about the

inadequacy of thethencurrent (Winton Act)school labor law had to be multifaceted. Because school lobby groups evaluated laws using different, and often conflicting criteria, the Winton Acthad to be found wanting by labor and managementgroups for different reasons. In this

section, we will briefly explain the major characteristics

of the previous system, some of the longterm changes that had been occurring within the school lobby, and the lature of the proximate cause ofreconsideration during theearly 1970s:

It is a truism that policyis often shaped bya clearer vision of what is to beavoided than what is tobe achieved.

Thus, in the manner of generalspreparing for the lastwar, policymakers usually focus their efforts to remedying the shortcomings of the status quo. Lindblom, ofcourse, tells us that it is both easier to achieve agreement on what is

11 118 wrong and to agree on specific remedies than it is to build

support and consensus on a more comprehensive sense (5). The Status Quo. The Winton Act, passed in 1965, and its

subsequent revisions and interpretations constituted the status quo facing those who contemplatedOw creating a new

system. The Winton Act, along with several otherstatutes and courtdecisions, provided for: the, rht ofpublic

employees to join unions and otherorganizations; required

school board to "meet andconfer" withan "employee council" and to produce a "memoradum of undzarstanding" (6). The

WintonActdid not explicitly limit the scope of

discussions,what the school boards were required to talk

about. It did not requite boardsto bargain in good faith but rather gave then thepower to make decision unilaterally once discussion were concluded. And the employee councils, which C442.461) conferred withmanagement, wereb- ed on proportional representation ofemployeegroups, rat ar than the designation ofan exclusive. representation organization.

In short, the WintonAct formalized some obligations in school labor relations--andin that sense went beyondstates that did not have a law on the subject--but it stopped substantiallyshort of the position taken by states with public employee collectivebargaining laws.

The Winton Act, at the timeof its passage,was largely a consensus measure (7). It was viewed by management groups--school administrators and school boardsas a

12 119 measure that did notextend bargaining rightsto employees,

and that preserved management's right to make decisions

unilaterally, while at the same time 'providing some

structure for discussions. It was initially supported by the California Teachers Association--thelargest of the teacher groups--because it provided, throughthe employee councils, a forum for the discussion of both employee and

professionalconcerns. At the time, the CTA--unlike its

rival, the California Federation of Teachers--opposed

collectivebargaining. CTAalso felt that proportional

representationonemployeecouncilwould emphasize its

majority statusand put the more militant and vocal CFT membership into 'perspective.

Dissatisfaction with the WintonAct. By 1975b employee

and employer organization support' for the WintonAct had

changed dramatically. The causes of dissatisfaction were diverse, reflecting the different interests of the

participants but theycumulatively provided the impetusfor a re-examination of the statutorybasis for school labor

relations. Changes on the employee sidereflected long-term

shifts in positions by the largest organizations (CTA and

CSEA), while those on the employer sidewere shaped by both

the long termdevelopment of the Winton Act and bya major series of court decisions.

EmployeeOrganizations Change. Historically, the largest school employee organizations--CTA and CSEA--had

19e. 0 opposed collective bargaining, Over time, both

organizations respondingto national shifts and tothe need

to maintain effectiveness in their competition with their AFL-CIO rivals, shifted their. positions. The CTA, for

example, under pressure from theparent National Education

Association . had changed its own opposition to collective bargaining into an aggressive position for

support. After a period ofconflict, involving leadership changes within CTA, CTAshifted itsposition on the issue.

An important consideration inboth the shift ofCTA and

CSEA was their numerical superiority over thestate rivals.

Typically employee organizations are in conflict with other employee organizations for members and for the power to negotiatewi hemployers. Thus, the California Teachers. Association1 (NEA) and California Federation of Teachers (CPT) were locked ina struggle for certificated employees. A parallel struggle existed between CSEA and SEIU for classified} employees. Theoutcome of these ongoing organizational rivalries couldbe shaped by a change in the rules from the Winton "meetand confer" system tocollective bargaining.

The advent of collectivebargaining almost alwaysmeans ( the designation of an exclusive bargainingrepresentative, one organization to speak fora given set of employees. The organization that achieves that designation, through an election or some otherspecified means,can benefit greatly

14 121 in terms of power, money in the form of "fair snare"

payments, and increased membersnips,The numerically smaller

employee organizations--CFTor SEIU--would, of course, be

disadvantaged in struggles to become the exclusive bargaining representative. Thus o ce CTA and CSEA had .changed their positions about collective bargaining,

important organizational power considerations spurredtheir efforts to achieve their newgoal of pursuinga statutory

change from "meet and confer" to a system of collective bargaining.

The American Federation of Teachers and Service Employees International Union, asunions, had always been, opposed in principle to "meetand confer" laws that fell short of collectivebargaining. Yet there were some advantages for them in an arrangement that at leastgave these organizations' proportional representation on the employees councila particularly if the alternative was no representation at all. Thus, there werereasons for AFT and SEIU to be somewhat apprehensive about the prospect thata collective bargaining lawmightpass with the additional support of CTA and CSEA. Indeed, one former legislative staff personcharacterized CFT's priorsupport of collective bargaining as being confined to laws that hadlittle chance of passage. Whether that characterizationwas accurate, the fact remains. that some organizational considerations must have caused some internal cross-pressures between a

15 122 commitment to collective bargaining andthe minority status of the unions.

There wpre, ofcourse, ways to resolve the cross- pressure between organizational survival concerns and expressed principles in ways s8.%;ort of going-backon the commitmentto collective bargaining. It was possible, for

instance, to press foran "ideal" bill unacceptableto other

participants and to otherwise raise objectionsto specifics

without abandoningthe principledposition. But there were

also pressures withinbothCPTand SEIUthat made such a

strategy problematic. Specifically, both unionscontained locals with strength in a fewbig cities. These,locals constituted the most importantsegmentof_the.state units

strength. The big city locals, inturn, would unlike their parent organizationsbenefit greatly from thecoming of

nollective bargainingbecause it was likely thatthey would win the designation of exclusive bargainingrepresentative.

According to several interviewees,these locals constituted important forces--within the parent organizations--pressing

for support fora feasible bargaining bill. Thus on the labor side, the organizations found

themselves dissatisfied with theWinton "meet and confer" sygtem. The largestgroups had changed their positionson collective bargaining, and they sensed theenormous gains

they might made shoulda bargaininglaw pass. At the same tithe, the smaller employee unions maintained theirexisting

16 123 commitmentto collective bargaining for both historic and organizational reasons.

Employer, and Asuomat Organizations Change:

Historically both the California School BoardsAssociation (CSBA) and the Association of California School

Administrators (ACSA)--the majoradministrator group--had

opposed collectivebargaining for school employees. The

Winton Act system, whichrelied upon a formalrequirement to confer without a requirement that the parties actually

bargain,was consistentwith these historic positions.

Indeed, according toa former Assemblyman, the schoolboards

had succeeded in gettingthe original Winton billamended to change "bargain in good fai'. to "meetand confer."

Similarly, ACSA and itspredecessors, reflecting the views. of its superintendent andother administrator members,had opposed bothcomprehensive and education-only collective bargaining legislation.

CSBAre-examined its position on bargaining and the

Winton Actbefore ACSA. Initially, CSBA had advised its memberboards that the WintonAct required them todo very little other than schedule "pro forma" meetings with employee organizations. But, according to several interviewees, these meetings evol% d into increasingly

,4? formal bargaining sessions. In addition, demands on the school board's time--legitimated by the Winton Act requirements--became increasingly burdensome as militant

17 employee organizations used litigation and othermeans to claim their rights.

Two court decisions servedto shift the CSBA from their position in supportof the Winton Act, with revisions, to one that supported a major new law. Basically the two decision called, SanJuan and Yuba City (5), were seen by the CSBAas expanding the scope of bargaining--the things the Boardswere required to confer about with employee organizations-7tocategories that ought to have been reserved for management. Thegeneral managementposition was to reserve some items--often equated with policy decision--for their considerationalone. The two decisions, interpreting the board's obligations underthe Winton Act, found that the formulation ofeducational policy waswithin the scope of negotiations, A school board lawyer characterized the decisionsas requiring the boards to talk about everything. In addition, the decisions called into question the status of resulting agreements,a point that worried some organizationson the employee side.

With the San Juan and Yuba Cita decisions, thestatus quo was no longer acceptable tothe leadership of the school boards. So theysought statutory limitationson scope, in return for recognizing an increasingly real bargaining situation. For that reason the_CSBA leadershipdecided to become the "only school boardassociation in the country to support a collective bargaining bil'.(9)."

18 125 This move proved to be divisive in terms of CSBA'sown

membership and its alliancewith the school administrators

in ACSA. Several CSBAstaff people described the"sales

jobs required due topthe "internal resistence"evidenced by

many local boards. They noted tha thesales job involved

emphasizing the dangers of the more comprehensive

alternative bills and the shortcomings of the status quo definitiol of thescope of bargaining.

This shift by CSBA took ACSA by surprise. An official of ACSA described theresponse:

ACSA was out on a limbswe were opposed to collective bargaining whenthe school boards came out in support. We re- examined our position ina hurry. After a lotofsoul searching and internal conflict, we got together withCSBA. We said we would also support a bill with: limited scope anda strong statement of management rights...(10)

So thanks to the decisionof the CSBA, and the acquiesence of ACSA, the thorny issue of a bargaining bill--in principle--was resolved infavor.

Sen. Rodda.acknowledged the significance of this step in a speech delivered afterpassage:

The leadership representing the School Boards and the School Administrators had to travel about the state educating their people andurging them to take a more positive attitude toward' the legislation. And I commend them for that effort; without that support I never could have obtained the kind of support for the bill tnat emerged. (11)

19 126 Thus by 1975, the major groups in school labor

management relations (the California School Boards

Association and the California Teachers Association) were

prepared to seek changes inthe Winton Act. The CS3A set a

highpriority on obtaining a more limited scope of

WO bargaining, and specifying other management rightsmore explicitly. Furthermore, the leadership ofCS3A--although not all its membership--waswilling to concede some extension of employee bargainingrights in trade. The CTA, for its part, wantedbargaining rights for its members. In short, dissatisfactionwith the WintonAct had been augmented to a point thata new law seemed likely.

Strategic Choices

Whilecircumstances favored a reconsideration of the

Winton Act and its "meetand confer" system, a number of obstacles remained before new educational labor legislation could be passed. Although the school lobby couldagree that the Winton system required overhauling, their individual analyses of what waswrong and how it should be fixed varied considerably. It seemed unlikely that tio school lobby, given its internal divisions, could--throughvoluntary coordination alone--achieve agreement on legislation to replace the Winton Act.

What was needed to overcome the obstacles to legislation was an entrepreneur who would take the

20 127 responsibility for assemblying the required coalition of

supporters, and devisinga strategy for using the materials

provided by the school lobby in a creative and effective

fashion. In this section, I will brieflydescribe Sen.

Rodda's role as that entrepreneur, andthe selection of a strategy that relied upon the bill to create the coalition of supportersnecessary for passage.

An Entrepreneur: Sen. Albert Rodda, and his staff,

performed the important policy entrepreneurial function in

this case (12). Basically,a policy entrepreneur is someone who assembles the rawmaterial providedby thediverse motivations of others into a workable, cooperative

enterprise. PerforMing the functionrequires knowledgeof

what the actors rant,what they will accept, thecredibility

of negotiateas well as the power to enforceagreements once made. Sen. Rodda and his stafftogether fit these

requirements. He had the formal position ofChairman of the

Senate Education Committee,a committee through which nearly all other legislationof interest to the schoollobby had to pass providinggroups with an incentive to maintain his goodwill. Se was respected for hisknowledge and integrity by other members of the legislature (he was later selected as Chairman of the Finance Committee). Both he and his staff, notably his aide JohnSukey, had over time developed considerable knowledge about the constellationof interests by school labor legislation. This information came

21 128 from earlier legislative initiatives, undertaken by Rodda

and others, that had servedto fill-out their conceptualmap

of the issue area (13).

In addition to his personal attributes, circumstances

worked to provide Sen. Roddawith a chance to playa central

role. After the replacement of Gov.Reagan, who has opposed

public sectorcollective bargaining, withGov. Jerry Brown,

observers believed that a comprehensive public sector

bargaining law vat imminent. Such a law would, of course,

had subsumed educationand left little room, for a more

narrowly draw lawarisingout ofthe schoollobby. Over

several years, however, the negotiationsbetween labor_and management. groupshadrepeatedlybrokendown and Gov.

Brown's ardor fora comprehensive liw had cooled. While it appeared for a time during the 1975 session thAtSen. Dills more comprehensive bill wouldpass, thateffort too collapsed. The fate of the Dills billaffected Rodda's role in two ways. First, the prospect that itmight eventually pass led somegroupsnotably the school boards--to view

Rodda's effortsmore favorably because they believedthat a comprehensive bill wouldbe less sensitive to their special needs than aone drawn specially for education. Second, the demise of\the Dills billprovided Rodda with the chance to advance his bill as the single vehicle forachieving a new law, thus remedying the perceived ills of the "meet and

22 129 confer' system.

A al:atm: Sen. Rodda, his staff, and others had

repeatedly called iris' billand the strategy thatproduced it a "consensus" approach. By that they meant thatthe bill

was supported by most of thediverse groups thatconstitute

OP the school lobby. The desire to achieve aconsensus was, according toone former Rodda aide, thecore of his approach to politics:

Sen. Rodda stakeshis effectiveness on integrity. Be wantsparties to reach a consensus, and he wouldn'tcarry a bill unless everyone agreed....(14)

Integrity, in thissense, meant that a bill he carried is one that had -the backing of relevant partiesand so the notion ofconsensus legislation was one that is fused with the Senator's belief about the nature of hisown effectiveness. In addition, other interviewees discussing the bill as a "consensus" bill alluded to the common assumption that a labor bill that was backedby both labor and management was one that the partiescan "live-with" in practice. All of these characterizat.%ons of "consensus" imply a degree ofcomprehensive agreementon the part of the parties.

For analytic purposes, it is useful togo beyond the surface characterization of Sen. Rodda's strategy as a

"consensus" approach. The term is somewhatmisleading in that "consensus" implieswidespread agreement. The actual

23 130 behavior of both of the Rodda team and the school looby indicates that the nature ofagreement was more fragmented.

While the partiesultimately agreed to a singlebill, they

agreed to it for many different reasons. One observer wrote: spa As eventually passed by the Assembly,...., the bill contained amendments sufficientto gather support from nearlyall the interested parties, including the California Teachers Association, the California School Boards Association, the California Federation of Teachers (AFL-CIO), the Association of CaliforniaSchool Administrators, and the Service Employees International Union (AFL- CIO), plus others. Completeopposition was forthcoming only from the smallProfessional Educators Group; the California School Employees Associationhad enoughobjections to withhold active support(15).

A descriptivelyaccurate characterization ofthe_Rodda strategy is that it relied uponusing specific bill provisions as the instruments for assemblims9.' sufficient coalition to pass it. The bill, in short, wouldconstruct the coalition that would pass it. Severalassumptions underlay thisapproach. First, a bill restricted to education would confine political activityto the attentive

public. Second, such a bill would pass, in the absence of more comprehensive legislation, if it could get widespread

support from the most importantmanagement and labor groups of the school lobby. Third, while the diversityof the school lobby precluded a ,truly "consensus" approach, the very specificity of group goals might be used constructively. Each group wanted to replace "meet and

24 131 confer" with "something else,"and each believedthat they

were disadvantaged by continuingthe statusquo. While. each wanted something from a new system, those things differed. The problem, then, was to use those items most preferredby each groupto gain their support for a package. This, of course, meant that some trade-offs would have to be made through the acceptance of undesirable items. The Rodda strategyaRpears to combine two approaches Zamiliar to political. scientists: the minimum winning coalition and commitment strategy (16). Sen. Rodda and his staffmade surethrough bargaining and negotiations--that the bill contained items that each' importantgroup considereda high priority. After the failureof thecompeting comprehensive bargaining bill, the Rodda bill constituted theonly plausible vehicle for the achievement ofthose goals. Rodda made clear that he would not continue to sponsor the bill unless the major groups continued their support. Realistically the chances for the bill'ssuccess, whatever the sponsorship, depended upon the continuedsupport of the major employer and employee groups. In short, the school groups found themselves part of a minimum winningcoalition. The defection of any singlepartner would signalthe end of the coalition's chance for success. Thus, the bargaining power of -.each participant was at its height. ht the same time, another factor worked to control their demands. They were engaged in a mixed-motive, non-zerosum game with one

25 another: a failure to stay togetherwould createa situation

in which each would lose somethingthat was valued. Rodda

was thus. in a position effectively to commit himselfto his

bill, and fight backanyfurther demandsforconcessions using as a resource thevery tenuousness of the coalition he

AP led.

The Bill and Its Coalition

The various features of theRodda Act will be described in this section. Each major element will bediscussed in terms of its political function,that is the contributionit made to the bill's finalcoalition of elpporters. The items to be discussed in this section are theright to bargain, the specification of thescope of bargaining, the exclusion of employees from thecoverage of the act a: the special treatmentaccorded to supervisoryemployees, and other issues (17).

1. The Right, to Bargain: A seriesof provisions in the Rodda Actestablish the right of public employees to bargain thereby compellingpublic employers to bargain with them. Without going into detail, the right to bargain is established in the following fashion. While under the

Anton Act, public educational employeesenjoyed the right to join unions and other employeeorganizations, the Rodda

Act provides for the certification of a single employee organization as theexlusive bargaining agent for employees

26 133 within a given unit. School boards must negotiateonly with the employee unit that receivesthe designation of exclt ive

representative. Negotiationsmust be conducted on all

matters within the 'statutorily defined scope of

representation for scope of bargaining). And these

OP negotiationsmust be conducted in "goOd faith." The Act

further authorizes the parties to enter into "written

agreements" resulting from those negotiations. In short, theRodda Act established a formal system of collective bargaining by providing for an exclusive employee representative, and by compellingschool boards to bargain "in good faith" withthat representative.

This item was, ofcourse, acentral goal on the labor side of the coalition. The California TeachersAssociation believed it stood togain bothmembers and additionalpower with the coming, ofcollectivebargaining.' The Service

Employees International Union, with itslarge urban local, also stood to make somegainsalthough the numerical advantage ofthe California School Employees Association would put it at a disadvantage 4n statewide competition.

Both CTA and SEIU supportedthe Rodda Act primarily because they believed that itwas the best available vehicle for the achievement of bargaining rights. While the California

Federationof Teachers and California School Employees

Association agreed, inprinciple, that collectivebargaining was desirable bothwere less enthusiastic about the Rodda

27 134 Act. Both CFT and CSEAexpressed greater support for the

comprehensive Dills bill. Despite these differences,it is

clear that the Rodda provisions for collective bargaining

constituted ailf-^'`.d appeal for the support ofemployee

organization and that appeal was responded to by the

enthusiastic support of thelargest employeegroup (CTA) and

succeeded in muting themisgivings of otheremployee groups.

On the employer side, the acceptanceofcollective

bargaining--required by law--constituted an important

concession. The California School BoardsAssociation, in

thewords of one of its official, "became the only school boards association in the entire country to support a collective bargaining bill." Perhaps a closer characterization was theone made by a former Rodda staffer,

sympathetic to the CSBAposition, who said that CSBA Accepted a bargaining lawin order to geta limited scope of bargaining and a strong statementof management rights.

There may have been,in addition, other proximate spurs for CSBA to accept bargaining. One official pointedto the prospect that some form ofbargaining was inevitable:

"The Berman and Dill's Billswere a problem. The teachers were supportingthe more extreme The most restrictive billwas the one preferred by CSBA.

In short.; the key to CSBA's acceptance ofcollective bargaining in the Roddabill rest:.; on its abilityto achieve gains in the bill'sother provisions.

28 135 2. Scope: An important issuewas that of scope. The Rodda Act reads:

'3543.2. The Scope of,reoresentationshall be limited to matters relating to wages, houri37Tml7yment, and other terms and conditions of employment. 'FFEirs and ar0171.ons of employment'mean health welfare benefits leave and transfer policies, safety conditionsof employment, class size, procedures to be used for the evaldation of employees, organizational security... procedures for processing grievances.... All matters not specifically enumerated are reserved to thepublic school eMployer and may not be the su pet ofmeetin naps;:iting7PrFacied tnat notffing erein may be coastrued the right of the .employer to consult withany...employee organization on any matter outside the scope of , representation...." (emphasisagcle44.

Basically the statutoryor case law statement of the scope

of bargaining (or representation as theRodda Act calls it)

determines what the parties are compelled to discuss in their negotiations. The Rodda Act contains a restrictive

formulationof scope because it lists several items and reserves all other subjects to the employer (13). One

reporter stated conciselythe political issue presented by scope:

Scope of bargaining: Just what can be bargained is a key issue Generally speaking, it is to management's interest to have the scope of bargaining drawn as narrowly and specifically as possible; for labor the reverse istrue (19)

The California School Boards Association had as its main purpose a bill twat would restrict the scope of

29 bargaining. Their positionwas shared by the Usociation'of

California School Administration (ACSA). A CSSA lobbyist

expressed his Organization'sdissatisfaction withthe status quo and its remedy_:

The Winton Act required-thatthe school board 'meet And confer' with employee organizations'. After the SanJuan and Yuba City decitions,we were required to 'meetand confer' about everything. So we supporteda bill, SB 160, that would limit thescope of bargaining 'towages, hours, and conditionsof elaployment.

Typically, employers prefer a restricted listof mandatory,

or required, subjects ofbargaining or representation. Such a list is meant to restrict the scope to enumerated items

thereby reserving allother matters to the governing. board. Like other public employers the schoolboards believed that increased scopediminished thr citizen'scontrol over government.

Public sector employeeorganizations, for their part, tend to bemore interested in wide scope than their private sector counterplarts. The California School Employees

Association, representing non-educational schoolemployees, ultimately opposed SB 160 because of limitedscope. A CSEA lobbyist explained:.

CSEA wanted wider scope in the Rodda Act.'i..When the bill got through we were frustrated at what was non-oargainable. (Why?) Take classifications, these are important to our members [the job claszification system of civil service

30 137 employees]. And lay off procedures,teachers 'already have good protectionin the law, they are told by the end of the school tear ef whether or not they will havea job. We get only a thirty day noticeand that is waivable when unforseeablerersons occur. The- CTA and AFT, the teachersorganizations, also

expressed some reservations-AFT's objectionswere somewhat stronger' that those of CTAwhich wasmore committed to getting the bill through. All CFT lobbyist said:

We ham strong reservationsabout the scope of bargaining, and wewould like to see it amended and expanded. (How?) Supply budgets, for example,we need paper to work. Everything notenumerated in thebill is reserved. to the schoolboards. In short, CFT believed--likeothers--that the bill effectively narrowedscope to enumerated. items,

The CSBAand ACSA postionwas seen by the participants as having prevailed. The RoddaAct specifies a short list of mandatory subjects ofbargaining: "wages, hours of employment and other terms andconditions of employment." But the labor side succeeded in broadening the scope of further defining "terms and conditions ofemployment." The expanded list includes items that management could have considered to be within their prerogativessuch as: leave and transfer policies, class size,procedures for employee evaluation. In addition, matters of organizational security--affecting the well-being of the orgdnization representing employees (membership requirements, the

31 138 collection of dues, etc.)--are also included under the term.

Finally, a permissive list of items on which the exclusive

representative of employeesmay. consult (but without a right

to do so) goes further to include: the definition of educational objectives, determinationr ofcourse content and curriculum, and the selection oftextbooks (subject to legal limitations). Finally, the Act specifies "allmatters not specifically enumeratedare reserved to the employer andmay notbe a subject of meeting and negotiating" (unless the employer chooses to negotiate them).

Interestingly, the disputeover the scope of bargening centered on the precise languageof the statute (20). The belief, shared byall participants, was_that the _language could determine whatwas actually negotiated when the law went' intoeffect. As it turned'out, however, the distinctionbetween items within and without scope was increasingly blurred through localpractices, PER3 decisions and by the courts. The problemwas that the language, despite its apparent precision, dealtwith a vague world which many policyconsiderations (reserved for management) could be interpretedas haying an impact on employee working conditions. Upon passage, a CSBAofficial expressed his fear about what wouldhappen during implementation.

*Perhaps the biggest potential problem, aside from money, is thescope of bargaining. According to executive directorJoe Brooks of the California School BoardsAssociation, his

32 139 organization insistedany compromise bill had to keep educational policy off the negotiating table. Re feels these subjects should be keptopen for the public. Employee groupsapparentlyhave the attitude that power will determinewhich topicscome up during bargaining(21).

The bill'sscope provisions were, in short, written to favor management. Yet there were concessions to laborin the extended list of enumerated items. In the language of the statute there was little ambiguityabout the superior

position obtained bymanagement, but the disadvantagedlabor aide could bide itstime for an assault on these provisions during implementation.

3. Exemptions:. The issue of who was not allowed to bargain (exemptions from the protectionsof the law)was the critical one for school. administrators. The fate of school administrators was shaped in large measure bythese provisions of thelaw but few' participants thought

explicitly about principalsand assistant principalsas they worked out thespecific language.

The Rodda Act excludesfrom its coverage two .ypes of school employees,manager and confidential employees, and restricts the participation ofa third type (supervisors)to bargaining tnrough units separate from rank and file employee units. Management and confidential employees are excluded from bargainingrights:

3542.4. No person serving in a management position or a confidential

33 140 position shall be represented byan exclusive representative. Any person serving in sucha position shall have the right to represent himself individually or by an employee organization.... No representative shall be permitted by a public school employerto meet and negotiateon any benefit or compensation paid to persons serving in a management or a conf:dential position.*

The Act defines these employeesas:

"3540.1 (g) 'Management employee'means any employee in a position having significant responsibilities for formulating district . policies or administering district programs..."

"3540.1 (c) 'Confidential employee' means any employee who, in the regularcourse ofhis duties, has access to, or possesses information relating to, his employer's employeremployee relations."

Undisputed examples of management employees are high districtofficialswhoconstitute the "superintendent's cabinet," confidential employees include secretaries and other assistants tomanagers.

The Rodda Act does describe anothertype of employee- - supervisory employees--as separatefrom all other employees, but unlike management and confidential employees, supervisors have bargaining rights. A supervisory employee was defined functionally as:

"354U.1 (m) ...any employee, regardless of jobdescription, having authority in the interest of the employer to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall,promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or the responsibility to assign work to and direct them, or to adjust their

34 141 grievances or effectivelyto recommend such action, if, in connectionwith the foregoing functions, the exerciseof such authority is notof a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment."

In addition, theAct restricted their rarticipation to

bargaining through unitsmeeting specificrequirements:

"3545.2 A negotiating unitof supervisory employees shall not beappropriate unless it includes all supervisory employeesemployed by thedistrict and shall notbe represented by the same employee organization as employeeswhom the supervisory employees supervise.

3545.3 Classified employees andcertificated employeesshall not be included in the same negotiating unit." In short, the test for supervisoryemployees used a functionalone based on languagevery similar to the

National Labor RelationsAct (although NLRA differsfrom the

Rodda Act in thatit excludessupervisors from coverage).

And the Rodda Act requiredsupervisors to bargain through units separate from those of the rank and file' and prohibited the mixing of certificated and certified personnel in thesame supervisory unit.

The issue ofexclusion, who isto be ineligible to bargain, is one that usually does not divide labor and management in principle. But there are often divisions in practice. A California Federationof Teachers lobbyist, for example, noted that management was entitled to a core of employees loyal to it in order to meettheir obligations to

35 142 bargain in the board's behalf. The CSHA and ACSA,on the

employer-management side, wanted a substantial management

exclusion --the basisfor a "managementteam"--as a necessity for a workable collective bargaining law. Despite such agreement, there weredifferences between the positions.

These differenceswere summarized by areporter:

Management wants supervisorial,confidential and managerialpersonnel very carefully described and, generallyspeaking, doneso in a way asto exempt the. maximum number of employees; for labor, the reverse is true. In either case, thereason is one of relative power: Management wants to protect its ability tocarry on in the event of a strike or lockout, and laborwants to strengthen its ability to witholdworker's services.(22)

In the private sector, the eligibilityline has been drawnbetween rank and file employees and all other employees. Thus the private sectormodel excludes from bargaining all employees above those inthe rank and file. Indeed, the WagnerAct was amended by Taft Hartley specifically to exclude union activityon the partof foremen and othersupervisory employees(23). Many states have," howeve4, dealt with publicsector superviosrs differently in their laws regulating public employees. CuIrrentlyrof the 31 stateshav;nopublic employee bargaining laws affectingeducation, 24 permit publicsector supervisors to bargain.

Supervisors in thepublic sectorare a large and rather amorphous category. In education alone, such agroup might

36 143 arguably include: for certificated personnelsuch people.as assistant superintendents, curriculum supervisors, principals and assistant principals,department heads; for classified personnel, the list extends from assistant

business managers to head custodians. It is often argued that many public sector supervisors, unlike those in the private sector, exercise relativelylittle discretion ofthe type associated withmanager. Drawing the boundaries between those permitted and not permitted to bargain,then, often involvesdeciding what kinds ofmiddle management personnel to includeand to exclude.

The treatment of supervisorsdid not poseas important a point of contention as the scope ofbargaining issue. There were, however, differencesbetween labor and Management positions on thecoverageof supervisors. The "classified" employee organizations had supervisors within their memberships. In addition, a group of San Francisco school administrators, mostly principals, existedand they lobbied an behalfof bargaining rights for themselves. Other labor organizations representing "certificated" personnel were less involved. CTA had, over the years, become mainly a teachers organization. And AFTexpressed some ambivalence, one lobbyist told us: organization. And

AFT expressedsome ambivalence,one lobbyist told us:

We are not delighted. But it is not a bad idea. Administrators havea dual role. In

37 144 bargaining theyare part of management. They enforce the agreement. jn small district, they are part ofmanagement. In any event, neither CT.nor CFT made bargaining rightsfor school administratorsas important a priorityas CSEA or SEIU.

Reservations aboutsupervisory bargaining rights were expressed by CSSAand ACSA both concerned about the shrinking of the "management team" and about the practical effects (the capacity to run schools during stri, and the ability to enforcebargained agreements)of inclusion.

The management side,despite opposition inprinciple to supervisory bargaining, chose to do little about it.. A school board lawyersaid:

We, the school boards,preferred to have no vague area. There was a fear that the supervisorswere going to gowith the teachers in the larger districts.

A representative for the Association of California School Administrators stated flatly that they wereopposed to bargaining for school administrators at that time. Despite these .Misgivings themanagement sidedid little to make the explicitexclusion of principals part of the Rodda Act.

Several explanationsexist for this.' It was not clear from the statutory languagethat principals would indeed get the right to bargain. Even if theydid, no one expectedmany principals to exercise that righteven if it were granted. And finally, the issue was too small to sacrifice other

38 145 goals--particularly in the scope of representation during negotiations.

The Rodda staff had both principled and practical

reasons for engineering the compromise of providing

supervisors with bargainingrights exercised through units separate from those of rant and file employees. As to

principle, several staffmembers alluded to theirdesire to

increase choices forschool supervisors. One said:

We made attempts to give leverage formiddle managementbynarrowly definingmanagement. If youarenot management, then you can bargain. Principalshad a choice,' if they werenot going to be part of the management team, they could bargain. In Los Angeles, the superintendent intimidated the supervisors. -so they declared themse ves management. In San Francisco theywere re sophisticated and more labor oriented. Principalsdon't knowwhich role to play: they fight downtown butdon'treally like being adversarial

In addition, practical reasons reinforced this commitmenton the part of the Roddastaff. Specifically, thecomposition of CSEA and SEIU--both of which included supervisors in their membershipnecessitated some recognitionof the right of supervisorsto bargain. While it is possible that they might have defined the right of"classified" supervisorsto bargain narrowly, another consideration was also present.

The situation in SanFrancisco provided the Roddastaff with the incentive to keep the status of supervisorsas a broad group in the bill. One staff member said:

39 146 San Francisco hada supervisory union. And we were concerned about SanFrancisco. T1 y had the potential tomake trouble. In its final form, the Rodda Actcontained a broadly

written exclusion formanagement and confidentialemployees. These were acceptable to both the employer and employee groups. Indeed, the very broadness of the management exclusion could be interpreted as coveringprincipals. Next the Act provided supervisoryemployees withbargaining rights. This was a priorityfor the classifiedemployee unionsand it was not a significant enough issue for management groups to endanger the compromise bill.

Certificated, administrativepersonnel--mainlyprincipals-- had their status left in an ambiguousform. Supervisor was defined funCtionallyratherthanby title. Thus the status of principalswas arguable, leaving those supporting and opposing principalsbargaining to interpret it either way. Finallythe restrictionson the Kinds of units supervisors mightjoin provided material for other conflicting interpretations about its practical effects. The requirement for separate unitswas seen as an obstacle to organizing principals. The trouble of setting up a separable unit, forcertificated supervisors, coupled with the prospect of small gainwere expected to discourage much organizing of principals.

Thus, the requi ments of 41' coalition building mighthave introduced, with respect to the bargaining rights of

40 147 principals, a degree of ambiguity in the law. It 'was, in

the short run, not in the interests ofthe various parties to resolve that ambiguity. Each side chose to interpretthe outcome as one that favored them, but some of these

intexpretationswere in practical conflict withothers. Other issues: The,Rodda staff negotiated other compromises on the bill's remaining features. 'Organizational securitymatters--involving the nature of dues or other employee contributions to exclusive

representatives--were left to individual bargaining situations. Impasse procedures--what to do in case of failure during bargaining--were, for the most part, left somewhat vague. No right to strikewas created by statute, and a host of other impasseprocedures--fact finding, the capacity to agree to compulsoryarbitration, etc.--were enumerated but not required. For the mostpart these compromises were seen as favoringmanagement marginallymore than labor. Management had long opposedagency or union shop arrangements and the right to strike for public employees. Another issue revolvedaround the specification of "unfair labor practices," and the enforcement of those provisions. Typically, employerorganizations oppose a detailed listing ofsuch practices--usuallyfailure to live up to the-,provisions ofthe labor law (e.g.the Rodda Act)-- because it is unions who generally bringsuch proceedings against employers. Thus the listing of practices and

41. 148 .provisions for their enforcementconstitute a compromise that favors laborover management.

Summary

The foregoing discussion of the Rodda Act indicates

that each of its majorprovisions produceda specific reason

for a group tosupport it. Employer organizationsgot some things they wanted badly at the expense of accepting

provisions desired byemployee organizations andvice versa.

It should be clear that itwas the specific elements inthe bill that drew the different groups to support it rather

than a consensus that the system represented by the Rodda

Act was the most desirableone. Indeed such a strategy of

coalitionbuilding, he use of the bill's provisions to

/ . create the coalition; thatsupported it, might havebeen the

optimal pane for a leg'slative environment characterized by

diverse dissatisfacti4)ns with the status quo of theWinton

/ system, and by groups representing conflicting interests. 1124,3 represents the various major provisionsof the Rodda ct along with thegroups who were most for those provisions

and those opposing groups who accepted them despite misgivings in orderto achieve`other goals.

42 149 01.E..3 1 PROVISIONS GROUPS FOR GROUPS The rightof school WILLING TOCONCEDE employeesto bargain All employeegroupi throughexclusive except forthe minor CSBA, ACSA bargainingunits ProfessionalEducators Group Limit thescope of representation CSBA, ACSA CTA, CFT, (bargaining) SEIU, CSEA(with strongreservations). Exclusionof management andconfidential CSBA, ACSA No significant . employees opposition I from employee organizations Supervisorybargaining rights SEIU, CSEA, San Francisco CSBA, ACSA admihistrators group Impasseprocedures short ofthe rightto CSBA, ACSA strike CTA, CSEA,SEIU

Organizationalsecurity itemsnegotiable CTA, CSEA,SEIU, CFT. (Wouldhave CSBA, ACSA prefeJ6redunionor agency shop) Specificationof unfair labor practices CTA, CSEA, SEIU, CFT CSBA

151 150 A number of conclusionscan bedrawn form thepassage of the Rodda Act in California. First, the legalstatus of school administrator bargaining was shaped by actors who were preoccupied with other issues or who. focus was on other supervisory employees. While manyof the actors-- particularly the unions and Rodda--were interested in extending bargaining rights toas many people as possible there was little direct pressure (aside from thatexerted by the San Francisco principalsgroup) to includeeducational middle managers. It is clear that an ambiguous status for school administratorswas the price that bothmanagment and labor were willing to pay in order to achieveother, far more important, goals.

Second, California policymakersresponded to theirown environment, and their own politicalneeds indealing with the supervisory bargaining issue, rather than drawing directlyfrom the National Labor Relations,Act. Some observershave suggested that the national model of supervisory exclusion would be a logicalone to adopt. And while the legislatorsdiddrawupon NLRA language-- to definemanagement and supervisory employees-- they felt quite free to differentiatebetween the private sector's practices and theirown plans for the publicsector. Third, it was obvious that the coalition ofgroups supporting the Rodda Act were not in basic agreement and failed to press the basic differencesamong them on the

43 152 issue of supervisory collective bargaining. The wording of the law avoided openly granting or denyingthe right to bargain; instead, the statute differentiated between managerial and supervisory employees (in a fashion that could conceivably excludeprincipals as managers), and denied supervisors the 'tight to join rank-and-file organizations. Ambiguity about the principals role was apparently a pricemost were willingto pay to achieve their other ends.

These and other issues raised by the RoddaActwere to be dealt with during the law's implementation. The next. chapter details the roleof the PublicEmployment Relations Board (originally entitled the Education Employment Relations Board, or EERB) in making sense of theof the statute. There is also some evidence from interviews that neither the management nor labor (pro-supervisory bargaining) groups were pleased withthe results: the school board in San Francisco feltthat law was too strong in its support of supervisory bargaining mnJ the United Administrators of San Francisco felt the law too weak and unspecified. Once the lawwas adopted, each side could be expected to press itsown favored interpretation.

The next step inthe policyprocess was implementation, as the EERB began to grapple with the meaningof the law for local administrators. This topic is treatedin chapter IV.

44 153 Footnotes

1. For a discussionof politicalmaps, see Arnold J. Meltsner, "PoliticalFeasibility and PolicyAnalysis," Public Administration Review, No. 6 (Nov.-Dec.,1972). 2. Arnold Meltsner,John Kramer, GregoryKast, Robert T. Nakamura, Feasibl=411.Zcho9.1 Finance Eel= 1.1.Cali/prrila New York: Praeger,1972). For a description of California legislative practices,see George Blair and HoustonFlournoy, LegislativeBodies In California (Belmont,-California:Dickenson. 1967). 3. Robert T. Nakamura,Schools, "Informationand the Policy Process", unpublished dissertation, Dept. ofPolitical Science, Universityof California,Berkeley, 1975,

4 Arnold Meltsnerand Robert T.Nakamura, "The Political Implications of i " in John Pincus,ed., School Finance in Tank tts,(Cambridge,Mass: Ballinger. 1975), 5. See Charles Lindblom, "The Science of Through,'" taaniatratiailElzw (19), pp. 79-88.For a Ifilci:sionof Lindblom's assumptions , see Ian Lustick, "Explaining the VariableUtility of Disjointed Incrementalism," AmericanPolitical Science Review (Vol. 74),RD. 342-353 6. For a discussion of that system,see Institute for Industrial Relations,"ProceedJags of Conference:The Meyers - Milian -Brownand Winton Acts:Major Issues in Public Employee Relations,"Jan. 21, 1971.

7. See Gordon Winton,"Memorandum on the Historyof the Winton Act," dated 5/26/67. By 1972, eight states (Calif., Idaho, Kansas,Minnesota. Missouri.Montana, Oregon) had adopted some versionof the meet andconfer approach, Lee Shaw, "The see Development of State andFederal Laws." in S. Zaponia. ed., York: American Ealtilija.arLLEkeildPublicUr...... fTriions (New Assembly, ColumbiaUniversi 7, 2). 8. ZjaalemIlgapersAssociation v. San JuanSchool Algtrict, Yuba CityUnified EducationAssociation V. e Bogyd of Trustees of theYuba City Un5.fied "ahool_ District 44 A3d2377777)

9. California School BoardsAssociation interviewee. 10. Association of California SchoolAdministrators interviewee.

11. Sen. Albert S. Rodda, "Breakthroughin California" (extemporaneous remarks)in Frederic Meyers,ed., .The 1.12Astig_Lai, (Los Angeles: Institute of IndustrialRelations, 154 University of California,Los Angeles, 1976),p. 16. 12. For a discussion of policy'entrepeneurship, see Eugene Bardach, The SkillFactor In Politics (Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress, 1972). 13. For a review of this and otherlegislative attempts,see Bruce Keppel. "TheCollective BargainingIssues." California Journal (April,1975),pp. 119-138; and Brice Keppel,"From a Sure Thingto Let's Wait and See," California Journal (November.1975),pp. 394-396 .14. Interviewwith Rodda aide. 15. David J. Bowen. "New CollectiveNegotiations Act for California PublicSchools," CaliforniaPublic Employee Relations (December.19751, 11713. For or examples ;TIMInTtrategy,see Meltsner and Nakamura. Stephen I. Bailey op.cit., and and Edith Moshmr. ;SEA:The Office of, ducation AdministersA Law (Syracuse,New York: Syracuse University Press, 19;8),chapters 1-3.

16. WilliamGammon, "A Theoryof Coalition Formation." American SociolculicalRevi= Aug. 1961,pp.; 373-382, thomas Schelling,The Strategy ofConflict (Cambridge: Harvard.University Press,1970).. 17. Summarized from Senate Bill 160,appr-oved by theGovernor, September 22, 1975,filed with the Secretaryof.State on Sept. 22, 1975. For a further discussion,see Felicitas Hinman, ed., Collective Bargaining in CaliforniaPublic Education, BB 160--The Rodda Act, Policyand Practice Papers presented ata statewide conference heldin Los Angeles, Dec. 5-6, 1975,sponsored by the Institutefor Industrial Relations,University of California,Los Angeles (Los Angles: Institute for IndustrialRelations, 1976). 18.,For a survey of state laws andtheir treatment Ofscope, see John Pisapia, "TheLegal Basis of!Administration Bargaining," unpublishedpaper, 1979.

19. Keppel, "TheCollective BargainingIssues," op.cit. 20. See Paul Prasow, "Understanding the RoddaAct." in Felicitas Hinman,ed.Collective Basslialn41aLuill Service in Public Em loment: 11...ri os Ange fe: nstitute for IndustrialRelations, 1976). 21. Leah Cartabruno, "Yet AnotherBargaining Board With Massive Financial Problems," CaliforniaJournal , April, 1976,p. 124. 22. Bruce Keppel, "The CollectiveBargaining Issues: Who Is Covered, Scope ofNegotiations, ResolvingDeadlocks," in

155 S2:112allaauall,April 1975,p. 119. 23. See Subcommitteeon Labor, Committeeon Labor and Public Welfare. LegislativeHistory of theLabor Management Relations Act, 1947(Washington: Office. 1974). Government Printing

24. Pisapia.22.211. CHAPTER IV

IMPLEMENTING SCHOOLADMINISTRATOR BARGAININGPOLICY

This chapter details the implementationphase of the labor relations process at the state level (1). The groups

concerned are those atthe local school districtlevel whose

behavior is supposedto be shaped by the lawiand those at

the state level suchas thequasi-judicial 'dor lawbodies

(such as California'sPublic Employee Relations Board) who

are given the legal responsibilityto interpret the law. As the previous chapter indicated, the law was a political documentwhich contained as many contradictions and ambiguities aswerenecessary to achieve agreement. This - --- meant that the implementation of the Rodda Act, or any complex piece of educational labor legislation is itself a significant phase. Thereal meaningof a piece of school labor legislation is defined in how its requirementsare actut!lly applied in the world. In this instance, the fate of educational supervisors and what they(and others) were permitted to bcrgain overconstituted two of the most important issues left to the implementation phase for resolution.

This chapterhas several purposes. First, it will point out the central roleplayed by an administrativebody

(the PERB) whichhas functional counterparts in every state that has public employee collectivebargaining. As school

157 supervisors become involved in collective bargaining--a system bounded by legal rights and obligations--more of their legal fate will be decided bysuch tribunals. Second, the chapter will discuss the important role of political coalitions in shaping,PERB decisions,which in turn shape the legal environment inwhich schoolemployees exercise their rights. In the case of California, two important decisions by PERB will be emphasized because they demonstrate the power of theagency to fundamentally shape the meaning of the law and to definewho it covers. Third, wewill introduce some comparativematerial-- drawn from anotherstate in similarcircumstances (Florida)-- to indicate the political limits within whichPERBs operate.

California's RoddaAct

The 1975 Rodda Act became effective in increments during the first six mouths of 1976. Responsibility for overseeing its implementation--interpreting provisions, certifying bargaining groups, adjudicating grievances and other disputes, and generally make theAct work --was given to a board created by the Act: the Educational Employee 'Relations Board (EERB which was later renamed the Public Employee RelationsBoard or PERB).

PERB workedthrough regional staffs who dealt directly with local school districts and employeeorganizations, The full Board served as an appeals and administrative body.

2 158 Hence, while the regional board staffs handledmuch of the regular contactwith the field, the statebody determined the framework of rules and interpretations within local districts andunions worked.

A numberof workshave dealt with the quantitative outputs ofthe system as organized by PERB (2). Other studies have chronicled PERB's internal difficulties, emphasizing the splits and dissension which characterized the membership of the board (3). In our research, thePERB becomes a vital instrument in defining policiesduring the implementation. Whileone canargue thatwhile some definingand clarificationoccur at all levels--local, regional, and state--it remains clearthat the statelabor board's decisions are distinguishable from the individual

interpretations andadjustments of localnegotiations and thenarrowly applicable decisions of regional hearing officers.

In effect, PERB decisions--unless overturnedby the courts in those instances where judicial review is permitted--have the same standing as the statute in regulating labor-managementrelations. For that reason, the focus of this section will be on important PERB decisions that have structured and defined the meaningof the Rodda Act. This interpretive activityby PERB, in the view of nearly all actors interviewed, hassubstantially altered the meaning of the Act. Indeed, one PERS member has contended

3 159 that the system of PEPSand court decision-makingwhich grew

up around the Rodda Act hastaken on a life of its own and

empowered participants--lawyers wholitigate and negotiate

on behalf of the partiesat both the local andstate levels- -in educational decision- making (4).

The specifictheoretical question posed by the Rodda Act is how a coalition building strategy basedon specific appeals to a disparate public willinfluence the further

definition of policyduring implementation. For reasons specified in the previous chapter, we believe that' such

coalitionswill characterize the groups thatshape school

labor lib, andhence thebargainingrights of school

administrators-- in thestates. To deal with this question,.

this chapter is dividedinto the followingsections: First, it begins with a brief definition of thediscretion which legislators delegateto PERB through the formulationof law.

Specifically, the discretionwas passed down in several forms: a formal delegation ofthe power to interpret the statute; and informal and even inadvertent delegations in the form of same contradictoryprovisions andvague phrases. supporting coalitions whichpassed the Rodda bill.

Second, there is a discussion of the political discretion delegated toPERB through the dissolution of the coalition ;'tat passed the law in the first place. As our

Florida comparison case will demonstrate, the absence of a powerful coalition standing behind a statute's original 160 meaning is quite significant indetermininghow much leeway an administrative tribunal has to re-write a law during implementation. Third, we will turn to an analysis oftwo important .:aces (involving scope and administrator bargaining rights)which indicatehow PERB has used its freedomand authority to interpret and thus change the meaning and impact of the statute. Fourth, a comparison between the California and Florida experience is made to indicate how a.similar law and situationcan vary in its outcomes and results.

Delegation of Discretionr.o PERB

The Rodda Act gave to the labor board (the EERB/PERB) the statutory discretion to interpret the meaningand intent of the Act. Because the law was a new one, 'the slate was relatively clean. Thus the law-makers passed on considerable latitute because the PE7B was to re-create a system of regulations that was wipedout when the Rodda Act repealed the Winton Act. Frederic Meyers,Director of the Institute for IndustrialRelations, wrote:.

. .growing instability,was a characteristic of the Winton Act period; both school managers and organizations of school ,employees had begun to feel some confidence in theirunderstand of the rules. Now all of a sudden, theyare faced with an entirelynew set of rules. In the abstract,many of them may have felt anew set ofrules was badlyneed

5 161 and, again in abstract,they may have felt that thenew rules would bebetter than the old. However, as Reginalde Alleyne has pointed out ruleswritten by legislature can, in this complexarena, rarely be clear and unambiguous. The parties, the Educational Employment Relations Board and thecourtswill--over time--flesh out legislative ambiguities, often deliberate, so that the partieswill gradually know with more certainty how to behave. Now, I feel sure, there is vastly moreuncertainty than certainty (5)

Sources of PERB Power

Delegations of powers are, of course, not confined to the formal power to interpretstatutes discussed above.

Indeed important delegations of discretionmay lay in what

legislators choose notto decide.The sources of discretion during implementation arewellknown. First, insofar as policy-makers fail to make specific choices in writinga statute, they pass on the discretion to thoseinvolved in implementation. Thus, for example, coalition-building considerations may lead policymakers towrite policies in vague phrases because a more specific formulation might endanger a coalition's capacity to cooperate,or they may put contradictory provisions in astatute for much thesame reason--to please a diverse group (6). Second, interest groups may influence policymakers to keepchoices open for the implementation process in the hopes tha thegroups will have axgreater say in the less public.-and threatening.- arenas provided by theimplementationprocess.

6 162 Third, the subsequent activities of policy implementation ana evaluation require the cooperation of other actors andgroups--whose own organizational and other goals were inadequately represented during policy

formulation--and whose activities require a policy to be adapted to the "imperatives"presented by theseother environments (7).

Each of these general reasons has some similarity to thecase ofthe. implementation of the Rodda Act in

California. Thepreviouschapternoted the statutory ambiguities whichwere left forPERB to resolve, confusion growing out of thecoalition building process. There is some evidence that tne laborrelations groups believedthat they would have agood secondchanceto change to shape policy during the implementation phase--believing that the

PERB, courts, and governor (who appointed them) would be more sympathetic to their cause (8). Finally, the capacity of policy-makers to finetuneproscriptively a collective bargaining system to be applied to over a thousand diverse school districtwas limited at best.

Unique Sources. In addition to the above characteristics, shaved by the Rodda Actand other such policies, there are other sources of dta^retion that a specific to the Rodda Act. First, as we have noted, the law issues explicit discretion to PUB to interpret the actand issue binding

7 163 rulings. Second, implicit delegationsarise from the quasi- judicial status of PERB (forexample, it has to interpret thestatute in light of its own precedents, using inmany

situations precedentsfrom its own pastas well as similar bodies like the co.frts and the NationalLabor Relations Board).

A third important source of political discretion comes from the political circumstance that producethe Rodda Act. In this issue area, the legislaturedeferred to school groups and to its own specialized committees. Sincethe coalitionof school groups hadtemporarily coalesced behind the legislation and then resumed its diversity and conflictual qualities,no unified coalition persisted after its enactment (9). Thus, the discretionof PERB was greatly enhanced because thebackers of the original legislationno longer existed as a unified force once implementationbegan. So, for example, should PERB violate the original or expected intent, no coalitionstood ready to yell,return to thestate legislature, and work to overturn the PERB interpretation.

PERB Decisions

In short, PERB was to become the main arena for the ft.irther definition of the Rodda Act during implementation.

While some reinterpretations of the law would undoubtedly occur at the local level through individual negotiations,

8 164 uI PERB decisions would provide the authoritative interpretation ofthe rules of the game until changed by courts or the legislature. Indeed, the courts either

supported or extendedPERB's powers (10). The legislature, for its part, has not acted to curtail far-ranging PERB decisions, nor have they acted to alter substantially the statute itself. Indeed, despite PERB's internal

difficulties, and despitethe fact that PERB has ruled that school principals may bargain collectively,the legislature haseven expanded PERB's jurisdiction to cover collective all public sectorbargaining. Thus, PERBbegan as and remains theprimary arena for the interpretation ofthe Rodda Act. And theBoardhasused its power to alter

substantially the meaningof the Act as itwas understood at the time ofpassage.

This section deals briefly withtwo important areas in which the Rodda Act has been reinterpreted by PERB. These arecases dealing with scope of bargaining and school administrators' bargainingright

Scope

As the chapter on the formulation of the lawindicated, the scope of bargaining bargaining or negotiations(that is; what the two partieswere obligated or permitted to negotiate and form bilateral policiesabout) was an item that separated management from labor. The Rodda Act had

9 165 betA carefully written to reconcile bothsides of the issue and to solicit their support for the bill. Each aide, however, focused upon different aspectsin their decisionto form the coalition.

Management, accordingto interviews withthe California School Board Associationand the Association of California School Administrators, saw their main goal as reducing the scope of bargaining from the Winton Act (11). They believed that they had achievedthis throughthe Rodda Act's "strong management rights" section: reserving matters notenumerated to the employerand furthermorespecifying limitationson

bargaininable items by name. Management saw as the most vital, the limiting phrase: "All matters not specifically enumerated are reserved to the public school employer and may not be the subject of meeting andnegotiations." The stress of labor was on theintrmwztory phrase: "thescope of representation shall be limitedto matters relating..." and their understanding of "matters relating"was a broad and permissiveone.

The legislative compromise had, in short, introduceda degree of vagueness andambiguity into the law. While each phrase, read separately, had the ring of specificity, read together,,their meaningwas not clear. In%addition, the actual implementation ofthis language would, in local school district, raise these contradictions in highly specific terms. How, for example,would the limitation of

10 166 scope apply to an item which was notspecifically enumerated (thus, outside the scope) but relevant insome fashion, to those items thatwere enumerated (thus potentially within scope). A PERB hearing officer characterizedthe dilemmaas being presentedby an "internal contradition" in thestatute (12). Another said, in an interview, that the difficulty lay with the world itself; the division betweenlegitimate labor and management rights was in practicenot clear since all management decisionsconceivably affectthe terms and conditions of employment and viceversa. The Rodda Act left it to PERB to determine in cases whethera particular item was within or outside thescope of representation (Section 3541.3 b).

In two cases, PEED hearing officersdealt with a large numberof scope issuespertaining to classified and certificated employees. One school board lawyer called these "monster" decisionbecause of large number of issues and precedents involved. In addition, the decisions were seen by both labor and management as significant because the cases dealt with model contract proposals advocated by the California Teachers Association and the California School Employees Association. Thus, when the school boards refused to bargainon a number issues raised by these organizations, claiming them to be outside the scope of negotiations, the state was setfor major decision- making affecting many other situationsby PERE. These two

11 167 cases are uivally referred to as the Jefferson and

Healdsbura decisions; the former dealt with teachers, the later, with classified school employee contracts(13). Without going into detail, the facts and issues are

similar: The unionasked to bargain about a set of items that management rejected as outside the scope ofbargaining- -thus setting the stage for "unfair labor practices" charges by both sides. The issues turned on whether the items in dispute were within thescope of representationor not; if they were within, then the schooldistricts would be guilty of failing tonegotiate in good faith. If the items were outside scope, thenthe unions would beguilty.

The decisionswere also similar in their determination of the legal issues involved. The hearing officers-- who made the initial determination both rejected the school districts' contentionsthat theitems were beyond thescope of bargaining because they, the issues, had not been specifically enumerated in the statue as outside. Both decisions viewed the statutory language as failing to delineate specifically two separate labor and management spheres. For example, theJefferson decision stated:

To merely assign a problem a label classifying it as a "policymatter" or a "working condition" when there are clearly competing considerations is hardly to face the matter squarely(p. 16).

HealdsburE had similarlanguage:

12 168 . . .many subjects inevitably relate to both th

scope of representation inthe Meyers-Milas-

Brown Act, defined broadly as "wages, hours,

and other terms and conditionsof employment"

. . .,and to reserve theareas of management preorgatives.

The decisions went on to explainthat the Rodda Act language

failed to settle the issue. Indeed, both decisions contend

that it is impossible or unwise to draw a statutory line

whichwill clearly separate the scope of bargaining, and that such a line must be drawnon a case by case basis.

Both decisions view thelist of permitted items for bargainingbroadly, suggesting that a claim that a dispute is relevant to an enumerated itemis an examinable claim.

Jefferson:

Although the statuteattempts to limit

negotiations to the enumerated subjects, the question with respect to any particular scope .

dispute is whether there is a sufficient

relationship between the disputed item and

one or moreof the enumerated subjects in

order to require negotiations (p. 10).

Indeed, EIALlatala advises school districtto exalhine union claims about items being in scope as part of their

13 169 negotiations:

. . . the requirement to meet andnegotiate in good faith implies andincludes a willingness

to consider the possiblerelationship between

matters not specifically enumeratedas being

within the scope of representationand those

subjects which are clearlywithin scope.

The Jefferson and Healdsburi decision, then, go on to dispose of thespecific items in dispute, using different versions of a balancing test applying them to an intermediate area bewtween clearly management only and clearly management and labor concerns. Management is obligatedto .egotiate on unspecified items to the extent that they are relevantto the items specified in thelaw.

In shori% tLP Jefferson and Healdsburli cases have substantially expanded the scope of bargaining from the specified list found inthe Rodda Act to a much longer list of items that are relevant to thoseenumerated. School district lawyers and lobbyists stated flatly that they believed that these decisionshave taken the lid off scope entirely., Virtuallyanything can be interpretedto meet the PERB test. A PERB hearing officewhom we interviewed agreed in part, noting that it is the interpretation of the item, not its intrensicproperties, that make it a management or

14 170 labor issue.

The scope language of theRodda Act so laboriously worked out during the formulation period, represented a

tenuous compromise at best. Once the implementation phase

began, the differentsides- tried to influence the PERB to

side with its interpretation. While managers might havehad some strong claims on the faceof the statute--with its

blanket prohibition against items not specifically enumerated--, they failed topersuade PER[ to endorse their view.. Instead, labor prevailed, aided by the precedents from the pre-Rodda period, by the somewhat contradictcry language of the law itself,and by the ambiguity inherent in the terms of what is legalfor collective negotiations. Had theoriginal coalition, whichhad agreed to the original intent of the RoddaAct held together, it is conceivable that the PERB decisionnegating the limitations of scope to those items enumeratedin the law might have overturned the interpretation in subsequentlaws. But to date, this'has not happened.

Administrator 12112111a !Ana

Having used the scope issueas an example of how PERB could use its discretion to change thedirection of the orginal legislativecompromise-- albeit one whoseintent was unclear on the fare of the state)we now turn to an area that WAS somewhat clearer in language. Based on a reading

15 171 of the statute alone, it isdifficult to see how principals could gain the right tobargain collectively.

The Rodda Act explicitly or implicitly defines four categories of employees in two sets: the first set is

comprised of "management" and "confidential" employeeswho are ineligible to bargain collectively. The second set consists of "supervisory"employees and all remainingschool employees, both of whom are entitled to seek bargaining representationbut areto be represented by separate negotiating unitsor unions.

While apparently clear,the Rodda Act does containsome ambiguities when applied to such school administrators as principals, assistant principals, department chairpeople, and otherMiddle-level personnel. A number of problems emerged as PERB attempted to understandand interpret the meaningof theAct. First, there was a question of boundaries between typesof employees. Were middle-level administrators intended to be in the "management" or

"supervisory" category? Adecision would determine whether or not thy would be eligible or ineligible to bargain.

The definitions are functional rather than by job title. Thus someone must interpret how the should classify various employees (14).

Second, there are some ambiguities about how, if at all, a middle level school administrator ought to be represented (15). Read two portions of the Acttogether..

16 172 (1) requirements thatsupervisors and the supervisedmust be represented in separate units, and (2) that allclassrooms teachers mustbe represented by thesame unit--has led some to believe that the Act makes a unit of schccl administrators withLeAchia,certificates impossible.

Several explanations andinterpretations were advanced by interviewees forthe way which schooladministrators were handled by the law. The Rodda staff offereda political explanationofthe need to reconcile organizationswhose membership included supervisors alongwith rank and file employees (mainly stategovernment groups, not educators, including SEIU and CSEA), and prevent theopposition of the

San Francisco principalsgroup.

Thus, the status of supervisory employees was recognized in the law and the concerns of school district management about conflicts of interest between the supervisor and the supervisedwere addressed by the legal requirement for separate 'units and broad management exclusion. Labor believed that ithad gained some statutory guarantees ensuringa form of bargaining for employees above the rank and file. Another view, a managerialone held by the school boards and administrators state associations (r.Rta and A:SA).was that the law was written foreba6p middle administratorsfrom bargaining.

It appears that the management side, who thought educational supervisors (particularly principals) were

17 173 excluded had some strongstatutory language in their favor.

A schoolboardassociation's lawyerpointed to the broad definition of manager (that is, someone who formulates or administers district policy)as evidence that a large number of administrators would be...excludedfrom bargaining. And

ACSA lobbyist pointed to the same language and added that his organization interpretedthe requirement the requirement of separate supervisoryand rankand file units along with the requirement of totalclassroom teacher representationas make it impossible forschool administratorsto form a unit because it had ''to separate (composed of administrators). But sinceadministrators also had teachers certificates, they were caught an betweenwithout the right to bargain.

That is, as administrators,they could not join theteachers group; bu as certificated teachers, theyas administrators could not forma competing unit alone.

Taken together, these explantation indicate that both management and labor sidesbelieved that they had won, and both supported their conclusions by citingthe language of the Act. Thus, a measure of ambiguityentered the statute's treatment of school administrators because of coalition- building concerns. Different provisionswere written to reconcile various interests. Together, these provisions could be interpreted by management and labor to reach different and conflict conclusions. In addition, as the formulation chapter indicates, the central focus of

18 174 participants had been on scope and other questionsso the different understandings of management and labor about

administrator eligibilityfor negotiations was simply not examined; or perhaps, participantswere hesitant to divide

themselves overa relatively. minor issueat the time.

PEEB, in a series of decisions,settled the question and established the bargaining rights. of school administrators in several ways. The lowest level supervisors, thosewith theleast discretion, became eligible to join the rank-and-file unions through a functional test ofsupervisory status. Themanagement exclusion wasnarrowed so thatonly a few high-ranking

district executives would fall into the category thereby making the remainder eligible for bargaining. And the Board certified an administrator bargaining unit as the appropriate negotiating representative,thus disposing of both the separate unit and exclusiveclassroom teachers unit questions. \These actions were taken in the following decisions.

Lompoc wasa landmark decision in that it effectively disposed of the broad statutory definition ofmanagement and thus restricted the coverage of the managementexclusion to a few nigh officials (16) . Recall thata manaaement employee was someone "having signfiicant responsibilities for formulating district policies or administering district programs. The "or" is significant because many school

19 175 administrators almost by definition--administer district

programs even when they donot formulate them. The majority wrote:

Although the National Labor Relations Act IF itself contains no definitionof "management

employee," the NationalLabor Relations Board

(NLRB), with the approval of the federal

courts, has defined management employees as

those "who are in a position to formulate,

determine, and effectuate management

policies". Thatdefinition is basically

similar to the definitionin Government Code,

Section 2540.1 (g). The single real

difference appears to be the useofthe

conjunction in the NLRB definition and the

disjunctive in theGovernment Code definition

in demarcating the formulation and

administration of .policy. (emphasis added).

That difference, although significant in the eyes of management, was not seen as important of the California labor board (KERB). Instead, the majority went on touse the NLRB defiWitAen.-rath^rthan f he 1..nvagoc of the Rudda Act. Two of three boardmembers concurred on this implicity formulations:

20 176 No controlling significance can be ascribed

to the Legislature's use of the disjunctive

in Section 3540.1 (g). The reference to

"significance responsibility"in that section

modifies both "formulatingdistrict policies"

and the "administeringof district programs."

It is settled that the disjunctive particle

"or" should be construedas "and" in cases

where such construction isnecessary to carry

out the obvious intent ofthe legislation.

Since the only school districtofficials whoboth formulate and administer' policy are those at the highest levels, the

Lompoc decision makes themanagement exlusion clause f the

RoddaAct very narrow, thus permitting most middle administrators to fall outsidethe exlusion and bargain.

The implications of Lompoc were made more explicit in

San Francisco decision (17). In this action, the Board upheld a hearing officer's decisionto certify the United

Administrators of SanFrancisco as an exclusive bargaining representative for school middle administrators. To do this, the decision explicitlyreiterates the Lompoc test for management as requiringboth policymaking andadministration and finds that \the unit (which includes virtually all educational administrators except the superintendent's cabinet) is a permissible one. Since the certificationof

21 177 San Francisco association makes the issue ofwhether or not

a' unit is possible moot, the decision does notexplicitly deal with the technical objection of the impossiblity of such a unit under the Act (18).

The management side, whileexpressing unhappiness about

the PERB decision, did nottry to change the law throughthe

tat legislature. Such a statutory change formiddle level educational administratorswas at least plausible. The only significant 1i/cup of organized principals was that in San

Francisco,. and the position of otherlabor organizations was only mildly supportive of principal unionization. But the

Association of California School Administrators(ACSA) which represented a large number of superintendentsand principals as part cf management, had during the after the law's passage, altered its opposition to bargaining for administrators, tt had moved from opposing to beingneutral on the issue. An ACSA official explained the association's position:

We believe principals were part of

management. Later, after the Lompoc,

decisic,n, zome principals said they wanted

the option. Elementary principals in Los

Angeles were supportive. The high school

prricipals alway v. considered themselves

-inogemento At t'le secondary level

1 78 principals havemore discretion.

. . .ACSA formed an ad hoc task force. . . This is

rather a tender territory, given the mix

composition of ACSA. The elementary

principal in LA wanted the option. The

superintendents and assistant

superintendents, and othercentral office people, didn't want thereto be an an option.

The task force reported said there ought to be an option (Interview).

In short, the PERBinterpretation was subsequentlysupported by the most importantmanagement group, if somewhattactily, thereby neutralizing the opposition from within the association. Thus, any move by the school boards association (CSBA) to changethe Act in the legislature would divide management ranks between superintendents and board members at thestate level.

These bargainingdecision affectingadministrators are instructive for two reasons. First, the interpretationof PERB that the legislated "or" should be read as "and,"was significant for its boldness. Those decisions clearly reinterpret the meaningof th statute and thus allowed supervisors to bargain. Second, despite the boldness of this and otherdecisions in management exclusion, no significant effortwas made to amend the law tobenefit the

23 179 managerial position. In part, this inactivity may be attributed to the low probability of success. The state school boards group (CSBA) would have had toact alone; the coalition which had supported the initial formation it the law was no longer in effect. And indeed thepossibility of an open division within management ranks--between CSBA and ACSA-- might have averted actionon the school boards part. Laborno longer had anything to loseby disagreeing with management, and the management side was itselfdivided on th question.

Florida: A CounterExample

The Florida experienceposes a useful contrastto that ofCalifornia. There are enough similarities and differences between the two cases to offer a natural experiment. The circumstances ofpassagewere analogous insofar'as the coalition of groupspassing 71.7iie lawwere assembled in rather a similar and tenuous manner. In addition, the law was seen as ambiguous in itstreatment of bargaining rights of school middle administrators and supervisors.

Next, the state labor agency, th Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC),interpreted the lawto make a group of principals eligible and to recognize their bargaining unit in Dade County (Miami). The differences begin at this point. The opposing groups--the Florida

24 .180 School Boards Association (FSBA) and the FloridaAssociation of School Administrators(FASA)--succeeded in getting the law amended t, specifically exclude principals and ether middlerank supervisorsfrom bargaining.

In Florida,a comprehensive publicemployment relations law was passed in 1975.(19). According to interviewees,the main spur to legislative enactmentwag an external source:

an order by the FloridaSupreme Court to implement a state

constitutional right, basedon a 1968 FloridaConstitution, to public employee collective bargaining (20). Although the

legislature passed the law, over the strong opposition of the school boards associations, its passagewas not the result of a strong prolabor coalition,, Indeed, nearly all of labor's subsequent efforts to strengthen their position in th law have been defeated in the stateassembly. Though the labor coalition was not strongin the legislature, it received a boost fromthe Supreme Court order. The portion of the Florida statute relevantto school

administratorswas ambiguous about whowas or was notto be granted bargainingrights (as witnessed by the official

state recognition andcertification by the PEN), both the FASA and FSBA took the position that middleadministrators were excluded by means ofdefinitions and managerial functions. Several teachers unioos officials told us that they beleved that thelaw would cover middle level school admintstrators and entitle them to form a separate

25 181 bargaining unit.

Again, as in California, the Florida PERC decided in favor of bargaining rights for school administrators (21). They certif%ed a principalsbargaining union Dade County- Miami; in so doing, PERC rejectedthe claim that principals

in Dade Countywere management under thelaw.

In short, the law was ambiguous,the PERC resolved the confusion in favor of principalbargainingrights, and the management side was unhappy with the settlement. Here the differences began, Mangementwas united in. their desireto keep middle level school administrators frOmbargaining. No splitsdeveloped between FSAA anti FSBA. Furthermore,'no ti 11chism emerged within the state administrators association, as had happened within the Association of CaliforniaSChnol Administrators.

A number of factors worked infavor of FSBA and FASA: They pursued the narrow goal of statutorily limiting the

bargaining rights of school administrators, rather than challenging the major elements of the bargain:1glaw. In so

doing, they limitedthe amount of oppositionfrom the school unions that represented rank and file employees; while unions Were opposed to limitingthe rights of principalsto bargain in principle, their own statusas unionists was not under challenge by this attack on the supervisors. In

addition, the Dade County principalsthemselves had altered ,thei position and agreed (1) to seek voluntary decertification before the law was altered and (2) not to oppose the move to amend the law which would effectively decertify them. In return, they hoped forbetter treatment fromtheir Board; and they did receive a "grandfather" clause in the law guaranteeingtheir negotiated contractfor the following year.

In 1974 labor lawwas thus amended in 1977 to change thedefinition of managerial employee; a list of titles covering middle level schooladministrators was added to the law effectively making allschool administrators managerial.

Subsequently, thePERC acted on therequestofth2Dade

County School Administrators Association and the School Board of Dade County, anddecertified the union (22).

The Florida case provides a useful counterpart to the experience in California. In both instances, the coalitions that passed the laws were joined only by temporary convenience, and the resulting law for administrators was unclear with management and labor differing in their interpretations. Furthermore, the state commissions (PERC and PFRB) behaved similarly in both places by resolving the ambiguities in favor ofadministrators having the right to bargaining representation. Indeed, the interpretation of the PERC in Florida was even closer to the statutory language than that ofCalifornia's PEPS.

However, in Florida, the management group was sufficiently cohesiveand modest in its goals to achievea

27 183 change in the statute itself, therebyoverturning the pro- labor PERC decision. In California, themanagement groups were divided internally,and faced a strong labor sector, such that no coalition was possible. There were, ofcourse, differences, the most important being that the Florida school boards group hid never supported the initial bargaining law. But their success in amending the law indicates the relatively weak position of school adminstrators when their bargainingrights are opposedby a united management group andthey lack the supportof other elements of the the labormovement, or those groups are themselves relativelyweak.

Conclusions

The California case represents one experience with a particular coalition-building strategy, its effect on the content of a law, and thesubsequintprocess offurther delineation and definition duringimplementation. While descriptively accurate,one cannot easily generalize to all states with employment relationslaws basedon these few examples. A larger comparison is necessary. These conclus,ions, then,are tentative: 1. Formuation: The legislating ofthe Rodda Act isan example of a coalition-building strategythat used .a series of policy provisions to attract a disparate coalition of

184 supporters. Each major group received the policyerovi.sions they most desired in return for givingconcessions to the intense preferences of other groups. This strategy has elements of both the minimum winning coalition (maximizing the leverage of coalition members) and of the commitment strategy that uses thedesire for a settlement to lead participants to accept a compromise. Insofar as the collective bargaining coalitions in others states reflect the fragmentationand multiple goals of the California groups, we expect a similar strategyto.be used in passing legislation. s.ap

2. Ambiguous Results: Due to the natureof supporting

coalitions, and thepolicy provisions usedto attract .heir support, the final statutecontainedmajor ambiguities. They were of several types: vague language,conflict between specific provisions, and uncertainty about how provisions should. be applied to cases at the margins of statutory categories. Under those circumstances,the law gives the administrative agency (PERB or PERC) broad discretion(the capacity to choose among interpretations) in howthey define the specific regulations that bind local participants. Insofar as such ambiguities characterize laws in other sta,es, the discretion of the administrative agencies will increase.

185 29 3. Dis12111.21 Coalitions: The coalition ofsupporters for the Rodda Act, held together for hte duration of the legislative process by theircommon interest in getting a law passed, vanishedupon passage of the bill. The components of the supporters returned to their previous adversary relationship, divided between general"labor" and

"management" stances. Thus, thegroup that might have stood behind the policy as formulated no longer existed as a unified force. Again; discretion was transferred to the

implementers, primarily the state administrativebody whose decision would stand untilreversed by the courts or the legislature. Again, insofar as this situation is found in other states, thetransient natureof collective bargaining coalitions will strengthen the hands of those in

administrative authority by diminishing the prospects for legislative intervention.

4. PERB Acts: The subsequent definitionsof the Rodda' Act by PERB had a substantialeffect on the meaning ofthe law. In two instances, the definition of scope and administrator bargaining rights, PERS in California 4eut beyond the language in the law to sustain their interpretation. Such discretionmay have, in part, resulted from the absence of an effective legIslativecoalition to reinforce the initial understanding tre bill Unlike New York where principals and superintendentshave different

186 30 state and national associations, in California, ACSA (the tssociation of California SchoolAdministrators) isa common group for both middle and top schooladministratorsa-perhaps explaining why ACSA changed itsposition from strictlypro- management to "neutral" to its reactionto Jefferson and Healdsburg and to more among some administratorsto bargain (or At least to preserve the option). The contra sting example is posed by Florida in whichadministrators lost hte right to bargain because in part becausethe school board and superintendentsassociations stood firmand the Dade County group gave way. This indicates that principals do have a measure of control over their fate, although that control is marginal. In both states the expressed preferences of principalsand their groups were consi(lered. School boards and superintendents, afterall, do havesome vested interests in maintaining the goodwill of their supervisorsory personnel.

In ,short, these cases provide valuableinsights' into howbargaining laws for administratorsget implemented and changed in the process. It also reinforcesthe notion that laws and their interpretation havean enormous impacton the behavior of local administrators. In Florida, the collective bargaining movement died for school principals when Dade county administrators andsupervisors lost their right Co bargain. While in San Franciscoand in other places administrators do bargain. This difference is, inpart, attributable to the the roleof law in theprocess.

32 188 FOOTNOTES

1. For a discussion of implementation,see Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron B. Wildaysky,Implementation (Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress, 19/7); Milbrey McLaughlin, "ImplementationAs Mutual Adaptation: Change in ClassroomOrganil,ation," in Walter Williams and Richard Elmore,eds., Social Pro ram Implementation (New York-: AcademicPress, 197 ); Eleanor Farrar, John David K. Cohen, "Views from Below: Implementation Reserarchin Education," Teachers Colin! Record (Fall, 1980); RobertT. Nakamura and PrankmiTWEEd, ThePolitics of Lau Implementation (New York: St. ManTniTinli).

2. See for example, Senate Bill 160:Task Force Report written by an AsiiiiEW-TinaIointstirT7FTE:T478; Richard Currier, "A Case Study: 16Public School Job Actions and the Use of ImpasseProcedures," Jack Brittain, "At the Table: TheImplemention of Collective Negotiations Under the Rodda Act,"both from California Public Employee Reporter June,1977; Institute for Industrial RelatTBTE7TCLA, TheRodda Act: One Year Later (1977). EERB, Annual 1E7277r7975an779777

3. Leah Cartabruno, "Yet AnotherBargaining Board With Massive Problems," CaliforniaJournal (April, 1976).

4. Ray Gonzales, "NewDecision Makers in Education," Sacramento Bee (11/15/77).

5. Frederic Meyers, "Introduction,"The Rodda Act (.tIR, UCLA, 1976).

6. Robert T. Nakamura, "Strategiesfor Defining Policy During Implementation," in JohnP. Crecine, ed,, Research in Public Polici Analysisand Management (CN: TITT-1517;33711)1177

7. Martin Rein and Francine Rabinovitz,"Implemenation: A Theoretical Perspective," inW. D. Burnham and M.W. Weinberg, American Politics andPublic Policy (Cambridge: MIT Prei77-7377); anT7TITreyMcLaughlin, op.cit.

8. Therewere letters from schooldistrict boars and management contained in CSBA, ACSA,and legislative .les indicating misgivingsabout the powers of PERS whose membership would be appointedby Governor Brown. The.San Francisco local of AFT notedsome of the ti opportunities presented by thenew law in Dick Meister,

189 "Rodda Act: A Real Voice for Teachers,"a pamplet, 1976. 9. For a discussion of another bill inwhich its coalition of supportersbbecame dormant (ratherthan disintegrating) afterpassage, see Beryl Radin, Implementation, Chanel and the FederalBureaucracy (New York: Columbia Un versit7Fress,1976). 10. Lower courts dealt swwiftly indismissing early attempts to vitiate the RoddaAct by the Professional Educators Group andothers opposed toteacher unionism. And in the landmarkcase of San Diego Teachers Association vs.Superior Court forSan Diego, the SWFiiiiiUUUrT-expandedtan78's p157ir"sin unfair labor practices to includeresponsibilitiesover a judicially created right of publicemployees to strike. 11. For a strong statment of management" reasoning, see Joseph Herman, "Scopeof ReprsentationUnder the Rodda Act: Negotiable andNon-Negotiable IsueWCalifornia Public EmployeeRelations, March 19/3. 12. CSEA vs. Healdsburg Union High SchoolDistrict ana aildsEturg Union SchoolDiiFFITE-(7i17-77sF-CE-68), 7714/78,p. 11.

13. Jefferson ClassroomTeachers Association,CTA/NEA . vs. JerfersorSchool District,Unfair Practice CaseNos. T-Cr=7"irdSTZU=S,proposed decision, 7/13/78;and California SchoolEmployees Associationvs. Healdsburg Union TaTel District,UnfiT7-1571EtneCharge, Case Tal7-3F.,..617177oposeddecision,7/14/78. Both hearing officer decisionswere affirmed by PERS in 1980. 14. Many states rely on exclusionsby title ratherthan function,

15 t.iyers, "Introduction,"The Rodda Act.

16. Lompoc UnifiedSchool District andLompoc Educati-a-TiTicTiETEF(CTA/NEA)-"gidUSi5cFederation of riachers, ocaa '15r(CTA /AFT) ,-taseNos. to R.3717T-77. EERB Decision No.13. An earliercase dealing with the functional definition of supervisorwas Sweetwater Union High SchoolDistrict, CSEA ChpptIr am, 102, Tiii-Tos. 471, and SEIU, 171 LA-R-27,77,796FEEFE-DeTnionNo,

17. San FranciscoUnified School Districtand Internet ono Brotherhood of Teamst4rTrocal960, San 7FiTET3TETETIoEITUTWITEratori-UNTMnand United-- Administrators of SanFrancisco and SanFrancisco Tiic7e73-17Miation,C A, and San FranciscoFederation ETTTEFEers,AFT, Caseno. ET:R=779, EERB becTEITT77. 23.

18. Other issues on the separatenessof units were dealt with in Fairfield Suisun UnifiedSchool District and California SchooltiT7iFFIREECTRI67,3771113Tano 71713Te77341riFnutua rganization of superVT3ors Case No .7-g7-.R-54137-151-18Decision No. 121, 1980; and March rg, SaCramento City UnifiedSchool District and Service EniTIFieesInternatronal Co611-375, B Case No. S-R- Occ:.sion 4o7T777FiFFE25,1980 and Los Angeles Commuinitt Collee District and ClassifiedUnion of Supervisory Empoyees, LocalEq9, SEIU ag PERK Case No. LA-R- Decision No. 123,March 257T980. All of these cases dealt with the nature of th affiliationbetween . parent organizations whose localsrepresent rank and file supeviosryemployees separately. 19. For a discussion of Floridadevelopments, see Raymond McGuire, "PublicEmployee BargainingIn Florida...," Florida StateUniversity Law Review,Vol 17 1973. 20. Dade Count Classroom TeachersAssociation vs. ature State of FI3Fra7-SupremeCourt of Florida, Jay term, 42.12-1. 21. Dade County School AdministratorsAssociation and nai Count Public school-R-777re TRarch 1 105). V771717774777003 22. Dade County School AdministratorsAssociation and School Board of Dade County, CaseNo MS-77-0039 Jan .73f CHAPTER V

FROM "CLUBS" TO "UNIONS"

The Impact of Policy Chanuon Administrators

Introduction

Like many other occupational groups, school administrators and supervisorshave long joined professional associations and clubs, though in the lasttwo decade the nature of theseorganizations haschanged dramatically because of collective bargaining. From mid-1800's untilthe early 1960's, principals, assistant prinicipals,directors, and other middlelevel administrators participated in professional societiesdevotedprimarily to social and managerial ends (1). Morerecently, however, thesemiddle rank administrators havecreated local, state, and national collective bargainingunits--paralleling the unionstructure for teachers and otherpublic employees,a system dedicated to many of thesame employees ends: theenhancement of their politfmqand economicpower and collective status (2).

This metamorphosis, fromclub to union, is topic of this chapter (3). Such a focus allowsan analysis of unions as organizationsdedicated to meeting the collective needs of its members. Why did school administratorsalter their organizational structure and theirrelationship with school superintendents and boards ofeducation? How are collective

192 bargaining units or groups similarand different from other voluntary assoc!.ations? Howdo they relate to their

immediate and nationalenvironment? What impacthas this new arrangement had on local,state, and national suervisors

groups and the behavior ofadministrators generally?

From Club to Union

As early as 1869, the school principals of the Cincinnati Common Schoolsorganized an association for

professionaldivelopment. Moreover, this organizatonwas deemed useful to the school superintendentas ameans of strength4ning the efficient managementof the schools. SuperintendentHancock explained the association's utility.

in the schooldistrict's Annual Report,1869:

The Principals havean Association which holds its regularmeetings each Saturday preceding the bill daysof the Board. The purpose `ofthese meetings is thediscussion and adoption ofsuch measuresas shall render the work of the schools more efficient. . The opportunitythus afforded for a full and free interchange ofviews cannot be result in greatbenefit to the schools,the experience and opinionsofeach principal-teacher by this means becoming the common property of all. And I gladlyavail myselfof the present opportunity of acknowledging my obligations for the manyvaluable hints I have received from discussions engagedin by these practical workers in the field of 'education (4).

Management's control of these new principals associations is made still clearer by thecomments of Paul Revere Pierce, the major historians of the school

principalship. Be wrote that the superintendent in Cincinnati required that "the secretary ofthe Association

prepare a table showing not only the attendanceand absences of the principals at meetings ofthe organizations during

the year, butcases of tardiness as well.(5)"

Other cityschool systems, too, saw the creation of associations of principals. In 1870, principals in Chicago schools formed agroup to handle matters of "instructionand discipline." The DetroitPrincipals' Associationwhich began in 1894 was reported bythe superintendent, to his board, as successful, in that"it fostered friendly feelings among schoolpeople, awakened edudatidnaIthought-i- cemented diverse interests, and effected unityof effort.(5)" And

Cleveland principals were praised by their superintendent for conducting a PrincipalS Round Table on topics of importance to themas professionals.

This local organizational structure was soon mirrored by a state and national set of professionalassociations. At first, the NationalAssociation of Elementary School

Principals and the NationalAssociation of Secondary School Principals were departments of the National Education

Association (NEA), thisarrangement being codified in 1921.

St4tes, 'similarly, placed the elementary and secondary administrators groups within the inclusive ranks

3 194 of the state educationassociation. This pattern of omnibus educational organizationsprevailed until about 1972 when the NEA began to disaffiliate itself fromadministrators and supervisors, focusing instead on the special needs of teachers. At thispoint, the elementary and secondary

associations (NAESP and NASSP) become independentnational organizations, a development whichsome but not all states followed.

Enter Collective Bargaining. As we havediscussed at length in this book, a major shiftoccurred in the activities ofschooladministrator associations. Whereas the primary concern of the principalsassociations prior to collective bargaining (1920 to 1970) was social and professional, it changed dramatically to those concerns characteristic of employeeorganizations. Indeed many of

these activities were union-like, includingsuch activities as engaging in collective negotiations, enactinggrievance against the board of education, and lobbying in state capitals and Washington, D.C., for supportivebargaining legislation (7). The tone of the superintendent- school board-principal relationshiphad changed. In effect, the role of middle-level administrator had shifted fromclose managerial ties with the superintendent, as thecomments from Cincinnati and elsewhere indicate, to a more independent (and at times cdversaril) interaction) . At the same i:ime as the local "clubs" became more union-like, the

4 195 state and national principalsgroups began to move from being professional development organizations like NASSP and NAESP to either avowedly anion-affiliatedgroups like the AFL-CIO's American Federationof School Administrators (AFSA) or the Teamsters,or to more open in the political outlookIsuch -401± as the recent actions of groupseave begun 1.obbytng for the rightsof principals tc bargain and supporting local bargaining units of school administrators. Hence, while the daily activities ofadministratorsmay havecontinued to be managerial in nature (8), the organizational, collective life of theseschool supervisors has takenon the qualities of unions: negotiating andeven, on a few occasions, striking (9). Thisambivalence and conflict, between managerial pressures on theone hand and collective needs on the other, has. beendescribed by Dee Schofieldas follows:

The participation of school administrators, specifically the school principal, incollective bargainingunits has implications. A kind of schizophrenzicrole emerges for the middle administrator. In dealing with teachers and their union representative, heor she assumes the roleof management, charged withcarrying out the employer's side ofthe contract and making sure that the teachers uphold their part of the agreements. He or she must conjunction operate in with the central office administrators (specifically, the supeiintendent)to carry outdistrict policy set by the school board.

However, when the principal's own interests (suchas salaries, promotion, and

5 196 termination) are at stake, he feels himself assuming thesame relations to the board and the superintendent as that assumed by teachers--the employeebargaining through a negotiator withmanagement. Although in some districts the management team concept has been instigated to allow middle administrative personnelmore say in central office decisions and intheir own job-related concerns, the continued expansion of collective negotiationsunits indicates that the management team is not that satisfactory a means of representing administrators' special needs (10).

In sum, school administrators indistricts with collective

bargaining are organized differently, behavedifferently,

and are seeking differentgoals. It is the purpose of this chapter to analyze these differencesby focusing on the union as an organization.

,Organizational Theory and AdministrationUnionization

Current Research: Despite the interest in unions in

both the private and public sectors, few researchershave

studied the local bargaining unit as an organization.

Perhaps the powerful survey tools of labor relations

specialists are deemed inappropriate for therather "softl

analyses necessary for studying the behavior of

organizations. Or perhaps the focuswas elsewhere. For the

development ofthe labor movement in the 20th centurywas

national, not local. Analysts were more intrigued with

questions of uniondemocracy, the bureaucratization of

national unions, of whether unions confirmed or denied

6 197 Michels' "iron law of oligarchy" than in local laboL: organizations (11).

The fewscholars who have focussedon the individual unit have failed to develop adequate concepts for what unions do, their. organizationalstructure, relations, and

affiliations; instead they tend todescribe components of

Locals such as personnel, actions, and problems, Probably

the first major studyof factory-level unionswas Sayles and Strauss' The Local Union. The authorsrecognized the problem: that to date scholarshad overlooked thelocal. But their book showed littleunderstanding of organizational behavior or theory. Their reaction to the dearth of research was:

When the proverbialman onthe street thinks of the word "union" he thinksof the international and themen like Lewis, Murray, and Reuther who made theheadlines. But for the averagemember of the factory, hisunion is his local--and when he talks about the union, hiTirksabout his local officersand his local's problems."(12)

The topics covered inthis book follow thebasic components of local unions: grievance process, officers, stewards, meetings, and participation. Little time is spent conceptualizing the unit ofanalysis, the union itself.

Probably the most authoritative piece on the union

. organlzation is Tennanbaum's article in the Handbook of auniptions. While his treatment ofunions if useful and quite comprehensive, hefails to conceptualize the unionas

7 198 he defines it: unionsare "organizations designedto protect

and enhance the social and economic welfareof the members Cq (13) ." Missing in a sense of bow the organizationof the

union does the enhancing and protecting. Tennanbaum and

Kahn investigate thebehavior ofunionmembers locally--

i.e., their participationin union affairs--butmake little

comment on the organizations to which these members may or

may not belong (14). Even looking back thirtyyears in the

historyof labor relations researchin the private sector,

one is left unfulfilled. Boxier in perhaps the first major

study of industrial labor relationsin America, commentedon certain key organizational variables. But , as Tester points out, Boxie merely mentions thesedilemmas of organizational

life and lets them drop(15):

Union historyshows a constant struggle between the forces of centralization and decentralization, social idealism and enlightened self-interest, narrow trade autonomy and industrialism, economic and political method (16).

And themost recent studies of union organization generally and educational bargainingunits in particularare likewise lacking. Unfortunately for analystsand historians of the labor movement, thecreation and early actionsof the largest, most powerful and most newsworthyteachers' union, the United Federation of Teachers, New York City, was obscured by the nastyblack-white confrontation at Ocean

Hill- Brownsville, Intermediate School 201, and in the Two

8 199 Bridges Model School District(17). Authors tended to write

about the livelyaltercations betweenunionists and black

power advocates, not the behaviorof the unionas union.

The Content of UnionPower

OP .Collectivebargaining units, like those among some organizations of school adMinistrators,are a particular kind of voluntary association, and mustbe differentiated from service clubs,fraternitiesand sororities, and other such organizations. While unions certainlyhave an important social and commonweal function toplay in modern community life, their primaryreason for being is political and economic: i.e., to affect theway scarce resources are allocated in a system. Arthur S. Miller, in his study of the importance of political power and voluntary associations, commentsas follows:

Groups (voluntary associations) are constitutionally significant, when they exercise power in a politicalsense. (For present purposes, Lasswell'sconcept of power is accepted: the abilityor capability to make decisionsaffecting the values of others.) A hierarchy of voluntary associations exists in the United States, some being far more important (wieldingmore political power) than others. Moreover, alliances are often formed between associations with respect to particular politicies proposedor actual. (17)

Unions, then,are voluntary associations witha stake in the distribution of resources, particularly questions of

9 200 remuneration, continued employment, transferring of jobs, working conditions,and so forth.

In addition, however, unions occupy a particulary

strange place in relationsto the enterprise whichemploys its members: a conditionof proximity, dependence, and

constant interaction. For without the corporation, school system, or other locus of employment, there would be no union. As such, the boundariesof the unionare on the one hand separate and distinct from thecorporate employer; on the other hand, the members and activities (locally) are

mostly performed within the organizational context/confines of the employment system. True, unionshave parties,

meetings, elect officers,go Dowling outsidethe boundaries of the employing firm. But the most importantactivities- - those which, in fact, define theessence ofunionism--are done co-determinativelywith the corporate leadership:

particularly collectivebargaining, grievance procedures, implementation of contracts, employee evaluationF transferring of employees,etc.

Hence, unions are both part ga and separate from, their, immediate environment. Functionally, the unioncannot operate without engaging in bilateral actions with the employer. Conversely, compensation, benefits, and work rules cannot bemade and accepted without the cooperation and co-determination ofthe union. John H. Freemen explains

the consequences ofsuch unclear boundaries:

10 201 A system of veryporous organizations may have more unit characterthan any one of them alone. In consequence, the researchbegins to assume case-study c.1.0...racteristics witha closed-system perspective. . . . If the focal organization (e.g.,the union] is found to be very permeable,so that where it stops and members of its organization set [environment] start - is difficult to determine, environmental factors become internal characteristicsof the set that now forms the real operative unit of analysis. And this unit hasnotbeen studied in terms of its environment (18).

Freemanmakes a Very interesting point here: that

environmental factors, inour case the immediate employing

system, 'become internal characteristics" of the unit of analysis, the union.

The problem still remains,however: how to studythe

union as an organizationalunit in its environment. We have

evolved a three-part focus, a wayof analyzing the

..ifferences between unionsand other clubs and voluntary

associations. The primarydifference lies in the need for power and control, conditionsthat do not always pertainto other voluntarygroups (19):

1. ORGANIZATIONAL-POWtR VARIABLES: Local unions

attempt to unify theirmembers into a community ofinterest,

approximating their occupationstratum to receive formal and

legal recognition, and to provide a centralized base of

power for members. While clubs and otherassociations may

only have informalrelations with the schoolsystem, a union becomes, under law and/or contract, the sole bargaining

11 202 agent and spokes-group for employees. The variables to be

investigated in assessingan organization's control are:

a. The existence ofa separate middle-administrative

organization: the possiblevariation ranges from no

association for supervisorsand administrators to one which

is shared by topmanagement (the superintendent and deputies) and one with teachers,to a single organization of mid-level staff.

b. Centralized,recognition as representative of

middle-administrators: this variable is dichotomous withan

organization either representingits membership or not. In

non-centralized settings, eachadministrator (employee)

would representhim/herself in setting wages and other conditions of employment.

c. Recognitionas sole bargaining agent under the following conditions:

,(1) Voluntau and extra-legalrecognition by board of education--in the absenceofstate enabling legislation, the board of education agreed to for a contractual relationship with the association.

(2) State-enabling recognition: in 19 states (three of whichare in our sample), state public employment laws entitle supervisors to recognition, if amajority so vote. Both contractual and legislative protectionprovides a basis of power and legitimacy to administrator associations that other voluntary clubs- and organizations

12 203 may not have.

d. Coalitional structure: since middle administration of school systems includes a wide varietyof titles

(elementary, junior high, high schoolprincipals? assistant

principals,program coordinators, directors of curricuium,

guidance, vocational-technicaltraining, etc.), theproblem of A integrating disparategroups (with varying past histories

of association) intooneor a few bargaining units. Levels of integrationrange from numerous toa single organization- -with representation on governingboards from various sub- groups.

e. Staff leadership: The political strengthof an

association is related to the availabilityof staff to work for the goalsof thegroup. This variable attemptsto capture the existence, number, and lunction of full-time, paid, versus part-timeunpaid staff with varying levels of

expertise (a 'union witha full-time legal counsel, field

representatives, and lobbyists are likely to be more

powerful than onewithno paid, full-time, or trained personnel).

2. POWER OF AFFILIATIONVARIABLES: Trade unions have long affiliated with state and national/international

federations; the purpose was two-folded: to enable the

interests of local membership to be heard instate capitals and in Washington, D.C. Lobbying and information were

13 204 provided Second, local unionsoften nee outs de help:

people tobargain, provide legal assistance, and advice. Since school administrators have onlyrecentlybegun

bargaining, andoften uneasily, at that, the needfor help

may be great. The variables for assessing power of MP affiliation are:

a. Formal organizational affiliation: The range is

from no state and/or nationalaffiliation as an association

(members may, forexample, join the NationalAssociation of

Secondary School Principals as individuals); state organizational affiliationonly; national affiliationonly; to both state and nationalmembership- -even if it's thesame outside group withnationatate branches.

b. Lobbying power: Affiliationwith an outside organizationallows the local to havelobbying power; this variablesconsiders thescope and location of such efforts: state, national, or both.

or External assistance: Local unions need help in a number of areas:

(1) Support du r_ bargaining: some local bargaining units have the opportunity to bring in outside consultants for the state/national organization; other do not, and must dependon the members to do the bargaining, evaluate the contract, andso forth.

(2) Lecal help: since unions are often called upon to press cafes (e.g., unfairlabor practices, breach of

14 205 contract charges, and contractinterpretation issues),legal

support is needed. This variable is dichotomous: outside

attorney available or not--aspart ofaffiliation (apart from the ability of local unions to hiretheir own lawyer).

,(3) Special benefits: national and state affiliation may provide additional benefits, such as training for unionleadership, digestsof recent labor

relations developments,etc.; the variable is also "yes" or "no".

3. POWEROF CO-DETERMINATIONVARIABLES: Finally, organizational powercomes from the ability to participate

in major decision-making, including, the settings ofwages,

benefits, dueprocess procedures, transfer policies,lay-off

policies, sabbatical leaves, etc. It is this right of

bilateral ism that distinguishes unions from other

organizations--though without the prior variables

(organizational recognitionand outside support), internal

co-determinationmay not be possible. Co-determinism takes

place in three ways: "legislatively" in negotiating the

contract; "judicially" in settling points of misunderstanding such as grievances; and "executively"in

the joint implementationof the contract bymanagement and employees. The variables for assessing the power of co- determinationare:

a. Rights of collectivebargaining: Some associations

15 206 may have no rights to negotiatea contract, with managemerlt

extending the conditions ofemployment unilaterally; others

may "meet and confer"over such items, though either party

can walk away at any point; and still others have thelegal

and recognized right bi-lAterallyA4determinepay and other

items. Also, bargaining involvesemployee and employers in

direct discussion; othermethodsoften see a third party

(often the superintendent) acting as a "go-between" in settling employmentmatters.

b. Contractual system: professional employees like

school administratorswork under a letter of agreement, without a bargaining contracts; others mutually sign a document whichspells out thematters ofconcern to both parties.

c. Due process 1anqua9e: the range is fromno written procedures for adjudicating differences to a system of redress for grievanceswhich is mutually negotiated. This process often involvesa serie6of meetings among grievant, union leadership, and management;appeals to the board of education; third parties;and ultimately to thestate public employment relationsagency (and even court).

d. Seniority rights for reduction in force (RIF): unions most often insist on seniority as the most dispassionateway of laying off staff; boards wishto retain their prerogativesto remove administrators of their choice

(based, perhaps, on merit and performance). Seniority

16 207 language is often a goodproxy for union strength.

e. Rights to "bump" teachers: at the point of lay-

off, some contractsmay allowa senior (moreexperience4

administrator to take the job of a less senior teacher- -

across ranks. This option is oftenanother sign of collective bargaining andco-determination.

f. Unfair labor practices.: a number of unions and managementgroups have the right to file "unfair labor practices" charges if theot".er party refuses to bargain in good faith; theseclauses may either bepart of the state law or be stated in thecontract.

g. Ressinitim rights,: the right to representa group ofemployees is central to the existence -of the organization, asmeasured in the first place of this discussion.

h. Right to strike: in traditional labor theory, the right to deny the firm one's workwas the major impetus to maintaining the bargaining process: it involved a loss to both parties, with employeessacrificing their wages and the company, its production.2° No school administrators and few public employees generallyhtme the legislated right to strike (Minnesotapublic employment law allowsemployees to walk out but only after arbitration and never for supervisors), though the number of illegal strikes among public employees has steadilyrisen since the 1950s. And in

1968, the Council of Supervisors andAdministrators, New

17 208 York City, did strike along with the UnitedFederation of Teachers.

i. Third partyintervention: Impasse resolution,

whether during the bargaining or grieving process, is

anotheropportunity for the union to co-determine the key

deCisions in its life. Some stateshave voluntary

arbitration; in suchcases the union has two opportunities

to participate in settlement: (1) the union and the school

board must determine whetherto call in a third party (fact-

finder, mediator,or arbitrator); (2) both parties have the right to refuse to accept the intervenor's decision. The range on this variable isno third party intervention, third party on grievances only, thirdparty on bargaining impasses only, and dual arbitration.

j. Administrator, tenure: another sourceof power for the union is tenure, thoughsome unions have been willing to trade it for a strong due-process/just-causeclause in the contract. Thisvariable is dichotomous: tenure or no tenure.

k. Retention of tenureas teacher: A final indicator of strength gained at the bargaining table(and/or in the state capital) is the right tomaintain tenure as a teacher-

-even after being promoted to supervisor. In industry, typically, an employee who is promoted to foremanor higher loses the protection afforded the rank-and-file: the argument being thatone is paid at a higher level to bear

18 209 the "risk" of layoffs and the loss of dueprocess. Teacher tenure/no teacher tenure isthe range.

In summary, the shift from clubto union involves three

changes, eachdirected at increasing the power of the organization.. See figure_ By becoming the sole, legitimate, and legal spokes-organization for a particular employe a group, the union increases its control. By its ability to turn to outside resources, such as the state and/or national anion, the organizationis able to lobby, influence state and nationalpolicy, bring in titside labor relationsand legal experts, and receive advice, all in return for membership and dues. Finally, through bilateral involvement in keydecisions, unions-shape-their work environment and their compensation, maintainingpower over their lives.

19 210 Figure :1OrganizationalPower Accessing for

Collective Bargaining Units

LEGAL OUTSIDE RECOGNITION SUPPORT (Control over internal (State and/national organizational life) representation and 'available legal/ bargaining help)

BILATERAL DECtSION-MAKING

(Bargaining, grieving, contract implementation, influencing)

Sample Organizations: A Variety of Middle Administratorclam

While 64percentof the nation's teachersare members of collective bargainingunits(20)11°less than 60,000 out of about 1.48,000 middle administrators are currently negotiating with board ofeducation. Bence, any study of mid-level supervisory personnelmusttake into account that wide variationamong types. In this study, we selected six school districts for intensive investigation. A brief description is as follows:

1. NEW YORKCITY: Council of fuaryisors and Administrator (CSA): This association of school middle administrator is the nation's largest with some 3,850

20 2.11 members representing 16 different job categories: five types of principals groups, three of assistant principalsat varying kinds of schools, school psychiatrists, of four units supervisors and directors, as well as a number of assistant director categories. CSAhas a full-time, salaried staff of 11 people, including the field staff who handle grievances,a full-time legal counsel,and lobbyists, as well as officers elected by the members andpaid salaries by CSA while on-leave fromthe city's schools. The budget of the organization is nearly $1 million, gathered dues. from Under the New York labor relations act for public employees (the Taylor law), CSA represents the administrators in bargaining, though the organization is older than the law. CSA was instrumental inthe founding of the American Federationof School Administrators which (AFSA) was chartered as theAFL-CIO's newest nationalunion in 1976. And in 1979, the New York Council of School Administrators, AFL-CIOwaschartered after strongsupport from CSA.

2. SANFRANCISCO: United Administrators of San Francisco: Representing the 310scao=Eu.stratordiii the city schools,UASF is among the newest bargaining units in the United Statesand the first officiallyrecognized for its 310 administrators under the Rodda Act in California in 1975. The organization was formed byunifying the 9 different groups includinga Teamsters faction, a black and Latino group, and several representingsubgroups such as elementary and secondary principals. In a 1977 vote, the membership opted to join the AFL-CIO's AmericanFederation of School Administrators,though a faction hasbeen involved for four year priorto official board recognition. UASF has one paid executive, a retiredschool principal, who the operates organization from his home. Each group (elementary, junior high, secondary,and central officesupervisors) has representatives on the governing board of the association; the executivedirector is ex-officio. Though the San Francisco local43of AnA is in communication with administrators in the 'Big Five" school districts in California, it hasno state affiliation andrelates directly to the national AFSA officein New York City.

3. MINNEAPOLIS: Principals Forum, sAssociation of is Administrators andConsultants (MAAC), and dERTnential Em lo eesAssociation: Because of a long tradition, of separa e 57-galitiations, the Minneapolis administrators formed threebargaining units which are recognized officially bythe board of education under the Minnesota Public Employment Labor Relations Act (PERLA) passed in 1971. Each group bargainsseparately, coming together on labor relationsmatters almost never. The Forum

21 21, has 86 members; MAAC, 23; and Confidential group, 11. In 1978, the Forum-School Board negotiations went to impasse and an arbitrator was called in. He accepted the Board's offer of a 0-0-0 percentage increase for administrators, though the Forum kept its small cost-of-livingallowance. At this point, the Forum ad theMAAC voted to affiliate with Teamsters loca1320, previouslyan all-law enforcement union of about 6,000 employees oflocal and state polio personnel. Thus, the Principals Forumand the MAAC groupare tied into the local, state, and federal Teamster organization,though the emphasis is primarily local.

4. CLEVELAND: Cleveland Council of Administrators and 51.3. ervisors: Prior to 1964, school TrClevean were chartered as a separate local alongside the Cleveland Teachers Union, American Federation of Teachers,141554. When the administratorgroups was stripped of its voting rights withinthe AFT (since they were not teachers under new federation policy),it withdrew as the Cleveland Federation of Administrators and Supervisors, later changed to "councils. The organization has 450 members, with an additional 100 administrators opting notto join. The Council is voluntarily ar.d extra- legally recognized by the Cleveland schoolboard, since Ohio has no public employeebargaining law. It is affiliated with the state "umbrella"organization, theOhio Council of Administrative Personnel Associations,a unity group of the state elementary, secondaryprincipals, and curriculum supervisors associations. Members of OCAPA can decide which national association they 44.sh.to join when their local organization affiliate with the state unbrellaassociation. Locally, the ClevelandCouncilagoverning boardrepresents the various categories of personnel.

5. DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA (Miami): Dade County School AdministratorsAssociation: Between lrrand 1978, the DCSAA was the recognize bargaining unit for the county's 1,076 school administrators. A contract was bargained. In 1977, the state legislature movedto remove supervisors in the public sector from bargaininggroups, at which time the made County middle administrators decidedto bargain their lastcontractwith the understanding that they would voluntarily request to be "decertified"as a bargaining unit in return for certain payprovisions. In 1978, the association no longer bargained; it would "meet and confer" with the'board of education. In other areas, however, the organization continued torepresent its members. Currently the association has 954members, representing 13 sub-groups including levels of principals, assistant principals, central offic3 directors, adult education and day care supervisors, and so forth. Each group sends two members to the governing board, plus officers elected at-large. DCSAA has a full-time executive director, an office, and a secretary. It is not affiliated with any state or national association, attempting to lobby inTallahassee on its own. Privately, of course, administrators join the National Association of Elementary School Principals, the National Associationof Secondary School Principals, and other groups.

6. ATLANTA: no separate or anization: Principals and other administrators in the At anta pub is schoolsare not organized into a recognizablegroup; rather they as individuals may belong to the national groups and the state'sGeorgiaAssociation ofProfessional Educators, association of teachers, principals, and superintendents-- much like theNational Education Association prior to the 1950's. As such, principals receive aworking agreement privately, as individuals. They have no collective voice in policy-making or wage-setting. They do notiAlong to any outside group anddonot exercisea collective influence. They are perceived by top administrationas being a part of themanagement structure--the *managementteam.* Since Georgia has no public.bargaining law, no statewide principals' assciation, and no political role statewide. Unlike the other states inthis sample, Georgia has no tradition of- organized labor activity, though the industrializationof the state has led to 18 percent of employees in the private sectorare part of unions.

As indicated in these brief descriptions,sample cities represent a continuum from NewYork Citywith an older, larger, and well established bargaining unit for school administratorswith a large budget and staff to Atlanta whereschool administrators have no apparentcollective role. In between, cities vary from Miami where administrators had and lost the right to bargain to San

Francisco and Minneapolis whereadministrators opted to join

"labor" (AFL-CIO and Teamsters respectively)and Cleveland where administrators affiliated with a state coalition of school supervisory associations. Among the cities with

214 bargaining units (New York City, San Francisco,Cleveland,

and Minneapolis), onlyMinneapolis has no paid staff to operate thA bargaining units, perhaps because themiddle

administrators are internally divided into three separate

bargaining units. Dade County, though ithas no bargaining for administrators,has a paid executive.

The six sample districts also have numerous

commonalities: all are large cityschool stystems--with the

problem of budget, race, and bureaucracy. We purposely selected the nation's largest (NewYork City with 933,000

students), fifth largest (DadeCounty with 123,000 pupils)

and others havingno less than 80,000 pupils. This choice provides a somewhat. similarenvironment inwhich large systems come to treatadministrators in like ways. All these cities have witnesssignificant reductions instudents with the concommitantclosing of schools. Hence, reductionin-force pressureswere common across settings. Finally, the six cities all had seen some indication of teacher militancy--thoughAltanta's pressureswere less. Teacher militancy is seen bysome to be a major cause of administrator toughness, as middle supervisors deal with teacher grievances, power at the bargaining table, and ability to control theallocation of resources.

It was hoped in the selection of this range of case studies that we could replicate the categories of administrator associationsin the United States: three in

24 215 states with legislative enablement (New York, California, and Minnesota), three without (Ohio, Florida, andGeorgia).

Four bargain; two do not. And yet -ach has a particular history with the long litiny of urban educationalwoes: strikes among teachers (Qleveland, New York City, San

Francisco); bankruptcy, whethernear of actual (Cleveland,

MewYork City), court-ordereddesegregation (New York City,

ClevelAnd, Atlanta), and white/middle classblack flight to the suburbs (all th9samplecities).

Ca se Analysis:

A Comparative Approach

This research is exploratoryin two ways. First, this is a new attempt to studycomparatively the transition of administrator organizations,from clubs to unions. Second, as far as we can tell, this isa unique effort to understand local collective bargaining units and associations in light ofcurrent organizational theory. As such, the comparative case method seems appropriate toour theory-building.

The steps for constructing a theoryof unions-as- organiza.'onal follows the research of Glaser and Strauss.

They explai that first "abstract categories and their properties" are generated: in our case, the three-part approach (structural, affiliative, and bi-laterial) to the increasing oforganizational influence. As shown in the earlier section, these categories are operationalized and

" 216 appli,A to thecase data.

Second, Glaser andStrauss advise as follows:

jas data analysisbegins], each incident is compared with other incidents, or with properties of a category,in-terms ofas many

similarities and differencesas possiblif. . . . The constantcomparison incidents in this manner tendsto result in the creation of a 'developmentaltheory.' It especially facilitates the generation of theoryof process, sequence, and changepertaining to organization, positions, and social interaction. (21)

Thedifferences in structure, affiliation and behavior between bargaining and non-bargaining schooladministrator groups will allow us tosee the changes and to isolate the particular qualitiesof a union whichdistinguishes it from,, other social units. By involving six statesand six cities, we avoid the over-generalization and error which a simple comparisonof one bargaining and one non-bargaining organization might allow, though the samplingprocedure was not scientific.

Rather, we chosecitieswith properties of middle administrator groupingswhich were beforehanddeemed typical and interesting. Geography was also considered: selecting four cities across the northern latitudes from New York, through Ohio and Minnesota, to California; the non- bargaining cities were Southern--though DadeCountyhad bargaining for teachers andonly in 1978 had deniedsame to administrators. (Several Northern and Midwestern states also statutorialy denied supervisors the right to bargain,

including Deleware, Rhode Island, Indiana, and South

Dakota.) And Georgia seemed typical of Southern and lower

Midwestern states in whichno public employee is permitedto

form unions, bargain,or strike--and where few have.

A Common City Environment

Muchhas been written aboutthe changing occupational life of the schooladministrator. Once the baron of his/her castle, the school, theseadministratorsnow confralt a frustrating and forbidding hostofproblems which have been often noted (22).

Though it is notour purposehereto investigate the exact natureofthe forces that caused the school administrator to bargaincollectively--but rather toanalyze the natura of the unionorganizations themselves, it may be useful to summarize brieflythe major stimulants to collectivebehavior (23). Some of these environmental variables may be relevant to a clearer understanding ofthe union organization; fiveinclude:

I. Consolidation, Proliferation,and Bureaucracy: The

1950s_and 1960ssaw three trends collide: merging of school districts, growth of school functions,and the expanding of school bureaucracies. The number of school districts inthe

United.States was drastically reducedby legislative and

27 218 judicial action--while, the number of children, staff, and

building increased. Hence, ever-more children attended

greater numbers of schoolsin fewer And fewer schoolsystems (from over 100,000 separate school districts in 1900,some 40,520 jurisdictions in 1560, to 16,960 by 1973). The schools' role expanded with the New Frontier and Great'

Society programs; thefederal and stategovernments came to expect schools to feed,clothe, cure, andsupport children-- jobs the community, home, and church/synagogue had long performed.

To oversee the proliferationofnewtasks came a plethora of new middleadministrators--and the -deepeningof the bureaucracy. Entire schools,progr departments, and roles were designed around compensatoryeducation following the Elementary and SecondaryEducation Act of 1965, vocational and technical (not tomention career education) in wake of the movement towardcareer choice under U.S.

Commissioner SidneyMarl-and, and handicappededucation since the passage ofF.L. 94-142. In New York City, forexample, the Council of Supervisors and Administrators represents mid-level staff whocomprise 237 different jobtitles: some are the traditional principal,assistant prirlipal, though the types ofschools changed toinclude special edtiCation and vocation settings;some are heads of divisions, offices, and programs such as curriculum and age-related titles

(elementary education);and others are the obvious results

28 219 of new waves in educational reform (Assistant Director of

Community Programs). The sheer number of such rolesand the

increased number of administrativetiers is sure to createa

civil servicementality--and theperceived need for union protection, Bain explained:-

Bureaucratization and thedensityofwhite collar unionism havebeen claimed to be interdependent; not only does bureaucratizationencourage the growthof trade unions, but trade unions by demanding the standardization of workingconditons are alleged to further bureaucratization. Inasmuch as bureaucratization isassociated with employment concentration, this argument implies that employmentconcentration and the density of union membershipare also interdependent (24).

2. Erosion of thi "ManagementTeam': The leadership

"team" appeared to vanish in urban school whenthe system

became so large as to replace personal interactionwith

standard operating procedures. Superintendents could no

longer knowand consult their middle administration; decisions were often handeddownex cathedra in memo form.

Administratorscould no longer trust that topmanagement would "take care of them." While superintendents were at one time the "go between" in representing administrators' needs to the board, moving back and forth between the principals' group and the school board in an effort to gain a raise for the staff, this system ofdiplomacy seemed to fail. Administrators felt the need at least to "'meet and confer" and later negotiatecollectively and directly with

29 220 4.

the school board. In the 2,850 or so districts,

administrators felt theycould bestbe represented by administrators.

Whether themanagement team was ever truly successful

cannot easily be assessed..(25). Large systems are more

typicaly hierarchical--not4collegial. The common notion of

the team impliesa group of relatively equalindividuals who

perform their particularspecialty with support fromothers.

School districts, especiallylargeone; often see more

communication and diretives flowing from superintendent

downward rather thana peer system. Whatever the image, it seems obvious to many administratorsthat they are not a

team; instead the top leadership is distantand willing to

overlook them, in catering to teacher unionsand angry communities (26).

3. Rising2eacher Power: Besidesa distant top

management, middle administrators in increasing numbers

confront a unioni260andmilitant teacher force which is

capable ofgainingmuch at the bargaining table. Such

teacher power affectsthe administrator in several ways.

First, in times ofscarce resources, teachersare often able

to grab raises whichmay come out of possible incrementsfor

administrators.While oncemiddle-rank personnel had their

pay linked in a ratio to teachers(a "me too" clause stating

that any raiseor benefit accruing to teachers was also

given to administrators), boards ofeducation are oftennow

30 221 insisting on setting administratorwages independently.

Second, unionized teachers signcontracts which limit the prerogatives ofadministrators: limits on after-school

meetings,'theassigning of teachers to hall and toilet

duties, the evaluation ofteachers, and so forth. What then

is left for the principal and other administrators to

determine? And howcan administrators lead when their

option in the schools are severely restricted byworking

agreements bets en teachers andother employees (custodians,

bus drivers, maintenance personnel, secretaries)? Further, the principal findshim/herself the first rung in the

teachergrievance procedure. As the first line. in

supervision,___ principals often_ need protection. And when teachers strike, as they have done with great regularity in

the last tenor twelve years, the supervisors bear thebrunt

of keeping buildingsorlon, protecting property and children,

and yet trying to maintain some relationshipwith the

teachers. .For after the strike, the administrator and

teacher must again work together. Unionization isseen- as

one way of dealing with building-level 4wIteacher power: making it possible for administrators to seek help from their association when thingsget tough (27).

4. Militant School Communities: Minority anger was

often directed at the schools. Blacks, Latinos, Chinese, and Native Americansblamed the schools for the continued

31 222 segregation, poor education, and lack of occupational opportunity. The administrator felt the heat: white principals were fired or transferred outof nonwhite community school in increasing numbers incity schoolS.

Chicago and New York Cityschools are but two examples. In

1970, the Chicago school board mandated Local School

Counctls whichmade recommendationson the hiring of principals and permitted "parents and school patrons to share in the,processof arriving at decisionswhich affect local schools (28)." Black communities usually hiredblack administrators- -a perceived threatto seniority and the careers of white principals. And in New York City, the epic removal of 11 principals in Ocean Hill-Brownsville, along with 29 teachers, ledto the unity of staff and the first strike of school administrators in the nation's history.

Diane Ravitch, in theGreat School Wars,describes the confrontation between the community council and the educators (United FederationofTeachers and the Council of Supervisors and'Administrators):

By the beginning of the fall 1968 term, the governing board [of the Ocean Bill- Brownsville communitycontrol project] was ready for a confrontation with the 0FT, having hireda full teaching staff to replace the UFTteachers [and administrators] who walked out in the spring.

The union was ready too. Its delegate assembly authorizeda city-wide strike unless the Board of Education extended the protection of previouscontracts to all

32 223 decentralizeddistricts under its new plan and agreed to return all UFT teachers to Ocean Hill-Brownsville. Some members of the Board of Education thought they could convince the UFT to restrict its strike to Ocean Hill, whichwas patently impossible since those schools were nowfully staffed with teachers loyal to the governing board. (29)

It was not the community that caused theadministrators to

unionize; rather thepressure consolidated the organization and its mission.

While the 1970smayhavebeentimes of less direct community protest, the pressure from the "community" continues, though in more aophisticatedforms: malpractice and neglect suit broughtagainst educators; publicuprisings against taxes and economicbenefits for staff; andCallsfor accountability that are directed at teachers and administrators. Hence, themore recentefforts toward collective action (bargaining, due process, and lobbying) are attempts by administrators toprotect their jobs.

5. Attaining the Legal Rightto Bargain: Twenty-one states now have legislationprotecting the rights ofpublic sector supervisors to bargaining: guaranteeing them recognition and "good faith"bargaining (30). Without such enablements, collective bargainingwould beminimal, for in only seven states plus the Districtof Columbia, local boards of education havevoluntarily agreed to recognize and bargain with administrators--without legal requirements.

Bence, like the industrial labor movement, the public move

33 224 toward unionization has been legitimizedby legal support.

Why legislatures reversedtheir two-hundredyear policy

of not permitting publicemployeesgenerally and teachers and administrators particularly is not known. Rochan'3 study of characteristicsof states with and without

bargaining is useful,though no singlestate characteristics

totally explains the levelof bargaining policy-making. He explains:

The zero-order correlationbetween economic and social characteristicsand the indices of public sector laws suggest that more urbanized, industrialized,affluent, and high income, states and those irir7rising.pei capita incomeswere quickerto enact pubild sector7DWITETes and tend to have more comprehensive policies- inthe area. (31) Robert E. Doherty, in hismassive review of bargaining in education for the Industrial RelationsResearch Association

series, placesparticular emphael on the ability of the

United Federationof Teachers, New York City, to gain recognition, bargaining, and a contract througha brief representation strike in 1965 -"-two years prior to the passage of the state's publicemployment relations act (the Taylor Law). Doherty wonders:

It is interesting to speculate about what mighthave happened to the teacher bargaining movement had that strike failed. Had NewYork officials heldthe line in the face of thArather weak showingby organized teachers..., it is at leastconceivable that enthusiasms for bargaining in other sectors of the country would havebeen dampened. A

34 225 refusal might also havecaused legislatures in other statesto question whether publicsector bargaining was either inevitable or appropriate,,

As matters turned out,however, the New York City agreementseemed to haveencouraged those favoring bargainingand broken whatever resistence to bargaining mighthaveexisted in most of the statelegislatures. Between 1966 and 19760 almost 40states grantedsome degree ofbargaining or meet and confer rights to publicemployees. Whether New York City was the camel'snom under the tentor an inspiration of thoseseeking economicjustice depends on theview one has of the desirability of teacherbargaining. (32)

Whatever thereason for the legalsupport of bargaining for teachers andsome administrators, thefact remains that since the 1964, public school personnel have shared in the movement toward collective.IptiatiOni-(33) In summary, the impetus of school administrators to seek bargaining and unionizationhas come front structural,

managerial, political,and legal sources. School systems are larger since 1900; theyhavemany more riddle' administrators, who seek to participate in thedecision- making for the system. With such size and complexity, the management team has oftenceased to work, leaving administrators vulnerable to thie, dictates of higher

management and less ableto share in' the real governance of the school district. Simultaneously, the immediate environment for many administratorschanged: communities demande6 control over school personnel; teachers unions exerted power, weakening still more the ability of

35 226 administrators to lead. Further, administratorssaw their relative wage advantage shrinking as teachers caught up. Finally, the same laws thatgave teachers the statutory right to bargain in most cases likewise enabled administrators toseek bargdiningrecognition.

With this brief background on why some administrators have sought collective negotiations as their main modeof interaction with the board of education andsuperintendent, we can now analyze the six sample school administrator groups asexamples ofvarious forms of administrator organization.

I. STRUCTURE, CO-DETERMINATION', AND UNIONINFLUENCE

The first step inany theory of unionpower begins with the ex!(.stence of thebargainingunit itself. For without some level of centralized control, the particular occupational group cannot claim sufficientlegitimacy and strength to represent its membership. We argue in this section that school administratororganizations underwent two kinds of organization transformations. First there was a clear change in the vantity of middle administrator organizations: frommany to fFel, from dispersedstructure to centralization. Second, the qualities of the organization changed, from that resemblinga social club to that associatedwith unionism.

36 227 Studies of organizationalbirth are of someuse, though we ascribe to the tenets of structural contingencyIhlux:

that there "is no singlebest wayto organize. Rather, the

appropriate organizational structuredepends on the

contingencies confrontingthe organization," inparticular,

"the environment in whichthe organizationoperates (34)."

Hence, each of the six school settings (NewYork City, San

Francisco, Minneapolis,Cleveland, Dade County,and Atlanta) provide a distinct, thoughnot entirely dissimilar environment.

Organizational Transitions: Studies in RilloilikLa

Pressures, described *earlier, have cha_ged the organizatinal life of school administrators. For these employees and others existin a sociopolitical environment which shapes not onlytheir personal jobperceptions (as presented, for example, inthe theories of Getzelsand Guba)

(35) but their occupational views--the shared views of employeesconcerning the worth, rewards, and securityof their jobs. The working environmentoften changes, as the size, structure, legal constraints, and societal expectations evolve.

The working environment of school administratorshas been altered radicallysince the firstprincipals assumed

37 228 leadership over public schools in the 19th century. As the organzational settings changed, the necessaryoccupational transitions may havecaused a sense ofdisequilibria, the perception that a particular category of educators was no longer in control of their professionallives and that their job security and satisfaction were threatened. We have identified four stages in the development of the environment, organizations, and activities of school administrators: (1) TheAdministrator as Independent

Manager wherein theprincipal oversaw his/herschool or set of'schools with strong control and with little supportor

interference from thesmall or-non-existentcentral office; (2) The Administrator as Team Member wheresupervisory staff were seen as part of a managementsystem extending from the board and superintendent to the various field

administrators; (3)Administrators: Meeting and Conferring whereby middle rank supervisors weregranted a role in

requesting conditionsof employment fromthe superintendent who relayed such concerns to the board; and (4) Administrators and Collective Nagotiations in which administrators were recognized under law 'and/orcontract as the legal representative of the occupational group and contracts were signed. This four-step developmenthas some obvious characteristic whichunderlie the formalization of the occupational condition ofschool administrators. First, the organizational life of school administrators evolved

38 229 from private and almost totally non-existentduring the

principal-as-sole-managerphase to a full-blown political system or 'interestgroup." Perhaps the best theoretical

treatment of the changes involuntary associations isone by

H.S. Harris. When referring to unionsand other groupings, his words seem appropriate for this study. He starts by

explaining that peopleand their earlyorganizationoften begin in privacy,though these associationsmay not continue to be private--nor does 'voluntariness alwayspresuppose privacy (36) ." This shift fromprivate to public, from informal to formal, results, according to Harris, from radical changes inthe en "ironment:

It is plausibly argued bymoderngroup- theorists that voluntary or private associations of the kindthatare peculiarly prone to become political interestgroups are normallyformed as a result of some serious disturbance 9f theestablished equilibrium of life for the groupwhichbecomes formally associated. Such adisturbance may arise either from natural causes [whatever "natural" means],or from the intervention of some other group or social authority, or of course, from both, sources together.. .the tendencyofthe associations. . .is to seek to be accepted as public agencies, and be endowed withpublic authority. All such groups, in striving to maintain or restore the threatened equilibrium,seek to legislate for the sphere of human activitywith which 11* they are concerned. To the extent to which, they are able to do thisand obtain the backel of the public authority for what they do, they lose their privatecharacter. (37) Thus, as school admnistrators moved from being lone managers, leadership team members, to ameet and confer status on policy matters, and finally, participants in

formal collective negotiations, their organizational life

takes on a more publicquality. This movement, accordingto

Harris, is made in an attempt to recreatea sense oi

associational equilibrium,conditions whichwe shall discuss for school administratorsshortly.

Second, organizationallife for school administrators became more centralized, as a single voice wasrequirato deal with management. It seems clear from our data andthe studies of othersthat unionization of laboris coterminoO with the centralization ofauthority and control. While

during the initialcareer of the school administratorin the

19th century heor she was able to speak as an individual

and be heard, themeet-and-confer and collectivebargaining stages witnessed the increased need for political power.

Zald describesthe importanceofcentralized authority in

dealing with externalthreats: "Task requirementsencourage

varyingdegrees of centralization and decentralization."

"The hostile environment,"for example, "of conspiratorial parties leads to highcentralization" (38).

Finally, the four stages of school administrator development show a shift in relationships with top management: theboard of education and superintendent(s). While the earliest administrators worked without central management, or with the superintendencyin its infancy, the later periodssee the rise of strong building administrator

40 2 14 six

dependency for jobs, help, and self-respecton the

superintendeat; in turn, the superintendent acted

paternalistically toward his staff. Hence, during the

period of management team and meetingand conferring, the

ideology was thatof Rode big happyfamily," with the superintendent at the head. 106 WithA advent of bargaining, however, the tone of the

relationship changed dramatically.While professionally the r administratorwaspart of the administrative structure of

thedistrict,when matters of 'occupational life and

remuneration were considered,the administrator tooka more

,independent, and sometimesadversial stance. Each of these

changes (from privateto public purpose, from factured to

centralized structure, and from dependency to independent adversary)was brought about by an environmental

change. In the following sections,we shall analyze the

evolution of the administrators' organizational role, the

conditions that affected their jobs, thenature of their

organizational life, and the weaknesses that led to additional changes.

1. The Administratoras Illussist Manager Conditions

The. very first school principals operated as powerful

manager within their schools. In the absence of a strong

superintendw--or any superintendent at all--, the

administrator enjoyed great authoritybutvery little

41 2 32 .support from other school leaders. They performed a range

of Aties, including the direct supervision of staff,

buildings, students, andprogram. Pierce relates the role

of principal and thelimited central officecontract in this Cincinnati annual schoolreport:

The Male principal, as the local superintendent this emphasis],is response le for the observanceand enforcement of the rulesand regulations ofthe Board for the guidance and directionsofTeachers and government of the schools,and is accordingly invested with authority tocarrythem into effect. Withthe cooperationof the Female Principal, he is to classify thepupils in the different grades.. . . He shall employ half an hour each day in visiting the Schools of his District, and shallannounce to the other departments,by the ringing ofa bell, the hour for beginning andclosing school . . shall promulgate to all the Teacherssuch rulesand regulations of general applicationas he may receive from the Board . . shall transmit to theClerk, at the close ofeach School month, allbills for salaries ofteachers and report monthly to the Board according to blank forms furnished him shall transmit to the clerk, a report of the conditionof all the schools in hisDistrict . . shall also at the close of eachyear returnto the Clerk the keys to therooms of the house over which he has had charge shall see to the safe keeping and protection of the house, 'furnishing, apparatum, fences, trees, and shrubbery and maintain the strictest cleanliness. . . . shall require the pupils to to appear in or about theyard earlier than, fifteen minutes before the opening of school, and prevent them by noise or otherwise from annoying the neighborhoodof the school. He shall provide for the sweeping and scrubbing, lighting and maintaining the firesof the house . . . and shall make an equal per cent assessment on

42 233 all the teachers in thehouse (to paysomeone to keep the fires going in the buildings) .(39)

The leadership role of principalwas all-inclusive. He ran

the entire operation, includingbeing a rule-enforcer,pupil

classifier, supervisorof other schools whichwere usually

elementary, bell-ringer, bill-payer and bookkeeper,keeper of the keys, facilitiesprotector, sanitaryengineer, and fire watcher.

It seemsobvious that anyperson with thatmuch

responsibility andpower, including, also, the rightto hire

and fire staff almostunilaterally, was managerial. Such a person hardly needed aunion. Such apersonprobably

enjoyed the respect andthe fear) of children,'teachers, and community /parentsas well.

This rise ofthe principalship is well explained by

Pierce and others: schools requird some on-site supervisor

at the point where school board wereoverwhelmed by

increasing numbers of children, buildings, and responsibilities.

Nature of. AdministratorAssociation

We haveonlyscanty evidenceof the collective

professional activitiesofprincipals duriAg this early period. Without a centralizingmanagerial presence, tre

building principals rarely met together, since their roles were defined solely in theirbuildings. Whether the school

43 234 board leadership summonedthe entire staff ofprincipals to meetings is not clear,thoughwe do know that school board members tried to meetingregularly with the principals in their respective building for discussion,test:ing of pupils, and so forth. The onlymentionof centralization in the long Pierce discussion earlier was the regulation that principals present financial reportsto the clerk of the school board. So the funding ofschoolswas in large part centralized; the rule-makingwas a matter of board decision;

but the operation ofschools was leftto the principals (for men and women, with theMalePrincipal havingoverall control).

Weakness of the LonePrincipalship No data are available on the problems of the principal as building superintendent. Unlike the private schoolhead, the public school principal ceased bythe end of the 19th century to be a lone operator, not necessarilybecause he or she was inadequate but because of theoverall centralization and bureaucratication of American schools. The

superintendentemerged as the strong figure in local schools, wielding asmuch power over principals as these administrators did/had over teachers. Principals no longer had exclusive access to the board of education; the chief executive worked closelywith the board of education, replacing the principalas the direct agent.

44 235 Being a lone operator had certain inherent

shortcomings. Principals had few if any professionalsto

consult, to lean on for help, to learnfrom. Concentration

of effort in a single setting; withno distant-wide view seemed to be detrimental,as Pierce indicates: "the attitude

engendered by entrenchment intheir positions oftenresulted

in reactionary tendencieson the part of theprincipals, to

the detriment both ofthe schools and theirown professional development (40) ." One superintendent in Bostonwho encountered the closed viewof principals explained:

There wasmuchpassiveopposition to be overcome. Schoolmastersare usually great for passive opposition, andperhaps none were ever-greater than the Bostonschoolmaster of the last- generation. Eachwas a supreme ruler in his own school district,and relying on the support ofhis district committee, he coulddefy the interferenceof allother authorities, and he often did.(41)

It was against this background tha,': we move thenext phase of school administratororganization: that of the management team. It came slowly as schools centralized their functions and built a strong management system--with the administrator at themiddle level.

45 236 2. The Administrator andthe Management Team

Conditions

The management structure of the public schools in the

mid- to late-1800swas builton the notions of the business

hierarchy; the principal fell from near absolute authority

to the place theycurrently occupy: between the central

office managers and theteachers. For over a hundredyears,

principals, assistantprincipals, and other middlelevel staff have beenpart of asystem oforganization in which

they have both discretion for schoolsand programs under

them but directaccountability to thecentral office superintendents.

Research on the styles oftop school leadership showsa seriesof management typeswhich has been studied extensively elsewhere: developing from the corporate scientific managementtradition and moving toward ahuman relations style.--Thedisequilibrium created by a newand strong central managementwasnoted by a number of superintendents of the period. Philbrick of Bk.ston in the

1850s was stymied in his attempts at "thebringing of his course of study into effectiveand complete operation in all the schools (42)." The principals reacted by obstinance, disagreement, and comp saints. For them, a stong superintendent meanta weaker and less free principal.

Superintendents reacteddifferently to the principals'

46 237 tesistence. Some top leaders gave up: allowing the

building principals tomaintain their autonomy. Pierce

wrote that "the principals usually managed to keepa firm

grip on supervision in their own schools, and the

superintendentgenerally, whatever theymayhave felt,

showed no great zeal in trying to impose supervision from

the central officeupon them. In Boston, the supervisor of

primary schoolswas taken from grammarmaster in 1879 and

given to supervisors, butthree years later itwas restored

(43). Other superintendents played tough, exerting

increased authority over principals and other

administrators. . "The extent of theprincipal'sauthority and influence depends more on the attitudeof the superintendentthan upon the working of board rules. Two cities may have ruledalmost identical; yet inone city the principal may freelyexercise administrative initiative, while in the other hemay have all initiative dwarfed by the demandsofeabureaucratic central central office (44) ," Pierce explained.

The disequilibriumwas ended in the early 20th century with the emergence of the"management team" concept. In industry, this notionhad been introduced by thefollowers of the "human relations school" of management (45), who advocated a participativeapproach to leadership. Cuban and others have noted that the teammaintenance function of school mangement and have labelled the superintendents'

47 238 behaviors as the negotiator-stateman role. Cubanexplains

that superintendents build coalitions,seek advice, mediate,

and reconcile the differenceswithin their environment:

The negotiator-statesman role hashad a powerful hold on schoolmen's imagination. The stateman sees policymaking as a huge arena encompassing many groups. Shepherded by a school chief whoencourages and assists others to participate, teachers, principals, and communityare all involved in theprocess ofdecision-making. The administrator's job is to work calmlyand democratically with each group, releasing their creative capacities; moreover, he (and she] is expected to enter the community, unaggressively but firmly, to mobilize its educationalresources in behalfof improvel schools. Rather than being the expert who incessantly plugshis pet ideas, the superintendentactively seekspersonal and group growth both within schools and community. Such is the statesman's roles. (46)

School middle adminiitrators, then, were no longer working

alone; a system wasnowconstructed to guide, protect, and, limit his/her activities.

Nature of Administrator Organization

Littledata arecurrentlyavailable on the early

associations of principalsand other administratorsduring

the early smangement team" period. We do assume that, the

pre-bargaining organizationin at least some of the sample cities are similar: that is, these associations functioned

as primarily social, informational, and professional gatherings. Often, too, the superintendentwas a member.

48 239 And these groupingswere at least initially,an extension of the administrators' joband station.

Table k indicates the six characteristics of

administrator clubs. They wereprimarily informal, voluntary groupings that functioned as social and

informationdiffusionassociations. While such informal

contactmayalways provide an opportunity for building influence and some power, they were not overtly "tical.

Structurally, these units 'wereoften divided along various lines: by rank and setting, function, personalbackground, and individual interests.Thus, themore diverse the city and the school system, thegreater the numberof school administrator clubsor associations. Finally, there issome evidence that theseorganizations were operatedto reinforce the basically paternalistic relationship with the board of education and superintendent. Activities werecarefully monitored by the top executive; explanations of the existence and behavior of thegroups were reported to the board. And the organizationwas basically a servant of tie management structure.

49 240 CHARACTERISTICS OF.CLUB AND UNION ORGANIZATION

Club Union L. Membership Voluntary Mandatory eeltibilmrsilir Policy closed oragency (members mustpayd--4 whether they join union or not), aduri

dues check-off. Attempt to rgIDAASIAM

entire "community o-1: interest. 2. Status: Informal, extra-legal Legally r14-401"44)2

under statute, ICIC.49,

contract, or frireA:

3. Relationship, Paternalistic, Separate; CL.AutellArl to Tog extension of Hinagement management system 4. Function Social; information Stronglyr°1;44"kl, Wildly political representing

needs of middle -administration; participating in settingwages gri van rftoc.ectwire$, bil

5. Influence Weak, diffuse, Strong and 6;ta+2-1"-c311)

(uncontractual official spokes- organization 4-or'i occupational s*T.ccnA0A

6. Structure Loose; specialized Centralized: sole for each sub-group, bargaining unit; ethnic and social Coalition ofvet.n.001-LS interest, faction241 mid-levelSwA r34-1447r In the early section of this chapter,we discflesed the

qualities of the administratorassociation as described by Pierce. These gatheringswere places to share information

( wa full and free interchange of views"), renew social relations (to "foster friendly feelings among school

people"), and extend the control of the superintendent, according to Pierce'sanalysisof these early groups. Though there is verylittle information on these early

associations, we have some more recentdata fromour six cities: informationfrom the 1950s and 1960. a Administrator Associations in Sample Cities

Interviewdataon the six school districts indicate

clearly that up untilthe 1960s there were numerousmiddle

administrator clubs and associations. BettyOstroff described the prebargaininghistoryof NewYork City administrators as follows:

Throughout the decadeof the 1950s and before, NewYork City schoolsupervisory associations existedas professional "clubs." Persons holding licenses,and employed in the school system mayjoin in the clubs. Associated in thisway under professional titles, eachgroupworked separately to monitor and protect the rights and privilevS of itsmembers. (47) In other \cities, the role of these clubs was even less political. In Atlanta,one elementary principal recalled:

52 242 Yes, we hada principals' club. We met about four times a year. The lastmeeting was always a retirementbanquet for those members who wereleaving the system. We had no meetingswith the high school principals. They didn'tassociate with us. And the superintendent wouldcome to our meetings as a speaker or guest aboutonce a year. (48) In Minneapolis, intervieweesrecalled the differences

between the status of highschool and elementaryprincipals.

The secondary principals alwaysmade more Money than we did. They were almost always men, older, and cloierto the superintendent. When it came time toannouncesalaries, they alwaysdid better than us. True, their building hadmore students. ; But , we worked just as .hard. We wereusually women. don't claimdiscrimination. But these differencesmight to have existed ifmore of us had been men. (49)

In several cities, there existed not onlythe clubs basedon

school level and job but alsoon race and religion. In New

York City and San Francisco,in the late 1950s, theblack

administratorshad an association: "anopportunity for

black supervisorsto get together and talk and to lookout for one another (50)."

ATLANTA: The Management Team with Some Renovations

Atlanta school administratorsdo notbargain, theydo not meet and confer. They are part of themanagement system of the district, though there is evidence ofsome

formalization ofrelations, between schoolprincipals and the

0, 53 243 board of education.

Participator x Governance: Using the ,cask -force approach, the superintendent and school board have involved

the Atlanta Association of Elementary SchoolPrincipals and

the Atlanta Association of...Secondary School Principals in

setting certain key policies: in particular, the lay-off

(Reduction In Force), evaluation, and transfer procedures.

Even though the Atlanta associationsare not recognized for bargaining purposes, the policies bear resemblance to those in cities with bargaining.

For example, lay-offs of administrators, as described

in the personnel policies handbook, follow Seniority by need and division. Whilewe havenot yetbeen able to obtain and analyze these policies, itdoessound like the ) RIF proceduresofother cities. One informant explained that no administratorshave been dismissed yet, however;so it is difficult to know whether the procedure will satisfy the two principals' groups. Further, like other cities in our sample, th Atlanta personnel policy allows administrators who are laid off to "bump"or take the job of a teacher with lesser seniority. Thus, there are means for protecting the needsof administrative staff-evenwithout the right to bargain.

Wall Setting: Wages for administrators in Georgia are determined jointly by thestate and the local school board; this dependenceon the stae is fairly comon in the South and

54 244 ,,....r.,-,r--- , -r. grows out of the Depression (1930'sand 1940h) when Southern

school systems wentbankrupt and were rescuedby the state.

Hence, a principal receives the reacher s' state base of

$8,590 and $30 per teacher in his/her building which is

supplemented locally in\te..richerschool districts. Hence, bargaining locallycan be only moderately successful--since

the bulk of the salaries for administratorscome from the state legislature and are tied to the state teachers' base pay and supplement.

Staff Evaluation: Thoughthere is no bargained due

process for the evaluation ofadministrators, there are

certain safeguards in the personnel procedures. An

administrator is allowed to examine hisor her file; if there is something derogatory in it, the supervisorymay

requestan explanation, be allowed to place'countermanding

statementsinto the file, and finally, to appeal to the state board/of education. As yetwe do not have sufficient evidence to tell whether theseprotections are working. Without a %,'Jtractor the right to bargain these procedures,

it is unlikelythat an administrator would have much influence over his/her professional life. But this statement remainstentative until further studies are possible.

The future of administrative jobs in Atlanta, is in danger, since the enrollmentdecline in Atlanta schoolshas 0/75.-A0, been drastic in the last five years,/ a drop from about

,55 245 105,000 to 72,000 students--dueto familiesmoving to the

suburbs, enrolling children in privateschools, and having

miller families. Whether attrition will continueto be the

major way ofcutting administrators isunclear, since there is some limit to this --approach. Sc far, Atlanta

administrators appearto be protecting themselvesreasonably

well as part ofan alert management team--with strong unit

participation in rule-setting. Without a collective

bargaining lawin Georgia, administratorsand teachers will

not be able toengage in collective bargaining;hence, they

must continue toworkwithin the "team" to protecttheir jobs and well-being. Further, gaining salaryincreases is

greatly complicatedbythe state'smajc;role in setting

educator wages. But since the large andprestigious Georgia

Association of Educators (GAE), the state affiliate of the

National EducationAssociation, isconstantlyworking to improve the wages and well-beingof teachers, and sincethe principals' salariesare tied to the teachers, the state's principals can improve their base paywithoutdirect lobbying. The local supplement is up to the local school board; here the weaknessesof the management team are obOious, since administrators cannotcarrytheir needs directly to the board and must work through the superintendent.

Summary: Weaknesses ofthe Management Team Approach Atlanta administrators' association shared

characteristics withsome of the supervisors' groups in other cities: they bring administrators together, allow

them to share ideas, and, when asked by thesuperintendent,

to participate in makingcettain decisions. The Atlanta

personnel policieshandbook was the result of some shared

decision-making, though the Atlanta administrators didnot bargain over its contents. One topmanager explained that the policies were drawn originally fromthe National School Board Association's manual forpersonnel management, nota

source that anadministrators' union wouldtrustoutright.

Clearly, the united presence ofvariousprincipals

associations, aswas the case in Atlanta and elsewhere,is a

vast improvementover earlier periods when principalshad no voice. But the club or team associationhas serious

weaknesses as theenvironment becomesmore political and a

stronger and more independentcontrol is needed. First, the collective voice ofadministrators in Atlanta and inmost of the other cities in our samplewas divided. Ostroff explains the problemsof divided authority, particularly at the point where "meetand confer" becomeimportant:

By necessity, theseprofessional associations often would have to vie withone another for a fair share of the salary dollar for their members. Each association had itsown salary chairman, and inmany instances, the salary chairmanbecame thechief lobbyist for the association, both locally and in Albany. Eachpressed for legislation which favored

57 247 his member, whether or not it was at the expense of members in the otherassociations.

From 1951 through 1953, New York City school supervisors failed to getanyraises other than increments. TheCityclaimed that teachers' wages cutso deeply into the budget that therewas nomoney left for increases for the administrative staff. Neglected in this way by the City, the individual associations pressed thState Legislature for special consideration,but were rejected. In spite of this, it took until 1958 for the salary chairmen tocome together to developa program for concerted action. (51)

In San Francisco, as late as 1970, therewere as many as

eleven organizations that represented the city's

administrators and supervisors. As we shall see in thenext

section, at the pointwhere the school boardsought to *meet and confer" with the schoolmid-administrators, theboard Could playone group against another. Thus, during the club

phase, the lackofunity presented problemswhenever administratorscame under pressure.

3. The Administrator--Meetingand Confrrring

Conditions

py the middle and late 1950s, school administrators were pressing for a say in wage setting, policy determination, and otherproblems affect them. Though state laws in the 1950's and 196ds forbad collective bargaining, they did in some cases permit or encourage local boards of education to "meet and confer" with local groups. For

58 248 example, under (the WintonAct in California employeegroups

were permitted to organizeand present their requests for wages, working conditions,lay-off procedures,etc.) to the

employer, who in turnhad the option toaccept unilaterally,

change, or reject the offer. Meeting and conferringwas a change from the old "management team* view, though it failed to give administratorsand other groups bi-lateral involvement.

We can conceptualize the relationship betweenemployees and the school board as follows: (1) Under the "team' approach, the. administrators (and teachers, too) never directly met the boardofeducation to present terms of employment. .Rather the-superintendent acted as the diplomat-stateman,meeting with the employees, then, the board, and back to the employees, hammering out the work agreement in that fashion.

"The Go-Between Approach"'

Employee Group SUPERINTENDENT Board of

(teachers, adminis- (Personnel Staff) Education trator) 4

The superintendent attempted to balance the needs of his staff with the level of willingnessof the board to provide mot\e money. As often happened, theteachersweregiven a

59 249 raise--because of theirshere size and the incredibly low

salaries they received. Themiddleadministrative staff received little. Andthose educator who couldearnmore

money elsewhereleft, as the turnover figureson teachers and administratorsindicate.

(2) During the meet and confer stage,the employeegroup was

brought facetofacewiththe employer, the board. But the

purpose of the meetingwas strictly advisory. After hearing the requests of the teachersand various administrators groups (seniorhigh, junior high,elementary, and assistant principals, central office coordinators, directors,0 al.), the board and supeiintendentcan then decide what employment terms

To Meet & Confer

BOARD OF EDUCATION Aj vice EMPLOYEE GROUP: Advisory kin Condi-Hems Superintendent Committee IlmasimmillE

250 60 Will be accepted on a unilateral basis. (3) Finally, as conditions dictated and laws were changed, administrators

were enabled to engage incollective bargaining,wherein the two sides (management and employees) negotiateas part of a contractual (notan advisoii) relationship.

To Bargain Collectively

EMPLOYEE GROUP: EMPLOYER: Board Collective

Negotiating Team Negotiating Team ,Bargaining

During the meet and confer phase,employeegroups are not officiallyorlegally recognized; rather they are

allowed to discuss theiremployment requests withthe board. The rest of the process is up to the board, whichmay accept, reject, change, or take under adviser ant anything offered.

Nature of AdministratorAssociations

Meet and confer proceduresdo not stipulate who will representa particular group of employees. In theory, any subgroup of teachersor administratorscould request time for a presentation tc be board. And the board could, in turn, offerone. package (wages, fringe benefits, working conditions) to one group and nctanother. And by granting one group a larger pay raisethan another, the board could

61 251 cause a struggle between the members of particular occupationalgroup. In New York City, prior to collective bargaining, the variousadministrator associations for elementary, junior high, vocational and technical principals, curriculum dirictors, and subject supervisors fought for raisesunder the board's"meet and confer rules." "The frequent meetingsof the salarychairmen and association presidents over a three year period producedan unanticipated result,"Betty Ostroff explains.

An understanding had graduallygrown among these leaders. They realized that the problems facing themwere more similar than different, and that ifthey wished to achieve any substantial benefitsin the future, it would be-imtheir-best-interests to involve themselves with likemindedcolleagueson a long range basis incooperative action. (52) Since they were not bargaining as a group, theyovercame their differences and agreedon a fixed ratio for each job title in 1960. Later, they formeda loose confederation of administrators called the Council of Supervisory Associations, recognizingthe differencesamong the groups. Thenew Council was successful in getting the state legislature to accept the ratio salary schedule for all

middle administrators;and in 1962, theeleven organizations were given de fact9 recognition by Dr. Bernard Donovan, superintendent of New York Cityschools. Be wrote) "My intention to consider the Council as spokeman for its affiliation is known by the Board of Education and meets

62 252 with its approval(53)."

The Nature ofAdministrative Association

Under conditionsof *meeting and conferring," theNew York City group, originally in acompetitive situation, learned to cooperate and act as confederates--rather than

fight and diminish theirinfluence. For while teacherswere numerous and more unified in cities like New York, the administrators were few in number and inherentlyless powerful. Hence, in New York City,at least, CSAbecame a unifiid effort to represent administratorsprior to dejure recognition by the boardof education in 1967. Other citiessawotherorganizational arrangements during themeet and confer stageof boardadministrator relations. In California, under the Winton Act, various groups attempted to represent middle level supervisors. Some groups were supported by national labororganizations. The AFLCIO chartereda small groupof administrators as local/1"3of the American Federationof School Administrators with the assumption that once the state ofCalifornia had a collective bargaining law for the publicsector, AFSA might win the representation election. The Teamsters, Locar960, were involved and were particularlystrong among the weakest group of administrai:ors, the assistantprincipals (which joined the Teamsters group, up to 40 percent of their numbers). Some administratorseven approached the American

63 253 Federation of Teachers whichwas strong among the San Francisco teachers. But AFT waswary of admitting administrators for fear of a takeover (a commonconcern, since before the 1960s,. National Education Associationwas dominatedby administratots). Further, minorities joined administrator groups, as a way of protecting their role in the school and a means for extendingblack identity in the schools.

The board of education in San Franciscowas evidently quite skillful at playing onegroup off against another. Also, the administrator in California hadlong been part of a management team-oriented group, the Association of California School Administrators (ACSA), whichattempted to represent all superintendents, administrators, and supervisors. The strength of thisgroup--which has :.tld the middle and upper management of the state'sschool together-- had beenseen in the fact thatSan Francisc is almostthe only school district to date to recognize its miciale administrators forpurposes of bargaining. Prior to bargaining, theadministrators in Cleveland had joined theteachers association;they had been chartered as a group within the Cleveland Teachers Union.

Administrators felt that allyingthemselves with the larger and more powerful teacher's union would best allow them to meet and confer with the board of education. Since Cleveland administrator salaries were tied to th teachers

64 254 in the 1950s 1 and early 1960s anyway, it made sense, according to respondents, formallyto ',oin loca141554 of AFT. In 1964, the administrators lost their vote in the ClevelandTeachers Union, a decisionmade locally in

response to a national trend to 00 free teachers from the domination of their administrators andsupervisors. So, in 1966, the Cleveland Federation of School Administrators became the Cleveland Council of SchoolAdministrators, which it remains tod4y. a

Unlike administratorgroups in other cities, the Cleveland supervisors werealready joined into onegroup, though the varioussub-categories maintainedtheir identity thro'h representation on the governing board. Years prior t t unionization of teachers, however,the city saw the prlucipals' clubs and associations much like those elsewhere. Saving close relationswith the teachers hadthe distinct advantage for the administrators:it gave themsome of the same "meet and confer' rightsas teachers; later, when the board ofeducation recognized the Cleveland Federation of Teachers as the official bargaininggroup for teachers, they also were willing to bargainwith the administrators--eventhough the state of Ohio hasno public employment relationslawand thusno entitlement for school supervisors tonegotiate.

The various administrator groups in Minneapolis have had a long tradition ofclub membership. The organization

65 255 were divided along joblines: the secondary principals,

elementary principals,assistant principali,central office supervisors, and later the central officeconfidential

employees each had itsown separate group. Apecking order existed, with the High School PrincipalsAssociations having the most prestige, pay, and visibility within the system.

During the meet andconfer stage, the board sat downwith each of the groups, seeing that.the secondaryadministrators had higher salariesthan the lower school leaders. This

wage tension continued, rightinto the bargainingperiod, as did the threeorganizations: Principals Forum, Minneapolis Association of Administrators and Consultants (Central office supervisory staff), and the Confidential Employee Association.

Dade Countyadministratorshad meeting and confer status for six years, leading up collectivebargaining recognition in 1975;by 1977, they lostthe right to bargain and resumed themeet aid confermode. The organizational structure changed over the period,for sitparate clubs, for administrators of differentrank, to a singlegroup, the DadeCounty School AdministratorsAssociation (DCSAA). Prior to the consolidation of Dade County schools with the cityschools of Miami, there werenumerous smaller associations for white and blackadministrators, county and city administrators, and so forth. The city-county consolidation in the 195ds brought all the middle-level

66 256 staff intoone unit, pre-datingthe use of themeeting and conferring and collectivebargaining. In summary, meeting and conferring required some

organizational unit: onethat could engage in discussion with the board; one that in some wayrepresented the

administrators in the school system. Since there wasno legal underpinning for the meet and confersessions, the board was not required to confer "in good faith"or to be held to what they accepted. No contractwas signed; usually these sessions led to some agreement' of understandingor perhaps a change in board policy.Meeting and conferring was a first step ina formalizationprocess. The recent meet-andconfer session in Dade County, Florida, for school administrators found theDCSAA meeting with the superintendent to prepare an agenda; the meeting then moved to the school board wherethe leaders presented their requests: pay, extra vacation days, a diffe!ent accrual system for vacations days so that if an administrator takes fewer than alloted days off one year, he/she can use these days next year. Task forces, with staff from the superintendent and administrator groups, worked jointly on various issues; these problems were then put into writing and accepted by the administratorsand the superinte"ndent--beforefinal presentationto the Dade County board of education.

67 2 5 7 Weaknesses of Meet andConfer Approaches Meeting and conferring stands directlybetween total

employee separationfrom theboard and key decision-making and co-determination as existswith collectivebargaining. As such, it shares the best and worstcharacteristics of bothpoles of this continuum. Meeting and conferring preserves the notion of the "management team," the strong feeling, as Redfern explains, that "if middlemanagers are

part of , management in board-superintendent-teacher

negotiations, it is utterlyridiculous to thinkthat they could or should join a unionor an association to bargain with their bosses. Management is an entityand it is totally incongruous to haveone managerialcomponent bargaining against anothercomponent (54)." The role of supervisors as part of management, and thus not appropriately part of a collective bargaining unit, was expressed in the private sector in1948--atthe time when Congress was revising the National Labor Relations Act (passed as the Taft-Bartley amendments). The 'Rouse report explained:

Supervisorsare management people. They have distinguishedthemselves in their work. They have demonstratedtheir ability to take care of themselves withoutdepending upon the pressure of collective action. No one forced them to become supervisors. They abandoned the "collective security" of the rank and file voluntarily, because theybelieved the opportunities thus opened to them to bemore valuableto them than such "security." It

68 258 seems wrong, and it is wrong, to subject people of this kind, who have demonstrated their initiatives, their ambition,and their ability to get ahead,to the levelingprocess of seniority, uniformity,and standardization that the Supreme Courtrecognizes as being the fundamental principlesof unionism. (55)

In education, the topic of going beyondmeet-andconfer, to bargaining for adminstrators, has stirred such deep reactions from-"managementteam" advocates thatone can understand the feeling ofthreat involved. Sinclair calls separat3 bargaining foradministrators "thewrong solution," based on the absenceof legal authorityin Arizona (butnot elsewhere, necessarily), the impactof bargaining on

"professional staff relations," and thesmall net financial impac't of bargaining,as drawn from research oncollective bargaining for teachers (56). Heddinger reports that a survey of Pennsylvaniaprincipals showed that "principals indeed are part of the managementteam in Pennsylvania, and have significant authority and responsibility for making decisions.' (These surveys, by theway, were distributed by the superintendent inthe local district.) (57)

Finally, the Ohio Association of Elementary School

Principals in 1971 gave this advice to superintendents concerning the managmentteam:

The effective superintendent today recruits capable. supportive administrators and supervisors, then employsthem in sucha manner as to most effectively accomplishthe administrative functions for that school. This type of involvement would promote the

0 ,69 259 utilization of principals, supervisors,and others in communication with the board of education, the community, and the student body, recognizingthat in individualareas of administration theirexpertise oftenexceeds thatof the superintendent. It behooves administrators toreassess the relationship between principal-supervisor-director and superintendent in order toascertain whether the presentorganizationalpattern guarantees them the bestpossible utilization of the expertisepossessed by each . . . In partnership with the superintendent, the principal hasa significant contribution make, to but such a partnershipcannot be bought, coerced,or dictated, although itcan readily be earned.(58) Yet meeting and conferring fails to guaranteeemployees anythingother than a chance to be heard. While "communication," utilization," and "partnership" are valuable concepts, they fell short of true bilateral decision- making. Hence, in theperiod 1965 to thepresent, an increasing numbs of administratorsare opting for the right to bargain--a situation that grew out of the disequilibrium of the period. Teachers were bargainingand

gaining increases inpayand benefit; communitygroups were influencing the placement and continuation of jobs for admixtstratori; and laws were enabling principals legitimately t el im the rightto bargain.

4. The Administratorand Collective RArmL,inin-

Conditions

In the five cities where administrators had or were

70 260 bargaining, conditionshad changed, making them ripe for

bargaining. In NewYork City, the Council of Supervisory Associations had been officiallyrecognized in 1965, when Walter Degnan, president of CSAand James B. Donovan,board

president, jointly signedthe memorandum of understanding, including:

The Superintendent of Schools or his representative, willmeet and consultonce a monthduring the schoolyear--and the Board of Education atleast once during suchschool year--with representative of the Council on matters of educationalpolicy and development and will confer with them,witha view to arrive at a mutuallyacceptable position with respectto their working conditionst.salary . schedules, and grievanceprocedures. (59) Note the preTaylor Lawlanguage' of consulting and attempting to arrive ata mutuallyacceptable position."

'Once the state publicemployment law was passed,recognition was more formalized (atleast in wording):

The Board recognizes the CSA as the excldsive bargaining representative of all employees of the. Boardserving by appointment or assignment 'under license or other pedagogical certification in pedagogical supervisory or administrative positions in schools, bureaus, district or central offices, and receivingsalary established for such position, excluding managerial and confidential employees in these titles designated as managerial or confidential under the procedures ofthe -aTy,mr1 naw or by agreement of the parties.(60) Other cities in our sample, too, found administrators seeking the right to bargain. Only Dade County

71 261 administratorsreceived that prerogative and thenforfeited itbecauseofpending state legislation againstmiddle administratornegotiations.

The Nature of AdministratorOrganizations Our studyof sample administrator organizations indicates thevariations inunit characteristicsalong three dimensions: Organizational-structural, Co-determination, and Affiliation. As organizations, the samplegroups differ in their ability to influence theirschoolsystems, in part because oftheir ability tocommandcontrolover a formal and legallyrecognized org4nization,to engage inbi-lateral decision-making, and the resources they gainfrom outside relationships. Table 7 presents the fiveorganizational power variables, which we shall apply to the sixcities; Table7shows theextent of associationalco-determination each sample grouphas; and Table 3, later, indicates the amount ofexternal bargaining, grieving, andinformational help each administratorgroup receives..

. TABLES) Adv144 POWER-ASSESSINGFUNCTIONS OF UNIONS ASVOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS

Atlanta: TheManagement Team The school administrators in Atlanta public schools score loweston our scaleof structural and bilateral

,72 262 POWER-M4ESSING FUNCTIONS OF UNIONSAS VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS 7-4134.E, I - dr;able.s

Administrator Associations:Sample Districts

Dade Cleve-Minne- San Atlanta County land apolis Fran. NYC

1. Organizational Power Variables,:

a. Se arate Mid-Administrator Organization none = 0; mixed w/supt.a 1; separate = 2) 0 1 2 2 2 2

b. Centralized Representation (none = 0; mixiaair 0 1 2 2 2 2 sole represent. In 2) c. Recognition: Under Voluatary Agreement by Board of Education (1); Under State Law (2) 0 0 1 2 2 2

d. Coalition Structure- Internal Governance (proportional represent.) 0 1 2 2 2 2

e. Staff Leadership: Elected (1); Single Paid (2); Hierarchy of Staff (3) 0 2 1 1 2 3

SUB-TOTAL 0 5 8 10 11 13

1,41A.1 Co-DETciarKLW,fsAr 1/4,(49) MSGIs 2. Power of Co- Determination Varlages:

a. Bi-Lateralism (bargaining): 0 = None; Meet and Confer = 1; Collective Negotiations = 2 0 1 2 2 2 2

b. cOntrartiml S-:tcm: Yes = 1 1 1 c. Oue Process for Grievances: 71o170; Yes= 1 1 1

d. SenioritRi hts for Reduction in orce: No = 1; Yes = 1 0 0 0 1 0 0

-72"- 263 -51.mA e0vki)

Administrator Associations_: Sample Districts

Dade Cleve- Minne- San Atlanta County, land apolis Fran. NYC

e. Right to "Bump": (No - 0; Yes 1) ;- 1 1 1 1

f. Unfair Labor Practices Clause: WOWom;e7---- 0 0 0 1 1

10921.11$.121212.: (No n 0; g. es= 0 0 1 1

h. Right to Strike: (No = 0; Yes =1) 0 0 '0 0 0

I. Third-Part eal: (Grievance trat on = Bargaining Arbitration = 2) 0 0 0 2 1 1

j. Administrative Tenure 0 0 0 0 0 1

'Tenure as Teachers: (No = :JP es = fr-----' 1 1 1 1 1

SUB -TOTAL ;I 4 6 10 9 11 I control. Taking column one, we see that school

administrators haveno centralized, recognized,and staffed. organization; rather, two informallyrecognized principals' clubs or organizations permit them to share information and voice the concerns of their-occupationalgroup. True, under

the structure ofparticipativemanagement Atlanta principals serve on task forcet and make their needs know;but they are not officially or legally recognized and mustwait to be included in keydecisions. Without some device for

coordinating the needsof elementaryand secondary school

administrators,. the two groups were unable to present a united stance; competition existed; and interviewees mentioned their inabilityto control their occupational. environment. No staff leadership existed. Atlanta

administratorswere led by their elected presidents,one for

the elementary principalsand one for the secondary. But no full-time staffwere available.

As for the co-determinationvariables, Atlanta administrators didnot bargain; they did notwork under a contract system. Rather, their jobswere governed by the working personnel policiesof the district. It appears that some of the procedures were similar 4.110,e us;ftV.v.leVAA through bargaining, though whetherthe administratorshave the power to oversee their enforcementis an open question for further research. We have already mentionedthe nature of salaries and fringe benefits in Georgia schools: the

73 265 state pays the base pay of some $8,500 plus $30per teacher in a principal's building; Atlantaadds to thatamount as a local supplement(poor district donot: their administrators earn the state 'sums only).' The salarysupplement is not

. negotiated. The schoolboaxd and superintendentwork out a total salary schedule for all employees, withadministrators getting a similarpercentage as the teachers.

,Lay -off procedures resemble local unionsthat bargain. Atlanta administrators are given some assurances of seniority rights--amajor concern ofunions that bargain--as one of several variablesused indeterminil who will be fired during a reduction in force. But since the Atlanta schools have:- notlaid administratorsoff (rather, theyuse attrition), it is hard to tell what partseniority will play, versus other7riteria suchas *needs of the district," ability to reassign an administrator to another job laterally, and the perception byadministratorsthat they are not being fired for personal reasons. Administrators in Atlanta enjoy the rightto replace or "bump" a teacher--if they have seniority over him/her and cannotbe placed in another administrative post. Should this removal occur during the Imar, the administrator continues toreceive the supervisory pay--even though he/she isperforming teaching duties until the end ofthe school year at which time the teacher's salary replaces thehigher administrativeone.

74 266 As for other variables in co-determination, Atlanta administrators have no "unfair labor practices" clause, since they do not bargain understate law or localcontract. Like the other five sample cities,Atlanta's supervisorsdo not have the right to strikg. They haveno appeal to third party intervenors to settlegrievances, thoughthere is a state appealsprocess to the state board of education. Principals are not tenured, though theydomaintain their rights asteachershence, the rightto bump. In all, Atlanta administrators scoredthe lowest of the six cities, receiving a zero oti organizational power variables with no separate, recognized, legitimated coalitional structure and leadetship to represent their needs.Though they are included insome key decisionsas a part of the managerial system, they cannot claimthat right independentof the willingnessof the superintendent to include them. As for co-determination,there is little. Personnel policies protect all staffmembers, providinga rationalprocess for lay-offs,bumping, and appeal. These procedures appear tomeet the demand forsmooth bureaucratic operation, not any strong labor relationsappear--thoughwe may be wrong nn this!, r_oras ri city c-hcols withthoualla of employees can hardlyindividualize every lay-off, transfer, or bump. Thus, the process makesgovernance easier and allows forsome protection of employeerights.

75 267 Dade County: Meeting and Conferria

After. Bargairlial

Florida has strong protection for the rights of

employees in the publicsector to bargain. In fact, the new Saaatitution of the state, adopted in 1968, containsthe stated right to unionize:

The right ofperson to work shall notbe denied or abridged on account ofmembership or nonmembership inany labor union or labor organization. The lit' lLt ofemployees, Laand throe t labor to bar TT: coliectivel shall not be denied or apridg ec on ;

Under the gplutilutipm and the state collectivebargaining

law, theDadeCountySchoolAdministrAtorsAssociation

bargained two contracts, establishing the right of recognition, dueprocess, and thefull range of bilateral

activities on December 18, 1974. The Florida Public

Employee RelationsCommission found thatthe Dade County

School Administrators Associationwas "incompliance" with the state law and was therefore "the exclusive representative for thepurposes of collective bargainingfor the employees in theunit described below:all regular full time professional administrativeemployees employed by the Dade County SchoolBoard." (61)

But in 1977, the Floridaemployment law was amended to include stricter provisions concerning the definition of

"administrative personnel." It placed principals and other

76 26 administrators in the same work category as the superintendent, as "managerial," and thus ineligible for bargaining. Chapter 447of the Florida statutes defines managerial employeesas those who perform jobsthat "require the exercise independentjudgment," "formulate policies," "assist in the conductofcollectivebargaining," "a significantrole in personnel administration," and "in employee relations." Then, by name, administrative personnel are:

Administrative personnel comprises the superintendent, supervisus, principals,and those who maybeemployed as professional administrative assistants to the superintendent or tothe principal...(62) In lightof these changes in thelaw, and the clear likelihood that the. Florida Public Employees Relations Commission,would de-certifythe Dade County Administrator, the union voluntarilyrequested to be de-certified in the follow resolution:

WHEREAS, the Floridal legislatureenacted Senate Bill 1449,amending the FloridaPublic Employees RelationsAct . . .

WHEREAS, the effect of thatamendment is to exclude from the definition of "public 6110.0yeet'l andtrierefore from the protection of the Act, school administrativepersonnel as defined try Section 228.041(10). . .

WHEREAS, thebargaining unit represented the by Dade County School Administrators Association and the membership of our Association is comprised primarilyof such administrative personnel,it is hereby

77 269 .RESOLVEDby the Dade County School Administrators Association that said Associations hereby

1). disclaimany interest in being the exclusiveFailliingagent ofany employees of the Dade CountySchool Board;

2) disclaims its roleand functionas an employeiBrgiaiation. . . ;

3) disclaims therepresentation ofany publi6 employeeor group ofpublic employees concerning anymattersrelating to their employment relationship with any public employer . . and

4) disclaims its certification as the bargaining agent fo: that bargaining unit described . . . by the FloridaPublic Employees RelationsCommissionon March 13, 1975. (63)

*. The organizationalimpactof decertification is as yet unclear. True, the DCSAA no longer

bargains; but in voluntarily seeking

decertification, theorganization was permittedto

complete its contractyear and remain the spokes- group for all administrators. Instead of

bargaining, thegroup now meets and confers with

the board. Looking at column two, Table 1, one sees a number of .structural and bilateral

qualities that differentiate Dade County adminietratuEs both the Atlanta supervisors and those, in othersample cities.

First, the DCSAAdoes not represent solely the middle administrators; in fact, the superintendent hasjoined the group. Hence, the Dade County group is a broad managerialunit, with mixed representation,no recognition under law since 1977, and a mixed coalitional structure

including all top andmiddle administrators. Like NewYork and SanFrancisco, the DadeCounty

organization hasa full-time, paidadministrators, who operates an office for the managementof the association's affairs.

The co-determinationvariablesare a bit more

confused. Once an organizationhas bargained and

established a certainposture, one wonderswhether

simple decertificationis sufficientto place the

relationship on a strictly meet-and-conferbasis.

Further, many ofthe provisions inthe 1975 and

1977 contracts (whichwerebargained) remain,so that the protective language is still ineffect-- even thoughthe group isno longer the bargaining representativeof the administrators. The contract includes payincrements, a "systematic career ladder and promotion policy,* a transfer policy incase of reduction in force which allows an administrator tokeep his/her formersalary and preferred status in finding another jobelsewhere in the system for oneyear, as well as other special considerations such as holiday changes,

79 271 automobile allowance for administrators using their own cars for officialwork.

Hence, the association holdson to several of

its advantages, suchas the contract, the right to

bump into the classroomif lay-offsoccur, and the

continuation of teacher tenure into the

administrative role. Most importantly, the unity

of the organization,its governingstructure which

includesstaff representative from the various

levels in the organization, hasmaintained the

presence of administrators inthe school system.

As for the actualelectoral system, ithas Changed

over the years. At first, theDCSAA had a 35 person board,thirtyelected andan additional 5 appointed to insure racial and jobtitle balance.

Recently, thegroup moved to a straight title election with 5 officers,2 secondaryprincipals,

2 elementary principals, 2 central office supervisors and directors,2 assistant principals, and 2 administrativeservices.

In the long run, it is unclearhow the non- bargaining approach will work. SincJ all employees in Floridaare guaranteed the right to bargain even, perhaps school administrators if the amendment to the employment law were challenged in court) , the competition for funds,

80 272 raises, and power among school calployees at all levels will intensify. Perhaps the administrators can maintain their relationship with the

superintendent and gainpower and favor in that way; but in timesof crisis, meeting and conferring may not beenough.

Cleveland: Bargaining in the

Absence ofa State Employment RelationsLaw Even though Ohio is among the most

industrialized and urbanized of states (having more large cities than anyother state), it has yet to pass a public-employment relatiOnslaw.

Yet an increasingnumber of citieshave bargaining for educators, including the Cleveland Council of

Administrators and Supervisors. Like other employees in Ohio, administrators inCleveland have long benkhigh politicized, beginning their

collectivebargaining as partof the Cleveland

teachers' union, an AFTaffiliate. On September 26, 1974, the Cleveland administrators gained

separate recognition,done voluntarily andextra-

legally by theCleveland board ofeducation:

WHEREAS, meeting the educational needs of the children of the Cleveland District School requires cooperation of all concerned .

81 273

S WHEREAS, the Board has concluded that the Cleveland Federation of Principals and

Supervisors hereafter knownas the Council . . ., represents the vastmajorityof its employees . .

WHEREAS, the Council has pledged that their efforts will be dedicated to the achievementof educatjonal excellence

BE IT RESOLVED, that until such timeas collective bargaining legislation becomes effective in Ohio,or until such time as the Board concludes, based upon satsifactorily evidence submittedto it, that the Cleveland Council of Administratorsand Supervisorsno longer represents a majorityof those in administrativl and supervisorypositions, and oncondition thatsaid organization of administrators and supervisors not discriminate against anyemployee on the b4.sis of race, creed,color, national origin, sex, marital statusor membership in or association with activities of anyemployee organization, the Cleveland Council is recognized . . .as the sole representative of administrative and supervisorypersonnel with the exceptionof the Superintendent, the Deputy . . . . for the purpose of negotiations . . on all matters concerning salaries and such other items concerning terms and conditions ofemploymentas the Supt. or Board and said Council . . shall agree are proper subjects of negotiations. (64)

Ta1ole i (column three) indicatesthe level of organizat &onal

ifluence het by the Cleveland group. It has a recognized,

and leqtimated organizational role in Clewtlind ochool AVair. Intrnally, th Council is

4(wecned by t;eptesentativeo elected from the various job

the ?choca 9TAi:..e; though it has no paid,

Tomko, has held

o8 b nWo0 o qht arld o p euJe7 the association while alsobeing a high schoolprincipal (he has a private telephone line in hisschool office, paidforsand for the service of, the ClevelandCouncil of Administrators

and Supervisors). But, while Dade County, New York City, and San Francisco havepaid staff, as yetCliveland does not.

The co-determination level for the Cleveland administrators is high. It bargains, operates under a

contract, hasa six-step grievance procedure,and seniority rights in staff reductions. Thegrievance process is interesting as one ofadministrator bilateraldecisionmaking. ,Stec 1: CCSA determineswhether a legitimate grievance exists by committee review-ofwrittencomplaint; If attp2: a grievance exists, the Councilcommittee

notifies the AssistantSuperintendent, Personnel, inwriting and a meeting maybe held with Grievance Committee,

Personnel head, andGrievant; Step 3: Within 5 days, the

Assistant Superintendentrenders decisions, in writing;Step, JO A direct appeal by Council Committee to the

Superintendent who willmeet with Committee and Grievant in 10 days; Rtes!: within 5 days, the Superintendent makes his/decisionon the grievance; and Step 6: the Grievance Committee may makean appeal to the Board of Erciu.(4410'1^((°'

While suchgrievance procedures in New York and

Californiamay involve an appeal to the state public

83 275 employment relations board or commission, Ohio has no appeals machinery, since no bargaining law exists. Interviews in Cleveland indicate thatas yet no seniority procedures have been implemented,though administratorsmar bump teachers in a reduction force. Likewise, there isno third:-party appeals since there isno law to provide for arbitration, mediation,etc.

In all, then, the Cleveland Council has strong influence, accordingto our rating scheme: it is recognized andb Q the right to bargain. Since .the timewhen the Council was theFederation - -part of the teachers'union.--.1it has been unified and centrally andstrongly led. It has had itsproblems,_ since- the cityschools ofCleveland have witnessed the whole listof urban school problems: federally-ordqred busing for 'desegregation, state receivership forfinancial bankruptcy, white flight tothe suburbs, and numerous and long teachersstrikes. The school administrators have maintained a neutral but supportive posture during the recent strikes (1978, 1980), refusingto break a picket lines, "scab,* or antagonize the teachers. Like a number of administrator unions,the Cleveland Council has attempted to remain loyalto the superintendent and the board of education and yet notparticipate in strike- breaking; this list of positionsexpresses the Cleveland Council's stanceduring strikes:

84 276 1. . . .CCAS mustcomplywith the superintendent's instructions to allownon-strikers toreport to work if they choose to enter thebuilding.

2. . . .CGSA members believethat school should not be conducted withouta majority of staffpresent. 3. CCSA memberswill recommend when less than that schools be closed a majority of, certificated staff is present (liability insurancemay not apply during certain conditions). "atypical"

4. CCAS does notbelieve that school should be conducted unless classrooms are manned certificated staff. regular

5. CCAS buildingadministrators should the recruiting not engage in of substitutes forstaff members withholding services, beyond normal school districtprocedures. 6. CCAS believes thatprincipals shouldcomply with existing union agreements in assigning duties to staff members who reportfor duty.

7. CCAS members shouldnot perform the jobdescription covered by othernegotiated agreements.

8. CCAS members shouldnot disrupt picketlines by intimidationor coercion.

9. CCAS membersrecognize their unique function as delineated administrative by the administrative contract and will safeguard andprotect students,parents, personnel, and school property.(66)

In brief, the Council had determined thatit will do all it can within its contact butnot attempt to keepschools open without staff, not help the superintendent bring in substitutes to break the strike,not teach, and not use pressure on teachers to bringthem back into the buildings. Such a stance is certainly independent and pro-union4 reflecting the realities of organizedlife in Cleveland and Ohio.

85 277 Minneapolis: Bargaining UnderLaw but Highly Divided

Minnesota has thestrongest collective bargaining law in the nation: one that involves third-party intervention,

steps leading to the right to strike, andthe inclusion of

collectivebargaining for administrators and supervisors.

Minneapolis administrators,supervisors, and consultantsare

organized into three .separate, recognized, and active bargaining units. On allvariables in the first part of

Table 1, Minneapolis receives a 2 except for leadersIlip structure. For since the administrator ranks are divided, and since these administratorcannot muster sufficient funds tire a- full -timestaff or maintainan office, in effect; the Principals' Forum, the MinneapolisAss6ciationof

Administrators and consultants, and the Confidential

Supervisors cannot raise enough funds to staff their respective organizations.

On measures ofco-determination, thegroups havedone reasonably well, thoughthe Principals Forumran into some bad luck during bargaining. At impasse, an arbivator was called in; he sided with the Minneapolis scho,:i board and awarded the Principals'Forum a zero-zero-zero raisefor the years 1978 to .981 (though the principalsdid rece:ve a small cost of living raise under the existing contract).

Even co-determinationcan lead to injustice--or so itseems. The forum appealed to the Minnesota PublIC Employment

86 278 Relations Board. The PERB explained the situation in its ruling:

The Arbitrator hascarefullyexamined all of the evidence presented by the Parties relevant to this issue:

The Forum, in requesting an update of the recently expired schedule, stresses unique responsibilities germane. to Minneapolis Principals in addition to the general salary adjustments being gained by teachers throughout the state. Moreover, according to the Forum the ever-risingcostof living has caused the averageprincipal's real earning to shrink with thepassing of time.

Conversely, theDistrictargues that there areessentiallythree "compelling reasons"

for maintaining thestatus quo on salaries. . .the practiceof equating the principals' earning to themeanof othercompensable Minnesota. School District. . . . the desired equationhas fallen out ofbalance arC. consequently Minnesota finds itselfpayol principals salarieswhich generally exceed the comps ableDistrictsboth locally and nationally: . . .the declining enrollment coupledwith the sharply reduced abilityto pay means that Minneapolis hasto hold the line onprincipals' salaries or "face economic disaster." (67) The PERB ruled in agreement with the arbitrator: that indeed there was evidence that hardship was likely if an increase in salarywas awarded, thatthe Forum's salaries were high in comparisonto other states and districts, and that "to award a three year salary increase (costing hundreds of thousandsof dollars) and justifying it primarily on the assumEtion of increased state aid, is logically and economically unsound. . . . Accordingly, the

87 279 Minneapolis Principals' salaries for the life of the new

contract shall remain status222.(68)." The Forum, in turn,

appealed thedecisionof the arbitrator, as supported by

PERB, to the Fourth DistrictCourt for Hennepin County. The

Defendent, in thiscase, tha. Board of Education,argued that

the"plaintiff has shownno compelling reason todepart from the general rule that the award of an arbitrator should be

enforced and than: all doubts should be resoviedin favor of

the award." The brief for the Principalsmade the case that "the Forum has met its burden of showingthat both the Duty Year Award and the Salary Award havebeen poisoned by the arbitrator's lawlessinterpretationof what is management right and what is a term and condition ofemployment. Both, award should be vacated and remanded for arbitration in accordance wiAllthe Forum's ProposedOrder." The Judge ruled that the arbitrator had been patentlyunfair and remanded the decision backto him for another ruling-eat which time the arbitratorrefused to continue thecase. The reaction of the schoolboard was to appeal the case to the Minnesota Supreme Court where it awaits finaladjudication.

Meanwhile, the time came near tobargain the 1981 contractthough the board ofeducation wished to waituntil the court makes its decisions. The MAAC group

(administrators andconsultants in central office) received an average of six percent raisesover the three years; the central office confidential employees, 8percent average.

c 88 280 So while the Forum enjoys the rights of codetermination, contract, due process, andan arbitrated award on seniority which states "that in the event of discontinuance of position,. lackof pupils or administrativereorganization, reassignment, discharge and reinstatewent shall be based upon seniority in one of the jobsclassifications covered by this Agreement . .as follows senior, junior high a d middle school principals, elementary principal, and assistant principals." There is no language about bumping teachers, though tsnuredoes hold andone presumes that an administrator canbump if he/she hastenure in the lower ranks,

Administratorsdo nothave the right to strike; but they are givenarbitration rights under the Minnesota employment IWO\ In all, then, the middle administrators enjoy full influence under collectivebargaining, though this forcefulness is somewhat reduced by their divided ranks. As we shall discuss in the next section, these administrators have attempted to compensate for their reduced influence by affiliating withorganized labor, in particular, theTeamsters union, which represents both the Forum and MAAC organizations.

San Francisco: California'sFirst Middle

Administrative la_r_aaini,ng. Unit

California was among the last large, industrialized

89 281 states to pass a public sector bargaining law; and San

Francisco's administrator were the first unit of middle- level supervisors to be recognized for bargainingby the state's Education Employment Relations Board (SERB), later

becoming the PublicEmployment Relations Board. Unity came not out of understandingbut because of the legislative

requirement thatone organization only could represent each "community of interest" or occupationalgroup. In an election, the United Administratorsof San Francisco, the APL CIO groupwon and became theexclusivebargaining representative of the unit of certified supervisory employees (69)." While thebargaining process came

relati4elY xatee theactivities of employeeorganization was already well underway beforerecognition occurred. Hence, in short ceder, the San Francisco administrators' group rapidlybuilta strong structure as Table 1, column 5 indicates.

The group was recognized at a separate, centralized, staff, and structured unit,getting 2's on the measures of organizationalpower. Saul Medfes,a highly respected high school principal, on retirement from the system,took over the full-time executive leadership of the United

Administrators; he hasno staff, for the organization is hardly large enough to support more thanone staff member.

Co-determination variables indicate full-scale bargaining, a contractselaboratedue process procedures,

90 282 though seniority rights havenotyet been written intothe contract. San Francisco schools have long used modified

seniority for the reductionin force for all staff. The due process procedure resemblesothers we have

studied, though there isa 'step provision for theuse of an arbitrator, under rulesof the AmericanArbitration

Association (AAA), ifboth parties agree. The steps areas follows:

"Both the Districtand the Association agree that everyone concerned will benefitwhen prompt and confidential resolution of grievances is encouraged.. The following procedures is herebyestablished:

--Written grievances will be discussed with the kievant's immediatesupervisor;

--Within ten days, the immediate superior will investiage the claim and determine whether it is legitimate and what shouldbe done;

The grievant may then appeal the supervisor's decision to the Superintendentor his/her designee;

--Before 15 days, theSuperintendentwill investigate the claim and render adecision in writing to the grievant, the Employee Relations Office, and the Association;

--If the decision isnot acceptable to the grievant,it maybe appealed to voluntary andadvisory arbitration (i.e., the decision is not binding on either the

district or the administratorin question) .

During the entire process, the rightsof the grievance are protected: e.g.:

91 283 No grievance materialshall be placed inthe personnel file of a memberof the bargaining rights unit exercising his under the grievanceprocedure. Neither shall such material beutilized in the evaluation the promotional reports, process, or in any recommendationfor job placement(Article 9.5e). In summary, San Francisca administratorshave rapidly formalized theirrelationshipwith the board of education,

gaining the rightto 4argain, grieve,bring in third part4.es for advisory arbitration; the organization represents the

diverse titles in theschools, undera system of elections. Prior to the open elections, theorganization maintaina

mixed system of electionand appointment(on the theory that the appointees would come from minoritygroups among the administrators who mightnot otherwise receive sufficient votes to be on the governing board). So while the Rodda bill giving public employees the rightto bargain mayhave been amo)g the newest laws, , the San Francisco administrators' group hasmoved rapidlytoward bilateral influence.

New York City: TheNation's 81.2iest The Council of Supervisors and Administrators(CSA) has achieved institutional status in fifteen years. It was recognized in 1965, making it the oldest unionized group in our sample. It is also thelargest bargaining unit for administrators in the nation, with 3,789 members representing 29 differentjob titles. Thus, the CSA scores high on the variables presented inTable 1. First, it isa

92 284 separate unit strictly for supervisory personnel.

Superintendentand their immediatestaff are excluded, as are staff who teach. The CSA is the solerepresentative of

middle administration,recognized under the state's Taylor law. It has an elaborate electoral system, creating a

Delegate Assemblyof some seventy members, while thedaily

operation of the unionfalls to the ExecutiveCommittee made up of the officers.

As an organization, CSA is large and complex: a president, executive vicepresident, five other vice

presidents, secretary, treasurer, plusa seven--member paid

executive staff includingan executivedirector, grievance director, consultant, lobbyist, legal counsel, public

relationsdireCtor, and controller. The budget reaches nearlya million dollar yearly, with each member fayI1.2 percent of his/her salaryyearlr to the organization. And since CSA members earnbetween $24,000 and $38,000yearly, the budget is large, supporting a diversifiedstaff. Hence, on our scale, CSA scoresa 3, since its organization is structured and hierarchical.

CSA also enjoys a wide range of co-determination activities, including bargaining, contractualrights, due process, 'seniority and tenure as administrators (gained under statestatute, not local contract) , the right to bump teachers in the ranks,an elaborate "unfair labor practices clause," and the right to grievance arbitrationunder the 285 93 rules of the AAA. In fact, CSA has the most elaborate set of labor relations practices in our sample, due perhapsto the history and development of collectivebargaining in New York state and New York City. Also, the CSAhas participated in the political actions of educators in the city, including the strikes andpressures of the "community Q control" era in the 1960s. More recently, CSAhas participated in "unity bargaining" in the attempts by the city; to controlwages.

CSAhas also providedthe leadership for the Amirican Federationof School Administrators ,-(AFSA),the AFL-CIO affiliate for school supervisors, as our next section discusses.

/I. AFFILIATIONAND UNION INFLUENCE

Besides structural organization and bilateral ism, unionsgain power from their relationship with other organizations, in particular, state and national unionand professi:lhal associations. The six sample cities providea range of affiliation, from those administratorgroups which have joined state and national unions (AFL-CIO and

Teamsters) , to those which are part of umbrella organizations at the state level, and finally, to those wnich have no official relationship with outside associations. Table 2presents the numericalbreakdown of

94 286 the existence of formal organizational affiliation (U none; 1 = state only; 2 = nationalonly; and 3= both state and national;. These affiliationsare of a specific type; they involve the local organization's joining asa unit a state or national group. (We are not measuring the incidence of individual member's joininga state or national

group, since such membershiptends toserve the professional needs of each member but not thecollective needs of the bargaining unit.)

Second. we are concerned with the lobbyln power of local unions, since policies are made at the state level which affect the lives of administrators:issues of tenure, pay, certificlon, plus the range of labor relations policies. Also, as Congress continues to debatea national public employment relations law (e.g., H.S. 777) the ability of administrators tolobbying in Washington, C.c.% becomes of greater importance (70). Questions arise, such as, ShoUld a national law permitmiddle administrator: to form separate bargaining units, common units withl.E aerq, or engage in no collective negotiations? Should Conq create a separate National. Public Labor Relatlow.; t3oar:L paralleling the National Labor Relation P,o7Ar. _ pr /batesector? Or should publicemploye private sector board and policies? Tha.: discwlsed t'nelast:, chapter:, but::

the state and national, captto.1 5e2com(:, important as administrators attempt to shape theirpolitical environmdnt.

Finally, we studied the ability of outside organizations to services to support local unions: bargaining help, legal services, someone to advise local leaders on policies during a local teachers' strike. We ranked theseresources either 0 or 1: Yesor No.

'NO

288 96 TABLE

RATING OF AFFILIATION RESOURCES

BY SAMPLE CITIES

1. Dade Power of AffiliationVariables: Cleve- Minne- San Atlanta County land apolis Fran. NYC a. Formal OrganizationalAffiliation None = 0; State Alone= 1; National Only= 2; Both State/ National = 3 0 0 1 3 2 3 b. Lobbying Power: Self= 1; State = 2; National = 3; Both= 4 0 1 2 2 3 4 c. External Assistance: argai n ng e p (0-1) 0 0 1 Legal Help 1 .1 1 0 0 0 Special Benefits__ 1 1 1 _ 0 0 1 1 1 1 SUB-TOTAL 0 1 5 8 8 le

Since the Atlanta administratorshave no single,

representative supervisory organization,there is no group

to affiliate. While many of the principalsin Atlanta are

members of the Georgia Association of Educators and the

NASSP and NAESP (national principals association, these local clubs do not derivehelp from them in servicing their

local collective needs. Theone exceptionmaybe the

lobbying 'done by the Georgia Association of Educators in

areas of state aid and salaries for local employees. As we mentioned earlier, the base pay of all educators in Georgia

97 289 publ_c schools is contributed by the state--with local

communities makingsupplementary additions. But principals in Atlanta do no influence the behavior of the GAEand do riot necessarily see thatgroup as their own.

Dade County administratorsare not members of any state

association--as a collective. The state principals groups

are not highly political and donotengage in bargaining or bring legal suits for local administrators. Under tha. lobbying variables, we learned that the DadeCounty Schdol Administrator Association lobbies in Tallahassee itself, sending members to present theorganization's viewpointto

legislators. Hence, the association inDade County scoreda

one (1) on the powerof affiliationmeasure for direct organizational lobbying.

Cleveland's administratorsare affiliated with the Ohio Council of Administrative Personnel Associations, an umbrella groupof the state'selementary and secondary principals and curriculumsupeLvisors. OCAPA was "designed

to unify the efforts cif state administratorassociations to deliver needed services to local associations." It was organized to provide liaoility insuranceup to $250,000, to represent members in grievances,to provide direct advocacy on "issues vgsulting from the administrator's job activities," to publish a newsletter, and to provide membership in the separateelementary/secondary association of the member's choice. As such the Cleveland Council has

98 2t'o lobbying power in Columbus, Ohio, external assistance in

bargaining, grieving, and other benefits. In fact, on a

weekly basis, the OCAPA executive secretary attended meetings of the Councilto offer help.

Hence, unlike mostother state principals'groups, the

Ohio state organizations have united to service local bargaining units, while trying to provide individual professional help by jobcategory.

Minneapolis administrators,themselves divided, face a divided state association. That is, the elementary and secondary principals' organizationsare not merged, nor are they unified as theyare in Ohio. During a crises, the

Minneapolis Principals' Forum sought affiliationwith the

Teamsters union, local 4`320, which also represented the St.

Paul administrators,state university employees, and later the Minneapolis Association of Administrators and

Supervisors. In so doing, the principals hoped to gain access to political power, the kind thatwould make a arbitrator think twice about givinga 0-0-0 pay raise in a decision.

In effect, the principals weregiving the Teamsters authority to bargain forthem, represent them 1,n grievance procedures, and lobbying help in the state capital and in

Washington, though there was some realization that the

Teamsters International in Washington,D.C. in not going to concern itselfwith public school supervisors over the

99 291 issues that affect rank and file. But, locally, it was

believed that such affiliation would give them clout. The

scale indicates that the Minneapolis principals and

administrators receive an eight: state and national

affiliation, state lobbying primarily, and external

assistance in bargaining, grieving,legal help, etc.

San Francisco United Administrators is locae3 of the

American Federationof School Administrators; as such, the

local union receiveshelp with bargaining, legal problems,

and other help. Currently, AFSA doeslittle lobbying in

California, since the nationaloffice of AFSA is in New York

City.but the local and state labor federations (AFL-CIO)

are available, though some locals of AFSAhave had trouble 40 relating locallyAthe blue collar members of the state

-11 federation of labor. In all, however, the San Francisco

supervisors and administrators receive high levels of

outside help: in bargaining, lobbying,and grieving.. ,New YorkC14) The Council of Supervisors andAdministrators,is local

41 of AFSA (AFL-CIO). The first president of AFSA, in fact,

was the former presidentof CSA, the late Walter Degnan;

past president, Al Morrison, and the current head, Peter

O'Brien, also cameout of CSA. When Degnan approached

George Meany inorder to affiliate CSA directly with the

AFL-CIO, Meany requested that Degnan attempt

to bring other urban school administratorassociation into a

national group, rather thancharter a single unit like CSA.

100 292 In 1974, the School Administrators and Supervisors

Organizing Committee (SASOC)was formed; when the number of

locals reached 45, Degnan requested a full charter as a

national AFL-CIO union, which was grantedon July 7, 1976.

AFSA services the New YorkCity local, providinga link

with llbor andaccess to the Public Employee Department of

the AFL-CIO. CSA, however, is large enoughto provide much of the legal, bargaining, grieving,and lobbying services

internally. Hence, CSA has the power advantageof strong affiliation and strong internalresources.

The Power Variables Summarized

A composite score of the six' sample school administrator organizations indicates the following: New York City, CSA, had a total of 34points on the composite structural, co-determination, and affiliation scale; San

Francisco, 28; Minneapolis administrators, 28; Cleveland

Council, 21; Dade County, 13; and Atlanta, 2. These indicatdr5 are a first attempt to quantify the characteristics of unions andother voluntary organizations. They show the impactof state laws, loccal history and levels of political action, roles of superintendents and boards, and the impact of ideologies suchas unionism and "management team."

The environment, then, has a strong impact on organization, particularlygroupings of employees who are

101 293 forever adjusting theirrelationships to their bosses,their constituencies, and the lawsof their states.

102 294 NOTES

1. Paul Revere Pierce, The aigin andDevelopment of the Public School Pr.....1clizsak....211. (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1935),p. 182.

2. See Bruce S. Cooper, "TheFuture of MiddleManagement in Education,* in The Pvincial in MetropolitanSchools, Donald A. Erikson and ore L. fieTier e s.) (San Francisco: McCutchan, 1978),pp, 272-299.

3. Betty S. Osteroff, "TheMetamorphosis of a Professional Association into a Union,* unpublished doctoral dissertation, New YorkUniversity School ofEducation, 1972. 4. FortiethAnnualLtemmA of the Common Schools of Cincinnati, 1-66977777.

S. Pierce,, o2. cit.,p, 183.

6. Ibid., p. 183.

7. Bruce S. Cooper, *CollectiveBargaining Comes to School Middle Management," Phi Delta Eagan, 58 (November 1976), pp. 202-204; and Bruce S. Cooper, "Bargaining for School Administrators Four Years Later," Phi Delta Raman (May 1979).

8. Dee Schofield, "Collective Negotiations and the Principals," SchoolsLeadership Digest (Arlington, Va.: National Association ofElementary School Principals,1976), p. 3.

9. In 1968-1969, the Council ofSupervisory Associations (later renamed the Council of Supervisors and Administrators) in New York City joined the United Federation of Teacherson- the picket lines in protestingthe transfer of both teachersand principals by the community board in Ocean Hill-Brownsville, I.S. 201, and JHS 271. While the role of theUFThas been extensively explored in print, CSA's part hasonly been mentioned. For a reviewof the strike,see Diane Ravitch, TheGreat School Wars: New York City,, 1805-1973(New York: Basic Boo671774,pp. 366- 777 TheWaigniniators' organization, for mentioned example,. is in F. Cassell and J. Baron, Ocean Hill- Brownsville: A Modern Greek Tragedy Old). (a mimeographedessay,

10. Schofield, a. cit.,p.

103 295 11. Arnold S. Tannenbaum, "Unions," in the Handbook of Or anizations, James G. March, editor (Chicago: Rana.' Mc Y. 96, p.-710.

12. Leonard R. Sayles andGeorge Strauss, TheLocal Union: Its Place in the Industrial Plant (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953), p. J.

13. Tannenbaum,a. cit., p. 709.

14. Arnold S. Tannenbaum and RobertL. Kahn, Participation in Local Unions (Evanston, Ill.: Row,Peterson, 1958).

15. Richard A.Lester, As Unions Mature:An Analysis of the Evolution of American Unionism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UniversityPress, 1958), p. 5. 16. R. Moxie, Trade Unionism in the United States (New York: Appleton, 1923), ii7777-'

17. .ArthurSelwynMiller, 'The Constitution and Voluntary the Association: SomeNotesToward a Theory," in Voluntary' Associations, Nomos XI, J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (Eds.)(New York: Atherton Press, 239. 1969), p.

18. John H. Freeman, "The Unit Of Analysis in Organizational Research," in Environments and Marshall Organization, W. Meyer, et al., trit(3irFrancisco:Jossey- Bass, 1978),p. 337.

19. Mayer N. Zald, "Political Economy: A Framework for Competitive Analysis," inPower in Or anization, Mayer N. Zald (Ed.) (Nashville, Tean.: Vanier i t UniversityPress, 1970), p. 224.

20. Bureau of Labor Statistics,1976, Dept. of Commerce.

21. Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L.Strauss, The Discovery of GroundedTheo:: Strategies for Quantitate VW Research rehia557gninervi61), p. 31.

22. Bernard C. Watson, "ThePrincipal Against in the System," The Principal, inMetropolitan Schools, 2E. cit., p. 40.

23. For a useful model of white collar unionism in Great Britain, see GeorgeSayers Bain, The Growth ofWhite Collar Unionism (Oxford: The Claredon Press, 1970). 24. Ibid., p. 184.

296 104 25. Paul Salmon, "Are the Collective Administrative Team BargainingCompatable?" and 1972), p. 3. Compact, Vol. 12 (June

26. Other management team literature includes Schofield,' op cit, pp. Dee 15-17;1 Chester Butkiewicz, "Superintendents, AreYou Ready?" NASSP 1975, pp. 29-33; Bulletin,September George B. Redfern, "School AdministratorUnion or Mangement: Management Team?" ERIC (EA 199), 1976; H. Holley, -044- the Role Jr., et. al., of the Principal "PerceptiOns of Journal of in ProMiiiinaj.Negotiations," Collectivealotiations, 369; HarryH. Rains, Vol. 5, No.4, pp. 361- Sector and the 'Collective Baargaining inthe Public Need forExclusion of Labor Law Journal, SupervisoryPersonnel," May 1972,pp. 275-288;Myron 7727iFerman:fTriAn Invitation Lieberman, to Trouble," and "Salmon: AdministrativeTeams BuildStaff," The Journal, June American SchoolBoard 1977, pp.24, 27, and465. Z7. Teacher powerand itsimpact on the principal andother administratorshas onlyrecently been ways, administrators recognized. In some. are able to gain forth by improvedpay and tso "coattailing*onto the teachers: get a raise, so do as the teachers the administrators. necessaryon the impact- More researchis of teachermilitancy and perceptionsof principals. on the behavior

28. See "Reporton Local School Education,' Councils to the Bcard of Recommendaions (revised Office of the December 19, 1970), Superintendent, Chicago Document 70-1161, Public Schools,r--- p. 1. Their emphasis. Peterson SchoolPolitics, Chicago See also Paul 14. of Chicago Style (Chicago:University. Press, 1976), p. 225, influence of for an analysisof the communitygroups over the principals. Peterson wrote: selection of In 1971, the board I no "-Inger considered variations inperformance n the qualifying/ examination but allowed representatives community; to consider candidates the entirelist of from applicants . . . "The Principals Club. vigorously opposed the policy, asserting "that the actionsof the local selectioncommittees the guidelines operating under of the Boardof Educationhave failed to inspire the confidence of the ChicagoPrincipals in the selection validity of the process" (The Reporter, 1971, pp.7-8). Spring

29, Ravitch (NewYork: Basic Books, 1974),p. 366.

105 297 30. Bruce S. Cooper, 5221 cit. 1979.

31. Thomas A. Kochan, "Correlates of State Public Employment Bargaining Laws," IndustrialRelations, Vol. 12, No. 3, October 1973,p. 331.

32. Robert E. Doberty, "Public Education," in Collective Bargaining: ContemporaryAmerican4.Experience, Gerald G. Somers (Ed.)(Madison, Wis.t: Industr al Rtlations Research Association, 1980),p. 521.

33. Edwin M. Bridges and Bruce S. Cooper, "Collective Bargaining for School Administrators: A Significant Development in the Field of Labor Relations," Theory Into Practice Vol. XV, No. 4 (October1976), pp. 306-313.

34. Jeffrey Pfeffer, "The Micro-Politicsof Organization," in Environment and Organizations,22.. cit., p. 30. 35. See the Getzells-Guba model.

36. H.S. Barris, "Voluntary Associations as a Rational Ideal," in Voluntary Associations, Pennockand Chapman, E.

37. Ibid., p. 51-52.

38. Mayer N. Zald, "Political Economy: A Framework for Comparative Analysis," in Power Organizations,22. cit., p. 24r

39. Pierce, 22. cit.,pp. 13-14.

40. Ibid., p. 18.

41. Ibid., p. 19.

42. Ibid., p. 19, from Annual _Report of the School Committee of Boston, 1879,pp. 15-16.

43. Ibid., p. 20.

44. Ibid., p. 21.

45. See, for example, the work ofHenri Fayol, General and Industrial Management, translatedby J.A. Conbrough (Geneva: InternatfEnal Management Institute, 1929; James D.Mooneuy, The Principles of Organization (New York:Harper and Bros., T347); annTiFiry C. Metcalf and L. Urwick, eds., Dynamic Administration: The Collected Papers of MaryParker Follett (New York: Harper & Bros., 1940).

106 298 46. Larry Cuban, Urban School Chiefs Under Fire (L.hicago; University of Chicago Paii71975),p. I41 :142.

47. Ostroff, 22. cit., pp. 29-30.

48. Interview notes.

49. Interview notes.

50. Interview notes. OP`

51. Ostroff, op. cit.,p. 30.

52. Ibid., p. 32.

53. Letter for Dr. Bernard Donovan, Supt. of Schools of NYC, to Benjamin Strumpf, President,CSA, Feb. 1, 1963.

54. George A. RedZern, "School Management: Administrator Union or Management- Team?" ERICdocument EA 004-199, n.d.r p. 2.

55.* R.R. Rep. No. 245, quoted in 1 legislative History, LMRA at307-08. See also, Harry- IL Rains, "Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector and the Need for the Exclusion of SupervisoryPersonnel," Labor Law Rew, May 1972, pp. 275-288.

56. John E. Sinclair, "The Great Debate: Separate Bargaining Units for Principals--One Wrong Solution," NASSP Bulletin, May 1977, p. 52-55.

57. Fred N. Heddinger, "Do Your SchoOl Principals Have Enough Decision-Making Power? In Penna. . . .", The American School of Bd. Journal,Feb. 1978, pp. 30-31.

58. Ohio Association' of ElementarySchool Principals, "The Administrative Team," (Westerville,Ohio, 1971), p. 2.

59.. Memo of Agreementr May 5,1965.(mimeo).

60. Agreement bet. the Bd. of Educationof the City School District of the Cityof New York and the Council of Supervisors and Administrators,Local 1, Amer. Federation of School Admin., AFL-GIZO, Oct.1978-Sept. 1980, pp. 1-2.

61. Certificate of Representation Following Recognition Acknowledgement and Order to Negotiate, Case No. 8H- RA -"744- 3003, Dec. 18, 1974.

62. Public Education: General Provisions, chapt. 228, p.

107 299 2.

63. Public Employees Relations Commission,Case MC-77-025, Sept. 14, 1977.

64. Agreement bet. Board of Education of Cleveland City School District and the Cleveland Council of Admin. and Supervisors, 1974, pp. 12-13. S. 65. Ibid., p. 26ff.

66. Memo, August, 1978.

67. Minnesota PERB, decision,1980.

-18. State lfMinnesota ftblic EmploymentRelations Boards, in the mattes ofArbitrationbet. Minneap4lis Principals' Forum and the School District of Minneapolis,Case 77, PN- 906, pp. 4-5.

69. Contract bet. San Pracisco UnifiedSchool District and United Administrators of San Francisco, April 11, 1978, Article 1.1,p. 4.

70. Bruce -S. -Cooper, 'Federal Action and Collective Bargaining for School Administrators," PublicPersonell Management,, Sept.-Oct., 1978,pp. 44-61.

108 300 CHAPTER VI

IMPACT ANDIMPLICATIONS

Collective bargaining for school administrators and supervisors hasbeen something of aquiet revolution in school labor relations and management. No longer are individual principals_suspended between "management" and "labor", notknowing which way to turn. Fora growing number of schooladministrators, the way toturn is toone another -- forming separate, independent, and unified associations with the rightsof unions.

In someway, this revolution is a logicalextension of the "labormovement" of the lasthundred years; in effect, principals are becoming labor oriented, using mar of the same tactics ofbargaining, national-state-localunion affiliation, grievance procedures, andlobbying that rank- and--fileunionists devised. But, unlike fire and police supervisors,most school principals havenot actuallyjoined the rank-andfileunions. Instead, these supervisorsbanded together with othermiddle-rank administrators to forgea new alliance oftheir own. Hence, administrator collectivebargaining is both the extensionof teacher unionizationand aradical departure from it. What has happened, in effect, is thatprincipals have emergedin many city school systems(and a fewsuburban

301 ones) as a third force, a Third Estate,between the teachers

on the one handand the superintendent-schoolboard on the

other. No longercan the top management blithelyassume that all orders, changes, fiats from thetop will be implemented

*ithout question --particularly if these new policies

directlyaffect the careers or working conditions of principals.

A situation in New York City will illustrate the new

relationship. In 1979, the Chancellor ofthe city schools (equivalent to the generalsuperintendent) had plans to deny

tenure to 90 supervisors, members of the Council of

Supervisors and Administrators, Local #1, American Federation of SchoolAdministrators, AFL-CIO. As one CSA vice-president explained,

The Chancellor was-readyto chop heads. These men and women had worked long and hardin the New York lity PublicSchools and would have lost their positionsand their careers. CSA leadership met withthe Chancellor and his Cabinet. We presented both a threatand a plan. The threatwas to file grievances under our contract. Principals and other supervisorshave a right to review and evaluation. More importantly, we offered professional training to improve these supervisors. All their jobs were saved through cooperation and the consultation . process.{1}

What is revealed by thissituation is as follows: The means for operating the school districtremainsmuch the same,

With the top management running things, the middle ranks reacting, planning, and cooperating. The main difference between thedays ofthe principals "club" and the "union"

is that at onetimeadministrators would simply have

accepted the fiatof the board of education. Now, the CSA

acts as a focus for discontent and a communicator ofmember

needs to the superintendentsand Chancellor.

Another example: in the 1981-1982school year, the New

York State Board of Health required that all children be

immunized against childhooddiseasesbefore entering public

schools in September. But thehealth board providedno funds

to help the Public Schools notifyparents, staff to send out

the letters; and no staffto keep up with the students. The

issuewas an importantone, since schools received their state and local aid, basedon the number of pupils in Daily

Attendance. Iflarge .numbersof studentswere refused

... admission to school becauseof incomplete innoculation

reports, then the school system and the individualschools would lose millions of dollars.

Again, the Council ofSupervisorsand Administrators

provided the necessaryleadership by (1) alerting the

central board of the impossibility of asking principalsto

contact all their students withoutadditional staff and

,time, (2) settingup a procedure for permitting children to

enroll temporarilyuntil full innoculations could be

provided, and (3) establishing a list of childrenneeding

shots to begiven to thecityhealth department-- since V schools cannot administerthe injections.

303 ,111100 vor.u= ally

impact of unions for school administrators: unity,

cooperation, a legitimate voice,and collective clout.

Unity. While middle rank school administrators and

supervisors have traditionallybeen ahighly divided group -- along school, ethnic,religious, and geographiclines--

the pressures for collectiveaction led to the creationof a single, all-encompassing school administrators union. The history of administrators'associations in numerous school ts districts shows, for example, thatpriorAbargaining school administrators belongedto clubs of high school principals, central officecoordintzors,directorsof guidance, and various associations ofblack administrators,Jewish admin istrators, women administrators, administrators from the

East Side and West Side. When it came time for thesetting of wages and other workingconditions, school boards hadan easy time of playing onegroup off against another -- while never dealing with the administratorsas a group.

Even later, whena semblance of collective bargaining began in such school districtsas San Francisco, the School Board "bargained" with a number ofgroups claiming to

"represent" the school administrators. These included the AFL-CIO (with 45 members), the Teamsters (38 members), the High School Principals Association ( 71 members), and so forth. This fracturedapproach was furtherencouraged by the Winton Act (see Chapter III), which permitted group comprised of members from the various administrator

associations, the numberbased on the size of themember-

ship).

Collective bargaining demandeda single representative

from each "community of interest." This notion was defined quite differently, dependingon the local history and needs.

In Minneapolis, for example,as was discussed in Chapter V,

the buildingadministrators, central officeadministrators, and confidential administrators(also in the central office) formed three differentbargaininggroups. Though this divided the general categoryof "supervisor," it did, crvcieletttia. AlowAr6v.s.t maintain the cohesionwithin the ranks of principal,4 and' ' central office supervisors.While supervisors and administrators as_a group inMinneapolis might not have the power that the single administrators' unionof places like New

York City and San Pranciscor there was sufficient negotiations, contract administration, and otherprocedures to continue.

Cooperation. Information from school districtswhich have collective \bargaining for school administrators indicates thatdespite the built-in adversarialism of the

'collective bargaining process, there was considerable cooperation between schoolmiddle administrators and their bosses, the superintendents.In fact, unionizationmayhave

305 improved the situation in some places, for some of the followin:reasons:

1. Security: Someadministrators argued thatcollective

bargaining had permittedthem to move beyond issues of pay, benefits, and securityto deal with board and superintendent

without fear of reprisal.As one principal explained:

In the past, we were always worried about beingtaken advantageof bythe superintendent, about being left behind when the teachers union bargained, and about other "bread and butter" issues.. Now thatwe have a contract and protection, we can forget about these survival stuff and turnour attention to working with central office to improvethe schools. {2} In fact, the unionstructure improved relationship between board and middleadministrators, rather than destroying it.

2. A Rightful Place.The presence ofan administrators association which isdulyrecognized permits principals to participate asa group in major district-wide andcity-wide policy-making. It has becomecommon practice in New York

City, San Francisco,Philadelphia, ane Detroit,for example, for the leaders ofthe middle administratorsunion to serve on commissions, boards, and other groups affecting the schools.

In the last toyears inNew York City, the Council of

Supervisors and Administrators, for example, has participated in a range ofcommitteesdealing with

30.6 4.MV4CMOU60114in 1.11 tne scnools. Itappears

that a new modeof big cityschool governance is emerging; one might call itgovernance by jointcommission. When a problem is identified,the Chancellor and Boardof Education

establishes problem-solvinggroups representing the various

organiiitions in the city schools: teachers (United

Federation of Teachers), principals (Council of Supervisors and Administrators) , parents (United Parents Association) ,

top administration (Chancellor'soffice), and so forth.

Jointproblem-solving is hardlynew; administrators

have served on committees inpast years. Whatis new and

indicative here is the role of the associations (CSA, UFT,

UPA) in-selecting theirown representatives and the sense

among these participants that they areaccountable to the

organizations that appointthem. Hence, while in the pasta principal wasappointed by and responsible to the

superintendentwhen servingon joint committees, here we

find participants there specifically to representthe needs and wishes of their respectiveassociations.

In 1981-1982 alone, CSA served on the Promotions

Policies Committee tooversee such programs as the *Gates," an effort to test, retain, and provide summer school for children working twoor more years belowgrade level; the

City-Wide Testing Committeeto examine the question of which tests to use and when and how to administer them in the

Schools; the Confidentiality Committee concerned about

307 maintaining the privacy of student records as they were

being computerized; and the committee to plan the "Design

for the 80'swprogram, the Chancellor's long range planning ,effort.

What has happened inNewYork Cityand elsewhere is What Bacharach and Lawler in Power and Politics in

Organizations predicted: organizations are systems of conflicting sub-groupswhich work together only by forming coalitions, meeting togetherenegotiatingdifferences, and then disagreeing again.As Bacharach and Lawlerexplain:

The only politicalrecourse that most individuals have for their grievance isthe group. The group becomesthe viable unit for politicalaction. It providesmaximum mobilizationofpower and some protectionagainst retaliation. Put simply, the group is the viable unit because, as the adageholds, there is strength in numbers. {3}

What our study indicatesis the institutionalizationof

this group power andinvolvement. Unions becomepart of

the operational fabricofthe system, participatingas

recognized, legitimate spokesgroups fortheir various

member. Principals take thifrightful place alongside

teachers, parents, andtop administrators in helpingto

determine the policies ofthe district, policies which

the principals themselves will have to carry out in their schools.

The Strike Option

308 That is not to say thatconflict between board and

principals does not exist. In anylabor-management setting, the diffetencesbetween employer and employee,

between superior and subordinate,can erupt and strikes

can occur. In fact, some have argued persuasivelythat the right to walkoff the jobcollectively is an

inalienable right, like lifeand liberty. For withouta

workers' opportunity to withdrawtheir labors, then no collective bargainingcan exist.{4}

Despite the strength of thisargument, supervisors

almost never strike. Theylack the numbers to close

,down the school system; they fail to gainwidespread public support, since administrators' salaries tendto be too high to pluck the heartstringsof many citizens;

and they (administrators)tend to picture themselvesas sympathetic tomanagementwhen other groups like the teachers "hit the bricks." In our research, we found numerous times when principals feltgreat sympathy, 11 notempathy, for the teachers' plight and would have gone out on strike with them. Stopping short of this, principals sometimes "helped" the strikersby (1) closing the school atthe slightest provocation-- thus bolstering the strike's effectiveness;(2) serving hot coffee to teacherson the picket lines;(3) refusing to

"scab," that is, teach in the strikingtelcher's place to keep the schools running; and(4) sometimes refusing

9 to cross picket-lines, thus enhancing the impact of strike action.

In at least fourcases in New York City andone in Detroit, schooladministrators and supervisors ackually declared their unionsto be on strike and joined their colleagues, the teachers,on thP picket lines. Since these events are somewhatr unusual and indicativeof the problems facing school middle level managers, they deserve some discussion.

New York City.

During the autumn of1968, the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) and the Council ofSupervisory

Associations (CSA)(5}went on strike three times.Perhaps a better way to see these job actions is as one long walkout that startedand stopped three times, sincethe issues and power struggles underlying the strike wad essentially the same: the power contest between the leadership of the blackcommunity of Ocean Bill-Browns- ville CommunityBoard and the teachers and administrators associations.(61

.Table 1 shows the three 1968New York City strikes and their immediate causes; in all three cases, principals and other supervisors under the banner of CSA were outon strike.

310 Table lc New York City Strikes of UFT and CSA, Fall of 1968

Dates Proximate Reasons for the (1968) Cause Return to work STRIKE I: Sept. 9-10 Unions reacted to the School Board promised "replacement" of UFT/CSA protection to teachers'/ per nnel in Ocean Bills. principals' jobs back for removed staff in Ocean Hill.

Strike II: 0. Sept. 12-30 Unions fearnon- Agreement that 110 UFT/CSA enforcement of Sept. 10 staff could return to Ocean agreement; ten teachers Hill with protection and still not reinstated "neutral observers."

Strike III: Oct. 14- Jr. High School 271 UFT/CSA got jobs in Ocean Nov. 17 reopened in Ocean Hill Hill back; salaries would without union-desired be retroactivestate would protection for UFT /CSA oversee due process for staff. staff..

From the archivesof CSA, it becomes obviouithat the

school administratorsunionwas actively involved in the three strikes. Inan open letter to Mayor John Lindsay, the

CSA invited.his Honor to "meet some of themore than 30

supervisorsdrivenout oftheir schools bythreats and

violence. You might learnhowdue process, civil and human

rights, and academic freedomwere violated by vigilantism."{7}

Then the CSA news release provided "PROFILES OF TERROR",

giving biographiesof principals who had beenharassed on the job:

11 Principal E: We (with the Office ofPersonnel) discussedmy fear of returning to Public School X because of the following: (1) An assault onme with a knife and robberyon June 25, 1968;(2) An assault on me by a parent on June 18, 1968 while Iwas breaking up a fightbetween two boys in front of the school; (3) Recurrent vandalismon my car; (4) INTIMIDATION ON RACIALAND RELIGIOUS GROUNDS; (5) An attitude communicated to certain elements in the neighborhoodwhich would explain the sixteen UNLAWFUL ENTRIES AND ACTS OF VANDALISMto th,school building between April and June;(6) The police view that I HAVE BEEN MARKED AS A TARGET.{8}

Such statements by CSAwerecommon as the group attempted to handle the rising tideof anti-white and anti-Jewishfeeling within the Ocean Hillcommunity.

During the three strikes, CSA circulated letters and announcements attempting to getthe mayor, the state legislature, and theFord Foundation (which suppliedmuch of the money to finance the community controlexperiment in New

York City) todisband the black controlled District and reinstate centralizedcontrol and the dismissed UFT/CSA staff. Onecircularchallenged the mayor to do the following:

1. DISBAND Junior High School721 .

2. REMOVE the 7 principals ruled illegal bythe courts and replace themwith principals qualified by examinations and legal procedures;

312 3. GETsuspended AdministratorRhodyMcCoy outof the

district, DISSOLVE the suspended"local governing board."

4. MAKE IT CLEARthat Superintendent Donovanis officially

in charge of Ocean Hill-BrownsvilleDistrict and his orders are to be. obeyede.(9)

Besides addressing their comments to the mayor, the

Council of SupervisoryAssociations also addressed its

advice to the Board of Education President, John Dcar,

outlining its grievances and reasons for striAing:

harrassment of teachers andadministrators; unwillingness to

remove the power ofMcCoy and the CommunityBoard;

insubordinationon the part ofOceanHill-Brownsville

teachers,. administrators,and principals (those hired'by the

Community Board),; andthe reopening of JES 271 -- a direct

affront to the unions.The flyer was ended with anappeal to

the Board President toact:

You havedestroyed our faith andour hope, Mr. Doar -- and we cannot give you charity. To inspire good faith,you must act in good faith.{10}

But perhaps the greatest cause of thewalkouts was the fear of direct reprisalsagainst union members.In a bright blue handout entitled "WhyDon't YouTell the TRUTH, Mr.

313 -4 VO.W26 1.440 Des 1.ecit:IAKI GU varlous statements oy tne black

leaders; here is -one example:

MISREPRESENTATION--

"There has been no evidence ofharrassment and threats and intimidation at J.H.S.271.1 (Statement by Rhody McCoyon Channel 4, Nov. 10v 1968).

THE TRUTH

Dr. Donovan (superintendent], Board ofEducation, observers, the Mayor'sobservers, witnessed such harrassment. Dr. Donovan closed J.H.S. 271 because of the explosive con ons.

Mrs. Evelyn Farrar, the Principal, has repeatedly revealed the threatfilled atmosphere at J.H.S. 271. She finally asked to be reassigned in the faceof threats on her own life. She stated ata press conference on November 8, 1968: "There is a reign of terror-- acancer

that goes from.onschool to another . The motivesof the militants were 'to take over the school and make ita black school.!"

ISN'T TilIS RACISM?(111

That is notto saythat all the supervisors and administrators

supported the strike. Agroup called the New-York Association of Black

School Supervisors andAdministrators, in a press release ,dated 12

noon, Tuesday, Sept. 17, 1968, wrote thefollowing:

The racial and religious tensions accruing as a result of the actiontaken by the United Federation of Teachersand the Council of SupervisoryAssociations in, closing and, in some cases, padlocking the schools can only lead to deeper divisions in our C4ty. For this reason and those evenminecritical reasons related to thm, educational needs

314 BEST COPY AVAILMilt -0f- our children, the New York Association of BlackSchool Supervisors and Administrators is unalterably opposed to this strike.{ 12}

By November, the teachers and administrators on strike had become exhausted; the uglinessof the strike had sho6ked everyone. The

Council of Supervisory Associations met at the Hotel Pierrepont in

Brooklyn to hear the results of the collectivebargaining between the

Board of Education and CSA/UFT.The minutes of the meetingon November 17 reveal the nature of thesettlement:

Mr. Sasserath arrived witha copy of the Agreement and summarized itas follows:

A. A State Commission is setup with city-wide jurisdiction to protect the rights ofteachers and supervisors. The membersof this commission will be Harold Israelson, Walter Straley, and John Beunell.

B. No reprisals and no.loss of benefits.

-C.70cean-Hill:-Brownsville will be placed44er StateTrusteeships HerbertJohnson. Impartial observers will be stationed in each school.

Three principals,William Harris, Louis Fuentes, and Ralph Rogers are assigned to Central Office pending outcome oflitigation. Other principals will remain at their schools as long as they obey directions. All OFTteachers are to return to normal teaching programs.

RhodyMcCoy can resume his duties upon promising to obey directives.

D. The CSA does not waive its rights inthe on-going litigation.

Mr. Degnan (CSA President] arrived and described the provisionofan independentpanel t hear grievanceson a citywide basis as the most important gain. He pleaded thatupon return to the

15 schools, we actas mature supervisors, take the leadership in restoring good humanrelations.{13}

A vote of the CSAExecutive Board followed. By a vote of 275 to 23, the union agreedto return to work on November

18. Thus ended themost difficult and painful strike in

American publicschool history-- onewhich involved not

onlythe, rank-and-file employees, the teachers, but the

supervisors and middle administratorsas well.

In this strike, the wenemy"*andsource of the walk-out CT was not the Board of Education; the issuewas not money for

. salaries, fringe benefits, and sabbaticals. The strikewas

againsta "community' outsidethe schools and for due

process and control over the inner-workingsof the school

system: such issues as who should control the removal of

staff, what constitutespoor performance, and what rightsan employee has under the workingrules of the system.

The fourth strike involving administrators occurred in

1975 and was directly relatedto the labor relations actions

of theBoard of Education. Inpart, the issue was contract

integrity and the right to bargain ingood faith -- both traditional unionconcerns.

In the summer of 1975, the Board of Educationlaid off 16,000 teachers which causedthe class size in New York City

to jump to 46, on average. Furthermore, the contract

negotiations between the UFTand the School Board dragged

16 into Augustwithoutsettlement, with lay-offs casting a

shadowover the process. Meanwhile CSAwas prepared to

bargain its contract, but the Boardrefused to meet them at

the table until UFT negotiations were completed. When CSA

filed an "unfair labor practices" complaint withthe Public

Employment Relations Board (PERB), the PERB determined that

the board must bargain-- but still it refused.

A second issue wai-a directive from.theBoard that all

school assistant principals-supervisorymust teach, in part

to make up for the large lay-offs. WhenCSA filed a breach of contract grievanceon thedirective, the Board released

the elementaryschool assistantprincipals from having to teach, arguing that they,. the principals, came under the jurisdictionof the 32 decentralized elementary school districts inNew York Cityandwere not the direct responsibility of the centralboard of education. But since the high schoolswere under the central board, these AP's had to teach.

It now appeared that the UFT bargaining was not going to lead to a contract; onm again the schoolswere about to be struck. On September 4 (school was toopen after Labor

Day on September 9th), the CSA, led by President Peter

O'Brien, held .a meeting atManhattan Center to prepare itself for the pending walkout. Threechoices confronted the administrators: (1) to await the outcome of the OFT bargaining;(2) to determine in advance to strike both in

317 support of the teachers and topress the Board negotiations

around itsconcerns; (3) or to determine in advance not to support the teachers walk-out andto see what the outcomes

were to be for administratorsand supervisors.

When President O'Brien called for a vote, the show of hands was extremely close; when he asked those in favorto come forward and those againstto move to the rear of the

room, some eight hundred movedup and a few less than that

shifted to the back.Using the discretion of thechair, he declared the "ayes* had it and orderedthe Manhattan Center Resolution i)proved-- theorganizationwould strike in support of UFT and in theinterestof' the safety of the children..

Later, PeterO'Brien explainedsome of his thinking in

pushing for the 1975-CSAwalk-out. In his book, The Sublect ig Schools, O'Brien wrote that he supported the strike

because "past experiencehad shown thatschools could not functionduring a teachers' strike." (Interview with

O'Brien, as presented inThe Subject Was Roses). Further,

We nowlearnthat CSA participation in the UFT walk-out gained Shanker's support for the entry of the administrators-supervisors unioninto the AFL-CIO. O'Brien explains:

During the ensuingweek-long strike at the beginningof the school year, a supervisor's work stoppage helped to shut

318 down the schools. I called it an exhibitionof courageon behalf of fellow unionists. Later it led to a brief suspension ofthe union's dues checkoff,but joint action with the UFTmay have helped gainan AFL-CIO charter in 1976 of the OrganizingCommittee as a national union, the American Federation ofSchool Administrators(p. 57).

Walter Degnan andPeter O'Brien knew that without the

support of AFT PresidentAlbert Shanker within the AFL-CIO, the school supervisors_wouldnever have received a national charter from PresidentGeorge Meany. Hence, active support for the 1975 teachers'strike was essential. At the same time) however, O'Brien'spush for the strike (and his controversial wramrodding" ofthestrikevote at the

Manhatten Center) were misunderstood and resentedby many CSA members, as the divisionwithin the ranks indicated.

Three days later, the High School Principalsdivision of CSA helda press conference at which time they announced that theywere against a walk-out withor without teachers; the high schoolassistant principals,on the other hand, met and voted to supportthe strike, some 700strong.

The strike lasted onlyone week, fromSeptember 9 to 16. The issue for the teachers was the loss of 16,000 members; for CSA, the concernwas the integrity of the contract (whichdid not provide that assistant principals had to teach), safetyof the school during the teachers strike, and solidaritybetween UFT and CSA. While the UFT membership stayed out in large numbers (some 93percent), the CSA memberswere somewhat less enthusiastic.Many feared

319 reprisals; others were concerned about the "two-for-one" clauseofthe. Taylor Law which required that striking employees lose twodays pay forevery day on strike. The results of the strike were clear.First, therewere no reprisals against the teachers or administrators;second, no supervisorswere laid off; third,there. was increased solidarity between UFT and O'Brien's union, and fourth,CSA had proved that it could operateindependently of thelarger UTT. In the words of theCSA. Newsletter, quoting President Peter O'Brien, "CSA is nota union that would scab.It's not a union that would take the jobs of teachers. It'snot a union that would break theteachers' union. We'rea union and they'rea union, and I don'tcare what you believe,we are not an appendage ofthe UFT."{ 14}

Detroit. .

In 1980, the Organization ofSchool Administratorsand Supervisors, OSAS,went onstrike alone. When the School Board had stopped bargaining andappeared to be ignoringthe union, the President, Aaron.5. Gordon calledfor a series of one-day strikes("sick-out's"). OSAS selected key days to beabsent: for example, city-wide test day saw principals at home,causing confusion in the District andmaking their walk-out felt. This technique had several advantages. First, since strikes are illegal among 0 public employees in Michigan, the one-day

320 approach wasso fast that it was hardlypossible for the Board and the state to move legally against the

organization. Second, a brief strike prevented a tide of public opinion from rising againstthe administers. Third, it has the effect of severelyannoying the SchoolBoard-- rather than directly challenging it. Finally, itmaybe easier to get compliance from union members, sincestaying home for one day ("sick") is hardlya serious hardship to members of the strikinggroup. It's easy to sell and administer.

But one day strikes also havetheir limitation.First, the School Board can simply wait. One daywithout principals could hardly injure the system. All schools function without principalsfor a dayor so a year when the administrator is- meeting-im the--central office or is home sick. Second, aone-day approach may be as muchwork as a week -long strike, communicating withmembers, convincing them that this strike is necessary, andseeing that members do not come in. And finally, a one-daystrike is hardly a true strike, sincea walk-out should continue until the sides agree at the bargaining table.

In summary, the relationshipbetween school boards and administrators is not always cordial. Whenever groups, charged with the protectionof their rights, work together in e system, there is bound to be conflict. Collective

21 negotiations is adevice for resolving conflict,, as is

grieving, going to PERB or court, and just working

informally. When allelse fails, one groupmay attempt to

deny 4 servicesto the other, and strikesoccur.

This studyhas found thatstrikes very rarely occur among school supervisors-- only five in history, thus far. In most cases, the walk-out is done in conjunction O. with the teachers organization,since principals'are too weak to go

out alone. Sometimesthe issue is external to the school district -- as with theperceived threat of community control in Ocean Hill-Brownsville. Or theadministratorsmay

feel that the school board is not bargaining ingood faith

(Detroit). Or,as in New York City, the principalsmay leave

their jobs to showsolidarity and union kinship withfellow ynionists (the teachers).-

Whatever thecause, style, or outcome of the strike,as long as school administrators and supervisors form

bargaining units, the potential fora walk-out is always present.

Psychological jzamist.,1

Thus far,we have mainlyconcerned ourselves with the

impact of administratorcollectivebargaining on the school districtorganization and the administrator's association. There remains, however, the all-important question of the influence of unionizationon the administrators themselves.

322 Has collective bargaining affectedthe way school ad-

ministrators and supervisorsperceive themselves as leaders,

their profession, and their bosses, the superintendent? If

these perceptions remain basically unchanged, then

unionizationhas meant little to the psychologyand beliefs

system of principals and othermid-level administration. If,

on the other hand,principals who bargain (versus thosewho

do not) see their relationships and beliefs differently,

then we can argue that the m6vementto unionize school supervisors has changed theoutlooks and attitudes of these key staff members.

A Common Heritage

, One belief system hassupposedly unified administrators

at all levelsof the organization: adherence to the tenet

that superintendents,principals, assistantprincipals, and

other supervisorsare part of a common "managerial team" or

."management system"{16} Thisattitude is so ingrained in, the

training, speeches, writings, and everyday expectations of

many administrators that it is rarelychallenged.

No single, accepted definitionof the "management team"

is available. In general, it has come tomean that school

administrators ofvarying ranks, from superintendent to assistant principalor director, share a common set of goals concerning schoolmanagement, feel a sense of loyalty toone another, act in a way to enhance the best interests of

323 management, and importantly, retainthe "responsibilityand

authority for participating in school decision-making."{17}

Common tasks, sharedpurposes, and joint governance, so the

concept goes, fuse the leaders of the schoolsystem into an

efficient and effectiveinstrument for managingthe system.

Today, despite the rise of collectivebargaining and other indicators oftheerosionof themanagement team ideal, there is still strong support for, and belief in, this viewpoint. E. Hark Hanson, forexample, in his book on

school management,advocates that the superintendentuse the

team as "a problem solving, program developing, leadership emit" by calling for membersof the team to shape:and operate the critical management informationsystem, the budgeting system, the collective bargaoing system" and so forth.{18} Paul S. Salmon, too, believes thatthe "team is constructed moundthe idea ofcollaborative efforts and

,commonality of purpose."{19}In effect, the team" accordingto Salmon, "offers real opportunities for mid-leveladministrators to establish a more meaningful identity ineducational decision-making andmanagement determination."{20}

For the purpose of thisfinal chapter,we are trying to determine what impact bargaining has hadon the managerial perspective of middle administrators.Why is this an important issue? First,if we are to understand the impact of bargaining, we must explore the changes in attitudes, if any, between principals who bargain and those who do not.

324. Second, if there are anysignificantdifferences in

managerial outlooksor identification. betweenbargaining and

,non-bargaining schooladministrators from similardistricts, then a new mode of educational managementmay be called or.

Third, an excellentwayto test the hypothesisof Bacharach and Lawler (the belief that organizationsare coalitions of different sub-groups all vying for controi in an

inter-organizational, political environMent){21}is to see to bat extent middle administrators (who bargain and who do not) agree with their bosses, the superintendents,on key issues. If there is little comityacross groups, then it mould lend credence to the Bacharach-Lawlercontention: that

organizational perspectivesvary withone's position and activities; thatorganizations are not the holistic,

rationale, and unifiedsystems, as some scholarsbelieve.{22}

An Empirical Study To test the strengthof the argument thatbargaining may have an impact on the managerial outlook or

identification of schoolprincipals and other supervisors, Je {23} examined the relationshipbetween the "managerial

orientations of a randomly selected group of superintendents, principals, and assistant principals and their

involvement in unionization.The key research question was: Do supervisors who receive collective bargaining

representation, Alincontracts, and join variousadministra-

25 for unions and associations identia less with school

management than supervisorswho do not unionize? A related

Auestion which was studied was: Did rank in the school

district hierarchy,years of job experience, and otherlocal

districtconditions (size, urbanization) affect the wax school administratorsperceive their closeness to roi milipagemen in schools? 'these and otherquestions provide the

basis for a model of managerialorientation, one designedto

explain "pro- labor" and "pro- management" identification of school administrators in thisstudy.

*Management Orientations: The DependentVariable.

,Management orientation is defined as thedegree to which school middle administratorsagree with top management (su-

perintendents andassistants) on issues concerninghow the

district should beoperated. In- particular, we identified

fourteen key issues which might have involvedconflicts of

interestbetween middle and top administrators.The issues are:

1. Rights of school administratorsto bargain and strike 2. Evaluation of administratorwork performance 3. Means for awardingpay increases to administrators 4. Transfer policies foradministrators 5. Lay-off procedures foradministrators 6. Tenure for administrators 7. Levels of building-sitecontrol and discretion 8. Dismissal of administrators 9. Superintendent-principal relations 10. Administrator behaviorduring teachers' strikes 11. Hiring policies foradministrators 12. Grievance proceduresfor school administrators 13. Scope of bargaining foradministrators 14. Administrator affiliationwith state and national organizations r 26

326 On the basisof these fourteen issues, we developed

fifty-nine Likert-like attitudestatements. Each statement consisted of 4 normative resolution of an issue. For instance, the statement "Seniority in an administrative

position should be, themajor determinant in deciding which

principals to lay off" (a "pro-labor" statement), or "The

decision to lay off principalsshould be madeon the basis

.of work performance" ("pro-management")are both pertinent

to the general issue of howschool districts determine the ,laying off of middleadministrators.

We thusmeasured managerialorientation by asking each administrator in the researchsample to respond to the

Aifty-nine statements byindicating their level ofagreement or disagreement. on a five pointscale With each statement.{24}

The Independent Variables

1. Collective Bargaining Variables: The major independent variable inour model is the type ofsadministra- tor unionization. Thisvariable, as mentioned in the introduction, may be importantin differentiating schooladministrators who identifywith management from those who do not. The variable. "unionization" has a number of components: First, does theadministrator wotk ina district that has a recognizedbargaining group for school md-level administrators? Ifso, then perhaps the administrator has been placed ina situation ofbargaining for salaries,

27 fringe benefits, dueprocess protection, and otherworking

conditions. If not, thenperhaps the administrators "meet and confer" for salariesand other benefits,an arrangement

by which principalsmeet informally to discuss ,theirpay.

Second, local administrator groupsmay be affiliated

with'state and/ornationalorganizations. Has theadminis-

trator, for example, iginedthe AFLCIO through theAmerican

Federatiof SchoolAdministrators (AFSA), the National

Association of ElementarySchool Principals or the National

Association of SecondarySchool Principals throughit3 state

,organization;or the national superintendents'group, the American Association ofSchoolAdministrators (AASA)?

Certainly,membershipin the superintendents' versus the AFL-CIO's organizationshouldbe an in144icer of the managerial orientation ofsome principals and supervisors.

2. Personal Characteristics:It is important to attempt

to control for other, extraneous effectsthat might

influence managerialidentification. For example, do years, of administrative experiencehave any impactonmanagerial

bias,particularly when consideredalong with rank in the

.hierarchy? One mightmake a case thata more experienced ad-

ministrator, who is also higher up in the ranks,should be

more managerially oriented, whilea "young Turk" down in the

system (as the assistantprincipal'sspot, for example)

might be more pro-laborin his/her reaction to thefourteen

labor related issuesmentioned above. Yet,one might also

328 expect that a slightly older administrator, who hasbeen passed over for promotion, mightbecome moremilitant and

independent in his/herreaction to topmanagement. ,Perhaps, too, years of graduate educationmightbe ,important as an explanation for an administrator's managerial orientation. Weexpect thatthe more graduate

courses in school admiltistrationand leadershipa respondent had completed (as reflected inher/his level of graduate training), the more "managerial* theperson might be. Though little is known aboutthe impactof graduate study on administrator attitudes, {25}we might safelyassume that most master(' and doctoral programs in school administrationtend to be .strongly "managerial" inorientation (fewprofessors of school administrationinstruct their students, for example,-to unionizeagainst their bosses).

3. Environmental Forces:Finally, it is important to control for characteristicsof the setting in which administrators are employed. We includefour measures of the nature of local districts as possible influencers' of managerial orientation as follows: (1) district size, (2)

urbanization level, (3) sapenditure 01.0111, and (4) perceived local labor union influence.(26} Thesevariables were included inthemodel for the following reasons. First, large, urban districts may cause the

supervisor-managementrelationships to be negativelybiased toward management, or perhapspositivelybiased. For, ifa

29.

329 ,large, urbandistrict hasa complex hierarchical system of

control, school supervisors may have more subordinates and

accordinglybemoremanagerially responsible and more

managerially oriented. Or, the very existence of extensive

bureaucratization in urban school districts may so alienate

and isolatemiddle-leveladministrators thatcollective

bargaining and pro -labor attitudesemerge.{27} Certainly, we

would intuitively assume thatunionization was an urban,

rather than a rural or suburban, phenomenon.

, Second, expenditures for education may have ant effect

on administrator unionization, though the exact nature of

that relationship is not Clear. Perhaps, perceptionof a

lowtaxbase and low per pupil expenditure, relative to

other districts, mayimpede unionization, since there is

little moneyto bargain for. Or, perhaps, low-expenditures

and pay may so infuriateadministrators that collective

negotiations is deemed necessary. High per pupil levels, on

theother hand, may provide a muchwanted prize and

stimulate union behavior.

Finally, we controlled for the general labor relations

milieu in the community on the assumption that school admin-

istrators were more likely to organize unions in settings

With active labor groups and less likely to in

pro-managementcommunities. Would, for example, school administrators be more managerially oriented in districts with

strong managerial and professional constituencies7{28}

30 A

330 Conversoly, if the local district had pervasive blue collar, union activities (and even a few unionists on the school board), would one not expectadministrators to feel more closely aligned with labor?

The Questionnaire, Sample, and Population

The survey questionnaire included the fifty-nine managerial orientation scale (MOS) statements and twenty-two

itemspertaining to the several independent and control variables outlined in .the preceding section.

The populationof interest was all school administrators and supervisors in the jurisdiction ofthe New Jersey

Public Employer-Employee Relations Act.{29} These include all administratorswith the rank and/or certificationof superintendent of schools, assistant superintendent, principal, assistant principal, and specialist supervisor.

All these administrators come under a single state law, the

same rulings of the state courts, and the Public Employment

Relationstemplis4Nand the same state personnel policies.

Hence, we canassume that they arebeing influenced by a

somewhat similar legal and regulatory environment.{30}

A randomsampleof 925 school administrators was

obtained from the total membershiplists of the three

relevant associations in the state. The sample included 350

members of the AFL-CIO affiliated New Jersey Council of the

American Federation of School Administrators (AFSA); 475

331 members of the New Jersey Principal and Supervisor

Associations (called hereafter the PSA); and 100

participants in the NewJerseyAssociation of School

,Administrators (called the superintendents association). We

had full support of the three state groups -- AFSA, PSA, and

the superintendents associat2,n -- in obtaining the randomly

.selected mailing lists,' cover letters, and announcements in

the/state newsletters. However, we made it clear that the

research was being done by independent university

researchers and that anonymity of responseswould be

guaranteed. While it is possible that some bias was

introduced by the endorsement of state associations, we were

careful to indicate that we, not the organizations, were

.doing the study.

The questionnaires were mailed to the sampledmembers

of the threeorganizations in November 1980. A follow-up

mailing was conducted in December and January. Responses

were received from 483 of the 925 questionnaires distributed

-- thus attaining an overall response rate of 52 percent.

This included 56 responses (56 percent) from the superinten-

dents association; 277 responses (58 percent) from the

Principal and SupervisorAssociations (PSA), and 43 percent

from AFSA. However, because 80 administrators failed to

provide answers to all 59 attitude statements, the number of

useable questionnaires was reduced to 403 (44 percent) which

included 49 (49 percent) superintendents, 232 (49 percent)

332 PSA, and 122 (35 percent) AFSA. Finally, a small number of

respondents failed to answer all 22 items pertaining to the

independent variables, thusfurther reducing the number of

observations to be used in the analysis.

Examination of the incomplete questionnaires yielded no

evidence that they were systematic as to any variables such

as respondent rank, Location, collective bargaining status,

groupmembership, or any paLticular attitude statement. It is therefore probable that no significant bias resulted from

the elimination of incomplete questionnaires.

,Analysis

The analysis was conducted in three parts. First, dif-

ferences among organizations (AFSA, PSA, and superinten-

dents) were assessed bycomparing percentages of -agreement

and disagreement registered by eachgroupfor individual

attitude statements.

A0cond, item analysis wasapplied to the fifty-nine

attitude statements inorder to develop the management

orientation Scale to measure the respondents' overall

managerial orientation.{31} For each respondent, the total

,score on the MOSprovided an aggregate indicator. Further,

we performed item analysis on ninety of the 403 randomly

selected questionnaires in order to ascertain the level of

significance of each of the 59 completed items. Subsequent

.33

333 analysis that used the MOS excludedthese ninety respondents who were used to develop the scale.

Third, regression analysiswas employed to examine the ,relationship betweenMOS and several independent variables defined above.

Results

Differenceson Managerial Issues

If themanagementteam were that cohesive unit that some presume, the statistical differencesamong administra-

.tor's attitudes on managerial issues would be small. Yet, when sample respondentsare categorized into four groups by affiliation and bargainingstatus for analysis-- (1) AFSA members, (2) PSA members who bargain collectively,(3) PSA members who do not bargain, and (4) membersof the state superintendents association -- strng and significant differences in managerial attitudesappear.

. One indication of thedifferences is the aggregate score on the MOS.{32} The AFSA totalscore out of possible 236 was a low 64.22 for an.average per item response of 1.09 out of a possible 4.0, indicating a strong "pro-labor" stance. Bargainingmembers of the PSA were also low (77.35 total score with a 1.31 per item average). Non-bargaining

PSA members totalleda more pro-managerial score of 91.79

(1.56 per item average), while the superintendents associa-

334 tion respondents hada net score of 130.36 fora 2.21 per item average.(331

,Another sign of the strong internaldifferences within the administrative ranks is the diffeientiationamong certain key issues in the MOS suchas scope of bargaining for administrators, lay-offs and dismissal procedures for administrator, andgrievance procedures. Theresults on theseconcerns shows that the four categories not only diverge overall,as the aggregate data aboveshow, but they also are divided on key separateissues: 1. Thescope of bargaining is a highlydivisive issue, with pro-managerial respondents indicatinga preference for narrow breadth of bargainable items,mainly salaries,while pro-labor respondents desiring an unlimited scope in negotiations.For example, whenasked to respond-to the statement, "Thescope of bargaining for principals andother supervisorsshould be restricted lastate law toprotect the prerogatives ofthe board and superintendent," 75percent of the superintendents association agreed, while 82percent of the AFSA and 66 percent ofPSA disagreed. Also, in reaction to the statement, "Collective bargainingfor principalsand .other supervisors should include alljob-related issues of interest toeither or both parties at thetable," thesuper- intendentsmembership disagreed with thisunlimitedscope by 53 percentand AFSA (with 93 percent) and PSA (by 88 percent) supportedthe statement.

335 2. The lay-off process for administratorswas. another divisive issue.A lay-off means removal for personnel or manpower reasons, not personalassessment of incompetence. The pro-labor position seemedto be in supportof "seniority in an administratic,fe position" beingthe majordeterminant of lay-offs, whicli the AFSA respondents supported by 15 percent, PSAby 65 ... percent, and the superintendents disagreedwith by 57 percent. Similarly, whenasked to react to the statement, "Lay -off procedures should bea bargainable item between school boards and *.lipals and other supervisors," 79 percent ofAFSA and 73percent of PSA supported the econtention, while thesuperintendentsby 61 percent disagreed, favoring managerialcontrol over lay-off procedures.

3. Dismissal, alas°, placedtopand middle administra- torson opposite sides of the issue.When asked toreact to two items (theright of the superintendentto discharge ad.(' ministratorsanilaterally, and accessby dismissedadminis- trators to an "impartial thirdparty toreverse unwarranted dischargesof principals or other supervisors"), the three categoriesofschool administratorshad verydifferent views. The superintendentsgroup (by 84 percent)wanted the superintendents to have the controlto fire administrators. The PSA and APSA respondentsdisagreed, by 52and 90 percent respectively, both wantingsome limits on the authority of the top executive to remove middleadministrators.

336 4. The type of grievanceprocedures for theprotection of school administratorswas also a controversialissue for middle andtop rank administrators. The superintendents as- sociationpreferred *informal means . . . for settling differences between professional managers* by 68 percent, although theAFSA groupby 67 percent andthe PSA by 57 a percent rejected the idea. But to thestatement, *Principals should haveaccess to a neutral third party for the settlement of grievances,* AFSAand PSA supported theidea by81 percent and 70 percentrespectively. Thesuperinten- dents rejectedby 71 percent the notion ofoutside intervention by third party arbitratorsof any kind.Sae. TA14.-41.

33 7 TABLE ti

INTER-GROUP DIFFERENCES ON KEY DIVISIVEISSUES

SUPTS. Issue AFSA PSA ASSOCIATION SCOPE OF BARGAINING:

1. Bargainingscope 98% 88% 53% restricted by law (Pro-Labor)(Pro-Labor) (Pro-Magt.)

2. Should include all 82% 66% 75% issues ofconcern (Pro-Labor)(Pro-Labor) (Pro-Magt.) LAY -OFF OF ADMINISTRATORS:

3. Seniority as Main 75% 65% 57% prirsciple for lay-off (Pro-Labor)(Pro-Labor)(Pro-Magt.)

4. Lay-off of admin. 79% 73% 61% Should be bargainable (Pro-Labor)(Pro-Labor)(Pro-Magt.) DISMISSAL OF ADMINISTRATORS:

5. Supt. has powerto 56% 52% 84% dismiss admin. : (Pro-Labor)(Pro-Labor)(Pro-Magt.)

6. Use of third-party 80% 71% 73% arbitrator on dismissal (Pro-Labor)(Pro-Labor)(Pro-Magt.) cases for administrators

3RIEVANCE PROCEDURES FORADMINISTRATORS:

7. Use of infornal 67% 56% 67% processes (Pro-Labor)(Pro-Labor)(Pro-Magt.)

8. Third partyas final 81% 70% 71% step in grievance (Pro-Labor)(Pro-Labor)(Pro-Magt.) procedure.

fr 38. Issues of ManagerialConsensus

While middle andtop administrators tended to disagree

among organizationson most issues, as demonstrated above,

the picture isnot so simpleor consistent. On several

philosophical concerns, principals reactedmuch like top

managers, indicating perhaps theambivalence of life in the middle ranks. When asked their attitudes, for example,on

the statement, "The'management team' concept is the most

effective approachto administering theschooldistrict," all three groups respondedmanageriallyand positively --

supporting the team'concept by 64 percent (AFSAmembers), 78

percent (PSA), and 90percent Asuperintendents group). See Table 3.

Yet, in subsequentstatements 'on the usefulness of

7wadversary-trelations" and"conflicts ofinterest"between superintendents andprincipals, the managerial consensus

vanished and only 41percent of the AFSA and 45percent of

PSA agreed with thesuperintendentswho disliked "adversary

relations" by 63percentand "conflicts ofinterest" by 78 percent.

The issueof merit in school personnelrelations- also

placed the PSA and AFSArespondents in themanagerial camp. When asked whether payincreases should be determined in

part by merit, 92 percentof the superintendents,69 percent of the PSA, and 49percentof the AFSAgroups agreed, as

shown in Table 3, items 4-6. "Promotion by merit" likewise

339 TABLE 3

MANAGERIAL ORIENTATION ON KEYCONSENSUS ISSUES

Supt. I5 AFSA PSA ASSOCIATION MANAGEMENT TEAM I. "Management Team" is best Strong ProM* .9 Strong ProM 39% Strong ProM59% approach. Mud. ProM 37 Mod. ProM 39 Mud. ProM 31 Total 64% oral 78% Total 911%

2. Adversary relations are some- Strung ProM 13% Strong ProM 23% Strong ProM15% times necessary. Mod. ProM 28 Mod. ProM 22 Mod. PrnM 18 Total 41% Total 45% Total 631- Strong Pml. 16% Strung Prof. 13% Mod. ProL 29 Mod. ProL 27 1 mai 45% Total 40%

3. "Cnntlict of interevt" is some- Strung ProM Strong ProM 17% Strong PrnM31% times necessary. Mod. PmM 33 Mod. PmM 25 Mod. ProM 41 TOO I 46% Total 42% Total latais Strong PruL 13% Strong ProL Mod. ProL 33 Mod. ProL 3$ Total 46% Total 48%

MERIT PAY 4. Pay should be awarded on Strong ProM 16% Strong ProM 34% Stroug ProM59% basis of merit. Mod. ProM 33 Mod. ProM 35 Mod. ProM 33 Total 49% Total 69% Intal 92% Strung ProL 19% Mod. ProL 20 Total 39%

5. Promotions within adtninis- Strong PruM 53 Strong ProM 64% Strong 1'toM90% tratise ranks should he made Mod. ProM 30 Mod. PruM 25 Mod. ProM on merit. Total 83% Total 89% Total 9814

6. Merit and performance should Strong ProM 15% Strong ProM 21% Strong ProM51'"v be the basis of layoffs. Mud. ProM 31 Mod. ProM 39 Mod. ProM 29 Total 46% Tonal 60% Total 81)% Strung PruL 19% Mod. Prof. 26 Total 45%

CENTRALIZAnoN 7. Funds lhould be controlkd Strong ProM 14% Strong ProM 13% Strone lirnM Its "'o Mom the central office. Mud. ProM 35 Mod. ProM .35 Mod. I'mM 3i Total 49% Total 48% Total 53% Strong Prof. 14% Mud. ProL .31 Total 45%

N. Student discipline should be Strong ProM 50% Strong ProM 55% Sunni!lirtIM53",t controlled procedurally fmni Mud. l'rnM 32 Mod. ProM 30 Mod. ProM 29 the central office. Total 82% Total 85% Total

340 BEET COPY lv-11 .1.1 111~1111110 elicited consensus: 83percent ofAFSA, 89 percent of PSA,

and 98 percent of superintendentsconcurred that administra-1

tors should be promoted according to the quality of their performance.

Third, when asked aboutthe level of centralization,

that is, thedegree to which some particular decisions

should be madeby the superintendent,not the principal,

again principals tended to agree with their superiors.

Controloffunds andmajor student discipline (such as expulsion rules for student infractions) were rightly the 4e

responsibility of thesuperintendents' office, according to

this purvey. According to. Table 3 (item8), making policies on '"disciplining troublesome. students" shouldbe the super-

. intendents' prerogative:,'AFSAby 82 percent; PSA by 85

percent; .and superintendentsassociation, 82 percentagreed. Central funding control,though less consensual andpro-man-

agerial, was nonethelessdeemed anappropriate task for the

superintendents' level: agreedwere the superintendentsassociation (53 percent), PSA (46 percent), and AFSA (49 percent).

on the issues of theconcept of the management

team, merit as a basis' for promotion, and cehtralized

control over money andstudent personnel procedures,super-

intendents tended to agree. Perhaps, as professional,

middle-class supervisors,principals felt that they should

uphold the concept of "management team," "merit," and

341 'centralization* in the abstract, while rejecting the team

on particular issues which affectedthe principals' jobs and

livelihood suchas lay-offs, transfer, scope of bargaining, and dismissals.

Issues of Managerial Ambivalence

Abile most issues .elearly divide middleand top admin-

istrators, and while a few seem to engender aconsensus

around key concepts, two minor issues seemedso mixed as to

be unclear but imoortant: (1) the appropriate state and

.national group to represent school administrators

effectively and (2) the correctactionsofbuilding principals during a tea:her; strike.

1. The affiliation of school administratorsdivided and

unified survey.respondents._When askedwhich group was best able to represent the interests of school administrators in

state capitalsandWashington, D.C., eachsample group 4 supported its own association. For example, 79 percent of

APIA membersagreed that principals 'shouldbe affiliated

with state laborgroups "to enhance their power and lobbying

influence," while 46 percent of PSA and 69 percent of the

superintendents association its own association. For

example, 79 percent of AFSA members agreed that principals

should be affiliated with state labor groups "to enhance

,their power and lobbying influence," while 46percent of PSA

and 69 percent of the superintendents association rejected

that assertion. But, when asked to respondto the statement

that the American Association of School Administrators

42 342. (RASA), the national superintendentsgroup, represented the needs of all school administrators, 60percent of thesuperintendents agreed, but boththe AFSA rembersby 55 percent and the PSA by65 percent disagreed.

But, that is not to say that the superintendentsgroup disliked the principals' having their own strong, independent state .association or union. Here the inconsistency appeared: 73 percent ofthe superintendents group supported the needof principals fortheir own state and nationalpoliticalgroup.

2. When teachersstrike, what shouldbe the appropriate role of principals and other supervisors?Should middleadministrators cooperate with thesuperintendent, functionas teachers to keep school open,, assist with the hiringof substitutesto attempt to break thestrike, delivercourt ordered injunctions to teachers ordering them back to work, and maintainthe rightas principals'to close their buildings shouldsafety becomea factor? On the general issue ofoverall cooperation,all three groups tended to agree with a pro-managerial stance: 85 percent of superintendents and78 percent of PSAagreed, while only46 percent of AFSAconcurred. On principal: filling in for teachers duringa walkout, thegroups divided along union-management lines, with superintendentsgroup respondents supporting the tactic by 94percent, 53percent of PSA concurring -- but 58 percent of AFSA resisting the

343 ,practice. Likewise, the AFSAgroupdid not support the ,hiring ofsubstitutes to break the teachersstrikeby 62 percent (disagreed); however, 53percentof PSAand 49 percent of superintendentswere in favor. On the issuesof using principals asprocess servers for back-to-work injunctions and permitting administrators the authorityto close their buildings when they cannot guarantee the safety.of staff membersand students duringa strike," all_three sample groupsheld similar, pro-labor positions. Some 92 percent ofAFSA, 89 percentof PSA, and 77 percent of superintendentspreferred no to use principalsas process servers to teachers.On the right to plow: buildings (and thus perhapsto helpthe striking teachers), 97percent of AFSA, 89peicentof PSA, and 57 percent of superintendents agreed thatsuchdiscretionwas appropriate.

In summary, by far the majority ofitems divided middle and top echelons, throwing some doubton the solidarity and even existenceof the managementteam concept. On more philosophical issues, like merit andthe need forteamwork, some managerialconsensus arose. On a few issues,AFSA and PSA became somewhat managerial;on other issues thesuperintendents agreed withthe more labor-orientedadministrators. Finally, affiliation and strike behavior showed and underlying ambivalence among school administratorsor at least a willingness to grantthe other partythe right to

344 exist. Superintendents, for example, felt that a strong principals associationwas appropriate.

Besides a comparisonof responses to attitude statements, analyzed bygroup membership,we can also relate the overall scores on the MOS to particular independent able. This following section uses regressionanalysis to study the correlation betweenmanagerial orientation and taffiliation, bargaining, and otherdistrict and personal characteristics.

The Attitude Scale

Item analysis resulted in the selection offorty-four attitude statements (outof the original fifty-nine) to include in the Management OrientationScale (MOS). The analysis indicated that these forty-four items consistently worked together to distinguishbetween the highest and lowest scoring administratorsamong the 90 respondents used in developing the scalingprocedure. Thus, ifan individual

respondent agrees withthe managerial (orlabor) view onany one of the 44 items, there is a high probabilitythat she/he

will agree with thatview on the remaining43 statements. We tested the reliability of the scale in discriminating between high, or a "pro-managerial" orientation, and a low, "pro-labors score by calculating Cronback's alpha reliabilitycoefficient.{34} This test was applied to the responses of the 313administrators, yielding

345 an alpha reliability coefficientof .904, indicating very high levels of reliability.

Evidence of the validityof the MOS is provided by the

fact that administratorsofhigh managerial rank,that is, the superintendents, consistently scored higher and more

managerially than didadministrators of lower rank.(The superintendents' overalk average was 130.4 while principals

overall scored 80.0, thoughvarious associationalmembers, such as the AFSA, scoredeven lower.)

Regression Analysis

Regression analysiswas used to assess therelationship between administratorattitudesas measured by the MOS and these independent variables: unionization, job rank,years of experience, years of graduate education,perceived local labor influence, urbanization, perceived per pupil expenditure in localdistricts, and number of students enrolled in the schooldistrict {35} We used two equations to analyze the variables.

As shown in Table M we-found highlysignificant coefficients on four keyvariables. Relative to being a member of the superintendents association,membership in AFSA or PSA resulted in a substantial reduction inMOS scores (that is, 48.45 and 40.50points respectively), when all other variableswere held constant. Second, administrators,who have receivedcollective bargainingrepresentation

346 scored considerably loweron the MOS than did ncn-bargaining

. respondents (15.76 points). Third,years of experience asan

administrator diminished themanagement orientation of ad-

ministratorsby .52 points per year ofadministrative

experience. Finally, thoaeadministrators who perceivedthat a. union official would likely beelected or appointed to the

local schoolboard also scored significantly loweron the MOS. The coefficientson job rank, urban setting, perceived per pupil expenditure, and district size did not attain satisfactory levels ofstatistical significance.

347 TABLE4 ),,,

REGRESSION ANALYSISOF' THE RELATIONSHIPBETWEEN MANAGERIAL ORIENTATIONSCORES AND KEY INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (14=2S

VariabTe- Regression Stan ar Sig Coefficient Error UNION MEMBERSHIP

AFSA Membership(AFL-CIO) -48.45 6.65 .0 Principal andSuperv. Associations (PSA)-40.50 6.43 .0 Membership

COLLECTIVE BARGAININGfor Administrators -15.76 3.32 .0,

JOB AND PERSONALCHARACTERISTICS RANK Assistant Principal -13.93 8.17 .0i Principal -3.94 8.12 .6: Assistant Central Office -6.09 7.11 Supervisor .3 Years as an administrator -.52 .19 Years of Graduate School Training .93 1.43

DISTRICTCHARACTERISTICS

Local LaborInfluence -2.71 1.00 .0 Urban Setting -2.14 4.17 .6 Per Pupil Expenditure 1.62 1.74 5 Size of School District (no. ofpupils) -4.7 wory .00

.516, F- 23.56, F <.0001

348 RIM!! RR)F TABLE $3 REGRESSIONANALYSIS OF THE COMBINED.EFFECTS OF JOB RANK AND EXPERIENCEON SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORMANAGEMENT Varia e ORIENTATION(N=29t Regression Standard Coefficient Siini UNIONMEMBERSHIP: Error Lev AFSA (AFL-CIO)Membership N -48.94 5.01 PSAMembership .0001 -41.15 4.35 .0001 CQLLECTIVE BARGAININGfor Adminittrators -16.03 3.29 .0001 JOB andPERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS: Rank withYears of AdministrativeEx erience Assist. Principal/Years of Exper. -1.09 .31 .0005 Principal/YearsofExperience -1.29 .18 Assist. .19 CentralOffice Supervisor/ .48 Years ofExperience .24 .04 Years of GraduateSchool Training .99 1".43 .48 DISTRICT CHARACTERISTICS:

Local LaborInfluence 2.59 .99 Urban Setting .0009 -.25 4.16 .80 Per PupilExpenditure 1.27 Size of 1.17 .46 District(no. of pupils) 6.57 .00 .43 rt= .515, F=25.75, <.0001 allMingiUMMISSAMMWMIOMMMUMMIUMIIIMMI iMMIONIMMIIISMMISWIMMIMM711======n

349 trio COPYkakILAFAi As shown in Table f7;,, we interactedjob of rank andyears administrative experiencein order totest for combined their effecton managerial orientation. This produced a interaction highly significant negative coefficient, indicatingthat administratorswhohave spent more yearsas an assistant principalor an 'assistant central office supervisor tended to score lower on the MOS. (The coefficientsfor union membership,collective and bargaining, perceivedlabor influenceretained theirsignificance this equation; in however the other variables remained insignificant.)Overall,both equationsattained of high levels statisticalsignificance andexplained about 51percent ,of thevariance in managerialorientation.

Discussion -1'""tr!"_""!!!""`"'!"!""r".""" The purpose ofthis MIKA was todetermine levelof whether the administratOr agreementwith the managerial anticipated positionis related to aspects of and unionization severalother occupational and districtvariables. First,there is clear evidencethat union membershipand collectivebargaining among schoolmiddle administrators supervisors and am-strongly related tothe levelof With agreement topmanagement on keyissues. Theconclusions from thisresearch are three.First,on the vastmajority of issues,the "managementteam" was divided,with lower level,bargaining, and unionaffiliated

50 Administrators being morepro-labor (scoring lower) than their higher echelon, non-bargaining colleagues in the PSA and superintendents group. While it istrue that therewas someblurring ofthe distinctionsbetween lower- and upper-tier administrators over philosophical issues,by and large the inter-associationaldifferences recorded in this study were stableand highly significant.

Second, the regression analysis showed thatbesides organizational affiliation, othervariableswere also important in explaining the reduction inmanagerial orientation, includingjob rank, yearsof experience, and perceived union influence. Thelower down the hierarchy and thelonger the service, the higher thelevel oflabor attitudes. It would appear, then, that theconcept of the 0 ignagement team is less effective withassistant-middle ad-, Amistrators than their supervisors. Perhaps these assistants feel even less involved inschool decision-making and control than principals, who at leastcontrol their school buildings to someextent. Also, we found that communitieswith perceived labor influence weremore conducive to pro-labor orientations than management districts. Thus, unionization in the environment seems to support collective bargaining among other employees, ,including schooladministrators. Third, it is clear that school administrators at all levels)Okuk. in the APSA and ?SA/are still supportive ofsome

351 . managerialconcerns. Our research indicatess.zong agreement with thenotionof merit in promotion,transferral, and

. removal of middle administrators. Further,when askedabout the "managementteam" specifically, manyadministrators registered supportof the concept. Hence, while theteam may be near deathoperationally, and particularlywhendealing With basicoccupational, concerns of mid-rankadministrators, the belief inbeing part of a leadership systemremains very

much alive. .

It should be keptin mind, however, thatour research to date is limited. NewJersey is butone state; additional research in otherstates with similar and differentunion, urban, and regional characteristics isnecessary to test these findings and refine theMOS. SeCond,causation cannot be derived frOm cross-sectional data.Perhaps,differences in managerialorientation are both a cause andand effect of collective bargaining among administrators. Perhaps a pre-existing labor sympathy leads to unionization; or unionization itself influences thewayadministrators feel about their jobs-- and collectivebargaining is butone of numerous results. Do administratorsjoin a bargaininggroup already pro-labor?Or do they become more pro-laborover the years? Under what conditions domoves toward orawayfrom a labor orientationoccur? We know from this studythat collectivebargaining, as well as other related variables,

352 have someseparate effect, whenother conditionsare held constant.

Nevertheless, the results of this studysuggest that schoolmanagers and policy makers should alter theirbeliefs and practices. Superintendentscan no longer blithelyassume that the "management team" exists. Instead, school eXecutives must acknowledge that some intra-organizational conflict willemerge as middle administratorsact in their own self-interest.{36} Given the number ofdivisive issueswe noted in this study, some increase must occur in collective

. action and bi-lateral decision-making, even within the administrativeteam.

While it istrue that many superintendents havealready learned to bargain, to operatewithin contractual guidelines, andto accede to grievanceprocedures it dealing with their administrators,many still maintain theprimacy of themanagement teamand deem themselves failureswhen their mid-rank administrators take a more independenttack. Such collectiveaction canhardly be avoided, gi'7en the depth of the inherent differencesbetween middle andtop administrators. Also, superintendentsshould not overreact; administrators still believe in teamwork, in meritas the basis for many actions (likepromotion and transfer),as long as the perceived rights of administrators are protected. If these findings appear a bit contradictory,

353 they probably representthe ambiguityof "life in the middle," lifeas both an "employee" anda *manager." For principalsand other supervisors, thedays of com- fortableacceptance of top managerial directivesand control appearover. Instead,middle administrators seem to have strong differences with their bosses over certain fundamental issuest -how the personnelfunction shouldbe run. If there isdiscomfort, even conflict, suchchanges in the relationshipbetween top and middle administrationare probably inevitableand overdue -- given the differencesin status, power, and attitude that existbetweenprincipals and superintendents.

It is important, then, to understand the impact of collective bargaining on the professionalpsyche of school administrators and supervisors. Surely the changesin iden7 tification withmanagement on many critical issues indicate the depth ofrevolution that has occurred in school management inrecentyears. On balance, it is clearthat principalsno longer want to be ignored,taken for granted in the internaloperationof the schools. Collective bargaining and a new pro-laboroutlook arepart of Olenew publicpersona ofan increasing number of suchsupervisors. Yet, these data also show a preVailing da3ireamong many *middle-level administrators to becooperative, effective members of theadministrative team. This ambivalenc f life

354 in the middlehas not been eliminated byjoining the labwr movement; perhapsfor some, it has onlybeen exacerbated. Hence, the unionization of schooladministratorshas not only influenced the way schools are run (the way decisionsaremade, resources, allocated, and the actors involved) but also the occupational outlook of administrators. It hay definitely madethem lessmanagerial in outlook,though the desire and impulse to bepart of the managerialsystem remains present andstrong.

55 355 NOTES (Chapter VI)

1 Interview with Ni as Neuhaus and Ted U82. Elsberg,.September

2lnterviewwith high school principal,Philadelphia,May 1978. IP

3 Bacharach and Lawler,POWER AND POLITICS INORGANIZATIONS, p. 8.

''For a fulldiscussion of the ethics of theright to strike, sae Robert B. Pokier,"Public Employees Strikes andPolitical Theory," inCOLLECTIVEBARGAINING II GOVERNMENT, pp.291-96; Neil W. Chambersand James W. Kuhn, COLLECTIVEBARGAINING, 2nd edition (New 'York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 149ff; MyronRoomkin, "Union Structure, Internal Controlsand Strike Activity," INDUSTRIAL ANDLABOR RELATIONS REVIEW (1972),pp. 198-214.

5Someconfusion may arise as to the correcttitle for the CSA. From its inceptionin 1962 until".its joining theAFL-CIO, CSA stoodfor the Council of SupervisoryAssociations. At the point of joining,the letters came to stand forCouncil of Supervisors andAdministrators. The reasonfor the changewas the subtledifference between a "council ofassociations" and a "council ofadministrators and supervisors." The unionpreferred the notion ofa unified council, not a councilof othergroups.

6 F or a detailedanalysis of the strikes in NewYork City, see Mil:Le Ravitch, THE GREAT SCHOOLWARS: NEW/ORK CITY, 1805-1973 (New 'pork:Basic Books, 1974); Miriam Wasserman,THE SCHOOLFIX, NYC, USA (NewYork: Outerbridge and Dienstfrey,1970).

356 acuutia--- :Is 4,

70pen Letter tc Mayor John Lindsay from CSA,September 21, 1968.

8News Release from theCouncil of SupervisoryAssocations, New York City,September 39, 1968.

9Public Circular, no date.

10 Ibid.

11Flyir entitled: "Why Don'tYou Tell the Truth, Mr. McCoy," distributed by theCouncil of Supervisory Associations, no date.

12News Release, BlackSchool Supervisors and Adminiitrators, September 17, 1968, New York City.

13Minutes of the CSA Meeting,Novermber 17, 1968.

14CSA NEWSLETTER, September 16, 1975.

15Robert Duncan, "New Wine in New Bottles: TheAdministrative Team Revisited," PLANNING ANDCHANGING, Vol. 7 (Summer 1976), pp. 35-44; BuckeyeAssociation of School Administrators, THE MANAGEMENT TEAM: A RECOMMENDED APPROACHFOR OPERATING OHIO'S SCHOOLS(Columbus, Ohio: the Association,1978).

16-Harold J. McNally,."The AdministrativeTeam: A Matter of Trust,'61ATIONAL ELEMENTARY PRINCIPAL, Vol. 53 (November- December 1973); pp. 22-23.

17Hanson, EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION ANDORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR, p. 267. 357 BEST COPYPull 18 Salmon, "Are theAdministrative Team and Collective Bargaining Compatible?"COMPACT, Vol. 12 (June 1972),p. 3.

19 Ibid.

20 Samuel'.Backarach and EdwardJ. Lawler, POWERAND POLITICS IN ORGANIZATIONS,pp. 1-9.

.. 21 Ibid.

22 The statistical datawere gathered and analyzedwith the assistance ofKent F. Murrmann,Virginia Polytechnical Institute. See Kent F. Murrmann and Bruce S. Cooper,"Attitudes of Professionals Toward Arbitration:The Case of UnionizedSchool 'Administrators," JOURNALOF ARBITRATION, Vol.56 (Fall 1982).4. Kent F. Murrmann and Bruce S. Cooper."Unionization andIts Impact on the Outlooks of School Administratorsand Superintendents," JOURNAL OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING-IN TEEPUBLIC SECTOR (forthcoming); and Bruce S. Cooper and Kent F.Murrmann, "ManagementIdentification and the Unionization of School Administrators,"ADMINISTRATOR'S NOTEBOOK, Vol.In, 1982, No. 1.

23To avoid test bias, thatis, the unwillingnessof come respondents to agreeor disagree repeatedly withresearch items, I the number of pro-managementand pro-labor stateswere balanced.

These ranged from "StronglyAgree" to "StronglyDisagree" on a five point scale.

24SeeNeal Gross and Robert Rerriot; .STAFF "A."RSHir IN

AMERICAS SCHOOLS (New York:Wiley, 1965) fora treatment of education and perceptions ofstaff leadership.

25 We measured (1) district sizeby calculating the number of pupils enrolledin the fall of 1980. (2)Urbanizationas a variablewas measured in two categories: "urban"versus "non- urban. (3) Perceived per pupil expenditurewas measured by asking respondentsto indicate their district'sper pupil expenditure, relativeto other New Jersey districtsas "above theaverage for the state," "at theaverage,"or "below." (4) Perceivedunion influence in the localcommunitywas measured by askingrespondents to indicate thelikelihood thata union official wouldbe elected or appointed toa local board ofeducation (ona five-point 'scale ranging from"Very Likely"to "Very Unlikely." We opted to measure expendtzurelevels and union influencethrough the perceptians ofrespondents,rather than objectivedata, because personal perceptionsare more relevant toattitudeformation.

26 See Paul Berg,"The Impact of CollectiveBargaining Upon the Principal,"ADMINISTRATOR'S NOTEBOOK, Vol.12, No.9, 1973. pp. 1-4.

27 David Minar, "Community Basisof Conflictin Suburban School Politics,"AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW, Vol.31 (1966), pp. 822-835.

28 See the §ttutes.olLiesetheNew JerseyPublic, Z221.c)1=311...... isAct,0, 303, 1968 N.J. Laws 891.Amended by c. 123, 1974 NJ. Laws 569and by c. 85, 1977 N.J.Laws.

29 For a discussion of the NewJersey law andits implementation,see Z.W. Mustriani, "The PublicEmployee Relations .359 Notes (Chapt. VI), -5-

Commission, EDUCATIONALVIEWPOINTS, Spring 1981,pp. 11-13.

30 Refer to Allen L. Edwards,TECHNIQUES OF ATTITUDESCALE CONSTRUCTION (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1957),pp. 149-170 for a concise descriptionand evaluation ofthe method used.

ON. 31 If a respondent were totally or perfectlymanagerial in

orientation, then his/hertotal score would be 236points

(that is 4 pointstimes the 59 items);conversely, if

complete labor orientationor identificationwere in evidence,

the score might be0 points -(or 0 timesthe 59 items).

32 A ,t test of intergroup or inter-categoricaldifferences was run. All differences among groups were significantat the .002 level. .ThUs, even within the sameorgatization, thePSA, those who bargain were markedly differentfrom thosenon-bargaining members of the Principal and Supervisor,Association.

33See David A. Specht and Mina Hohlen, SPSSRELIABILITY SUB- PROGRAM .FOR ITEM AND SCALE ANALYSIS(Northwestern University, May 1976).

341n this equation, we specified unionmembershikas two dummy variables (membership in OSA andmembership in PSA). We made membership in the superintendentsassociation the referencegroup by excluding it from the equation. Collective bargainingwas also specified as a dummy variablebetween bargaining and non-bargainingadministrators. Job rankwas specifiedas three dummy variables: Assistant Principal,Principal 60 and Assistant CentralOffice Supervisor* These three variables 'au400 kvuay. vl, and assistant superintendents. Years of zraduate schooltraintal andmaker221011/1111 thedistrict were bothcontinuous variables. Perceived laborinfluence was specifiedon a five-point scale, 0 to 4, iddicating the likelihood thata union official wouldbe elected/appointedto the local board of education. Urbianl,setting. was a dummy variable between urban and other. Perceived per pupil expenditure was specified as a dummyvariable between "below average" in reference to "average "'.and"above average."

35See Bacharach. and Lawler,POWER AND POLITICSIN ORGANIZATIONS.

3 61 CHAPTER VII

THE FUTURE OF SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORCOLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Introduction

The future of unionizationfor school administrators, and otherpublic sector supervisors, is not altogether clear. It appearsat this juncture that three distinct paths are podsible.

1. A National Law Protecting theRight of PublicSector Supervisorstu BArgaining. To date, no federal lawgoverns labor relations for state, county, municipal, and school employees; such policies areset by stategovernments. Were the Congressto enact a National Public EmploymentRelations Act (NPERA), the option would beavailable to follow the lead of thet, nmy-one states which haveclauses permitting supervisors tounionize. 2. A Nations'. Law Denying the Eight of Supervisorsto Bargain. Should Congress act, it could followthe precedent of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 and exclude public supervisorsfrom the coverage of the law. Not only would this option be in keeping with theintentof the private sector law, Taft -par: ley, it would also 1:,e consist-ant with policiesgoverning labor relations for federal employees (President Ford's ExecutiveOrder 11838). This is also the practice currently followed by'several states including

362 Delaware, Oregon, and Rhode Island. In those states the

laws have (despite the possiblityof voluntary bargaining)

"resulted in a laborrelations environment almost devoid of

effective supervisorcollective bargainingactivity (1)." 3. A State-bv-StateApproach, in the Absence of Federal Action. Thiroption is essentiallythe statusquo, a situation in which each state sets its owncourse. This approach is based on the belief that the regulation of

public employees W within thelegitimate domain ofeach state. The educationalsystem is, after all,already shaped

primarily by state and local action. Here the argument for federalism-- that the .statesought to bepermitted to respond to localneeds-- is often citedQS justification.

Obviously within the'state -by -state option, a variety of statutes have and will emerge. These approachescan range from a total banon all collective bargaining forall

employees, including supervisors, to universal rights to unionize for all state, county, and local personnel, supervisors included.Here eachstate sets itsown course, writing itsown laws, perhaps settingup a public employment relations board/commission, interpreting and changing its policies. As we have seen, such bodiesmay beparticularly significant in deciding the bargaining fate ofeducational supervisors when thelaws on the subjectare vague. Each option has its supporters and detractors; each viewpoint can muster a set ofconflicting legal,

2 363 intellectual, and ideological arguments. Debates in Congress, the halls ofstate legislature, andlocal boards of education often have used acombination of thefollowing rationales, determiningthe status of publicsupervisors.

Federal.Action

?or the last five terms, bills have beenintroduced in

Congress to providebargaining rights to public employees. While none has passed (or come close to a vote), a federal role in labor relations remasnsAreal416 possibility. Here are some bills and proposalsthatreflect thediversity of suggested approaches for afederal rolewith respect to supervisory bargainingin the publicsector.

1. Extend the National. Labor Mlations Act to

Zink ernes. H.R. 77, *Public Employment Labor Relations Act,* was introduced in 1975 (as H.R. 77) and reintroduced in 1976 as S.R. 777. It was short and to the point'; extending to employees and employers in the public sector the same rights, privileges, obligations, protections, and prohibitions thatnow exist in the private sector (2).* In so doing, the federalgovernment would put state and local government employees, includingsupervisors, under the Taft-Hartley law, one which denies the rtght to barg,ain to industrialsupervisor: s. in a single move, H.R. 777 or similarproposals would remove protection from the polices fire, government,and

3 364

varponywri744-5-teds.^merm44--;"--" I ''''.17';`:?4''::

A Rationale. This approach--applyingprivate sectorlabor relations to the publicsector--has received snore support among scholars. Perhaps themostcogent argument has beenadvanced by Hayford and Sinicropi(3) and rests on three majorpoints:

1. Currentregulationsare confusing and conflicting, often producing a "patchquilt of laws, Governor's state executive orders, Attorney General opinions (4,1" and should beoverridden bya pre-emptive federal law.

2. The precedentsnowexist both and private in federal employment to exclude per supervisory

3. Shouldthe vanted the 3upurvisor be statutory right tobargain, mount pressure will to change the lawsgoverning private federal and

4 3 65 sector labor relations. A kind of domino theory.(5)

In effect, Hayford and Sinicropi argue against bargaining for supervisory personnel in thepublic domain because, insummary, the current setof statelaws are Confusing (at least when compared to one another); the precedent againstsupervisory unionization has already been set in the privatesector; and there might be spilloverfrom public intoprivate employment.

These scholars goon to outline the possible detrimental resultsof supervisoryunionization, though their datadid not include school administrators and supervisots. These include the influenCe ongrievance administration, management centralization,and the dividing of theworkforce.

GrievanceAdministration

,Here Hayford and Sinicropiargue that if supervisors engage in collective bargaining, theywill find themselves in a conflict of interestwhen called upon to representthe mangement viewpoint. For, in administering the contractand particularly when labor files a grievance against management, supervisors are often the first group against whom employees direct theirgrievances. In 'effect, then, permitting supervisorsto unionize jeopardizes, according to this argument, the entire managerial system, of which first-line supervisorsare a

5 366 vital part. Hayford and Sinicropistate:

Given this framework, it becomes apparent that theintegrity of themanagement and the control of the decisionmaking administrative apparatusdepend toa great extent on how well the first -level supervisorsare integrated structure. inTkanagement Upper levels ofmanagement must give first-level supervisors the kinds of tasks and1 responsibilitiesthat that a high demonstrate degree of confidencehas been placed in them. To do so is role to assist in identification andgive definition and predictability to the expectationsof all management personnel . (6)

Centralization ofManagement, As public organizations becomelarger andmore complex, the importance of centralizedcontrol increases.They argue that the role ofthe supervisor becomesvital to the operation of the system; if these administrators have a divided allegience, they will be less likely to support central managementand the system willcome apart. Without the undivided loyalty of topmanagtsent and middle management, the probability of "organizationalcommunication 'failure and the resultant loss ofefficience andlowering of morale becomeinsurmountable (7)."

Bifurcation of theWorkforce

Finally, collective bargaining divides("bifurcates," to use Hayford and Sinicropi's term)the work force. Since union-management relations are adversarial, supervisors

6 367

rrowyr+01.31117.11totspenT.wrOW . . r "must ultimately choose to beon one side or the other in their struggle for resource determination, and,indeed the choice is painful (8) ." By becoming negotiators, themselves, supervisors would further fracture the cohesion of themanagement systemwhile still not finding' comfortable place inthe organization. These, then, are a set of rationalesfor denying public supervisors the right to bargain; hence, these arguments could be mustered to support a N.B. 777-approachto pull school and other middle-level cut from under the legal protectionof various. proposals for federally defined bargaining rights for publicemployees. Sucha move would lead to thedeath of thenascentpublic supervisory bargaining movementin much the sameway as Taft-Hartley stopped the developing )unionizationof shopforemen in the late 1940s.

2. Create a new federal collectivebargaining structureparallel to, but separate from. the -NLRA for public employees,. Another federal possibility, is -represented by H.R. 8677 (introducedin 1974), a bill to establish a nationwide right of employees in the public, sector to bargain. It Aould set these rights in a fashion Aistine' from the National Labor Relaticon6 Act'str.eatiteil% of the same rights in theprivate sector. Under such a statute, publicemployees would gain sets

7 368 of procedures for representationelections, for determining unfair labor charges, and requiring negotiations on all terms and conditions of employment.°That till 4ou.se

S.44.6c..0nit ti q o yKaAt. .

It guarantees the rightsof employees organize to and bargain collectively, and authorizes unionsecurity agreementsand dues check-off. It also provides impasse procedures involving mediation and factfinding. (9) Also, under this proposed law, a NationalPublic Employment Relations Commission (N-PERC) wouldbe appointed bythe President to preside over casesof unfair .laborpractices, local labor elections and so forth, muchas the NLRB does in the privatesector.

In the section of H.R. 8677 establishing the dutiesof the NPERC, the statue explicitlyprotects the rightsof supervisors in state, county, and local public employment. It particular, the bill would permitsupervisors to jointhe rank-and-file unions (of firefighters, patrolmen, office workers or teachers) or to form separateunions of their own, as determined byNPERC:

In eachcase where the appropriateness of the claim is at issue, the Commission shall decide the questionon the basis of thecommunity of interezt among their employees, their wishes, and/or established practices their . . Provided, That-- (1) except in regards tofirefighters, educational employees, and public safety

8 369 officers, a unit shall not be considered appropriate if it includes both supervisors and nonsupervisors; (unless] . . a majority of the employees in eachcategory [workers and supercisors] indicate byvote or other credibleevidence that theydesire to be included in such a common or mixed unit.(10) This legislation is a good exampleof the billsfavored by such national groups as the AFL-CIO. It would allow the current practice of separate units forschool supervisorsto existalongside "mixed' unions preferredby the patrolmen and fire fighters, ()nes in which captains,lieutenants, and sergeants participate in the same union as the rank-and- files

In the future, as new laws creatingseparate bargaining systems for public employees areintroduced, the issue of mixed versus separate negotiating groups for c' lic personnel has the potential to divide the labor movement. Some policy-makers might argue thatplacing supervisorsinto the same cnione as the men and women theyoversee creates serious conflicts of interests;othersmay contend, that "there is a atrong community of interestbetween supervisors Id their subordinates"and that a number of comprehensive state oublic employees statutes make nodistinction between supervisors and rank-and-file employees (11).* Hence, they might arquew mixed bargaining units of employees and superutena it: not dangerous to theproductive work of the 4rat Tho mov, dramatth ca!ie foL solidarity is that made tot Ughtef:N both .he rank and file and their immediate supervisors (sergeants and lieutenants)share in the sametasks, dangers, and life expectancy,so why should they not alsobe in thesame union?

Rationale

,The argumentseems to rest on the role ofsupervisor in the publicversus the private sector. In industry,raw efficiencyseems to be the driving force; the role of supervisors, then, is to get as muchwork outof their workerswith a modicum of interference and delay. The supervisory taskin many public sector jobs-- suchas those in education--is different. Often thesupervisor isout of directcontactwith the supervised (teachers)as they are

doing their-jobs. Insofar as ameasure ofcontrol is exerted, itmust be indirect. The comparisonbetween industry andeducation yields furtherdifferences; thereis less specificationofwhat the supervisor'issupposed to compel the supervised to do and less agreementon the measuresof bow howwell the supervisor has donehis/her job. An educationalsupervisor is simply notanalogous toa foreman in how the can supervise, who they superviseand in what they are supposed toproduce. Furthermore, Hayford and Sinicropi--whodo not favor bargaining for supervisors in the public sector--explain that many supervisory positionsin governmentare not really supervisory: that these individuals do not have the requisiteauthority to recommend promotion, decisively on the firing,and transferof their supervisoris subordinates. If a notfound(in an analysisof bea his/her bona fide job)to supervisors, according to the Sinicropiargument, Hayford- then theymightbe whiletheir permittedto bargain "real"supervisory colleagueswould distinction not. Sucha may befine in theory,but how tell couldone always whetherone principalwas performing bona supervisorywork fide andothers not? And what supervisory is bonafide workanyhow? There is enough "managerial" problemtelling functionsfrom "supervisory" and ones;now, Hayford Sinicropimaintain thatfurther madebetween distinctionsmust be real andfalse supervisors.We would upon under be called the planto make thefollowing 1. IS A determinations: PRINCIPALMANAGERIAL? Principalswho such jobsas setting perform districtwidepolicyor who the school bargainfor board against teachers wouldbe "managerial" deemed andwould be excludedfrom all bargaining. 2. IS TEE PRINCIPALA BONAFIDE Principalswho SUPERVISOR? truly have the power to performance, oversee the deployment,and evaluationofteachers termed true would be supervisorsand under the Hayford systemwould be - Sinicropi excludedfrom bargainingalso. 3. IS THEPRINCIPAL A TEACHER? If the not teachi principaldoes manage,or supervise, then he or she may 11 bargainina separate bargaininggroup. Sucha set of criteriamay be usefulin "managers" from distinguishing "supervisors* and *teachers". "supervisors" from But how would one differentiated "supervisor" be fromanother "supervisor"? In short,we believe thatsuch a schemeof distinguishing among functionally principals-- many ofwhom do bit ofall a little of thethings above-- is too distinctions .4, dich.p. for fine to satisfythe criterionof simplicity, by theHayford implied and Sinicropi concernover the state laws diversityof on thesubject. Cooper makes another argument for collective supervisory bargainingasa national argument policy (12). restson four This propositions:

1. It wouldbe disrualalto overturn supervisory state-supported bargainingin the public,sector. Hayford TheSinicropi- positionrestson thenotionthat Changing thediverseand "patchquilt" ofstate laws, attorneys opinions,and general courtrulings thatgovern public relations is sectorlabor confusing and disruptive to the progressoflabor on-going 'relationsin the single UnitedStates. law atthe But a federallevelwhich the right overturned anddenied to\supervisorswhoare already beeven negotiatingcould moredisruptive. This bookhas shown the extent to which school

12 373

1"7.7:77,1"77177' '47 administrator-supervisory unionization developedsystem is inmArly already a states. If addedinthe similar uniform studieswere and services, state county government, government,public municipal hospitals, transportation,and prisons, soon, regional theextent unionization in of 28 states supervisory would plusthe laythe Districtof foundation Columbia: fora strong supervisorsto case for bargaining permitting ina future Hence, federal perhapsthe statute. appropriate regularizeand taskfor extendthe Congressisto ina enablingproceis majorityof already states, underway ratherthan, Sinicropiargue, as to Hayford and overturnthese statelaws 2. A altogether. workable universal public -definitionof sectoris *supervisors$in emerging,making the bargaining While possible. asocial scientist looking employment at theSO relations statepublic laws and confused,policy policiesmight makersand become to be working implementerswithin out the statesseem the ambiguitiesinthe roleof statutesand supervisors making clearand threep.we show workable. 17, howeven the chapter vaguest California, law,such can be as theone in interpreted to bargainingby allowor certain disallow categoriesof participants personnel. maildisagree While come withthe ,interpreted, way that thelawhas whatever the been participants individual accept those preferences, interpretation as guides for 13 37,4 behaviorandas the foundationsof a complexsystem of relations. labor

In New York, thecriteria for supervisors bargain) (who may have beenset and appliedfor manyyears. And the statehas a well developed system for makingdifficult distinctionson a regular basis. For example, who make supervisors and implement districtwide policies are *managerial" and may notengage in collectivebargaining. In Binghamton, New York, for example,PERB applied definition this to sixcentral officesupervisors whose rightsto bargain inthe principals'union was contestedby the board. school PERB ruled that fourof the.directors elementary, (for secondary, adUlt, and'special federal educationand programs)dld indeed make policyfor the thatthese system and administratorscould aat bargainas The sixth managers. supervisor (the attendanceofficer), carry out was foundto policy,not make it, and was termed andallowed *supervisory" to join the middleadminis`rators group. bargaining

These andother systems of standards, then, havebeen createdand applied undercollective bargaininglaws in states. These 28 workingdefinitions apparentlyallowthe labor relations process to function without difficulty. great

Superintendents can rely upon their associates managerial (theso-called wcabinrdt" of top officialsand others), whilefreeing. the middle levels whoare not really managers to pursue collective actionshould theychoose. Again, theBinghamtoncase is informative. PERBdecided that tase f.ve Directorswere directextensions of the superintendent's authority; the attendancedirector had much less responsibilityand discretion and couldbe separated fromhis fellows.

Thus, the managerial function is notnecessarily impaired bythe movement of supervisors ,(as opposed to *managers') into collectivebargaining. PERB explained:

The evidence in therecord indicates the instant that in case, eachDirector hasa major responsibilityfor.a different educational aspect of the program of theDistrict. hissphere of Each in responsibilityselectsamong options anddetermines the District takes direction thatthe- in fulfillmentof its mission. Eachin his sphere ofresponsibility is consultant to a the Superintendent and Superintendentand the the Superintendentrelies heavilyupon his advice and counsel. , The administrativestructure of designed the District is so that,it isinherentin the five positions thatthe Superintendent upon should rely the incumbents andthe record clear that makes in the recommendationsof the Directors five are usually adOpted.(13) Here is an example ofa functional definition of school supervisor being applied todetermine whocan and who cannot bargain collectively. It seems obvious that the NewYork Public EmploymentRelations Board has investigated the actual job of Director--its relationship to the superintendent,its scope of authority, and its level of

15 376 managerial power--andhas created categories of personnelin Binghamton.

This processdoes not lendcredence to thecontention that statescannot differentiate supervisors fromthose who manage for purposesof unionization. Criteria have been layed *down and applied. Add ifNewYork and other states canmake such definitions work, it is probablethat a National-PERB under a National Public Employment Relations Law could effectively protectthe rightsof bothmanagers and public supervisors in thefuture.

3. Organizedlabor now has ..an interest in lamsq21the risk t...s ofsupervisors tounionize. For the firsttime,public sector supervisorsare affiliating in large numbers with theAFL-CIO andTeamsters. Such relationshipswill likely mean that any billintroduced into Congress will have provisions for supervisory collective bargaining as a protected right. As the previous point spoke to the technical feasibility of including supervisors,' this point siJeaks to the increased political feasibility supervisorycollective bargaining. The major school administrator-unionlint is through the American Federation of School Administrators (AFSA), which is one of the newest nationalunion (1976) ofthe An- CIO. XSA began in New York Citywith the Council of Supervisory Associations, later renamed the Council of

16 3 7 7' Supervisors andAdministratcrs. In 1970, CSA sought a direct membershipin the APL-C10 as a single affiliation? President GeorgeMeant refused/ stating that CSA could only come into the national union along with other administrator associations, To 'cast the water, then-President of dSA Walter Degrancontacted the leadsra of the large city school administratorassociations and formed a loota nationalgroupcalled the National Council of Urban School Aeministrators and Supervisors (called a-CU SAL).

NCUSAS held4 series of meetingsat Kennedy Airportin NewYork City; Tulsa, Oklalloma;Phoenix, 4rizona; and San Francisco todiscuss mutual problems and topress for the formation ofa national $doinistrators union. The agenda of the first meeting on April 24-26, 1970 at Kennedy Airport posed the problem(from the agenda)

What would a National Unionmean to aaiav (Max Pranklei aBor attorney). a. What are the possibilities of obtaining a national charterfrom APL-CIO?

b. That is neededin local effort?

c. What effectwill a national supervisorC union haveon local supervisors? d. What kinds of supportwill a Tational union expectfrom localgroups? (14) In attendance 'were elevenurban administratorgroups: Boston, (2) Buffalo, (3) Baltimoret (4) Cleveand, (5)

17 378 Chicago, (6)Detroit, (7) Philadelphia, (8)Los Angeles, (9) New York, 10) Sail Francisco,and (11)Washington, D.C. The purpose of CUSAS was to pave the way for unionization and eventual affiliationwith theAFL-CIO. But of the originaleleven cities represented, threeand latera fewothers that joined NCVSAS (like Milwaukee)were not interested in the union linkage. NCUSASbecame, then, a device for AFL-CIO recruitment,whichcame to bother Philadelphia because it pictured itself as part of management; Los Angeles because it hadno right to bargain and was highly internally divided;and Clevelandwhich was part ofthe state of Ohio'selementary andsecondary principals association.

In 1373, George Meany had Witnessedthe interestamong urban school adminiattators and created the School Administrators and Supervisors OrganizingCommittee (SASOC) and immediatelyenlisted most of themembers of NCUSAS;New York Citybecame Local 1, Chicago, Local2, San Francisco (Local 3), Washington, D.C., (Local 4), and so on. Walter Degran moved frombeing President of Local 1,the Council of Supervisors atld Administrators, tothe Presidentof SASOC which had its national officesin New Yorfr.City.

On.July 8s 1976, the APL-C/0chartered the American

Federation of 5,,,:600l Administrators (USA) and school supervisors took their place in the Public Employment Departmect of theAFL-CIO alongside the teachers, state,

18 3 7 county, and municipal employees, firefighters, police and public serviceemployees.

AFSA hasgrown to seventy locals in both citiesand smaller communities; like other unions, its provides bargaining assistance, legal services,lobbying, and general member welfare.

Such a development increases the likelihoodthat if the labor movement presses fora National PublicEmployment will most surely be protected in thelaw, muchas they havebeen granted representationin 21 statePERL's. Other changes, thoughless important' also point toward afuture in which supervisorsmay bargain under a nationallaw. Besides schoolsupervisoryaffiliation with the AFL-CIO,they have also joined such otherunions suchas the Teamsters International. The existence ofa small unit in San Franciscoprior to the passage of the Rodda bill,and three units in the Minneapolis-St.Paul area are testimony to the assistance thatsc400l administratorsgain from affiliation withnational unions. Recently, too, the NationalAssociation of Elementary School Principals and the NationalAssociation of Secondary School Principalshave gone on record supportingcollective bargaining for principals and have established national commissions tosupport local groups which seek to bargain. Though NAESPand NASSP tend to be quite conservative,they still see the press for negotiationsamong their members in

19 380 many states.

Both Teamsters and NAESP/NASSPwould likely supporta supervisors representationclause in a NPERL, should one reacha serious stage of consideration in the Congress. Perhaps, when a Democratic administrationrecaptures the 00 White House, the labor movement willpress for a law to extend the right to bargain into the 29 states which currently have no .such' legislation. If and when that time comes, a coalition ofeducational and laborgroups will probably seekto protect the rightsoftheir supervisor 'colleagues to bargain.

We say "probably"becauseeven within the "house of labor" there are conflicts. During the 1977teachers strike in Chicago, the administratorswere slowto support the walkout. In retaliation, theChicago TeachersUnion, supported by AFT locals in Rhode Island, introduced a resolution at theAmerican Federationof Teachers Convention to expell the principal union from the AFLCIO. The arguments presented in the Resolution in 1977 were as follows:

1. WHEREAS historically site administrators represented management's have point of view with teachers . 2. WHEREASmanagement personnel out and present were developed to carry managerial objectives, goals, regulations, policies,, and directives to teachers . .

3. WHEREAS there are basic and fundamental conflicts between ..dnagementand labor personnel,

20 4. WHEREAS AFL-CIO organized teachersunions are experiencing conflict with AFL-CIO organized school administrators unions regarding all aspects negotiations, and of teachers administratorsengage in strike breaking, 5. WHEREAS the policyof AFSA national] is for [principals union administrators to report for work during teachers a strike called when teachers were forced without a contract, to work

6. And, WHEREASadministrators unions: a. Subvert collectivebargaining achievements, b. Subvert relationsbetween labor movement teachers and the

c. Cast teachers inan anti- union. role [as witnessedby this union], resolution against a fellow

7. BE IT RESOLVEDthat theAmerican Teachers take whatever Federation of steps necessary tovacate the AFL-CIO charter of theAmerican Federationof School (15) Administrators.

Albert Shenker, President of AZT,heard the resolution and referred it to committee; no action was taken. Furthermore, AFL-CIO does not revokecharters as therequest of other unions.

But the situationis interesting for otherreasons. It illustrates that even within, the labor movement, where principalsseek collective rights and political clout of unionists, thereis no peace.

Despite these internecine battles within labor,there seems to be recognition of the needs and rightsof public supervisors to unionize. The 13014Aurof the major labor organizationsmay turn out to be a prOminent force it getting federal legislation passed, laws protecting the

21. 382 right of public supervisors tobargain. It should, however, beremembered as the California and Florida experiences indicate-- that the bargaining rights of school administrators are not majorconcerns to either legislatorsor to people in the labormovement. In that context,labor willmost likelysupport the right of supervisors to bargain insofar as they are also able to achieve theirTore importantgoals while maintaining that, position'. They will, however, notsacrifice theinterets of rank- and -file unions-- the bulk of the labor movement-- in order to havea chance to organize the numerically"mall and suspect ranks ofsupervisors.

Continued StateAction We believethat the most likely future for school administrators and supervisors liesin a continuationof the status quo: a state-by-3tateapproach to the regulatu,3n () public employment. Some states havegranted lupervL;oro bargaining protection and will continue to rio got os't-01:- which currentlyallow such negotiationPmAy (cv, Florida legislature and PERC di6 19'; New enter the bargainingarena, including Some 4he '360h rt6 Midwest whichhave traditionallyfroiwned on ImIt000 all kinds, prefect ing itvitead a rat,x highly patovnatiotic reLJ W ;:n and those who work.

At present,'several states seemclose to passing

PERLts. One candidate is Ohio, where a Democraticgovernor

has just been elected with strong labor backing. But the

paceof public sectorunionization has slowed and a

difficult processof lobbying and organizing in less

friendly stateshas begun. Within states already

bargaining, there is little indicationof reversals; similarly, in states withoutbargaining at all or restricted

bargaining for supervisors, littledramatic change is likely.

Rationale

We have examined the in-principle 'arguments for and

against the unionizationofsupervisors, and have looked

briefly at the technical and political feasibilityof

various plans. We now turn to the precedentsthat have been

established in this areawhich mayguide the federal decision to shape thisarea or leave it to the states.

141 Some argue that public employment relations is a state and local matter, to be dealtrith by state legislature and

courts, not by the U.S. government. Some credence was given to this approach bythe decision of the U.S. Supreme

Court, National League of Cities v. Usery, Secretary of

Labor (No. 74-878, June24, 1976).

The case dealt withan attempt by Congress to extend

23 3494 the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1974 to includenot caly private employees but public sectorworkers as well. In particular, the Actwanted to provide "minimumwage and maximum hour provisionsto almost all employees of States and their political' subdivisions." Cities and states,not wishing V* to be held tonational pay and hour standards, argued successfully that the federal government had no legitimate role 'in controlling the employee-employer structure:

1. Insofar as tht 1974 amendments displace the State's ability to structure employer-employee relationships in areasof traditional governmental functions,they are not within the authoritygranted Congressby the Commerce Clause. . . . Thisexercise of congressional authoritydoes not comport with the federal systemofgovernment embodied in the Constitution.

2. Congressmay neexercise itspower to regulatecommerce so as to forcedirectly upon the Statesits choicesas to how easential decisionsregarding theconduct of integral governmental functions are to be made. (16)

The League of Cities case mightprovide aprecedent for declaring a federal public employmentlaw regulating state and local employees unconstitutional. Robert H. Chanin, General Council for the National Education Association, disagrees and has argued pursuasivelythat the case doesnot forbid federal involvement in local/state employment relations, as follows:

24 385 1

(The case] holds that the power of the state to regulate the employer-employee relationship inareas of traditional governmental operations 4san attribute of state sovereignty, but itdoes not hold thatevery congressional enactmentwhich intrudes into a the protected area is per se unconstitutional. The court adopts a balancing test, pursuant to which the degree of intrusion must L weighed against the countervailing federal interest. (17)

Whichever way this coilt:oversyturns out, the policy no!, tW til challenged) is thatthe U.S. government must be verycautious in. attempting to impose regulationof labor relations upon the jurisdiction of the state, if it regulates labor relations at all.

.Hence, the majorarena for settingpublic employment policies will likely continue to be the state legislature, courts, and employment relations board, wherethey exist.

Lobbyists for th NPERA confronta dillimma in pressing for the act. A neicact, aswe indicated, could leave many supervisory public employeesworse off.Areal possibility is the enactment of a that excludes supervisors. One national leader in the school supervisors' unionexplained that he would rather have no federal law than to see one enacted that did harm to his effortsto organize principals.

Hence, there may be more to lose than to gain frompressing federal legislation. pasaingState Laws

Some studies have been made of the conditions which states to enact Public Employment RelationsLaws. Though no

25 386 one can predict with greataccuracywhen a state (or which

state) will pass a PERL, much less whether that lawwill

permit school supervisorsto unionize, some efforthas been made to correlate certainstate and regional characteristics with the level of public sector bargainingactivity (see

Kochan). Others haveattempted to predict which workers will seek unionmembership. Despite the imprecision of

predictions thatcan be made about state behaviors,the fact remains that it is in state arenas that the fate of

educational supervisors ismost likely to bedecided. For

that reason we will brieflyexamine the things thatare most likely to be importantin shaping state action. A number of staterelated variablesseem important to watch in thenear future:

1. The Power of Labor: It seems clear that supervisory

unionization is sweptinto local communitiesbythe rise in

general public sector labor actions and byparticular

teacher militancy. In fact, we have not founda single case

in the entire nation in whichschool supervisorsengaged in

collective bargaining withoutlocal teachersleading the

way. Thus, teacher collectivebargaining is a necessary,

though not totallysufficient, precondition for principal

unionization. We expect this .rend tocontinue.

What are the expectationsfor increased local, state,

and national labor influence in the years to come? The

26 367

------7 vnrTrajrmz-nrrwm...p.mitern ,1VMP.,rW rww....o picture is not promising. he large manufacturingfields,

have suffered setbacks, making unionizationmore difficult. Witheducational staff being cut almost universally (or being contracted by attrition), the chance ofgreatly expanded union or organization is also restricted. Unless educational unions, both supervisory and teaching, can expand into non-teaching/non-educational areas, then the growth of the size of the supervisory unionmovement will slow. Already, we see AFSAworking to formlocals of supervisors who are notschool administrators:groups like cafeteria supervisors.

2. Supportive State Laws: We havealready discussed the role of state legislation at length. If states passnew bargaining laws, then thechance that supervisors will be

permitted to seekbargaining representationis high; in the past only fiveoutof 26 states thatpassed bargaining statutes specificallyexcluded servisors from the purview of the law. Even in the absence of such legislation,most local community, board of education can volunteer to negotiate with principals, a situation commononly in

communities withwell-developed unions. The best example is Ohio, which has the largest number of extra-legally recogniZed supervisory units, due in part to the strong labor traditionand large number of urban school districts.

3. Local Management Practices: Finally, we cannottotally

27 38 dismiss the impact of school managerial practices on the perceived need among supervisors to unionize. In large cities, unionization appears inevitable. Superintendents and principals cannot easily share the same outlooks and engage intrue joint decisionmaking. Adversarialismseems to appear whenever large groups havedifferent needs and cannot be easily integrated into the managerialsystem. In smaller districts, the picture is not quite so clear. In states with prevalent unionization, suchas New York, NewJersey, and Connecticut, virtuallyall school administrators and supervisorsbargain, regardlessof local conditions, size of district, or management practices. It seems that collective bargaining in these locations _has becpme an established modeof operation. In other states, principals appear to be "driven into bargaining" by outlandish demandsand unsympatheticbosses. A case in point: in a tinyschool district (four principals) in suburban Detroit, thesuperintendentcalled hismiddle administrators into hisoffice in Mayand announced that theywereall fired. When asked why, he explained that he wanted the freedomto hire back onlythose principals whom he wanted. They were "allon notice!" When the shock had worn off, the administrators called the Michigan ,Labor Relations Boardand learned that theyhad the right to form a collective bargaining unit andto file an unfair labor practice, given theircontracts with the board.

28 389 Not only did the groupunionize, but theycontacted Martin Kalish, Presidentof theOrganization of School Administrators andSupervisors in Detroitand Vice President of the AFL-CIO'sSchoolAdministrators and Supervisors

Organizing Committee,who steered them intoaffiliation with AFL-CIO. What is a group offour suburban schoolprincipals doing in the AFL-CIO? Local management abusecan catalyze a group of professionals and'make militant unionistsof them in a hurry.

Similarly, in Minneapolis,as we reported earlier, when

the school board andsuperintendent offerno raise for three

years, while the teachers walkaway with 27percent during

the same time period, all the best managerial intentions vanish and' somebasic survival instinctstimulates a labor movement mentality.

It seems obvious that many principalsdonot yet see themselves as unionists. Many do. One of the critical determinants of thisattitude appears to betreatment on the job. While principalsmay be senior executives in their schools, they find themselves playing junior member in dealing with the central office. If that relationship (principal to superintendent) breaks down, strongcollective action may insue.

The Future of thePrincipalship

29 390 As long as American schoolsare organized the way they

are, with large systems including separateschool sites, the

principalship will remain. These administrators find

themselves physically separated from their superiors yet

mentallyattached to decisions and attitudes from

"downtown." Being site executives and bureaucratic

subordinates--simultaneously--creates a kind of tension that may never be resolved (18).

What has changedover the years is not the condition

but the solution to ease the dilemmas. For years,

principals ruled their buildingswithclose to absolute

authority over teachers,children, programs, and standards.

Since the sixties, the worldhas ganged up on the principal:

teachers have unionized witha vengeance, student attitudes

toward schoolshave changed, and the generalcommunity has become skeptical of the ability ofthe principals and their

schools to deliver on promises of education and economic improvement.

For many principals, theanswer has become unionism--an overtly politicalIclearly formalisticapproach to the use of collectivebargaining,grievance procedures, contractual controls, and even the strike. For others, the modes has been to work within the traditional management system.

Where the conditions are right, the superintendent understanding and supportive and available, the need to engage in unionization havebeenminimal and conflict

30 391 somewhat lower. Yet even here, under the calm surface of organizational behavior, lie deep divisions, tensions, and conflict.1 Some of this fighting is normal and to be

expected. Collective bargaining cannot eliminateit, now or

in the future. Instead, .iegotiations, grievanceprocedures,

MP join contract implementationall the joint acts of bilateral governance--prove a legitimate, convenient mechanism for managing internacinedifferences.

Limitation of Collective tiarain

Collective bargaining and otherunion activities cannot now or ever solvemany of the problems of being a school administrator or supervisor. Theseproblems in some way fall outside the domain of thosethings attainable through bargaining.

That is,much of the daily pressure and activities which confront school principalson the job--such as dealing with staff and students, controlling the schedule, use of materials and physical plant, setting andcarrying out goals and plans--cannot be controlled or changed by unionization.

After the union has done all it can, supervisors are still very muchon their own. Furthermore, much ofwhat makes a job exciting and worthwhile (the "motivators", to use Frederick Herzberg's term) fall outside the power of collective bargaining to correct. These vital on-job

31 392 "satisfiers" includea sense of achievement, recognitionfor

having done agood job by bosses andothers in the school, the tone and excitement of the work itself, the

responsibility of the job, and the sense of advancement within.the system.

As one can see at a glance, unions rarely addresssuch issues; instead, we argue, collectivebargaining and'other

union-like activitiesprimarily focuson what Herzberg has called the "hygiene' factors,such as salaries, status, relations with topmanagers, technical aspectsof being evaluated as a principal, working conditions, and job security (the"dissatisfiers")(19). Figure 1 shows the two dimensions of berg's viewof motivation;we have added the union/non-uniondimension, since we have found that unions handle the dissatisfierswhile ,principalsare still very dependent on the superintendent

Figure 1--Unionism andOn-Job Dimensions

"Satisfiels" "Dissatisfiers"

(Non-Union Areas) (Primary Concern of Unions)

Achievement 'Salary Policy and -Recognition 'Interpersonal Administration Work itself Relations Working 4.orldi4io-piS

',Responsibility 'Status 'Job Security "Advancement Supervision Benefits

32 393 e rticisuAAA

MOTIVATION HYGIEAE r Satisfiers lead to Dissatisfiers leadto decreased increased performance, performance. If provided for, as they focuo onareas these factors satisfy of professional our basic growth. maintenance needs butdo not This potential for lead to great on-job satisfaction. motivation is highin most people. A

In the future, as in the past, schooladministrators and supervisorsmay look to the unionor other organizations to handle some or much of the basic 'hygiene'concerns like pay, status, relations withsupervisors, benefits, while they must continue to look to theirbossits, the job, andthe immediate school environmentto prrvide themore important

psychic rewards, the "motivation factors." In effect, the

unionization ofschool administratorscan look after their basic survival needs; the traditional concerns of prc:essional fulfillmentand development mustcontinue to come from key on-the-job relations. Unions cannot takethe place ofon-site achievementand accomplishments, nor do they really try.

The future forprincipals and othersupervisors remains a difficult and ambivalent one. Unionizationmaycontinue to be one adaptivedevice for handlingaspects of these dilemma=s. Or, as happened to shop foremen, school supervisors may lose the right to bargain, which will only add to their problems. At least with the right to bargain, administrators can 'count on the union to handle the

33 394 mdissatisfiers", leaving the principal freeto devoteenergy and time to satisfying his or her needs to achieve and advance. This burden is quite enough, given the complex school environment and conflictingdemands from faculty, students, superintendents, andparents; to add the double worry of having to fight for salarieS,benefits, protection from capricious transfersand lay-offs wouldbe almost too much for those school leaderswho must survive"life in the middle."

34 395 1 NOTES' (Chapter VII) -1

1 Stephen L. Hayford and Anthony V.Sinicropi, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE PUBLIC SECTORSUPERVISOR (Chicago:

International 1 Personnel Management Association, 1976),p. 11; all federal employees and supervisorscome under ExecutiveOrder 11491 and and 11838 except postal employees. But supervisorsin the Postal Service are excluded frombargaining rightsby Section 1004 of the Postal Reorganization Act. Instead, postalsupervisors (the NationalAssociation of Postal Supervisors)are granted a consultative role in determining theirown wages and working conditions--a situationnot unlike the "meet and confer"approach seen in some public schooldistricts.

2barines before the Subcommittee\onLabor-Manazement Relations of theCommit on Education-and Labor,House of Representatives (94thCo gress, 1st Session), H.R.77 (November, 6, 2, 1975),p. 1.

3 See Stephen L. Hayford andAnthony V. Sinicropi,"The Bargaining Rights' Status of PublicSector Supervisors," INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS(March. 1971),p. 3.

4Ibbid.,p. 46.

5SeeBruce S. Cooper, "Federal Actionsand Bargainingfor Public Supervisors:Basis for an Argument," PUBLICPERSONNEL MANAGEMENT (September-October1977),pp. 341-352.

'Hayford and Sinicropi, COLLECTIVEBARGAINING AND THE PUBLIC, SECTORSUPERVISOR, p. 33.

7 Ibid., p. 35.

396 8Ibid., p. 36.

9See the Hearin :s before the S ecial Subcomtittee on Labor o the Committee on Education and Labor, 5014e of.itogrei.sAntpes (93rd Congress), on H.R. 8677 and H.R. 9730 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974); note the testimony of Rep. Bill Clay (Dem.-Mo.) and Ralpn J. Flynn, head of the Coilition of American Public Employeed, pp. 16-17 and pp. 22-157.

10 Ibid.; p.

11Hayford and Sinicropi, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR SUPERVISOR, p. 2. See also, "Cities Reminded to Cherish Management, " LMRS NEWSLETTER (October 1974), p. 3.

12 Cooper, 2.2. tit., p. 341.

13In the Matter of City School District of the City of Binghamton, 5 PERB 0273 (1975)

14Minutesof the Meeting of the National Council of Urban School Administrators and Supervisors, Kennedy Airport, NYC.7.April, 24.26, 1970, p. 3.

15 Resolution before the'American Federation of Teachers, AFL -CIO,

at the 1977 National Conference, Presented by the Chicago Federation 1

of Teachers, Local 1f1, AFT., AFL-CIO. Passed.

16NationalLeague of Cities v. 21112,j1uratam.2121122E (ns., 74-878, June 24, 1976)

17 Robert H. Channin, Can a Federal Collective Bargaining Statute for Publitamployees Meet the Requirements of National League Notes (Chapt. VII) of Cities v. Usery?: A UnionPerspective," JOURNAL OF LAW AND EDUCATION, Vol. 6, No. 4 (October1977), p..508.

18This concept was clearly statedby Dan Lortie at a presentation at the University ofOregon, ERIC Center for Educational Management, Eugene, Oregon,July 9, 1982.

19Frederick Herzberg, and others, THEMOTIVATION TO WORK (New York: Wiley, 1959); Frederick Herzberg,JOB ATTITUDES: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH AND OPINIJN(Pittsburgh: Psychological Services of Pittsburgh,1957); Frederick Herzberg, WORK AND THE NATURE OF MAN (New York: World,1966).

358 (v'