IDEAS & ISSUES (NAVAL INTEGRATION) Charting a Path to Naval Integration A bias toward maritime action by LtCol Robert L. Burton he recently released Comman- The 31st MEU recently demonstrated dant’s Planning Guidance and >LtCol Burton is a Tank Officer and the viability of the concept as several Force Design both add greater graduate of the U.S. Army School of enlisted Marines capably earned surface weight and institutional iner- Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). warfare specialist qualifications while Ttia toward a Marine Corps that is more He is currently assigned to U.S. Spe- underway.2 Interestingly, Marine Corps naval in character. While many of the cial Operations Command. regulations do not permit wearing of ideas outlined in these guiding docu- most Navy warfare pins, with aviation ments certainly support that theme, wings as a notable exception. A Marine integration with the Navy remains new path that more closely aligns our with a surface warfare pin would offer rather shallow. To drive naval integra- primary mission in direct support of much greater creditability to blue-green tion further and deeper into our Corps’ naval campaigns. Although this vision conversations, especially when dealing character, we must do more than divest appears to orient more on the littoral with issues of composite warfare or na- of heavy vehicles and artillery cannons. fringes, the Marine Corps will continue val campaigning. The Corps must fully appreciate naval struggling to adapt its warfighting con- Another consideration for deepen- operational demands from a blue suit cepts to the Navy’s composite warfare ing the Marine Corps naval investment perspective. The Commandant stated, commander doctrine unless Marines resides within the infantry. Many have “Marines cannot be passive passengers fully grasp the totality of naval war- identified a necessity for an older, wiser en route to the amphibious objective fare. Undoubtedly, the Commandant’s infantryman who can lead and manage area.”1 Yet, until Marines learn what Planning Guidance will compel greater small units in a dynamic, complex op- fighting from the sea entails, there is erating environment. Gen Scales made little they can contribute that could it a major feature in his seminal work, not be performed by a salty gunner’s ... officers must gain a Scales on War, where he challenged the mate. Marine officers must gain greater Nation’s investment in its infantry dom- familiarity of naval maneuver beyond better understanding of inance: “Human research and anecdotal ship to shore movement. Additionally, evidence prove the optimum age for a the Marine Corps should consider the blue-water fight ... close-combat infantryman is between “sailorization” of the infantry to imbue twenty-eight and thirty-two.”3 He fur- them with the necessary experiences and ther suggests only accepting infantry naval knowledge to lead and fight for naval doctrinal input into current pro- from second termers. “After four years sea control. The Marine Corps should fessional military education. But offi- in other arms, such young men would also lead an effort to develop a new and cers must gain a better understanding be more mature and closely committed shared lexicon for naval operational art. of the blue-water fight before they will to long-term service. More importantly, Finally, the Marine Corps should extend have the proper perspective on how to they would have some skill translatable its naval integration beyond the general- contribute. Most officers know little of to close-combat small teams,”4 Scales purpose forces and into the realm of its the difference between a cruiser and a wrote. Perhaps an initial term as a sail- special operations component. destroyer, much less how an infantry- or before entering the infantry would Although many Marine Corps of- man can support it. If the Corps wants generate the necessary and translatable ficers are exposed to naval operations to contribute more than landing parties skills to succeed in the sea control or through Reserve Officer Training Corps and landbased firing platforms, officers denial fight. Although this could be or the Naval Academy, many never have must also be grounded in surface war- challenging to implement, there are the opportunity, beyond a ship visit, to fare. One method may include pursuit many creative solutions to explore. A truly appreciate the demands of ship- of surface warfare qualifications for Marine could be detailed to sea-duty board life until assigned to a MEU. officers or interservice exchange tours following boot camp, or Sailors could Yet, the Marine Corps is seeking a with the surface warfare community. be offered reenlistment incentives to Marine Corps Gazette • July 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette WE1 IDEAS & ISSUES (NAVAL INTEGRATION) interservice transfer into the infantry. other Services. However, if the Marine to support the joint force regardless Regardless of how achieved, a “sailoriza- Corps is to truly operate as a maritime of the demands. Though the response tion” of Marine infantry would enhance element, there must be a new, shared will undoubtedly leverage the synergy the Corps’ contribution to the maritime common language that accounts for harnessed from this reinvigorated re- fight considerably. ground maneuver in the littorals. lationship with the Navy. It is impera- Another significant gap that inhib- A final consideration for genuine tive that the Marine Corps complete its unified naval effort is the separate naval integration is to examine naval its investment into naval integration “dialects” of operational and tactical special operations forces (SOF). The efforts, or it will sacrifice its joint agil- lexicon. Although planning method- Marine Corps developed their special ity by burdening itself with multiple ologies are relatively similar, the op- operations component with an eye to Service personalities. Success during a erational graphics of the Navy and the both its own strengths as well as rel- joint, naval campaign requires a Marine joint force are not quite compatible. A evance to its warfighting requirements Corps able to “fight at sea, from the sea, battalion movement to contact order, during a period of extended land cam- and from the land to the sea.”5 If the with all of its graphics and control paigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Thus, Marine Corps cannot understand, ar- measures, is practically abstract art to Marine Corps Special Operations ticulate, or communicate operationally blue water sailors—and appropriately so Command (MARSOC) is composed with the Navy, then what shall distin- considering the lack of direct relevance primarily of an amphibious-skilled spe- guish it from the Army? Finally, if its that mission has on a ship, especially a cial operations force that more closely other joint force contributions, such as non-amphib. However, if the Marine resembles its Army SOF brethren than MARSOC, are no longer relevant to Corps is to perform landbased missions Naval Special Warfare. However, as the emerging naval campaigning concepts in direct support of the fleet, it is time Marine Corps continues to invest more or do not capitalize on shared com- to throw out the maps and grab some into its naval identity, MARSOC will monalities with the Navy, the Marine charts. Marine Corps units, such as the be less reflective of the nature and needs Corps must reconsider the capability’s littoral regiments, have to be able to of the newer Marine Corps. It may be value proposition. The Commandant convey the scheme of maneuver and time to consider a model along the lines has provided the necessary catalyst to appropriate information in a manner of the British Special Boat Service. A turn the ship, but the institution must that is relevant to the fleet’s scheme of single, naval-oriented special operations continue feeding the boiler before she maneuver. Many of the fire support force which incorporates the strengths runs out of steam. control measures and aviation related of both Services, the Navy and Marine terms and graphics likely require little Corps, in order to serve the greater and adaption as they already suit the pa- shared maritime interests. Arguably, Notes rameters of amphibious operations. It is the two Services cover the spectrum 1. Gen David H. Berger, 38th Commandant’s the new and innovative tactical opera- of maritime/littoral operations as is— Planning Guidance, (Washington, DC: July tions that the Marine Corps intends to however, with different emphasis on 2019). pursue that must be developed from a specific SOF core capabilities. Yet, if blue water mindset. For instance, what MARSOC and Naval Special Warfare 2. Sgt Audrey Rampton, “Naval Integration: does an expeditionary advance base both support a common mission, might 31st MEU Marines Earn Enlisted Surface War- look like on a naval chart? How are there be a little more commonality in fare Specialist Pins,” Marines, (April 2020), available at https://www.marines.mil. the grounds lines of communications their training, structure and even assess- between distributed, maneuvering, and ment and selection? A single Naval SOF 3. MGen Bob Scales, Scales on War, (Annapolis, temporary expeditionary advance bases component would ideally assess opera- MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016). depicted in order to be relevant to a tors from both Services, train them to a cruiser or destroyer? What about the common standard, field them together 4. Ibid. utilization of small boat formations in common units, and still serve the or even unmanned aerial systems/un- requirements of both Special Opera- 5. 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance. manned underwater systems swarms? tions Command and the Joint Force Some may ask if it even matters. If not, Maritime Component Commander. then what makes the mission relevant to The Marine Corps has always been sea control or denial? The Navy is not naval in character; although, it has of- off the hook in this regard either.