Deepening Interoperability a Proposal for a Combined Allied Expeditionary Strike Group Within the Indo-Pacific Region by Capt Eli J

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Ideas & Issues (Chase PrIze essays)

2019 MajGen Harold W. Chase Prize Essay Contest: First Place Deepening Interoperability A proposal for a combined allied expeditionary strike group within the Indo-Pacific region by Capt Eli J. Morales

o restore readiness and en- 40,000 gallons of water from a nearby 1 hance interoperability, co- >Capt Morales is an Instructor at the supply ship. alition partners and allies MAGTF Intelligence Officer Course, Currently, the Navy and Marine Corps in the Indo-Pacific region Marine Detachment, Dam Neck, VA. are faced with a choice to maintain Tmust assemble and deploy an expedi- current levels of forward naval pres- tionary strike group (ESG) built from ence and risk breaking its amphibious the capabilities and resources of each deployment and miss Exercise COBRA force, or reduce its presence and restore coalition partner and ally. The high op- GOLD. On a separate occasion, readiness through adequate training, 2 erational tempo of the last decade has after being ordered to respond to the upgrades, and maintenance. What resulted in deferred maintenance and 2010 Haitian earthquake just one has not changed over the last decade is reduced readiness for Navy and Marine month following a seven month de- the need for Navy and Marine Corps Corps units. In 2012, after the USS ployment, the USS Bataan (LHD-5) units to establish and maintain capable Essex (LHD-2) skipped maintenance suffered a double failure of its evapora- alliances and partnerships within the to satisfy operational requirements, the tors forcing the 22nd MEU to delay Indo-Pacific region. 31st MEU was forced to cut short its rescue operations in order to take on In his farewell letter to the force, former Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis wrote that we must “hold fast, alongside our allies, aligned against our foes.”3 Secretary Mattis’ comments are nested in the President’s 2017 Na- tional Security Strategy (NSS) when he wrote, “Sustaining favorable balances of power will require a strong commitment and close cooperation with allies and partners.”4 Within the Indo-Pacific Command, “U.S. allies are critical to responding to mutual threats, such as North Korea, and preserving our mutual interest.”5 For the region, the NSS highlights the importance of our alliances with South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, India, the Philippines, Thai- land, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. Critical to maintaining a favorable balance of power in the The Navy and Marine Corps can maintain current naval presence operations or move to de- region is the Marine Corps coopera- ploy with a totally reconstituted amphibious capability. (Photo by LCpl Scarlet Sharp.) tion with each ally. The NSS mandates

8 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • December 2019 that within the Indo-Pacific region the United States will maintain a forward presence capable of deterring and, if necessary, defeating our adversary. We will strengthen our long-standing military relationships and encourage the development of a strong defense network with our allies and partners.6 When Secretary Mattis wrote his farewell letter, he again highlighted the importance of maintaining alliances against our foes. In his 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), Secretary Mattis spoke of three elements for achieving a capable alliance and partnership network: uphold a foundation of mutual respect, responsibility, priorities, and accountability; expand regional consultative mechanisms and collab- orative planning; and deepen interop- Marine Corps interoperability with Indo-Pacific coalition partners. From top left, clockwise: erability. For the Indo-Pacific region, ROKS Dokdo (LPH-6111) sails alongside amphibious assault ship USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6); ROK Marine watches the first MV-22B Osprey land on the flight deck of the Republic Secretary Mattis’ priority was to expand Dokdo Canberra Canberra Indo-Pacific alliances and partnerships.7 of Korea ship (LPH-6111); Marines onboard the HMAS ; HMAS suc- cessfully embarking four USMC AAVs. (Sources: “Amphibious Assault Vehicle Trials go Swimmingly;” “U.S. Ultimately, Secretary Mattis’ strategic Republic of Korea Forces Kick off Exercise SSANG YONG;” and “U.S. Republic of Korea Forces Kick off Exercise SSANG 11 approach for the Nation’s National De- YONG.” ) fense Strategy called for “a more lethal force, strong alliances and partnerships, Unfortunately, the United States is not a certified biannually to perform mission American technological innovation, and member state of ASEAN, and without a essential tasks ranging from humanitar- a culture of performance.”8 principle of collective defense, ASEAN ian assistance to amphibious assaults. lacks the legitimacy to deter adversaries Likewise, the staff from CPR-11’s higher The Current Model within the Indo-Pacific region. command, Amphibious Force 7th Fleet Unlike NATO in Europe, the Indo- In the absence of a collective defense (ESG-7), embarks, attaches a cruiser or Pacific region does not have a coalition treaty, the United States has maintained destroyer, and earns its certification as of states bound by a principle of col- a forward presence within the Indo-Pa- a forward-deployed ESG. lective defense. An attempt was made by the United States in 1954 following the signing of the Southeast Asia Col- lective Defense Treaty that formed the Unfortunately, the United States is not a member state Southeast Asia Treaty Organization of ASEAN, and without a principle of collective de- (SEATO). However, “SEATO had no independent mechanism for obtain- fense, ASEAN lacks the legitimacy to deter adversar- ing intelligence or deploying military ies within the Indo-Pacific region. forces.”9 As a result, SEATO formally disbanded in 1977. Since 1967, attempts to promote regional peace and stabil- ity have been through the Association cific region. Units such as the 7th Fleet The Navy and Marine Corps have of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). and the III MEF have been instrumen- been participating in theater security Today, member states promote mutual tal in maintaining a forward presence cooperation exercises in the Indo-Pacific trust and confidence through their con- ashore and at sea. Subordinate to both region to obtain capable alliances and tributions to the establishment of the organizations is Amphibious Squadron establish partnership networks. Exer- ASEAN political-security community. 11 (CPR-11) and the 31st MEU. Twice cises such as TALISMAN SABRE, SSANG The focus among ASEAN Defense a year aboard three of CPR-11’s ships, YONG, and RIM of the PACIFIC provide Ministers has been on the use of ASE- the 31st MEU deploys within the Indo- training opportunities with coalition AN military assets and capacities for Pacific region. As the maritime contin- partners that help foster and sustain humanitarian assistance and disaster re- gency force for the Indo-Pacific com- cooperative relationships, enhance lief as well as peacekeeping operations.10 batant commander, the 31st MEU is readiness and interoperability, and ad-

Marine Corps Gazette • December 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 9 Ideas & Issues (Chase PrIze essays)

United States* Japan Singapore Thailand USS Wasp LHD-1 JS Kaga DDH-184 RSS Endeavour LPD-210 HMS Angthong LPD-791 USS Green Bay LPD-20 JS Izumo DDH-183 RSS Persistence LPD-209 USS Ashland LSD-48 JS Ise DDH-182 RSS Resolution LPD-208 USS Germantown LSD-42 JS Hyuga DDH-181 RSS Endurance LPD-207 Australia Philippines South Korea India HMAS Canberra L02 BRP Davao del Sur LD-602 ROKS Dokdo LPH-6111 INS Jalashwa L41 HMAS Adelaide L01 BRP Tarlac LD-601 HMAS Choules L100 *Amphibious Squadron 11

12 Figure 1. Amphibious ships in the Indo-Pacific region. Sources:( World Navies in Review. ) vance command and control capabilities achieve this capability, coalition part- listed are tank landing ships and landing through the conduct of combined am- ners and allies within the Indo-Pacific craft. All of the ships listed are capable phibious operations with force-on-force, region must be committed to support- of carrying, launching, and receiving live-fire training modules. During each ing this initiative through the deploy- various types of rotary-wing aircraft. exercise, the Navy and Marine Corps ment of ships, aircraft, and personnel If each of the nations listed in Figure 2 exercises interoperability through the on a rotational basis. Leadership and (on next page) commits to contribut- execution of combined ship-to-shore tasking, authorities, rules of engage- ing ships, aircraft, and personnel on a operations and crossdecking Marines, Sailors, and equipment. These exercises are all held biannually with units participating for as long as one to three To achieve this capability, coalition partners and al- months. During the interim, Navy lies within the Indo-Pacific region must be committed and Marine Corps units participate in annual exercises like COBRA GOLD, to supporting this initiative through the deployment of KEY RESOLVE, ULCHI-FREEDOM ships, aircraft, and personnel on a rotational basis. GUARDIAN, or KEEN EDGE/SWORD with coalition partners for as long as one month out of the year. Unfortu- nately, these exercises are highly scripted ment, and the roles and responsibilities rotational basis, obtaining a persistent and limited in duration as opposed to a of the CAESG must be agreed upon presence in the Indo-Pacific region as seven-month deployment as a maritime by each coalition partner and ally. To a coalition will become more sustain- expeditionary force conducting real- achieve such a commitment, a treaty able for each nation. Coalition partners world contingency operations. of collective self-defense must first be and allies not listed in Figure 2, such established with coalition partners and as Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Proposal allies within the Indo-Pacific region. Vietnam, that also have amphibious Coalition partners and allies in Without a treaty calling for a collective capabilities can provide their support the Indo-Pacific region will benefit if self-defense, the CAESG will have no by committing their ships, aircraft, they deploy a combined allied ESG legitimacy as a deterrence against ad- and personnel into a rotation. If a co- (CAESG). This formation shall be versarial threats, accountability between alition partner is not able to contribute built from the capabilities and re- partners and allies will not be estab- by providing an amphibious capability, sources of each coalition partner and lished, and the instrument to formally member nations can provide their sup- ally. Through the employment of this establish an allied force will remain port though alternative methods such as CAESG, coalition partners will exercise nonexistent. deploying a frigate or destroyer, provid- allied interoperability through opera- If partners and allies were to commit ing financial or logistical support to a tional planning and by patrolling as a to a collective self-defense treaty, Figure patrol, or hosting a port visit. maritime contingency force within the 1 depicts the amphibious ship capabili- Figure 2 depicts what a hypotheti- Indo-Pacific region. The ESG can be ties that potential members of the coali- cal deployment schedule can look like tasked organized with capabilities that tion can contribute to a CAESG. The for a CAESG. Ideally, the strike group will allow it to respond to the current ships listed are not all inclusive of each will deploy twice a year throughout mission essential tasks of a MEU. To country’s amphibious capabilities. Not the Indo-Pacific region. When a coali-

10 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • December 2019 20 20 20 21 20 22 Jan-Jun Jul-Dec Jan-Jun Jul-Dec Jan-Jun Jul-Dec USS Wasp LHD-1 X USS Green Bay LPD-20 X United States USS Ashland LSD-48 X USS Germantown LSD-42 Cruiser or Destroyer X JS Kaga DDH-184 X JS Izumo DDH-183 X Japan JS Ise DDH-182 X JS Hyuga DDH-181 Destroyer X RSS Endeavour LPD-210 X RSS Persistence LPD-209 X Singapore RSS Resolution LPD-208 X RSS Endurance LPD-207 Frigate X HMAS Canberra L02 X Australia HMAS Adelaide L01 X HMAS Choules L100 X Frigate or Destroyer X BRP Davao del Sur LD-602 X Philippines BRP Tarlac LD-601 X Frigate ROKS Dokdo LPH-6111 X X South Korea Frigate or Destroyer X HTMS Angthong LPD-791 X Thailand Frigate X INS Jalashwa L41 X India Frigate or Destroyer X New Zealand Frigate X Malaysia Frigate X Indonesia Frigate X Vietnam Frigate X

13 Figure 2. Hypothetical ship deployment schedule. (Sources: World Navies in Review. ) tion member’s ship is only required to maintenance, upgrades, shore-based metrics for an ESG, ARG, and MEU deploy for approximately six months training, or research and development. until such a time exists that the coali- every three years, it will become less of It is expected that participating coalition is able to establish metrics that are a burden logistically and financially for tion partners will require a significant acceptable, feasible, and suitable for the each partner. When a coalition partner amount of training prior to consolidat- creation and sustainment of a CAESG. is not deploying its ships, aircraft, or ing and deploying. To standardize train- This can be achieved during each pa- personnel on an annual or biannual ing and employment, it may be neces- trol when the coalition establishes and basis, more time and money can be sary for coalition partners to utilize the maintains SOPs derived from best prac- spent on improving readiness through Navy and Marine Corps’ certification tices and lessons learned.

Marine Corps Gazette • December 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 11 Ideas & Issues (Chase PrIze essays)

Select staff members of ESG-7, the and refueling sites for fixed-wing, rota- November 2015), available at https://csbaon- 31st MEU, and CPR-11 may embark ry-wing, and unmanned aerial systems’ line.org. on coalition partner ships to gain a operations. Simultaneously, they will better understanding of methods and maintain persistent situational aware- 2. Ibid. procedures in an effort to enhance in- ness through partnered intelligence teroperability and cohesion. If it is in the surveillance and reconnaissance opera- 3. Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis, “Mem- orandum for all Department of Defense Em- interest of the coalition partner, these tion. By embracing the EABO concept ployees,” (Washington, DC: December 2018). staff members can provide mentorship, through the implementation of stand- training, and assistance throughout in forces complemented by CAESG 4. President of the United States, National Se- each deployment. Conversely, when a deployments, the Navy and Marine curity Strategy of the United States of America, U.S. amphibious ship is deployed, se- Corps will meet the NDS’ objectives of (Washington, DC: 2017). lect staff members from the coalition deterring adversaries from aggression, force may embark on the ship to gain maintaining favorable regional balances 5. Ibid. a better understanding of a coalition of power in the Indo-Pacific Region, partner’s methods and procedures as bolstering coalition partners against 6. Ibid. well as enhance interoperability and co- coercion, and sharing responsibilities hesion. Ultimately, the coalition ESG, with coalition partners for common 7. Department of Defense, Summary of the 14 National Defense Strategy of the United States ARG, and MEU staff will be comprised defense. of America: Sharpening the American Military’s of members of the coalition. The am- Competitive Edge, (Washington, DC: 2018). phibious ships, along with their crew, embarked units, and equipment, will be ... the Navy and Marine 8. Ibid. manned, trained, and equipped by each Corps must deploy with coalition partner in accordance with the 9. Department of State, “Southeast Asia Treaty standards established and agreed upon coalition partners ... Organization (SEATO),” (Washington, DC: by the coalition. 1954).

Counterargument 10. Association of Southeast Asian Nations, “ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting,” (Clark, One might argue that by reducing Conclusion PHL: October 2017). ship deployments in the Indo-Pacific When Secretary Mattis advised the region, the United States will reduce force to “hold fast, alongside our allies, 11. Department of Defence, Helen Frank, and its forward naval presence. If the Ma- aligned against our foes,” he understood Steven Thomas, “Amphibious Assault Vehicle rine Corps simultaneously embraces its as an armed Service that we must not Trials Go Swimmingly,” Navy Daily, (Online: expeditionary advance base operations conduct combat operations against a July 2016), available at http://news.navy.gov. (EABO) concept through the imple- peer adversary alone.15 He understood au; Ryan Mains, “Ospreys Land on Korean mentation of stand-in forces, the Ma- future combat operations against a peer Amphibious Assault Ship,” (Online: March rine Corps will not reduce its forward or near-peer adversary within the Indo- 2015), available at https://www.31stmeu.ma- naval presence. In fact, it will maintain Pacific region will require the force to rines.mil; and Carla Burdt, “U.S. Republic of Korea Forces Kick off Exercise Ssang Yong,” its forward naval presence. During each strengthen alliances and partnerships. Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, (Online: March coalition ESG deployment, the Marines Finally, he understood through deepen- 2014), available at https://www.cpf.navy.mil. and Sailors from the 31st MEU who are ing interoperability the combined allied not embarked will become the stand-in force will act together to coherently and 12. Eric Wertheim, World Navies in Review, force that will remain ashore to deter effectively achieve military objectives (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 2018). and train alongside coalition partners in the future operating environment. and allies within the Indo-Pacific re- To achieve greater interoperability, the 13. Ibid. gion. Their presence ashore alongside Navy and Marine Corps must deploy our coalition partners in the region with coalition partners in the Indo- 14. Art Corbett, EABO and Stand-in Forces: A will engender confidence, assurance, Pacific region as a CAESG while em- Discussion on Innovation in Strategy and Con- and trust to operate as a combined al- bracing the EABO concept through the cepts, (Quantico, VA: Marine & Naval Con- cepts, Concepts and Plans Division, Marine lied force. Over time, the coalition will employment of a stand-in force. Corps Warfighting Laboratory, 2018). create an integrated maritime defense in-depth that is capable of deterring 15. “Memorandum for all Department of De- peer and near-peer adversaries within Notes fense Employees.” the Indo-Pacific region. While ashore, 1. Bryan Clark and Jesse Sloman, “Deploying the stand-in force will be capable of es- Beyond Their Means: America’s Navy and tablishing mutually supporting strong Marine Corps at a Tipping Point,” Center for points in close and confined seas. They Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, (Online: will establish rotating forward arming

12 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • December 2019