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Indian Ocean 1390_A8-A13 11/4/08 5:11 PM Page 123 330-383/B428-S/40005 Indian Ocean 37. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers1 Washington, June 24, 1969. SUBJECT Congressional Hearings on Diego Garcia Information Memorandum Representatives of the Defense Department will testify before the House Armed Services Committee on June 30 regarding plans to con- struct communications and refueling facilities on the island of Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago in the Indian Ocean. Because of cur- rent debate on Capitol Hill regarding bases and overseas commitments, the Pentagon is concerned that during congressional hearings on the Diego Garcia project a leak from foreign sources might prove prejudi- cial to approval. Diego Garcia is one of a number of Indian Ocean islands included in the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT). We have an agreement (1966) in principle with the British to construct facilities in these is- lands.2 Diego is attractive because of its location in the middle of the Indian Ocean, it is British territory, and the only inhabitants are non- indigenous copra workers imported from Mauritius and the Seychelles. In the event of U.S. Government approval of the project, the British are obligated at our request to remove these workers. Their repatriation to Mauritius and the Seychelles could cause political problems for the British because of unemployment in those areas. The Pentagon is proposing the construction of a dredged anchor- age, fuel storage, an 8,000 foot runway, and a communications facility 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 15 IND–US. Secret. Drafted by Grant E. Mouser (NEA/INC); cleared in draft in J/PM and AF/AFI; and cleared in H, EUR/BMI, NEA/INC, and NEA. 2 The Anglo-American BIOT Agreement of December 30, 1966; 18 UST 28. Its salient points were summarized as follows. “Purpose: BIOT available for defense purposes of both governments. Terms: BIOT remains UK territory; agreement in principle on each undertaking; detailed agreement between designated administrative authorities (i.e., USN and RN); each government bears cost of its own sites; and initial period of agree- ment 50 years—provision for 20 year extension.” (Attachment to a memorandum from Spiers to Irwin, January 3; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Unfiled Mater- ial, Country “Cy–E” 1953–1977, Diego Garcia) 123 1390_A8-A13 11/4/08 5:11 PM Page 124 330-383/B428-S/40005 124 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV at an estimated cost of $26 million. Equipment for the communications facility will eventually raise the price by $11 million. NEA has supported this project from the beginning—despite some potential problems with the Indians who say they are opposed to great power activity in the Indian Ocean—because of Diego’s obvious value to the United States and the absence of many of the political liabilities which afflict other bases and facilities. We and the British feel that there is a good chance to contain negative Indian reaction if New Delhi is informed in timely fashion of our plans. The Indians know already of our general agreement with the British and they also know that some progress towards a decision has been made. We have stressed to them that no base is envisaged and the Indian Government has taken this line effectively in reply to Parliamentary questions. We had originally planned to tell the Indians, Mauritians and oth- ers on the same day we went to the Congress. This has now slipped to July 3 per agreement with the British. (The Mauritian Prime Minis- ter will be in London on that date.) We have felt that neither the Indi- ans nor the Congress should first hear of Diego through a leak from the other. We still feel that we have a good chance to mitigate Indian reaction, though the Government may feel compelled to state its for- mal opposition. However, Indian reaction would probably be much harsher if they heard indirectly through a leak which resulted in press stories. This bureau believes that while the decision is difficult, the bal- ance seems to lie in favor of July 3 notification. Pentagon concern over Congressional reaction has led to increas- ing nervousness there, including some talk of deferring notification fur- ther. We now await confirmation from the British that they still are firm regarding notification on July 3.3 3 The British notified regional governments, such as Mauritius and India, of the BIOT agreement on July 3. (Telegram 5310 from London, July 4, and telegram 9494 from New Delhi, July 4; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 15 IND–US) 1390_A8-A13 11/4/08 5:11 PM Page 125 330-383/B428-S/40005 Indian Ocean 125 38. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Departments of State and Defense1 London, July 9, 1969, 1546Z. 5406. DOD for OSD/ISA. Subj: Diego Garcia: Stewart/Singh Discussion. 1. Singh2 saw Foreign Secretary Stewart this morning and in course of conversation raised question of Diego Garcia. Singh com- plained at some length that the American plans as explained to GOI threatened to introduce big power competition into the Indian Ocean area, and his govt was “very unhappy” at the prospect. Singh men- tioned that the Chinese were already showing interest in the Indian Ocean, and that the Russians had been asking for refueling facilities “from certain countries.” Introduction of an American base was certain to result in unwanted rivalry between big powers.3 2. Replying Stewart emphasized the modest nature of the facility en- visaged, denied that the term “base” was accurate description, and stated that US has the right under the BIOT agreement to establish such facil- ity. He said this plan in no way constituted a threat to the area or to GOI. 3. Singh said he questioned that the Americans had any need for the base. Stewart responded that the US has obligations in the Far East and that the Indian Ocean facility was needed for refueling and communica- tions in order to carry out these obligations. Singh retorted that if the USG has Far Eastern obligations then let them use the territory of Far Eastern countries to discharge them. What we were now proposing would bring the US into a new area where it had no present obligations and where competition with other major powers would be the inevitable result. He said the GOI was certain other Asians would also oppose the project. 4. Singh inquired about the present status of the proposal within the USG. Stewart said that it was still being considered on a confiden- tial basis by the Congress, and that his personal estimate was that Con- gressional approval was likely but not certain. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 15 IND–US. Secret; Immediate. It was repeated to New Delhi, Port Louis, Tananarive, CINCPAC, CINCLANT, and CINCSTRIKE. 2 Indian Minister of External Affairs Dinesh Singh. 3 Singh passed on a similar message of concern to Nixon in their July 10 meeting. The memorandum of conversation of their meeting is in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Document 26. Background material for this meeting is in a memorandum from Saunders to Kissinger, July 10. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1236, Saunders Files, Indian Ocean) 1390_A8-A13 11/4/08 5:11 PM Page 126 330-383/B428-S/40005 126 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV 5. In closing Stewart reminded Singh that we had notified GOI on confidential basis and hoped that this would be respected. Singh ac- knowledged the point but made no promises. 6. Preceding is summary taken from FonOff telegram to UK Em- bassy in Washington giving full and detailed report of conversation. UK Embassy has been requested to pass complete text to Dept imme- diately upon receipt. Annenberg 39. Paper Prepared in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Moorer)1 Washington, February 11, 1970. Diego Garcia—Background and Status The Navy has long recognized the strategic importance of gaining a modest logistics support capability in the Indian Ocean. In recogni- tion of this need a Navy Strategic Island Concept was developed in 1959 and approved by JCS in 1960. In essence it calls for a stockpiling of islands for contingency use of the U.S. Pursuant to this concept a bi- lateral agreement was signed in December 1966 between HMG and USG which granted the U.S. base rights in the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT). The BIOT was formed in 1965 and comprises the Cha- gos Archipelago (includes Diego Garcia), Aldabra, Isle des Roches and Farquhar. The selection of these islands was based on unquestioned UK sovereignty and a negligible native population. The islands were formerly part of the Mauritian and Seychelles groups. The agreement with the British provides for U.S. use for 50 years with an option for an additional 20 years. The cost of the agreement to the U.S. was one-half of the detachment costs ($14 M) which was funded by offsetting British Polaris R&D charges.2 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 15 IND–US. Secret. The paper was submitted to U. Alexis Johnson under a February 1 covering memoran- dum from Moorer. 2 The British Foreign Office expressed considerable doubt about making informa- tion on the details of BIOT financing available to the U.S. Congress. The Foreign Office felt that “having well and truly cooked its books vis-à-vis Parliament on BIOT financ- ing,” it was vulnerable to any exposure.
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