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Specialist Crime Directorate SOP (Standard Operating Procedure)

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Specialist Crime Directorate SOP (Standard Operating Procedure) Protective marking: Restricted Publication scheme Y/N: No Title: Overseas Travel - Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) Version: Version 3.3 These SOPs support the MPS Overseas Travel Policy Summary: and provide direction and guidance to MPS staff and contractors travelling abroad on MPS business. Branch/ OCU: Specialist Crime Directorate Policy Forum Review date: November 2010 Notice reference/ date: Item 3, Notices 47/07, 21 November 2007 Policy Contact: SCD14(4) International Crime Co-ordination Unit, extn 63219 MPS Overseas Travel Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) Index: Introduction Application Details of SOP Purpose of Travel The Business Case Risk Assessment and Management Selection of personnel for deployment overseas Arrangements to travel Travelling Doing Business Abroad Return to the UK Ownership and Monitoring of this SOP Associated Documents, Policies and Links Appendix A (Useful Information Sheet) Appendix B (Process flowchart) Introduction Policing in London has an increasingly international dimension, and the need for the MPS to establish and develop access to overseas facilities and resources is growing. Overseas travel involves a significant use of public resources, and is subject to close scrutiny by the Metropolitan Police Authority and the public. In the interests of accountability it is vital that all foreign travel undertaken by members of MPS is appropriate, necessary, justifiable and undertaken as safely as possible. The procedures outlined below seek to ensure that this is the case, recognising the specific and varied needs of different business areas within the MPS. The procedures are to be used to: prepare for overseas visits; seek authority for them; properly identify, assess and manage all risks associated with overseas travel; make travel arrangements; conduct MPS business abroad; deal with foreign agencies and legal systems; and provide appropriate support on return to the UK Application These procedures apply to All police officers and police staff, including the extended police family and those working voluntarily or under contract to the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC) or the Commissioner (collectively referred to as MPS personnel) must be aware of, and are required to comply with, all relevant Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) policy and associated procedures. This includes in particular all those travelling abroad on official business, or on visits funded by the MPS. These procedures should be adhered to unless specific arrangements have been agreed in writing between the command unit concerned and the senior officer charged by the Commissioner with implementing the overseas travel policy. In all cases a comprehensive risk assessment must be completed before authority to travel outside the United Kingdom can be given. Where an MPS contractor is required to travel outside the UK on MPS business, the contract should make it clear that this SOP applies to the contractor concerned. (For further advice, please contact the Directorate of Legal Services). Start date These procedures will apply with immediate effect. Impact Implementation of the procedures will assure the MPS that personnel travelling abroad on business do so safely and effectively, and in a manner that represents best value to the people of London. Responsibilities MPS officers of ACPO rank are responsible for authorising foreign travel in their business area, for securing budgetary provision for the proposed travel, and for ensuring that effective risk management measures are in place. Senior police staff within the MPS who are in overall charge of a business area are responsible for authorising foreign travel in their business area, for securing budgetary provision for the proposed travel, and for ensuring that effective risk management measures are in place. Unit heads are responsible for ensuring that the business case for travel undertaken by their personnel is sound, and must support each application for authority to travel. A line manager is responsible for completing a comprehensive risk assessment and implementing a risk management process. The line manager completing the process should have requisite knowledge of the task to be undertaken, and of the area to be visited, or of where to obtain that knowledge, in order to make a valid assessment of the risks involved. The person seeking to travel, or directed to travel, must obtain authority to do so before making any firm arrangements or entering into any undertakings in connection with the intended visit. Details of SOP Purpose of Travel 1.1 Travel overseas (i.e. outside the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man) by MPS personnel may be authorised by an ACPO ranking officer or a senior member of police staff in overall charge of a business area for the following purposes: Operational investigations (including participation in Joint Investigation Teams (JITs)); Operational evidence gathering; Operational meetings; Operational intelligence gathering; Operational assistance to other government departments or agencies; Operational capacity-building projects; Protection duties; Advice and assistance in hostage and kidnap situations; Extradition; Transfer of persons in custody; Provision of police assistance on behalf of, or supported by, HM Government; Exchange visits; Non-operational liaison; Non-operational research and fact-finding; Non-operational sporting, social, or educational events; Training, conferences, lectures and presentations; or Representational functions. Every case will involve an abstraction of resources from London's police service, and the proposed visit must be justified and supported by a robust business case. A comprehensive and ongoing risk management process must precede each deployment overseas. 1.2 Any Metropolitan Police personnel travelling outside the UK - including to the Channel Islands or Isle of Man - to offer advice or assistance in a non- operational capacity that is primarily of benefit to the host country rather than to the MPS or the UK must be in possession of authorising letter from the Home Office under Section 26 of the Police Act 1996. This applies to all MPS personnel and to all non-operational visits, irrespective of their duration. Failure to obtain the letter may result in loss of normal benefits, such as pension rights. Section 26 applications are dealt with by the Home Office International Police Assistance Section, which can be contacted on 020 7035 1813. For further information and advice, please see the International Crime Coordination Unit intranet site. 1.3 Assistance to countries with the death penalty The UK Government is opposed to the use of the death penalty. When the assistance of UK police officers or police staff is requested by any country where the death penalty applies, and where there is a significant risk that that penalty might be imposed on anyone found guilty of an offence where the investigation has been assisted by UK personnel (e.g. assistance into a murder investigation), then it is normal HMG practice to seek an assurance, via the FCO, from the authorities of the country concerned that the death penalty will not be imposed, before authorising that assistance. In cases where such an assurance is not forthcoming, but where the FCO considers that there is nevertheless a compelling case to provide UK assistance, FCO Ministers will approach Home Office Ministers (in cases of assistance from E&W forces), to ask if they are willing to authorise that assistance under s.26 of the Police Act 1996, if the police service is prepared to provide it. In most cases, officers/staff will be on stand-by at the provisional request of the FCO. The Home Office's International Police Assistance section has asked the ICCU to remind officers and staff that until the all the necessary steps described above have been completed, they may not issue s.26 letters of authorisation. Officers and staff must not travel without confirmation that force procedures including police authority approval have been completed and that Home Secretary approval under s.26 has been granted. Requests for assistance are considered on a case-by-case basis. In exceptional cases (e.g. a kidnapping where it is necessary to act quickly to protect British lives), a decision may be taken by HMG to authorise deployment of UK personnel immediately, without first seeking assurances about non-imposition of the death penalty, to which consideration can be given in slower time. This is without prejudice to the statutory position that all police assistance must have prior authorisation by the Home Secretary. 1.4 In some MPS business areas, travel overseas is a fundamental requirement. In cases where the volume of travel is such that it is not practicable to obtain authorisation at the level specified above, an authorising ACPO officer or senior staff member may formally delegate authorising responsibility to a Branch or OCU Superintendent or Police Staff equivalent. MPS personnel on contracted secondment to other agencies or government departments who are required by their host agency to travel overseas will be subject to the travel policy and risk management process of the host agency. In cases where the host agency has no risk management process or travel policy, the seconded MPS member must consult HR Secondments Branch before agreeing to travel overseas. The number of people deputed to travel must be the minimum required to achieve the objectives of the deployment in safety. There is no organisational
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