'The Breath Returns to God Who Gave

Home , Andreas Musculus, Jacob Heerbrand, Johannes Agricola, Johannes Gigas, Philippists, University of Helmstedt

‘The Breath Returns to God Who Gave It’ The Doctrine of the Soul’s Immortality in Sixteenth-Century German Lutheran Theology

A dissertation presented by ITTZÉS Gábor

to The Faculty of Harvard Divinity School in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Theology in the Subject of Theology

Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts April 2008

To my mother and to the memory of my father

Abstract

This study examines the development of a new Lutheran doctrine of the soul’s immortality in the course of the sixteenth century. After a brief sketch of the medieval and Renaissance background, I begin with Luther, whose eschatological thought has been much scrutinised, but without producing a lasting scholarly consensus. Against widely different recent interpretations, I argue that Luther’s apophaticism and emphasis on the unspeakability and ungraspability of the post-mortem state should be recognised. Against a popular mid- twentieth-century theological position that sharply juxtaposed the resurrection of the body with the immortality of the soul, and attributed the same conviction to Luther, it must be affirmed that the Reformer saw the latter doctrine entailed in the former, and he understood both insights as articles of faith, of which reason could never be certain. Analysing revisions between his Commentarius and Liber de anima, I show that Melanchthon’s mature position was that the immortality of the soul could be recognised by reason without revelation, while belief in the resurrection of the body was a privilege of faith. Melanchthon’s return to Aristotle and his admission of reason, however, must be seen in the context of a Lutheran law–gospel dialectic, and should not be regarded as compromising the older Reformer’s theology. In the second half of the sixteenth century, German Lutheran authors, including Melchior Specker, Andreas Musculus, Basilius Faber, Martin Mirus, David Chyträus and others produced a remarkably coherent body of literature in which they affirmed the soul’s immortality. Superficially, the new orthodoxy seems closer to Lateran V than to Luther, but that is not the case. While patristic ideas and other factors were also in play, the three most profoundly formative influences shaping the work of second and third-generation Reformation theologians originated with Luther, Melanchthon, and a confessional commitment against the Catholic doctrine of purgatory. Philosophically, later-sixteenth-

v Abstract vi century authors were all students of Melanchthon. Theologically, however, Luther exerted a more profound influence on them, which I demonstrate by examining their arguments and prooftexts in general, and their treatment of three questions—soul sleep, knowledge of the righteous dead, and the appearance of departed souls on earth—in particular. The dissertation concludes with some reflections on the functions and consequences of the doctrine.

Contents

Abstract...... v Contents ...... vii List of Tables ...... x Notes on Citation and Transcription ...... xiii Abbreviations...... xv Acknowledgements...... xvii Introduction...... 1 1. Delimiting the research ...... 1 2. From Luther to the end of the century...... 6 3. The medieval background...... 8 4. On the eve of the Reformation...... 16 1 Luther...... 20 1.1 The Ganztodthese in the context of twentieth-century Luther reception...... 20 1.2 Luther on Lateran V...... 27 1.3 Aristotle and the soul’s immortality ...... 37 1.4 Immortality as an article of faith...... 44 1.5 Abraham’s and Jacob’s death in the Lectures on Genesis...... 51 1.6 Soul sleep and the Zwischenzustand ...... 58 1.7 A persistently inexpressible reality...... 64 2 Melanchthon...... 71 2.1 Luther, Melanchthon, and Aristotle...... 72 2.2 Speeches on philosophy...... 76 2.3 Philosophy and theology...... 83 2.4 Commentarius and Liber...... 87

vii Contents viii

2.5 The soul’s immortality in De anima...... 92 2.6 Arguments for immortality...... 95 2.7 Aristotle, immortality, and resurrection...... 101 3 Later-Sixteenth-Century Authors and Texts ...... 106 3.1 Matthias Tacius, Ein Predigt von der vnsterbligkeit der Seelen (1556) ...... 107 3.2 Melchior Specker, Vom Leiblichen Todt (1560)...... 109 3.3 Andreas Musculus, Gelegenheit/ Thun vnd Wesen der Verstorbenen (1565)...... 112 3.4 Basilius Faber, Tractetlein von den Seelen der verstorbenen (1569)...... 114 3.5 Johannes Garcaeus, Jr., Sterbbüchlein (1573)...... 118 3.6 David Chyträus, Sr., De morte et vita æterna (1581–1582) ...... 121 3.7 Martin Mirus, Sieben Christliche Predigten (1590)...... 125 3.8 Moses Pflacher, Die gantze Lehr Vom Tod vnd Absterben des Menschen (1582)...... 129 3.9 Gregor Weiser, Christlicher Bericht (1583)...... 132 3.10 Bartholomaeus Frölich, Seelen Trost (1590)...... 134 3.11 Friedrich Roth, Fünff trösliche vnd nützliche Predigten (1591) ...... 136 3.12 Authors and texts: summary overview...... 139 4 The Later-Sixteenth-Century Corpus ...... 147 4.1 Structural parallels between Specker, Garcaeus, and Faber...... 147 4.2 Textual borrowing...... 165 4.3 Musculus between Specker and Garcaeus...... 176 4.4 Mirus, Pflacher, and Weiser...... 183 4.5 The Mirus group and the Speckerian tradition...... 192 4.6 Tacius, Chyträus, Frölich, Roth, and the limits of the Speckerian trajectory...... 204 5 The Immortality Doctrine in the Later Sixteenth Century...... 209 5.1 The core doctrine and its context...... 209 5.2 Dwelling places of departed souls ...... 215 5.3 Rational arguments for the immortality of the soul...... 222 5.4 Theological arguments in the 1560s...... 227 5.5 Argumentation after Mirus...... 233 5.6 Sleep and death...... 237 5.7 Soul sleep...... 244

Contents ix

5.8 Continuities and discontinuities with Luther...... 248 6 What Blessed Souls Do and Know...... 253 6.1 Occupation of the blessed souls...... 253 6.2 Knowledge of the blessed souls...... 259 6.3 Personal recognition...... 265 6.4 Interpretation of biblical counterevidence ...... 271 6.5 Appearance of ghosts: Specker...... 277 6.6 Garcaeus and Faber ...... 284 6.7 Authors outside the Specker group...... 288 Conclusion ...... 294 1. Genres and functions ...... 294 2. Body and soul...... 300 Works Cited ...... 306 1. Ancient to early modern sources...... 306 2. Literature ...... 310

List of Tables

Table 2.1 Publication history of Melanchthon’s De anima in the sixteenth century...... 88 Table 3.1 Publication history of Faber’s Vnterrichtungen and Tractetlein ...... 116 Table 3.2 The reconstructed publication history of Garcaeus’ Sterbbüchlein...... 120 Table 3.3 Publication history of Chyträus’ De morte et vita æterna ...... 122 Table 3.4 Structure (chapter outline) of Chyträus’ De morte et vita æterna...... 124 Table 3.5 Structure of Mirus’ Regensburg Sermons, Nrs. 4–7...... 128 Table 3.6 Titles of selected works by Pflacher (with biographical information)...... 130 Table 3.7 Titles of funeral sermons appended to Pflacher’s Die gantze Lehr...... 131 Table 3.8 Printing history of Pflacher’s Die gantze Lehr...... 132 Table 3.9 Friedrich Roth’s published works by year and VD16 numbers ...... 137 Table 3.10 Authors’ educational level, office, and place of activity...... 140 Table 3.11 Overview of the publication history of immortality texts, excluding Melanchthon’s De anima, in the later sixteenth century...... 143 Table 4.1 The overall structure of the argument in Specker’s Vom Leiblichen Todt (Pt. 3), Garcaeus’ Sterbbüchlein, and Faber’s Tractetlein ...... 148 Table 4.2 Detailed outline of the structure of the ‘immortality’ chapter in Specker and Faber...... 150 Table 4.3 Detailed outline of the structure of the ‘place’ chapter in Specker and Faber ...... 152 Table 4.4 Detailed outline of the structure of the ‘means’ chapter in Specker, Garcaeus, and Faber ...... 157 Table 4.5 Overview of Garcaeus’ borrowing of non-biblical passages from Specker in the ‘means’ chapter...... 159

x List of Tables xi

Table 4.6 Correspondences in the description of departed righteous souls’ life by Specker, Garcaeus, and Faber ...... 162 Table 4.7 Specker’s and Faber’s rubric for the arguments from God’s judgement for the souls immortality ...... 166 Table 4.8 Examples of close textual correspondences outside formal quotations between Specker and Faber...... 167 Table 4.9 Some major textual correspondences outside formal quotations between Specker and Faber...... 168 Table 4.10 Some major textual correspondences outside formal quotations between Specker and Garcaeus ...... 169 Table 4.11 Examples of close textual correspondences outside formal quotations between Specker and Garcaeus...... 170 Table 4.12 Quantitative analysis of textual correspondence between passages in Table 4.11...... 172 Table 4.13 Some major textual correspondences outside formal quotations between Specker and Faber...... 173 Table 4.14 Correspondences in the biblical arguments for the immortality of the soul in Musculus and Garcaeus...... 178 Table 4.15 Textual echoes of Musculus’ Gelegenheit in Garcaeus’ Sterbbüchlein ...... 179 Table 4.16 Quantitative analysis of textual correspondence between passages in Table 4.15...... 181 Table 4.17 The structure of Weiser’s borrowing from Mirus’ Regensburg Sermons...... 185 Table 4.18 The structure of Pflacher’s borrowing from Mirus’ Regensburg Sermons ...... 185 Table 4.19 Detailed outline of the ‘immortality’ section (with deniers) in Mirus, Pflacher, and Weiser...... 186 Table 4.20 Hebrews 11:37–40 as quoted by Mirus, Pflacher, and Weiser ...... 188 Table 4.21 The state of blessed souls: examples of textual and structural correspondences between Mirus, Pflacher, and Weiser...... 189 Table 4.22 Some loci of textual parallels between Mirus, Pflacher, and Weiser ...... 191 Table 4.23 Example of textual correspondence between Mirus, Pflacher, and Weiser ...... 191 Table 4.24 Catalogues of false teachings from Specker to Weiser ...... 193

List of Tables xii

Table 4.25 Arguments for the soul’s immortality proposed by the Specker group and Mirus...... 195 Table 4.26 Order of biblical prooftexts for the souls’ instantaneous arrival at their interim abode from Specker to Pflacher...... 196 Table 4.27 Shared names of the righteous souls’ abode between the Specker and the Mirus groups...... 198 Table 6.1 The occupation of departed righteous souls according to Specker, Garcaeus, and Faber ...... 256 Table 6.2 Knowledge of the blessed souls according to Specker, Garcaeus, and Faber ...... 261

Notes on Citation and Transcription

In order to preserve the historical meaningfulness of printing information, the publication date used in citations refers, with rare exceptions, to the first edition of the given text. If the copy I consulted is of a later printing, all the necessary information about the relevant edition, including its actual publication date, is given in the bibliography. Page numbers cited and other information such as VD16 number etc. always refer to the later printing of the text, actually consulted in preparing the dissertation. If the later edition is related to (e.g. by translation), but not identical with, the earlier printing, the later date is used in references, but with the date of the text’s origin supplied in square brackets. In a few cases the existence of an earlier version of the text cannot be ascertained but seems likely, and its probable existence is relevant to my argument. The hypothesised date of origin is then marked by placing a small raised circle before it in the square brackets, e.g. (1590 [°1575]). Wherever possible, sources are cited from published English translations. References are then given only to the English text, except in the case of Luther, for whom the Weimar critical edition (WA) is consistently referenced. When no publicly accessible translation is available, I supply my own English version with the original quotation given in the notes. Passages from early modern texts have been transcribed as faithfully to the original as possible. The following unmarked alterations were nonetheless tacitly introduced. The typeface is changed from Fraktur to Roman. Vowel superscripts (e) have been replaced with umlaut. Typographical distinction between various forms of the same letter (e.g. ſ and s) has not been preserved, and spacing of punctuation marks (space after, but not before) has been standardised. In the absence of page numbers, signature marks of early modern editions have been used in references. Letter signs, whose capitalisation is often meaningful, are preserved, but leaf numbers are given in arabic numerals, and no typographic distinction is made between actually occurring and logically calculable leaf numbers.

xiii Notes on Citation and Transcription xiv

Patristic and other classical sources are cited by author, title, usual division numbers (book, chapter etc.) and page reference in a standard edition rather than publication date. Quotations from the Bible, unless otherwise noted, are taken from the NRSV.

Abbreviations

ANF Ante-Nicene Fathers: Translations of the Writings of the Fathers down to AD 325, ed. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, 10 vols. (repr.; Peabody: Hendrickson, 1995).

BPal Bibliotheca Palatina: Druckschriften / Stampati Palatini / Printed Books, microfiche edition, ed. Leonard Boyle and Elmar Mittler (Munich: Saur, 1995).

CD Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, trans. G.T. Thomson et al., ed. G.W. Bromiley and Thomas F. Torrance, 5 vols. in 13 (Edinburgh: T & T. Clark, 1956–1969).

CR Corpus Reformatorum, Series I: Philippi Melanchthonis Opera quae supersunt omnia, 28 vols., ed. Karl G. Bretschneider and Heinrich E. Bindseil (Halle: Schwetschke & Sohn, 1834–1860).

DBA Deutsches biographisches Archiv I–III, microfiche edition (Munich: Saur, 1999–2002), also available online in WBIS.

DS Heinrich Denzinger, Peter Hünermann and Helmut Hoping, eds., Enchiridion symbolorum definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum / Kompendium der Glaubensbekenntnisse und kirchlichen Lehrentscheidungen, GT Peter Hünermann and Helmut Hoping (40th ed.; Freiburg: Herder, 2005). English trans. cited after The Sources of Catholic Dogma, trans. Roy J. Deferrari from the 30th ed. (St. Louis: Herder, 1957).

GVK Gemeinsamer Verbundkatalog des Gemeinsamen Bibliotheksverbundes der Länder Bremen, Hamburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Niedersachsen, Sachsen- Anhalt, Schleswig-Holstein, Thüringen und der Stiftung Preußischer Kulturbesitz (http://gso.gbv.de/DB=2.1/SET=1/TTL=1/)

LuJ Lutherjahrbuch

LW Luther’s Works: American Edition, gen. ed. H.T. Lehmann, 55 vols. (Saint Louis: Concordia & Philadelphia: Fortress, 1955–1986).

xv Abbreviations xvi

LW ns Luther’s Works: American Edition, New Series, gen. ed. Christopher B. Brown, voll. 56–75 (St. Louis: Concordia, forthcoming) – numbering follows the Prospectus of the series (http://cyberbrethren.typepad.com/cyberbrethren/files/ lwprospectus.pdf).

MBW Melanchthon’s Briefwechsel: Kritische und kommentierte Gesamtausgabe, ed. Heinz Scheible, 12 (Regesten) + 9 (Texte) vols. to date (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann- Holzboog, 1977–).

Md Melanchthon deutsch, ed. Michael Beyer, Stefan Rhein and Günther Wartenberg, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1997).

MR Philip Melanchthon, A Melanchthon Reader, trans. R. Keen (American University Studies 7:41; New York etc.: Peter Lang, 1988).

NPNF1 Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: A Select Library of the Christian Church, Series I, ed. Philip Schaff, 14 vols. (repr.; Peabody: Hendrickson, 1995).

RGG4 Religion in Geschichte un Gegenwart: Handwörterbuch für Theologie und Religionswissenschaft, ed. Hans D. Betz et al., 8 vols. (4th, rev. ed.; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998–2005).

VD16 Verzeichnis der im deutschen Sprachbereich erschienenen Drucke des 16. Jahrhunderts (www.vd16.de)

VD17 Das Verzeichnis der im deutschen Sprachraum erschienenen Drucke des 17. Jahrhunderts (www.vd17.de)

WA D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, 72 vols. in 87 to date (Weimar: H. Böhlau, 1883–)

WA BR D. Martin Luthers Werke: Briefwechsel, 18 vols. (Weimar: H. Böhlau, 1883–)

WA DB D. Martin Luthers Werke: Die Deutsche Bibel, 12 vols. in 15 (Weimar: H. Böhlau, 1883–)

WA TR D. Martin Luthers Werke: Tischreden, 6 vols. (Weimar: H. Böhlau, 1883–)

WBIS World Biographical Information System (WBIS) Online (Munich: Saur) (http://db.saur.de/WBIS)

ZSTh Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie

Acknowledgements

My first word of gratitude is due to my advisor, Sarah Coakley, currently of Cambridge University, who has patiently guided this undertaking from its inception, pointed ways out when it had reached an impasse, and encouraged its completion at times, so I surely felt, against considerable odds. As a student at Harvard Divinity School, I had the privilege to work with many other distinguished scholars, of whom Ronald Thiemann and Kevin Madigan were especially liberal with their time in guiding and reviewing my efforts. I owe special thanks to Christopher Brown of Boston University, who read the entire draft of this dissertation and proposed helpful corrections, not only improving my text but saving me from several errors. My research could not have been completed without travelling scholarships that allowed me to study early modern texts in a range of German research libraries, chiefly in Heidelberg, Erfurt/Gotha and Wolfenbüttel. I thank Harvard Divinity School for the Dean’s Dissertation Fellowship, the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) for a Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship, and the University of Erfurt Transatlantic Program for a Carl Schurz Fellowship. My German academic hosts, Michael Welker and Christoph Markschies (currently of Humboldt University, Berlin) in Heidelberg, and Christoph Bultmann in Erfurt treated me as one of their own doctoral students. During my stay in Germany, I benefited from stimulating discussions with several experts on Reformation history and theology, of whom Volker Leppin of Jena University and Timothy Wengert of the Lutheran Theological Seminary at Philadelphia must be mentioned by name. Hans-Heinrich Lieb’s generous hospitality enabled my research at the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin. The assistance provided by the friendly and helpful personnel at the Forschungsbibliothek Gotha and the Herzog August Bibliothek Wolfenbüttel as well as at the International Office, Erfurt University greatly contributed both to the success of my research and to the pleasantness of my stay.

xvii Acknowledgements xviii

On the personal side, many friends have assisted me in various ways during the years of writing this dissertation. I am especially grateful to Louis Demos, Sándor Illényi, David Kim, András Kiséry, and Katherine Shaner for the countless, and practically invaluable, signs of their friendship. The brunt of this whole project was borne by my wife Laura and daughters Klára and Dorka, for whom the peace and joy of post-dissertation life has been as much a matter of hope as the blessings of post-mortem existence were available in the modality of faith to Luther’s sixteenth-century followers. May their patience find reward, and their expectation fulfilment in the days to come. My longest-standing debt is to my parents, who first taught me to face life and death, and to think about them theologically. By his death before the completion of this study, my father offered the most challenging commentary on my work. It is to his memory and to my mother that I dedicate this dissertation.

[T]he dust returns to the earth as it was, and the breath returns to God who gave it. (Ecclesiastes 12:7)

Introduction

The Reformation broke on the scene with a hefty polemic against indulgences which soon spilled over into a wholesale rejection of the underlying doctrine of purgatory that, in turn, became a hallmark of the new theology. With that radical redrawing of the eschatological map, the question of the soul’s post-mortem fate was bound to be reconsidered. It is perhaps a testimony to the strength and creative energy of the Reformation as a theological movement that the inevitable reconsideration came relatively late. The result of the indulgence controversy was not a scholastic debate of metaphysical detail, but a radically new theology that shook the foundations of the old system. Instead of quibbles about the soul’s exact state and whereabouts after death, questions of justification before God, sacramental theology, ultimate church authority and the like pressed to the fore. It was not until the second half of the sixteenth century that sustained attention was given to the problem of the soul’s immortality, although both Luther and Melanchthon had things to say on the topic. This dissertation will document this development and analyse the new doctrine.

1. Delimiting the research

The doctrine of the soul’s immortality was usually not a formally independent locus in early Protestant systematic theologies, and rarely did it become the sole topic of a treatise, although some sermons were preached on it. On the other hand, the number, identity, and distribution of loci are anything but uniformly established in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and that holds certainly true for the eschatological questions as well. Granted that theology does and should form an organic whole, it is neither impossible nor necessarily forced to define more or less self-contained areas of enquiry, and the problem of the soul’s status after the body’s death can be legitimately designated as one such area. It is delimited

1 Introduction 2 by, and to that extent surely related to, other issues like death, resurrection, life eternal, heaven, hell, purgatory and others. While I shall discuss some of those connections, especially between immortality and purgatory, it seems justifiable to focus sharply on one question without at the same time having to engage the neighbouring areas to the same degree and with the same intensity. The problem of the soul’s immortality will thus be at the centre of my exploration. For the purposes of the dissertation, the locus will be interpreted as an enquiry into the fate of the human person between her dissolution at death and her reconstitution, theologically understood as participation in the general resurrection. The context in which I propose to conduct my research is German Lutheran theology of the sixteenth century. Surely, the edges of such concepts are always blurry in reality, even if the new movement took shape and acquired constitutional recognition through the Augsburg Confession rather swiftly. Culturally-confessionally, German Lutheran theology nonetheless seems to be a notion of sufficient clarity to merit application, especially as we shall see that the intra-Lutheran debates, including the Gnesio-Lutheran/Philippist controversy, appear not to have spilled over into the locus under scrutiny, and it is also church-uniting rather than church-dividing with respect to the Lutheran/Calvinist split. The main question thus concerns the appropriateness of the chronological demarcation. That ‘sixteenth-century Lutheranism’ is a notional construct is hardly itself a problem, for all historical periods are. Yet the objection could be made that it is an external construct superimposed on the evidence and that the cut-off points are entirely arbitrary rather than organic. In the given case, however, the challenge can be met. Coordinating the rise of the Reformation (the terminus a quo of Lutheranism) with the beginning of the century, despite their rather inexact concurrence, is obviously not the issue. And at the other end, there occurs a transition internal to the sources that coincides adequately closely with the turn of the century to allow for the convenience of designating the pleasingly round date of 1600 as the cut-off point of the investigation—in full awareness of the fact that intellectual changes hardly ever take place overnight, and a transitional period must be recognised in this case as well. What happened in the last decade of the sixteenth century was not merely an upsurge in the interest in the soul’s post-mortem fate, judging from the available publication data, but a last upsurge of its kind (Table 3.11). It signals the end of a period when the language of theological reflection on the topic was chiefly German, and when the generic identity of the

Introduction 3 texts played no major role in determining their approach. Homiletic, devotional and systematic texts flow quite freely in and out of each other. Earlier texts are still reproduced in the first decades of the new century, although their circulation is in no way comparable to the figures from the 1580s and ’90s. Nearly all newly composed texts, however, are funeral sermons (of which we have but a few in the 1500s), geared towards consolation and comfort rather than the questions that preoccupied the sixteenth century. The soul’s immortality is invariably presupposed—not argued for—by them, and they have very little to say on the matter, except what is immediately applicable in the given pastoral context at the graveside. The shift is undoubtedly due to the takeover of the new genre, and not inherent in changes of theological reflection. That much we can assert because the doctrinal base underlying the sermons, of which we can still catch glimpses even if it is no longer foregrounded, is not yet altered up to and during the Thirty Years’ War. Parallel to that shift we also witness the migration of the reflective approach into Latin texts, clearly a sign of a move towards the academy. German treatises, relatively readily available before 1590, disappear with the dawn of the seventeenth century, especially as regards first editions. Latin pieces on the soul’s immortality that show up in sixteenth- century bibliographical databases are almost invariably works by non-Lutheran authors published outside the German-speaking area, especially in Paris, Venice, and Naples.1 By contrast, we have, alone from the first half of the seventeenth century, fifteen Latin titles on the topic by Lutheran theologians, mostly disputations, but also including such influential monographs as Georg Calixt’s (1586–1656) De immortalitate animæ (1627) that remained in print until the end of the century. It is, then, not a decline of interest in the question that we can register as we leave the century of the Reformation behind, but much rather a redistribution of the topic in terms of theological genres. From German devotional literature that was not to be sharply demarcated from more systematic theological reflection, it was removed, on the one hand, to the university, the shift clearly marked by crossing the linguistic line over to Latin. On the other hand, preaching on immortality was moved to the graveside, or, perhaps better said, the emerging new genre of the funeral sermon appropriated and domesticated this topic as well. This twofold split, linguistic and generic,

1 The field is dominated by Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463–1494) and Pietro Pomponazzi (1462–1525), including responses to them, and ancient authors like Aristotle, Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine, and commentaries on them.

Introduction 4 between Latin academic texts and German funeral sermons with little systematic interest, brings the previous period to a close, thus allowing the sixteenth century to be designated as a meaningful, rather than merely formal, historical period for study. Building an adequate corpus for an enquiry of this sort is no mean challenge, and I have found that strict application of a single set of selection criteria would not be adequate. Luther and Melanchthon are foundational figures without whom the story I am setting out to tell cannot be recounted. Luther constitutes an especially difficult case not only because of the sheer size of his oeuvre, but also because he devoted no single tract to the topic, and his position must be pieced together from a variety of sources, often small snippets of texts or casual remarks. Melanchthon does have a short but solid treatment of the locus, but properly to understand his return to Aristotle, which also constitutes the crucial context for his discussion of immortality, we must also look at a variety of other, mostly Latin, texts. From other sixteenth-century authors I have selected German works that deal either in their entirety, or in an extended fashion, with the question of immortality. The choice of German titles emerged quite naturally from the availability of sources, although when exclusive focus (or some similar formal criterion) is not required, it is a judgement call when a work becomes ‘relevant.’ Additionally, a preference for vernacular texts is supported by considerations that they were less exclusively the property of a theologically trained professional élite and more likely to reach ordinary (literate) believers, and in that sense represent German Lutheranism more fully than Latin texts would. Although it is methodologically problematic to draw far-reaching conclusions on what was believed from what was disseminated in print, and I shall refrain from such question-begging moves, weaker claims about a work’s reception history might be supported by its publication data. It is generally true that the choice of language betrays an intended audience, and works designed for popular consumption were written in German. While I am primarily concerned with intellectual history, I do believe that the texts, after their production, did not completely disappear in a vacuum of indifference, or fall on entirely deaf ears, but had a genuine reception history, glimpses of which can be reconstructed from internal evidence. Thus in several cases we have good grounds to suppose that the texts were not merely written but actually read by contemporaries who probably included educated lay people and not only a theological élite trained in the classical languages. Latin works, except in the case of Luther and Melanchthon, thus fall beyond the scope of my investigation. Interestingly, the leading

Introduction 5

Reformers’ most important contributions were also translated into German, even if that is not the likely form in which they were actually known to later generations of theologians. I shall examine texts of several prose genres, both homiletic and non-homiletic. They include a variety of types from occasional homily to didactic sermon series to Leichenpredigt, and from florilegium to systematic locus to devotional treatise. I shall argue that the dividing lines between them are permeable, and while a given text’s genre, not least because of concomitant limitations on extent, does have an impact on the treatment of the topic, such differences are of secondary importance until the shift described above that ushered in the new century. The inclusion of other types of texts like liturgical formulas, hymns and prayers would undoubtedly have benefited the analysis and enriched the findings, but it would have broadened the research base too far beyond manageability. Even with such considerations, it must be admitted that my text corpus is very likely incomplete. That much is probably to be expected, and is perhaps excusable, in the light that, with the research into the later-sixteenth-century Lutheran doctrine of the soul’s immortality, I am trying to navigate uncharted waters. There must exist further relevant sources that have escaped my attention. But the requirement my selection has to satisfy in order to support the weight of generalisation is not comprehensiveness either in an ‘absolute’ sense (considering all Lutheran texts ever published in the sixteenth century that contribute in some way to the discussion) or in a limited one (for example, defining a territory or intellectual circle such as a university and reviewing all corresponding texts). Rather, it is sufficient to establish that my selected corpus is representative and can thus serve as a basis of generalisation within the given temporal and thematic framework. That is indeed my claim, and a set of arguments can be proposed to support it. The texts represent the length and breadth of the Lutheran lands of the Empire as well as a considerable cross-section of the theological class. Most of them went through several editions and, taken together, they fairly seamlessly cover the second half of the century in chronological terms (Table 3.11). Third, and perhaps most important, there is a high degree of internal consistency between the sources (texts quoted, arguments proposed, interpretations championed), which suggests shared views and a common ground. All that may not make me immune from the charge (always possible to level in such cases) that my conclusions are invalid because the sources I am working with are but a fragment of the whole picture, but in the light of my observations the burden of proof is shifted, and in

Introduction 6 order to substantiate such criticism texts must be produced that contradict my findings. Until such evidence is offered, my findings have a legitimate claim to validity.

2. From Luther to the end of the century

The late medieval church’s last dogmatic feat before the dawn of the Reformation was the promulgation of the doctrine of the soul’s immortality at the Fifth Lateran Council in 1513. Luther’s repeated dismissals of that council and, specifically, its doctrinal formulation gave rise in the twentieth century to an interpretation of his position as denying the soul’s immortality altogether, and advocating, instead, a belief in the death and resurrection of the whole person, body and soul. In more recent decades, that view has been challenged and a doctrine of soul sleep, on the one hand, and that of the soul’s conscious post-mortem existence, on the other, have been attributed to him. Such divergent interpretations alone should give us pause, and help us recognise that there is indeed internal tension in Luther’s fragmentary remarks. I shall argue that even if his occasional reflections, taken together, are not strictly consistent, the contradictory readings scholarship has produced of him over the last few generations are in large measure due, on the one hand, to preconceptions of all too neat interpretive boxes and, on the other, to an unwillingness to take no for an answer and recognise the seriousness with which Luther stood for the ineffability of the matter, and represented an apophatic approach to the question. I shall thus seek to establish the thesis that for Luther, and the entire sixteenth century, a modern juxtaposition between the immortality of the soul and the resurrection of the body is simply unthinkable. There were indeed different constructs of their theological interrelationship, and I shall identify two major models, one associated with Luther, the other with Melanchthon. Specifically, it was not with an affirmation of the immortality of the soul per se that Luther took issue, but with certain philosophically laden formulations of the teaching, his enmity to Lateran V being motivated to a great extent by the council’s adherence, and his own determined opposition, to Aristotle. More generally, far from denying it as many of his modern interpreters would have it, Luther saw the soul’s immortality entailed in the doctrine, and creedal confession, of the resurrection of the body. Consequently, he understood both insights as articles of faith, and faith alone could be certain of them. Rational thought could never reach a comparable degree of certainty with

Introduction 7 regard to either. Melanchthon’s mature position, by contrast, was that the immortality of the soul could be recognised by reason without revelation, while belief in the resurrection of the body was properly a privilege of faith. Those are indeed significantly different options, motivated in my view by differences in the Reformers’ metaphysical commitments and in their appropriation of Aristotle; but I shall argue with equal emphasis that they are not irreconcilable positions, and Melanchthon’s philosophical moves and his return to Aristotle should by no means be seen as compromising Luther’s Reformation theology. On the contrary, when Melanchthon was creating a niche for reason, he was working out an implication of the quintessentially Lutheran law–gospel dialectic, and his position on the soul’s immortality must be seen as a further development along those lines. While Luther’s eschatological views have been widely explored and discussed, the tradition after him is largely shrouded in darkness. Even Melanchthon’s corresponding notions—despite their more concentrated presentation in an important chapter of his Aristotle commentary—have been much less scrutinised; and the rest of the sixteenth century, when the topic was finally treated at length, has been almost entirely abandoned to obscurity. Apart from the resultant ignorance as regards the later period, that one-sidedness has repercussions for Luther studies as well. Later-sixteenth-century authors routinely affirmed the immortality doctrine, and felt no contradiction between Luther’s position and their own, or, at least, they did not voice any such concerns while repeatedly drawing on their great master.2 Their work might have drawn attention to what has not been sufficiently recognised in contemporary literature that the single most important text Luther produced on the topic was his commentary on Abraham’s death (Gen 25:7–10) in the Genesisvorlesung towards the end of his life. I propose that no discussion of his theology of the individual’s post-mortem fate can be satisfactory without taking full account of that exposition. In the second half of the century, German Lutheran authors, mainly ordained ministers of a variety of ranks and educational levels, produced a considerable and remarkably coherent body of literature on the soul’s immortality. Its analysis unfolds a

2 I am not suggesting that the interpretation of (near-)contemporaries should be especially privileged, but awareness of it can certainly enrich our readings of the whole phenomenon. To anticipate, Pomponazzi, for example, was considered a ‘good Lutheran’ by several German Enlightenment thinkers (cf. Pluta (1986) esp. 66–71)—a conclusion sixteenth-century Lutherans, I think Luther himself included, would not have shared.

Introduction 8 fascinating chapter in the history of ideas. Philologically, the transmission and transformation of ideas can be traced, thanks to the interdependence of many of the texts, in great detail and with unusual precision. Theologically, there developed a broad consensus on the soul’s immortality that included much more than a mere affirmation of the central tenet. It also involved certain ‘compulsory’ aspects of its discussion, including ways to delimit the issue; divergent views to counter; arguments, rational and scriptural, offered in support of the ‘orthodox’ position; a highly standardised set of prooftexts, especially biblical; related issues to discuss such as the epistemology of the departed souls, their abode, with the corresponding biblical terminology, and their appearance. On such points, a particular set of views was widely held and consistently, though certainly not uniformly, presented. That development is unthinkable without Luther and Melanchthon, whose influence can be richly documented from the texts. Philosophically, as witnessed primarily by their understanding of the nature of the soul, second and third-generation Reformation theologians are all students of Melanchthon. Theologically, however, Luther exerted a more profound influence on them. Their methodology remained essentially Bible-based, and very few of them were eager effectively to make use of the liberty Melanchthon’s construct created for the deployment of rational arguments. Thirdly, the role of anti-Catholic polemic, in this case chiefly directed against the doctrine of purgatory, must also be recognised in the formation of the emergent Lutheran teaching. While patristic ideas and other factors were also in play, I shall argue that the three most profoundly formative influences shaping the new orthodoxy originated with Luther, Melanchthon, and a confessional commitment against Catholic doctrine. Superficially, later-sixteenth-century affirmations of the soul’s immortality seem closer to Lateran V than to Luther; and, with hindsight, we can certainly discover several important divergences between the Reformer and his followers. It would still be a mistake to read the tradition as therefore effectively failing Luther. On the contrary, his followers both saw themselves and, in my estimate, were in continuity with him—a point that perhaps deserves explicit mention in the light of recent historiographical debates about the success or otherwise of the Reformation.

3. The medieval background

Although the focus of my research is primarily the later 1500s, Luther and Melanchthon are

Introduction 9 much more central to my story than being mere precursors to it. Neither they nor their followers in the latter half of the sixteenth century can be properly interpreted without some understanding of the medieval background, to which we must first briefly turn. The ecclesiastical-intellectual context of the soul’s immortality on the eve of the Reformation was formed by two long and complex developments; one was the emergence of purgatory; the other, the repercussions of the rediscovery of Aristotle in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Both stories are so multifaceted that they can only be alluded to rather than summarised here; but since the latter is more fraught with philosophical technicalities, it requires a little more elucidation beyond a simple evocation. Following a first papal pronouncement in 1254, the Second Council of Lyon defined the doctrine of purgatory twenty years later,3 which was, in turn, upheld at the Council of Florence (1439) and later also at Trent, where the name itself, originally introduced by Innocent IV (c.1180–1254, pope from 1243), was again used.4 While the official teaching has never gone beyond asserting, on the one hand, the existence of purgatory—necessary because of the temporal punishment still to be paid by the repentant sinner—and, on the other, the usefulness of the intercession—in prayer or otherwise—of the living in reducing the suffering of the departed souls, the concept, as is well known, came to be greatly elaborated in ecclesial practice, preaching and pastoral care. That is a story on its own, and it has been amply documented,5 but need not detain us here, partly because any substantial discussion would take us too far afield, and partly because the basic contours are well known, due to the historical significance of the indulgence controversy for the rise of Protestantism. What has to be stressed is that, whatever the three-tiered notion of hell– purgatory–heaven might seem to suggest, purgatory was, even on Catholic understanding, a secondary and asymmetrical development. First, it was an intermediate and temporary stage on the soul’s way to its final destiny.6 Second, it was not only not on a par with heaven and hell, it was not even in the middle between them. Purgatory was a stopover, however painful

3 On the significance of these early pontifical and conciliar documents, see Le Goff (1984 [1981]) 283–86, and his Appendix II (pp. 362–66) on the history of the term; cf. Pater (1984) 121–24. 4 Esp. at the Twenty-Fifth Session (1563), which itself appealed to Canon 30 of the Decree of Justification at the Sixth Session (1547). Cf. DS 838 (ET 456; Innocent IV, 1254), 856 (ET 464; Lyon, 1274), 1304 (ET 693; Florence, 1439), 1580 (ET 840; Trent, 1547), and 1820 (ET 983; Trent, 1563). 5 Jacques Le Goff’s The Birth of Purgatory (1984 [1981]) has established itself as the standard account of it. 6 Caroline Bynum rightly emphasises the decisiveness of the moment of death (1995:280–81).

Introduction 10 and drawn out, on the way to heaven. Those who landed there upon death were destined, but not yet ready, for life eternal. That in popular imagination purgatory looked much more like hell than heaven may be an indication of the degree to which much of pastoral theology was in need of reorientation at the close of the Middle Ages. It might be noted here, not least because it will be an issue frequently tackled by Lutheran theologians, that the appearance—in a process of further differentiation, never sanctioned in the church’s official teaching—of the limbo of the fathers and the limbo of unbaptised children on the edges (limbus) of purgatory also signals some contradictions. The former is the resting place of the Old Testament saints until Christ’s ascension into heaven. As such, it is a temporary abode, essentially keeping in line with the whole concept of purgatory as both interim and heaven- oriented. The limbus infantium, however, was conceived as the permanent place of those otherwise innocent yet dying without baptism and therefore excluded from the beatific vision. The rediscovery of Aristotle was one of the most momentous events in the intellectual history of the Middle Ages.7 Some of his writings had, of course, been continuously known and transmitted in the West as well, but there was now a flood of new material. Not only were Latin translations made of his previously unknown works from Arabic and Greek; the primary texts, sometimes including false attributions as well, arrived accompanied with a great wealth of commentaries. Notably for my enquiry, Aristotle’s De anima became available before 1215, and interpretations by his most celebrated Greek and Arab commentators, Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. AD 200) and Averroes (1126–1198), respectively, arrived along with it. Averroes, ‘the last Islamic philosopher,’8 developed a doctrine of the unity of the intellect, which was arguably the most controversial theory in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.9 He taught that there was only one intellect, both passive and active, for all humanity. It was incorruptible and immortal, but existed outside the individual human souls, which only participated in it in a transient way while performing acts of knowledge. That

7 For this complex history, including the reconstruction in this and the following section, see Kristeller (1964), (1979) 181–96; Mojsisch (1982); Pater (1984); Greshake (1986a) 216–39; Pluta (1986); Bynum (1995) 227–317; Dales (1995); Oguejiofor (1995); and Wels (2007). 8 Pater (1984) 139. 9 So Mojsisch (1982) 344.

Introduction 11 effectively amounted to a denial of the immortality of the individual soul. Alexander, who— thanks to his Aristotle commentaries—earned the byname ‘the Exegete,’ represented a kind of materialism, interpreting the human soul as a material form, extended from the potency of matter. Identifying the active intellect with pure form, he also denied the immortality of the individual soul. There seems to be no scholarly agreement on the relative importance of Averroes and Alexander for the medieval scene. Paul Oskar Kristeller, for example, considers the Arab philosopher both more radical and more influential, while Olaf Pluta— representing probably more of a partisan view—insists not only that the Greek exegete posed a greater challenge, but also that his impact was rather tangible long before the sixteenth century.10 The influx of foreign intellectual property into the world of Latin Christendom had several consequences, among them the emancipation of philosophy, and the need to reconcile it with theology, based on revelation of which Aristotle’s or the Arabs’ thought was independent. It was perceived early on that the newly imported knowledge contradicted Christian doctrine at certain points, and one form of ‘reconciliation’ was its official condemnation, or at least the condemnation of its unacceptable details. Aristotelianism, broadly understood, however, was not to be so easily defeated, and ways had to be found or rather, developed, to meet the challenges it posed. At the beginning of the West’s systematic encounter with Greek and Arab philosophy stands Dominicus Gundissalinus (c.1110–after 1181), who was active in the famous ‘School of Toledo,’ translating works of Arab and Jewish thinkers, and later also the Corpus Aristotelicum Arabum—via Spanish—into Latin. His treatise De immortalitate animæ marks the beginning of a new era, when Aristotle’s concept of the soul inspired lines of reasoning that gradually replaced Platonic arguments for the immortality of the soul. He proposes four external and eight internal arguments. Members of the first set are essentially moral, based on the requirements of divine justice. His eight radices are more important both in the sense that he finds them more convincing and that they had an effective history, reaching well into the high Middle Ages. The most significant of them is perhaps the desiderium naturale argument, viz. that the soul has a natural desire for eternal happiness, which—given the principle of natural attainability of everything that is naturally desired—

10 Cf. Kristeller (1964) 75–76, (1979) 187; Pluta (1986) 11–12, 37–49.

Introduction 12 secures the desired conclusion. William of Auvergne (c.1180–1249), Bishop of Paris, is usually given the credit for being the first high scholastic philosopher who tried to reconcile Aristotle with Christian theology, especially in its Augustinian form. Yet he was a transitional thinker, and he paved the way both for the mature Aristotelianism of the Dominicans and—by his rejection of certain Aristotelian concepts—for the Aristotle criticism of the Franciscans later in the thirteenth century. Specifically, he works with, and defends, the Greek philosopher’s definition of the soul, but he still considers the soul a substance, and his argument for its immortality inevitably presupposes its substantiality, a markedly Platonic trait. The study and appropriation of Aristotle reached new heights in the work of Albert the Great (c.1193–1280), second perhaps to none among medieval thinkers in his range of interests and learning. He is generally noted for his open-mindedness towards Greek and Arab philosophy, but he sought to refute Averroes’ theory by arguing that since it is the intellect that makes us what we are, humans, thinking is a function of the human being rather than so external to her as to depend on another substance, viz., the universal intellect. He understands the human soul to be an immaterial substance whose function is to inform the body. His definition of the soul thus combines Aristotelian and Platonic elements, which he himself may never have noted, due to the then customary false attribution to Aristotle of the Liber de causis, a work which coloured—with distinctly Neo-Platonic traits—his interpretation of Aristotle. For the immortality of the soul, which he considered to be demonstrable by reason, he supplied eight proofs, but—given the soul’s substantive nature—the question does not seem to have been a real problem for him. The ultimate, if ultimately incomplete, synthesis of Aristotle and Christian theology was achieved by Albert’s most famous student, Thomas Aquinas (c.1225–1274). From Aristotelian hylomorphism, the notion that every subsisting entity is made up of a form informing matter, he developed a theory of ‘formal identity,’ which took the rational soul to be the form of the human person (homo) and the body her matter, informed directly by the soul rather than by a form of bodiliness. On Aquinas’ view, the soul is not itself a susbtance but a subsistent form, which means that it does not depend on the body for any of its activities and, hence, existence. He offers several arguments for the immortality of the rational soul. It cannot be destroyed accidentally, in the Aristotelian sense, for—unlike the animal soul—it subsists per se; nor can it be destroyed essentially beacuse—in contrast to

Introduction 13 the body—it possesses being in actuality rather than potentially. The soul cannot die, for it is not itself made up of form and matter, and destruction would mean precisely the separation of form and matter. Destruction always depends on contraries, and the intellect contains nothing contrary, for which reason it is incorruptible. Significantly, Thomas also retrieves the desiderium naturale argument from Dominicus Gundissalinus: the soul’s natural desire for perpetual existence cannot be in vain. Quite apart from the strength and validity of his arguments, there appears a deep fissure in Thomas’ thought, even if we grant him the desired conclusion of the soul’s existence without the body. However they may differ in their emphases, scholars generally agree that it is here that fundamental contradictions of Aquinas’ thought become most visible. He denies both that the soul is only accidentally related to the body, and that it ultimately depends on the senses and the body for knowledge (as Aristotle thought), but without explaining—rather than merely positing—another mode of knowing. Ultimately, Aristotelian hylomorphism ‘posed for the scholastics an insoluble problem, which even Aquinas could not work out in a completely satisfactory manner.’11 If Thomas’ work constitutes the high-water mark of medieval Aristotelianism, the tide was turning already in his life, with his Franciscan colleagues picking up and developing different strands from the earlier tradition. Bonaventure (1221–1274), for example, also starts with the Aristotelian definition of the soul as the form of the body, but—instead of formal identity—he operates with a theory of universal hylomorphism, attributing a form– matter structure to all substances, including both the human soul and the body on their own. In other words, on his view, each had its own form and matter. At the heart of his theology is desire, the desire of the soul for God and for the body (and, possibly, also of the body for the soul), which duality inevitably resulted in some tensions in his thought. Even apart from the ambiguity of desire itself (it is both an expression of love and a need that must be satisfied for perfect joy), is happiness a result of the soul’s union with God, or with the body? There need not be any tension after the resurrection, but prior to it, Bonaventure’s insistence on the soul’s immediate enjoyment of God in the beatific vision is difficult to reconcile with his notion that the soul desires reunification with the body. Duns Scotus (1270–1308) may have played a more important role than Bonaventure

11 Dales (1995) 201; cf. Mojsisch (1982) 346, Pater (1984) 165–71, Greshake (1986a) 231–32, Pluta (1986) 18– 19, Bynum (1995) 268.

Introduction 14 in transmitting Aristotle to the Franciscan tradition, but he was also more critical of the Greek philosopher. Probably as a result of his Oxford education and his study of Aristotle’s Analytica, he set very rigorous norms for philosophical demonstrability, and found that, measured against those high standards, philosophical arguments for the immortality of the soul were inconclusive. Most importantly, he countered the argument from desire, which we have repeatedly encountered, by suggesting that for it to hold, it should be demonstrated that the desire for immortality can indeed be fulfilled in nature, otherwise its status as a natural desire is questionable. That we all want to escape death is an insufficient proof of that desire’s naturalness, for by the same logic the immortality of animals could also be concluded. He likewise denied that the soul’s independence of the body in terms of its intellectual activities would entail its independence in terms of existence. The ethical argument he finds even weaker because it is only a posteriori reasoning, not based on the nature of the soul. That is not to say that Scotus altogether denied the value of philosophical arguments; rather, he found then merely probable rather than demonstrative. Certainty, for which he strove, was only available in faith. In his critique of what is available to reason, William of Ockham (c.1280–c.1350) went considerably further than Duns Scotus. His critique of arguments from authority as well as his famous epistemological razor worked to sharpen the criteria for rational thought beyond his predecessors’ norms. Not only do arguments for the immortality of the soul turn out to be inconclusive in their light; reason must also conclude that the rational soul is mortal. Substances can only be experienced through their accidents, Ockham holds. Hence, from the experience of thinking and willing we need not, and therefore should not, jump to the conclusion that they must be ascribed to a form of the body, that is, the soul. And even if that attribution were granted, it would be rational to say that it is a corruptible form of the corruptible body. As for Aristotle, Ockham curtly dismissed him on the question because of the Greek philosopher’s inherent ambiguities. It is not the very claims such as the Aristotelian definition of the soul as the form of the body or the immortality of the soul that Ockham negates, but their demonstrability by reason. Their content he does accept as articles of faith. With Ockham, we have reached the end of high scholasticism. Before moving on to a brief review of the late medieval and Renaissance scene, it is worth noting that one upshot of the thirteenth-century debates about the nature and fate of the soul was the beatific vision

Introduction 15 controversy. Benedict XII’s (c.1285–1342, pope from 1334) doctrinal clarification, in his 1336 bull Benedictus Deus,12 of the state of the blessed souls in heaven followed upon a controversy that had been occasioned by his predecessor’s preaching, but whose roots reached back to the previous century. When Jacques Fournier, now as pope, declared that the souls of the blessed saw divine essence clearly and directly, he did not altogether exclude the possibility—which seems to have been his private opinion—that the intensity of the vision might increase after the resurrection, but he certainly voiced a view that had gained ascendancy in the course of the thirteenth century, and stood in marked distinction to the beliefs of twelfth-century Cistercians such as Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153). It was a result of the Thomist doctrine of formal identity, which had momentous consequences for eschatological thought. On the one hand, it relocated personal identity and made a requirement of material identity in the case of the human person’s reconstitution on the last day superfluous. Any matter, by virtue of being informed by a particular form (soul), was its matter, even if it comprised of particles that had earlier belonged to somebody else’s body. This approach is certainly not without its problems, and it is perhaps not very surprising that exponents of the formal view of identity did not draw out the full implications of their position, and usually argued, instead, for a material identity between this worldly and eschatologically reconstituted bodies. The first reaction of near-contemporaries, who sometimes saw the consequences more clearly than a Thomas himself, was also more of rejection than of enthusiasm as epitomised by the condemnations at Paris and Oxford in the 1270s and ’80s. But if formal identity seems to signal a victory of mind over matter, it was something of a Pyrrhic victory, for the soul not only wrested identity from the body but also acquired many of its qualities, witness the late medieval abundance of somatomorphic souls in visions and on journeys into the otherworld.13 There was little the soul was now incapable of experiencing, and there seemed to be no need to deny or delay the vision of God to blessed souls once they had the capacity to receive it. Unlike the understanding of Bernard, the disembodied, yet somatomorphic, soul could now attain to the fullness of bliss by enjoying the sight of God, without having to wait for the reconstitution of the body at the

12 DS 1000–02 (ET 530–31). 13 Cf. Zaleski (1987) 51–52; Bynum (1995:291) also borrows the term.

Introduction 16 general resurrection. Aquinas already proposed the argument,14 which, after initial resistance, became increasingly popular in the early fourteenth century and was finally enshrined in Benedictus Deus.

4. On the eve of the Reformation

We have seen that after Aquinas, a tradition gained ascendancy that was critical of the extent to which Aristotle—and in general, reason—could be useful in establishing the soul’s immortality. Jean Buridan (1300–1358), rector of the University of Paris, may have been an even more radical critic than Ockham. At any rate, he presented a threefold typology of Aristotle interpretations that included, in addition to the truth of faith, the doctrines of Averroes and Alexander of Aphrodisias, and he declared that the latter had the strongest case from the point of view of natural reason. While Buridan did accept the immortality of the soul from revelation, he emphasised that it cannot be demonstrated from reason. Olaf Pluta, surely following a partisan agenda, argues that Buridan’s work had far-reaching influence, and we can rightly speak of a ‘school of Buridan’ in the later fourteenth and fifteenth centuries that included, among others, Pierre d’Ailly (1351–1420) and Laurence of Lindores (c.1375–after 1438), rector and governor of the University of St. Andrews.15 In most cases, however, Pluta must qualify the ‘Buridanism’ of his heroes; and, even in strong cases, it rarely extends beyond a reverberation of the threefold typology with the rationality of Alexandrism affirmed. While Pluta is overstating the case, the presence of a tradition in late medieval and Renaissance thought, ultimately culminating in the work of Pietro Pomponazzi, that challenged reason’s power to grasp the soul’s immortality should be freely acknowledged. Kristeller, in fact, deems the entire Aristotelian tradition, including Aquinas, not particularly congenial to the doctrine of immortality, but he nonetheless acknowledges the existence of a narrower philosophical trend, which he prefers to call ‘Italian Aristotelianism’ rather than ‘Paduan Averroism,’ of which Pomponazzi was a characteristic, yet original—and by no means the only—representative. That, however, was not the only development as the Middle Ages were drawing to a

14 Summa contra gentiles IV:91.1, cited by Bynum (1995) 266–67. 15 Pluta (1986) 38–49. For the larger scene outlined in the following paragraphs, cf. also n. 7, above.

Introduction 17 close. The mid-fifteenth century saw the rise of the Florentine Academy, perhaps the centre par excellence of Renaissance Platonism. As Pluta champions a school of radical Aristotelians apparently advocating a doctrine of the soul’s mortality as the most rational position, Kristeller argues for the existence of a larger body of humanist literature, predating the Academy, that not only exhibits an interest in Plato, but is also specifically concerned about the immortality of the soul. It may indeed have provided a vital context for Marsilio Ficino’s (1433–1499) eloquent defence of the Platonic-Augustinian doctrine. At the heart of Ficino’s reasoning is the natural desire argument, which is hardly surprising if we bear in mind that his whole theological outlook centred, like Bonaventure’s, on the desire for God, to be reached by contemplation. Indeed, a crucial historical significance of his work was that it supplied later defendants of the doctrine with plentiful ammunition for the debate. Ficino’s influence will be of significance as we now turn to the last chapter in the pre-Reformation history of the immortality of the soul, the clash between Lateran V and Pomponazzi. At the eighth session of the Fifth Lateran Council, on 19th December 1513, Pope Leo X issued the bull Apostolici regiminis, by which the doctrine of the human soul’s immortality became an officially promulgated dogma of the Catholic Church.16 As the Paduan philosopher emerged from a long intellectual tradition, the council’s doctrinal formulation also had its prehistory. In 1312, the Council of Vienne—in what has been called ‘a striking instance of the impact which a hunderd years of Aristotelian speculation at Paris and elsewhere were to have even on theology and church dogma’17—declared the rational soul to be the form of the human body.18 The formulation was repeated two centuries later at Lateran V in a passage whose primary import was to reject the mortality and the unity of the human intellect. Interestingly, the earlier conciliar adoptation of an Aristotelian insight is here used as supporting evidence in an argument against two interpretations, now officially deemed heretical, of the same philosophical tradition which, historically, may have been closer to the original than the favoured reading. The Lateran Council named no names, but its declaration is understood to be directed against Pomponazzi, who had been lecturing on Aristotle’s De anima at Padua for

16 DS 1440 (ET 738). 17 Kristeller (1979) 186. 18 DS 902 (ET 481).

Introduction 18 twenty years. The main driving force behind the council’s declaration was Giles of Viterbo (1469–1532), Prior General of the Augustinians after 1502, who delivered the opening speech at Lateran V. He had studied in Padua, but was thoroughly disappointed by the form of Aristotelianism offered there, and moved to Florence, where he joined the Academy. It is most likely that Ficino’s influence thus stands behind Apostolici regiminis, which ‘is as much the echo of Renaissance Platonism as the decree of Vienne about the soul as form of the body had been the echo of thirteenth-century Aristotelianism.’19 Whatever the intention of the council fathers at Lateran V, their declaration was not the last word on the matter, for a few years later Pomponazzi published his main work on the topic, the Tractatus de immortalitate animæ (1516), in which he concluded that—on a purely rational basis, ‘leaving aside revelation and miracles, and remaining entirely within natural limits’20—the soul’s immortality cannot be established. He presents his opinion—which is closest to that of Alexander of Aphrodisias, who was becoming more readily available in new Latin translations around 1500—against three others, viz., Plato, Averroes, Aquinas, and it is clear that he reacts to Platonism as propagated by Ficino. His central argument is that— although it has no material substratum, and in a subjective sense does not inhere in the body—the soul depends on the body for knowledge. Pomponazzi denies the Platonic possibility of pure intelligible knowledge, and concludes that the soul is essentially mortal. Nonetheless, he both upholds the immortality doctrine as an article of faith, and also admits a kind of secondary immortality on philosophical grounds.21 It has been debated, especially in the light of his apparent retractions in the final chapter, whether he ultimately really gave in to revealed truth, or his restatements of official ecclesiastical teaching and declarations of submission to church authority were merely a decoy manoeuvre.22 That, however, is largely a question of his far-reaching Wirkungsgeschichte,23 which is—however fascinating—another

19 Kristeller (1979) 191; cf. Constant (2002) 357–60, Wels (2007) 197. 20 Pomponazzi (1965 [1516]) 281. That itself was in defiance of Lateran V, where the condemnation included those who maintained the disputed position ‘at least according to philosophy’ (DS 1440, ET 738). 21 In assigning the human soul a kind of middle position between mortality and immortality, he proves himself heir of much of the Renaissance ‘philosophy of man.’ 22 Incidentally, they did not ward off the Dominicans’ wrath and the burning of his books, though not of himself: his life was spared, thanks to the protecting hand of influential friends such as papal secretary Pietro Bembo (1470–1547). 23 His work provoked an immediate controversy in the course of which Pomponazzi himself produced further rejoinders, but it also reached far into the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In fact, the debate has still not

Introduction 19 story, and neither need nor can be followed here, especially as both Luther and Melanchthon have been accused, probably not without justification, of being ignorant of Pomponazzi and the controversy around him.24 On the eve of the Reformation, there is, then, the official reading of Aristotle, also enshrined in conciliar pronouncements. On the other hand, we find a variety of interpretations with varying, but not incommensurate, degrees of persuasive power, some of which might even pose a rational challenge to doctrinal assertions. Further, the Ockhamist position may be singled out as yet another option, distinguishable from the Scotist tradition at least in terms of its approach to Aristotle, whom it curtly ignores in the discussion of the soul’s immortality, for the Greek philosopher had written ambiguously on the question. Somewhat earlier, in the 1310s, Henry of Harclay (c.1270–c.1317) had similarly asserted both that the soul was mortal and that it was immortal according to Aristotle. That is precisely the point. Notwithstanding Rome’s official decrees favouring a particular philosophical view that happened to be Aquinas’ reading of Aristotle, and asserting the immortality of the soul, whether or not Aristotle had taught the doctrine, and whether or not it could be established by rational argument alone (or at all), were and remained controversial issues in the centuries leading up to the Reformation.

been settled once and for all, but continues to make waves in scholarly circles. 24 Cf., e.g., Headley (1973) 76–77, and see n. 127 on p. 104, below.

1 Luther

Martin Luther (1483–1546) belongs with the most prominent figures of western ecclesiastical and cultural history, and as a virtually peerless giant of the sixteenth century, he occupies a position in many ways unique in Reformation studies. He stands essentially alone in having received tremendous scholarly attention as regards the soul’s immortality. In sharp contrast to the largely unexplored rest of the sixteenth century, Luther’s views have been painstakingly scrutinised and reconstructed, although it must be admitted that the tremendous amount of scholarly attention lavished on his position has not resulted in a lasting consensus. There was a time, a good half century or so ago, when it seemed to have been achieved, but, whatever the merits of the then fashionable Ganztodthese for systematic theology, its historical applicability to Luther has since been seriously—and, in my opinion, rightly—questioned. My explorations must nonetheless begin here not only because most of our current knowledge originates in that context either directly or indirectly, but also because it provides both a point of connection to, and a point of departure from, the medieval story which I sketchily outlined in sections 3 and 4 of the Introduction. Not only does Luther’s appearance on the stage of doctrinal history stand in great chronological proximity to the bull Apostolici regiminis (1513) and Pomponazzi’s De immortalitate animæ (1516), but it was also the Reformer’s reaction to the Fifth Lateran Council that triggered a discussion of his views of the state of the dead in the interwar period.

1.1 The Ganztodthese in the context of twentieth-century Luther reception

The original dispute arose in the mid-1920s between Carl Stange and Paul Althaus, whose

20 1 Luther 21 contributions mostly appeared in the early volumes of the Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie.1 The journal2 as the locus of the debate is a telling detail of the larger significance of the exchange, which opened a new chapter both in Luther scholarship and in Protestant systematic theology.3 While Stange suggested that the Reformer had altogether rejected the immortality doctrine, in Althaus’ view he had simply regarded the conciliar pronouncement as a superfluous affirmation of a self-evident truth. The arguments were carried forward, the positions further developed, and the debate broadened over the next years and, in Althaus’ case, decades,4 but the discussion soon outgrew its original setting and was carried over from Luther studies into systematic and New Testament theology, from Lutheranism to Reformed Protestantism, and from Germany to neighbouring cultures as well. A broad consensus emerged in mid-century Continental Protestantism around the view that death involves the whole human person, body and soul. It was expounded in various forms by German, Swiss and Dutch New Testament scholars, church historians, systematicians and historians of religion, both Lutheran and Reformed, such as Peter Meinhold, Werner Elert, Helmut Thielicke, Karl Barth, Gerardus van der Leeuw or Oscar Cullmann.5 The Ganztodthese, as the common central insight of this school of thought has sometimes been called, has remained influential for decades chiefly in and through the work of those prominent representatives. On the one hand, this theological position continued,

1 Stange (1925a, 1925b, 1926) and Althaus (1926a, 1926b). 2 Stange, who was, incidentally, the successor of Paul Althaus, Sr. in Göttingen, founded and edited the periodical and wrote a great many papers for it himself. 3 On Luther as the only Reformer with major significance for the renewal of twentieth-century systematics, quite apart from the specific problem of individual eschatology, see Gestrich (1999), esp. pt. IV (pp. 42–46). 4 Stange (1928, 1930, 1932a, 1932b); Althaus (1930, 1941, 1950). Stange’s literary output thinned out considerably after his retirement in 1935, until the last decade of his long life (1870–1959). After the early 1930s, he seems not to have come back to the question again. Althaus developed a highly successful textbook on eschatology; Die letzten Dinge went through, including several major revisions, ten editions between 1922– 1970. His 1962 Theology of Martin Luther (ET 1966), however, offered only a brief discussion of the last things (pp. 339–54). 5 Meinhold (1936) 396–98; Elert (1940) 631, (1960) 513; Thielicke (1970 [1942]), and see his comment in Althaus (1950) 257; for Barth, see §46–§47 of CD III/2, esp. §47.5 ‘Ending Time’ (pp. 587–640), Barth (1957), and cf. Koch (1992), esp. pt. II. (pp. 470–78); Leeuw (1956). Cullmann—who was bilingual, held parallel tenured positions in Basel and Paris and, though himself Lutheran, lectured at Reformed seminaries for decades, and spent over half of his life in France—quite stunningly embodies the confessional and cultural breadth of this ‘school.’ His greatly influential Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the Dead? was first delivered as the 1955 Ingersoll Lecture at Harvard Divinity School. It went through several English and seven German editions until 1988 and has been translated into French, Spanish, Italian as well; the English version is currently available in at least two different online editions.

1 Luther 22 and perhaps still continues, to acquire new exponents, including some prominent figures of the German theological scene. Most notably Tübingen systematician Eberhard Jüngel represented a similar approach in the last third of the last century.6 As late as 1997, Reiner Preul, professor of practical theology in Kiel, discussed Luther’s Sermon von der Bereitung zum Sterben under the title ‘Der Tod des ganzen Menschen.’7 On the other hand, however, the thesis has also been increasingly challenged, especially since the 1970s, in Protestant theological circles as well.8 Althaus himself seems to have led the way in turning the tide. In 1930 he stated that ‘at death, according to Luther, the soul (in the psychological sense) also dies.’9 Nevertheless, his reconstruction of Luther, which seems to have won the day against Stange’s more exclusionary interpretation, always left more room for a reassessment of the Reformer’s view on immortality, and twenty years later in a highly concentrated and significantly titled lecture, ‘Retraktationen zur Eschatologie,’ he raised six questions against the then current understanding of the completeness of death. His questions concerned both the historical and the systematic aspects of the matter, New Testament and Reformation scholarship (Paul and Luther) as well as theological and philosophical anthropology. Althaus rightly recognised internal tensions in Luther’s thought both in terms of a traditionalist ontology and its theological reinterpretation, and in terms of eschatological imagery (soul sleep and immediate entry into the heavenly community).10 A few years later Heinrich Bornkamm, while still insisting on the unity of the whole human being, also argued that, as heir to the intellectual traditions of the West, Luther self-evidently accepted its anthropology with its two or threefold structure. That need not be challenged, so Bornkamm; what must be asked

6 His 1971 Tod appeared in nine printings in Germany by 1993 (ET 1974, US ed. 1975). 7 I am here discussing mainstream German Protestantism. That Adventists from Canright (1882 [1870]) to Froom (1965–66) to Ball (2008) advocate mortalism and interpret Luther and the Reformation accordingly is less remarkable or relevant. Given the points of connection to the Lutheran scene, it might still be worth noting that in a two-part English language paper on Luther’s eschatology in the 1980s, German Adventist Winfried Vogel sided with Stange against Althaus and, rather confusingly, claimed Ole Mondalsli for support (1986:263). For Mondalsli, see n. 32 on p. 25, below. 8 For some criticism from beyond that circle, cf., e.g., Pieper (1963 [1959]), Schmaus (1963 [1959]), Ahlbrecht (1964), Greshake (1969, 1975, 1986b) and Hampel (1974). 9 Althaus (1930) 20: ‘nach Luther auch die “Seele” (im psychologischen Sinne) im Tode stirbt.’ 10 Althaus (1950) 254–55. The rest of the paper is no less significant for the systematic question, but a reconstruction of developments along those lines cannot be attempted within the confines of this investigation.

1 Luther 23 is what he (Luther) made of it theologically.11 A similarly mild shift occurred in New Testament studies as well.12 Cullmann, with his radical rejection of the immortality doctrine as irreconcilable with the New Testament witness, is often taken to affirm that the soul dies with the body.13 It is true, the most he is willing to concede is ‘a kind of approximation’ or ‘a certain analogy to the “immortality of the soul”,’ and he never ceases to emphasise the radicality of the distinction between Greek thought and biblical revelation or to insist that the continued existence of the dead ‘does not correspond to the natural essence of the soul.’14 Yet, in the last chapter of his immortality lecture, he faces the problem of the interim state squarely—and offers an answer in the affirmative! In explicit rejection of the Barthian position, he asserts the existence of an interim state in time in which the dead are nearer to God. At the end of the decade, Hans von Campenhausen took up a materially similar but interpretively even more flexible position.15 He argued, like Cullmann before him, that neither the Old nor the New Testament showed any evidence of immortality as a quality of the human being, but in a few undeveloped systematic-reflective remarks von Campenhausen, on the one hand, assigned the problem to the realm of anthropology and, on the other, declared himself open to a ‘so to say theological [understanding of] immortality.’16 In the same dialogic volume, Wilhelm Anz acknowledged Luther’s indebtedness to a philosophical metaphysics and his presupposition of the soul’s immortality while recognising the theological inadequacy of those insights.17 Later in the decade, Ulrich Asendorf in his important book-length study of Luther’s eschatology altogether refrained from raising the ontological question and quite emphatically dismissed the whole conundrum of the Stange–

11 Bornkamm (1953) 76–91, esp. 84–85. 12 The significance of this development lies in the fact that the sola scriptura principle remained operative in Protestant theology, which therefore found itself beholden to biblical scholarship. If scriptural evidence for the Ganztodthese is found wanting, it will inevitably have repercussions for the topic in other theological disciplines as well. 13 Cf. esp. Pieper (1963 [1959]) and Schmaus (1963 [1959]) 312. 14 Cullmann (1965 [1955]) 44, emphasis original. 15 The material agreement between Cullmann and von Campenhausen extends to their rejection of the immortality doctrine as unbiblical but not to the evaluation of the evidence for an interim state. Von Campenhausen takes that concept, too, to be alien to the New Testament (1963 [1959]:310). 16 In the original: ‘eine sozusagen theologische Unsterblichkeit’ (1963:311). 17 Anz (1963 [1962]) 250–51.

1 Luther 24

Althaus debate.18 He was able to do so in large part because he conceived of eschatology more as an approach to, than as a locus of, theology and devoted a bare eight pages of a total of nearly 300 to death and related topics19—but that itself was surely a sign of the changing theological climate. And as an indication that the gradual shifts made inroads into systematic theology as well, let me just refer to Thielicke, in whose later work a modification of his mid- century position is tangible.20 Narrowing the focus to Luther scholarship, those developments came to full fruition in the early 1980s. Three studies appeared within a year of each other in 1982–1983 which represented major new interpretations of the evidence. Gerhard Ebeling published the second part of the middle volume of his Lutherstudien, a magisterial commentary on the philosophical theses of the Disputatio de homine, which gave him occasion, by way of the third thesis, to review Luther’s position on the soul’s immortality in great detail.21 Perhaps as a consequence of his relative proximity in age to the protagonists of the old debate,22 he positioned himself between Althaus and Stange; he essentially sided with the former but sought to throw appreciative light on the concerns of the latter theologian as well.23 He works out, and rightly emphasises, the consistent distinction Luther maintains between the philosophical and theological understanding of immortality and his resistance to an ontological grounding of the soul’s immortality.24 He argues, against Meinhold, who blamed the apparent prominence of the immortality doctrine in the great Genesisvorlesung on the Melanchthonian persuasion of its early editor,25 that it is not biblical thinking that is accommodated to philosophical thought here, but much rather the philosophical concept of the soul’s immortality is integrated into biblical thinking and correspondingly reshaped in the

18 Asendorf (1967) 288n. 19 Asendorf (1967) 285–93. Consequently, as a discussion of Luther’s understanding of the last things per se, much shorter treatments like Thiede (1982), Mondalsli (1983) and perhaps even Vogel (1986) or Lohse (1999 [1995]) 325–32 can exhibit an explanatory force and a concentration of primary evidence comparable to Asendorf’s. 20 Cf. Thielicke (1978) 549–50. 21 Ebeling (1982) 60–183. 22 He earned his doctorate with a thesis on Luther’s interpretation of the gospels back in 1938, so he must have been aware of the controversy from his youth. 23 Ebeling (1982) 145–46. 24 Ebeling (1982) 182. 25 Meinhold (1936) 394–98.

1 Luther 25 process.26 Whereas Ebeling sought, rightly, in my view, to propose carefully weighed and circumspectly articulated interpretations commensurate with the complexity of the evidence,27 two younger scholars offered bolder, but mutually exclusive, readings of the Luther corpus. Both of them were explicitly reacting against the Ganztodthese.28 Werner Thiede (1982) revived the age-old concept of soul sleep,29 whereas Fritz Heidler (1983) claimed Luther as a proponent of a robust doctrine of immortality. In order to buttress their respective convictions, both enterprises must oversimplify the matter and explain away some disturbing evidence—usually what is most strongly claimed by the alternative reading.30 On the whole, Thiede seems to have the stronger claim, which he has restated several times,31 and the view that Luther conceived of the interim state in terms of soul sleep now enjoys some currency32—not without justification, I might add, although it is important to emphasise that Thiede overstates the case and presses the evidence into all too neat a formulation.33 Heidler, on the other hand, seems to be appealed to only by Catholic authors.34 It was hardly an accident that the Stange–Althaus debate took place in the 1920s, at a time when liberal Protestantism, together with its triumphalist eschatology, was radically challenged by two new theological movements, Dialectical Theology and the Luther

26 Ebeling (1982) 174. 27 For evidence of Ebeling’s influence on later readings, see, e.g., Asendorf (1998) 126–27n. Of the authors discussed in this section, it is probably Ebeling who left the strongest imprint on my own analysis of Luther. 28 Thiede (1982) 24, Heidler (1983) 9–10. 29 The thesis that Luther expounded a doctrine of soul sleep goes back at least as far as Francis Blackburne in the eighteenth century (Secker (1967) 422). 30 On the internal tensions in Luther, see, in addition to Althaus (1950) 254–55, Secker (1967) and Vogel (1986) 262–63. 31 Thiede (1991:96–99, 1993, 2001) and cf. (2005) 800. 32 Cf. Mondalsli (1983) 334–35, Pinnock (1986) 241–42, Lohse (1999 [1995]) 326, Link (2004), Juhász (2008) 156–70, to which list Adventist readings like Ball (2008) 28–33 might be easily added (cf. n. 7 on p. 22, above). Mondalsli’s essay is a useful overview of Luther’s eschatological thought, but as its very structure betrays, its most significant contribution lies in the interpretation of the Reformer’s twofold norm of the last judgement (pt. III, pp. 336–44). The section on the interim state (pt. II, pp. 334–36) is rather short, just over a page. 33 Cf. Lohse (1999 [1995]) 328. 34 Cf. Greshake (1986b) 140–41.

1 Luther 26

Renaissance.35 Whatever the merits and shortcomings of anthropocentric liberal and christocentric Neo-Protestantism, the continuation of human identity beyond death as a necessary prerequisite of a doctrine of the general resurrection is a genuinely interesting issue—and a serious theological task. Whether it is best, or whether it can at all be, described as the immortality of the soul will depend on a number of considerations, chiefly on the interpretation of the soul and its relation to other key concepts like body, mind, person, personhood, self, the ‘I’ etc. A systematic theology that seeks to offer a contemporary interpretation of the ancient belief in the resurrection must take into account the development of human thought in those regards, but that development itself is not a theological issue, only provides a context for theology. It could be argued that the modern Protestant debate about the immortality of the soul is largely misguided in that it concentrates on an anthropological issue instead of the theological question, or, perhaps, it mistakes an anthropological question for a theological problem. Be that as it may on the systematic side, when theology turns to the very tradition from which it emerges, it must be aware of the changing meanings of certain terms and the development of human thought in general, which has always provided the context for it as faith seeking understanding. Historical theology must especially be aware of, and provide for, the need of translation between the ages. Later concerns, results of developments in psychology as the science of the human soul, must not be simply read back into theological expressions of earlier ages, in our case, Luther, who surely does lend himself to contested readings by virtue of internal tensions at least in his formulations if not in his theological insight. The fact that systematic, and perhaps somewhat misconstrued systematic, concerns got mixed in with the historical question since the interwar period has, positively, inspired an intense engagement with Luther’s individual eschatology, which has resulted in a much improved understanding of the historical evidence with all its tensions and internal contradictions. Negatively, however, the Ganztodthese or the immortality/resurrection dichotomy also served to confound rather than clarify a body of evidence that was rather

35 On the larger context, cf. Greshake (1986b) 144–46 and Ruhbach (1999) 40–41; on the Luther Renaissance as ‘the other departure,’ see Assel (1994). Given the points of contact, alluded to above (cf. n. 12 on p. 23), of my narrower theme to New Testament studies, it might be pointed out here that liberal Protestantism was also challenged in yet another way by the work of Johannes Weiß and Albert Schweitzer which effectively put an end to the Old Quest for the historical Jesus, a quintessentially liberal Protestant undertaking, and resulted in a renewed theological interest in eschatology.

1 Luther 27 complex in and of itself, even without alien concepts layered over it.

1.2 Luther on Lateran V

The records show Luther to have alluded, directly or indirectly, about two dozen times36 to the Fifth Lateran Council in the course of his career,37 practically always disparagingly.38 Temporally, the references appear in two broad periods. Half of them date from the formative years of Luther’s reform movement between the late 1510s and the very early 1520s. The rest come from the last decade and a half of the Reformer’s life, that is, after 1530. Broadly speaking, two themes surface time and again in the texts,39 but there is no correlation between the temporal and the thematic distribution. Both central topics appear repeatedly in both the early and the late periods. One is the immortality of the soul; the other, the reform of the church, the authority of councils and the pope’s primacy over them, that is, ecclesiology. My concern is with the former, but the latter issue is relevant insofar as it may suggest an independent ground for Luther’s dislike for Lateran V. As the Reformer himself reported both publicly and privately,40 Cardinal Cajetan (1468–1534)—in what has been called ‘the most terrible single ordeal of [Luther’s] life’41— cited the council’s condemnation of an earlier conciliar position (that of Basel) as proof of

36 An automated search turns up nearly a hundred references to ‘Lateran’ from over sixty works, but the majority of them are either to another Lateran Council, mostly the fourth, or to the great church building there. A number of the references appear in others’ (such as editors’ or correspondents’) texts. The allusions are sometimes phrased in terms of ‘the latest council’ (‘novissimum concilium’). 37 Luther’s verdict on Lateran V has been a topic of some scholarly interest; cf., e.g., Köhler (1900) 100–15, Stange (1928) and Headley (1973). 38 The only instance when Luther cites the council’s dogmatisation of the soul’s immortality with approval appears in his 1519 Commentary on Galatians (WA 2:541.16–23); cf. Ebeling (1982) 146–47. A late gloss from 1538 and a table talk from the following year are best described as factual without value judgement. Commenting on the advice of a cardinals’ committee commissioned by Pope Paul III (1468–1549, pope from 1534), Luther correctly adds, when the text speaks of an earlier recommendation that university lecturers should be reminded no to teach godless things in questions like the world’s createdness or eternity, that they should also teach the soul’s immortality: ‘Et docerent Animam esse immortalem secundum Decretum Leonis Decimi in Concilio Lateranensi etc.’ (gloss to WA 50:303.28). For the table talk (WA TR 4:290.18–20 and 24– 29, Nr. 4390; 1539) cf. p. 46, below. See also n. 61 on p. 31, below. 39 Köhler identified seven issues on which Luther commented concerning Lateran V (1900:100–15, esp. 102). 40 In the published report of the exchange in the Proceedings at Augsburg (1518; LW 31:262 = WA 2:8.10–12) and in a letter to Spalatin, dated after 14 Oct 1518 (WA BR 1:219.36–38; Nr. 102). 41 Headley (1973) 63.

1 Luther 28 the pope’s overriding authority.42 Johann Crotus Rubeanus (c.1480–c.1539) also reminded Luther in a letter dated 28th April 1520 that Lateran V had recognised papal authority.43 Those exchanges surely did not warm Luther to the most recent council, to which might be added his own fruitless efforts to secure a new council, that failed to materialise until the convocation of the Tridentinum towards the end of his life. Back in late 1518, he did make a notarised appeal to a new council.44 In a letter to Spalatin at the end of October, he had announced his plan with specific reference to the possible failure of the appeal of the University of Paris,45 in which struggle the pope again appealed to Lateran V. Such experiences probably went a long way to predispose Luther against the council and significantly coloured his view of its achievement. That attitude is worth bearing in mind as we now turn to his references in which the dogmatisation of the soul’s immortality is evaluated. One of the most pointed formulations can be read in his 1520 address To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation, where he supports a demand for the reformation of the Roman Curia with the argument that in outdoing all kings in splendour and pomp, the papal court has hindered study and prayer so much that now ‘they are hardly able to speak about the faith at all. This they proved quite flagrantly at this last Roman council, in which, among many other childish and frivolous things, they decreed that the soul of man is immortal.’46 At around the same time, Luther gives a longer list of such childish articles of faith that the pope has established for his believers. I nevertheless allow that the pope may establish articles of his faith for his faithful such as the bread and the wine are transubstantiated in the sacrament, the divine essence neither begets nor is begotten, the soul is the substantial form of the human body, himself is the emperor of the world and the king of heaven and God on earth, the soul is immortal, and all such endless portents in the Roman dunghill of decrees…47

42 For Cajetan’s own position on Apostolici regiminis, which he refused to sign, see Wels (2007) 198. 43 WA BR 2:88.37–38 (Nr. 281). As the editors point out, Crotus’ letter may still be at work behind a rhetorical question in the Address to the Christian Nobility (1520; WA 6:448.22–23). 44 WA 2:36–40. 45 LW 48:90–91, Nr. 28 (WA BR 1:224.10–13, Nr. 105; 31 Oct 1518). 46 LW 44:163 (WA 6:432.30–33). 47 Assertio omnium articulorum M. Lutheri (1520/1521): ‘Permitto tamen, quod Papa condat articulos suae fidei et suis fidelibus, quales sunt, panem et vinum transsubstantiari in sacramento, Essentiam dei nec generare nec generari, Animam esse formam substantialem corporis humani, Se esse Imperatorem mundi et regem coeli et deum terrenum, Animam esse immortalem, Et omnia illa infinita portenta in Romano sterquilinio Decretorum’

1 Luther 29

We hear a similar tone a decade later in the 1531 Warning to His Dear German People, When the last Lateran council was to be concluded in Rome under Pope Leo,48 among other articles it was decreed that one must believe the soul to be immortal. From this one may gather that they make eternal life an object of sheer mockery and contempt. In this way they confess that it is a common belief among them that there is no eternal life, but that they now wish to proclaim this by means of a bull.49

And, to quote a last example, in a 1535 sermon50 that Ebeling rightly introduces in the discussion,51 Luther contrasts, to illustrate God’s providential care, the particularly evil state of the world at the time of Christ with the present, more tolerable, age. Although the situation is bad enough, yet the worst is spared. ‘Now not so evil, although there are many who do not believe in the resurrection, yet that is not openly preached. Had God not restrained the pope and the cardinals, it would have already occurred, for thirty years ago they decided whether the soul were immortal.’52 What transpires from these passages is not only a resistance to Lateran V in general53 or an ironic stance over against the doctrine of the soul’s immortality but, more disturbingly, an apparent juxtaposition of that doctrine with the resurrection and life eternal. Stange may have been right, after all. On the one hand, the council’s teaching is ‘childish’ and ‘frivolous’; the pope is sarcastically allowed to decree such a thing for his church, where transubstantiation and his leadership are also enacted as binding beliefs. On the other hand, Luther concludes from the conciliar decision (‘From this one may gather’) that papists do no believe in eternal life. In fact, the decree amounts to a public proclamation of such unfaith, and it is only thanks to God’s very special guidance that the false view is not openly preached ‘for thirty years ago they decided whether the soul were immortal.’ Luther’s (or his transcriber’s) Latin is indeed somewhat confused here. The reported question form (sit

(WA 7:131.37–132.4). ET foreseen for LW ns 1.36. 48 Pope Leo X (1475–1521, pope from 1513). 49 LW 47:37–38 (WA 30III:304.3–7). 50 Predigt am Tage Johannes des Täufers, nachmittags (1535, Nr. 34). 51 Ebeling (1982) 148n. 52 ‘Iam non so bos, Quanquam multi sint, qui non credunt resurrectionem, tamen non publice praedicatur. Si deus non gesteuret papae et Cardinalibus, iam wers auffkomen, quia ante 30 annos concluserunt, num anima sit immortalis’ (WA 41:341.20–23). 53 Of that, we have further evidence, e.g., WA 5:245.21–24 (1519/1521), 7:429.11–19 (1521), 50:288.29–289.5 (1538); WA BR 6:484.18–20, Nr. 2028a (to Elector John Frederick of Saxony, in the second half of June 1533; ET foreseen for LW ns 8.111).

1 Luther 30 instead of esse) sits ill with the verb concludo. At any rate, the cardinals’ position concerning the soul’s immortality is (or, without God’s intervention, would be) in causal relationship with their open preaching against the resurrection (note the causative quia): ‘if it weren’t for God, such preaching would have already appeared because…’ The evidence seems to point in the direction of an opposition, on Luther’s part, not only to Lateran V but to the very doctrine of the soul’s immortality, and apparently not merely on grounds of distrust of anything papal, but also because of a perceived irreconcilability of the immortality doctrine with the church’s teaching about resurrection and eternal life. That, I contend, however, is not the right reading of these passages. To begin with, the first excerpt, from The Christian Nobility, continues like this, and that every priest must say his prayers once a month unless he wants to lose his benefice. How can the affairs of Christendom and matters of faith be settled by men who are hardened and blinded by gross avarice, wealth, and worldly splendor, and who now for the first time decree that the soul is immortal? It is no small shame to the whole of Christendom that they deal so disgracefully with the faith at Rome.54

Luther then adds that the cardinals should have less wealth and should study and pray more in order to be worthy to treat matters of faith as they were in earlier times when they wanted to be overseers (bishops) and not kings of kings. The point is, partly, the absurdity of such undeserving and unfit people making the assertion and, partly, that they only make it ‘now for the first time.’55 Intrinsically, the doctrine of the soul’s immortality is placed on a par with the declaration that a priest must say prayers at least once a month lest he wants to forfeit his benefice.56 Luther takes both conciliar decisions, enacting the soul’s immortality as a doctrine and prescribing one mass a month as a minimum standard of priestly conduct, as ridiculously self-evident. That is why they are ‘childish’ and ‘frivolous’: because a child would already know that much.57 That the cardinals can do and say nothing better and more important in faith matters is a clear indication of their ineptitude due, as both ends of the argument declare, to their striving after worldly pomp. That Luther is not taking issue with immortality per se is also corroborated by the

54 Italics added, cf. p. 28, above. 55 Cf. n. 122 on p. 46, below. 56 Incidentally, Luther is overstating the case. The actual prescription was minimally one mass a week (or two in a fortnight) not a month (Ebeling (1982) 150n). 57 The German word for ‘frivolous’ points in the same direction: ‘leychtfertig,’ i.e. something one is easily through with.

1 Luther 31 fact that a milder version of the argument appeared a year earlier in Resolutio lutheriana (1519). There he simply observed, ‘Lastly the study of Roman laws and the gospel fell into such neglect that they held it necessary to decree at the most recent council that the human soul was immortal.’58 The critique of Rome is surely there, but neither are the cardinals singled out for attack, nor does the immortality doctrine receive a bad name. Instead, a dreadful state of affairs (neglect of studies) is lamented, and the conciliar decree is cited as a measure of the ensuing grievous ignorance in divine matters. Rome has plunged into such darkness, we might paraphrase Luther, that even the most obvious truths had to be affirmed by the highest authority. While there is an added twist in the wording ‘they held it (rather than it was) necessary’ which may add a darker shade to Luther’s image of the Roman powers that be, it certainly does nothing to undercut the self-evidence of the doctrine affirmed. Rather than dismissing the soul’s immortality as ‘childish’ or ‘frivolous,’ Luther here appears to regard its truth as patently obvious. I will return to that impression in section 1.4. In the second passage quoted above,59 Luther puts the immortality doctrine side by side with transubstantiation and the papal claim of world rulership. The argument applied to the quotation from the address To the Christian Nobility (i.e. the problem is the banality of the affirmation) cannot be deployed here, for both neighbouring claims were obviously unacceptable to the Reformer. The inclusion of immortality in the same list suggests a comparable internal rejection of that issue as well. It hardly saves the day that there are two more items on Luther’s list, the Aristotelian definition of the soul as the substantial form of the human body and the denial of the divine essence’s generation both in the active and passive sense. The former belongs with the immortality of the soul to the doctrinal clarification of Lateran V and as such cannot offer an independent vantage point from which to evaluate the list, and we know that Luther was critical of Lateran IV on account of the latter issue.60 Disturbing as this text is, it ought to be remembered that Luther produced at least three more similar, but by no means identical, lists in the same period.61

58 ‘Denique eo devenit legum Rhomanarum studium et euangelii neglectus, ut necesse habuerint statuere in concilio novissimo, Animam hominis esse immortalem.’ (WA 2:226.38–40). ET foreseen for LW ns 1.30. 59 Cf. p. 28, above. 60 WA 39II:284–336; cf. Ebeling (1982) 151–53. 61 Minimally, a gloss from 1520 might be added: ‘Such was endorsed at the most recent council, where it was decided that the soul was immortal and that tithes were to be exacted for the Roman belly’ (WA 6:338.30–31: ‘Sicut probatum est novissimo concilio, ubi decisum est animam esse immortalem et esse decimas pro ventre

1 Luther 32

To being with, Grund und Ursach (1521), the independent German version of his self- justification against the papal bull, only includes immortality and Aristotelian hylomorphism from the five-item Latin list. Further, Luther comments on Psalm 22:19 (1519/1521): Of that kind [papal decisions based on ‘inane human traditions’] are: the essence of God is neither begotten nor does it beget, the soul is the substantial form of the body, the bread and wine are transubstantiated on the altar, only one kind is to be given to the laity for the whole sacrament and similar portents, the likes of which were determined in large numbers at the Council of Constance.62

To which a passage from The Babylonian Captivity (1520) may be added: Moreover, the church kept the true faith for more than twelve hundred years, during which time the holy fathers never, at any time or place, mentioned this transubstantiation (a monstrous word and a monstrous idea), until the pseudo philosophy of Aristotle began to make its inroads into the church in these last three hundred years. During this time many things have been wrongly defined, as for example, that the divine essence is neither begotten, nor begets; that the soul is the substantial form of the human body. These and like assertions are made without reason or cause, as the Cardinal Cambrai [Pierre d’Ailly] himself admits.’63

The soul’s immortality appears in neither of the latter lists, but that does not make them irrelevant. Taken together, there is only one item, the soul as the substantial form of the body, that is included in all four catalogues. Transubstantiation and the generation of divine essence appear in three, while communion in one kind and papal claim of world rulership make it only to one each. Immortality appears in two, inherently related, lists (the Latin and German versions, though not strict translations, of the same text). If we consider, which we can with some limited justification, the Assertio omnium articulorum and the Grund und Ursach as one text in two editions, we will be left with three lists each containing three items, transubstantiation, hylomorphism and divine essence. One text (Operationes) adds one, another (Asssertio/Grund) two more items. In the case of the Psalm commentary, communion in one kind can be seen as a kind of extension of the transubstantiation issue. In

Romano extorquendas’). The context is papal authority, but the remark is too short to allow more than a general negativity to be registered. The reference to the immortality issue is largely neutral in and of itself, but the second clause on Rome’s insatiable greed casts its shadow over it. At any rate, the isolated nature of the remark makes it uncertain whether it is a short but thematically comparable list to the other four at all. If so, which is doubtful, it might still be suggested, to anticipate the unfolding argument, that the main thrust of Luther’s objection is directed against the origin and not the content of those decisions. 62 Operationes in psalmos: ‘Huius generis sunt: Essentiam dei nec generari nec generare, Animam esse formam corporis substantialem, panem et vinum transsubstanciari in altari, unam tantum speciem laicis dari pro sacramento integro, et similia portenta, qualia in Concilio Constantiensi multa sunt determinata’ (WA 5:652. 29–32). ET foreseen for LW ns 3.2. 63 LW 36:31 (WA 6:509.27–34).

1 Luther 33 the apologetic text, immortality appears perhaps in conjunction with hylomorphism (the all- time favourite), and papal rulership is also thrown in for good measure. From this, it may perhaps be tentatively suggested that Luther’s objection to the soul’s immortality was not so determined as to some other issues, notably to hylomorphism (or transubstantiation and the generation of divine essence). That is an important caveat but in and of itself does not explain away the difficulty, especially in the light of the prominence immortality attained to in Grund und Ursach. Luther’s logic in the other lists may, however, provide a key. Even if they do not include immortality as an abhorrent example, their broad common ground with the Assertio64 allows us to suspect that the Reformer’s logic explicitly formulated here is probably operative implicitly there, too. In the Operationes, Luther explicitly contrasts decisions ‘according to the spirit of truth’ or ‘by the authority of scriptures’ with those ‘by the rod of the pope according to inane human traditions.’65 The problem with the phoney items is their inadequate derivation. The Babylonian Captivity is even more explicit; they are a result of ‘the pseudo philosophy of Aristotle.’ Aristotle is not only bad; his infiltration of theology is also unnecessary. The church could do for over a millennium without him; he only crept in over the last few centuries. We can do without him, or, in fact, we should, for he contradicts the church’s established usage. ‘[T]he holy fathers never, at any time or place,’ felt obliged to speak of the transubstantiation. At this point we find quite an explicit point of connection with the Grund and Ursach, ‘Thence it has arisen that the holy article was truly masterfully decided upon recently in Rome, viz. that the human soul was immortal, for it had been forgotten in the common creed where we all say, “I believe in life everlasting”.’66 The forgetfulness clause is an unmistakeable sign that Luther is being bitterly ironic, but there are other signals as well. The creedal affirmation is recent; it was masterfully made, and in the context emphatic holy takes on ironic overtones, too. Luther need not be interpreted as contending with the truth of the soul’s immortality, but can be seen as challenging the circumstances and the implications of its doctrinal formulation.

64 Note also the appearance of the generalising ‘portenta’ in Assertio and Operationes. 65 Cf. ‘secundum spiritum veritatis’ or ‘per autoritatem scripturarum’ versus ‘per aurindem Papae secundum inanes traditiones hominum’ (WA 5:652.25–27). 66 ‘Da her ists kummen, das newlich zu Rom furwar meisterlich beschlossen ist der heylig Artickel, das die seele des menschen sey unsterblich, denn es war vorgessen ynn dem gemeinen glawben, da wyr alle sagen: “ich glewb eyn ewigs leben” ’ (WA 7:425.22–24).

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The five-item Latin list of the Assertio turns out to be coherent not only if we suppose that Luther rejected the content of all five propositions, but also if we regard them as examples of inadmissible philosophical intrusion into matters of faith. Seen in that light, Luther’s objection is still not to the soul’s immortality as such but to its doctrinal ‘overdefinition’ that might suggest that the creedal article concerning the resurrection of the body is somehow inadequate or incomplete—a thought obviously abhorrent to him.67 Yet it is precisely an irreconcilable juxtaposition between immortality and resurrection that we can sense in the next two passages introduced above. That the Lateran Council had prescribed faith in immortality, Luther writes in 1531, is an obvious sign that the pope and cardinals hold nothing of life eternal.68 What first catches the eye is that he speaks of eternal life rather than of resurrection. Here at least, then, the contrast is not between immortality and resurrection, as usually formulated in the modern discussion, but between immortality and life eternal: a mutual exclusion conceptually much more difficult to interpret. Second, Luther does not simply say that the princes of the Roman church do not believe in eternal life but also adds ‘that they now wish to proclaim this by means of a bull.’ The bull obviously stands metonymically for the doctrine, but that is adversatively conjoined not with life eternal (the bull is the means of teaching it!) but with the cardinals’ attempt to teach it despite their unbelief. Consequently, it seems here also more likely that Luther wants to say the council fathers give away their unbelief by regarding a statement of the obvious as necessary (implication, it is not obvious to them) than to suggest that by promulgating the doctrine they were expressis verbis denying life eternal. Be that as it may, this passage does not allow a juxtaposition to be drawn between resurrection and immortality, if for no other reason, because the former term simply does not appear in it. Moreover, there are, again, some variations on the theme. Luther repeatedly accused pope and cardinals of not believing in life eternal. Commenting on the Creed, he observed in 1538, ‘For whoever has no hope for a future life needs Christ just as little as the cows and other beasts in paradise did. . . . This dogma originated at the pope’s court in Rome, and the same leaven leavens all their ecclesiastical ranks from the cardinals down to the acolytes.’69

67 Cf. Ebeling (1982) 150–55. 68 Cf. p. 29, above. 69 The Three Symbols or Creeds of the Christian Faith, LW 34:211 (WA 50:269.26-32). Incidentally, Luther here seems to imitate Paul by coupling faith in Christ with belief in the general resurrection (cf. 1 Cor 15:12–13.16), but the

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There is no explicit mention of Lateran V here, and Luther need not necessarily have thought of that council again as the editors of both the Weimar and the American editions suggest. Nor is the precise interconnectedness of the doctrines of immortality, resurrection and life eternal clarified in any way, and the censure is directed at the entirety of the Roman church, not only its elite. In other words, Luther might base his accusation that the cardinals do not believe in the resurrection partly on the achievement of Lateran V, but the immortality doctrine is surely not the sole factor informing his unfavourable opinion. In a most entertaining pamphlet, a veritable Screwtape Letter of the sixteenth century, occasioned by the plan of a council at Mantua, which also caused him to produce, in a more serious vein, The Smalcald Aritcles (1537), Luther addressed the Roman church in the name of Beelzebub. One piece of advice the archfiend gives is that nobody may become or remain a cardinal who does not have sufficient qualifications like lying, treachery, bearing false witness, robbing, stealing, murdering, poisoning etc. ‘Most of all, however, since you [of the Roman church] hold nothing of future life, be it heaven or hell, let him [a cardinal] not discuss the foolish sermon of the Galileans [i.e. Lutherans], but let him mock and laugh at everything he hears of it.’70 Again, Lateran V and the soul’s immortality are not mentioned, but we find a general, and here rather farcical, accusation that the cardinals deny the hereafter. In fact, the introductory material cites, with reference to his repeated mocking of Lateran V, this feature of the text, i.e. Luther’s chastising the cardinals for not believing in the soul’s immortality, as one of three internal arguments for his authorship of the piece.71 In a 1543 preface to Melanchthon, Luther was more explicit, He [Pope Leo X] did not expunge everything but left behind that sweetest decree, namely, that next it was to be believed, or at least to be taught, that the human soul was immortal. By decreeing this they wanted a resolution not for themselves but for the misery of God’s church. For neither Leo himself, nor the Curia believed that, nor do they believe it to this day, but they consider those foolish who believe and confess [such a thing].72

larger argument goes beyond that connection in a general coherentist direction quite characteristic of Luther. No article of faith can be relinquished without endangering the whole edifice. 70 Beelzebub an die Heilige Bepstliche Kirche (1537): ‘Fur allen dingen aber, das jr ja nichts halt vom kuenfftigen leben, es heisse der himel oder die helle, Lasse sich die narren predigt der Galileer nicht bereden, Sondern spotte und verlache alles, was er davon hoeret’ (WA 50:128.23–26). ET foreseen for LW ns 6.18. 71 WA 50:127. 72 Vorrede zu Melanchthons: ‘Responsio ad scriptum quorundam delectorum a clero secundario Coloniae Agrippinae’ (1543): ‘Reliquit tamen, ne omnia expungeret, illud suavissimum decretum, scilicet Deinceps credendum vel saltem docendum esse, quod anima humana sit immortalis. Hoc decreto consultum non sibi, sed miserae Ecclesiae Dei

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To illustrate the point, the text then continues with an anecdote that has also been preserved by several scribes of the table talks.73 Deciding in a debate over the soul’s immortality, Pope Leo X acknowledged the truth of its affirmation but ultimately sided with the person who denied it because that was better news.74 Here Luther does not contrast immortality with resurrection at all. The content of the council’s decree is not criticised (and we need not decide whether ‘sweetest’ is meant ironically or not). The wedge is driven between the public proclamation and the private beliefs of the prelates. Indeed, those on the side of immortality come out vindicated—at least by Luther. The last excerpt75 cannot be redeemed by the same argument. There the contrast lies indubitably between resurrection and immortality, and the preaching of a denial of the former is causally related, as we have seen, with the assertion of the latter. Yet the matter is once again more complex. The ‘conclusion’ of the cardinals, we recall, is given somewhat inconclusively in the form of a reported question as if Luther changed his mind mid- sentence and wanted ultimately to suggest that the bishops of Lateran V, once they had denied the resurrection, cannot really have believed in the immortality of the soul either.76 Further, the quia-clause might be read as an explanation why the worst had not happened. Had God not intervened, it would have come about: implication, but it did not—because thirty (actually, only twenty) years before77 immortality had been promulgated.78 Finally, the voluerunt. Nam neque Leo ipse, neque Curia idipsum credidit, Et adhuc hodie non credunt, Sed pro fatuis habent eos, qui credunt et confitentur’ (WA 54:9.21–25). ET foreseen for LW ns 5.79. 73 WA 54:9.26–10.6; cf. WA TR 2:48.17–20 (1532); WA TR 2:367.23–28, Nr. 2213a (1531); WA TR 2:367.29– 368.6, Nr. 2213b (1531); WA TR 3:394.1–4, Nr. 3543 B (1537); WA TR 3.422.1–8, Nr. 3574a (1537). See also WA TR 3:674.38–40 and 675.9–12, Nr. 3869 (1538) and WA 48:561.27-34 – cf. WA 43:67.15-21 (on Gen 19:14). 74 The meaning of ‘facere bonum vultum’ is not entirely clear; cf. WA 43:67.20, 48:561.34, 50:53.5, 50:128.26– 27, 54:10.6, WA TR 2:48.17, 2:49.39, 2:367.32, 3:394.3–4 (and note on p. 720), 3:422.3, 3:674.39–40. NB: most occurrences are related to the complex tradition history of the anecdote. 75 Quoted on p. 29, above. 76 Ebeling has a somewhat different take on the grammatical anomaly, ‘In Luther’s expression (or Rörer’s transcript) the mention of the conciliar decision and the notion of questioning the soul’s immortality that lies behind it probably flow into one another’ (1982:148–49n: ‘Wahrscheinlich flossen in Luthers Äußerung (oder in Rörers Nachschrift) die Erwänung des Konzlibeschlusses und der Gedanke an die ihm zugrunde liegende Infragestellung der immortalitas animae ineinander’). 77 Incidentally, Luther gave the same, but by then correct, estimate over a decade later in the 1543 preface to Melanchthon, quoted above on p. 35, ‘more or less thirty years ago when Julius II bequeathed the inchoate Lateran Council to Leo X’ (WA 54:9.14–15: ‘ante plus minus triginta annos, cum Iulius secundus reliquisset Leoni X. inchoatum Concilium Lateranense’). Julius II (1443–1513) was pope from 1503. 78 It is, of course, possible to understand Luther as not referring to the promulgation of Apostolici regiminis but to

1 Luther 37 causal explanation may be understood on the level of the complete, if short, passage. On this view, the overarching logic attributed to Luther is akin to that underlying the interpretation of the previous texts. It is from the cardinals’ assertion of the immortality that we learn about their lack of faith in the resurrection: not because the latter doctrine is contradicted by the first but, as in the earlier cases, because their need to solemnly state a theological platitude reveals how un-self-evident they considered it. From Luther’s undoubtedly critical stance over against Lateran V and its only achievement in matters of doctrine, a rejection on his part of the content of its teaching cannot be rightly deduced. Three main reasons have emerged from the foregoing analysis for Luther’s opposition to the fathers of Lateran V. First, the new doctrine is superfluous because self- evident. Or, to put it differently, the new doctrine is precisely that, new or, better said, belated. As such, and this is his second point, it implicitly threatens the received formulation of faith as transmitted in the ancient creeds of the church: a deposit Luther practically treated on a par with scripture (for in his mature view it was nothing but a simple restatement of biblical truth).79 Thirdly, he finds the immortality of the soul qua doctrine problematic because of the Aristotelian package with which it arrives. Faith needs no such scaffolding. The affirmation of the soul’s immortality per se is, then, not objectionable to the Reformer. Indeed, we have repeatedly encountered his approval of the doctrine’s truth. That now has to be looked at more closely.

1.3 Aristotle and the soul’s immortality

If the Fifth Lateran Council enshrined Aristotelian metaphysics in Catholic dogma, Luther burst on the scene with a hefty program of anti-Aristotelianism. The vehemence with which he opposed the ancient philosopher was such that one might be tempted to see his entire program for the renewal of late medieval theology as a determined attempt at its de- Aristotelisation. Already in his Erfurt period, he considered Aristotle ‘refractory’ and a ‘fabulator.’80 Ebeling observes that, as a result of his Ockhamist training, Luther was the Reformation when he speaks of divine intervention a short generation earlier (cf. Ebeling (1982) 149n). 79 Cf. On the Councils and the Church (1539) and p. 233, below. 80 Randbemerkungen to Augustine’s De trinitate (1509): ‘fabulator Aristoteles’ and ‘renitentem Aristotelem’ (WA 9:23.7,9–10). ET foreseen for LW ns 1.2.

1 Luther 38 prepared to criticise the philosopher, yet even these early marginalia go beyond the language of his Erfurt school.81 And that was only the beginning. In 1517, Aristotle is not only ‘the chief of all charlatans’ who ‘imposes on others[ ]things which are so absurd that not even an ass or a stone could remain silent about them,’ but Luther would be prepared to think he was the devil himself but for his appearance in flesh.82 A few years later he is ‘the most impious Aristotle, by whom nothing but errors are taught,’83 ‘the blind, heathen teacher,’ ‘this damned, conceited, rascally heathen,’84 ‘the knave and liar Aristotle,’ who can be found ‘in the pigsty or the asses’ stable,’85 ‘the blind leader,’ ‘the fool master of the high schools,’86 ‘that heathen master, that archmaster of all masters of nature, who rules in all of our universities and teaches in the place of Christ,’87 and a decade later ‘a lazy jackass who abounded in money and leisure.’88 Luther was also prepared to go beyond such name-calling and declare repeatedly that Aristotle was a punishment from God. ‘God has sent him as a plague upon us on account of our sins.’89 And if that were not enough, Luther offered global rejections of Aristotle on several occasions. In the Disputation against Scholastic Theology (1517), which, from a theological point of view, might as well have been selected to mark the beginning of the Reformation as the

81 Ebeling (1972 [1964]) 86–87. 82 Letter to Johann Lang (8 Feb 1516 [i.e. 1517]), LW 48:37–38 (WA BR 1:88.12–14,22–23, Nr. 34). 83 Adversus execrabilem Antichristi bullam (1520): ‘impiissimum Aristotelem, in quo non nisi errores docentur’ (WA 6:604.12–13). 84 To the Christian Nobility (1520), LW 44:200–01 (WA 6:457.34–35, 458.4–5). 85 Concerning the Answer of the Goat in Leipzig (1521) LW 39:134 (WA 7:282.15–16). 86 Adventspostille, ‘Euangelium am andern sontag ym Advent. Luce. 21’ (1522): ‘der blindeleytter Aristot[eles]’ and ‘Aristoteles, der hohen schulen narrentreyber’ (WA 10I/2:100.1, 101.1). 87 Christmas Postils, ‘The Gospel for the Festival of the Epiphany, Matthew 2[:2–12]’ (1522), LW 52:165 (WA 10I/1:567.12–13). 88 Table talk Nr. 5412b (1532): ‘otiosum asinum Aristotelem, qui abundabat pecunia et otio’ and ‘dem müßigen Esel, der Geld und Gut, und gute faule Tage genug hatte’ (WA TR 2:456.31–32, 457.8–9). 89 To the Christian Nobility (1520), LW 44:201 (WA 6:458.6). Cf. Weihnachtspostille, ‘Epistell am newen Jar tag ad Galatas’ (1522): ‘Weyl sie [die Papisten] denn nu Mosi nit glewben, Christum nit bedurffen, und alßo new und allt testament furwerffen, die lebendige gantze schrifft vordamnen, ist yhn widderumb von gott recht geschehen, das sie des todten vordampten heyden Aristotels schuler wordenn sind und des teuffels heymlich gemach, der sie durch Bapsts gesetz und menschen lere vollschlemmet, das es ubir und ubir gehet und die welt vol stenckt und vorschlempt’ (WA 10I/1:472.8–13). To the Councilmen of All Cities in Germany That They Estabish and Maintain Christian Schools (1524): ‘he [God] in turn did the same; instead of Holy Scripture and good books, he suffered Aristotle to come in, together with countless harmful books which drew us farther from the Bible’ (LW 45:374–75, cf. WA 15:50.22–25).

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Ninety-Five Theses,90 Luther set out to dethrone Aristotle. Among a great many particular objections to the philosopher, he also included a few blanket statements: 41. Virtually the entire Ethics of Aristotle is the worst enemy of grace. . . . 42. It is an error to maintain that Aristotle’s statement concerning happiness does not contradict Catholic doctrine. . . . 43. It is an error to say that no man can become a theologian without Aristotle. . . . 44. Indeed, no one can become a theologian unless he becomes one without Aristotle. . . . 50. Briefly, the whole Aristotle is to theology as darkness is to light. . . . 53. Even the more useful definitions of Aristotle seem to beg the question.91

Over and beyond the general antagonism, one can sense in these lines a particular concern for Aristotle’s inimicality to Christian theology. The Heidelberg Disputation (1518) sounded a similar note. 29. He who wishes to philosophize by using Aristotle without danger to his soul must first become thoroughly foolish in Christ. 30. Just as a person does not use the evil of passion well unless he is a married man, so no person philosophizes well unless he is a fool, that is, a Christian. 31. It was easy for Aristotle to believe that the world was eternal since he believed that the human soul was mortal. . . . 34. If Aristotle would have recognized the absolute power of God, he would accordingly have maintained that it was impossible for matter to exist of itself alone. . . . 36. Aristotle wrongly finds fault with and derides the [I]deas of Plato, which actually are better than his own. . . . 38. The disputation of Aristotle lashes out at Parmenides’ idea of oneness (this is pardonable for a Christian) in a battle of air. 39. If Anaxagoras placed infinity before form, as it seems he did, he was the best of the philosophers, even if Aristotle was unwilling to acknowledge this.92

Aristotle fails not only as a theologian, but he is also far surpassed as a philosopher: the affront is surely designed to bite. And within the context of Aristotle’s worthlessness for theology, we meet a new theme, the philosopher’s denial of the soul’s immortality. I shall have occasion to further comment on this feature. In the 1536 Disputation concerning Man the same general tone can be heard. Aristotle is accused of ‘know[ing] nothing of theological man.’93 He is ‘not able to understand or to define what the theological man is. . . . In short, philosophers [and Aristotle has just been discussed] know nothing about God the creator and man made of a lump of earth.’94

90 Though the text was surely printed in early September 1517, the earliest extant copy dates from 1520. It is probably no accident that the piece did not catch on like the Disputatio pro declaratione virtutis indulgentiarum a couple of months later: the social relevance and impact of the indulgence controversy far surpassed that of the rather more academic concerns of the earlier disputation. Nonetheless, the theological significance of the Disputation against Scholastic Theology seems comparable. 91 LW 31:12–13 (WA 1:226.10,12–14,16,26,31). 92 LW 31:41–42 (WA 1:355.2–7,12–13,16–17,20–23). 93 Thesis 28, LW 34:139 (WA 39I:176.24). 94 Another [Against 22] and Against 11, LW 34:142–43 (WA 39I:179.4–5,33–34).

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It was not only in academic disputations that Luther challenged Aristotle; he was dismissive of him in his sermons, too. In the Advent Postils of 1522, the philosopher’s stature in ecclesial circles is presented as the non plus ultra of all things despicable. In short, it is impossible that greater lies, more abominable error, more dreadful blindness, more obdurate blasphemy could still come than there reign even now in Christendom through bishop, cloister and high schools so much that the dead, blind pagan Aristotle teaches the Christians and reigns more than Christ himself.95

In the Christmas Postils of the same year, Aristotle is denied any value not only in matters of theology, but in other fields of learning as well. ‘Aristotle, the highest master of all universities, not only fails to teach anything concerning Christ, but . . . what he teaches is idle nonsense.’96 Admittedly, such generalisations do not appear frequently in Luther, but that it is not a unique instance can be seen in the last passage I include here. It is taken from one of the three seminal reforming tracts of 1520, the address To the Christian Nobility, and I quote it at length to allow the force of Luther’s scathing argument to build up. In this regard my advice would be that Aristotle’s Physics, Metaphysics, Concerning the Soul, and Ethics, which hitherto have been thought to be his best books, should be completely discarded along with all the rest of his books that boast about nature, although nothing can be learned from them either about nature or the Spirit. Moreover, nobody has yet understood him, and many souls have been burdened with fruitless labor and study, at the cost of much precious time. I dare say that any potter has more knowledge of nature than is written in these books. It grieves me to the quick that this damned, conceited, rascally heathen has deluded and made fools of so many of the best Christians with his misleading writings. God has sent him as a plague upon us on account of our sins. Why this wretched fellow in his best book, Concerning the Soul, teaches that the soul dies with the body, although many have tried without success to save his reputation. As though we did not have the Holy Scriptures, in which we are fully instructed about all things, things about which Aristotle has not the faintest clue! And yet this dead heathen has conquered, obstructed, and almost succeeded in suppressing the books of the living God. When I think of this miserable business I can only believe that the devil has introduced this study. For the same reasons his book on ethics is the worst of all books. It flatly opposes divine grace and all Christian virtues, and yet it is considered one of his best works. Away with such books! Keep them away from Christians.97

Luther here rejects Aristotle in rather radical terms. Aristotle at his best is useless—

95 Adventspostille, ‘Euangelium am andern sontag ym Advent. Luce. 21’ (1522): ‘Kurtzlich, es ist nitt muglich, das grossere lugenn, grewlicher yrthum, schrecklicher blindheytt, vorstockter lesterung ymer mehr komen mugen, als itzt schon regirn ynn der Christenheyt, durch Bisschoff, kloster und hohen schulen, biß das auch der todte, blinde heyd Aristoteles die Christen leret und regirt mehr denn Christus selbst’ (WA 10I/2:96.21–97.1). 96 Christmas Postils, ‘The Gospel for the Festival of the Epiphany, Matthew 2[:2–12]’ (1522), LW 52:166–67 (WA 10I/1:569.7–9). 97 LW 44:200–01 (WA 6:457.35-458.17).

1 Luther 41 superlative on the one hand, unqualified denial of value and merit on the other. The structure appears repeatedly: his best works are to be unconditionally abolished; his most excellent book teaches nonsense; his noblest thoughts are diametrically opposed to Christian values. And the critique, once more, is not limited to spiritual matters; all aspects of knowledge are included. It is no wonder, then, that the works could not enlighten the simplest person and are to be blamed on devilish machinations—in value below the lowest human standard; in danger beyond all infernal limits. The impression of apparently uncompromising hostility on the Reformer’s part is so strong that it led Ronald Frost to argue, in a debate that arose in American evangelical circles a decade ago,98 that the driving force behind Luther’s reforming zeal was his desire ‘to rid the church of central Aristotelian assumptions that were transmitted through Thomistic theology.’99 Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that while the image here sketched of Luther’s dogged polemic against Aristotle is wholly true, it is not the whole truth. First of all, the predominance of early references, roughly up to 1522, should be noted. Secondly, even here, Luther occasionally makes concessions. In the continuation of the previous passage, for example, Luther ‘would gladly agree to keeping Aristotle’s books, Logic, Rhetoric, and Poetics, or at least keeping and using them in an abridged form, as useful in training young people to speak and to preach properly.’100 Or again, in the Christmas Postils, he first counsels the avoidance of the philosopher’s books, but then makes a significant exception by allowing them to be consulted in secular matters. ‘The books of Aristotle and those of the pope and of any other man should be avoided or they should be read in such a way that we do not seek in them information concerning the edification of the soul, but we should use them to improve our temporal life, to learn a trade or civil law.’101 And as thesis 51 of the Disputation against Scholastic Theology suggests,102 and as Theodor Dieter has shown in the case of the Heidelberg Disputation,103 at times Luther even made gestures to set himself up as a better

98 Cf. Frost (1997, 1998) and Muller (1998). 99 Frost (1997) 3. 100 To the Christian Nobility (1520), LW 44:201 (WA 6:458.26–28). 101 ‘The Gospel for the Early Christmas Service, Luke 2[:15–20]’ (1522), LW 52:39 (WA 10I/1:139.16–19). 102 ‘51. It is very doubtful whether the Latins comprehended the correct meaning of Aristotle’ (LW 31:12, cf. WA 1:226.28). See Ebeling (1997 [1964]) 66. 103 Dieter (2001) ch. 6, originally his doctoral dissertation. While the Frost–Muller exchange highlighted different possible approaches to the problem of Luther’s (Anti-)Aristotelianism, Dieter’s nearly 700-page work

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Aristotelian, or at least a more reliable interpreter of the philosopher, than his scholastic forebears. Frost, then, surely overstates and oversimplifies the case, especially by making Aquinas the main culprit.104 Muller rightly emphasises—besides the richness of the medieval tradition that cannot be reduced to a simple ‘Aristotle/Aquinas model’ against which an ‘Augustine/Luther model’ might be neatly pitted—the complexity of Luther’s rejection and use of Aristotle. On the other hand, in his rejoinder Frost insists not without good reason that, in the context of justification and the problem of the will, Luther had no patience for the philosopher.105 Aristotle as a dogmatic presupposition is obviously anathema to Luther.106 I shall return to the larger issue of Aristotle’s place in Reformation theology in the next chapter,107 but the narrower question of Luther’s take on his view of the soul’s immortality must be attended to here. We have seen that Luther, aware but disapproving of other interpretive traditions, attributed to Aristotle a view that death involves the soul as well. ‘Why this wretched fellow in his best book, Concerning the Soul, teaches that the soul dies with the body, although many have tried without success to save his reputation,’ he exclaims in the address To the Christian

(all of it dealing with the young Luther up to 1518!) offers analyses of the question to which only some of Ebeling’s pioneering explorations could compare in depth since Friedrich Nitzsch’s slender Luther und Aristoteles in the late nineteenth century. 104 Cf. Frost (1997) 3: ‘To the degree that Luther failed—measured by the modern appreciation for these Thomistic solutions in some Protestant circles—a primary thrust of the Reformation was stillborn. The continued use of Aristotle’s works by Protestant universities during and after the Reformation promoted such a miscarriage.’ 105 Cf. also Ebeling (1972 [1964]) 89–91. 106 That Aristotle is no prerequisite to becoming a theologian, Luther remained adamant to the end of life. In addition to the evidence cited above (esp. theses 43–44 of the Disputation against Scholastic Theology and theses 29– 30 of the Heidelberg Disputation, p. 39), see also: Christmas Postils, ‘The Gospel for the Festival of the Epiphany, Matthew 2[:2–12]’ (1522), ‘they teach that no one may be a theologian without Aristotle, the best of Christians! O blindness beyond all blindness!’ (LW 52:178, cf. WA 10I/1:584.17–18)—but note here the exception, too: ‘We could of course tolerate it, if they meant by natural knowledge that fire is hot, three and five are eight, and so on, all of which are well known to natural reason’ (WA ll. 18–20). Nachwort zur Epistola Theologorum Parisiensium ad Cardinalem Coetanum[!] reprehensoria (1534): ‘Item alius magnus sane vir in concione palam definivit: “Nolite errare, adolescentes boni. Absque Aristotele nemo potest theologus fieri”. Nos autem adolescentes interim Hilarii, Hieronymi, Augustini, Bernhardi etc. recordabamur, qui Aristotelem vel non legerunt vel eo non sunt usquam usi in suis scriptis, et cogebamur vel eos non credere theologos fuisse vel aliud genus theologorum fuisse’ (WA 60:124.38–44). And finally a table talk from the 1540s: ‘Sine Aristotele nemo fit Doctor theologiae. Cogitavit secum: Wo sind denn Hieronymus vnd Augustinus doctores worden?’ (WA TR 5:412.34–36, Nr. 5967.) 107 I shall be discussing it specifically with reference to Luther and Melanchthon and their reception history. Muller is primarily a scholar of the Reformed tradition, and many of his observations and illustrations relate to the Calvinist side.

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Nobility.108 Likewise in a Christmas postil, Aristotle is said to have ‘decide[d] that the earth has been as it is from eternity and will remain so forever and that all souls die with the body.’109 In a comparison which Luther must have elucidated time and again in dinner conversation, for it has again been preserved in different table talks of the 1530s, he prefers Cicero to the Greek philosopher not least because the former writes on the soul’s immortality. A later version of the remark explicitly accuses Aristotle of ‘kn[owing] nothing about the soul, about God, and about the immortality of the soul.’110 Or elsewhere, ‘Aristotle thus denies these two: the immortality of the soul and divine providence.’111 In yet another variation that seems to be related to the same tradition, Luther avers that ‘Holy scripture fights against Aristotle, who denies the immortal soul.’112 The most Luther allows is that Aristotle deliberately hedged on the issue and ‘argue[d] about the soul in such a way that he diligently and shrewdly avoid[ed] discussing its immortality anywhere.’113 Perhaps the most famous of Luther’s references to Aristotle’s doctrine appears in thesis 31 or the third philosophical thesis of the Heidelberg Disputation, already quoted, ‘It was easy for Aristotle to believe that the world was eternal since he believed that the human soul was mortal.’114 It is quite an achievement Luther makes in this short sentence. It is not so much reversing received opinion as turning much of the medieval philosophical tradition on its head. It is one thing that he disagrees with many of the schoolmen as regards the correct

108 Cf. n. 97 on p. 40, above. 109 ‘The Gospel for the Early Christmas Service, Luke 2[:15–20]’ (1522), LW 52:165–66 (WA 10I/1:567.22–24). 110 Table talk Nr. 3608d (1537), LW 54:243 (WA TR 3:451.20–21). Cf. WA TR 2:456.26–457.3, Nr. 2412b (1532). 111 Table talk Nr. 155 (1532): ‘Sic negat Aristoteles haec duo: immortalitatem animae et providentiam divinam’ (WA TR 1:73.24–25); on Cicero, see ll. 25–29; GT at 74.11, no mention is made here of Cicero. 112 Table talk Nr. 3904 (1538): ‘Scriptura sacra pugnat contra Aristotelem, qui negat animam immortalem’ (WA TR 3:698.4–5); for Cicero, see ll. 7–17. 113 Notes on Ecclesiastes (1532: print; lecture in 1526), LW 15:59 (WA 20:70.27–28) on Eccl 3:20. 114 Cf. n. 92 on p. 39, above. Both Ebeling (1982:60–183) and Dieter (2001:454–563) devote nearly book-length studies to this one thesis alone. The two teachings, of the world’s eternity and the soul’s mortality, can and do appear together as here or in the Christmas postil (cf. n. 109 on p. 43). But other groupings are also possible (cf. nn. 110–111 on p. 43), and they can also appear separately as immortality above (nn. 112–113 on p. 43) or eternity in the following places: That These Words of Christ, ‘This Is My Body,’ etc., Still Stand Firm Against the Fanatics (1527): ‘asserted with Aristotle and Pliny and other heathen that the world existed from eternity’ (LW 37:30–31; cf. WA 23:91.11–12; cf. 90.11–12). Eine hauspredigt von den artickeln des glaubens (1537): ‘Der weisse man Aristoteles schleusset vast dahin, es sey die welt von ewikeit gewesen’ (WA 45:13.9-10; ET foreseen for LW ns 7.85). Either doctrine is sufficient to demonstrate the theological uselessness of the philosopher. It is only in the Heidelberg Disputation that the two are not merely placed side by side, if at all, but brought into a causal- explanatory relationship.

1 Luther 44 reading of Aristotle. But even a Pomponazzi, whose interpretation of the philosopher coincides with Luther’s on this point, only arrived at that conclusion at the end, and as a result, of a long investigation. The Reformer, by contrast, presents the claim that the soul is mortal according to Aristotle as a self-evident presupposition.115 Moreover, and that is why the parallel between the Paduan and the Wittenberger ends right there, Luther not only attributes a ‘mortalist’ view to Aristotle, but rejects that right away as false. To that degree he also goes beyond Ockham, who had ignored Aristotle because of his ambiguity rather than rejected him as simply wrong. The immortality of the soul requires no demonstration in this scheme. It is the presupposition whose rejection on the philosopher’s part necessarily resulted in the falsity of his opinion concerning the eternity of the world: a view that no late medieval theologian could entertain as legitimate. Luther is quite consistent, then, not only in interpreting Aristotle as advocating the soul’s mortality (thus far Luther agrees with Pomponazzi, whom he never once mentioned in his writings), but also in condemning him for that view (where he parts ways with the Italian). There is a stream of further references to the soul’s immortality in Luther’s writings116 that makes one wonder how it has ever been possible to entertain the conviction that he held a contrary opinion. We have now come a very long way from Stange, but if the pendulum seems to have swung in the opposite direction, it would be overhasty to draw the conclusion that Luther subscribed to the traditional doctrine without reservations. His unremitting denunciation of Lateran V, and the very fact that he reads Aristotle contrary to many, and going beyond practically all, of the scholastic traditions,117 should surely serve as caveats against such oversimplification.

1.4 Immortality as an article of faith

If Luther takes the immortality of the soul for granted in a way, there is a tremendously

115 Cf. Ebeling (1982) 60–183, esp. 77–83 and 139–45. 116 Cf., e.g., WA 3:49.2–3, 141.19, 176.25–27, 392.31; 4:323.27–28; 5:344.33–34; 20:7a:4–5, 72.8–9, 774.32, 38:505.35–39; 38:656.32–36; 39II: 351.19–20, 386.8–11; 40III:579.2–4, 608.32–34. 117 In a comparative analysis of Luther’s and Eck’s Aristotle interpretation, Ebeling shows that one area of sharp divergence between their approaches is the use of authorities (1982:127–45, esp. 131–36). In contrast to Eck, who is very familiar with, and richly references, the interpretive tradition, Luther represents an autonomous approach and ‘proceeds completely unconventionally’ (‘geht völlig unkonventionell vor,’ p. 141). Cf. also n. 115 on p. 44, above.

1 Luther 45 important qualification to it. Philosophy can never come to the heart of the matter: that knowledge in its true sense is not available to reason because it is an article of faith. Luther is quite tireless in reiterating the point, and a rather sophisticated position can be reconstructed from his remarks. Commenting on the story of Jesus’ transfiguration, Luther wrote in 1538, But see how the best among the nations seek in their disputations after the immortality of the soul and the future life, but they find out nothing certain. This so certain and clear service is reserved for the Son of God alone in order that this hope of future life may be promised to the world by him alone and be clearly revealed by that service.118

The best minds may seek it, but it can only be found in Christ. Luther allows scholars of reason to have some vague ideas about the ultimate mystery of human destiny, and he certainly acknowledges their desire for such knowledge, but certainty in the matter is reserved for Christ’s revelation. It also deserves mention that the immortality of the soul and the hope of the life to come appear side by side without any hint at their juxtaposition. The same happens again in a disputation of the following year where Luther also sets considerable limits to Cicero’s insight into the soul’s immortality, on account of which, we recall, he was considered Aristotle’s superior.119 But Cicero and Plato argue impressively about the immortality of the soul. These are very good thoughts. Nevertheless, although these matters are admitted and acknowledged, it does not follow that philosophy believes in the incarnation or that eternity can become temporality which is taken into the infinite. These matters can be reflected on by man, but they can in no way be believed, just as I am able to think about many other things which are beyond my capacity to understand. Anyone can reflect on the word and on all the articles of the faith, on eternal life, and many other things; but it is not possible by oneself to conclude that they are true, nor that that which is infinite can be made finite like man. For if they could have understood it, they would have believed. In short, I said it thus above: Philosophy deals with visible matters, but theology deals with invisible ones.120

To know and to believe are two radically different things. Luther draws a sharp distinction between knowing as having thought about something and belief as knowing that it is true. The terminology is not fully identical with that of the previous passage, but the parallels are

118 Annotationes in aliquot capita Matthaei (1538): ‘[Gentilium disputationes de immortalitate animae] Nam vide, quid optimi inter Gentes quaesierint suis disputationibus de animae immortalitate et futura vita, et tamen nihil certi invenerunt. Soli filio Dei reservata est haec tam certa et clara apparitio, ut per ipsum solum mundo haec spes vitae futurae certo promitteretur, et aperta ista apparitione ostenderetur.’ (WA 38:656.32–36; on Mt 17:1). ET foreseen for LW ns 4.8. 119 Cf. p. 43, above. 120 Argument 7, The Disputation Concerning the Passage: ‘The Word Was Made Flesh’ (John 1:14) (1539), LW 38:249 (WA 39II:14.24–15.6).

1 Luther 46 clear. Luther here seems to work out faith in epistemological terms, apparently suggesting that reason cannot attain to sure and secure knowledge of truth, only to opinion, but that is a misleading impression. The objects of the different kinds of knowledge he names are all articles of faith. Knowing truly as faith knows, knowing for certain, knowing as recognising the truth of an insight: with respect to such objects, all these parallel forms of knowing must be considered not in epistemological but in existential terms. Hence, it does not follow that Luther would equally deny that philosophers can establish with certainty the cognitive truth of merely anthropological statements. That the soul’s immortality is something that Luther ultimately places beyond the grasp of reason indicates that he takes it to be more than a purely anthropological question. ‘Even Cicero and others wrote about the soul’s immortality, but somewhere they reported that this very immortality of the soul they did not believe in steadfastly. . . . If the philosopher were asked about these and the resurrection of the body, there would be nothing he would respond.’121 Cicero’s admission has only rhetorical significance. His denial would not change the sate of affairs. Immortality and resurrection, which appear as very nearly indistinguishable concepts, are articles of faith, not objects of rational knowledge. In a table talk at the end of the 1530s, Luther credited Lateran V with decreeing ‘that the resurrection of the dead be believed in.’122 The council had no constitution on the resurrection of the dead; Luther must be referring to the immortality doctrine, which is a clear indication that the two are rather interchangeable than mutually exclusive in his thought. We can reach the same conclusion from his much earlier Christmas postil, where he concludes from Titus 2:13 ‘that the soul is immortal, ay, the body must also come back as we pray in the Creed: “I believe in the resurrection of the body and life everlasting”.’123 Immortality and resurrection are again side by side, both articles entailed in the expectation

121 In locum Iesaiae cap. 9. de Christo et regno eius etc. (1546): ‘Scripserunt quidem Cicero ac alii quidam de animae[ ]immortalitate, sed alicubi tamen produnt se, quod illam ipsam animae immortalitatem non constanter crediderint. . . . Si quid de his et de corporum resurrectione interrogaretur Philosophus, nihil esset, quod responderet’ (WA 40III:608.32–34, 609.4–5, on Isa 9:1). ET foreseen for LW ns 4.4. 122 Table talk Nr. 4390 (1539): ‘ut crederent resurrectionem mortuorum’ (WA TR 4:290.19–20); for the context, see lines 18–20 and 24–29. The German translation adds ‘erst,’ i.e. the doctrine is only then (and not before) promulgated in the papal church. 123 Weihnachtspostille, ‘Die Epistell czu der Meß der Christnacht. Ad Citum ij.’ (1522): ‘das die seel unsterblich sey, ya auch der leyb widderkummen muß, wie wyr ym glawben betten: Ich glewb eyn offirstand des fleyschß und eyn ewigs leben’ (WA 10I/1:56.21–23).

1 Luther 47 of the second coming and in the creedal formulation. But to return to the problem of the soul’s immortality as an article of faith, it was not in the late 1530s that Luther worked out his position in this regard. He was clear on the matter already in the mid-1520s. His commentary on Ecclesiastes was printed in 1532, but the lectures in which the published work originated had been delivered six years earlier. Explicating the closing verses of chapter 3,124 he protests that the text cannot be interpreted with reference to the soul’s mortality. This passage cannot be twisted to refer to the mortality of the soul, for he [the Teacher] is speaking about things under the sun. The world, of course, cannot understand or believe that the soul is immortal. . . . The philosophers have indeed disputed about the immortality of the soul, but so coldly that they seem to be setting forth mere fables. . . . That is, if the Lord did not give His Spirit to man, no one could say that man is different from the beast, because men and cattle, being made of the same dust, also return to the same dust. . . . ‘Simply show me,’ he says, ‘one man who is not among the godly but among those who are under the sun, or in the world, one man who can assert that the soul lives after this life, when he sees that the spirit of men and that of cattle are not different from each other; for death comes immediately to both of them when their breath fails.’ No one among men knows this. That we do know it is not on the basis of what we know as men but of what we know as sons of God and above the sun, inasmuch as we are in the heavenly places . . . and belong to heaven. But in the world there is neither this knowledge nor peace, but everything is carried on as it is among the beasts. . . . The ungodly are vexed by their similarity to the beasts, and they get nothing out of their labors but vanity; for they neither know nor believe this teaching, because their reason does not persuade them of it. This passage also convicts the whole mob of the philosophers, who compile many arguments about the immortality of the soul, although they themselves do not believe it.125

Not only is the soul’s immortality affirmed here (actually, with the force of a self-evident truth for speaker and audience), but such knowledge is explicitly and repeatedly limited to divine revelation. What reason sees is that death is common to humans and animals; all die, and their end seems to be final. Luther knows that the notion of the soul’s immortality also appears in pagan philosophy; that is not what he denies. Rather, though his terminology is still somewhat fluid here, he juxtaposes awareness, mere knowledge or opinion, with faith, which alone is true knowledge. The scope of the world, of reason and philosophy is confined to the former. True knowledge is the prerogative of those enlightened by God’s

124 ‘For the fate of humans and the fate of animals is the same, as one dies, so dies the other. They all have the same breath, and humans have no advantage over the animals; for is all is vanity. All go to one place; all are from the dust, and all turn to dust again. Who knows whether the human spirit goes upward and the spirit of animals goes downward to the earth? So I saw that there is nothing better than that all should enjoy their work, for that is their lot; who can bring them to see what will be after them?’ (Eccl 3:19–22.) 125 Notes on Ecclesiastes (1532: print; lecture in 1526), LW 15:59–61, on Eccl 3:19–22 (WA 20:70.22–24,26– 27,35–71.17, 71.31–37, 72:23–27, on Eccl 3:20–22).

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Spirit.126 The immortality of the soul belongs in this realm. The same insight informs the 1536 Disputation concerning Man, possibly Luther’s most important statement on the question, which Ebeling devoted so much attention to. 1. Philosophy or human wisdom defines man as an animal having reason, sensation, and body. 2. It is not necessary at this time to debate whether man is properly or improperly called an animal. 3. But this must be known, that this definition describes man only as a mortal and in relation to this life. . . . 11. Therefore, if philosophy or reason itself is compared with theology, it will appear that we know almost nothing about man, . . . 13. For philosophy does not know the efficient cause for certain, nor likewise the final cause, 14. Because it posits no other final cause than the peace of this life, and does not know that the efficient cause is God the creator. 15. Indeed, concerning the formal cause which they call soul, there is not and never will be agreement among the philosophers. . . . 17. Nor is there any hope that man in this principal part can himself know what he is until he sees himself in his origin which is God. . . . 20. Theology to be sure from the fulness of its wisdom defines man as whole and perfect: 21. Namely, that man is a creature of God consisting of body and a living soul, made in the beginning after the image of God, without sin, so that he should procreate and rule over the created things, and never die, 22. But after the fall of Adam, certainly, he was subject to the power of the devil, sin and death, a twofold evil for his powers, unconquerable and eternal. 23. He can be freed and given eternal life only through the Son of God, Jesus Christ (if he believes in him). . . . 32. Paul in Romans 3[:28], ‘We hold that a man is justified by faith apart from works,’ briefly sums up the definition of man, saying, ‘Man is justified by faith.’ . . . 35. Therefore, man in this life is the simple material of God for the form of his future life. . . . 37. And as earth and heaven were in the beginning for the form completed after six days, that is, its material, 38. So is man in this life for his future form, when the image of God has been remolded and perfected.127

The overall structure of the theses embodies the juxtaposition of philosophy and theology, reason and faith. That the transition between the two halves is not after but before thesis 20 may be taken as mimetic. In the philosophical section, also in the theses not cited, reason predominates. It is highly praised and much appreciated. Yet in the context of ultimate concerns, it avails little or nothing. The overriding message is its limitation and uselessness. Thesis 14 explicitly confines its purview to temporal existence, and thesis 3 sets similar limits to the philosophical definition of the human being. Reason can only grasp human nature in its fallenness, in its subjugation to sin and death. Whatever her pristine condition, we have no access to it in philosophy. Whether any of that condition survives or not is a moot point because even if it does, we cannot recognise it. Philosophy fails not only to lead us back to

126 Robert Rosin reads the entirety of the Notes as Luther’s response to the challenge of skepticism in which epistemological issues play only a minor part. Reason may play a legitimate role in daily life, but the real issue is the theological one, the certainty of salvation, to which only faith can provide an adequate existential answer (1997:78–150, esp. 124, 147–50). 127 LW 34:137–40 (WA 39I:175.3–8,24–25,28–33,36–37, 176.5–13,32–34, 177.3–4, 7–10).

1 Luther 49 paradise but, so to speak, also to show the way from paradise. It cannot come to terms with our true nature because it cannot get past sin back to our created nature. If nothing else, the fall sets up an epistemological limit to understanding human nature. Hence, there is no need to discuss whether the distinction between animals and humans is essential or inessential (thesis 2). It is highly significant that the philosophical definition includes biological existence (animality), the body, the senses and reason—but not the soul. Or, more precisely, bearing in mind the etymology, it includes the soul only in its aspect it shares with the beasts (the anima of animal)—echoing Luther’s exposition of Ecclesiastes 3. The only place the soul appears in the first nineteen theses is thesis 15, where the impossibility of any philosophical consensus on its nature is foreseen. Again, Luther is not altogether denying that philosophy may aspire to treat of such matters, but predicts the failure of all such efforts. Psychology in its true sense as talk about the soul finds its rightful place in the theological definition. There humans are defined as created with body and soul; and immortality, too, appears immediately at least as a divinely intended purpose and gift. In other words, the soul enters the definition not as an ontological given that reason might as well explore but only in the context of creatureliness that is understood as being in a relation to God. In a kind of mimetic syntax, the phrase that contains soul appears between an assertion of the human being as created by God on the one hand, and in the image of God on the other. Likewise, the way forward, which is the way back, is not secured by any ontological quality of the human being. After the fall, there is no mention of the soul’s immortality. What appears in thesis 23, instead, is a gift of eternal life. After theses 21–23 define humans on the scheme of creation–fall–redemption, there follow a series of theses, not quoted, on the undefeatability of sin and death and the limitations of human powers which pave the way to thesis 32, another theological definition of the human being. It is much shorter than the first (the Latin original consist of three words only) and exhibits a much simpler structure, too. Instead of a threefold scheme, it focuses on one single element, justification by faith. ‘[H]ominem iustificari fide.’ This pithy clause in which the three operative elements (human being, justification, and faith) appear in a brilliantly condensed formula without any inessential trimmings is explicitly offered as a definition of what the human being is. Yet Luther does not say that ‘the human being is [that which is] justified by faith,’ but that ‘the human being is justified by faith.’ That is what she

1 Luther 50 is; that is her definition. Significantly, Luther does not observe here the classical principle ‘Definitio fit per genus proximum et differentia specifica.’ Grammatically, that would require a noun phrase in the predicate. Luther offers, instead, a more dynamic (accusative and) infinitive clause. Significantly, the infinitive is in the passive form. The human being thus defined is not the agent but the patient in her own definition in which the active role is assigned to God. What ultimately has to be stated about human nature is a need (passive infinitive), a corresponding gift (justification) and a relationality (by faith). It is in this fulfilled relationality answering to her deepest need that the human being is constituted. It is only a short step from here to the climax of the disputation. ‘Therefore, man in this life is the simple material of God for the form of his future life. . . . And as earth and heaven were in the beginning for the form completed after six days, that is, its material, [s]o is man in this life for his future form, when the image of God has been remolded and perfected.’128 What ought to be noted here, in addition to the reiteration of the theme, on a grand scale, of relationality in which the human being is the patient, is not only the underlying Aristotelian categories but also the totality of the claim, which itself recapitulates a trajectory that has run through the entire disputation. Theology defines the complete human being (thesis 20); the whole person is oppressed by sin and death (thesis 25); Paul understands the human being in a total sense (thesis 34)—to name a few manifestations. Luther does not set the contrast between soul and body, but between sin and justification. There is nothing in the soul that would secure a special place for it. The whole human being is sinful; the whole human being is in need of redemption; and the whole human being, body and soul, is justified by faith. The immortality of the soul, if it has any meaning post lapsum, is not an ontological fact about humans but a divine act of creation by which God brings the human being to the fulfilment of her ultimate purpose—but that consummation will also involve the body. If the soul’s immortality can be pronounced on any other grounds than by virtue of being entailed in resurrection faith enshrined in the creeds, such grounds must be biblical, not philosophical. And in a famous passage, Luther seems to offer precisely that. He speaks with man alone. Accordingly, where and with whomever God speaks, whether in anger or in grace, that person is surely immortal. The Person of God, who speaks, and the Word point out that we are the kind of creatures with whom God would want to speak

128 Cf. p. 48, above.

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eternally and in an immortal manner. Such a God or Gods, as He is called here, Abraham has; and he who clings to Abraham’s promise has the same God and is a servant of God. Eventually he will live while he sleeps, even though he is dead.129

Human immortality, and Luther rather asserts than denies it, has its source and reason not in human nature as such, but in the relationship God offers to humans. Note that the relationship is constituted by God addressing the human person, that is, in speech, more precisely, the Word of God. It is because God addresses us in God’s Word, and because who God and God’s Word are, that we know that we are destined for eternity. While this need not lead to universalism—for Luther’s trademark distinction between law and gospel, speech in anger and speech in grace, leaves plenty of room for a traditional twofold destiny in hell or heaven—he only pursues the latter line here through Abraham. Heirs of his promise, though dead, live while they sleep. That has now brought us to the patriarchs and the question of soul sleep, and we must consider the last two issues in that order.

1.5 Abraham’s and Jacob’s death in the Lectures on Genesis

The significance of Luther’s Lectures on Genesis or, more precisely, of his commentary on the death, especially, of Abraham130 and, to a lesser degree, of Jacob131 for the Reformer’s understanding of the Zwischenzustand has been decidedly undervalued in modern criticism. As we shall see in chapter 4, those passages were widely quoted and became highly influential in the literature of the later sixteenth century. In fact, the section on Abraham’s death was published in 1551 as a separate booklet in the German translation of the second generation Lutheran and later Catholic convert Stephan Agricola, Jr. (c.1526–1562).132 The work appeared once more in 1560, years after Agricola’s own conversion, together with a couple

129 Genesisvorlesung (1535–1545), LW 5:76 (WA 43:481.32–38) on Gen 26:24–25. 130 LW 4:308–20 (WA 43:357.6–364.14) on Gen 25:7–10 (‘This is the length of Abraham’s life, one hundred and seventy-five years. Abraham breathed his last and died in a good old age, an old man and full of years, and was gathered to his people. His sons Isaac and Ishmael buried him in the cave of Machpelah, in the field of Ephron son of Zohar the Hittite, east of Mamre, the field that Abraham purchased from the Hittites. There Abraham was buried, with his wife Sarah’). 131 LW 8:314–19 (WA 44:811.1–814.18) on Gen 49:33 (‘When Jacob ended his charge to his sons, he drew up his feet into the bed, breathed his last, and was gathered to his people’). 132 Cf. WA 42:xviii and VD16: L 4208.

1 Luther 52 of other biblical expositions he had translated from Johannes Brenz (1499–1570).133 The German translation of the entire lecture cycle came out between those two editions in 1558 as part of Luther’s collected works. The first half of the book was translated by Basilius Faber (1520–1576), whom we will meet again.134 While details of the text will have to be more closely engaged during the discussion of soul sleep in section 1.6, it seems advisable to present an overview of the commentary’s pertinent parts here. Luther begins by reflecting on the fact of Abraham’s death, which he takes to be a source of comfort for us. ‘In all Holy Scripture this is the first passage which declares that the death of the saints is peaceful and precious in the sight of God (Ps. 116:15) and that the saints do not taste death but most pleasantly fall asleep.’135 He brings Isaiah to bear on the interpretation of death, and the two passages he quotes (Isa 26:20136 and 57:1–2137) will be among the most popular prooftexts of the soul’s immortality in later generations. The bulk of the section is then taken with an analysis of Abraham’s post-mortem whereabouts or, to put it differently, by an interpretation of the phrase ‘[he was gathered] to his people.’ First, Luther uses a variety of biblical terms to speak of that reality. In addition to ‘to his people’ and ‘chambers’ that we have already seen (and he will return to the latter term as well),138 he also mentions ‘to his fathers’ (Gen 15:15),139 ‘the land of the living’ (Ps 27:13),140 ‘the bosom of Abraham’ (Lk 16:22),141 and later also ‘the hand of God’ (Wis 3:1),142 ‘paradise’ (Lk 23:43)143 and others. His point is partly that death does not end it all, but our existence

133 Cf. VD16: B 7907. 134 Cf. VD16: L 3338 and section 3.4, esp. n. 24 there. 135 LW 4:309 (WA 43:357.23–25). 136 ‘Come, my people, enter your chambers, and shut your doors behind you; hide yourselves for a little while until the wrath is past.’ These ‘chambers’ will be famous in later literature, cf. Table 4.3 and section 5.2, below. 137 ‘The righteous perish, and no one takes it to heart; the devout are taken away, while no one understands. For the righteous are taken away from calamity, and they enter into peace; those who walk uprightly will rest on their couches.’ 138 LW 4:312–13 (WA 43:360.15,23,34). 139 ‘[Then the Lord said to Abram (v. 13), . . .] “As for yourself, you shall go to your ancestors in peace; you shall be buried in a good old age”.’ 140 ‘I believe that I shall see the goodness of the Lord in the land of the living.’ 141 ‘The poor man died and was carried away by the angels to be with Abraham [Gk to Abraham’s bosom].’ 142 ‘But the souls of the righteous are in the hand of God, and no torment will ever touch them.’ 143 ‘He [Jesus] replied [to the criminal on the cross], “Truly I tell you, today you will be with me in Paradise”.’

1 Luther 53 will continue beyond it, and partly that it has always been so; there has always been, from the very beginning, a community of departed saints. His synonymous references are further noteworthy in that they will take on a life of their own in the latter half of the century.144 Luther maintains throughout both that what is being said in these passages pertains only to the righteous, neither to animals nor to the ungodly, and that the whole question is ultimately shrouded in an aporia. We know that it is true, but we cannot grasp how it is true. In a typically Lutheran fashion, God’s promise is at the heart of the matter; that is why it is unshakably true. Abraham’s bosom comes to play a major role in this context. The point of connection between the appellation of the present text (‘to his people’) and the New Testament term that appears in the parable of the rich man and Lazarus (a seminal text for any discussion of the post-mortem state) is evidently provided by the protagonist himself. Abraham is here said to be gathered to his people, and later Lazarus and, by extension, the righteous are taken to Abraham’s bosom. Further, the text under discussion does not only point forward to Jesus’ parable, but it also harks back to the scene where God had promised Abraham a great many descendants in his childlessness, which ‘he believed . . . and the Lord reckoned it to him as righteousness’ (Gen 15:6). Later in the same scene, God further promised deliverance and wealth to the people into which Abraham’s as yet nonexistent family would grow, and a peaceful death to himself (v. 15). That promise is now being fulfilled on the personal level. It is in this very promise—faith in which is reckoned to the believer as righteousness, we are really at the heart of Luther’s theology— that the Reformer finds the key to the whole problem of the soul’s post-mortem existence. The righteous are said to enter Abraham’s bosom not in the sense that there would be a place where the patriarch embraces them on his lap, but by virtue of sharing in the promise given to him of universal blessing for humanity.145 Luther further develops the insight in chronological terms of the ages of the world. Abraham’s bosom has no unlimited validity; it is—or, rather, was—only a temporal reality. Prior to Abraham, it was the bosom of Adam by virtue of the promise given to him, that is, the protogospel (Gen 3:15). Nor can the bosom of Abraham be affirmed in New Testament times, when the original promises have been fulfilled in Jesus Christ, who now supersedes

144 Cf. Table 4.3, Table 4.27 and section 5.2, below. 145 See Gen 22:18 and cf. LW 4:311 (WA 43:359.13–14).

1 Luther 54 the patriarch. In other words, ‘the bosom of Abraham is the promise concerning the Christ who would come; and the father of this promise is Abraham. But today it is changed to the Word concerning the Christ who has been manifested in the flesh.’146 Consequently, Luther does not shy away, the lack of direct biblical sanction for the usage notwithstanding, from speaking of Christ’s bosom as the destination of dead saints after Easter. Indeed, he repeatedly emphasises throughout the entire section that we are in a much better position and have much clearer testimonies of the life to come than did the righteous in Old Testament times who nonetheless firmly believed in it. Luther’s theological interpretation provides a strong enough ground for him to dismiss Augustine’s reserved statement that the departed ‘soul dwells in a hidden retreat,’147 as a sign of ‘the weakness of the human intellect’ to which the power of God’s word is to be opposed. ‘Therefore the whereabouts of the souls is the Word of God or the promises in which we fall asleep.’148 That is Abraham’s bosom. Rather than take it in a locative-literal sense, Luther insists that ‘where’ the departed righteous souls are is in Christ, God’s Word and promise. The insight has both a constructive and a critical function. The former is more limited, for Luther never really relaxes his position that the whole issue is beyond human grasp. He repeatedly refrains from making ‘positive statement.’149 ‘For God did not want us to know this in this life.’150 There is indeed very little Luther ventures to say on the content of the soul’s existence in Christ’s bosom after the death of the body. Citing biblical evidence we have already seen and adding a few more loci like Matthew 22:31–32,151 John 8:51152 or Revelation 14:13,153 he affirms, first and foremost, a continuation of life in and beyond death. ‘And many passages of Holy Scripture confirm that we do not die after death but are plainly

146 LW 4:311 (WA 43:359.21–23). 147 Enchiridion, ch. 109 (NPNF1 3:272). 148 LW 4:314 (WA 43:361.9,12–13). 149 LW 4:311, 315, 316 (WA 43:359.8–10, 361.36, 363.5). 150 LW 4:313 (WA 43:360.20–21). 151 Jesus said to the Sadducees: ‘And as for the resurrection of the dead, have you not read what was said to you by God, “I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob”? He is God not of the dead, but of the living.’ 152 ‘Very truly, I tell you, whoever keeps my word will never see death.’ 153 ‘And I heard a voice from heaven saying, “Write this: Blessed are the dead who from now on die in the Lord.” “Yes,” says the Spirit, “they will rest from their labours, for their deeds follow them.” ’

1 Luther 55 alive.’154 Second, he stresses that our continued existence is a life of rest and peace. Luther is emphatically discussing the post-mortem state of the righteous only; he says that they are held in God’s promises and that the content of those is peace; more we cannot know. That reservation is to be appreciated, for he actually formally raises two questions, first ‘about the state of the souls after this life’ and, second, about the ‘kind of life or rest’ they have.155 I shall discuss those passages in more depth in the next section, but we shall see that Luther’s answers do not take us far beyond the framework established here.156 We really cannot know more—Luther is committed to his apophatic stance. Critically, his doctrine of the Word of God as the receptacle of the departed saints produces somewhat more tangible results. It can function as a challenge and corrective to Catholic doctrine with its fivefold structure of the hereafter, including the limbos.157 As for heaven and hell, Luther tentatively suggests that they will not be entered until the last day, and even the godless are resting in the meantime, but he ultimately withholds judgement. The limbus infantium with its ‘suffering-free’ deprivation of God’s sight he finds a contradiction in terms. ‘To be deprived of the vision of God is hell itself,’ he counters. Likewise, ‘he who is in purgatory is in hell itself.’158 The limbo of the fathers is inappropriate language and should have been called Abraham’s, or Christ’s, bosom. At the end of the day, all we are left with are heaven, hell and an aporia which may in fact cover the interim place of all the dead where they rest before they enter their final abode after judgement day. That may appear a somewhat weak conclusion, but, on the one hand, Luther, to repeat, is serious about the limitations of human knowledge, and, on the other hand, he never tires to underscore the divine promise which receives the righteous at their death. Considering who gives the promise, that is surely enough to comfort us in our greatest need. For Luther, a divine promise is nothing short of God Godself. If we have the promise, and if it is the promise that awaits us upon death, no greater good can befall us. That is the point Luther

154 LW 4:312 (WA 43:359.39–40). 155 LW 4:312–13 (WA 43:359.31–32, 360.19). 156 Cf. p. 61, below. 157 The editors of the American Edition cite the 1439 Florentine bull Laetentur coeli as evidence (LW 4:311n), but the conciliar statement only concerns heaven, hell and purgatory but not the ‘limits’ (DS 1304, ET 693); cf. also p. 9, above. 158 LW 4:315 (WA 43:362.11,15).

1 Luther 56 indefatigably drives home. More he cannot say, both because the details are God’s secret, and because there is nothing more than Christ who is our promise. One last observation must be added here. Throughout the section on Abraham’s death, Luther is mostly speaking of ‘us’ or ‘the righteous’ or uses some similar term. In a passage of about 3300 words, anima only appears twenty-two times. Some of those instances are immaterial, and virtually all others, fifteen in number, occur within a much shorter, roughly 800-word, portion of the text. It is indeed the part where questions about the post- mortem fate of the soul are explicitly raised. As I shall argue in the next section, in some key passages here the contrast is usually not with the body.159 That is not to deny that Luther does affirm that the souls live, but in the given context the peacefulness of their life is equally emphatic.160 He raises the question of the pre-judgement day punishment of damned souls, but finally leaves it open—although their very existence is quite clearly presupposed even so.161 The soul’s immortality is perhaps most openly articulated when he says that ‘the whereabouts of the souls is the Word of God or the promises in which we fall asleep. . . . [W]hen we take hold of it in faith and fall asleep in the Word, the soul comes into infinite space.’ Yet even here the text continues, ‘it is more than enough to know that we depart safely and quietly into the bosom of Christ; that is, that those who rely on the Word and the promise escape afflictions and tribulations and enjoy everlasting peace and safety.’162 In other words, Luther did not share a modern predisposition against the notion of the continued existence of disembodied souls, but his theological concern is with the human person rather than only with an ontological constituent of hers. Even more strikingly, immortality only appears once in the entire section, and there it is ‘our future immortality’ for which we should prepare.163 It is thus not the soul’s quality but ours, and it is not a present but a future reality. That is to say, the wording here resists an interpretation in ‘classical’ ontological terms (the soul is by nature immortal). By contrast, resurrection occurs ten times. Four of them we can discount as irrelevant, and the remaining six instances are all coupled with eternal or future life. They come in two blocks of three,

159 Cf. p. 60, below. 160 LW 4:312–13 (WA 43:359.37, 360.21–23). 161 LW 4:314 (WA 43:361.29–31). 162 LW 4:314, emphasis added (WA 43:361.13–16,18–20). 163 LW 4:318 (WA 43:364.5).

1 Luther 57 towards the beginning and the end of the section.164 In each case, Luther’s context is the promise given to the saints of the Old Testament and us. What Luther sees evidenced in the story of Abraham’s death and related scriptural quotations is the resurrection. The implication is twofold. On the one hand, especially in the light of the ‘soul’ passages discussed in the next section,165 immortality of the soul and resurrection of the body are more or less interchangeable rather than mutually exclusive concepts for Luther. On the other hand, immortality is hardly the operative concept in his theology. The promise, which is the heart of the matter for him, is not the immortality of the soul but the continued existence of the person, characteristically affirmed in terms of resurrection and life. In this scheme, the single occurrence of immortality, which is future and ours, is better understood as a synonym of eternal life bestowed upon us as God’s gift than as a created quality or ontological given of the soul. The overall logic of the somewhat shorter discussion of Jacob’s death166 is fairly similar and can be briefly summarised. In terms of their historical delivery, the two sections are separated by several years, but their basic thrust is the same. We know that life does not end with death, but the saints come to rest in Christ; yet we do not know how and where. This basic structure of ‘yes and no’ is so prevalent that it creates a fundamental rhythm in the text. Scripture . . . testifies that the dead saints are gathered to their people, or to those who believe in the Messiah and awaited His coming, just as Adam, together with all his descendants, died in faith in Christ. But how these saints are kept in definite places, we do not know. It suffices for us that Scripture testifies that from the beginning of the world those who believed in the Seed of the woman did not perish and were not consigned to oblivion but were gathered to their people. But no one can say what the nature of that place is.167

The addressees of this biblical language are still the righteous. Luther retains his earlier interpretation of Abraham’s bosom as the promise of resurrection and eternal life, and he also dismisses the complex elaborations of purgatory and the limbos. Again, immortality appears only once, as ‘the hope of future immortality,’168 while resurrection occurs six times,

164 LW 4:309–10 and 316–17 (WA 43:358.4–5,16–17, 28–29 and 363.9–10,18–19,26). 165 Cf. pp. 59–61, below. 166 Cf. n. 131 on p. 51, above. 167 LW 8:316 (WA 44:812.18–26). 168 LW 8:315 (WA 44:811.9–10).

1 Luther 58 half of which, together with three further instances of verbal forms, are irrelevant. The three pertinent cases have to do, like in Genesis 25, with the promises into which saints, past and present, die. Luther does not deny the soul’s immortality, but his theological interest lies with the resurrection. There are two aspects in which the commentary on Genesis 49 goes beyond that on Abraham’s death. First, Luther is somewhat more articulate here in denying that heaven and hell are entered immediately upon death. Jacob did not ascend into heaven; nor did he descend into hell. Where, then, did he go? God has a receptacle in which the saints and the elect rest without death, without pain and hell. But what it is named and what kind of place it is, no one knows. But it is certain that it is called, and is, a people.169

Second, for the content of the Zwischenzustand, Luther argues from somewhat richer analogies of the foetus’s life, extreme psychological experiences in illnesses and trances as well as the more quotidian phenomenon of sleep. It is now to this problem that we must turn in detail.

1.6 Soul sleep and the Zwischenzustand

Following biblical usage, Luther routinely speaks of death as sleep. And, we might add with Hamlet, ‘there’s the rub: / For in that sleep of death what dreams may come, / When we have shuffled off this mortal coil, / Must give us pause’ (3.1.65–68). Luther’s, or his interpreter’s, dilemma is not identical with that of the Prince of Denmark contemplating suicide. But the same question that motivates his indecision must be confronted here as well. How far does the analogy of death to sleep extend? And the Reformer’s answer is anything but simple and easy to interpret. In a letter to Nikolaus von Amsdorf (1483–1565) in early 1521, Luther discussed purgatory. He repeatedly protests his ignorance and the impossibility to reach a definitive answer concerning the sate of the dead, but he ventures this much, ‘my opinion would be that this is uncertain. It is most probable, however, that with few exceptions, all [departed souls] sleep without possessing any capacity of feeling.’170 But we must be careful no to draw

169 LW 8:315 (WA 44:811.22–26). We might be witnessing here a development in his thought. Back in the early years of the Reformation, he on occasion spoke of hell as the place of the souls of the dead (cf. p. 232, below). 170 Letter to Amsdorf (13 Jan 1522), LW 48:361, Nr. 111 (WA BR 2:422.22–23, Nr. 449).

1 Luther 59 too far reaching conclusions from this suggestion of insensitive sleep. Luther is very cautious not to overstate his case. Apart from the text’s general tone of uncertainty, he only presents the point as likely, and makes a small exception to it even so. On the whole, he is guided by scripture, ‘I am drawn to this opinion by the word of Scripture, “They sleep with their fathers” [2 Sam 7:12 and passim].’171 Arguably the fullest discussion he offers of the biblical evidence occurs in the section on Abraham’s death in the course of the great lecture cycle on Genesis I have analysed in the previous section. The most pregnant paragraphs come in the middle of the text where he raises two questions concerning the fate of the soul. In response to the first, more general, question, he concludes, citing a variety of Bible verses,172 ‘that our souls are living and are sleeping in peace, and that they are not being racked by any tortures.’173 Here he seems to confirm, in more certain terms, the opinion he voiced to his friend a decade and a half earlier; departed souls continue to exist in a state of sleep. However, when he proceeds in the second, more particular, question to examine the details of that existence, he significantly qualifies the verdict. Nevertheless, there is a difference between the sleep or rest of this life and that of the future life. For toward night a person who has become exhausted by his daily labor in this life enters into his chamber in peace, as it were, to sleep there; and during this night he enjoys rest and has no knowledge whatever of any evil caused either by fire or by murder. But the soul does not sleep in the same manner. It is awake. It experiences visions and the discourses of the angels and of God. Therefore the sleep in the future life is deeper than it is in this life. Nevertheless, the soul lives before God. With this analogy, which I have from the sleep of a living person, I am satisfied; for in him there is peace and quiet. He thinks that he has slept barely one or two hours, and yet he sees that the soul sleeps in such a manner that it also is awake. Thus after death the soul enters its chamber and is at peace; and while it sleeps, it is not aware of its sleep. Nevertheless, God preserves the waking soul. Thus God is able to awaken Elijah, Moses, etc., and so to control them that they live. But how? We do not know. The resemblance to physical sleep—namely, that God declares that there is sleep, rest, and peace—is enough. He who sleeps a natural sleep has no knowledge of the things that are happening in his neighbor’s house. Nevertheless, he is alive, even though, contrary to the nature of life, he feels nothing in his sleep. The same thing will happen in that life, but in a different and better way.174

While the letter to Amsdorf is much quoted in modern literature, Luther’s early modern

171 Letter to Amsdorf (13 Jan 1522), LW 48:360, Nr. 111 (WA BR 2:422.6–7, Nr. 449). 172 Cf. p. 54, above. 173 LW 4:312 (WA 43:359.37–38) on Gen 25:7–10. 174 LW 4:313 (WA 43:360.24–41).

1 Luther 60 followers were beholden to the latter passage. The theme of ignorance (limited knowledge) is again prominent, as regards both the sleeping subject’s knowledge and our own knowledge of the whole matter. Yet Luther does say some things and, to anticipate, asserts their opposite, too, right away. First, death is and is not like natural sleep. Luther begins by emphasising their differences, but then moves on to argue from their analogy. The sleep of ‘that life’ is deeper than our diurnal repose, but their dissimilarity only serves to establish the contrary affirmation, the soul lives in the sleep of death—no less than in this life, we might add. Then again, the text culminates in the paradoxical assertion, ‘The same thing will happen in that life, but in a different and better way.’ Similarly, the state of the soul resembles and yet is different from, the state of the person in sleep. It is noteworthy that the term body does not appear in the text. It is not the body but the human person (homo) that sleeps, and with whose sleep the state of the soul is compared and contrasted. Indeed, there is a genuine fluidity of subjects in the passage. On the level of nouns, ‘person’ (homo), ‘soul’, and ‘God’ all appear as subjects, to which the pronominal ‘he who sleeps’ can also be added. The primary contrast is between the human being and her soul. That is a good deal more complicated in itself than a body–soul dualism would be, but add to that the fact that the cognitive functioning of the person receives a lot of emphasis in the text (what the sleeper knows or does not know): that would normally be predicated of the soul rather than the body. Thus the juxtaposition of sleep and wakefulness is internal to the soul, not parallel to a(n external) juxtaposition of body with soul. In fact, Luther moves on the linguistic level in a few sentences from a contrast between sleeping person and wakeful soul to an attribution of both contrary options to the soul within a single sentence: the soul sleeps yet is awake. There is also a contrast in terms of agency between the soul and God. The sleeping soul is not aware of its sleep,175 but God watches over the wakeful soul. The latter half of the sentence comes as something of a surprise, considering that the soul’s consciousness-despite-sleep has been argued in the previous lines. One would expect that the soul serves God. But the shift to divine agency is pronounced; it is carried on in the next sentence. God can wake up Elijah

175 The sentence could perhaps indicate a senseless sleep, but that is not the likely meaning. Given the analogy of dreams and visions in natural sleep, just sketched, it seems to me more probable that what Luther says is this, ‘the soul is awake and is not even aware of the fact that an outside observer would think it is asleep.’

1 Luther 61 and Moses and rule that they live.176 It might also be pointed out that the duality of activity and passivity is present in natural sleep as well. The soul watches, yet not simply sees, but rather receives, dreams and visions. The contrast is even more visible in the Latin where the deponent verb has a passive form (patitur). The text is, then, fraught with paradoxes. Nothing can be stated without reservations as regards the state of the dead, Luther seems to suggest. Any statement needs to be qualified, and preferably by its opposite. The Zwischenzustand appears to elude conceptualisation; we have to make do with metaphors, knowing full well that they are but partial. I find it significant that not only concepts but language itself breaks down in face of this mystery. Luther does not say that we cannot offer neat conceptual formulations but must be content with metaphors—meaning that metaphors are perhaps second best to clear concepts, but they can at least be consistently applied in the given context. Luther’s insight cuts deeper; the truth about the post-mortem state bursts not merely our concepts, but also our language. We can only say that death is like sleep if we are prepared to constantly qualify what sleep means. There are only two features that are exempt from this general fluidity. On the one hand, sleep brings rest. That is the one thing we can and must know, Luther insists, because God says so. ‘God declares that there is sleep, rest, and peace.’177 If that seems banal, we may remember the context. What Luther asserts of sleep is metonymically transferred to death. Of course, ‘the final rest’ is still a platitude, but it is in fact platitudinous only as a euphemism. To see death as true repose is a prerogative of faith, not only against a late medieval anxiety that still echoes faintly in Hamlet’s meditation, but also against a modern hope of annihilation. It is crucial that this only secure piece of knowledge about sleep-death is rooted in God’s word. Its security is derivative of its origin. On the other hand, sleep, be it this-worldly or of a deeper kind, profoundly transforms human consciousness. That is the other reliable element in our knowledge about the Zwischenzustand, but it is really a negative piece, an aporia. The sleeping person does not perceive what goes on around her or in her neighbour’s house (and the examples are characteristically negative, fire and murder). When Luther returns to the point (it is evidently important enough to him to make it twice in the short passage), he adds, this insensitivity is

176 The allusion is to their appearance with Jesus at the time of his transfiguration (Mt 17:3 and par.) 177 Luther’s Latin (‘Deus affirmat esse somnum, quietem et pacem’) is perhaps capable of being translated as ‘God affirms that sleep is rest and peace.’

1 Luther 62

‘contrary to the nature of life,’ obviously referencing waking life. The sleeper, more specifically, has no time consciousness. She thinks she has slept ‘barely one or two hours’— implied is a long night’s sleep as contrasting reality. A couple of pages later Luther again seems to unambiguously represent psychopannychism, but, beyond a general juxtaposition of Christ’s activity with the saints’ passivity, it is actually in epistemological terms that they are contrasted. The sleep metaphor is essentially another expression of that limitation on the part of the righteous. He is always working and does not rest as do the saints who sleep, about whom it is stated in Is. 63:16: ‘Abraham does not know us, and Israel does not acknowledge us.’ Therefore there is a great difference between the sleeping saints and the ruling Christ. The former sleep and do not know what is going on. Nevertheless, they are resting.178

The last clause also reminds us of the other main function of sleep language. The metaphor is theologically applicable to death because it holds both for the tenor and the vehicle that the subject lives, rests, and her consciousness is transformed. And one more aspect might be added, although it only makes a veiled appearance in Luther. Just as a mother brings an infant into the bedchamber and puts it into a cradle—not that it may die, but that it may have a pleasant sleep and rest—so before the coming of Christ and much more after the coming of Christ all the souls of believers have entered and are entering the bosom of Christ.179

The genderedness of the simile itself makes for an interesting reading, but leaving that question aside, the immediate significance of the excerpt for my discussion is a further implication of the sleep metaphor, here gestured towards but not developed, viz. that it entails an expectation of waking up, the equivalent of which on the metaphorical level is the resurrection. For all these reasons, Luther is happy to speak of the state of the dead in sleep language, but it should always be taken in a metaphorical sense, and never as a straightforward assertion of ontological truth. The fluidity and constant qualifications of his language guard against such oversimplification. These findings essentially confirm what we saw in the analysis of the overall section above. Luther affirms that life does not end with death. He has no scruples to frame that insight in terms of the soul’s continued existence, although he does not deploy the phrase ‘immortality of the soul.’ God’s promises ultimately pertain to the whole human being. What

178 LW 4:316 (WA 43:362.32–36). Further on Luther’s reading of the Isaiah passage and on its later interpretations, see n. 67 on p. 273 and section 6.4, below. 179 LW 4:313, italics added (WA 43:360.42–361.3).

1 Luther 63 awaits us on the far side of death is peace and rest, but we know next to nothing about further details. The most significant new element Luther’s in-depth analysis adds is an extension of the aporia from our knowledge to the consciousness of the dead. That theme is further elaborated on in the commentary on Jacob’s death.180 First, he offers a more explicit statement of consciousness’s powerlessness to grasp the reality of the interim state even as it undergoes the experience. I have often tried to observe the moment of time at which I either fall asleep or awaken, but I have never been able to detect it or to prevent sleep from coming upon me unexpectedly and before I thought it would. Our death and resurrection will also be like this. We depart, and we return on the Last Day, before we are aware of it. Nor do we know how long we have been away.181

In the second half of the passage, Luther brings further analogies besides that of sleep to illustrate the same point. It is not only sleepers but foetuses, small babies, and mentally ill people (‘epileptics and madmen’)182 during their fits, or those falling into mystical trance whose life is preserved without the subject having the slightest understanding or awareness of it. The notion Luther repeats throughout his writings. In the Lenten Postils of 1525 he explicitly names the transformed consciousness as the ground why the Bible speaks of death as sleep. That is why even death is called a sleep in scripture. For just as he who falls asleep and arrives at the morning suddenly, when he wakes up, knows nothing that happens to him, so shall we at once be raised on the last day so that we do not know how we have come in and through death.183

On occasion, he explicitly contrasts ‘subjective impression’ with ‘objective reality.’ ‘But when the first man arises on the Last Day, he will think that he has been lying there barely an hour.’184 ‘And in the resurrection, it will be to Adam and the patriarchs as if they had been alive half an hour before. There is no time; there can therefore be no specific place

180 Cf. n. 131 on p. 51, above. 181 LW 8:318 (WA 44:813.42–814.5). 182 LW 8:317 (WA 44:812.34). 183 Fastenpostille, ‘Euangelion auff den sontag Judaica. Johannis 8[:46–59]’ (1525): ‘Drumb heyst auch der tod ynn der schrifft eyn schlaff. Denn gleich wie der nicht weys, wie yhm geschicht, wer eynschlefft und kompt zu morgen unversehens, wenn er auffwacht. Also werden wyr plötzlich aufferstehen am Jüngsten tage, das wyr nicht wissen, wie wyr ynn den tod und durch den tod komen sind’ (WA 17II:235.16–20). 184 Die ander Epistel S. Petri und S. Judas ausgelegt (1523–1524), LW 30:196 (WA 14:71.3–4, 16–17) on 2 Pt 3:8–10.

1 Luther 64 either; and there is neither day nor night.’185 The main point is clearly formulated in the latter passage: time and place are not applicable categories to the hereafter. That it is not an easy exercise for the human mind, Luther knows full well. That is why he insists, ‘For here one must forget about time and must know that in that world there is neither time nor hour, but all is an eternal instant.’186 The last phrase is an even more striking oxymoron than the ‘infinite space’ into which the soul enters, and which Luther opposes to Augustine’s ‘hidden places.’187 The reality of the interim state is beyond our grasp, and beyond our propositional language.

1.7 A persistently inexpressible reality

It is, finally, against this background that a famous, and difficult, passage from Luther’s preface to the posthumous edition of Urbanus Rhegius’ Prophetiae veteris testamenti de Christo (1542) must be considered. He writes, Hence we know that our Urban, who in true invocation of God and faith in Christ assiduously lived and faithfully served the church and ornamented the Gospel through chastity and piety of mores, is also blessed and has life and eternal joy in the society of Christ and the heavenly church in which he now learns, examines and hears the things which he discussed here in the church according to God’s word.188

Not only the verb forms but also the explicit time adverb ‘now’ suggests that Luther thinks of his late friend and colleague as currently in the company of Christ and the heavenly church, enjoying life and eternal bliss. Further, it is a very active presence; Rhegius is the subject of the verbs ‘learns, examines, and hears.’ It is difficult to reconcile this presentist and particularist image with the agnosticism of the previous quotations, and especially with

185 ‘[Predigt] Auff das Evangelium Luce. xvj.’ (1523, Nr. 19): ‘Und wenn man auffersteen wirt, so wurde es Adam und den alten vetern werden, gleich als weren sie vor einer halben stundt noch im leben gewest. Dört ist kain zeyt, derhalben kan auch kain besunder ort sein und seind weder tag noch nacht’ (WA 12:596.26–30). ET foreseen for LW ns 7.9. Cf. WA 40III:525.5–6. 186 ‘[Predigt]’ (1522, Nr. 33): ‘Denn hie muß man die zeytt auß dem synn thun vnnd wissen, das ynn yhener wellt nicht zeytt noch stund sind, ßondern alles eyn ewiger augenblick’ (WA 10III:194.10–12). Note the oxymoron ‘eternal instant,’ once more signalling a rupture in language. 187 Cf. pp. 54 and 56, above. 188 ‘Praefatio D. Martini Lutheri’ (1542): ‘Quare et Urbanum nostrum, qui in vera invocatione Dei et fide Christi assidue vixit et fideliter servivit Ecclesiae et Euangelium castitate et pietate morum ornavit, scimus beatum esse et habere vitam et laetitiam aeternam in societate Christi et Ecclesiae coelestis, in qua nunc ea coram discit, cernit et audit, de quibus hic in Ecclesiae iuxta verbum Dei disseruit’ (WA 53:400.14–19). ET foreseen for LW ns 5.74.

1 Luther 65 their insistence that wherever the departed souls may be, they are not in time and space. This text seems to negate a Zwischenzustand altogether; Rhegius is with the saints in heaven, where he will remain in all eternity. The impression, however, need not remain unqualified. First, the whole construct depends on the verb ‘we know’ (scimus). The overarching sentence structure is not ‘Our friend Urbanus is…’ but ‘we know that our friend Urbanus is…’ It is perhaps no eisegesis to propose that Luther’s declaration is primarily a confession of faith and only secondarily a statement of fact about Rhegius. That reading is corroborated by the larger context. The sentence is introduced with ‘hence,’ which takes the previous sentence (not quoted above) for its antecedent. ‘Blessed are the dead, says scripture, who die in the Lord.’189 It is indeed a confession, a personal application of the biblical promise of blessedness to his friend, that Luther develops from the line in Revelation. Thirdly, the internal structure of the sentence concerning Rhegius is constituted by two corresponding parts, past and present, grammatically signalled by perfect and present verbs. He who lived here in fear of God and served the church is now in the company of the same, and examines directly what he discussed here according to the word of God. In other words, Rhegius’ present condition is in full accordance with his earthly life: the former is the fulfilment of the latter. In that, the description seems more stylised than geared towards particular detail. That is not to say that a theme of ‘eschatology of heaven,’ to borrow Althaus’ term,190 lets itself be explained away from Luther’s thought. Commenting on the story of Jesus’ transfiguration, he says, Thirdly, we have here two most faithful witnesses, Moses and Elijah, that the dead are not dead and that those who die merely migrate from this wretched and calamitous life to another better one. Indeed, if Moses and Elijah were simply extinct and sent back to nothingness, they would not have appeared here.191

As far as I know, this passage has not been discussed in the context of Luther’s views of the interim state. It certainly seems to frustrate the tidying up of the overall evidence into a neat doctrine of soul sleep, although one might argue that Luther is only denying Moses and

189 ‘Praefatio D. Martini Lutheri’ (1542): ‘ “Beati mortui”, inquit scriptura, “qui in Domino moriuntur” ’ [Rev 14:13] (WA 53:400.14). 190 ‘Eschatologie des Himmels’ (Althaus (1950) 257). 191 Annotationes in aliquot capita Matthaei (1538): ‘Tertio, Duos fidelissimos hic testes habemus, Mosen et Eliam, quod . . . mortui non sint mortui, quodque morientes tantum migrent ex hac misera et calamitosa vita in aliam meliorem. Nam si Moses et Elias simpliciter extincti in nihilum redacti essent, non hic apparerent’ (WA 38:656.20–23; on Mt 17:1).

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Elijah’s extinction, and they may be temporarily awakened from their sleep—a suggestion that might square with Luther’s musing in the letter to Amsdorf.192 It seems to me better, however, to acknowledge that there are irreconcilable tensions in Luther’s thought on the state of the dead.193 It is ultimately a mystery about which we know only very little. What is important to know is that death can set a terminus to human actions but cannot limit divine agency and, hence, human existence. Second, there are tendencies in Luther to resist the soul-body dualism. He is reluctant to be satisfied with ‘half a man.’ There is more to add. In the Genesisvorlesung, Luther can further say on the patriarch, ‘Abraham died, and God is the God of Abraham. Consequently, Abraham is living. “To be sure, he died and was buried; but for Me, God, Abraham lives and knows the Trinity of the Persons and Christ, his Seed; for God is not the God of nothing”.’194 Not only is the internal tension to be noted again—contradictory statements placed emphatically and repeatedly side by side as if to signal that language must be brought to the breaking point if it is to fumble towards the inexpressible mystery of God’s nature, which is the sole ground on which the truth about us can be grasped—but also the assertion that the patriarch, admittedly dead and buried, yet is now living before God. Even more interesting is a table talk from 1542. Likewise Abraham lives. God is the God of the living. When one now wanted to say, Abraham’s soul lives with God, the body lies here dead, the distinction is rubbish! I want to contest it. It must be: The whole Abraham, the complete person must live. But you tear a part of Abraham apart and say, that lives. The philosophers speak like that, Once the soul has emigrated from this domicile etc. That must be a foolish soul which, being in heaven, should be desirous of the body!195

The argumentation is again based on Matthew 22:32, but the comment is remarkable by virtue of its total claim. And it certainly raises quite a few questions in answer to which different readings might be proposed. One option is to argue that Luther indeed believed that the patriarchs and other Old Testament saints were raised with Christ, and were now

192 Cf. p. 59, above. 193 Cf. also n. 169 on p. 58, above. 194 LW 5:73 (WA 43:479.26–30) on Gen 26:24–26. 195 Table talk Nr. 5534 (1542): ‘Item Abraham vivit. Deus est Deus vivorum. Wenn man nun wolt sagen: Anima Abrahae vivit apud Deum, corpus hic iacet mortuum, die distinctio ist ein dreck! Die will ich anfechten. Es mus heissen: Totus Abraham, der gantze mensch soll leben. Aber so reisset ir mir ein stuck vom Abraham vnd saget: Das lebet. So reden die philosophi: Postquam anima ex hoc domicilio emigravit etc. Da mus ein nerrische seel sein, wenn die im hiemel were, das sie des leibs begeren wolte!’ (WA TR 5:219.11–17.)

1 Luther 67 bodily in heaven.196 Beyond a long tradition of the ‘harrowing of hell,’ Matthew 27:52–53 could provide some basis for that conviction. The interpretation might tidy up this table talk, but it does not easily square with Luther’s admission, quoted from the Lectures on Genesis above, that Abraham ‘is dead and buried.’ Another option is to suggest that the last sentence of the excerpt is Luther’s own opinion and implies that the soul is also dead until the last day. That fits the rest of the overall evidence even less than the previous reading. Quite apart from the possibility that the last line is still attributed to the philosophers, Luther’s understanding of a robust Zwischenzustand in the sense of it being distinct from the final abode of humans in heaven or hell may much better serve to resolve the interpretive difficulty. In other words, a soul in heaven would indeed be foolish to desire the body, but the souls of the righteous are not yet in heaven, but in an interim state where such longing is still admissible.197 While we have seen that Luther usually spoke of the post-mortem state of the person rather than of the soul alone, the difficulty of the specific fate of the body is not prima facie removed. Third, we might admit that Luther’s assertions are not fully consistent, and resist strict systematisation. It might be well to insert here a reminder that we must be more careful with the evidentiary value of the table talks than with that of his letters, lectures, sermons, and, especially, published writings. But the tensions between his different formulations need not merely be a liability. They might be interpreted as signs of how far Luther was prepared to go to express the inexpressible, God’s lordship in, through and over death. Whatever the merit of the different strategies, this much is clear. Luther’s emphasis is on life. The whole Abraham lives. Or, to be more precise, the whole Abraham shall (soll) live. Difficult if not impossible as it is to translate this German modal auxiliary (and must might in fact be a more adequate, if etymologically unrelated, equivalent here), it is clear—and that is the second we can safely state about the passage—that by the use of soll and mus Luther signals some distance between his controversial claim and a straightforward assertion of fact. The smack at the philosophers points in the same direction. Whatever Luther wants to say about life-in-death is only to be grasped in the modality of faith. Not only are space and time

196 Luther may indeed have thought that Enoch, Elijah etc. and those raised with Christ either on Good Friday or at the ‘harrowing of hell’ are already bodily in heaven; cf. LW 8:313, on Gen 49:29–32, and 317–18, on v. 33 (WA 44:810.9–12, 813.13–15, 23–26). 197 Incidentally, we may here hear a faint echo of the beatific vision controversy of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries (cf. pp. 9–16, above).

1 Luther 68 inapplicable to the realm of the hereafter, God’s reality also supersedes our dichotomy of life and death. ‘Therefore in his [Christ’s] eyes death is like life, one like the other, death and life. When we are dead, we are not dead before him. For he is not the God of the dead but the God of Abraham etc. who live, as Mt 22[:32], where it says they are not dead, but live before me.’198 The appeal is again to Jesus’ response to the Sadducees, a foundational text for any discussion of the soul’s immortality, but the context is a sermon on Luke 7, the raising of the widow of Nain’s son. It serves as an appropriate reminder at the end of this enquiry that immortality and resurrection are never far from each other in Luther’s thought, and that the soul’s post-mortem fate can, on his view, be never fully considered in isolation from, let alone in contradiction to, the resurrection of the body and the life of the world to come. Luther quite naturally worked with, or at least within the framework of, a medieval descriptive anthropology with its understanding of human nature as a two or threefold system consisting of body and soul (and sometimes spirit).199 (To renew that model was, for Luther, a task of philosophy, not theology.) To that extent it cannot be denied that the soul, and its immortality, also have an ontological aspect in Luther’s thought. But that is by no means the decisive issue. It merely has to be stated in order to avoid the pitfall of denying it. Much more important is our finding that, contrary to much twentieth-century theological reflection, the immortality of the soul and the resurrection of the body are not two contrasting, let alone mutually exclusive, concepts for Luther. Much rather, they are virtually synonymous or, at any rate, inherently connected. It would be a grave mistake to conclude from this that Luther also sold out to Greek (pagan) philosophical thought, and accommodated his theology to its concepts. On the contrary, Luther denies any meaningful understanding of the soul’s immortality to philosophy, and insists that it is an article of faith. Reason can get past neither sin, in order to have an adequate grasp of what we are, nor death, in order to properly understand our destiny. Material philosophical formulations are anathema to him, although he is prepared to make use of philosophical concepts in the unpacking—and, hence, the service—of biblically derived theological insights.

198 ‘[Predigt] Lucae VII.’ (1533, Nr. 37): ‘Ideo fur seinen [Christi] augen ist der tod sicut vita, Eins wie das ander, tod und leben. Quando sumus mortui, non sumus mortui coram eo. Quia ipses non est deus mortuouum[!], sed deus Abrahae [et]c. qui vivunt, ut Matth. 22 q. d. non sunt mortui sed vivunt mihi’ (WA 37:149.18–21). 199 Cf. The Magnificat (1521), LW 21:303 (WA 7:550.20–551.24) on Lk 1:46.

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The soul’s immortality can only be grounded theologically, but even that must be further qualified. Luther does not reach back to creation for arguments of a kind of protological anthropology as Heidler would have it200 (even if that is safely beyond the scope of reason). Rather, he sees the guarantee of the soul’s continued existence in our relationality, in the fact that we are addressed by God. That is the sole reason why it is not all over at death. Whatever the precise content of the soul’s post-mortem fate, God’s agency is key to it. The soul is not simply immortal because God created it so, but because God maintains a relationship to it, be it by addressing it through God’s eternal Word, or watching over it in its wakeful (or perhaps insensitive) sleep, or waking it up. But the hope Luther holds out is not so much for the soul as for the whole human being. There are tendencies in Luther to resist the soul-body dualism not merely in the way it was once fashionable to recognise in terms of a Ganztodthese. Luther understands the life out of death offered by God to humans to pertain not only to the soul but the body as well—and at times he seems prepared to suggest that in some specific cases as with Elijah or the patriarchs, the consummation of that promise is present reality. At any rate, it will be in the general resurrection which may or may not lie far ahead on a worldly timescale, but it is surely very near to those who have passed through the narrow gate of death. The evidence thus supports neither the older view that insisted on Luther’s dismissal of the notion of the immortality of the soul, nor a more recent reaction emphasising a doctrine of soul sleep (Thiede) or the soul’s conscious post-mortem existence (Heidler). The metaphor of sleep Luther freely uses, but never attributes to it a more than metaphorical validity. The state of the dead cannot be contained in it. A description of the Zwischenzustand ultimately bursts the limits of language. ‘Soul sleep’ appears on the linguistic level, but it resists a reading as ontological statement. On a larger scale, it should perhaps be taken as an important qualification of the doctrine of the soul’s immortality. Luther has little to say on what the souls do; and almost even less on what they know. He does speak more on the latter point, but only negatively, what they do not know. The departed souls have no time and space-consciousness, and we should probably not apply time and space categories to them at all.201 That is so because space and time are

200 Heidler (1983) 45. 201 Cullmann, we recall, argued that according to the New Testament’s teaching the dead are in time (cf. p. 23, above). Luther definitely has a different view.

1 Luther 70 philosophical categories, and the mystery of the soul’s survival in death can only be appropriated in faith, rather than grasped by reason. Much, then, as Luther would agree with Pomponazzi that Aristotle is not the master from whom to learn the lesson of the immortality of the soul, he would equally strongly reject the Italian philosopher’s conclusion, and would regard his effort as fundamentally misguided, precisely because the Paduan sets out to consider the matter under exclusion of revelation.202 Luther rejects both Pomponazzi and the backlash to him at Lateran V for the same reason. They have philosophical rather than theological commitments, which is inadequate in dealing with an article of faith that the immortality of the soul really is. What we are left with is mostly an aporia as far as the details are concerned. The inapplicability of our fundamental categories; some metaphors with limited validity; a set of contradictory statements. But we have God’s promise, and that is all faith needs for certainty. We do not know how it continues, but we do know that it is not all out with death. And that, on Luther’s view, ultimately applies to the whole human being, body and soul.

202 Cf. p. 18, above.

2 Melanchthon

Had he not written anything on the immortality of the soul, his silence would require explanation. Philip Melanchthon (1497–1560) is a figure who cannot be passed over in silence in an account of doctrinal developments from Luther to the later sixteenth century. His Loci communes (1st ed. 1521) earned him a status as the first systematician in the Saxon Reformation; his organisational talent left its mark not only on the church but also on the entire German educational system. He may have ultimately failed to become a secondary authority in the church after Luther’s death,1 but as Reformer, exegete, educator, scholar, rhetor, he helped shape the movement and its institutions as no one else except Luther himself. Through his works2 and students,3 he remained remarkably influential until the end of the century and beyond. While his impact as Praeceptor Germaniae on culture at large is widely appreciated, his role in the history of Lutheranism has been subject to sharp and enduring criticism. This issue will demand attention, but first it must be clearly stated that, for better or worse, Melanchthon did play a central part in the development of evangelical doctrine. By far the most important text where he discusses the soul’s immortality is the concluding chapter of his De anima (1st ed. 1540), an innovative commentary on Aristotle.

1 Cf. Kolb (1991) 97–98. 2 Both the Augsburg Confession and its Apology became recognised creeds of various Lutheran Churches, and as such, continue to be read and interpreted for reasons other than purely historical. The VD17 also lists several of his other works still in print in the outgoing seventeenth century, and De anima, with which I shall be more closely concerned, remained in use as a university textbook well into the 1700s. 3 As Robert Kolb points out, members of both parties in the major inner-Lutheran controversy of the sixteenth century, Gnesio-Lutherans as well as Philippists, were not only followers of Luther but also students of Melanchthon (1991:70). See also his ‘Philipp’s Foes, but Followers Nonetheless: Late Humanism among the Gnesio-Lutherans’ (1992) and Scheible (1997b).

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This fact alone might raise not only a host of questions but quite a few eyebrows, too, if we recall Luther’s scathing dismissal of the philosopher.4 The question must, therefore, be squarely faced if there is any room for Aristotle in theological reflection that claims to maintain Luther’s heritage. It might be objected that I am putting the cart before the horse and, instead, Melanchthon’s position should be first carefully reconstructed and then, if the charge can indeed be rightfully made, the problem of his selling out to philosophy tackled. However, any and every turn to Aristotle, for purposes other than ridicule or criticism, seems problematic, and we cannot avoid ‘reading as’: Melanchthon’s moves appropriating insights from Aristotle run the risk, against the background of the previous chapter, of appearing suspicious prima facie unless we can find a suitable interpretive matrix. It is therefore with the place of Aristotle in evangelical theology that we must begin.

2.1 Luther, Melanchthon, and Aristotle

The tradition is sharply divided over the interpretation of Melanchthon,5 and his Aristotelianism featured prominently in the debates. The Pietist Friedrich Wilhelm Zierold6 called him ‘a cunning Aristotelian dialectician who wanted to size up God’s secret with reason’ and in Gottfried Arnold’s [1666–1714] Unparteiischer Kirchen- und Ketzer-Historie [1699] Melanchthon appears as the one who brought back in through the back door Scholastic theology and Aristotelian philosophy that Luther had thrown out through the front door; [as the one] who, by introducing ‘liberale erudition’ in theology under the false conviction that faith could not be preached without ‘learning,’ caused the ‘apostasy of the Lutherans from true apostolic teaching.’7

On the other hand, ‘the father of German Rationalism’ Johann Salomo Semler (1725–1791) praised Melanchthon for his ‘brilliant learning’ and as ‘the initiator of a healthy application of

4 Cf. pp. 37–40, above. 5 For a helpful review of ‘Melanchthon Stereotypes,’ see Wengert (1999a) 9–14. 6 Probably Johann Wilhelm Zierold (1669–1731) is meant. 7 Wallmann (1980) 206–07: ‘Einen listigen aristotlischen Dialecticum, der Gottes Geheimnis mit der Vernunft ausmessen wollen. . . . In Gottfried Arnolds “Unparteiischer Kirchen- und Ketzer-Historie” erscheint Melanchthon als derjenige, der die von Luther zur Vordertür herausgeworfene scholastische Theologie und aristotelische Philosophie durch die Hintertür wider hereingebracht hat, der dadurch daß er die “liberale erudition” in die Theologie eingeführt hat, in der irrigen Meinung, ohne “Gelehrsamkeit” könne nicht der Glaube gepredigt werden, den “Abfall der Lutheraner von der wahren apostolischen Lehr-Art” verursacht hat.’ (See Wallmann (1980) 215 for sources of the original quotations.)

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Aristotle’s philosophy.’8 The debate was not confined to the eighteenth century. On the one hand, Karl Holl (1866–1926) emphatically stated, and his opinion was echoed by other scholars in the Luther Renaissance which his work inspired, that ‘Melanchthon corrupted the Lutheran doctrine of justification,’ and even blamed him for Calvin’s shortcomings in this regard.9 In the wake of World War II and Luther’s National Socialist conscription, theologians on both sides of the Atlantic blamed Melanchthon for much of Lutheranism’s failure,10 and the question Franz Hildebrandt posed then (Melanchthon: Alien or Ally?) was still reiterated at the turn of the millennium as ‘one that is not easily answered.’11 On the other hand, it was not posterity that first accused Melanchthon of corrupting the genuine Lutheran heritage. Such censure was voiced already in his, and what is more, Luther’s, lifetime when people like Johannes Agricola (1494–1566), Conrad Cordatus (1476–1546) or Bishop Nikolaus von Amsdorf of Naumburg, ‘the grandfather of the Gnesio-Lutherans,’ tried to drive a wedge between the two Reformers.12 That history of interpretation deserves to be, and has been, studied on its own. For the purposes of the present investigation it is enough to have noted the length and breadth of the controversy and to have pointed out that the debate dates back to the first half of the sixteenth century. I need not pursue it historically. Instead, I shall consider Melanchthon’s reintroduction of Aristotle into evangelical theology as a systematic question. The first thing to note on such an approach is still historical in nature. Luther and Melanchthon never in fact did break one with another. Whatever frustration they may have caused each other at

8 Wallmann (1980) 208, quoting J.S. Semler, Versuch einer nähern Anleitung zu nützlichem Fleisse in der ganzen Gottesgelehrsamkeit (Halle, 1757) 38 and 48: ‘glänzende Gelehrsamkeit’; ‘der Urheber einer gesunden Anwendung der Philosophie des Aristoteles.’ 9 ‘Melanchthon hat die lutherische Rechtfertigungslehre verdorben’ (Holl (1910) 107, emphasis deleted); cf. Gestrich (1999) 38–42, esp. 39. 10 Hildebrandt (1946), Caemmerer (1947), Pelikan (1950). On the ‘Melanchthonian Blight’ and its historiographical context from a specifically Missouri Synod perspective, see Schurb (1998). 11 Steinmetz (2000) 50. 12 The phrase is Robert Kolb’s (1991:71). In 1527, Agricola accused Melanchthon of diverging from the true interpretation of scripture embodied in Luther’s exegesis. In 1536, Cordatus, unaware of Luther’s approval of Melanchthon’s view, reproached him for teaching the necessity of good works for salvation. In the last major controversy in the mid-1540s before Luther’s death, Amsdorf challenged Melanchthon on the free will and the Eucharist. See Wengert (1999b) 62–84, Scheible (1997a) 158–66, and cf. Wengert (1997) and, on the debates after Luther’s death, Steinmetz (2000) 54–56 and Kolb (1991) 63–98.

2 Melanchthon 74 times,13 they were both committed to maintaining the relationship, and both made successful attempts at preserving it even over occasionally diverging opinions. It is true that Melanchthon only temporarily abandoned his program of purifying Aristotle, and, after 1526, gradually returned to the original plan and brought out books on the philosopher, without whose aid a ‘theologian cannot operate’14—an appreciation that appears diametrically opposed to Luther’s evaluation of ‘the blind pagan teacher.’ Moreover, Melanchthon began with a commentary (first published, to be sure, without a preface) on the Nichomachean Ethics,15 a book that Luther had deemed ‘the worst of all books[; i]t flatly opposes divine grace and all Christian virtues.’ Or, he (Luther) may have allowed De anima to be Aristotle’s best book, but only to juxtapose it with holy scripture and to dismiss it as utterly useless,16 yet Melanchthon produced, and then reedited, a commentary on it that became one of his greatest publication successes. All that is true, but that, too, must be interpreted within the matrix of the two Reformers’ ongoing collegiality and cooperation. Melanchthon, perhaps the humanist par excellence among the Reformers, came to Wittenberg in 1518 as a professor of Greek. His inaugural speech ‘On Correcting the Studies of Youth,’ while critical of high scholasticism, won applause from all corners not so much for its support of evangelical theology as for its call for curricular reform that resonated with changes already afoot in the Electoral Saxon university.17 He was proposing a return ad fontes, the battle cry of the humanists. Purged of confusing and confused commentaries, ancient authors were to be read in their original splendour, including, especially, the unadulterated Aristotle, who was already on offer in Wittenberg, on which good luck the students were to be congratulated. It is also noteworthy that Melanchthon understands the reform of a liberal

13 On perhaps the most pointed remark by Melanchthon, on his ‘servitude’ under Luther, see Kurig (2000). 14 Steinmetz (2000) 53, who cites no less than eight references from Melanchthon to buttress this claim (165n). 15 Scheible (1997a) 91. 16 Cf. n. 97 on p. 40, above. 17 Heinz Scheible (1999:259–60) distinguishes between two kinds of reform as the way out of the late medieval crisis of the university. Humanist reforms entailed the addition of new lectures (and lectureships) to the well- established scholastic course listings but without challenging the supremacy, as mirrored in professorial sway and salary, of the old school. It was only through evangelical reform measures that the influence of scholasticism was in fact reduced at institutions of higher learning. Wittenberg may indeed have led the way in the second respect, but such changes were only implemented between 1523–1536, starting under Melanchthon’s rectorship. On the other hand, the reforms of the late 1510s did not exceed the scope of a humanist renewal that had already taken place elsewhere in the fifteenth century (cf. 1996, 1997a:28–56, and Kusukawa (1995) 34).

2 Melanchthon 75 arts education for which he is calling as a means to an end—a view that remained characteristic of him throughout his life. For I am clearly persuaded of the view, as one who likes things that are distinguished, that the mind must previously be exercised prudently and sufficiently by the human disciplines (for such I call philosophy) in order to excel, whether it be in sacred things or the marketplace.18

A thorough grounding in the liberal arts serves as a stepping stone to the professions, secular and ecclesial—an idea that was embodied in the very structure of the medieval university with a degree from its philosophical faculty as a prerequisite for the higher faculties of medicine, law and, crowning it all, theology. He concludes by offering Homer and Paul’s epistle to Titus as suitable instructional material. It was indeed on those two texts that he then began lecturing at Wittenberg. Coming under Luther’s influence, Melanchthon earned a B.Div. (baccalaureus biblicus) degree in 1519, which allowed him to teach in the faculty of theology. But he remained ‘Magister Philip’ for his entire life, and never became a doctor of theology in order, as Scheible notes, to keep his position in the arts faculty where the highest degree was the master’s.19 He did not even attain to the title sentetiarius, for that would have required him, as the word itself suggests, to treat the standard scholastic textbook, Peter Lombard’s (c.1100– 1160/1164) Sentences, and ‘his aversion to Scholasticism was too great.’20 Instead, Scheible continues, he wrote the Loci communes (1521), which not only counts as the first systematic presentation of Reformation theology but also established a new genre. Although never ordained and never formally a preacher,21 Melanchthon customarily offered Latin exegesis of the day’s gospel on Sunday mornings, primarily for the sake of foreign students who would not understand the German sermon at the regular service.22 He also lectured and published commentaries on New Testament texts, which he always regarded as falling within his purview as professor of Greek.23 It would be, then, a grand mistake not to recognise

18 Melanchthon (1518) 54. 19 Scheible (1997a) 41. 20 ‘Sein Widerwille gegen die Scholastik war zu groß’ (Scheible (1997a) 34). 21 Following Wilhelm Maurer, Pauck observes that ‘at no time in his life Melanchthon ever occupied a pulpit in order to preach’ (1984 [1961]:44). 22 Scheible (1997a) 42. 23 E.g., as T.J. Wengert (1998) has demonstrated, his Scholia in its various editions in the late 1520s constitutes

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Melanchthon as a theologian. As Wilhelm Pauck nicely put it, ‘We cannot deny the title of “theologian” to the author of the “Loci communes” or “theologici” who also composed the “Augsburg Confession” and its “Apology”.’24 Yet he also contrasted him as a ‘philosophical humanist’ to the ‘unphilosophical evangelist’ Luther.25 Heinz Scheible captured the contrast more felicitously,26 The centre of Melanchthon’s life was evangelical faith. He was a theological thinker full of innovative power, and assumed episcopal functions in the church. Professionally, however, he remained anchored in the philosophical faculty for all his life.27

It is well for us to register that duality and reflect on the institutional setting that Melanchthon chose for himself because it can give us clues to his concept of theology, which was not identical to that of Luther.28 For the relationship, antithetical or otherwise, between philosophy and theology was certainly not simply a practical question that Melanchthon could solve by cleverly safeguarding a comfortable niche for himself in the institutional structure of the university. It was an issue demanding reflection, and he provided an answer for it in a quintessentially Lutheran fashion, juxtaposing philosophy with the gospel, but allowing it to find its rightful place in the context of the law.

2.2 Speeches on philosophy

His position may be best reconstructed here through a brief analysis of a series of academic speeches. Melanchthon was both a theoretician and a practitioner of public speech throughout his life. In addition to Greek and Latin grammars, he wrote textbooks on rhetoric and dialectic, and such works spanned his entire career. During the Wittenberg an eloquent rejoinder to Erasmus (1469?–1536) in the free will debate. 24 Pauck (1984 [1961]) 44–45. 25 Pauck (1984 [1961]) 43. 26 Although Pauck himself offered more carefully worded formulations, and we should perhaps regard those as his considered opinion, ‘he was a teacher both of biblical-theological and humanistic scholarship. . . . Thus, though he was a professional theologian throughout his life, he was and desired to be, at the same time, a humanist. . . . Indeed, we must regard him as a theologian whose main concern was the teaching of true doctrine’ (1984 [1961]:44–45). 27 ‘Melanchthons Lebensmitte war der evangelische Glaube. Er war ein theologischer Denker voll innovativer Kraft und hat in der Kirche bischöfliche Funktionen wahrgenommen. Beruflich war er aber zeitlebens in der philosophischen Fakultät verankert’ (Scheible (1997a) 86). 28 For recent contributions to the debate, see, e.g., Bayer (1990), Junghans (2001) and Wiedenhofer (2001).

2 Melanchthon 77 university reform in the 1520s, in which Melanchthon was instrumental, fortnightly declamationes, public rhetorical exercises, were introduced, to which were later added two disputations a month. Melanchthon was the author of a great many of them; about 180 of his addresses are extant, although they were often delivered by others:29 two of the four speeches I suggest for consideration fall into that category. Incidentally, they were all commencement speeches in the philosophical faculty, given at the time of conferral of Master’s degrees. ‘On Philosophy’ (1536) is not only the earliest of them;30 it also has the broadest topic, while the other three—an oration ‘On Plato’ (1538) and two ‘On Aristotle’ (1537, 1544)—raise important questions through a lens that is focussed on the individual lives of those ancient princes of philosophy. In the first address, then, Melanchthon cuts to the chase quickly, and not only states his topic but clearly articulates his thesis ‘that the work of the church is not merely a knowledge of grammar, but liberal education and even the study of philosophy and many other fields.’31 He is fully aware that not everyone agrees with him, though he does not name names, and warns against ‘those who do not think carefully about the task of the church, who would want you to flee liberal learning and execrate those very things as harmful nuisances and dire portents.’32 In this light, he proceeds to demonstrate his thesis first by its reverse under the heading ‘an uneducated theology is an Iliad of ills.’33 Nothing finds its right place there; all is confusion. ‘Thus since an unlearned theology is so evil, it is easy to recognize that the work of the church consists of many disciplines’34 that are then elaborated on positively in the second step. Underlying the broad claim that all knowledge is useful, and in a sense necessary, for theology is the conviction, first, that there is a ‘universal science,’ that is, all knowledge is interconnected and forms one single whole which, secondly, can be investigated with the help of a uniform philosophical method.

29 His ‘ghost writing’ activities extended even beyond that; he also penned disputation theses and wrote most of the recommendations when Wittenberg theologians were asked for their expert opinion or advice (cf. Scheible (1997a) 38–42, 86–90, 143). In that regard, he acted as the secretary of the Reformation. 30 For the Anabaptists and the Münster kingdom (1534–1535) in the background, see Kusukawa (1995) 75–85, esp. 81–82. 31 Melanchthon (1536) 66. 32 Melanchthon (1536) 66. 33 Melanchthon (1536) 66. 34 Melanchthon (1536) 67.

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For there is everywhere a universe of subjects in which all things are split and joined among each other; in order to perceive the particulars, many things must be taken from various sources; wherefore the need of the church spans the world of all disciplines.35

All that, however, must not lead to a confusion of philosophy and theology. I am not unaware that philosophy is one class of doctrine, theology another. Nor do I wish to mix them together, as a cook mixes a stew, but I wish to help the theologian in the economy of method. For it will be necessary for him to borrow many things from philosophy.36

The two disciplines are not to be confused, but theology can and must make use of the method that philosophy can provide and sharpen. The usefulness of philosophy for theology can be discovered in a kind of hermeneutical circle. It is those untrained in philosophy that ‘do not see clearly enough either how much use there is for it in theology or how much theology is in accord with philosophy.’37 The line of argumentation in the last step is noteworthy. Melanchthon is not affirming philosophy’s concord with theology, but the other way round. The point is not how close reason can take us to truth—that would be works righteousness—but how far a recognition of God’s love leads us to the affirmation of reason as God’s gift. With that formulation I am, of course, reading much into Melanchthon’s line that is not explicitly stated, but the thrust of his reasoning—theology affirming philosophy to a large extent (but only to an extent!)—is significant and will be worked out more fully in later orations. Melanchthon then proceeds to review various philosophical schools of antiquity in order to demonstrate that Aristotelianism is the best and most suited of them all to be followed and employed in the sacred science.38 He is not dogmatic, though, and allows for those well-grounded in Aristotle’s method,39 which he sums up as ‘to claim nothing without proof, so that one may easily avoid absurd opinions,’40 to appropriate certain useful elements from other schools of thought as well—an approach he himself practiced as we shall shortly

35 Melanchthon (1536) 67–68. 36 Melanchthon (1536) 68. 37 Melanchthon (1536) 68. 38 Melanchthon was not the last to succumb to the temptation of singling out one particular favourite among philosophical approaches as the most (or only) beneficial one for the theological undertaking. Four hundred years later Rudolf Bultmann argued in a similar vein for the primacy of Existentialist philosophy. 39 Melanchthon’s preoccupation with method can hardly be overestimated. It was for good reason that David Steinmetz called his Melanchthon chapter in the subtitle a ‘Return to Method’ (2000:49). 40 Melanchthon (1536) 69.

2 Melanchthon 79 see. The oration is then rounded off with an exhortation that the hearers apply themselves to the cultivation of philosophy for the sake of the church. Melanchthon was, then, a theologian who stood for, and constantly worked with, the assumptions that, on the one hand, human knowledge forms one uniform continuum of which no part can be ignored without major consequences—theology itself cannot forgo the services of rational thought that must be cultivated by whatever appropriate means secular learning provides for the purpose—and, on the other hand, while the Holy Spirit is sovereign lord of all, he41 comes to us through the Word, who is anchored in the word; hence, the theological need to acquire the requisite philological skills to adequately handle the text. The other three speeches are akin in that they all share a similar theme and structure. The life of an ancient philosopher is reviewed and commented on before his philosophy is briefly reflected upon. The two orations on Aristotle (1537, 1544) are in many ways alike; some passages, especially in the first half of the speeches, are identical.42 In both texts, Aristotle’s life is divided up into five phases (ancestry and childhood, Plato’s student, Alexander’s teacher, schoolmaster in Athens, exile and death) into which an excursus is inserted, before the last section, on the fate of his works and his revival under Sulla. Apart from Aristotle’s presentation as a great master of method and universal knowledge, what matters most in this part for my investigation is Melanchthon’s interpretation of Aristotle’s relation to Plato. He praises the younger philosopher for his modesty, wisdom and devotion in remaining a student of the older master for twenty long years, until the latter’s death. He also notes their mutual respect and appreciation. Moreover, he dismisses suggestions of their rivalry as ‘inept,’43 and proposes, on a political analogy, another model for the interpretation of their relationship. Although many have said that there was a dispute between Plato and Aristotle, and that they could not deal openly with each other’s errors, still I believe that there was a difference of opinion on the form of the doctrine without malice and offense of spirits. For the closest

41 Melanchthon would, of course, use the masculine pronoun. 42 So much so that the editors of Melanchthon deutsch did not deem it worth translating both texts, and found the inclusion of the earlier speech sufficient—a somewhat surprising editorial decision in the light of the greater length and elaboration of the latter speech. 43 Melanchthon (1537) 74.

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men in the senate, in expressing their views, often disagree without acerbity.44

The model, to anticipate, seems applicable to Melanchthon’s own relationship with Luther. But to return to the place of philosophy, the differences in the second half of the speeches are more pronounced. In the earlier text, Plato is subtly contrasted with Aristotle in terms of eloquence, clarity and method. The older master may have been the most eloquent of all philosophers, but his style, especially his irony, has often been misunderstood. He is not as methodological and straightforward as Aristotle, ‘who is the one and only creator of method,’ and who also ‘saw that he could not train people in his own method except through liberal instruction.’ Philosophy is crucial, for only ‘the true plan of teaching . . . will separate man from beasts.’45 The focus shifts to Aristotle’s usefulness for the church in the oration of 1544, initially worked out in contrast to Plato. Both praised method, but Plato ‘never taught the principles of this art.’46 So the first use of Aristotle in the church is his dialectic, ‘for it properly informs our methods, defines correctly, divides properly, corrects fittingly, judges, and separates hideous connections.’47 ‘Platonic license in disputation’ was censured already in the earlier text for ‘allow[ing] for unsure and divided views,’48 but it was still recognised as playfulness. Now it has become ‘that ingenious license to debate, to defend absurd propositions, to disrupt certainties, and to let battles grow around ambiguous positions’ that would be ‘the least useful thing for the church to familiarize itself with.’49 Thus the presentation deeply undercuts the practical value of the otherwise undoubtedly wise teachings in his ethics. Aristotle, thanks to his method and moderation, emerges, again, victorious from the overall comparison, and his ‘Physics and Ethics’ are also found of great service to the church. ‘Since it is right for the church of God both to be the most moderate and the most beautifully endowed with literature and art, these subjects may be understood as gifts of God, because they are of great use to the human race.’50 God gave them to us as

44 Melanchthon (1544) 80. Cf. ‘For just as in the senate, when often the closest of friends express dissenting views without offense, so do good and learned men have dissimilar points of view without acerby’ (1537:74). 45 Melanchthon (1537) 77. 46 Melanchthon (1544) 84. 47 Melanchthon (1544) 84. 48 Melanchthon (1537) 77. 49 Melanchthon (1544) 84. 50 Melanchthon (1544) 85.

2 Melanchthon 81 ways to learn and know our home the world, in which God chose to reveal Godself, geographically and historically. The place of ethics in the church is secured by the fact that our life together, the subject matter of ethics, is a given of our createdness. Human community and society—and not only the church, that is, the community of the faithful—are divine institutions. Or, more accurately, our potential for social life is implanted and a gift humans received from the creator God. ‘God saw to it that law was impressed upon our minds.’ That is why true ethics is part of the divine law. And when philosophers seek the causes for laws in nature, as with other things, when they show that the vestiges of God are imposed on human nature, what else can it be that leads to discipline and to the confirming of honorable opinions in the minds of the majority?51

To align ethics with the law both sanctions and limits philosophy, a legitimate human quest for its better understanding. It sanctions philosophy because it assigns it a rightful place in the divine plan, but it also limits the scope of philosophy because it denies it any efficacy in matters of salvation that is the realm of the gospel. In other words, Melanchthon draws a sharp distinction between knowing and doing the good. Philosophy might recognise what is right, but it cannot do it. God feeds and guards the human race, maintains states when they cultivate justice, and punishes terrible crimes, perjury, tyrannicide, theft, incestuous lust. When we see this, we can understand society. But when society is perceived, and its causes, benefits, and punishments are in view, then we wretched ones, often ignorant of this bond, violate the laws of society, public offices sanctified for us when God gave us good things with which to comply. Here philosophy, almost stunned, wonders whence there is so much infirmity in human nature, that we are so easily impelled to violate this society so harmfully. The teachings of the church show the roots of this evil, and show the son of God as our helper; and with God it has renewed our society, and rules us seekers and turns laws to the service of society.52

Philosophy can both recognise the ought and the shortcomings of the is, but it can neither adequately explain the reasons for the discrepancy between the two nor move us to actually bridge the gap. Such efficacy is the prerogative of theology or, rather, the Holy Spirit active in the church. That, however, only limits but does not altogether negate the role philosophy can play. It is and remains ‘to be used by the church to her great benefit, if it is used rightly.’53

51 Melanchthon (1544) 86. 52 Melanchthon (1544) 86–87. 53 Melanchthon (1544) 87.

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Melanchthon’s mature position is most clearly spelled out in his oration on Plato (1538) that chronologically belongs with the address on philosophy (1536) and the first speech on Aristotle (1537). The review of Plato’s life gives occasion to recommend a determined and undeterred quest for truth. Here as in his discussion of Plato’s rhetoric and eloquence, for which the greatest praise is lavished on the philosopher, Melanchthon emphasises in subtle ways the interconnectedness of all intellectual efforts, which, for him, finds its ultimate purpose and meaning in a focus on God. In the final analysis, all knowledge is aimed at a greater knowledge of God,54 and ‘the goal of eloquence is not to delight humans but to give thanks to God.’55 Turning to the contents of Plato’s teachings, Melanchthon reiterates his consistent convictions that, first, Plato’s presentation often obscures his meaning; second, Aristotle is preferable for his method, but third, there are no great material differences between the two thinkers, and a reader well versed in Aristotelian method and capable of applying it to the older philosopher’s texts will gain a good deal from the latter. Interestingly, his comment again seems applicable to the differences between himself and Luther, ‘Plato wrote no body of teaching in any orderly fashion, but he showed again and again in free disputations what he approved of and what not.’56 In addition to his eloquence, Plato receives special commendation in two content areas, for his political thought—broadly interpreted to include all that pertains to life together—and his insights concerning the immortality of the individual soul.57 The latter might be in some ways philosophy’s highest achievement, but it also signals its limits. Even if I myself also love and admire these thoughts of Plato’s, the mistake of those is nonetheless to be most strongly reproved who on that account confuse Platonic philosophy and the gospel. This confusion of different kinds of teaching is to be avoided and detested

54 CR 11:424–25. 55 ‘Eloquentiae finem esse, non ut homines delected, sed ut Deo grata dicat’ (CR 11:421). 56 ‘Platonem non scripsisse ordine integras artes, sed liberioribus disputationibus alias de alio loco quid probaret, aut quid non probaret, ostendisse’ (CR 11:422). 57 Günter Frank, who translated and probably also annotated the text in the German edition, identifies five areas where Plato proved formative for Melanchthon’s own understanding. In addition to the God-centredness of all knowledge, immortality, and eloquence already mentioned, he names Plato’s concept of God and his creation myth from the Timaeus (Melanchthon (1538) GT 136). That his political thought is here, in my view, unduly neglected is perhaps not unrelated to Frank’s overall efforts to recognise Melanchthon as an exponent of a theologically grounded natural philosophy. That approach fails to do justice to the Reformer’s primary commitment to the gospel, which results, at best, in a philosophical theology with a clearly defined place of philosophy in the context of the law, as I am here trying to delineate, rather than a ‘theologische Philosophie’ as Frank (1995, 1996) would have it.

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by erudite people, and care is to be taken which place is to be assigned to philosophy. All good arts are gifts of God, but they should each remain in their own place. True philosophy, i.e. which does not deviate from reason and right procedures of proof, is a knowledge of God’s law; it knows that God exists, and judges civic morals; it sees that the power of discrimination between good and evil is divinely implanted; it judges that horrible crimes will be punished by God, and, besides, it has a kind of prescience of immortality. But it does not see and teach what is proper to the gospel, namely, the forgiveness of sins freely granted for the sake of the Son of God. That knowledge does not originate in human minds; on the contrary, it is put beyond the grasp of human reason, but the Son of God, who is in the bosom of the Father, has revealed it.58

Philosophy deserves, and from Melanchthon receives, tremendous attention and praise, but only as long as it is both properly done and remains within its legitimate bounds. The first criterion means that it is governed by the right method which sticks to rational enquiry and evidence, and does not allow itself to be carried away by unfounded opinion or flowery language. The second criterion limits philosophy’s scope to the temporal realm of reason governed by God’s law. Philosophy, just like any other human effort, cannot bridge the gulf between law and gospel, between ought and is. Melanchthon can thus close his speech with a rebuke to those who either try to turn the gospel into Platonic philosophy or, worse still, do not even understand Plato and invent castles in the air for the church from his thought. The church must insist on the correct distinction between different kinds of teaching, that is, on the purity of law and gospel.

2.3 Philosophy and theology

Melanchthon’s position as here reconstructed was worked out in a series of what we might consider philosophical texts. The core argument is nevertheless highly theological in character. From the researches of Heinz Scheible, Timothy Wengert and Sachiko Kusukawa we know, in fact, that the very concept, finding a place for philosophy in the context of the

58 ‘Etsi autem has Platonis cogitationes et ipse amo ac suscipio, tamen error illorum acerrime reprehendendus est, qui propterea confundunt Platonicam Philosophiam et Evangelium. Haec confusio generum doctrinae eruditis cavenda et detestanda est, ac videndum, quis locus Philosophiae tribuendus sit. Dei dona sunt omnes bonae artes, sed suum singulae locum teneant. Vera Philosophia, hoc est, non deerrans a ratione et a demonstrationibus, est quaedam noticia legis divinae, agnoscit esse Deum, et iudicat de moribus civilibus, videt hoc discrimen honestarum et turpium divinitus nobis insitum esse, iudicat puniri atrocia scelera a Deo, habet etiam quasi praesagium aliquod de immortalitate. Neque tamen illa videt aut docet, quae propria sunt Evangelii, videlicet, remissionem peccatorum gratis donandam propter filium Dei. Haec noticia non est orta ab humanis mentibus, imo procul extra conspectum rationis humanae posita est, sed Filius Dei qui est in sinu Patris, eam patefecit’ (CR 11:424–25).

2 Melanchthon 84 law, undergirded by a Lutheran law-gospel dialectic, has roots that date back to the late 1520s. Wengert has shown ‘that many changes one may wish to attribute to Melanchthon at this point in his career [such as the emerging importance of the distinction between civil and Christian righteousness] had a much wider currency among Wittenberg’s theologians.’59 Specifically, in Melanchthon’s attempts to anchor philosophy in the law, Wengert detects Johannes Agricola’s influence.60 The full complexity of the Reformer’s position was worked out in the context of his debate with Erasmus over free will, carried forth in his exegetical work on Colossians.61 Materially, it is what we have already seen in the later speeches. Philosophy is understood as arts and sciences rather than metaphysics; it is governed by reason that consistently applies method to evidence; as such, it is a gift of God but must abide by its limits and not presume into the realm of the gospel whose purity is to be preserved, for philosophy is not only unable to overcome human weakness, but it cannot even explain its cause. Roughly at the same time, Melanchthon was also returning to work on Aristotle, and published a prefaceless commentary on the Nichomachean Ethics (1529), but in the general introduction he articulated the purposes of the whole undertaking. After familiar arguments like commending philosophy as a means to move the soul from barbarism to humanity or praising the Aristotelian school as the best because of its simplicity and dedication to method, Melanchthon concludes with a discussion of the differences between philosophy and Christian teaching, which is essentially a discussion of the limits of philosophy. Scheible points out, on the one hand, that Melanchthon recommended precisely this concluding section for reading to his friend Joachim Camerarius (1500–1574), and, on the other hand, that the passage was sharpened in later editions by replacing the text on the uses of ethics with an articulate statement of Melanchthon’s mature position, viz. that law and gospel must be distinguished, and ethics belongs to the former and treats of morality that has significance for temporal life.62 The place that we saw Melanchthon carve out for philosophy in his university speeches after the mid-1530s had, then, been theologically defined, and the groundlaying had taken place before the beginning of the decade.

59 Wengert (1997) 82. 60 Wengert (1997) ch. 3, esp. 81–85. 61 Wengert (1998) ch. 6, esp. 82–87; Kusukawa (1995) 65–71. 62 Scheible (1997a) 92–93.

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With that, we can also see the full context of the return to Aristotle. It is by no means a sliding back into pre-Reformation Scholasticism or a selling out to philosophy. Melanchthon is not compromising Luther’s discovery. On the contrary, he is bringing the liberating effects of the Reformation to full fruition. Two details of the story are of utmost importance. Institutionally, Melanchthon was returning to Aristotle in a Wittenberg University that had, in the mid-1520s, reformed itself along evangelical lines. The old scholastic lectureships had been abolished and replaced partly by humanist and partly, in the theological faculty, by biblical studies. It is not to be overlooked that Melanchthon was editing and commenting on Aristotle as part of the curriculum of the faculty of ‘arts and sciences.’ Theologically, he was returning to philosophy in the context of the law-gospel dichotomy—stemming from Luther but soon acquiring wider currency and significantly articulated by Melanchthon himself63—which offered a legitimate and valuable, if carefully circumscribed, niche for philosophy as a pre-eminent exercise of reason by, at the same time, safeguarding justification as pure divine gift as the central theological insight of the Reformation. Melanchthon was free to return to Aristotle, partly because theology had been liberated from the undue encroachment of his influence, and partly because reason—a divine gift to all humanity that, in Melanchthon’s view, found an unsurpassed expression in the Greek philosopher’s work—once debarred from grasping salvation, was free to be enjoyed with all its benefits in its proper place.64 To this, finally a word on Melanchthon and Luther may be added. We have found that, on account of his ‘Aristotelianism,’65 Melanchthon need, and should, not be regarded as an artful betrayer of Luther’s deepest insight. On the contrary, the younger Reformer’s work in the philosophical faculty is part and parcel of Luther’s program that found expression, theologically, in a clear and consistent distinction between law and gospel and, institutionally,

63 He is famous for employing it more often than Luther (Scheible (1997a) 138; cf. Wengert (1999a) 19–20). 64 Cf. Scheible (1997a) 139. The idea of recognising reason and philosophy as great gifts in their proper place is not alien to Luther, either. Already in his vehement attack on Aristotle in the address To the Christian Nobility (1520), he makes concessions, ‘I would gladly agree to keeping Aristotle’s books, Logic, Rhetoric, and Poetics, or at least keeping and using them in an abridged form, as useful in training young people to speak and to preach properly’ (cf. n. 100 on p. 41). 65 The inverted commas are meant to signify that by no means is an implicit side taking here intended in the debate whether Melanchthon was Aristotelian or Platonist. It seems to be a moot point to me, minimally in the context of the present investigation, esp. in the light of his explicit allowance for eclecticism, provided it does not threaten the purity of method (cf. p. 78, above).

2 Melanchthon 86 at least in part, in the renewed curriculum of Wittenberg University. No irreconcilability must therefore be presupposed between Melanchthon’s return to Aristotle and Luther’s stauncher resistance.66 That is not to say that differences in temperament and emphasis cannot be detected, but they may be recognised as such that did not threaten the foundations and framework of their relationship. Both Scheible and Wengert argue, convincingly to my mind, that that relationship should be considered a collegial-collaborative one rather than termed a friendship as was wont in the older literature.67 Colleagues are always also rivals, and they may be that as long as their competition does not harm the common institution. If we consider Luther and Melanchthon as colleagues separated by an age difference of more than fourteen years, we need no longer lament the differences of two ostensible friends, but must wonder how narrowly and well these two rather different men cooperated.68

To which Wengert further adds that ‘they both engaged in what might be called theology through conversation.’69 I find this model highly attractive not only for its obvious systematic benefits but also for its historical explanatory force. I have suggested that the model Melanchthon employed to interpret the Plato–Aristotle nexus may be transferable to his own context. Short of any explicit evidence of Melanchthon in fact applying the analogy of Aristotle and Plato to himself and Luther, my suggestion that the dialogic model was consciously held by the sixteenth-century theologians is but a hypothesis, yet, I believe, it is a plausible one.70 Turning now to Melanchthon’s De anima, his commentary of Aristotle must be read in the triple context of, first, Melanchthon and Luther as colleagues, collaborating both as

66 Which, incidentally, is by no means to be mistaken for an unconditional dismissal of the philosopher, as was already recognised in the nineteenth century (Nitzsch 1883). 67 Cf. Scheible (1997a) 143–69, esp. 144; Wengert (1998) 106–09, (1999b). Pauck (1984 [1961]) and Steinmetz (2000) still use the term ‘friendship,’ but qualify it in ways that would undoubtedly meet with Scheible’s and Wengert’s approval. 68 ‘Kollegen sind immer auch Konkurrenten und dürfen dies sein, solange ihr Wettbewerb die gemeinsame Institution nicht beschädigt. Wenn wir Luther und Melanchthon als Kollegen betrachten, die ein Altersunterschied von mehr als 14 Jahren trennt, müssen wir nicht länger Differenzen zweier angeblicher Freunde beklagen, sondern können uns wundern, wie eng und gut diese beiden so unterschiedlichen Menschen zusammengearbeitet haben’ (Scheible 1997a:144). 69 Wengert (1999b) 85. 70 Needless to say, an in any meaningful sense of the word complete discussion of their relationship falls beyond the scope of my enquiry. What I am concerned with is merely to suggest an overall framework which allows for their differences while also doing justice to the fact—a historical given of tremendous systematic significance in my view—of their unbroken, if at times strained, cooperation.

2 Melanchthon 87 theologians (in dialogue) and as educational reformers; second, philosophy as a legitimate exercise in the realm of the law (as distinguished from, and opposed to, the gospel); and finally, third, Aristotle as part of the reformed curriculum in the philosophical faculty of the evangelical university.

2.4 Commentarius and Liber

The first edition of Melanchthon’s anthropological work On the Soul appeared at the beginning of 1540. He had been working on the topic since 1533, although originally he conceived of it as part of ‘physics.’71 The work was an instant yet lasting hit. When it appeared in print, it was immediately begun to be used in the lecture hall, and, going through innumerable editions, it remained an extremely influential textbook and enjoyed wide circulation in the universities for a very long time to come.72 The 1540 edition bore the title Commentarius de anima. Its Wittenberg publication was followed by at least three further printings—in Strasbourg, Paris and Lyon—in the same year, and, counting only the full editions, the work was reissued close to a dozen times in the next ten years before its major reworking under a new title, Liber de anima (1553).73 The revised text came out nearly ten more times in Melanchthon’s lifetime, and was then reprinted every few years until the end of the century, altogether more than twenty times. Including also the partial editions, never more than three years in a row, and that only twice, passed until 1595 without the book being published. Some two dozen different printers of at least ten cities brought out all or part of it, in altogether more than sixty editions during the six decades between its first appearance and the end of the century: a remarkable success story indeed (Table 2.1).

71 Kusukawa (1995) 83–85, Helm (1997) 176–77. 72 Schüling (1967) 10–11, 183–86, 267–68, 288; Kusukawa (1995) 85–86; Helm (1997) 175–76, 189–91. The exact number of its printings or editions will depend on the definitions of those terms, but there is no need to reconstruct the book’s printing history in all its complexity here. I shall only review the most salient features of its remarkable career. 73 The publication date of the rewritten version appears variously as 1552 or 1553 in the literature, but VD16 dates it to 1553.

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Table 2.1 Publication history of Melanchthon’s De anima in the sixteenth century74

Year VD16 Place: Publisher Cf. VD16 1540 M 2748 (Strasbourg: Kraft Müller) M 2749 (Wittenberg: Peter Seitz, Sr.) (Schüling) (Paris: Christian Wechel) (Schüling) (Lyon: Sebastian Greif) M 279075 (Berlin: Hans Weiss) 1542 M 2750 (Wittenberg: Peter Seitz, Sr.) (Schüling) (Lyon: Sebastian Greif) 1543 M 2751 (Wittenberg: Peter Seitz, Sr.) M 2752 (Basel: Robert Winter) V 1803 1544 M 2753 (Strasbourg: Kraft Müller) 1545 M 2754 (Wittenberg: Josef Klug) (GVK) (Frankfurt a.M.) M 2785–89 1548 M 2755 (Strasbourg: Kraft Müller (Widow)) ZV 20976 (Wittenberg: Hans Lufft) 1550 M 2756 (Wittenberg: Peter Seitz, Sr. (Heirs)) 1552 M 279476 (Lübeck: Georg Richolff, Jr.) (GVK) (Frankfurt a.M.: Christian Egenolff, Sr. (Heirs)) M 2785–89 (Schüling)77 (Wittenberg: Clemens Schleich) 1553 M 2757 (Wittenberg: Peter Seitz, Sr. (Heirs)) M 2785 (Frankfurt a.M.: Christian Egenolff, Sr.) R 559 1554 M 2758 (Wittenberg: Peter Seitz, Sr. (Heirs)) (Schüling) (Basel: Johann Oporinus) (with Vives) M 2786 (Frankfurt a.M.: Christian Egenolff, Sr.) R 560 ZV 792 (Strasbourg: Samuel Emmel) 1555 (GVK) (Lyon: Antoine Vincent) V 1803–06 (GVK) (Paris: Guillaume Cavellat) M 2785–89 ZV 2645 (Strasbourg: Samuel Emmel) 1556 M 2759 (Wittenberg: Peter Seitz, Sr. (Heirs)) (GVK) (Frankfurt a.M.) M 2785–89 1557 ZV 13002 (Frankfurt a.M.: Christian Egenolff, Sr. (Heirs))

74 Partial editions (usually excerpts in collective volumes) appear in italics. Some doubtful editions—listed, without convincing details, by Schüling (1967)—have been purposely ignored. 75 Knaust’s GT. 76 Apparently no longer extant low GT. 77 Schüling (1967) 184 lists a 1552 Wittenberg edition available in Berlin (although the call number, correctly Ji 500, is misprinted), and the Staatsbibliothek’s online catalogue gives ‘U. Schleich’ as its publisher. Another, by Schüling (1967:185) undated, edition by Clemens Schleich is dated to c.1552 in the catalogues of the relevant German libraries (Marburg and Tübingen; Fulda does not have it, pace Schüling). Neither editions can be traced in either VD16 or GVK, but they may be identical, and perhaps produced by Clemens Schleich in 1552. However, Schüling’s bibliographical data of the undated Schleich edition (including the author’s name spelt without -ch-) perfectly fit the details of VD16: M 2778 (1580), and the university libraries’ conjecture at the date may be inaccurate. A 1552 Wittenberg edition, nonetheless, seems to have existed.

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Year VD16 Place: Publisher Cf. VD16 1558 M 2760 (Wittenberg: Johann Krafft, Sr.) ZV 793 (Strasbourg: Samuel Emmel) 1559 M 2787 (Frankfurt a.M.: Christian Egenolff, Sr.) R 579 1560 M 2761 (Basel: Johann Oporinus) V 1804 M 2762 (Leipzig: Hans Rambau, Sr.) M 2763 (Wittenberg: Johann Krafft, Sr.) M 2764 (Wittenberg: Johann Krafft, Sr.) ZV 794 (Strasbourg: Samuel Emmel) 1561 ZV 10750 (Leipzig: Hans Rambau, Sr.) 1562 M 2765 (Leipzig: Hans Rambau, Sr.) M 2766 (Wittenberg: Hans Lufft) 1563 M 2767 (Zurich: Hans Jakob Geßner) V 1806 M 2768 (Zurich: Hans Jakob Geßner) V 1805 ZV 795 (Strasbourg: Samuel Emmel) 1565 M 2769 (Leipzig: Hans Rambau, Sr.) 1566 ZV 796 (Strasbourg: Samuel Emmel) 1567 M 2770 (Wittenberg: Johann Krafft, Sr.) 1568 M 2788 (Frankfurt a.M.: Christian Egenolff, Sr. (Heirs)) R 581 1569 M 2771 (Wittenberg: Johann Krafft, Sr.) 1570 M 277278 (Mühlhausen: Georg Hantzsch) M 2791 (Strasbourg: Theodosius Rihel) A 3827 M 2792 (Strasbourg: Theodosius Rihel) A 3828 1571 M 2773 (Wittenberg: Johann Krafft, Sr.) 1572 M 2793 (Strasbourg: Theodosius Rihel) A 3829 1573 M 2789 (Frankfurt a.M.: Christian Egenolff, Sr. (Heirs)) R 582 1574 M 2774 (Wittenberg: Clemens Schleich & Anton Schöne) 1575 M 277578 (Wittenberg: Clemens Schleich & Anton Schöne) M 2776 (Wittenberg: Johann Schwertel) 1576 M 2777 (Wittenberg: Johann Schwertel) 1580 M 2778 (Wittenberg: Clemens Schleich) 1581 M 277978 (Wittenberg: Matthaeus Welack) 1582 ZV 13003 (Frankfurt a.M.: Christian Egenolff, Sr. (Heirs)) 1584 M 2780 (Wittenberg: Johann Krafft, Sr. (Heirs)) 1587 M 2781 (Wittenberg: Simon Gronenberg) 1588 (Schüling) (Wittenberg: Simon Gronenberg) 1589 M 2782 (Wittenberg: Johann & Konrad (Jr.) Rühel) 1593 M 2783 (Wittenberg: Johann Krafft, Jr.) 1594 ZV 13004 (n.p.) 1595 M 2784 (Wittenberg: Georg Müller, Sr.) 1600 ZV 790 (Strasbourg: Theodosius Rihel)

The place assigned to anatomy in a book on the soul largely contributed to the

78 With Johann Stigel’s (1515–1562) commentary.

2 Melanchthon 90 novelty and significance of the work, and Melanchthon’s inclusion of cutting edge scholarship of his age, specifically his response to Andreas Vesal’s (1514–1564) De humani corpore fabrica libri septem (1543), in which the Paduan anatomist challenged and corrected Galen, has attracted much modern attention.79 Those issues are, however, of little consequence for my present enquiry, for which the concluding chapter of the work is of much greater interest. Before turning to a detailed analysis of Melanchthon’s two Latin versions of the text, it must be briefly mentioned that the last chapter of the work on immortality was translated into German by Heinrich Knaust (Chnustinus, 1521/1524–after 1577), and published as an independent octavo volume Von dem leben vnd vnsterbligkeit der Seelen still in the year of the first Latin edition.80 Knaust, later a doctor of both laws and a poet laureate, became a noted translator. This is one of his earliest published works. He was nineteen at most at the time, already with a Wittenberg education behind him, where Melanchthon was his favourite teacher. In 1540 he was called to be the rector of the gymnasium in Berlin (‘Coln an der Sprew’), from where he dated the dedication of the German edition in September. He seems to have brought Melanchthon’s latest work with him to his new job and offered the translation—under protestations of being urged by friends to publish it, as was wont in humanist circles—as an inaugural gift to his new employers, the mayors and council of Cölln. Melanchthon himself seems to have been unaware of the enterprise, and the translation can by no means be considered as authorised by him.81 Its popularity was certainly no match for that of the entire work that remained influential in its Latin form. I have not been able to ascertain that the German version was ever reissued, although an apparently no longer extant work Van der vnstarfflicheit der Seelen vnde Ewigem leuende82 may have been a low German edition of Knaust’s translation. As it stands, Von dem leben vnd vnsterbligkeit der Seelen is probably as much Knaust’s work as Melanchthon’s. The German translation is definitely more verbose than the

79 See, e.g., Kusukawa (1995) 114–23; Helm (1997) 183–89; Scheible (1999) 262, but cf. Scheible (1997a) 95. 80 VD16: M 2790 (Berlin: Hans Weiss, 1540). 81 The only reference I have found in Melanchthon’s correspondence to Knaust is a recommendation from 1546 in which the Reformer praises Knaust and recommends his Officia scholastica for publication (MBW 9:156, #4529a). 82 VD16: M 2794 (Lübeck: Georg Richolff, Jr., 1552).

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Praeceptor’s Latin, and the ‘rationalising’ tendencies of the Commentarius that, as we shall see, the Reformer sought to counteract in the revised edition of 1553 are even more pronounced than in the original. Later I shall include a few illustrative passages,83 but the differences in style are perhaps nowhere as pronounced as in the opening sentences. Melanchthon wrote, ‘Filius Dei perspicue nos docuit de uita perpetua, post hanc uitam agenda, ac testatus est omnibus mortuis restituenda esse corpora.’84 That concise statement more than quadrupled in Knaust’s rendering, who greatly ornamented the text with synonyms and interpretive clauses. I have added typographical emphasis to the text to show what is really needed to translate Melanchthon’s meaning. Italicised words appear few and far between, in graphic illustration of Knaust’s pomposity. DEr eingeborene gottes Son/vnser lieber Herr vnd Seligmacher Jhesus Christus / hat vns / die wir seine jüngere sein/ also in seinem heiligen Euangelio vnter weiset vnd geleret/ das nach diesem elenden / betrübten vnd zeitlichem leben/ein ewigs/ vnvergengliches vnd herrliches leben folgen sol / Er hat auch zugesagt vnd verheissen allen den / so in den grebern schlaffen/vnd der welt abgestorben sind/welch die würm vnd maden fressen vnd verzeret haben / sollen jren eigen leib widder vberkomen /vnd am jüngsten tag aufferstehen.85

Given the unauthorised status of Knaust’s translation and the incomparably more powerful effective history of the original work, I shall consider Melanchthon’s text in its different Latin versions, but before we leave Knaust’s text behind, a further feature of his booklet should be registered. Just as he elaborated the style, Knaust also amplified the structure of the work by adding an appendix of ‘Some fine words and others of comfort concerning the resurrection of the dead and life eternal, collected with special assiduity from scripture and the fathers.’86 That the introduction repeats the twofold orientation, canonical and patristic, is probably a surviving sign of an earlier plan that was ultimately abandoned, for the actual list only includes biblical quotations. The original intention is nonetheless noteworthy, for it signals an important direction in which later treatments of the locus will develop. Melanchthon, we shall presently see, spends time rather on pagan philosophers than fathers of the church, but later authors will indeed engage the patristic tradition with

83 Cf. nn. 93 and 113 on pp. 94 and 99 respectively. 84 Melanchthon (1540a) 303. 85 Melanchthon (1540b) A5r/v. 86 ‘Etliche feine Trostspruche/von der Aufferstehung der todten vnd ewigen leben/hin vnd wider / Aus der Schrifft vnd Vetern/ mit besonder[e]m fleis/zusamen getragen/’ (Melanchthon (1540b) C7r).

2 Melanchthon 92 both diligence and dexterity. The biblical prooftexts appear unadorned with commentary and in a somewhat haphazard order on Knaust’s list.87 That many of the scriptural loci that will acquire great currency in later discussions are missing from it may be due to Knaust augmenting rather than repeating the collection that was used by Melanchthon. Alternatively, the highly standardised set of prooftexts that we shall later see might be the result of some evolution. It is more important that Knaust justifies the inclusion of an appendix by saying that ‘it is useful and good to have many witnesses of scripture together in order to stimulate and confirm fear and faith.’88 Underlying the casual coordination of ‘fear and faith’ is probably a defining element of Lutheran theology, a hermeneutic of law and gospel that can be brought to bear on every locus, including eschatological ones as well. Last but not least, Knaust adds resurrection passages to a treatise on immortality, quite self-evidently demonstrating my thesis that it is a post-Enlightenment preoccupation to drive a wedge between the two, while a disjunctive approach is alien to the sixteenth century.

2.5 The soul’s immortality in De anima

Melanchthon closed his psychological dissertation with a chapter ‘Of the Immortality of the Human Soul.’89 The title itself is slightly changed from that in the Commentarius, to which the adjective was now added.90 The shift is small but, literally, significant. It calls attention to the many subtle details that were modified between the earlier and the later versions of the text.91 In some cases, the material was rearranged; in some other cases, the content was also changed. Most of the alterations occur early on in the chapter. The starting point is Jesus

87 Mt 15 [i.e. 25:46]; Jn 5–6 [i.e. 6:40]; 1 Cor 15; Isa 26[:19–21], 66[:15–16.21–24], 65[:17–20], 25[:6–8], 24[:21– 23], 35[:10], 34[:8–11]; Dan 12[:1–3]; Hos 13[:14]; Ez 37[:1–14], 33[:11]; Ps 16[:8–10], 22[:27], 43 [i.e 34:20–23], 116[:15], 49[:15–16]; Job 19[:25–27.29]; Jn 11[:25–26], 12[:24–25]; Mt 24[:29–31], 25[:31–46]; Mk 13[:26–27]; 1 Thess 4[:13–18]; 1 Pt 4[:5]; Rev 14[:9–11.13], 16[:15] (Melanchthon (1540b) C7r–D8r). 88 ‘Die weil es aber nütz vnd gut ist/ viel zeugnis der Schrifft bey ein ander zu haben / damit furchte vnd glaube erregt vnd bekrefftiget werde/’ (Melanchthon (1540b) C7v–8r). 89 Melanchthon (1553) 284–89; cf. (1540a) 303–15. 90 ‘De immortalitate animæ humanæ’ (1553) vs. ‘De immortalitate animæ’ (1540). 91 I was able, in various German libraries, to consult copies from nearly each edition of the De anima that appeared during Melanchthon’s lifetime. The text of the immortality chapter seems not to have been modified except between the two major editions of 1540 and 1553. The numerous republications of each only affected, at most, the respective typesetting, but not the text itself. It will therefore suffice to compare the Commentarius with the Liber.

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Christ in both versions, but the Commentarius opened with his teaching, while the Liber began with his example. What remains, significantly, unchanged is the anchoring of the immortality of the soul in the resurrection. Not until considerably later in the argument is the question of the soul’s separability from, and survival of, the body formulated. When it is, it actually marks a point of transition after which the two texts resemble each other more closely than in the sections before. The Commentarius starts like this.92 Christ taught us as his disciples that after this life comes another, eternal and glorious, life. He also promised to all who lie in the grave that they shall receive their body back and rise on the last day. Those who have believed in Christ will live with him eternally, but the wicked will suffer eternal pain in hell. Let us therefore strive to appear pure of heart before that judge. This introductory proposition and exhortation is followed by an epistemology of the afterlife in four steps. First, we learn about the life to come from scripture and not the books of clever pagans. It is because of the noetic effects of sin that we cannot trust reason. In our created splendour—had not the fall intervened—a great and high knowledge of life eternal would have shone in us; we would have known that we were created to know God and that a day would come when we would know him as he himself is. Due to sin, however, only some glimmers of that insight remain. Then follow, secondly, two versions of the moral argument, available to reason: it cannot be that the best people are only meant to suffer and that the pious not receive their rest and peace. Since we far too often see that such injustice does happen in this life, another life must follow. Second, conscience tells us that we must be obedient to God: it is impossible that such obedience be useless and in vain. Hence, again, another life must come in which the moral order will be restored. In the third step, the theme is elaborated through various biblical and historical examples (Adam, Abel, Nero, Tiberius etc.), demonstrating that an afterlife must follow because injustice is often not rectified upon earth, and gradually introducing another theme, viz. that God has given many signs of the life to come in preaching and examples (Enoch, Elijah, Christ and the people he raised etc.). The fourth and last step of the epistemological section deals with the twofold source of knowledge about life eternal: ‘there remained this conviction [about eternal life] among people everywhere, partly because people naturally judge so, and partly because it was preached in the sermons of the

92 Melanchthon (1540a) 303–08.

2 Melanchthon 94 righteous.’93 Pagans were also moved to believe in another life after death through the appearance of poltergeists (Cicero and Plutarch are cited as evidence), but in true prophecy, later confirmed not only by Christ’s words but also by his example and that of all those who were raised with him, we have even better grounds for such belief. It is a great wonder and shame in fact that so many doubt the truth of life eternal when God has provided so many and so clear confirmations of it. With that, the first major unit in the 1540 chapter is concluded. Melanchthon then turns to the ontology of the post-mortem state of the soul—a question that he also raises in the Liber, but after a somewhat different initial reasoning. In the 1553 text,94 the argument starts with the example of Christ’s resurrection, not his teaching about it. To it are added, in the form of a quick enumeration, many other similar examples from Adam over Noah to the patriarchs. Reversing the order of 1540 come then Christ’s doctrine and promise, followed by a warning, ‘But nobody will become a citizen of this celestial church unless he will already in this mortal life be a citizen of this church in which the voice of the gospel resounds, and turn to God before he departs this life.’95 The reign of the Son, through the gospel in the church in this life, is contrasted with that of the Father, which will not be mediate but direct in the life to come. Then will all, devils and godless humans alike, have received their just and eternal punishment. ‘This doctrine revealed by God by sure testimonies is proper to the church.’96 Here the list is inserted of biblical witnesses from Enoch to Elijah to Christ. The section is concluded with a brief exhortation to accept this teaching and pray for renewal of heart. ‘For as it was said before, it is absolutely necessary that conversion to God take place in this mortal life’97—the point concludes the first unit of the chapter. Melanchthon teaches nothing radically new in the opening pages in 1553 as opposed to 1540; the changes are nevertheless noteworthy. The later text is considerably shorter. An

93 ‘& hæsit apud homines ubiq; terrarum hæc persuasio, tum quia naturaliter ita iudicant homines, tum quia celebrata est res sermonibus bonorum’ (1540a:307). And in Knaust’s German: ‘Vnd ist also bey allen menschen auff erden/diese meinung vom ewigen leben geblieben. Erstlich darumb/denn wenn man auch natürlich dauon wil reden / so mus man zugeben/das nach diesem leben / ein anders wesen sein mus/ Zum andern auch darumb / denn die verstendigen vnd rechterschaffene Leute haben es dafur gehalten / vñ also aus grunde Gottliches worts/ geprediget vnd eintrechtig geleret’ (1540b:B3r). 94 Melanchthon (1553) 284–85. 95 Melanchthon (1553) 284. 96 Melanchthon (1553) 284. 97 Melanchthon (1553) 285.

2 Melanchthon 95 entire line of argumentation has been removed from it. No mention is made of reason’s access to the doctrine of immortality. Neither the original insight nor its vestiges, with or without the effects of sin, are alluded to. On the contrary, the whole doctrine is designated as ‘proper to the church.’ The moral arguments are also dropped at this stage; the point is established only from biblical examples and teaching, and several smaller shifts enhance the ecclesial point. Enoch is presented in 1540 as one whose example reminds us that another and better life awaits us, but who also preached about eternal life. Melanchthon’s evidence is the quotation from 1 Enoch 1:9 in Jude 14–15. In 1553, the New Testament’s echo of the enigmatic figure of Genesis 5 is specifically interpreted as an illustration of the church’s ongoing proclamation of this great truth. The exhortation to repentance comes later, as does the threat of eternal punishment, at the end of the first unit rather than of the propositio. In the Commentarius, the call to repentance is more in the context of the promise of future resurrection or eternal punishment. In the Liber, the emphasis is much more clearly on the need of the conversion to take place in this life, which, in the overall scheme, again takes on an ecclesiastical urgency. Despite all these differences, it is not to be overlooked that, setting off to establish the immortality of the soul, Melanchthon begins both texts by speaking of the resurrection of the body and life eternal. That is the anchor point of the whole reasoning, which is to be noted in two respects. First, the argument must move from the promised eternal life to the soul’s immortality and not vice versa. Second, the argument must be built up starting with the divine promise and not with human nature: it has to be theological rather than philosophical. Melanchthon explicitly makes the point. It is somewhat more muted but surely audible in the earlier text (it is from scripture and not from the books of clever pagans that we learn all that we need to know about the resurrection), while the focus on the church as the source of that insight is quite exclusive in the first pages of the 1553 rewriting.

2.6 Arguments for immortality

The second unit, which we may term the ontology of the post-mortem state, exhibits greater similarities in the two versions.98 The question that touches off the discussion is whether the

98 Melanchthon (1540a) 308–14 and (1553) 285–88.

2 Melanchthon 96 soul survives the body. Note that it is only at this point that the specific question of the soul’s immortality has been raised for the first time.99 The affirmative answer is provided through a, more or less identical, series of biblical prooftexts in both cases. The list begins with Matthew 10:28,100 followed by Luke 23:43. If the soul dissolved, it could not be with Christ in paradise, which is precisely the promise given to the right thief. The Liber text adds, against any possible misunderstanding of soul sleep, that ‘paradise means not the sleep of Epimenides, but a blessed life in which God disperses a new light in minds, and lives in hearts, so that they be just and full of joy, namely in harmony with him.’101 Then follows, in both texts, a short but complete and rhetorically very well constructed sermon on the Lukan scene102 that concludes with the repetition of the immortality thesis. Not only is the soul’s continuing existence affirmed, but the idea is explicitly rejected that it might simply dissolve like breath.103 The list of prooftexts then continues. In the story of the transfiguration, Jesus

99 Melanchthon’s definition of the soul offered at the beginning of the Latin tract already included immortality. ‘Anima rationalis est spiritus intelligens, qui est altera pars substantiae hominis, nec extinguitur cum a corpore discessit, sed immortalis est’ (Liber, CR 13:16). The circularity is rather typical of similar discussions (cf. p. 211, below), is not reflected upon by Melanchthon, and points beyond the scope of the present analysis. 100 ‘Do not fear those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul; rather fear him who can destroy both soul and body in hell.’ 101 Melanchthon (1553) 285; cf. p. 244, below. 102 Melanchthon (1540a) 308–10, (1553) 285–86. All should interpret the scene with regard to themselves. Christ sets the right thief as a teacher before us, for he alone assumed the apostolic office while the apostles despaired and kept silent. The two murderers with Christ signify all of humanity, sentenced to death for their sins. God reconciled us in Christ, but a part of humankind blasphemes and hates the Son of God. Tyrants and the like should look at this spectacle and recognise themselves in the cursing thief. Others, however, accept Christ’s benefit, know that they deserve punishment, but turn to Christ by whom they know themselves liberated from sin and death just as the right thief recognised in the half-dead Christ the Lord of life, gave him glory and preached, when the whole church was silent, that he would reign and give eternal life. He also did another honour (cultus) in that he defended the glory of Christ. The pious should recognise that they hang on the cross with that thief, for we are subject to death through sin from which Christ alone can redeem us. So let us call upon him in faith, teach others about his benefits, and defend his glory against those who blaspheme him. 103 In Knaust’s verbose German translation, the paraphrase seems to suggest two specific philosophical concepts that are being rejected here. First, that the soul is made up of the four elements, which would mean that it is subject to disintegration; second, that it evaporates into nothing upon leaving the body. (The first is clearly a philosophical option, going back at least to Aristotle and Plato. The second opinion is attributed to the wicked in Wisdom 5, but in the latter half of the century it will also be associated with the names of Zeno and Aratus; cf., esp., n. 27 on p. 214, below.) In Melanchthon’s Latin, the organising principle of the twofold structure is the twofold biblical option, simplified in Knaust’s translation, of being with Christ and being in paradise, both of which would be impossible if the soul were not immortal. Further, the negated options for the soul are ‘halitus dissipatus’ and ‘talis halitus,’ which might not offer a strong enough basis for philosophical sophistry (cf. 1540a:310 and 1540b:B7v–8r). Finally, the parallel is simplified in the 1553 edition, where only the first element remains, the soul cannot be like ‘a breath that is dispersed’ if it is with Christ (1553:286; Keen’s

2 Melanchthon 97 speaks with Moses (Mt 17:3), although he (Moses) had died and been buried (Deut 34:5–6). Consequently, it must have been Moses’ soul separated from his body. Paul desires to depart and be with Christ (Phil 1:23); he wants to be absent from the body, and to be present with the Lord (2 Cor 5:8). If the soul died, he could not be with Christ when leaving this body. Christ also went to preach to the souls in prison (1 Pt 3:19). While the story to which Peter refers is obscure, the words themselves are clear. Much is spoken of figuratively in the parable of Lazarus and Dives (Lk 16:19–31), ‘still the main point of the story is without doubt historical.’104 Upon death, the souls of the pious will be taken right away to heaven, the souls of the godless to hell. Moreover, Abraham’s soul must also live as is further witnessed by the dominical saying (Mt 22:31–32). Such is the order in the Commentarius, from which the Liber only slightly differs. The order of the texts is not identical with that in the earlier edition, and the commentary is somewhat shorter, while 2 Corinthians 5 is altogether omitted. On the whole, however, the collection is a fairly standard set used to establish the doctrine of immortality, and all the changes between the two editions in this entire section may be termed stylistic. The same cannot be said of the next step in the argument. ‘The philosophers have said nothing of the restitution of bodies that the divine voice most plainly revealed.’105 The introductory sentence marks an important turn in the whole chapter. The shift occurs in the 1540 text as well, but there, it is a return to philosophical arguments. Nor is the contrast as pronounced as in the later version. In the Commentarius, Melanchthon began with the resurrection and acknowledged the primacy of revelation over reason in this matter as well, but he did not deny some natural awareness of that great insight to pagan philosophers. None of that is allowed in the Liber. The starting point is still resurrection, but it does not so much entail as is contrasted with the soul’s immortality, at least in terms of reason. Melanchthon, we shall presently see, allows for rational thought to recognise the latter thesis, but he no longer treats it as a muted insight into the promise of the resurrection of the body. On the contrary, the philosophers’ insight is a clear indication of reason’s limitation. They are ignorant of the great Christian promise of the resurrection, and think that the soul alone continues to live. ‘But if some people believe that after death

English translation as ‘no one can be converted’ is probably mistaken, wrongly interpreting una as ‘one’ rather than ‘together’ and conversari as ‘to be converted’ rather than ‘to be, stay, abide,’ cf. CR 13:174). 104 Melanchthon (1553) 286. 105 Melanchthon (1553) 286.

2 Melanchthon 98 another life is to follow, they think that souls only survive, since they seem to agree that they are made up of a heavenly nature and not of the elements.’106 Much of what follows in the 1553 text is not new as opposed to 1540, but it certainly acquires a new meaning in the light of this new emphasis and context. While the Liber turns to philosophy and immortality proper for the first time in the chapter at this point, the Commentarius asks a more specific question, viz. whether souls hang around after leaving the body?107 Plato is cited in both texts, who suggested that the souls of great people rise upwards, while the souls of those subject to the pleasures of the flesh will be seen on earth and around the graves.108 The argument will proceed with the syllogism the ancient philosopher offered in the Phaedo to prove the soul’s immortality, but a short passage is first interpolated in the 1553 edition. Supported with a reference to Corax of Naxos from Plutarch, it states that ancients expressly appealed to the appearance of ghosts as a reason to believe that the soul did not die with the body.109 The connection is quite logical to Plato’s point; it is provided by the appearance of ghosts. In the 1540 edition, the passage belonged to the first section as part of the epistemological description.110 Undoubtedly, the rearrangement served the text well; the inclusion at the later point is unobtrusive, while in the earlier version Melanchthon had to correct it right away by saying that the Old and New Testament witnesses were more trustworthy than poltergeists. Now, however, in the limited and limiting context of immortality juxtaposed to resurrection, it may stand for what it is worth. That is not the only paragraph that ultimately finds its proper place after rearrangement in this section. The Liber, then, continues with three arguments in support of the immortality thesis, taken from Plato, Xenophon and Cicero.111 They also occurred in the Commentarius, but in a somewhat different order. There, the latter two had belonged to the first unit that underwent considerable simplification in 1553. The first syllogism is originally introduced by Plato. ‘A nature that does not spring from the elements is not corrupted. The soul does not come

106 Melanchthon (1553) 286. 107 Melanchthon (1540a) 308 and (1553) 285. 108 Melanchthon (1540a) 312 and (1553) 286. 109 Melanchthon (1553) 286–87. 110 Melanchthon (1540a) 307. 111 Melanchthon (1553) 287–88.

2 Melanchthon 99 from the elements. Therefore it is not extinguished at the burial of the body.’112 The force of the argument turns on the minor, which Melanchthon, following Plato, proceeds to prove with another syllogism. Knowledge of incorporeal things cannot arise in elemental nature. The soul has such knowledge of numbers, God, good and bad etc., therefore it cannot be of elemental nature. In the Commentarius, Melanchthon, like Plato himself, finds this argument nearly irrefutable and continues to elaborate on it for another page or two until he recalls the noetic effects of sin and concludes that in our current fallen state the earlier (moral) arguments hold. Finally, he strikes a balance, It is well for a good mind not to despise these admonitions which reason proposes concerning immortality. It is surely not negligible what they contribute to the stimulation and to the confirmation of honest opinions. But heavenly testimonies are nonetheless to be added.113

The praise is somewhat more muted, and the text shorter, in the Liber. Plato’s self- assessment is quoted but then left at that. Melanchthon, however, rather chooses briefly to develop the idea from a theological perspective. Instead of arguing for the non-elemental nature of the soul, he reminds the reader of its createdness. On a Christian reading, the innate perceptions point to ‘the eternal architectonic mind’ of the creator,114 to which is added an allusion to the effects of sin. The second argument is the moral one which we already saw in the introductory section of the 1540 edition.115 Many honest people are killed unjustly, while their murderers go unpunished. There must be another life to set the moral order in balance. By far the greater part of this point is worked out in terms of examples, and specifically examples from the church are chosen. Christ, John the Baptist, and Paul were all killed, although they had pleased God. The case of Abel is then elaborated on at some length, in whom the whole church’s teaching is summed up, ‘what it is, what it is like, why it is subject to the cross, what

112 Melanchthon (1553) 287. 113 ‘Est bonæ mentis has admonitio nes, quas ratio proponit de immortalitate, nō aspernari. Et nonnihil uel ad exuscitandas, uel ad confirmandas honestas opiniones conducūt: Sed tamen addenda sunt testimonia cœlestia. Estq; periucunda collatio bonis’ (1540a:313–14). In Knaust’s German: ‘Es gehört einem fromen hertzen zu/diese vermanunge/welche die vernunfft von der seelen vnsterbligkeit vns furstelt / nicht zuuerachten/ Denn sie auch gute gedancken von Gottlichen sachen / in den hertzen widerumb erregen vnd bestettigen. Jedoch sol man hinzu thun die zeug nis Göttlicher schrifft. Vnd es ist ein lust/also der vernunfft vnd heiliger schrifft argument / gegen ein ander zu halten/’ (1540b:C3v). 114 Melanchthon (1553) 287. 115 Melanchthon (1540a) 304–07 and (1553) 287–88.

2 Melanchthon 100 sort of judgment is to follow, and in what way the restitution of life is to be expected.’116 Here again, the constituents of the argument are all familiar from the 1540 text, but the arrangement is somewhat changed. Most importantly, the whole section is moved to a new place and the overall structure—ecclesiastical examples to powerfully illustrate and improve a point that is also available to unaided reason—is made clearer. The third argument is taken from Xenophon’s account of Cyrus. Conscience, that troubles even the outwardly strongest villains, is a clear sign that punishment will follow. On the one hand, this innate sense of right and wrong cannot be accidental. On the other, ‘God would not have sanctioned this in vain unless punishments followed sins. But as many are not punished in this life, punishments will follow after this life.’117 A similar line of reasoning, including the specific reference to Xenophon’s Cyrus, also appears in the 1540 text.118 There, however, it comes somewhat later in what is the last unit of material discussion before the concluding prayer, namely in the treatment of Aristotle. The rearrangement helps smooth out the argument. In the earlier version, Aristotle is introduced with an admission of the uncertainty surrounding his opinion. Melanchthon then rightly felt the need to justify his inclusion, which he did by emphasising that the best among the philosophers had always been aware of the soul’s immortality. Cyrus is quoted as an example—though no other is appended to the list. Thereafter Melanchthon returns to Aristotle. That somewhat awkward construction is now broken up; Xenophon is introduced as independent philosophical evidence, and helps prepare the ground in advance for the appearance of Aristotle. The third argument is akin to, but not identical with, the second. In both cases the moral order, and in some sense evil unpunished in this life, demands that reason recognises the necessity of another life. In the second argument, it is a moral demand. Unretaliated wickedness and uncompensated goodness must find their just reward—if not in this life, then in another, which must therefore come. The ability to judge right and wrong is here implicitly exercised, while it is consciously reflected upon and pushed to the centre of the third argument. The focus shifts from the demands of the global moral order to conscience, the innate precondition and guide of that order. Melanchthon’s second argument is that,

116 Melanchthon (1553) 288. 117 Melanchthon (1553) 288. 118 Melanchthon (1540a) 314.

2 Melanchthon 101 without an afterlife, our moral expectations would permanently remain unfulfilled. The third, that it would be meaningless to have such expectations without a corresponding moral order. Notwithstanding their subtle differences, both arguments pertain to the ethical realm, that is, to reason and the law (as opposed to the gospel). ‘It is useful to think of these arguments, and let us realize that divine revelation must be observed.’119 Melanchthon’s Latin has sed tamen whose adversative force is difficult to overlook. A more felicitous English translation of the conjunction would be therefore ‘but.’ Not only is the praise for the insights of pagan philosophers much more muted in this text than in the Commentarius, it is also more unambiguously subordinated to the primacy of special revelation.

2.7 Aristotle, immortality, and resurrection

The last step in the argument is, in both texts, a brief discussion of Aristotle.120 In the earlier version it is, as we have seen, somewhat apologetically done. That should be hardly surprising, not so much because of Luther’s objections to the philosopher as because of the well-known medieval debates I briefly reviewed in the introduction, surrounding his interpretation of precisely this issue. The very mention of Aristotle thus occasions a small digression on the certainty and reliability of pagan philosophical thought. With the revised structure of the 1553 text, that is not necessary. Yet even here, Melanchthon slightly changes the text that gives a much smoother entry to Aristotle. The review of the three major philosophical arguments is closed with a stock rhetorical turn, it would be too long to discuss all that philosophers have imagined. An example is immediately adduced to illustrate the point how absurd such views can be. The Stoics taught that the soul, after hanging around for a while, was ultimately ‘dissipated like fumes.’121 The notion does not even require refutation. Its very positioning in the text does the job—a subtle but efficient move whose success is an adequate indicator of Melanchthon’s rhetorical skills. Introduced against that background, Aristotle needs no apology. His uncertainties may be acknowledged (though somewhat muted), ‘even if many doubts, like winds, disturbed this thought of his,’ but he

119 Melanchthon (1553) 288; cf. CR 13:177. 120 Melanchthon (1540a) 314–15 and (1553) 288–89. 121 Melanchthon (1553) 288.

2 Melanchthon 102 can still be presented as the one who ‘sensed this more than other learned and modest men: the souls of men are not completely extinguished after the burial of the body.’122 Once again, Melanchthon’s revising touch has considerably improved his argument. The content of the Aristotle reference is also modified somewhat. Both in 1540 and in 1553, Melanchthon refers to two passages each, but only the second, from book 2 of De anima, is quoted in both where Aristotle speaks of the unique nature of the soul as not quite certain but probable. Kusukawa notes that Melanchthon here cites a few lines against which he wrote on the margin in his own copy of Aristotle, ‘Nota de immor/talitate/ animæ.’123 The first Greek quotation in the Commentarius on the origin of the rational soul as alone coming from without is dropped in the Liber, and replaced with a paraphrase from book 3 which more clearly suggests the immortality thesis, ‘that principal little flame in the soul of man [the active intellect] is not extinguished with the body.’124 In neither text does Melanchthon offer any detailed interpretation of Aristotle. Rather, he simply lets his suggestion stand, Aristotle probably, though by no means certainly, entertained a view of the soul’s immortality. In both works, Melanchthon rounds off the chapter’s argument with a reminder of philosophy’s limitations, but the shift from 1540 to 1553 is worth noting once more. The earlier text, quite in line with its whole tenor, protested here that the point was not to cite partisan supporters (suffragatores) but arguments that, when pondered, would move the youth to learning and virtue. The Liber, by contrast—although still in line with its own logic—redirects the reader’s attention from the realm of reason to that of the gospel. But let us leave behind the doubts of philosophers, and deplore the fog of our own souls which followed upon sin, and let us hear with greater care the divine voice about the will of God, and the goodness of our lord Jesus Christ, and the message of the restoration of perpetual life; and let us pray to the son of God himself to strengthen assent in our minds.125

The chapter, and the whole book, concludes, accordingly, with a prayer whose text also undergoes some changes between the two editions, but whose trinitarian structure is not altogether extinguished. Perhaps as important as the more prominent christocentrism of the

122 Melanchthon (1553) 288. 123 Kusukawa (1995) 98n. The original locus is Aristotle, De anima II.ii (413b.25–28), leaf 170r in Melanchthon’s copy. Kusukawa’s claim that that is ‘the only passage in the De anima . . . which suggests that the rational soul is immortal’ (1995:98) is an overstatement, but of little consequence here; cf. Dales (1995) 9–12. 124 Melanchthon (1553) 288; cf. (1540a) 315. 125 Melanchthon (1553) 289; cf. CR 13:178 and (1540a) 315.

2 Melanchthon 103 later supplication is also its unmistakeable shift in emphasis from, on the one hand, the renovation of the lost image to the service of the church and the greater glory of the lord to, on the other, humanity’s dependence on nothing but divine grace. The changes that Melanchthon introduced in the later edition of the last chapter of his commentary on De anima are, then, quite consistent and significant, though not obtrusive. In the 1540 text, one could sense some unease and vulnerability in his attempts to strike a balance between philosophy and theology. The overall framework, which I reconstructed in the opening sections of this chapter, was already clear, but its application was not yet fully satisfactory. It cannot, of course, be denied that the idea of the soul’s immortality is not peculiar to Christianity. To that extent, the notion of an afterlife is only in part a matter of revelation. It is also available to unaided reason, albeit weakly. Melanchthon is motivated by empirical evidence; from some heathen prophecies and the appearances of poltergeists, Plato, Cicero and others also concluded that another life must come after this. Yet Christians should not believe it for such bogus reasons, but for the words of true prophets confirmed by biblical examples from Enoch to Christ. This duality informs the entire chapter starting with the twofold epistemological basis of our knowledge to the repeated returns to various forms of the moral argument to the defence of Aristotle. Throughout the text, Melanchthon plays a kind of give-and-take. He affirms time and again that philosophical arguments are useful, but then undercuts them as valid only insofar as they support Christian doctrine; the rest is but madness. His recurrent protestations that the references to the wisdom of ancient philosophers serve a good cause also betray his misgivings about potential misinterpretations of his moves. Writing of the Commentarius, Kusukawa thus oversimplifies the matter when she claims, ‘Melanchthon never uses philosophy in this section to prove the immortality of the soul.’126 Strictly speaking, that is not even true of the Liber, although his performance improves considerably by the later text. A somewhat awkward balance of the Commentarius between reason and revelation, wherein the primacy of the latter is nevertheless affirmed repeatedly, is replaced with a much clearer structure in which the soul’s immortality, available to some extent to unaided reason, is considered as a weak substitute for the robust truth of revelation concerning the resurrection of the body. The theological subordination of law to gospel, reason to revelation

126 Kusukawa (1995) 98.

2 Melanchthon 104 is translated into a subordination of the soul’s immortality to the resurrection of the body or, more precisely, the knowledge (through natural reason) of the one to the knowledge (through divine promise) of the other. That insight shapes the entire discussion in the 1553 edition that Melanchthon, as the title announced, had ‘recognised.’ With that, several ‘wrinkles’ of the text are also quite naturally smoothed out, repetitions avoided and apologies made superfluous. Aristotle’s treatment deserves reflection. It amounts to roughly four per cent of the whole chapter in both editions. Remarkably little, we must admit, the shaky grounds provided by his De anima notwithstanding. Kusukawa observes that ‘Melanchthon here seems quite oblivious to the contemporary and quite sophisticated debate in Italy about the immortality of the soul.’127 She is probably right, but it is a moot point. He could have engaged in a more detailed discussion regardless his unawareness of the Italian scene. The very position of the chapter indicates Melanchthon’s overall approach. The immortality of the soul appears at the end of the work rather than where the Aristotelian references might invite interpretation. The final position is, of course, quite natural from a theological perspective. The topic is a last thing, an eschatological question. The whole work, in both versions, is but a loose commentary on the ancient philosopher. Equally importantly, it is a novel attempt to formulate an anthropological doctrine for the new theological movement. And Melanchthon works, especially in the concluding chapter, as he does in his Loci, by contextualising a question—in this case the immortality of the soul—richly, and considering it from all aspects. Aristotle, even on a generous reading like Melanchthon’s,128 is but a small part of the overall picture, fundamentally viewed from a theological perspective. Ultimately, we need not deny the differences either between Melanchthon’s, however tentative, reading of the philosopher and Luther’s interpretation, or between his overall theological construct and Luther’s. Melanchthon, in the last analysis, gave Aristotle the benefit of the doubt and interpreted him as affirming the soul’s immortality, while the older Reformer seems to have held the opposite view. As for the overall construct, Luther, ever weary of what reason could achieve in matters of faith, treated both a belief in the

127 Kusukawa (1995) 98. 128 Even so, Melanchthon has in fact very little to say on Aristotle as compared, e.g., with Luther’s commentary in the probatio of the 31st Heidelberg thesis.

2 Melanchthon 105 immortality of the soul and a belief in the resurrection as confessional questions. As a theologian, he affirmed both, but maintained that only faith could grasp them, and whatever intimations reason might have of either, it will never be the kind of certainty, alone worth having, that could hold against the gates of hell. Melanchthon saw the matter somewhat differently. Once he defined a legitimate place for reason under the law, he was prepared to let it do its work. Immortality, then, falls within its purview, but resurrection—a doctrine reserved for the church by revelation in Christ, which, of course, includes Old Testament revelation in Christ to come—is only available in faith. Thus while Luther distinguished between reason and faith in terms of adequacy and certainty in the theological enterprise, Melanchthon aligned them with the law and gospel, respectively. On both views, however, the fullest understanding of immortality can be achieved when resurrection belief is brought to bear on it. Melanchthon and Luther thus probably disagreed on some of the details, but that was just as well. It made for entertaining dinner conversations in Wittenberg. Greater significance their differences would not have had, for they were one in carefully circumscribing the scope and place of the matter. One could safely disagree about particular philosophical opinions, and even some theological constructs, provided that there was a shared commitment to the gospel and its interpretation. Melanchthon’s turn to Aristotle in De anima and his treatment of the ancient thinker’s relevance for a new anthropology did not at all violate that consensus. What Melanchthon did, then—instead of compromising Luther’s Reformation insight and selling out to philosophy—was to offer theological reflection on the question of the soul’s immortality in a more sustained fashion than Luther ever had. How those beginnings were developed into a full-bodied doctrine in the second half of the century will be the subject matter of the following chapters.

3 Later-Sixteenth-Century Authors and Texts

In the previous chapters we have seen that Luther—although not quite in the way mid- twentieth-century Protestantism used to think, or more recent revisionist readings suggest— significantly reinterpreted received tradition, although he never engaged the question of the soul’s immortality systematically. Melanchthon went a step further in devoting the structurally highly important closing chapter of his Aristotle commentary to the issue, despite the meagre textual basis offered by the work of the ancient philosopher. But he still stopped short of making this locus the subject matter of an independent tract; apart from Knaust’s apparently unauthorised German translation of 1540, that only came to pass among Lutherans in the next generation. Indeed, the immortality of the soul repeatedly received sustained theological attention in the second half of the sixteenth century. In most cases, however, it is still as part of a larger work that the question is discussed, although, as Knaust’s translation anticipated, the topic begins to appear in the title of works, some of which indeed focus more or less exclusively on this locus. There are about a dozen titles that deserve closer attention. The latter half of the century is better approached through texts than through authors. While it made sense to single out Luther and Melanchthon as towering figures in the first decades of the Reformation (although it was their person not the quantity of their reflections that determined their significance for the immortality question), no one in the following generations can compare to either in stature. The overall importance of authors like Andreas Musculus or David Chyträus is indeed much more considerable than some others’, but that does not seem to be directly transposable into an influence in matters of immortality. While Luther is cited by virtually all authors, and an Aristotelian understanding of the soul lurks behind most texts, in which Melanchthon’s influence may rightly be

106 3 Authors and Tetxts 107 suspected, hardly known preachers may earlier exhibit an equally well developed form of the doctrine than stellar names. If somebody from the later generations gets quoted—as, for instance, Martin Mirus does by Moses Pflacher and Gregor Weiser, on which more below1— it is not so much because of who they are, but because of what they wrote. Matthias Tacius, author of the chronologically first text to be considered from the latter half of the sixteenth century, is a case in point.

3.1 Matthias Tacius, Ein Predigt von der vnsterbligkeit der Seelen (1556)

We have little biographical information on Matthias Tacius, whose entire extant oeuvre consists of two sermons from the 1550s. The titles of his published works identify him as ‘Goslariensis’ and a pastor in ‘Groß Saltza’ (Groß Salze),2 but he does not appear among the 4.6 million entries in the World Biographical Information System (WBIS), the most comprehensive biographical database to date.3 Fol. 180v of Abraham Ulrich’s Stammbuch carries an entry by Tacius which probably dates from the end of April 1553 and which he also signed as pastor in Saltza near Magdeburg.4 In his second sermon, with which I shall be concerned, he identifies himself as a student of Antonius Corvinus (1501–1553),5 who was in Goslar between 1528–1532. Tacius was immatriculated in Wittenberg in 1536, and earned a master’s degree there in 1538. He may have been a schoolmaster in Coswig in the 1540s.6

1 Cf. section 4.4. 2 The settlement near Magdeburg went by that name in the early modern period, was later known as Bad Salzelmen and has, since 1932, belonged to Schönebeck (Elbe). 3 Throughout the chapter, biographical information, unless otherwise noted, is derived from WBIS. 4 Wittenberger Gelehrtenstammbuch (1999) [Text:]294–95. The undated entry comes after two notes by Matthias Flacius Illyricus (1520–1575) and Nikolaus Hahn (1516–1570) dated to 25th and 26th April 1553, respectively, both in Magdeburg. The entry immediately following Tacius’ was written in Aachen on 4th September of that year, probably by Stephan Reich (1515–1588). The editors date Tacius’ entry to ‘before 30 Aug 1554’ ([Text:]411–12). 5 Tacius (1556) D2r. 6 Citing Georg Buchwald, Wittenberger Ordiniertenbuch (2 vols., Leipzig: Wigand, 1894–1895) 1, Nr. 147, the editors of the Wittenberger Gelehrtenstammbuch state that he was. They add, however, that from 18th January 1554 he was also pastor there. Of the two towns with the name Coswig, probably the one ten miles west of Wittenberg is meant (the other lies another hundred miles farther away between Meißen and Dresden), but even that does not square with the internal evidence. The entry in Ulrich’s album itself (and its probable dating) sits ill at ease with the editorial claim, and Tacius’ two extant sermons, preached in 1551 and 1554 and published in 1553 and 1556, respectively, both present him as preacher in Groß Saltza, some forty miles from Coswig, Anhalt (and 140 miles from Coswig, Saxony).

3 Authors and Tetxts 108

In addition to a somewhat earlier sermon on repentance, based on the parable of the unmerciful servant in Matthew 18, the only still extant text by Tacius appeared in 1556 under the title Ein Predigt von der vnsterbligkeit der Seelen/vnd von jrem stande nach abeschiede von dieser Welt/ aufferstehung des fleisches vnd ewigem leben/ vber das Euangelium von des Obersten der Schulen Tochter/ Matthei ix. As we can gather from the continuation of the title, it had been preached two years before, and thus stands in close temporal proximity to Melanchthon’s Liber (1553), the revised edition of his De anima commentary. The date is further remarkable in that homiletic treatments of the question tend to come later. It is only a generation or so later that we begin to find sermons discussing the soul’s immortality, let alone sermons that announce themselves with such a title. Unfortunately, Tacius’ work has no dedication or any additional information on its own background. The opening paragraph allows us to suspect that it was delivered on a Sunday afternoon, continuing the gospel exposition from the morning service focusing on faith,7 which, however, has not come down to us. The preacher was now turning to the immortality of the soul and the resurrection of the body, and the coupling of the two themes should not go unnoticed. The text’s significance for our purposes lies precisely in its insignificance. To look at it in good Lutheran fashion—as Tacius himself treats his pericope—both through the law and through the gospel, it can serve to caution as well as to encourage. First, it warns us against any undue optimism in reconstructing the particulars of doctrinal development in the present case. An unknown preacher’s perfectly ordinary homily written still in Melanchthon’s lifetime, the text nevertheless presents a fairly full version of the whole doctrine of the soul’s immortality and its usual treatment. Seen positively, Tacius’ sermon reassures us that there indeed was a relatively standardised treatment of the doctrine in the sixteenth century that we can rightfully reconstruct. The thirty-page sermon is divided into three parts. It first treats of the soul’s immortality, then of the resurrection of the body, after which comes the application both as admonition and as consolation, that is, the topic considered under the aegis of law and gospel, respectively. The text is highly structured with logical subdivisions throughout; it is

7 ‘Of the faith of this woman and also of the ruler and what they gained and won through such faith as well as of how we should also follow such faith and what we receive through it, you my beloved have heard today.’ (‘VOm Glauben dieses Weibleins / vnd auch des Obersten von der Schulen / vnd was sie durch solchen glauben haben entpfangen vnd erlanget. Jtem wie wir solchen glauben auch nachfolgen sollen / vnd was wir dadurch bekomen / hat ewer liebe heut gehöret,’ 1556:A2r).

3 Authors and Tetxts 109 organised thematically and hardly offers a genuine exegesis of the underlying biblical passage. The story of the raising of the leader of the synagogue’s daughter only serves as a point of departure, and once the three topics are suggested, it altogether disappears from the discussion. The sermon opens with a review of deniers of the resurrection from the Sadducees to contemporary church members whose life belies their Christian name. Tacius repeatedly speaks of ‘this article,’ most probably meaning the third article of the creed or, more precisely, the loci of resurrection and eternal life. The title, the overall structure and the introduction thus all signal that the immortality doctrine was not considered in isolation and certainly not in contrast to the doctrine of the resurrection of the body. The two, so sixteenth-century thinkers saw the matter, were inherently connected. In the first part of the sermon, Tacius establishes the soul’s immortality from scripture against all false views and describes its post-mortem activities citing biblical and early church authorities. His key term is the ‘wirckunge’ of the soul, and his goal is to counter any possible affirmation of soul sleep. Citations from the fathers are also designed to prove that the soul is not insensitive in the Zwischenzustand, but begins to partake of joy or pain according as it will be its lot after judgement day. In the second part, little time is wasted on prooftexting except for quoting a few Old Testament passages from Isaiah and Daniel to establish the resurrection of the body. Two questions are focused on, instead, how is the resurrection possible, and how will the flesh be raised? The answer to the first is secured by God’s almighty power, its proofs elaborated on in some detail; the how is rather briefly settled by quoting 1 Corinthians 15 and 1 Thessalonians 4. The application then seeks to move to repentance and to provide comfort.

3.2 Melchior Specker, Vom Leiblichen Todt (1560)

If Tacius’ sermon is quite remarkable for its early date, there is a veritable flood of texts in the 1560s. They are, however, non-homiletic in genre. Melchior Specker, a pastor of St. Thomas’ in Strasbourg, published a volume under the title Vom Leiblichen Todt (1560). Biographical information is barely less scant on him than on Tacius. He was born in Isny im Allgäu at an unknown date. He studied under the great Hebraist Paul Fagius (1504–1549),

3 Authors and Tetxts 110 who taught in Isny between 1527–1535.8 His biographers credit Specker with earning a theological doctorate, but the title pages of his published works consistently designate him as ‘M[agister].’ He assumed a preaching position in Robertsau, Alsace, now a district of Strasbourg, in 1553. The following spring he rejected a call to become the reformer of Kaiserslautern.9 At the Strasbourg Academy, he took up a professorship, first of logic and metaphysics, then, in 1557, of theology, which chair he held for the rest of his life. Sometime in the late 1550s he became pastor at St. Thomas’ in Strasbourg,10 a Lutheran centre since 1524. He died in 1569. Half a dozen titles make up Specker’s oeuvre, all dating between 1554–1571,11 and half of them dealing with eschatological issues. In addition to an early text on the second coming,12 the last piece that he published in his lifetime was an exposition of Matthew 25.13 His works usually appeared in one printing each. Vom Leiblichen Todt alone went through three editions in 1560, 1561 and 1571 at three different Strasbourg publishers, and must be considered his greatest literary success. It is a fairly thick book of over 600 quarto pages, dedicated to a follower of Luther, Hans Ungnad Freiherr von Sonneck (1493–1564). It is a copious florilegium in which, as the list of authorities meticulously added to the end of the book makes it clear at once, Specker does not only cite biblical passages but gathers relevant excerpts from Greek and Latin church fathers—including among the latter some medieval thinkers such as Bernard of Clairvaux, Peter Lombard, Albert the Great or Gabriel Biel— and contemporary theologians as well as historiographers.14 The chief organisational principle of the work is thematic. The material is arranged into parts, chapters and sections, sometimes with further levels of subdivision. Each unit has a substantial and, customarily,

8 Fagius was the schoolmaster in Isny between 1527–1535, and then also minister between 1538–1543, but he may only have taught Specker in Strasbourg, where he was active, after ealier periods of residence, between 1544–1549; cf. Raubenheimer (1957) esp. 17–23, 42, 50, 70, 103. 9 Müller (2004). 10 His early works up to 1555 describe him as ‘preacher in Strasbourg’; works from the 1560s, as ‘pastor at St. Thomas’ in Strasbourg.’ 11 Cf. VD16: S 8164–72. 12 Von der Herrlichen Zůkunfft Jesu Christi/ zům Jüngsten Gericht (Strasbourg: Samuel Emmel, 1555), also available in microform in BPal F3801–02. 13 Außlegung Des Euangelij Matthei am XXV. Capitel (Strasbourg: Theodosius Rihel, 1568), also available in microform in BPal F3583. 14 Specker (1560) GG3r/v.

3 Authors and Tetxts 111 numbered title. The originality of the contribution is not to be underestimated. Peter Lombard’s Sentences, the most successful theological textbook of all times, itself worked on the same principle. While it had lost influence in Protestant circles, its methodology was widely imitated for at least another century, until the rise of the great systematic theologies of Lutheran orthodoxy. In the 1500s, florilegia and compendia were more common than actual summae (consider also Melanchthon’s own Loci communes). To name but one example of considerable illustrative power, Abbot Matthaeus Vogel (1519–1591) of Alpirsbach in the Black Forest produced a massive eight-volume Schatzkammer Heiliger Göttlicher Schrifft in the 1580s, employing the same authorial principles except that, as the title announces, he limited himself to excerpting the Bible, and felt no need to include works of theological reflection. The whole edition comprises over 4,500 folio pages and went through several editions until the early seventeenth-century. That itself is no mean feat, but the book’s story takes on further levels of complexity. The eighth volume came out in 1588, when the early parts of the book were already appearing in reprint. It is nothing but a register and summary, a skeletal version of the first seven volumes, containing Vogel’s own text (note the one to seven ratio in the overall opus), stripped of the long quotations of biblical support. Encouraged by the success, Vogel then proceeded to translate the work into Latin, and, dying before the fruition of his efforts, enjoined the task of completion upon his son, who dutifully brought out the Thesaurus Theologicus in 1607. It sold out, which prompted Vogel, Jr. (1563–1624) to publish a retranslated German version of the concise Latin four years later. The one-volume treasury in outline was reprinted as late as 1639.15 It is in this cultural context that Specker’s contribution must be seen. Vom Leiblichen Todt is divided into three parts. The first and longest unit, nineteen chapters on roughly 250 pages, deals with bodily death and its names; the second (thirteen chapters on 180 pages), with the corpse and burial, how one should proceed in such matters according to holy scripture. The last and shortest section of about 140 pages contains twelve chapters ‘on the souls and their place and state until the last day.’16 It opens with a definition

15 That not only father and son share a name, but that the various German versions of the work all have the same title, makes it rather difficult to disentangle the story with any degree of certainty. For a short overview of the family efforts, see Vogel, Jr.’s dedication in the one-volume edition of 1611 (b1r/v). 16 ‘[V]on der Seelen / vñ jrem ort vnnd Stande / biß an den Jüngsten tag’ (1560:219v).

3 Authors and Tetxts 112 of the soul (ch. 1), then lists arguments for its immortality (ch. 2). To establish the significance of the doctrine, a review follows of the sad consequences of its rejection, nothing short of a complete collapse of moral life.17 The third chapter deals with biblical names of the places of departed souls, augmented with a discussion of Christ’s descent to hell. Chapter 4 discusses when, chapter 5 how the souls come to their place, after which come four chapters on the righteous and three on the damned souls. In each case, the first two (6–7 and 10–11) deal with the life of the souls until the last day and their knowledge. Chapter 8 is devoted to a description of the blessed souls’ activity, and chapter 9, to their possible appearance on earth. Finally, the last chapter of the whole book turns to the will of the damned souls.

3.3 Andreas Musculus, Gelegenheit/ Thun vnd Wesen der Verstorbenen (1565)

After Knaust’s Melanchthon translation that turned into an independent piece what had originally been a chapter, Andreas Musculus (1514–1581) produced, to my knowledge, the first tract that claimed to have an exclusive focus on the post-mortem state. Musculus is one of the most prominent figures discussed in this chapter, and his oeuvre, with over two hundred entries in VD16, is second only to Chyträus’. He studied first in Leipzig, where he earned a BA in 1534, then—after a few years of private tutoring in Amberg—at the university of Wittenberg, where he received an MA in 1539, and married Johann Agricola’s (c.1494–1566) sister-in-law. In 1541, he found employment in Frankfurt an der Oder, where he remained for the rest of his life, steadily climbing in rank both in his pastoral and in his academic offices. Upon earning a ThD, he was appointed professor of theology in 1546, and soon became the rector of the university. He remained the only theologian in Frankfurt until the mid-1560s. He reached the height of his pastoral-administrative career in 1566 when the elector, in whose favour he continued throughout his life, appointed him general superintendent of Brandenburg. In the latter half of the 1570s, he worked, as a

17 Pomponazzi had turned this question on its head, and argued that those rejecting the immortality of the soul are all the more upright, for they are virtuous for virtue’s sake and do not behave decently in the hope of some otherworldly recompense; see ch. 14 of his De immortalitate animæ (esp. 1948 [1516]:350, 373–77) and cf. Pluta (1986) 56 on his earlier expressions of this view.

3 Authors and Tetxts 113 representative of the Mark, on the Formula of Concord. He died in 1581. Musculus was a staunch Gnesio-Lutheran and a great controversialist. He was a determined opponent of the Interim, and did not scruple to attack erstwhile allies writing, at times, against Agricola or his former teacher Melanchthon. Where there was any disagreement, Musculus was quick to take sides, and then resolutely defend the favoured position. His entire career can be reconstructed as a more or less continuous series of controversies. In modern scholarship, he has earned dubious fame as the main exponent of Teufelbücher, a specifically late-sixteenth-century genre.18 He belonged to those who saw his own age full of signs of the impending cataclysm of the second coming. While his theological interests were many and varied, the eschatological theme featured prominently among them.19 The last judgement was one of his favourite topics, to which he returned several times during his career.20 In 1559, he published a tract under the title Vnterrichtung vom Himel vnd der Hellen, in which he discussed both heaven and hell, the state of both the redeemed and the damned, and answered some objections. As the title of the Erfurt edition specified the context,21 he was considering the question after the second coming, ‘nach der zukunfft vñ gericht der HErrn Christi.’ The problem of the Zwischenzustand is not raised. Like Specker, he devoted a separate book to that issue a few years later. The lines are somewhat differently drawn, though, than in the Strasbourger’s case, for Musculus, ever eager to raise his favourite topic, includes the actual events of the last day with the discussion of the intervening period. The title of Gelegenheit/ Thun vnd Wesen der Verstorbenen /von jrem Abschied an / aus diesem Leben / bis zum eingang / nach gehaltenem Jüngsten Gericht/ zum ewigen Leben (1565) conceals a twofold structure. The first four of the tracts’ ten units deal with the Zwischenzustand between, and including, death and resurrection; the second half, with the events and details

18 Grimm (1960) esp. 539, 544–47, 552. Cf. his Vom Hosen Teuffel (1555), Wider den Fluchteuffel (1556), Wider den Eheteuffel (1559), of which the last was especially popular with six editions by 1568, but the others were also reprinted, the Hosen-Teuffel as late as 1630. For a more recent sketch of his life and achievement, including his contribution to education, the social welfare system and theology, see Weichert (1990). 19 See VD16: M 7121, M 7146, M 7151 (cf. ZV 11302), M 7185–86, M 7214–16 (cf. VD17: 7:687870R), M 7238–40, M 7246 (cf. VD17: 39:159627P). 20 Vom jüngsten Tag (1557, 1559), Vom Mesech vnd Kedar/ vom Gog vnd Magog/ von dem grossen trübsal für der Welt Ende (1577, republished in 1603 as Der Jüngste tag: Wie nahe oder ferne er sey), Nützliche vnd seligliche Betrachtung des zunahenden Jüngsten Gerichts (1578). 21 VD16: M 7214.

3 Authors and Tetxts 114 of the last day.22 The work is presented in a broadly catechetical form with questions replacing chapters. The first question concerns death; the second, the survival, consciousness and existence of the soul after death; the third, its location until doomsday. Question four seeks to clarify details of the general resurrection; the fifth and sixth, the glory of the Son of Man and his judgment seat in the second coming, respectively, while the remaining four (7– 10) engage the proceedings of the last judgement. Throughout the Zwischenzustand chapters, Musculus employs the analogy of death and sleep, available both in scripture and in pagan thought. This twofold argumentation from reason and revelation is a characteristic of Musculus’ piece. Thus in question two, he acknowledges the existence of powerful philosophical arguments for the soul’s immortality, and, in three, the scriptural answer is preceded by the Elysian fields and the dark underground place of pagan philosophers and visionaries. Both his analysis of the biblical names of the soul’s abode and the discussion of the soul’s possible appearance on earth echo Speckerian topics. While it may not belong to Musculus’ most popular pieces, the Gelegenheit was reprinted in 1574.

3.4 Basilius Faber, Tractetlein von den Seelen der verstorbenen (1569)

The author of the locus’s greatest success story is not a preacher but a teacher. Basilius Faber, whom we have briefly met as Luther’s translator in chapter 1, was one of the most significant educators in sixteenth-century Saxony. Incidentally, the family soon produced an even more influential pedagogue in Michael Neander (1525–1595), who was probably his nephew. Faber studied briefly in Wittenberg in the late 1530s, but soon moved to Nordhausen as private instructor to the sons of the minister there, Johannes Spangenberg (1484–1550), among them Cyriacus (1528–1604). By the end of the next decade, he was the rector of the school in Nordhausen, where he was also joined by Neander as colleague. In the mid-1550s, he probably headed the school in Tennstädt23 for a few years before moving

22 Though the ten units are not further grouped formally, the twofold structure is clearly signalled by the heading and beginning of the text itself as well as in the transition between questions 4 and 5: ‘from their departure from this life on until the resurrection of the dead, and from there on until the happy entry into life eternal’ (‘von jrem abschied an von diesem leben / biss zur aufferstehung der thoten / vnd von dannen bis zum frölichen eingang zum ewigen leben,’ 1565:B1r; cf. E1r). Interestingly, the general resurrection on this view is grouped with the interim state, and comes before rather than after the point of transition in the tract’s structure. 23 Today Bad Tennstedt, a small town some twenty miles north of Erfurt.

3 Authors and Tetxts 115 to Magdeburg towards the end of the decade. He worked on the first four of the Magdeburg Centuries. In the early 1560s, he was appointed to direct the school in Quedlinburg, which office he had to give up in 1570 because of his Gnesio-Lutheran commitment. After a short exile, he was offered the second position—but was probably the most influential teacher—at the Ratsgymnasium in Erfurt, a famous school set up a decade earlier in what used to be, in the Reformer’s student years, Luther’s Augustinian monastery. Faber died there in 1575 or 1576. His works were not exceptionally numerous but exceedingly popular. Hardly a book he ever published failed to be reprinted later. Half of his titles are translations, chiefly of theological works by Hieronymus Weller (1499–1572), Johannes Wigand (1523–1587) and Luther (his German rendering of the Lectures on Genesis went through four editions by the end of the century),24 but he also translated Albert Krantz’s historical piece Saxonia (1563, 1564, 1582). He also published a handful of pedagogical works, including his magnum opus the Thesaurus eruditionis scholasticae (1571). It is one of the earliest bilingual dictionaries, but the Thesaurus is much more than a simple lexicon. Except for the tumultuous period of the Thirty Years’ War, no decade passed by until the mid-eighteenth century without seeing at least one new edition of this enormously influential introduction to the study of the Latin language. Revised and enlarged by a series of successive editors, it went through well over two dozen printings by 1749.25 Even so, within the perspective of his own lifetime—or that of the sixteenth century—Faber scored an even greater success with his Allerley Christliche/ nötige vnd nützliche vnterrichtungen von den letzten Hendeln der Welt (1564). The first word of the title disappeared by the third edition, and coming the new editions certainly were in steady succession. In the next forty years, the book was printed no fewer than twenty times by eight different publishers in Eisleben and Leipzig. And that was not all, for within that period the tract appeared once more at an unidentified place (1567), once in low German translation in Hamburg (1591/1592), and came out once more in 1663 in Stettin. There might have been yet another, now lost, edition in 1568 since the early editions are all dutifully numbered up to

24 Cf. VD16: L 3338 (1558), L 3358 (1564), L 3375 (1569), L 3403 and ZV 18460 (1593), and see VD17: 3:610342F (1663). 25 Barnes, without adding further evidence, asserts that it ‘was reportedly in use until well into the nineteenth century’ (2000:271).

3 Authors and Tetxts 116 the fifth, but the fourth is missing from the bibliographical databases.26 At any rate, of the extant versions, it is the 1569 edition—still published during Faber’s Quedlinburg period and the first to be numbered ‘fifth,’ which designation is retained by virtually all subsequent printings—that appeared with another tract, of immediate relevance for my topic, in appendix. The Tractetlein von den Seelen der verstorbenen/ vnd allem jhrem zustand vnd gelegenheit was, to my knowledge, never published independently,27 nor were the Vnterrichtungen printed without it after its first appearance. The Tractetlein was thus incorporated into the earlier piece, and went through nineteen editions by 1604 and a twentieth in 1663 (Table 3.1).28

Table 3.1 Publication history of Faber’s Vnterrichtungen and Tractetlein

Unterrichtungen Tractetlein Publisher Year VD16: ZV 19246 (Eisleben: Urban Gaubisch) 1564. VD16: F 5 (Eisleben: Urban Gaubisch) 1565. VD16: ZV 16369 (n.p.) 1567. VD16: F 6 VD16: F 34 (Leipzig: Ernst Vögelin) 1569. VD16: ZV 23365 [included] (Leipzig: Hans Steinmann & Ernst Vögelin) 1572. VD16: F 7 VD16: F 35 (Leipzig: Ernst Vögelin) 1574. VD16: F 8 VD16: F 36 (Leipzig: Hans Steinmann & Ernst Vögelin) 1575. VD16: ZV 23366 [included] (Leipzig: Hans Rambau, Sr.) 1576. VD16: F 9 VD16: F 37 (Leipzig: Hans Steinmann) 1578. VD16: F 10 VD16: F 38 (Leipzig: Hans Rambau, Sr.) 1579. VD16: F 11 VD16: F 39 (Leipzig: Hans Steinmann) 1579. VD16: ZV 5661 [included] (Leipzig: Hans Steinmann) 1581. VD16: F 12 VD16: F 40 (Leipzig: Hans Steinmann) 1582. VD16: F 13 VD16: F 41 (Leipzig: Johann Beyer) 1584. VD16: F 15 VD16: F 43 (Leipzig: Hans Steinmann) 1587. VD16: F 14 VD16: F 42 (Leipzig: Zacharias Bärwald) 1587. VD16: ZV 19060 [included] (Leipzig: Hans Steinmann, Heirs) 1590. [low German trans.] [included] (Hamburg: Jakob Wulff, Heirs) 1591.29

26 It is also quite thinkable that a mistake is involved. It is impossible to disentangle the precise details of the book’s printing history without carefully consulting each edition, which fell beyond the scope of my research. The 1567 edition is identified on the title page as ‘third’. However, the dedication of the 1572 edition, with which I mostly worked, is dated to 1st November 1567 (A7v), yet it already speaks of the fifth edition (A2v). Cf. also Barnes (2000) 271n, but he works with a much more limited list, missing nearly half of the editions, to which he is not entirely oblivious. 27 The title of the earlier tract is missing from the 1584 edition in VD16, but that is only an editorial oversight. 28 Discussing the overarching work, Brady speaks of Faber’s ‘distinct success’ (1971:828), while Barnes, on the basis of only thirteen of the twenty-three editions I have been able to identify, calls it an ‘extraordinary publication record’ and a ‘tremendous success’ (2000:271–72). 29 Actually appeared in 1592.

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Unterrichtungen Tractetlein Publisher Year VD16: F 16 VD16: F 44 (Leipzig: Zacharias Bärwald) 1594. VD16: F 18 VD16: F 46 (Leipzig: Bartholomaeus Voigt) 1596. VD16: F 17 VD16: F 45 (Leipzig: Zacharias Bärwald) 1596. VD17: 12:101959P [included] (Leipzig: Jakob Popporeich) 1604. VD17: 23:241213U [included] (Stettin: Jeremias Mamphras) 1663.

Typographically, the Tractetlein remains somewhat separate from the main body of the Vnterrichtungen, yet its integration into the earlier work is clearly signalled by the table of contents, where the section on the state of the souls is listed as the last of seven units under the overarching title ‘Von den letzten hendeln der Welt.’30 The integration, however, remains partial in that the new chapter always remains the last one, and is never moved to the third place where it would logically belong. Thus the proposed order of Faber’s main topics is as follows: (1) last day and how one should prepare for it, (2) death, (3) resurrection of the dead, (4) last judgement, (5) heaven and life eternal, (6) hell, (7) state of the souls of the dead.31 Faber is known for taking a dark view of the state of the world, lamenting its corruption and desolation. He advocated intensification of preaching of the last day and the impending judgement as an antidote. This sentiment surely informed the Vnterrichtungen,32 but there was also a more personal side to their writing. As Faber explained to the dedicatees of both tracts, they were conceived for the purpose of comforting himself and his family.33 And as we can gather from the latter passage, he had every reason to desire consolation. By 1569, he had nine dead children! If such details do not always transpire in the case of other authors, they are more easily forgotten about by modern readers than by the texts’ contemporaries. When they do come to the surface, they can serve as a reminder that the

30 Faber (1564) A8v. The impression is reinforced by the fact that there does remain an appendix which contains excerpts from Luther, presented as warnings and prophecies concerning Germany (‘Mit angehenden Warnungen vnd Porpheceyen D. Martini Luthers/ Deutschlandt betreffende,’ A8v). 31 This order deviates somewhat from the actual structure of the work. It contains eight, rather than six, chapters prior to the Tractetlein: (1) last day (1564:B4v), (2) how to prepare for the last day (C5v), (3) how to die well before the last day (D4v), (4) the last day (H2v), (5) resurrection (H7v) (6) last judgement (M1v), (7) eternal glory of the elect (N5v), (8) hell (T6v). On this scheme, the Tractetlein should come between (3) and (4). Barnes (2000) offers a helpful overview of the larger tract’s contents in a few pages. 32 Cf. Faber (1564) B1r–3v. 33 Faber (1564) A2r/v and (1569) Y2v–3r; cf. Barnes (2000) 280n.

3 Authors and Tetxts 118 latter half of the sixteenth century was an age when Luther’s adaptation of the medieval hymn ‘Though in midst of life we be, / Snares of death surround us’ was lived experience rather than a pious phrase. This immediacy of death provided a vital context for the discussion of the soul’s immortality.

3.5 Johannes Garcaeus, Jr., Sterbbüchlein (1573)

If Faber’s Tractetlein was the greatest success on the market, it did have to compete with other tracts. In chronological terms, Johannes Garcaeus, Jr.’s (1530–1574) Sterbbüchlein is its closest competitor. Garcaeus was born in 1530 in Wittenberg, and probably grew up in Hamburg, where his father Johannes, Sr. was a pastor. The son came back to Wittenberg to study theology with his father’s friend Melanchthon and mathematics with the son-in-law of the latter, Kaspar Peucer (1525–1602). Upon earning a master’s, Garcaeus moved to Greifswald in 1555, where he became pastor at St. James’ and a professor of theology in 1559. Two years later he accepted a call to Neubrandenburg, and became superintendent. He earned a theological doctorate from Wittenberg University in 1570. He died, however, a few years later in early 1574. He published over fifty titles, including some astronomical and astrological as well as meteorological works for which he was and remains perhaps better known than for his more voluminous theological output, at least half of which appeared in Latin. Sermons only make up a relatively small portion of his publications. Most, though surely not all, of his works came out in one edition each, but he remained in print until the early seventeenth century. Eschatology seems to have interested Garcaeus both astrologically and theologically. In the latter context, he wrote a small book on the second coming in 1569,34 and his son Joachim (c.1565–1633) edited a more substantial posthumous piece on life eternal which was reprinted in 1611.35 Third, and for my topic most importantly, he also published a work on

34 Eine Christliche kurtze Widerholung der warhafftigen Lere vnd bekentnis vnsers Glaubens von der Zukunfft des HErrn Christi zum Gericht (Wittenberg: n.p., 1569) – VD16: G 430. 35 The book is now not readily available for inspection (due to war damage and to recent German legislation on the restitution of nationalised property in the former GDR) nor is it fully processed in VD16. Considering a variety of information that can be found in bibliographical databases, the work seems to have appeared in two versions, and the reprint bore yet another title. 1) Vom Ewigen Leben, Aller Freuden vnd Seligkeit, dann auch Zustand vnd Herrligkeit der Kinder Gottes in derselbten . . . : Warhafftiges, bestendiges, herrliches Bekentnis, vnd schönes nützliches Trostbuch (Wittenberg: Zacharias Lehmann, 1596): VD 16: ZV 21039; 2) Vom Ewigen Leben: Aller Freuden und

3 Authors and Tetxts 119 the post-mortem state of the soul that has come down to us as Sterbbüchlein. Two editions of it are still extant, both from Wittenberg; the first from 1573, the second from 1577. The dedication, however, is dated to St. John the Baptist’s Day (24th June) 1568.36 It would be rather unusual for the work to have appeared only five years later in print. Interestingly, Garcaeus’ eighteenth and nineteenth-century biographers do not know of the 1573 edition— whose existence cannot be doubted for we still have it—but mention two other printings instead. Johann Otto Thiess (1783), Christian Gottlieb Jöcher as edited by Johann Christoph Adelung (1787), and Hans Schröder (1854), who list Garcaeus’ works with publication dates, all agree, first, that there was an early Wittenberg edition in 1568 or 1569 and, second, that the Sterbbüchlein was published in Nuremberg in 1581.37 Schröder alone makes it clear that there is a single work behind the two editions, and he alone seems to be aware of the still extant 1577 printing. The existence of a 1568 edition is indeed what we would expect on the basis of the dedication preserved in the extant 1573 printing. It is surprising that pre-twentieth-century biographers know nothing of the latter edition—of which copies still exist in Berlin, Rostock, Wolfenbüttel and the Vatican38—but there is no reason to suppose that the two printings are in fact one. The differences in the title as well as the dedication and the printing dates are very strong arguments against such a hypothesis. Similarly, Schröder’s list of three dates undercuts any suggestion that the 1577 and 1581 editions could be somehow mixed up. Besides, the earlier biographers all agree on the existence of a Nuremberg edition. The most plausible hypothesis is that the Sterbbüchlein was indeed published four different times in less than a decade and a half (Table 3.2). That would make it Garcaeus’ most successful theological work.

Seligkeit, Dann auch Christlichen Pilgramschafft zum rechten gelobten Lande . . . nützliches Trost Buch (Ba[utzen]: Mich[ael] Wobs, 1596): not in VD16; 3) Trostbuch und wahre Glaubens Bekandtnuß Vom Ewigen seligen Leben, und Christlicher Pilgramschafft, zum gelobten Land Canaan (Frankfurt a.M.: Johann Bringer, Peter Maus & Ruprecht Pistorius, 1611): VD17: 23:327783P. It does not facilitate research that no other work seems to have come out of the workshop of the rather elusive printer Michael Wobs, nor is any other evidence available on him. The almost equally mysterious town of ‘Ba_’, as the name appears in modern databases, is, in all probability, Bautzen in Oberlausitz. At any rate, Thiess (1783) and Jöcher/Adelung (1787) (= DBA I/368:368 and 371, respectively) give ‘Budissin’ (i.e. Bautzen) as the work’s printing place. 36 Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) A4r. 37 See ‘Garcaeus, Johann d.J.’ in WBIS; for further details, see Table 3.2. 38 The Rostock copy has failed to found its way into VD16, and only shows up in GVK; nor is the Vatican copy from the BPal noted there.

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Table 3.2 The reconstructed publication history of Garcaeus’ Sterbbüchlein

Title Published Evidence Christlicher Bericht von der Seelen, ihrem Orte, (Wittenberg, 1568 DBA I/368:367, 371 Stande, Thun vnd Wesen, aller Menschen, nach or 1569) and 37539 jhrem Absterben, bis auf dem jüngsten Tag Sterbbüchlein Darin Von den Seelen/ jrem ort/ stande/ thun vnd wesen /aller Menschen/bis an (Wittenberg, 1573) VD 16: G 461 den Jüngsten tag Sterbbüchlein/ Darin Von den Seelen/ jrem ort/ VD 16: ZV 65408 and stande/ thun vnd wesen/aller Menschen/bis an den (Wittenberg, 1577) DBA I/368:37540 Jüngsten tag DBA I/368:367, 371 Sterbebüchlein (Nuremberg, 1581) and 37541

The more than three hundred octavo pages of the Sterbbüchlein are divided into twenty-five unequal chapters. The soul’s definition is followed in chapter 2 by biblical and patristic prooftexts of its immortality. Then come discussions of its origin (chapter 3), created glory (ch. 4) and powers (ch. 5) before an interpretation of death, ultimately as separation of body and soul (chs. 6–7). The next larger unit (chs. 8 to 13) deals with the immediate consequences of that departure. The place of the departed souls is first discussed (ch. 9), which naturally leads to the problem of purgatory (ch. 10). The argument is grounded in Christ’s redemptive work as the sole basis of the soul’s destiny (ch. 11). It is then considered how and when (ch. 12) and by what (ch. 13) the souls reach their destination. Questions concerning the blessed souls’ state, activities and powers are dealt with in the next eight chapters (14–21). The issues raised include the departed souls’ appearance on earth (ch. 14), their sleep and wakefulness (ch. 15), their life in paradise (chs. 16–17), activities in heaven (ch. 18), knowledge (chs. 19–20) and differences in glory (ch. 21). The last four chapters (22–25) deal with similar questions as regards the damned, namely, their suffering and state, their knowledge and differences among them.

39 Thiess (1783): 1569; Jöcher (1787): 1569; Schröder (1854): 1568. Title cited after Jöcher. Thiess differs slightly in spelling. Schröder, who lists all three editions (1568, 1577, 1581) in one entry, has Sterbe-Bühclein for main title. 40 Schröder (1854). 41 Thiess (1783); Jöcher (1787); Schröder (1854).

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3.6 David Chyträus, Sr., De morte et vita æterna (1581–1582)

David Chyträus, Sr. (1530–1600) is doubtless the most significant author discussed in this chapter. As a leading figure of the later Reformation, his influence extended over half of Europe from Scandinavia to the Alps. He is noted as a moderate Gnesio-Lutheran, a co- author of the Formula of Concord, and an educational organiser far beyond his contribution to the establishment of the University of Helmstedt in 1577, but he is equally well-known for his Austrian church ordinances or for his historical work, and both his thought and his impact continue to be studied in modern scholarship.42 He hardly needs a lengthy introduction here, but a brief overview of his life might be permissible. Born as the son of a Swabian pastor, he studied in Tübingen, where he earned a master’s at the age of fourteen. He then moved to Wittenberg in 1544, just in time still to hear Luther lecture. After an exile in Heidelberg (1546) and Tübingen (1547) during the Smalcaldic War, he began to lecture in Wittenberg (1548), but a couple of years later, after a study trip to Switzerland and Italy, he accepted a call to Rostock, where he was to spend the rest of his life. First he was offered a position at the Paedagogium, but in 1553 began to lecture on theology, of which subject he was appointed professor in 1561, upon earning a ThD. Two years later he became the rector of the university, and in 1570 the first councillor of the consistory, after which he continued a life of great professional activity and frequent travels for three more decades until his death in 1600. His published works number in the hundreds, and were reprinted throughout the seventeenth century, and have, in a limited sense, remained in print ever since. His eschatological tract on death and life eternal is like Melanchthon’s immortality chapter in that it was written by the author in Latin and then translated into German by someone else, in this case Mayor Heinrich Rätel of Sagan43 (1529–1594). The parallel in this case does not extend very far, however, for Rätel translated the whole work, not only the immortality chapter; his translation was reprinted, and it was done not altogether without the

42 At least five full books have been published on his work over the last decade and a half; Keller (1994), Stuth & Glaser (2000), Czaika (2002), Benga (2006), Bollbuck (2006); cf. also Kaufmann (1997). 43 Today Żagań in Western Poland, 45 miles east of Cottbus. Not much is known of Rätel’s life except the bare outlines. However, he is noted for his translation of numerous historical and theological works.

3 Authors and Tetxts 122 original author’s knowledge as seems to have been the case with Knaust.44 Interestingly, there is a closer parallel in Chyträus’ case as well, although it is less relevant for my topic. The chapter on heaven and life eternal was translated into German fairly soon (1582) after its first appearance in Latin by the little known Quedlinburg theologian Andreas Perlitius (fl.1582–1602).45 Chyträus’ original Latin tract appeared in two parts first in 1581–1582, followed by a one-volume second edition in the next year.46 In 1590, there were two Latin editions, one in Wittenberg, where the work had been published previously, and one in Rostock. At least the former offers a revised text which underlies Rätel’s translation, whose first part also appeared in the same year. Like the Latin original, then, the German translation was also published in two parts in two subsequent years (1590–1591). Interestingly, however, there is another printing of part 2 from 1592, but it is difficult to determine whether it constitutes an independent edition and, if so, what happened to the first part. It seems more likely that the 1592 copies are just a belated rerun and constitute the tail end of the first edition. In any case, there was a Danish translation in 1591 and a second German edition in 1598, bringing the total number of editions to a minimum of seven (Table 3.3).

Table 3.3 Publication history of Chyträus’ De morte et vita æterna

Title Published Year Edition VD16 (Wittenberg: De morte, et vita æterna Johann Krafft, Sr. 1581 Latin 1:1 C 2652 (Heirs))

44 Rätel’s German translation announces itself as being done at the author’s desire (‘vnd auff desselbten [des Verfassers] . . . begeren mit bestem vleis verdeutscht,’ title of the 1590 [1581] edition). The German edition also includes a Latin dedication by Chyträus himself addressed to the otherwise unknown Pastor Lorenz Wiedemann of Sagan (1590 [1581]:()7r), which further signals connection between author and translator. 45 A dozen or so titles have come down to us under his name, both translations and original works, but essentially no external biographical information is available on him. 46 I have not been able to consult every edition. The reconstruction of the printing history is in large measure based on information in bibliographical databases.

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Title Published Year Edition VD16 Altera pars Libelli Davidis Chytraei De Morte & vita æterna: continens locos DE Animarum Immortalitate et statu (Wittenberg: post corporis mortem. Purgatorio Johann Krafft, Sr. 1582 Latin 1:2 ZV 3328 Animarum Pontificio. Fine Mundi et (Heirs)) Resurrectione corporum. Extremo IVDICIO et Poenis INFERNI aeternis Vom Ewigen Leben vnd Herrligkeit der German Seligen im Himel / Von dem (Wittenberg: trans. of ch. Ehrwirdigen vnd hochgelarten Herrn D. [BPal Johann Krafft, Sr. 1582 3 [i.e. 8] by Dauide Chytraeo in Latein gestellet, F3846]47 (Heirs)) Andreas Nun aber verdeutschet durch Andream Perlitz Perlitivm Quedelburgensem (Wittenberg: De morte, et vita æterna Johann Krafft, Sr. 1583 Latin 2 C 2653 (Heirs)) (Rostock: De morte, et vita æterna 1590 Latin 3 ZV 3345 Stephan Möllemann) (Wittenberg: Libellvs Dauidis Chytraei, De morte, et vita Matthaeus Welack) 1590 Latin 4 C 2654 æterna, Editio postrema

Christlicher/ Tröstlicher vnd in Gottes (Berlin: Johann & Wort gegründetter vnterricht. Vom Tode Friedrich Hartmann 1590 German 1:1 C 2655 vnd Ewigen Leben & Nikolaus Voltz) Christlicher/ Tröstlicher/ vnd in Gottes Wort gegründter vnterricht: I. Von (Frankfurt a.d.O.: Vnsterbligkeit der Seelen . . . II. Von Johann & Friedrich dem Fegefewr. III. Vom Ende der Welt Hartmann & 1591 German 1:2 ZV 3346 . . . IIII. Vom Jüngsten Gericht. V. Nikolaus Voltz) Von der Ewigen Marter vnd Pein der Gottlosen in der Helle Om Døden oc det Evige Liff: En Herlig oc trøstelig Tractat: hvorudi alle Gudfryctige [Royal Mennisker undervises: Om det Evige Danish (Copenhagen) 1591 Danish Liff oc den Evige Fordømmelse: Library] Desligeste om den Himmelske ære oc 48 Glede

47 Not in VD16. 48 Cf. Czaika (2002) 464. I have not found the book in the catalogue of the Skoklosters Bibliotek (which Czaika references), but the online catalogue of the Royal Danish Library has it.

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Title Published Year Edition VD16 Christlicher, Tröstlicher und in Gottes Wort gegründter unterricht. I. Von Unsterbligkeit der Seelen und jhrem (Frankfurt a.d.O.: Zustand nach dem Leibstodt. II. Von Johann & Friedrich dem Fegefewr. III. Vom Ende der Welt Hartmann & 1592 German 1:2? C 2656 und Auferstehung der Todten. IIII. Vom Nikolaus Voltz) Jüngsten Gericht. V. Von der Ewigen Marter und Pein der Gottlosen in der Helle. Christlicher/ Tröstlicher vnd in Gottes (Frankfurt a.d.O.: Wort gegründter vnterricht/ VOm Johann & Friedrich 1598 German 2? ZV 3358 Tode/ vnd Ewigen Leben Hartmann)

There is a further peculiarity of Chyträus’ work. The order of the chapters in the printed text does not correspond to the authorial intention or their logical sequence. A note by the publisher to the reader after the chapter on the last rites in the 1581 first Latin edition explains why that is so. There should now follow the chapters on the state of the soul, on purgatory, on the end of the world, on the resurrection of the dead, on last judgement and on the punishment of the wicked in hell. However, the publisher has failed to secure those sections of the manuscript so he jumps straight to what should come last, the material on heaven. He promises to deliver the rest when he can.49 What is more surprising is that this accidental order is not corrected in later editions, but preserved not only in the Latin reprints but also taken over into Rätel’s German translation, with the slight modification that from chapter ‘8’ on life eternal a smaller portion is separated and turned into an independent chapter in its own right, on heaven (Table 3.4).

Table 3.4 Structure (chapter outline) of Chyträus’ De morte et vita æterna

Actual order Actual order Topic (chapter) Intended order (Latin) (German) Death 1 1:1 1:1 Burial 2 1:2 1:2

49 ‘Ex distributione capitum huius libri initio ab autore proposita, proximeiam sequi locos de statu ANIMARVM post corporis mortem: De purgatorio & redemtione Animarum,& Inuocatione Pontificia, de fine mundi, Resurrectione corporum: Extreme Iudicio & pœnis inferni, apparet. Cum autem partes illas ad manum non habeamus: postremum caput, de vita æterna, statim subiungendum esse duximus. Cætera, vbi acceperimus, sorsim fortassè excusa, cum pio & candido lectore communicabimus’ (1581:127v).

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Actual order Actual order Topic (chapter) Intended order (Latin) (German) Immortality of the soul 3 2:1 2:1 Purgatory 4 2:2 2:2 End of the world and resurrection of the dead 5 2:3 2:3 Last judgement 6 2:4 2:4 Hell 7 2:5 2:5 Life eternal 8 1:3 1:3 Heaven [8] [1:3] 1:4

The immortality chapter has no subdivisions, but its structure is nonetheless transparent. It begins with a definition of the soul, followed by a discussion of its immortality. First come the biblical prooftexts, then a list of philosophical arguments. In addition to pro-immortality views, ‘middle positions’ like that of the Stoics are also considered, but contrary opinions are disregarded. The second half of the chapter turns to the souls’ post-mortem existence. Their place and the time of their arrival are first considered, then their activity, knowledge and possible appearance on earth are discussed: a list of topics that begins to look familiar by now.

3.7 Martin Mirus, Sieben Christliche Predigten (1590)

Martin Mirus (1532–1593) belongs with the better known authors discussed in this chapter. He studied in Jena, where he was the first to earn a master’s degree after the imperial recognition of the new university in 1558.50 After some lesser positions, he was invited, upon the expulsion of the Crypto-Calvinists by Elector August of Saxony (1526–1586, elector after 1553),51 to become a superintendent in Weimar in 1573, but popular resistance caused him to resign immediately. He was then offered the superintendency in nearby Jena, together with a

50 The roots of the university reach back a decade earlier to the Collegium Jenense, established in the aftermath of the Smalcaldic War, when Elector John Frederick I of Saxony (1503–1554, elector 1532–1547) had lost his title and the better half of his lands, including Wittenberg with its university. 51 He was the younger brother and long-time supporter then successor of Elector Maurice (1521–1553, elector after 1547), who had ousted John Frederick I. August nonetheless sought reconciliation, or at least appeasement, with the Ernestine relative. — It is a sadly revealing detail of August’s life that of his fifteen children eight died in infancy, without reaching two years of age, another three in childhood, before turning eleven, and the average life expectancy of those four that reached adulthood and survived him still fell short of thirty-five years. Only one of them lived to celebrate her fortieth, and none their fiftieth, birthday—and that in a ducal family where medical knowledge and services that money could buy cannot have been in short supply.

3 Authors and Tetxts 126 chair of theology at the university there. He earned a doctorate and became the first court preacher to the elector in Dresden the following year, in which capacity he accompanied his lord to the Diet of Regensburg in 1575 for the election of Rudolf II (1552–1612),52 where he delivered a series of seven antic-Catholic sermons. In the years that followed, he also took part in the preparation of the Formula of Concord, and functioned as pastor and counsellor to the ducal family. After the succession of Elector August by his son Christian I (1560–1591, elector after 1586), who was more inclined towards the Philippists, 1588 brought Mirus loss of job, imprisonment and exile. He settled in Jena, and it was from here that he had his Sieben Christliche Predigten Auff dem Reichstage zu Regenspurg gethan published in 1590. His efforts were not in vain. He first got a position as cathedral preacher in Halberstadt in 1591, then later that year, after Christian’s death, he was reinstated by the elector’s staunchly Lutheran widow Sophie (1568–1622). Mirus died two years later, after falling ill on a visitation, which commission he had received to root out Crypto-Calvinism. His published works consist of more than thirty titles, almost exclusively sermons, including numerous funeral sermons. Over a quarter of his works appeared posthumously for the first time; the rest came out in the last decade of his life.53 Taken together, they went through more than sixty editions with some eighty printings; his works were still republished as late the early eighteenth century.54 Some collective volumes make it difficult to analyse his publication data without a careful look at each individual book, but it seems that about a dozen and a half of his works went through only one printing, and over forty per cent of them came out in several, a few in as many as five or ten, editions.55 Considered in that context, the Regensburg Sermons, while not his greatest success, definitely belonged to the more influential half of his works. They came out in apparently three different printings in 1590 by

52 Rudolf was elected King of the Romans at the Diet, during the lifetime of his father, Maximilian II (1527– 1576, emperor after 1564), and then succeeded him as emperor when the latter died a year later. 53 The bibliographical catalogues include one edition of his Sermon on the Person of Christ (VD16: ZV 23532) from 1576, but that is obviously a misprint for 1586, for the homily, as witnessed by its own title and numerous other editions, was preached on St. Martin’s Day in 1585 (Eine Predigt von der Person CHRISTI/ in der Schloßkirchen zu Torgaw gethan / den 10. Nouembris. ANNO M.D.LXXXV). 54 The work that circulated in at least four different editions in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries (Des Hocherleuchteten Theologi, Herrn D. Martini Miri, weiland Chur-Fürstl. Sächs. Oberhof-Predigers Geist- und Schrifftreiches Bedencken/ Wie/ und woraus ein Mensch/ zu aller Zeit und in allen Sachen Den Willen Gottes erkennen soll, 1691) was apparently a newly discovered and theretofore unpublished manuscript, and constitutes a self- contained chapter of his reception history, but Mirus remained genuinely in print until the 1610s. 55 E.g., his Sermon on the Eucharist was printed in half a dozen or so towns in 1588 alone.

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Esaias Mechler in Erfurt,56 and were reissued posthumously fifteen years later in 1605. It is all but certain that no earlier edition of the work has ever existed. All external biographical and bibliographical information on Mirus seems to rest ultimately on Johann Andreas Gleich’s Annales ecclesiastici (1730),57 an incredibly thorough early historical account of the Reformation in Saxony. That source only knows of the 1590 and 1605 versions of the Regensburg Sermons. Surely, there is a gap of more than a century and a half between the original delivery of the homilies and the Annales which might account, even without the ravages of the Thirty Years’ War, for the loss of all copies from a possible early publication, yet it is somewhat conspicuous that such a hypothetical first edition should have utterly disappeared without a trace. Internal evidence points in the same direction.58 The dedication of the 1590 work is dated to New Year’s Day of that year, and biographical allusions in the text make it irrational to doubt its authenticity. Mirus speaks of being unemployed for the second year,59 and we know that he had lost his job, due to the Lutheran–Crypto-Calvinist disputes, in 1588. He writes in the same preface that ‘I have been admonished by several kind-hearted people to publish, for the glory of God and the benefit of the church, some of my sermons, and I have now begun with those I preached at the Diet in Regensburg.’60 In other words, Mirus himself knows nothing of an earlier edition, and suggests fairly unambiguously in 1590 that he is now publishing his sermons for the first time. Mirus’ piece consists of seven sermons, the first three of which discuss justification, the church, and faith, respectively, and were probably delivered as regular Sunday homilies on the given day’s gospel from the nineteenth to the twenty-first Sundays after Trinity (that

56 By the criteria used in VD16, they count as three different editions and have received, accordingly, three different numbers (M 5469–71). Their physical properties clearly distinguish them, but they are typographically equally clearly related. M 5471 consists of 83 leaves; M 5469 and 5470 of 94 leaves each. The typesetting of the prefatory material is different in the latter two texts, but their actual sermon texts are identical also in typesetting. 57 See account of Mirus’ life starting on p. 305 of pt. 1, and his list of works starting on p. 341. 58 I have argued above for a no longer extant editio princeps of Garcaeus’ Sterbbüchlein, but precisely because it did leave some, both external and internal, traces behind. 59 Mirus (1590 [°1575]) A4r. 60 ‘..ich auch von vielen guthertzigen Leuten ermanet werde/das ich Gott zu Ehren/vnd der Kirchen zu nutze etliche meine Predigten in druck geben sol/vnd ich jtzt den Anfang gemacht von diesen so ich zu Regenspurg auff dem Reichstag gethan/’ (1590 [°1575]:A4r).

3 Authors and Tetxts 128 is, mid-October 1575). Sermon 461 was originally part of another sequence on 1 Corinthians 15, probably preached in the summer. From the introduction, the existence of a four-part exegesis of the chapter appears likely, of which the present homily constitutes the last instalment.62 Unfortunately, the rest of the series cannot be reconstructed. At any rate, the current exposition is highly thematic and has little to do with the Pauline text. For my topic, sermon 4 and part of sermon 5 contain the relevant sections. Sermons 4 to 7, the first two being shorter than average, are somewhat peculiar as regards their structure. They make up one long homily. At the beginning of sermon 4, Mirus proposes two points which he cannot finish before reaching the end of his last homily. Sermon 7, a relatively independent unit on the post-resurrection blessedness of the saints and suffering of the damned, deals in fact with the second point proposed for sermon 4. The other three (4 to 6) are the extensions of the original first point (on the soul’s fate after the body’s death), in which the last section is repeatedly drawn out and subdivided. Disregarding the second topic (ultimately, the subject matter of sermon 7) and focusing on the three points which sermon 4 set for itself within the first proposed topic, we find that the third is only reached in sermon 5, and its own third (sub)point (how to honour dead saints and whether they are to be invoked, after the problems of the appearance of ghosts and purgatory) is, again, postponed until sermon 6 (Table 3.5).

Table 3.5 Structure of Mirus’ Regensburg Sermons, Nrs. 4–7

Topic proposed in Sermon 4 (1590 [°1575]):N1r/v) Structural unit Actual sermon (part) State of dead until last day 1 #4 Immortality of soul 1.1 #4.1 Place and state of souls after death 1.2 #4.2

61 Possibly in a broad sense, including 5 to 7 as well; see next paragraph. 62 ‘Beloved in Christ, this summer we have treated the comforting article of the resurrection of the dead from the fifteenth chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians which has just been recited, in the course of which we have heard the following. First, what this teaching of the gladsome resurrection is founded on and how Paul defends the same with strong arguments. Second, how it will happen and what kind of bodies we shall have. Third, what will come to pass unto those that are still found alive on the last day. Now follows the fourth piece, what will happen in life eternal.’ In the original: ‘GEliebten in Christo / Wir haben diesen Sommer vber aus dem jtzt vorlesenen 15. Capitel 1. Corin. den trostreichen Artickel von Aufferstehung der Todten gehandelt/ vnd dorinnen ordentlich gehöret. Erstlich / worauff diese Lehre von vnser frölichen Aufferstehung gegründet / vnd wie Paulus dieselbe mit starcken Argumenten bewehret. Zum andern/Wie es damit werde zugehen/ vnd was fur Leibe wir werden haben. Zum dritten / Wie es mit denen ein gelegenheit werde haben / so am Jüngsten Tage noch lebendig erfunden. Nun folget das vierde stück/ Wie es im ewigen Leben werden zugehen’ (1590 [°1575]:M4v).

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Topic proposed in Sermon 4 (1590 [°1575]):N1r/v) Structural unit Actual sermon (part) Against papist teachings 1.3 #5 [= 4.3] Appearance of departed souls 1.3.1 #5.1 Purgatory 1.3.2 #5.2 Invocation of saints 1.3.3 #6 [= 5.3] Life eternal after resurrection in heaven and hell 2 #7

It is worth noting that discussion of the souls’ place and state includes several topics that are familiar by now. Not only does a list of biblical names of their abode appear here, but the circumstances of their arrival are also considered as well as the souls’ knowledge and activities reflected upon.

3.8 Moses Pflacher, Die gantze Lehr Vom Tod vnd Absterben des Menschen (1582)

Only the general outlines are known of Moses Pflacher’s life (c.1549–1589), and much remains uncertain. He was born in Swabia (neither the exact date nor the exact place of his birth can be determined with confidence) and studied at Tübingen University, where he also returned at virtually every major turn in his life. He earned a master’s in 1569, after which he probably went to Austria and became school master in Krems—some forty miles west of Vienna—and is supposed to have been visited in that capacity by David Chyträus. He was ordained, together with Polycarp Leyser (1552–1610) and others, by Jakob Andreae (1528– 1590) in Tübingen in 1573. His biographies all agree that upon ordination he returned to Austria as a preacher, although his post is unknown, and that he became court preacher to the Counts of Ortenburg in 1582, where he remained until following a call to the imperial city of Kempten at the foothills of the Alps in 1585, in which year he also earned a theological doctorate in Tübingen. He died in Kempten in 1589. An analysis of Pflacher’s works, however, suggests that the return to Austria is a myth. Rather, Pflacher likely took up the Ortenburg position immediately after ordination and then moved to Augsburg before going to Kempten (Table 3.6).

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Table 3.6 Titles of selected works by Pflacher (with biographical information)

Title Publisher Year VD16 Leichpredig: Vber dem tödtlichen abgang/ des Hoch vnd Wolgebornen Herrn . . . Anthonij/ der Eltern Grauen/ Graue (Nuremberg: zu Ortenburg/ [et]c. Röm. Kay: May: gewesten Reichs Hofrathe. 1573 P 2392 Hans Koler) Gethan Durch M: Mosen Pflacher/ Oberpredigern der Graueschafft Ortenburg/ den letzten May/ Anno, 1573. Die gantze Lehr Vom Tod vnd Absterben deß Menschen/ in ein (Frankfurt a.M.: richtige Ordnung kurtz verfasset/ vnd geprediget Durch M.Mosen 1582 P 2387 Christoph Rab) Pflacher/ Pfarrherrn zu Ortenburg in der Reichsgraffschafft. Christliche Predig Von dem vnkraut des Zwinglischen vnd Caluinischen Jrrthumbs/ Was es auff dem Acker des Herren für schaden thu/ vnnd wie weit es sich außbreyte. Gehalten zu (Regensburg: 1584 P 2383 Ortenburg auff den fünfften Sontag nach Epiphaniae . . . Durch Johann Burger) M.Mosen Pflacher/ gewesten Predigern daselbst/ Nun aber angehenden Dienern der Euangelischen Kirchen in Augspurg. Christliche Predigt/ Von brüderlicher Versönung/ auff den 6. (Tübingen: Sontag Trinitatis/ dises 88. Jars/ auß dem gewohnlichen Georg 1588 P 2381 Euangelio Matth am 5. Capitel Gethon Durch Mosen Pflacher/ Gruppenbach) der H. Schrifft Doctorn/ vnd Pfarrern in der Reichsstatt Kempten. Weinthewre. Oder Bericht auß Gottes Wort/ woher vnd auß was (Tübingen: Vrsachen/ dise jetzige Weinthewrung entstanden/ auch wie Georg 1589 P 2393 dieselbige abzustellen/ [et]c. geprediget Durch Mosen Pflachern/ Gruppenbach) der H.Schrifft Doctorn vnd Pfarrern in der Reichsstatt Kempten.

Pflacher delivered a funeral sermon over a Count of Ortenburg in May 1573, and the title describes him as ‘senior preacher’ (Oberprediger) in that county.63 In 1582, he is still pastor there,64 but two years later, when his anti-Zwinglian sermon is published, he is identified as former preacher in Ortenburg but currently servant of the evangelical churches in Augsburg.65 Finally, works from the last two years of his life not only announce his doctorate but also speak of him as pastor in Kempten.66 That he must have been in Ortenburg before 1582 is also borne out by the first edition of the work on which I will focus, Die gantze Lehr Vom Tod vnd Absterben des Menschen. It is a sequence of twelve sermons he preached in 1580–1581. When he published them the

63 VD16: P 2392 in Table 3.6, above. 64 VD16: P 2387. 65 VD16: P 2383. 66 VD16: P 2381, 2393.

3 Authors and Tetxts 131 following year, he augmented the work with four funeral sermons, originally delivered in the same period. Three of them had been preached in Ortenburg, and two of them—including Nr. 4, which had been given in Neuburg am Inn—identify Pflacher as preacher in Ortenburg (Table 3.7).

Table 3.7 Titles of funeral sermons appended to Pflacher’s Die gantze Lehr

Nr. Title P.67 1 Leichpredigt Vber den tödtlichen abgang des Wolgebornen Herrn/Herrn Gotfriden/ Herren zu 331 Limpurg / des Heiligen Römischen Reichs Erbschencken vnnd Semperfreyen/[et]c. Gethan zu Ortenburg den 16. Julij/Anno 1581. durch H. Mosen Pflacher/ Pfarrherrn daselbst. 2 Die ander Leichpredigt/ Bey der Begräbnus des Wolgebornen jungē Herrens/ Herrn Joachims/ 361 Herrn zu Limpurg/[et]c.Geschehen zu Ortenburg den 7. Octob. 1580. 3 Der dritte Leichpredigt. Vber den Tödtlichen abgang der Wolgebornen Frawen / Frawen 389 Adelheit/ geborne Wildt vnd Rheingräuin / [et]c. Gethan zu Ortenburg/ den 19. Octob. Anno 1580. 4 Die vierdte Leichpredigt/ Bey der Begräbnis des Wolgebornen jungen Grauen vnd Herrn Julij/ 422 des hoch vnd wolgebornen Grauen vnd Herren/ Herrn Julij/ Grauen zu Salm vnd Newburg am Jhn/Röm. Key. Mt. Reichshofrahts vielgeliebten Sohns: Gethan auff den Sontag Quasimodo, dieses 81. jars / in der Schlosskirchen zu Neuburg am Jhn/ durch H. Mosen Pflacher/Pfarrherrn zu Ortenburg.

Pflacher must, then, have been in Ortenburg for about a decade after 1573 and moved, probably briefly, to Augsburg by 1584, before finally settling in Kempten. Though somewhat smaller than that of his older contemporary, Pflacher’s literary output exhibits several similarities to Mirus’. It also consists chiefly of sermons; a considerable proportion was published posthumously; and his works remained in print until the third decade of the seventeenth century. What is quite remarkable on Pflacher’s work is the very high proportion of reprints. It is more the rule than the exception that his works went through more than one edition each, and three of his dozen or so titles were printed six or more times each. Die gantze Lehr belongs with these success stories; it came out in six editions in thirty years (Table 3.8).

67 In the 1589 edition.

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Table 3.8 Printing history of Pflacher’s Die gantze Lehr

ID Publisher Year VD16: P 2387 (Frankfurt a.M.: Christoph Rab) 1582 VD16: P 2388 (Herborn: Christoph Rab) 1589 VD16: P 2389 (Herborn: Christoph Rab) 1594 [not in database]68 (Zerbst: Bonauentur Schmidt) 1597 VD17: 23:282339A (Leipzig: Jakob Apel & Johann Beyer (Heirs)) 1603 VD17: 23:327300S69 (Frankfurt a.M.: Johann Berner & Erasmus Kempfer) 1612

Death is the central topic of Pflacher’s sermon sequence, and we only come to the post-mortem state and the resurrection in the final homilies. He begins with death to which all humans are subject, followed by the kinds of death reported in the Bible. Then comes a description of death on the basis of Philippians 1:22–24, and the origin of death in the fourth sermon. Fifthly, the natural effects of death; then its beneficial nature for Christians. The seventh homily is on the circumstances of death; the eighth, on Christian preparation for it. Pflacher then instructs his audience how to die well before he turns, first, to the soul’s and, second, to the body’s state after death, drawing on Wisdom 3:1–4 and 1 Corinthians 15:42–44, respectively. The twelfth and last sermon, taking its clue from Job 19:25–27, discusses the resurrection. Pflacher makes four points in sermon ten. First he seeks to establish the immortality of the soul, then he discusses its abode after the body’s death. Third, he raises the questions of when and how souls come to their place and, finally, of what they do until the last day.

3.9 Gregor Weiser, Christlicher Bericht (1583)

Gregor Weiser, a little-known pastor of Peritz, a village 18 miles north of Meißen, Saxony, issued his Christlicher Bericht/ Von Vnsterbligkeit und Zustand der Seelen nach jhrem Abschied/ Vnd

68 The 1597 edition seems to have escaped the attention of the editors of VD16. The apparently only still extant copy from this printing can be found in the Johannes a Lasco Library, Emden (cf. GVK). 69 Edited by Georg Anwander and printed together with sermons on Joel, Jonah and the Passion as Christliche/ und in Gottes Wort wol gegründte/ Auch mit einem schönen Methodo gezierte Predigten/ in den Propheten Joel/ Jonam/ und allerheiligsten Passion Jesu Christi/ nach den vier Evangelisten: Item/ zwölff außerlesene Predigten/ darinnen die gantze Lehr vom Tod und Christlichen Absterben deß Menschen/ in richtige Ordnung kurtz verfast und zusammen getragen/ Durch . . . Herrn Mosen Pflachern/ . . . An jetzo aber in Truck gegeben/ und mit kurtzen Tabulis verfertiget/ durch Georgium Anwander.

3 Authors and Tetxts 133 letzten Hendeln der Welt in 1583. This work saved Weiser’s name from total oblivion.70 It is in fact a revised edition of his 1577 Christliche Schöne vnd Auserlesene Vermanungen, which it now contains, in a new arrangement, as part two. The earlier work included the translation of a small collection of sermons, mostly on the last things, by Bernard of Clairvaux and Augustine of Hippo, augmented with an eschatological tract by the Croatian humanist Marcus Marulus Spalatensis (1450–1524). Its publication, beyond the urging of pious and God-fearing people, is justified with the wickedness of the times when such works are highly needed.71 That the author rightly judged the market, is borne out by the subsequent demand for republication. Weiser explains the book’s prehistory in the new preface he wrote for the revised edition.72 After the earlier version had scored a success with thousands of copies sold, the bookseller approached the author at the 1582 Easter Fair in Leipzig with the idea of republication. Weiser, unhappy with the previous version, decided to rework the book, which meant not only a rearrangement of the original parts but also extending his readings to contemporary authors. As a result, he produced a completely new first half, itself over twice as long as the entire 1577 volume. Taking a methodological hint from Jakob Heerbrand’s (1521–1600) Compendium theologiae (1571),73 Weiser chose the catechetical form to organise the new material he derived from Luther, Johannes Matthesius (1504–1565), Johannes Gigas (1515–1581), and, first and foremost, Martin Mirus. As a rule, each question receives a relatively short answer, followed by a list of scriptural prooftexts which may or may not be supported by lengthier excerpts from those Lutheran authorities. It is in these sections that

70 He did not earn an entry in WBIS, and I have not been able to find any external information on him. He was surely active between 1577–1582. 71 That is the central topic of the dedication, which includes lists of signs that make one doubt if the world can sink any lower (1577:A3r–B1v). For encouragement by others, see p. B3v. 72 Weiser (1583a) A16r–7v. In addition to the dedication (new from 1577 and dated to 1st October 1583 on 1583a:B12v), there is also an address to the reader (1583a:B13r–5v) in which much of the same ground is traversed once more. — The letters A to C are used in signature numbering twice. I distinguish the two sets with a raised index. 73 ‘And because . . . the venerable and erudite Mr. Jacob Heerbrand ThD etc. of Tübingen [treated] in his Compendium Theologiæ of the foremost pieces of this business in question and answer form, according to the usual manner of method, and this material is, as far as I know, nowhere else available in question format, I have brought it with all diligence . . . into our common language.’ In the original: ‘Vnd weil . . . der Ehrwirdige vnd hochgelehrte Herr Iacobus Heerbrandus der heiligen Schrifft Doctor/ etc. zu Tübingen / in seinem Compendio Theologico von diesem handel die fürnembste stück in Frag vnd Antwort Iuxta vsitatam Methodi rationem /vñ diese Materia an keinem ort sonst in Fragstück/so viel mir bewust verhanden/ habe ich dieselbe mit allem fleis/ . . . in vnsere gewonliche sprach gebracht’ (1583a:B14v–5r).

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Mirus’ homilies are copied into the Christlicher Bericht in several larger blocks. Weiser’s efforts bore fruits; his book must have found favour with the readers, for it came out two more times, in 1588 and 1590. The first half of Weiser’s treatise deals with doctrinal matters; the second, as explained in the overview of its development above, offers a collection of citations from theologians reflecting on the last things. Part one includes six loci de novissimis. It begins after death, with the soul’s post-mortem state, followed by an extended rejection of purgatory. The second unit is on the end of the world; the third, on the resurrection. Then come the last judgement, hell, and finally life eternal in heaven, each unit comprising roughly forty octavo pages except the last and the excursion on purgatory, which are twice as long. Add to that the shorter second part and the prefatory material, and the total comes to over 550 pages. The opening chapter Weiser begins, somewhat repetitively, by establishing the soul’s immortality, after which he turns to the place and then the occupation of blessed souls, followed by a clarification of the place and state of damned souls. The sleep and rest of the dead is discussed next, after which the problem of purgatory is raised briefly, only to be interrupted by reflections on prayer for the dead. The question partly rounds off the book’s first major unit, partly leads back, quite naturally, to a more detailed excursus on the arguments for and against purgatory, including the ostensible appearance of ghosts.

3.10 Bartholomaeus Frölich, Seelen Trost (1590)

Bartholomaeus Frölich’s (fl.1587–1590) Seelen Trost came out in 1590, the year that marked the peak of immortality texts. Virtually nothing is known of the author from external sources except that he served as a pastor in Perleberg, a small town in the north-western corner of present-day Brandenburg, and that he wrote some hymns of which ‘Ein Würmlein bin ich arm und klein,’ though no longer sung by the church today, is his greatest claim to fame. Three of his songs appeared a few years earlier in a collection by Nikolaus Selneccer (1520– 1592),74 but a larger group of twenty-two hymns were published at the end of Seelen Trost.75

74 Bautz (1990). 75 Frölich (1590) 90r–112r.

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His lyrics once enjoyed considerable circulation as part of various hymnals, and found their way into oratorios,76 but otherwise his oeuvre is modest. Seelen Trost is the only title by him in VD16, but there is also a funeral sermon77 which was published by the same printer (Johann Beyer of Leipzig) in the same year as his main work.78 Both works were only published once. An autobiographical passage at the end of the dedication of the Seelen Trost allows us to flesh out somewhat Frölich’s very sketchy vita. He was born and brought up in Strehlen, Silesia,79 to whose mayor and councillors the tract is dedicated. He moved to Breslau in his youth, served perhaps as instructor at St. Elizabeth’s then as assistant preacher at St. Jerome’s Church. Frölich studied in Wittenberg before he accepted a call to Perleberg.80 The dedication sounds a rather dire note, arguing—with the help of plentiful biblical and patristic support—for the reality of hell and eternal damnation against Epicurean opinions. The treatise itself is, by comparison, rather mild and benign, not so much trying to frighten the reader as to comfort and encourage her. Far more is said of the blessed state than of the damned, and references to infernal punishment are really quite sporadic and often only appear in supporting quotations. The Seelen Trost is divided into five points of teaching, neatly enumerated in the title.81

76 Scheitler (2005) 112n. 77 Des Ertzvaters Jacobs Begengnus und Sterbefart, on Joachim Rhores (d. 12 Oct 1589). 78 Cf. GVK. 79 Today Strzelin, Poland, some twenty-five miles south of Breslau/Wroclaw. Frölich spells it ‘Strälen,’ but it is not to be confused with Straelen, a small town of comparable size on the Dutch border in the far west of Germany, seven miles north-east of Venlo, Netherlands. 80 ‘Denn ob wol die löbliche Stadt Breßlaw / mir in vielen guts bewiesen/ nicht allein in meiner Jugend / vnd nachmals / da ich zu S. Elisabeth der lieben Jugend / nach meiner Wenigkeit gedienet / Vnd da ich zu S. Hieronymus mich in Predigten fast zwey Jahr übete / Sondern in dem auch ein hochweiser Rath/in dieser löblichen Stadt / mir mildiglichen zu Wittenberg die Hand gereicht / Auch sonsten durch den Ehrwirdigen vnd Wolgelahrten Herrn Dauid Reinischen mehr Förderung mir zu beweisen anmelden lassen. Welches auch alles ungezweifelt erfolget were / wenn ich nicht durch Gottes[ ]Schickunge mich allhier in die Marck Brandenburg begeben hette. Für welche Wolthaten ich nu meinem Gott / vnd[ ]dem hochweisen Rath daselbst Lob vnd Danck sage. Wie ich denn dieser Wolthat nu vnd in Ewigkeit nicht vergessen kan. Aber jedoch kan ich auch meines lieben Vaterlandes nicht vergessen / nicht alleine darumb / das mich daselbst meine liebe Eltern aus einem Christlichen Ehebette gezeuget/vnd aufferzogen/ sondern auch darumb/ das ich daselbst meine Initia literarum & pietatis gefasset / vnd nachmals/ wenn ich mein Vaterland besucht / mir Ehr vnd viel guts von E. E. W. vnd G. ist erzeiget worden’ (1590::(2v–:(3v). (I have not been able to further identify David Reinisch.) 81 Seelen Trost/ Das ist/ [C]hristlicher bericht vom Zustande vnd Glück der lieben Seelen/ in jener Welt/ biß an den jüngsten Tag. 2. Vnd das gleubige Christen keine Vrsach haben / sich für dem Tode oder Sterben zu fürchten. 3. Auch wie die Seelen seliglich abscheiden/ vnd der Mensch in seinem Todskampff wider alle Anfechtun bestehen kan. 4. Jtem/ Was der Mensch für Gedancken in seiner letzten Hinfarth haben / vnd wie er sich verhalten sol. 5. Schließlichen/Ob wir einander auch in jener Welt kennen vnd ansprechen werden. Sampt sehr schönen Gebetlein/ aus Göttlicher Schrifft Reimweise gestellet/in Sterbens vnd andern

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The various parts of the treatise are of unequal length. The first three comprise of roughly twenty-five octavo leaves each, while the last two are considerably shorter. The additional material brings the whole book to over 250 pages. Thematically, the book is intended chiefly to prepare Christians for a good death. The three central sections are framed by a chapter on the Zwischenzustand and one on whether we will recognise and talk to each other in the next life. Chapter two elaborates on five reasons why the pious should not fear death. The arguments prominently include the expected resurrection of the body. The third teaching offers a thematically organised collection of Bible passages against Anfechtungen, peppered with commentaries mostly by contemporary authors, chief among them Luther. The short fourth chapter gives instruction on how to behave in the last hour. After the fifth point, the book is concluded with a collection of deathbed prayers, several explicitly designed to be sung to well-known tunes. In the first unit, Frölich seeks to establish the soul’s immortality against a review of false opinions. The church’s pure teaching is demonstrated from scripture, church fathers and contemporary theologians—but not from philosophers. The chapter is rounded off with a solid refutation of the doctrine of purgatory and a brief affirmation of heavenly joy. Issues like the souls’ sleep and activity, the name of their abode, the how and when of their arrival there or the epistemology of the hereafter surface in passing, partly in this chapter and partly in later parts of the discussion.

3.11 Friedrich Roth, Fünff trösliche vnd nützliche Predigten (1591)

The chronologically last relevant text that my searches have turned up is a sermon, the first of Fünff trösliche vnd nützliche Predigten by Arnstadt Superintendent Friedrich Roth (c.1548– 1598), who is better known from his works than from external biographical data. WBIS has only one short entry on him from Jöcher (1750–1751), in which the biographical information amounts to three and a half lines.82 Again, however, an analysis of his published works allows us to enhance our knowledge of his curriculum vitae as well (Table 3.9). He was probably

Nöthen zu beten gantz tröstlich. 82 Cf. DBA I/1058:265.

3 Authors and Tetxts 137 born in 1548, perhaps in Eisleben83 (the town where Luther was born and died). He is first mentioned as archdeacon at St. Andrew’s Church in Eisleben on the title page of a funeral sermon he delivered at the end of 1577 and had printed the following year.84 He had been probably active there for a while by then since he had contributed to a couple of Latin volumes in the preceding years, beginning in 1575.85 His position at St. Andrew’s is steadily attested until 1586, but in 1587 he was appointed pastor at St. Peter and Paul’s, where he remained until 1589, when he was called to Arnstadt to serve as superintendent in the County of Schwarzburg. He probably transferred to his new post in the summer, for on 11th August he was already preaching in Arnstadt.86 His superintendency remains attested for the rest of his life. Jöcher dates his death to 1598.

Table 3.9 Friedrich Roth’s published works by year and VD16 numbers

Year VD16 1575 C 4936 1576 E 1787 1578 R 3223 1581 R 3219 1584 ZV 13375 1585 R 3224, ZV 13373–74 1586 R 3228 1587 R 3211, R 3214, R 3221 1588 R 3206 1589 R 3207, R 3209 1590 R 3205, R 3210, R 3215–16, R 3230, R 3232–33, ZV 13372, ZV 13376 1591 R 3218, R 3226, R 3231, W 3808 1592 ZV 13377, ZV 21845, ZV 25299 1593 R 3213

83 WBIS has no corresponding data, but GVK lists him as such. 84 Eine Knrtze Leichpredigt/ vber etliche wort des vierden Capitels im Buch der Weisheit/ bey der . . . Begrebnis/ des . . . Jungfrewleins/ Magdalenen/ Des . . . Herrn Magistri Johann Wittichs/ Medici/ Tochter. Geschehen auff dem Gottesacker zu Eisleben/ den 20. tag Decembris/ Anno Domini 1577. Durch M. Friederich Rothen/ Archidiacon zu S. Andreas (Halle: Urban Gaubisch, 1578) – VD16: R 3223. 85 Balthasar Beckmann et al., Consolationes Piae Et Ervditae, Scriptae Ad M.Conradvm Portam, Lvgentem Obitvm Carissimae Coniugis suae Vrsvlae Coniugis suae Vrsvlae, natae in inclyta gente Polonica (Eisleben: Urban Gaubisch, 1575) – VD16: C 4936. Incidentally, David Chyträus is also among the volume’s contributors. 86 Cf. VD 16: ZV 25300 (1594). The first edition of this sermon, annual commemoration of the city fire of 1581, came out before year’s end in 1589, but bore no specific date. The date seems nonetheless reliable for the commemorative sermon was delivered around St. Lawrence’s Day in later years as well (ZV 16317, 21846, 25299). We have further dated sermons from the autumn of 1589 (R3205, R 3215). Earlier that year Roth was still active in the County of Mansfeld (R 3216, R 3232).

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Year VD16 1594 R 3225, ZV 19600, ZV 21846, ZV 25300 1595 R 3212, R 3217, R 3220, R 3234, ZV 16317 1596 R 3227 1598 R 3208 1599 ZV 13378 1599 R 3222

Roth’s literary output, amounting to some forty titles, was not insignificant. German sermons and sermon series constitute its bulk, like Mirus’ and Pflacher’s, but his work, unlike theirs, was neither much republished nor remained in print long after the author’s death. The fast approaching new century does not seem to have cared much for his oeuvre; none of it was reissued in the 1600s. Only six of his works, practically all sermon series, went through two editions each, and none appeared more than twice in print. As Table 3.9 shows, the intensity of his output was rather uneven. After a few odd early texts, there is a steady stream with at least one title a year from 1584 on (except in 1597). There is nonetheless a great upsurge after his move to Arnstadt. 1590 alone brought nine new titles—a peak no other year could match. His vigour gradually weaned off, although there was another, more feeble, height in the middle of the decade. That Roth’s life was not altogether free from great personal setbacks is revealed by a closer look at his Sechs Christliche . . . Predigten (1591), and it might also explain the unmistakeable break in his career shortly after the energetic start in Arnstadt. The sermons included in the volume were all preached in the winter of 1590–1591, a year and a half after his arrival in the County of Schwarzburg. Only three of them are by Roth himself; the latter half of the collection includes sermons by his vicar Laurentius Drabitius (fl.1580–1597)87 on three of Roth’s children who died of the plague within five weeks of each other.88 The double blow of the first two deaths is lamented both in the dedication and in the epicedia on Johann Georg. Drabitius dedicates his funeral oration, the second of his (that is, the fifth of the six) sermons, to the mother, Mrs. Roth and the siblings Anna, Benjamin, J. Christina, Friedrich Jr., Andreas, Ernest and Barbara Margaret. The tragic episode, surely typical of

87 Drabitius himself is essentially unknown from external data; he barely shows up in WBIS. 88 Sophia (d. 28 Dec 1590, buried the next day), Johann Georg (d. 3 Jan 1591, buried the next day), Friedrich Jr. (buried 3 Feb 1591).

3 Authors and Tetxts 139 countless others in the age, does not fail to move even after four hundred years, especially when one pieces together the continuation of the story that Friedrich Jr., presumably the eldest son, was also to die a month later. It is against this background that Roth’s funeral sermon on Johann Foster, which I will consider in detail, must be appreciated. It also belongs to that most intensely active period of Roth’s life, beset with personal tragedy. The homily on Foster is not dated, but it appeared at the head of a collection of five funeral sermons of which the other four are dateable to the spring of 1591.89 Since the sermons appear in chronological order, it seems likely that the first was delivered in March or early April, that is, in the period shortly after the Sechs Christliche . . . Predigten. The collection was reissued in 1592, which is not only a sign that it belongs to Roth’s more successful works but also an indication of the flourishing interest in the topic towards the end of the sixteenth century. The shape of a funeral sermon collection is surely determined by a number of factors among which thematic coherence is probably not even the most important—let alone decisive—one, yet the Fünff trösliche vnd nützliche Predigten does exhibit a thought-through structure in that the whole sequence is framed by a homily on the Zwischenzustand, and another on the heavenly mansions and the way to eternal life. The three in the middle all fall in the category of death preparation. It is thus vaguely reminiscent of Frölich’s arrangement except that the concluding part focuses on another aspect of life eternal. Speaking on Wisdom 3:1–5 in the first sermon, Roth has limited interest in the questions that we have repeatedly seen surface in comparable discussions. At various points in his oration, he does raise issues like the biblical names of the soul’s post-mortem resting place, purgatory, or the appearance of ghosts, but all that is subjected to an overriding concern for consolation and reassurance, obviously prompted by the pastoral needs of the occasion. Roth’s sermon thus neatly embodies the transitional character of the age to which it belongs.

3.12 Authors and texts: summary overview

After reviewing the available texts and their authors individually, the resultant corpus also deserves some attention in its entirety. Although it is not a large body of literature in terms

89 Nr. 2: 10 Apr; Nr. 3: 18 May; Nr. 4: 19 May; Nr. 5: 9 Jun 1591.

3 Authors and Tetxts 140 of titles, it is reasonably voluminous with a total of roughly 3,500 pages, of which a third, or well over a thousand pages, are directly focused on the soul’s post-mortem state. The authors represent a rather homogeneous group in that they are all, with the single exception of Faber, ordained Lutheran ministers. While it is noteworthy that the layman Faber scored the greatest publishing hit with his Tractetlein, we have seen both that he was a theologically well trained, keen and involved scholar, and in the next chapter I shall show that he heavily relied on the work of a professional theologian, Melchior Specker. There is nothing surprising in the theological professionalism of the authors since the question being considered is also a technical theological matter, a doctrinal issue. Within this professional matrix, however, the authors represent a fairly broad range from the virtually unknown local pastors through various degrees of broadening influence to several architects of the Formula of Concord and, at least in one case, to contemporary international renown. Only in two cases could the author’s educational level not be determined, but it is likely that Weiser and Frölich also held master’s degrees.90 Of the remaining nine people, three or four had MAs, five (or, with Specker, possibly six) theological doctorates. There were five professors of theology among them, including two university rectors, and five held superintendencies or comparable positions. Three of the ten ministers appear to have been ordinary town parsons with no special qualifications or achievements (Table 3.10). Taken together, the authors represent the upper and middle strata of the professional class, which again is to be expected, given that they had to have access to resources that allow their thoughts still to be studied after four and a half centuries.

Table 3.10 Authors’ educational level, office, and place of activity

Author Degree Office Town Tacius MA pastor nr. Magdeburg Specker MA (ThD?) pastor, professor of theology Strasbourg professor of theology, university rector, Musculus ThD Frankfurt a.d.O. general superintendent Nordhausen, Magdeburg, Faber MA teacher Quedlinburg, Erfurt Greifswald, Garcaeus ThD professor of theology, superintendent Neubrandenburg

90 Specker’s theological doctorate is also questionable, but he surely had a master’s.

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Author Degree Office Town professor of theology, university rector, Chyträus ThD Rostock consistorial councillor professor of theology, superintendent, Mirus ThD Jena, Dresden court preacher Pflacher ThD court preacher Ortenburg, Kempten Weiser n/a pastor Peritz (nr. Meißen) Frölich n/a pastor Perleberg (Brandenb.) Roth MA superintendent Eisleben, Arnstadt

As far as the intra-Lutheran controversies are concerned, they do not seem to be immediately relevant for the given topic, yet if anything, a Gnesio-Lutheran preponderance might be detected among the authors. There is not sufficient evidence to draw any firm conclusion in several instances, and for authors whose available biographical data is limited to the last quarter of the century it might not even make much sense to raise the issue, but where we can conclude anything, it tends to point in a Gnesio-Lutheran direction. Musculus, Faber, Chyträus and Mirus present fairly clear cases, but Tacius’ station in the vicinity of Magdeburg, his acknowledged indebtedness to Corvinus, and the proximity of his entry in Ulrich’s Stammbuch to those of Hahn and Flacius, staunch Gnesio-Lutherans, might offer some clues. Similarly, Pflacher’s connection to Chyträus in Austria, his ordination with Leyser by Andreae, or his sermon Von dem vnkraut des Zwinglischen vnd Caluinischen Jrrthumbs91 might provide some limited ground for a similar conjecture in the Swabian’s case. Geographically, the writers cover the length and breadth of Lutheran lands in the German Empire from Rostock and Hamburg in the north to Kempten in the south, and from Strasbourg in the west to Bautzen, Frankfurt an der Oder and—at least in biographical terms—Silesia in the east, with a predictable preponderance of the Lutheran heartlands in Saxony and Thuringia (Table 3.10 and Table 3.11). Within its limited scope, the group as a whole fairly represents the entirety of German Lutheran theology without significant geographical or social bias. Generically, the works can be grouped in different ways. One obvious grouping would be sermons versus tracts, but as Weiser’s appropriation of Mirus’ homilies indicates,92

91 Cf. Table 3.6. 92 Cf. p. 133, above.

3 Authors and Tetxts 142 the dividing line is anything but impermeable. Another categorisation could be suggested along the lines of the work’s originality, independent theological reflection versus florilegia, biblical or otherwise. Again, however, counterexamples are not difficult to find that invalidate the distinction. The majority of the texts heavily rely on prooftexts of some sort, and Specker’s work is by no means less original, despite its catalogue form, than Faber’s or Garcaeus’, even though the typography of the latter makes their appropriation of earlier sources less transparent.93 When we turn to the kinds of evidence and arguments that are admitted by the author, a potentially fruitful classification presents itself. Texts that virtually limit themselves to biblical prooftexting can be distinguished from those that admit patristic or other theological sources, and from those that also employ philosophical reasoning. That distinction, too, soon turns out to qualify not so much the texts as their authors. Generally, the more educated a theologian is, the more at ease he will feel to deploy extra-biblical arguments. Chyträus and Musculus lead the way, while little known figures like Tacius or Weiser typically limit themselves to biblical grounds. The only quality of the text that appears to function as a productive category to mark off subsets is the structure of the overall argument and the larger context into which reflections on the soul’s immortality are situated. We can distinguish two broad groups, although it is much rather a question of emphasis than of an exclusive approach. On the one hand, there are those texts that treat the immortality, to borrow later orthodox terminology, as one of the eschatological loci de novissimis.94 They may or may not include death as one of the loci, but the overall perspective is to see the intermediate state in the context of a general eschatological scheme. Tacius, Musculus, Faber (when the Tractetlein is considered in the context of the Vnterrichtungen), Chyträus, Mirus and Weiser are representatives of this group. Specker, Garcaeus, Pflacher, Frölich, Roth, on the other hand, represent an approach in which the individual’s end provides the decisive interpretive matrix, and the soul’s post- mortem state is primarily seen in the context of death. Those are logical schemes inasmuch as the actual position of a discussion of the soul’s post-mortem state may very greatly within each group; it may stand front, back or middle, and, as in Faber and Chyträus, its logical and actual position may be in tension. Care should be taken not to overstress the distinction, for

93 For details, see sections 4.1–4.2. 94 On Johann Gerhard’s (1582–1637) role in establishing the terminology and on the inherent ambiguities in the structure of ‘last things’ as an area of theological enquiry, see Hjelde (1987) esp. 35–68.

3 Authors and Tetxts 143 each individual text constitutes a mixture of both types. Instead, the categorisation should be considered a heuristic device which draws attention to the irreducibly transitional character of the Zwischenzustand, and also underlines the fact that the soul’s immortality is never considered in isolation—let alone in juxtaposition to the fullness of eschatological reality— by sixteenth-century theologians, but is always treated as part of a larger scheme of fulfilment that even the ultimate destroyer death cannot undermine. Finally, the printing history of the sources is also of interest for two reasons. First, it makes an important contribution to the argument for the corpus’s capacity to carry generalisations. Second, it allows us to identify some dynamism in the locus’s popularity in the course of the later sixteenth century. As a rule, immortality texts were published more than once. There are only two exceptions, Tacius’ sermon and Frölich’s tract, both by virtually unknown authors who each had only one more title to their name. Half of the titles went through at least three editions; two of them appeared half a dozen times, and one as many as twenty times, including translations. The eleven titles represent a total of about fifty editions, well over forty of which appeared in the sixteenth century. After Tacius’ sermon in 1556, never more than three years passed without one of them being published, and after the late 1560s until the end of the century there is only one two-year gap without publication in 1585–1586. While the second half of the century is fairly gaplessly covered, there are three peaks of increasing strength in the publication history. The first came around the mid-1570s, followed by a stronger one in the early 1580s, and both were overshadowed by the early 1590s, when within three years some twenty to twenty-five per cent of all editions up to 1600 were published95 (Table 3.11).

Table 3.11 Overview of the publication history of immortality texts, excluding Melanchthon’s De anima, in the later sixteenth century

Year Author/Work Place 1556 Tacius, Ein Predigt von der vnsterbligkeit der Seelen (Magdeburg) … 1560 Specker, Vom Leiblichen Todt (Strasbourg) 1561 Specker, Vom Leiblichen Todt (Strasbourg) …

95 The peak around 1590 parallels Leppin’s findings as regards the production of apocalyptic pamphlets between the Interim and the beginning of the Thrity Years’ War (1999:53).

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Year Author/Work Place 1565 Musculus, Gelegenheit/ Thun vnd Wesen der Verstorbenen (Frankfurt a.d.O.) … 1568 [Garcaeus, Sterbbüchlein]96 (Wittenberg) 1569 Faber, Tractetlein (Leipzig)97 1570 1571 Specker, Vom Leiblichen Todt (Strasbourg) 1572 Faber, Tractetlein (Leipzig) 1573 Garcaeus, Sterbbüchlein (Wittenberg) 1574 Musculus, Gelegenheit/ Thun vnd Wesen der Verstorbenen (Dresden) Faber, Tractetlein (Leipzig) 1575 Faber, Tractetlein (Leipzig) [Mirus, Sieben Christliche Predigten] [preached in Regensburg] 1576 Faber, Tractetlein (Leipzig) 1577 Garcaeus, Sterbbüchlein (Wittenberg) 1578 Faber, Tractetlein (Leipzig) 1579 Faber, Tractetlein (Leipzig)98 1580 1581 [Garcaeus, Sterbbüchlein]99 (Nuremberg) Faber, Tractetlein (Leipzig) Chyträus, De morte et vita æterna (Latin, Pt. 1) (Wittenberg) 1582 Faber, Tractetlein (Leipzig) Chyträus, De morte et vita æterna (Latin, Pt. 2) (Wittenberg) Pflacher, Die gantze Lehr (Frankfurt am Main) 1583 Chyträus, De morte et vita æterna (Latin, Pts. 1–2) (Wittenberg) Weiser, Christlicher Bericht (Bautzen) 1584 Faber, Tractetlein (Leipzig) … 1587 Faber, Tractetlein (Leipzig)100 1588 Weiser, Christlicher Bericht (Eisleben & Leipzig) 1589 Pflacher, Die gantze Lehr (Herborn) 1590 Faber, Tractetlein (Leipzig) Mirus, Sieben Christliche Predigten (Erfurt)101 Chyträus, De morte et vita æterna (Latin, Pts. 1–2) (Rostock & Wittenberg)102 Chyträus, De morte et vita æterna (German, Pt. 1) (Berlin) Weiser, Christlicher Bericht (Eisleben)

96 No longer extant first edition probably in 1568 (or 1569). 97 Possible first edition (with hypothetical fourth edition of Vnterrichtungen) a year earlier in 1568. 98 Two editions: Hans Rambau, Sr. and Hans Steinmann. 99 No longer extant edition, attested in early sources. 100 Two editions: Hans Steinmann and Zacharias Bärwald. 101 Three printings: VD16: M 5469–71. 102 Two editions.

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Year Author/Work Place Frölich, Seelen Trost (Leipzig) 1591 Chyträus, De morte et vita æterna (German, Pt. 2) (Frankfurt a.d.O.) Chyträus, De morte et vita æterna (Danish) (Copenhagen) Roth, Fünff trösliche vnd nützliche Predigten (Mühlhausen) 1592 Faber, Tractetlein (Hamburg)103 Chyträus, De morte et vita æterna (German, Pt. 2) (Frankfurt a.d.O.) Roth, Fünff trösliche vnd nützliche Predigten (Mühlhausen) 1593 1594 Faber, Tractetlein (Leipzig) Pflacher, Die gantze Lehr (Herborn) 1595 1596 Faber, Tractetlein (Leipzig)104 1597 Pflacher, Die gantze Lehr (Zerbst) 1598 Chyträus, De morte et vita æterna (German, Pts. 1–2) (Frankfurt a.d.O.) … 1603 Pflacher, Die gantze Lehr (Leipzig) 1604 Faber, Tractetlein (Leipzig) 1605 Mirus, Sieben Christliche Predigten (Erfurt & Jena) … 1612 Pflacher, Die gantze Lehr (Frankfurt am Main) … 1663 Faber, Tractetlein (Stettin)

There is always a thinly veiled gap in the argumentation when jumping from publication data to conclusions about a text’s reception history. Moreover, it is always problematic to argue what is read, let alone what is believed, on the basis of what has been printed. Yet the data reviewed support this much. There was a growing theological interest, at least within the professional class, in the soul’s immortality as the sixteenth century progressed, culminating around 1590. The topic both engaged the attention of leading theologians and stimulated the industry of some much lesser figures for whom it provided an opportunity to make a name for themselves and, indeed, saved them from oblivion. Especially in the case of less outstanding figures, the issue seemed a fairly reliable key to relative success. Not infrequently, a work on the soul’s immortality was among the most successful pieces of its author. The fact that most titles were republished suggests that they must have sold if not read—although both their language (German) and their format (quarto

103 Low GT; dated to 1591, but appeared in 1592. 104 Two editions: Bartholomaeus Voigt and Zacharias Bärwald.

3 Authors and Tetxts 146 or, often, octavo) further indicate that they were meant to be read by the literate public. What is much less conjectural, however, is that the works were read within the guild, and the ideas disseminated in them did not evaporate like the soul on the Stoics’ view, but migrated from one book to another as if in a kind of metempsychosis. I have already noted Weiser’s appropriation of Mirus’ sermons, and P.V. Brady documented a few near-contemporary appreciations for Faber’s work.105 As the next chapter will show, there is much more to explore and discover in this area. The corpus reviewed in this chapter, then, is broad and substantial enough to carry generalisations and to allow for conclusions as regards German Lutheran theology in the later sixteenth century. The initial investigation has also revealed the group of texts to be coherent enough for an expectation of successful doctrinal reconstruction on its basis to be reasonable. That is not to say that any claim of exhaustiveness could be credibly made for it. There must exist further texts that could be taken into consideration. But for my conclusions to hold, I need not establish that I have evaluated all relevant sources, but simply that the sources not consulted are not likely to contradict my findings, and if they do, their interpretation cannot proceed without reference to the body of literature here presented. That much the foregoing argument should have achieved. In the next chapter, I shall look more closely at internal connections between the selected texts in the later-sixteenth-century corpus.

105 Brady (1971) 828–29.

4 The Later-Sixteenth-Century Corpus

In the previous chapter I argued that, taken together, my chosen texts fairly represent German Lutheran theology on the soul’s immortality in the latter half of the sixteenth century. Here I shall proceed to examine the corpus’s internal coherence, and demonstrate a remarkable degree of interdependence between the texts.1 The bulk of the selected sermons and tracts form one continuous textual tradition. A careful analysis will reveal much more than a simple pool of shared ideas, theological commitments or interpretive moves. More often than not, later authors seem to have known the work of their predecessors, and frequently followed them very closely over vast tracts of text. In numerous cases, there can be no doubt that it was not merely a thought or insight that they appropriated, but they actually had a source text before them in writing or print while penning their own homilies or treatises. The abundance of evidence is such that the lack of a formal acknowledgement of such dependence—which is, at best, a rare exception and by no means the rule—only makes the discovery more exciting, but does not diminish the strength of the conclusion.

4.1 Structural parallels between Specker, Garcaeus, and Faber

The greatest surprise the corpus holds for the attentive reader is that both Garcaeus and Faber were effectively copying Specker’s work. The verdict must be based on circumstantial evidence, for we have no witnesses nor do the authors plead guilty, but the case is so strong that the conclusion is virtually enforced upon us, and very little allowance need be made for a theoretically possible alternative explanation that the texts, including Vom leiblichen Todt, go

1 Although it carries little, if any, argumentative weight, it might be worth registering that my presentation follows the actual development of my research. In other words, textual dependence was no criterion in my original selection process, but I indeed discovered a rather astonishing degree of borrowing from one text to the next as I began to engage them in depth.

147 4 Corpus 148

back to a common source. In Faber’s case, the very fact that the Tractetlein came as an afterthought to the Vnterrichtungen invites speculation that there might have been some specific influence, beyond personal grief,2 that prompted its writing. I suggest that it was his acquaintance with Specker’s work some time in the late 1560s.3 In fact, if my reconstruction is correct, and there was indeed a 1568 or 1569 first edition of Garcaeus’ work,4 the appearance of the Sterbbüchlein and the Tractetlein in Saxony in the late 1560s may have prompted the posthumous reprint of Specker’s original in 1571. Those are, however, speculations, while Faber’s and Garcaeus’ dependence on the third part of Vom leiblichen Todt, I submit, can be demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt. To begin with, the overall structure of the three texts is essentially identical. It is true that Garcaeus’ version is longer, while Faber’s is somewhat more condensed than Specker’s, especially towards the end, but the same questions are raised in roughly the same order (Table 4.1).

Table 4.1 The overall structure of the argument in Specker’s Vom Leiblichen Todt (Pt. 3), Garcaeus’ Sterbbüchlein, and Faber’s Tractetlein

Specker Garcaeus Faber Topic (1560) Pt. 3 (1573 [°1568]) (1569) Soul and spirit Ch. 1 Ch. 1 [Ch. 1]5 Immortality of soul Ch. 2 Ch. 2 Ch. 1 Origin of the human soul Ch. 3 Glory of the human soul Ch. 4 Human soul vs. soul of unreasonable animals Ch. 5 Death as separation of soul and body Ch. 6 Departure of soul from this world Ch. 7 How to die well Ch. 8 Place of the righteous and unrighteous souls Ch. 3 Ch. 9 Ch. 2 Whether souls come into purgatory [Ch. 9]6 Proofs against purgatory Ch. 10

2 Cf. p. 117, above. 3 Surely, Specker’s first edition (1560) appeared years before the first publication of the Vnterrichtungen (1564) so Faber may have read the Strasbourger’s work well before the 1569 ‘fifth’ edition of his own tract, but that seems unlikely. 4 Cf. pp. 119–120, above. 5 Point briefly mentioned in ch. 1. 6 Unnumbered unit typographically clearly delimited within (or between) ch(s). 9 (and 10); not listed in the index (cf. B5r).

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Specker Garcaeus Faber Topic (1560) Pt. 3 (1573 [°1568]) (1569) Redemption only through Christ Ch. 11 When souls come to their place7 Ch. 4 Ch. 12 Ch. 3 How souls come to their place7 Ch. 5 Ch. 12 Ch. 4 By what means souls come to their place7 Ch. 5 Ch. 13 Ch. 4 Soul sleep8 [Chs. 2 & 6] Ch. 15 [Ch. 5] Life of righteous souls Ch. 6 Ch. 16 Ch. 5 Detailed description of life of righteous souls [Ch. 6] Ch. 17 [Ch. 5] Knowledge of righteous souls9 Ch. 7 Ch. 19 Ch. 7 Righteous souls recognise each other9 [Ch. 7]10 Ch. 20 [Chs. 6 & 7]11 Occupation of righteous souls Ch. 8 Ch. 18 Ch. 6 Appearance of [righteous] souls on earth12 Ch. 9 Ch. 14 Ch. 8 Differences in glory among righteous souls Ch. 21 Suffering of damned souls Ch. 10 Ch. 22 Ch. 9 State of damned souls [Ch. 10] Ch. 23 Knowledge of damned souls Ch. 11 Ch. 24 Will of damned souls Ch. 12 Differences in shame among damned souls Ch. 25

All of Specker’s topics, except the volition of the damned, are treated by Garcaeus, who does augment the argument substantially at four points, on the nature of the soul, concerning death and dying, the discussion of purgatory, and the hierarchical differences among the departed souls. Several of those issues are, nonetheless, treated by the Strasbourger elsewhere in his book,13 nor does Garcaeus’ introduction of new material affect my claim that he relied heavily on Vom leiblichen Todt in the ‘old parts.’ It is equally immaterial that he breaks up some of Specker’s chapters and divides the material somewhat differently at certain points. Faber’s strategy is different in that he tends to simplify his source, and

7 The three aspects of how, when and by what means souls come to their place are parcelled out differently by the three authors (Specker and Faber: first when, then by what means and how; Garcaeus: first how and when, then by what means), but all of them treat of all three aspects in two chapters. 8 The topic remains rather implicit in Specker and Faber, although they also clearly deny psychopannychism. For a detailed discussion of soul sleep, see section 5.7, below. 9 For a detailed discussion of epistemological issues, see sections 6.2–6.4, below. 10 Relatively minor point in the wider context of the departed souls’ knowledge. The question is more explicitly raised with regard to the damned in ch. 11. 11 Explicitly affirmed in a quotation in ch. 6 and also implicit in ch. 7. 12 For a detailed discussion of the topic, see sections 6.5–6.7, below. 13 Death as separation of body and soul in pt. 1, ch. 2; death in pt. 1, chs. 3–4; ars moriendi in pt. 2, chs. 14–16; purgatory in pt. 2, ch. 12.

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essentially leaves out the first and the last two chapters of Vom leiblichen Todt. These modifications aside, Specker’s line of thought is very closely followed by both later authors, who also leave the order of his chapters intact, except that the occupation of the righteous souls in heaven is moved forward before their knowledge by both of them, and Garcaeus also brings the question of the souls’ appearance on earth to the junction where the discussion turns from their arrival at their interim abode to their life there. Taken together, all those changes pale into insignificance against the remarkably close correspondences in the three works’ overall structure. What we see on the level of the complete treatises we shall also find within individual chapters. It would be tedious to marshal all available evidence, but a few examples will suffice. To prevent the argument from being drowned out as references and minutiae flood the discussion when we turn to details, I will treat the texts in pairs rather than try and keep all three works continuously in play. Faber offers somewhat less than Specker, but what he does offer mirrors Specker’s content and follows his arrangement. In the immortality chapter, the first four units (arguments from creation, redemption, judgement and specific biblical revelation) are identical in Vom leiblichen Todt and the Tractetlein, and the same prooftexts are also cited in the same order with a few occasional omissions by Faber, who is also uninterested in discussing false teachings as Specker does in the second half of the chapter (Table 4.2).

Table 4.2 Detailed outline of the structure of the ‘immortality’ chapter in Specker and Faber14

Specker (1560) Topic Faber (1569) Biblical prooftexts15 Pt. 3 Immortality of soul Ch. 2 Ch. 1 Gen 1[:26], Gen 2[:7], Wis Argument from creation Ch. 2[.1], I. Ch. 1 (1) 2[:23], Wis 11 [i.e. 12:1], Wis 15[:10–11] Argument from redemption16 Ch. 2[.1], II. Ch. 1 (2) Jn 3[:16.18], Jn 6[:40]

14 Numbers in square brackets: logical subdivisions, unmarked in the original, supplied as required by the structure of the argument. Numbers in round brackets: subdivisions marked by words in the original (e.g. ‘zum andern’). For a comparison of Specker and Garcaeus, see Table 4.25, below. 15 Texts in italics appear only in Specker. 16 Specker’s Latin heading names redemption; the German rubric, Christ’s suffering and death (222r). Only the latter wording is preserved by Faber (Y4v).

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Specker (1560) Topic Faber (1569) Biblical prooftexts15 Pt. 3 Argument from God’s Ch. 2[.1], III. Ch. 1 (3) Jud [14–15], Wis 5[:15] judgement and conscience17 Mt 10[:28], Lk 16[:2218], Mt 22[:31–32] = Lk 20[:37–38], Argument from specific texts Ch. 2[.1], IIII. Ch. 1 (4) Mt 17[:3] = Lk 9[:30–31], Lk 23[:43], Heb 10 [i.e. 12:22–24], Rev 6:9, Rev 20:4–619 False teachings about the Ch. 2[.2] soul’s immortality20 Consequences of such false Ch. 2[.3] teachings21 Reasons for this false teaching Ch. 2[.4]

Despite its much greater complexity, the chapter on the names of the places of the righteous and the damned souls presents a similar picture. The correspondences are especially striking in the section on the place of the blessed souls in the first half of the chapter, but the discussion of the damned also exhibits clear parallels. Overall, Faber condenses the material, cuts off some digressions and omits some further questions at the end of the chapter, concentrates on prooftexts from the Bible and Luther, leaves out even some of Specker’s biblical references and quite often gives only the locus without the actual citation. Occasionally he also rearranges the material slightly (Table 4.3). It is significant that Faber intersperses his chapter with extended Luther quotations (between five and thirty-five lines each). They all appear in exactly the same position as in Specker and, with a single exception, are the same or shorter as in the Strasbourger’s text.22 Also noteworthy is the detail that in the discussion of the name ‘Gehenna’ Specker cites, among other prooftexts,

17 Faber drops conscience. 18 Paraphrase. 19 Faber only alludes to Rev 20 in general. 20 With subdivisions: I. Epicureans and Sadducees; II. Pope John XXII; III. Contemporary Do[r]mitians (cf. n. 77 on p. 162, below). 21 With subdivisions: I. Neglect of good works and virtues; II. Desolate and rude life; III. All sorts of unrighteousness, violence and iniquity. 22 The exception is in the discussion of Abraham’s bosom (Specker (1560) 230v and Faber (1569) Z1r–2r), where Faber continues the quotation from Luther on Genesis 25 beyond the end of the passage in Specker. Recall that Faber published his own German translation of Luther’s exposition of the first twenty-five chapters of Genesis in 1558, and it appeared already in the third edition by 1569.

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Matthew 5:22 and 18:8, also giving Mark 9:43 as a parallel to the latter.23 In a corresponding passage, although this time under the heading ‘fire,’ Faber has ‘Mat v. xviij. ix.’,24 where the chapter references appear in same order as in Specker. Since Faber does not supply the quotations and, as is usual in the age, both authors omit the verse numbers, the explanation is somewhat conjectural, but it appears as though Faber had abbreviated Specker, but overlooked the fact that the last chapter (9) was from Mark’s Gospel not Matthew’s.

Table 4.3 Detailed outline of the structure of the ‘place’ chapter in Specker and Faber25

Topic Specker (1560) Pt. 3 Faber (1569) Biblical prooftexts26 Place of the righteous Ch. 3 Ch. 2 and unrighteous souls Names of the righteous Ch. 3[.1] Ch. 2[.1] souls’ place In Old Testament Ch. 3[.1.1] To the fathers Ch. 3[.1.1], I. Ch. 2[.1.1.1a] Gen 15[:15]°, 2 Chron 34[:28] Gen 25[:8]°, Gen 25[:17], To their people Ch. 3[.1.1], II. Ch. 2[.1.1.1b] Gen 49[:33], Num 20[:26], Deut 32[:50] Bundle of those living Ch. 3[.1.1], III. Ch. 2[.1.1] (2) 1 Sam 25[:29] with the Lord Tent or holy hill of the Ch. 3[.1.1], IIII. Ps 15[:1], Lk 16[:9], Heb 8[:2] Lord Land of the living Ch. 3[.1.1], V. Ch. 2[.1.1] (3) Ps 27[:13], Ps 116[:9–10] Chambers Ch. 3[.1.1], VI. Ch. 2[.1.1] (4) Isa 56 [i.e. 57:1–2]° Ps 31[:5], Ps 3[:5], Ps 4[:8]°, God’s hand Ch. 3[.1.1], VII. Ch. 2[.1.1] (5) Wis 3[:1–4], Deut [33:3] From the New Ch. 3[.1.2] Ch. 2[.1.2] Testament Abraham’s bosom Ch. 3[.1.2], I. Ch. 2[.1.2.1] Lk 16[:22]*°27

23 Specker (1560) 248v–249r. 24 Faber (1569) Z4v. 25 Numbers in square brackets: logical subdivisions, unmarked in the original, supplied as required by the structure of the argument. Numbers in round brackets: subdivisions marked by words in the original (e.g. ‘zum andern’). 26 Texts in italics appear only in Specker. Loci marked with an asterisk (*) are referenced by Faber without supplying the actual citation. Loci marked with a raised circle (°) are followed by a(n essentially identical) Luther quotation in both tracts. 27 Specker (1560) 230v = Faber (1569) Z1r/v (Luther on Gen 25) and Specker (1560) 231r = Faber (1569) Z2r (Luther on Gen 49).

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Topic Specker (1560) Pt. 3 Faber (1569) Biblical prooftexts26 Abraham’s bosom and the community of the Ch. 3[.1.2], I.[a] angels The Fathers had contradictory opinion Ch. 3[.1.2], I.[b] concerning Abraham’s bosom Lk 32* [i.e. 23:42–43], God’s Paradise Ch. 3[.1.2], II. Ch. 2[.1.2] (2) Rev 2[:7]*, 2 Cor 12[:2–4]*°28 City, heavenly homeland, Heb 11[:10]*, Heb 11[:13– Ch. 3[.1.2], III. Ch. 2[.1.2] (3) new Jerusalem 16]*, Heb 12[:22–24]* Of the revelation of the Rev 2 [i.e. 3:12]*, Rev 21[:1– Ch. 3[.1.2], III.[a] Ch. 2[.1.2] (3) heavenly Jerusalem 3]*29 The Father’s house Ch. 3[.1.2], IIII. Ch. 2[.1.2] (4) Jn 14[:2–3], 2 Cor 5[:1] Within the veil Ch. 3[.1.2], V. Heb 6[:19–20] Heb 10[:19–21], Heb 9[:8], The sanctuary Ch. 3[.1.2], VI. Ch. 2[.1.2] (5) Heb 9[:24] Heb 9[:24], Mt 5[:3]*, Heaven Ch. 3[.1.2], VII. Ch. 2[.1.2] (6) Mt 11[:12]*, Mt 23[:13]*, 2 Tim 4[:18], Rev 5[:13]30 The place of the martyrs’ Ch. 3[.1.2], VIII. Rev 6[:9] soul under the altar Names of the unrighteous souls’ and Ch. 3[.2] Ch. 2[.2] spirits’ place Ps 18[:5], Ps 116[:3], Hell Ch. 3[.2], I. Ch. 2[.2.1a] Lk 16[:23]°, Rev 1[:18], Rev 6[:8], Rev 20[:13] Of twofold hell Ch. 3[.2], I.[a] Ps 86[:13] Of twofold hell Ch. 3[.2], I.[b] Wis 17[:14], Mt 11[:23] differently Kingdom of hell Ch. 3[.2], II. Wis 1[:14–16] Isa 30[:33]*,31 Mt 5[:22]*, Mt 18[:8]* = Mk 9[:43],32 Topheth or Gehenna Ch. 3[.2], III. Ch. 2[.2.4a] Mt 23[:15], Mt 23[:33], Mt 10[:28] = Lk 12[:4–5]

28 Rev 2 and 2 Cor 12 appear in reverse order in Faber. 29 Faber treats Hebrews and Revelation on the heavenly city together. For Rev 21, he substitutes Rev 20. 30 The Matthean references are not cited, only alluded to, by Faber. The order is slightly different than in Specker. 31 Faber (1569:Z4v), probably mistakenly, has Isa 33 (without verse number or actual text quoted). 32 Note the same order of chapter references as in Specker, except that ch. 9 there is from Mark. Faber lists these references for the name ‘fire.’

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Topic Specker (1560) Pt. 3 Faber (1569) Biblical prooftexts26 Origin of the name Ch. 3[.2], III.[a] Furnace of fire Ch. 3[.2], IIII. Ch. 2[.2.4b]33 Mt 13[:41–42] Rev 19[:20]*, Rev 20[:10]*, Lake of fire Ch. 3[.2], V. Ch. 2[.2.4c] Rev 21 [i.e. 20:14–15]* Tartarus34 Ch. 3[.2], VI. Ch. 2[.2.2] 2 Pt 2[:4]° 2 Pt 2[:17] = Jude [13], Wis Deepest darkness Ch. 3[.2], VII. Ch. 2[.2.4d] 17[:20] Outer darkness Ch. 3[.2], VIII. Ch. 2[.2.4e] Mt 8[:12]* = Mt 22[:13]* Place of anguish Ch. 3[.2], IX. Ch. 2[.2.1b] Lk 16[:27–28]* Abyss Ch. 3[.2, X.] Ch. 2[.2.4f] Rev 20[:2–3]* Prison Ch. 3[.2], XI. Ch. 2[.2.3] 1 Pt 3[:19–20] The papists’ teaching Ch. 3[.3] Christ’s descent to hell35 Ch. 3[.4]

Garcaeus organises his ‘names’ chapter somewhat differently, but numerous points of connection are still clearly visible. He devotes the first five pages to the thesis that souls can only go to two places. He then comes to their respective names. He begins with the abode of the righteous. This place . . . has manifold names in holy scripture. For it is called Abraham’s bosom . . . also paradise, the hand of the Lord, your tent or the holy hill of the Lord, the land of the living, a chamberlet, the heavenly homeland, the new heavenly Jerusalem, the heavenly Father’s eternal house, also an altar in the throne of heaven under which the dear souls rest.36

The list includes ten names, all of which appear in Specker, although their order is different,37 and here they are not organised into Old and New Testament groups. Garcaeus

33 ‘Hell fire or eternal fire’ (‘Das hellische fewer/Das ewig fewer’) with different prooftexts in Faber (1569) Z4v; cf. n. 32, above. 34 Faber does not list the name Tartarus but uses 2 Pt 2:4 in the second paragraph of this section, speaking, between hell and prison, of the darkness of hell. It seems to me most logical to list this detail where it belongs by virtue of the prooftext, esp. as both Specker and Faber add Luther’s comment on this passage. 35 With twofold subdivisions: [4.1] Exposition of these words: I. Meaning of hell; II. Did Christ suffer in hell? [4.2] Counterarguments: I. Jesus committing his soul to the Father’s hand; II. Jesus to the right thief; III. The glory of Christ’s death would be diminished. 36 ‘DJser ort/ . . . hat in der heyligen Schrifft vielerley namen. Denn er wird genennet der schos Abrahe / . . . Jtem das Paradis / die hand des Herrn /deine Hütte oder der heilige berg des Herrn/das Land der lebendigen/ein Kemerlein/ das himlische Vaterland/ das newe himlische Jerusalem/ das ewige haus des himlischen Vaters/Jtem ein Altar in der Himels thron/vnter welchem die lieben Seelen ruhen’ (Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) G6r). 37 Garcaeus’ names appear in the order of 4, 5, 6, 3, 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10 in Specker. If we disregard the first three items (1 to 3), the sequence is unbroken, which might be interpreted as Garcaeus following Specker, with omissions, except that he puts the most popular appellations at the head of his own list.

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then proceeds to supply the biblical prooftexts at one fell swoop. His enumeration is partial even for his own list of names,38 but what he cites is all available in Specker, and the loci in fact appear in the same order and, with the exception of the Lukan citation, in close proximity to each other in two separate blocks.39 What is more, Specker, who does not limit himself to scriptural quotations as a rule, inserts a six-and-a-half-line passage from Anselm after the 2 Corinthians 5 pericope. The exact same text appears in Garcaeus in the exact same position, which would be rather astonishing for a coincidence even if we grant its thematic connection to the Pauline verse. A similar picture emerges from the analysis of the abode of the damned. After the transition, Garcaeus first discusses hell in general, copiously providing prooftexts, although some only as paraphrases.40 Not all of them appear in Specker, either at all or in this context, but five of the eight are used in the ‘names’ chapter of Vom leiblichen Todt. Given the topic, that is not necessarily significant, especially as their order does not correlate with Specker’s. It might still be noted that both synoptic double references appear conjoined in both works. Garcaeus then comes to the names of hell. This place is otherwise called a furnace of fire (Mt 13[:42]), also a fiery lake that burns with fire and brimstone (Rev 19[:20], 20[:10], 21 [i.e. 20:14–15]), also Tartarus, which is a terrible and dreadful place (2 Pt 2[:4]), also the outer darkness, a place of anguish, an abyss or a prison etc.41

Those are not only Specker’s names 4 to 11 with no. 7 skipped but also his prooftexts. Note that the order of names is exactly like in Vom leiblichen Todt, and the summary reference to Revelation 19–21 (lake of fire) appears in the same format as in Specker except, of course, that the Strasbourger actually quotes the relevant verses. Garcaeus then continues with a warning against speculation about the exact location of hell and a brief affirmation that its reality should not therefore be questioned. He closes the discussion with an explanation of

38 Ps 27:13 (although cited as Ps 28) and Ps 116:9 for the land of the living, Isa 57:1–2 (cited as Isa 56) for chamber, Lk 16:22 for Abraham’s bosom, Jn 14:2–3 and 2 Cor 5:1 for the Father’s house, and Heb 10:19–20 in a short independent paragraph, probably just for good measure because he does not cite the name ‘sanctuary,’ for which it would be relevant, and under which heading it is indeed to be found in Specker (1560:235v). 39 Specker (1560) 228v–229r and 234v–235v with Lk 16:22 on 230v in-between. 40 Ps 49:15, Ps 55:16, Num 16:31–33, Lk 16:22–26, 2 Pt 2:4, Isa 30:33, Mt 18:8/Mk 9:43–44, Mt 10:28/Lk 12:5. 41 ‘DJser ort wird sonst genennet ein fewroffen/Matth . 1 3. Jtem ein fewriger Pful/der mit fewr vnd Schwefel brennet/Apoc. 19. 20. 21. Jtem Tartarus /das ist ein schrecklicher grewlicher ort 2. Petri 2. Jtem die eusserste finsternis/ein ort der qual/ein abgrund oder gefengnis etc.’ (Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) H1r).

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the name Gehenna to which a brief repetition, with prooftexts,42 of the horrors of hell is finally added. The Gehenna passage is over a hundred and fifty words long, and is very close to a quotation that Specker brings from David Chyträus’ Onomasticon theologicum (1557).43 In a way that is quite characteristic of his citation technique, Garcaeus does not signal in any way his dependence on an outside source, whether Specker (who presents the text as an excerpt) or Chyträus himself. It is not impossible that the connection here leads from the Sterbbüchlein directly to the Onomasticon, but I find it the less likely hypothesis, given the rest of the correspondence between the former and Vom leiblichen Todt. On the whole, the similarities between Specker and Faber in the ‘names’ chapter put it almost beyond dispute that the latter author was using the text of the former, and those between Specker and Garcaeus point in the same direction, although here the material from this chapter alone is less than decisive. A look at the ‘means’ chapter will confirm our previous impression. The internal structure is all but identical in all three texts. It is divided into two halves, the first dealing with the righteous; the second, with the damned souls. Each half is further subdivided. Three things are stated with regard to the blessed souls: they are taken up into heaven (1.1) by God’s power (1.2) through faith and hope (1.3) with the help of angels. Similarly, but one degree more simply, the wicked are thrust into hell (2.1) by divine power and (2.2) carried by demons. Faber’s text mirrors Specker’s perfectly; Garcaeus omits the second point of the first half and adds a short summary of both the fate of the righteous redeemed by Christ and of the godless in hell. Specker marshals about two dozen scriptural prooftexts in the course of the chapter. Neither Garcaeus nor Faber uses a single biblical quotation other than can be found in Vom leiblichen Todt, although they do omit a few. Further, Bible verses are parcelled out among the five internal units of the chapter in the same way in all three texts. Since both of the later authors include references that are missing from the other, we need not suppose that they are aware of one another.44 Particularly interesting is the oddity of Johannine

42 Rev 20:10 and Isa 66:24/Mk 9:48. 43 Specker (1560) 241v and Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) H1v–2r. 44 Of course, only one of them could have read the other while composing his own text, but since the publication sequence of the extant editions is the reverse of the hypothetical order of their first printing for which I have argued, it remains undecided which way a dependency might at all be supposed. The point is moot, however, for I believe there is no direct connection between the Sterbbüchlein and the Tractetlein.

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citations in the very first, and most heavily prooftexted, section. The loci are listed roughly in their biblical order, but three out of four passages from the Gospel of John appear out of sequence. In all three authors, they are moved to the end of the list. Surely, there are some minor divergences in the final result since Faber leaves out two of the three out-of-place quotations, but the remaining one comes where it does in Specker. Likewise, Garcaeus relocates the fourth verse, originally in the right place in Specker, and moves it to be the first item of the postponed list, but he still does not integrate it with the other three, although it should come third, not first. In other words, Specker’s odd sequence is maintained by Faber (except that several items are dropped from the list) and fairly closely followed by Garcaeus as well45 (Table 4.4).

Table 4.4 Detailed outline of the structure of the ‘means’ chapter in Specker, Garcaeus, and Faber46

Specker Garcaeus Faber Topic Biblical prooftexts47 (1560) Pt. 3 (1573 [°1568]) (1569) By what means and how righteous and Ch. 5 Ch. 1348 Ch. 4 godless souls come to their place Righteous souls are [Ch. 5.1] [Ch. 13.1] [Ch. 4.1] taken up…49

45 Specker (1560) 253r/v: Jn 14:3, Acts 7, 2 Tim 4, 1 Pt 2, Jn 10:9, Jn 10:27–30, Jn 14:6; Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) L1v–2r: Acts 7, 2 Tim 4, Jn 14:3, Jn 10:9, Jn 10:27–30, Jn 14:6; Faber (1569) Z7r: Jn 14:3, Acts 7, Jn 10:27–30. 46 Numbers in square brackets: logical subdivisions, unmarked in the original, supplied as required by the structure of the argument. Numbers in round brackets: subdivisions marked by words in the original (e.g. ‘zum andern’). 47 Texts in italics appear only in Specker. 48 Cf. n. 7 on p. 149, above. 49 Not a formal title in any of the texts.

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Specker Garcaeus Faber Topic Biblical prooftexts47 (1560) Pt. 3 (1573 [°1568]) (1569) Ps 27[:9–10],50 43[:3–4]51; Isa ..by the power of 38[:16–17], 46[:4]; Father, Son and Ch. 5[.1], I Ch. 13[.1.1] Ch. 4[.1] (1) Jn 10[:9,52 27–30],53 Holy Spirit through 14[:3,54 655]; Acts word and faith 7[:55–59]56; 2 Tim [4:18]57; 1 Pt 2[:25] ..through faith and Ch. 5[.1], II Ch. 4[.1] (2) Heb 4[:3], 6[:18–20] hope58 Ps 91[:11–12]; Lk ..through angels Ch. 5[.1], III Ch. 13[.1.2] Ch. 4[.1] (3) 16[:22]59; Heb 1[:14]60 Godless souls are Ch. 5[.2] Ch. 13[.2] Ch. 4(.2) thrown down… Job 27[:8]; Lk ..by divine power Ch. 5[.2], I Ch. 13[.2.1] Ch. 4(.2) [1] 12[:20–21,61 45–46] Jn 14[:30]; Acts ..by evil angels Ch. 5[.2, II] Ch. 13[.2.2] Ch. 4(.2) [2] 26[:18]; Col 1[:13]; 1 Tim 6[:9]

With due respect to thematic governing forces inherent in a shared topic, such correspondence, I submit, is extremely unlikely to be produced by sheer coincidence. Yet there is more if we also attend to the non-biblical prooftexts. This time Faber’s case is less interesting. He inserts three passages into the third unit on the righteous souls.

50 Not quoted by Garcaeus. 51 Given out of sequence by Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]:L1v), after the Isaiah quotations. 52 Not quoted by Faber. Cf. n. 53, below. 53 Given out of sequence at the end of the catalogue by Faber (1569:Z7r). Jn 10:9, 27–30 and 14:6 given, in that order, out of sequence at the end of the catalogue by Specker (1560:253r/v) and Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]:L1v–2r). 54 Given out of sequence by Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]:L1v) between 2 Tim 4:18 and Jn 10:9. 55 Not quoted by Faber. Cf. n. 53, above. 56 Abridged, with slight variations, by all authors. 57 Not quoted by Faber. Locus given as 2 Tim 2 by Specker (1560:253r) and Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]:L1v). 58 Topic and, naturally, prooftexts skipped by Garcaeus. 59 Quoted as first by both Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]:L2r) and Faber (1569:Z8v–a1r). 60 Not quoted by Garcaeus. 61 Not quoted by Faber.

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Two of them are from Luther,62 probably turned up by his own research. The third is an excerpt from Chrysostom’s sermon on Lazarus and Dives. Interestingly, the same short text can be found in Specker as well, but not in the ‘means’ chapter but in the previous one on when souls reach their abode. This time, however, we might not have to do with direct borrowing, for the two versions significantly differ in translation.63 Far more exciting is Garcaeus’ performance. I have said that Faber and Garcaeus only narrow down Specker’s pool of scriptural prooftexts, they do not cite any independent passages. That, however, can only be asserted if it is recognised that what appears as Garcaeus’ own text on the surface is in fact a borrowing from some other source cited by Specker. A careful reading will reveal that Garcaeus’ chapter is quite full of such details. He effectively adopts six different passages of a combined length of some five hundred words (Table 4.5).

Table 4.5 Overview of Garcaeus’ borrowing of non-biblical passages from Specker in the ‘means’ chapter

Length Specker Garcaeus Common source (words) (1560) (1573 [°1568]) Bullinger c.80 253v–254r L2v Liber de salutaribus documentis c.60 254r L2v–3r Liber de salutaribus documentis c.90 254r L3r Chrysostom c.70 254v L3v Gregory the Great c.100 256r L4r Simon de Cassia c.80 256v L4r/v

Except for Chrysostom and a vague reference to the Liber de salutaribus documentis, Garcaeus never even hints at his sources, nor does he take over full excerpts from Vom leiblichen Todt. On the contrary, the quotations are usually embedded in his own text and sometimes slightly modified or elaborated. That, however, only makes their detection a good deal more difficult, but does not alter the fundamental fact of his reliance on those sources and, primarily, on Specker, where he found them. Theoretically it must be allowed that he found them independently, but, given the number of instances, the variety and extent of texts, the odds against that are such as to virtually exclude coincidence as a viable option. Much of Specker’s text is skipped by Garcaeus, but its order is nowhere broken. If we

62 WA 36:260.31–32 (‘Predigt auf dem Schlosse zu Wittenberg,’ 22 Aug 1532, Nr. 36) and WA 48:165.1–7 (Bibel- und Bucheinzeichnungen, n.d.). 63 Cf. Specker (1560) 251r and Faber (1569) Z7v.

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consider both biblical and non-biblical borrowing, there are only three minor instances out of eighteen items where the sequences do not run parallel.64 All in all, then, Faber’s and Garcaeus’ ‘means’ chapters are essentially thinned out versions of Specker’s, and their own contribution amounts to barely more than editorial revision, although Faber at least supplied a few quotations that are not to be found in Vom leiblichen Todt. The description of the life of righteous souls in heaven can serve as further illustration. We will once more find that both Specker’s structure and his prooftexts are preserved in large measure. He begins with a long excerpt from Luther’s commentary on Abraham’s death (Gen 25:7–10),65 followed by a passage by Henry Bullinger (1504–1575) on soul sleep. They obviously represent the theological undergirding of his position, for the longer second half of the chapter is introduced as a description of the souls’ life from scripture. Its internal structure mirrors that of the whole chapter with its uneven two-part division. First comes a section on the souls’ fellowship with the Trinity and the angels, then a detailed account of their life in eight points, one of which has further subdivisions. Faber only differs from his source in four regards. He leaves out a good deal of Specker’s evidence, including some of his biblical and all of his non-scriptural prooftexts. He adds a commentary of a page and a half on a passage from Revelation, in connection with which he also reverses the order of two quotations. Finally, he extends the Luther excerpt from the Genesisvorlesung in both directions, and moves it to the end of the chapter. Incidentally, he also uses a different translation, probably his own.66 Other than that, he essentially copies Specker’s text. Garcaeus relocates the opening Luther and Bullinger quotations to the beginning of the previous chapter, and reverses their order.67 Not only is his excerpt from the Commentary on Genesis a sentence shorter than Specker’s, he also uses the same translation!68 While that is not proof positive that Garcaeus had to rely on Vom leiblichen Todt for his German version,69

64 Garcaeus puts Ps 43 after Isa 38 (cf. n. 51), Jn 14:3 after 2 Tim 4 (cf. n. 54), and Ps 91 after Lk 16 (cf. n. 59); all notes to this chapter. 65 Cf. section 1.5, above, and n. 68 on p. 160, below. 66 Cf. p. 115, above, and n. 142 on p. 249, below. 67 Recall that chapter 15 on soul sleep is a new structural feature in Garcaeus (cf. Table 4.1). 68 Cf. WA 43:360.18–361.3 for Specker; 360.19–361.3 for Garcaeus, and 359.31–361.23 for Faber. 69 Recall that there was another German translation of precisely this section available in print, which I have not

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it certainly makes the connection more likely. The rest of Specker’s material he breaks into two. His shorter chapter 16 essentially incorporates the material of Specker’s first scriptural unit, on the fellowship of the soul with God and angels. There are only two points of divergence. He moves a passage from Simon de Cassia (d. 1348) forward, and inserts Christ’s words to the right thief (Lk 23:43) as a new prooftext in the penultimate position. What Specker offers under the heading of a description of the blessed souls’ life in detail builds the middle section of Garcaeus’ next chapter under a similar title. It is a long unit of thirty pages, and the first twelve and the last ten to thirteen are independent of the Strasbourg text. The central part, however, closely corresponds to Vom leiblichen Todt. Some of the material is simply left out, although not nearly as much as by Faber. A new prooftext (Ps 23:1) is inserted for the second topic; the location of one passage is changed70; the third and fourth of Specker’s eight points are combined,71 and a short commentary of some ninety words on Revelation 2:17 is supplied, for which I have not found a source in Vom leiblichen Todt. Garcaeus will part ways with Specker before the latter reaches his last point, and the penultimate section marks the departure. The rubric is not taken over in the Sterbbüchlein, and its beginning is replaced with a completely new set of biblical quotations.72 The bulk of Specker’s section is a series of Revelation quotations interspersed with Bullinger’s commentary. The biblical loci all appear in the Sterbbüchlein—but only those from Revelation—as do a couple of passages from Bullinger, although they are more or less paraphrased, and their order is also modified.73 The rest of the chapters, less than a quarto page in Specker and over ten octavo pages in Garcaeus, are independent. Those changes notwithstanding, the textual connection between the two works is unmistakeable (Table 4.6).

been able to consult (cf. p. 51, above). 70 Cf. n. 85 on p. 163, below. 71 Cf. n. 86 on p. 164, below. 72 Mic 7:19; Ps 32:1–2; 1 Jn 3:2; Rev 3:4, 6:11, 7:9, 19:8; Ps 45:11–12, and Eph 5. 73 Cf. n. 90 on p. 164, below.

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Table 4.6 Correspondences in the description of departed righteous souls’ life by Specker, Garcaeus, and Faber

Specker Garcaeus Faber Topic Structure (1560) Pt. 3 (1573 [°1568]) (1569) Life of righteous souls 6 Ch. 6 Ch. 16 Ch. 5 Luther on Gen 25:7–1074 6.1.1 256v–257v M4r–5v75 a4r–8r76 Bullinger against Dormitians77 6.1.2 257v M4r78 Scriptural description of life of 6.2 258r a1r righteous souls In company of Trinity and angels 6.2.1 258r M8r a1v–2r Lk 23[:43] 258r a2r Jn 13[:3] 258r Jn 13[:36] 258r a2r Jn 14[:3] 258v M8r a2r Jn 12[:26] 258v M8r

74 Cf. n. 68 on p. 160, above. 75 Essentially the same passage as in Specker, quoted in the previous chapter (15) by Garcaeus. 76 Longer passage than Specker’s, quoted at the end of the chapter. 77 The name requires some clarification, for it occurs in a variety of forms in the sources, and has invited unwarranted modern interpretation. A similar term occurs four times at three different places in Specker. (1) Enumerating the opponents of the soul’s immortality in ch. 2, he names the ‘Domitianer zů vnserer zeyt’ in the third place and cites Bullinger’ Revelation commentary, who polemicises against those who teach soul sleep but does not use the term itself (1560:224v–225r, and cf. n. 20 on p. 151, above, and n. 17 on p. 212, below). (2) Commenting on Jn 5:24 in ch. 4, Specker finds it useful against the false teaching of the ‘Dormitantianer’ that the soul sleeps until the last day (1560:251v). (3) In ch. 6, again citing Bullinger against the ‘soul sleepers’ sect’ (this is our passage now, from the Decades 4.10), he uses once more the form ‘Dormitantianer’ in the text, and ‘[contra] Dormitantianos’ in the heading above it (1560:257v). (4) Garcaeus, in our passage, which I believe he takes from Bullinger via Specker (i.e. 3), calls them ‘Dormitianer’ (see next note, 78). (5) Finally, Faber, this time copying Specker’s comment on Jn 5:24 (i.e. 2), again uses the form ‘Dormitianer’ (1569:Z6r, cf. Table 4.9). I have not been able to consult Bullinger’s Latin originals (Specker is not using Johann Haller’s 1558 German translation, in which the Latin term does not occur, anyway; Bullinger (1568 [1549–1551]) 314ar=Ggg2r), but the editors of a nineteenth-century English translation of his Decades supply the Latin version of (3) in a footnote as ‘Dormitantii’ and link it with ‘Jerome’s play on Vigilantius’ name’ (Bullinger (1849–1852 [1549– 1551]) 4:389n, italics original). Pierer’s Universal-Lexikon recognises both ‘Dormitantii’ and ‘Dormitantiani’ for psychopannychists (5:268). I have found no further evidence for Garcaeus’ and Faber’s short form, but it must derive from the same stem as must Specker’s, or possibly Bullinger’s, (1). At any rate, it likely contains a typographical error (missing the first ‘r’), and has nothing to do with the name ‘Domitian.’ That is worth pointing out because Barnes translates ‘Domitianer’ as ‘Domitianists,’ and etymologises it from the name of ‘Domitian of Ancyra, a sixth-century bishop and defender of the heresy of Origenism’ (2000:281n). That seems a very improbable derivation to me. Barnes offers no explanation of the connection of either Domitian or Origen(ism) to psychopannychism that is clearly at stake in each passage under every name. Incidentally, in the edition I consulted (Leipzig, 1572), Faber does have the elusive ‘r’ in place. It is curious that the 1584 Leipzig edition, which Barnes used, should have dropped it. (His other edition—Eisleben, 1565— does not yet have the Tractetlein; cf. Barnes (2000) 270n and my Table 3.1.) Throughout the dissertation, I will use the anglicised version of the short form as ‘Dormitians.’ 78 Similar passage as in Specker, paraphrased, without any acknowledgement of alien authorship, by Garcaeus before the Luther excerpt at the beginning of the previous chapter (15).

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Specker Garcaeus Faber Topic Structure (1560) Pt. 3 (1573 [°1568]) (1569) Jn 17[:24] 258v M8v a2r Chrysostom on Jn 12 258v Chrysostom on Jn 17 258v M8v–N1r Simon de Cassia 258v–259r M8r/v79 2 Cor 5[:6–8] 259r N1r Anselm 259r/v N1r–2r Phil 1[:23] 259v N2r a2r Chrysostom 259v–260r N2r/v Lk 23:43 N2v Heb 12[:22–24] 260r N2v–3r a2r/v 2 Pt 1[:10–11] 260r/v Life of blessed souls in heaven 6.2.2 260v Ch. 1780 Nothing evil touches them 6.2.2.0 260v No need, poverty etc. 6.2.2.1 260v N8r a2v Scriptural witness a2v Jn 4[:14] 260v N8r/v Jn 6[:35] 261r N8v Mt 5[:3]/Lk 6[:20] 261r N8v Mt 5[:6]/Lk 6[:21] 261r N8v Eat and drink with Christ 6.2.2.2 261r N8v Lk 22[:29–30] 261r N8v81 Ps 23[:1] N8v–O1r Ambrose 261r O1r Eat of tree of life 6.2.2.2.1 261r O1r Rev 2[:7]82 261v O1r Bullinger 261v Eat of hidden manna 6.2.2.2.2 261v Rev 2[:17a] 261v O1r83 No strife or vice etc. 6.2.2.3 261v O1v Dan 12[:13] 261v O1v Isa 57[:1–2]84 261v O1v a2v Wis 4[:7] 262r O1v a2v Heb 4[:3] 262r O2r85 a2v Heb 4[:9–10] 262r

79 Brought forward, before Jn 17, by Garcaeus. 80 The first twelve pages of Garcaeus’ new chapter are independent of Specker. 81 Locus not given by Garcaeus. 82 Locus given as Jn 2 by Specker. 83 A short commentary is included here by Garcaeus. 84 Locus given as Isa 56 by all three authors. 85 Quoted after Rev 14:13 at the end of the paragraph by Garcaeus.

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Specker Garcaeus Faber Topic Structure (1560) Pt. 3 (1573 [°1568]) (1569) Rev 14[:13] 262r O1v–2r a2v No wrath of God 6.2.2.4 262r O1v86 Wis 4[:15] 262r O2r a3r Rev 2[:17b] 262r O2r Bullinger 262r/v O2r No fright or anxiety etc. 6.2.2.5 262v O2r/v Isa 32[:17–18] 262v No fright or anxiety etc. 6.2.2.6 262v Wis 3[:1]87 262v O2v a3r Lk 16[:25] 262v a3r Rev 7[:15–17] 263r a4r88 Bullinger 263r Ps 16[:11] 263r O2v Isa 61[:10] 263r/v O2v89 Ambrose 263v No sin or impurity etc. 6.2.2.7 264r Isa 61[:10] 264r Lk 9[:30–31] 264r Rev 3[:4] 264r [O3v] Bullinger 264r O3v Rev 4[:4] 264v O4r90 Bullinger 264v Rev 6[:9–12] 264v O3v a3r91 Bullinger 264v–265r [O4r] Rev 7[:9–10] 265r O4r/v Bullinger 265r/v Wis 2[:22] 265v Summa: everything good 6.2.2.8 265v a4r and rich rewards Wis 3[:5] 265v a4r Isa 3[:10] 265v a4r Gen 15[:1] 265v a4r Mt 5[:12] 265v a4r

86 Specker’s rubric combined with the previous one by Garcaeus (cf. section 6.2.2.3), who then lists the prooftexts for both topics in two consecutive paragraphs. 87 Locus given as Wis 2 by all three authors. 88 Quoted after Rev 6, right before the final summary, by Faber. 89 From here on, Garcaeus significantly diverges from Specker, although after a page there come two more pages that echo (but do not closely agree with) Specker’s seventh point (cf. section 6.2.2.7). 90 Quoted out of sequence by Garcaeus, between Bullinger’s commentary on Rev 6 and the citation from Rev 7. 91 Here follows a commentary of a page for which Specker’s chapter constitutes no source.

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In the course of the chapter, Specker offers fifty-eight excerpts, forty-two of them from the Bible, and arranges them into twelve rubrics with sixteen headings.92 Ten of his rubrics and forty-six of his prooftexts, thirty-five from the Bible, are reproduced by at least one of his followers and, within the corresponding sections of the texts, only two scripture verses and a couple of short commentaries have no basis in Vom leiblichen Todt. Add to these numbers that the sequence of so many items is only reshuffled in a handful of instances, and the conclusion that Faber and Garcaeus were working with a copy of Specker’s book on their desk will be effectively unavoidable, even before noting such minor issues that two of Specker’s three odd references—where the locus cited does not match the actual quotation—are reproduced by both later writers.93

4.2 Textual borrowing

It is not for lack of further evidence that I present here no more chapter analyses. As Table 4.1 suggests, they could be readily supplied, and I shall indeed take a comparative look at a few more themes in the course of the theological analysis offered in the next two chapters. As far as my textual thesis goes, however, that is already sufficiently confirmed by what has been seen. What remains to be shown is that the correspondences extend to the level of wording as well. A few, almost haphazardly chosen, examples will illustrate the point. Introducing the third type of arguments for the soul’s immortality (from God’s judgement), Specker supplies a long rubric which can be easily divided into eight semantic units: ‘(1) Thirdly, (2) [we can argue] from God’s judgement (3) that God everywhere frightens the godless (4) and comforts the pious [with the soul’s immortality]. (5) How could that be (6) if the Epicureans’ notion (7) were true (8) that man goes to nothing both body and soul?’ The corresponding passage from Faber is remarkably similar. It contains the exact same semantic units and only the order of the last two is reversed. Further, of the thirty-six words that make up Specker’s passage and of Faber’s forty-three, twenty-two, or over sixty percent of Specker’s and over fifty of Faber’s, are identical (Table 4.7). The proportions are

92 The surplus is the result of the chapter’s complex internal structure. 93 Cf. nn. 82, 84, and 87 to Table 4.6.

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even more striking if we focus exclusively on substantial words94—let alone we considered semantic synonyms—but there is no need to belabour the obvious.95

Table 4.7 Specker’s and Faber’s rubric for the arguments from God’s judgement for the souls immortality

v r Specker (1560) 222 Common Faber (1569) Y5 96 words 96 Text Unit Words Words Unit Text Zům Dritten/ (1) 2 1 4 (1) Die dritte beweisung ist auß Gottes gericht/ (2) 3 2 3 (2) das Gericht Gottes / das Gott allenthalben der in der Schrifft tröuwet zůschrecken die (3) 7 4 9 (3) allenthalben die Gottlosen Gottlosen / damit bedrewet / vnd zůtrösten die Frommen. (4) 4 4 4 (4) vnd die frommen tröstet / Wie köndte solches sein/ (5) 4 0 4 (5) welchs ohne noth were/ so der Epicureer wa der Epicurer meinung (6) 4 2 4 (6) schwermerey/ das leib vnd seel miteinander war were/ (7) 2 297 10 (8) vnnd zugleich stürben vnd vntergiengen / das der mensch an leyb war were / vnd bestehen (8) 10 398 5 (7) vnd seele zů nicht werde? könte Total: 36 22 43

Without such numeric analysis, I include a few more pairs of quotations that speak for themselves (Table 4.8).99

94 Twelve of Specker’s seventeen and Faber’s nineteen are common; that’s a correspondence of over seventy and sixty percent, respectively. 95 Specker (1560) 222v and Faber (1569) Y5r. 96 Italics added (common words italicised). 97 In unit 7. 98 In unit 8. 99 Since the point is to establish textual correspondence, I will only cite the originals.

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Table 4.8 Examples of close textual correspondences outside formal quotations between Specker and Faber100

Specker (1560) Faber (1569) Zům Andern / würt die vnsterblichkeyt der seelen/ Zum andern wird die vnsterbligkeit der Seelen bewisen/vnd des leibs/ vnd auch deß leibs nach der aufferstehung der todten / auß dem leyden vnd sterben Christi/ aus dem leiden vnd sterben deß Herrn Christi/ vnd auß dem Glauben an denselbigen/ vnd aus dem glauben an jhn / das er zůr erlösung vnserer seelen vnnd leybs / das er zur erlösung deß leibs vnd der seelen / gelitten hat / gelitten hat / damit wir dardurch vom ewigen todt erlöset/ auff das wir dadurch vom ewigen tode erlöset / zůr seeligen vnsterblichkeyt kommen/ zur seligen vnsterbligkeit komen könten/ ohne das were solch groß leyden/ denn sonst würde das leiden vnd sterben des Sohns Gottes vmb sunst vnnd vergebens. vergeben vnd vmb sonst geschehen sein. (222r) (Y4v–5r)

Die Seelen oder Geyster der gerechten / Der Gerechten vnd seligen Menschen seelen/ werden von der krafft vnnd handt werden durch die krafft vnd hand des Allmechtigen Gottes / des Vatters/ Gottes deß allmechtigen Vaters / vnnd seines Sons / vnsers Herren Jesu Christi/ Sohns vnd des heyligen Gestes/ durchs wort vnd glauben/ vnd heiligen Geists / durchs wort vnd glauben auffgenommen vnd behalten. auffgenommen vnd behalten/ (252v) (Z6v)

Was für ein leben sey/ vnd welcherley Was für ein leben / vnd welcher gestalt der Heyligen Seelen im Himmel/ der Seligen vnd Heiligen seelen im himel sey / auß der heyligen Göttlichen schrifft. Bericht aus den zeugnissen der heiligen Schrifft. . . . Vnd ist nu demnach der seligen seelen leben / ein leben Jn der gemeynschafft Gottes in einer lieblichen gemeinschafft Gottes/ vnnd Christi / vnnd des heyligen Geystes / desß Herrn Christi / vnd des heiligen Geistes / vnd aller HimelischerÐ güter/ vnd aller himlischen güter / sampt den heiligen Engeln / sampt den heiligen Engeln/ vnd allen Außerwöhlten/ vnd allen außerwehlten / welche sie warhafftig sehen/entpfinden/ welche sie warhafftig sehen / empfinden vnd verstehen/darinnen auch verstehen/ darinnen auch vnaußsprechliche freüd vnd wunne haben. haben/vnaussprehcliche frewde vnd wonne. (258r) (a1r–2r)

In each case, the Speckerian text constitutes a heading, while Faber’s corresponding passage

100 Words shared between parallel quotations have been italicised.

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appears as running text without any indication of borrowing. There are numerous other examples of comparable parallels, some of which are listed in Table 4.9.

Table 4.9 Some major textual correspondences outside formal quotations between Specker and Faber

Specker Faber Topic Type of text (1560) (1569) Arguments from creation 221v Y4v Specker’s rubric adapted Arguments from redemption101 222r Y4v–5r Specker’s rubric adapted Arguments from judgement102 222v Y5r Specker’s rubric adapted On 1 Sam 25[:29]103 228v Y7v Unmarked quotation in Faber On Jn 5[:24] 251v Z5v–6r Unmarked quotation in Faber How souls come to their place101 252v Z6v Specker’s rubric adapted Fellowship with God and angels101 258r a1v–2r Specker’s rubric adapted Life of righteous souls 260v–262v a2v 3 of Specker’s headings combined Occupation of righteous souls 269r–270r b1r 2 of Specker’s headings combined Heavenly worship service 271v–272r b1v 5 of Specker’s headings combined Appearance of souls on earth 275v b7v Specker’s rubric adapted On Chrysostom’s homily103 278r/v b8v–c1r Unmarked quotation in Faber

It is important to emphasise that all of them are ‘unmarked’ cases, that is, instances outside formally recognisable quotations such as the many Luther passages that both authors share. It will be quite evident to any reader that the similarities far exceed a level that could be considered accidental. Faber must have had a copy of Specker’s text to reproduce it so faithfully. Garcaeus’ case is somewhat more complicated but not essentially different. He does occasionally adapt Specker’s headings, either as his own titles or incorporated in his running text,104 but his typical form of borrowing is the unmarked quotation of which we only have a few examples in Faber. The Sterbbüchlein is permeated with them. We have already seen a handful, not all unmarked, in the ‘means’ chapter (Table 4.5),105 and Table 4.10 offers an admittedly incomplete further selection.

101 For details, see Table 4.8. 102 For details, see Table 4.7. 103 For details, see Table 4.13. 104 Cf. e.g. Specker 226v and 266r with Garcaeus G3v and P8r, respectively, for the former, and Specker 262v with Garcaeus O2r/v for the latter. 105 Between Specker 253v–256v and Garcaeus L2v–4v, excluded from Table 4.10.

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Table 4.10 Some major textual correspondences outside formal quotations between Specker and Garcaeus

Topic Specker (1560) Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) Original source On Rev 6[:9–10] (soul sleep) 223v C8v–D1r Bullinger On Rev 20[:4–6] (soul sleep)106 224r D1r Bullinger Name ‘Gehenna’ 241v H1v–2r Chyträus On Rev 14:13 250v–251r K5v–6v Bullinger On Jn 5:24107 251v K7r Specker’s own text Sect of Dormitians108 257v M4r Bullinger On Jn 17[:24] 258v M8v–N1r Chrysostom Souls’ fellowship with God106 259r M8r/v Simon de Cassia On Rev 2[:17]106 262r O2r Bullinger On Rev 3[:4]106 264r O3v Bullinger On Rev 14[:4–5] 269v–270r P3r Bullinger On Rev 6[:9–10] 275r P7r Bullinger On Chrysostom’s homily107 278r/v M1r Specker’s own text

It might be registered in passing that the majority of Garcaeus’ unmarked quotations are ultimately from contemporary authors, and he is much more prepared to acknowledge at least the author of an idea he borrows via Specker when it is to be traced back to Luther or a church father. That may reveal something of the understanding and status of intellectual property in the sixteenth century. Alternatively, since Bullinger’s silent conscription is indeed a prominent feature of the Sterbbüchlein, confessional considerations may also have played a part in the story. The Zurich Reformer belonged, after all, to the rival Reformed camp. That, however, is only an aside. The important thing to note is that those listed in Table 4.10 are all unmarked citations or close paraphrases. They do not include the borrowing of biblical prooftexts or secondary supporting evidence where the source, at least by the author’s name, is identified. Of those, we have literally hundreds more in Garcaeus’ work, but I treated them as structural parallels. My point here is that, however unlikely that two different authors should produce an overlap of ninety percent in terms of their prooftexts, especially if their order is essentially also the same, it is still another degree of correspondence when passages that are not formally attributed to alien sources but routinely occur incorporated into the author’s own running text repeatedly turn out to have a counterpart in another work. That is

106 For details, see Table 4.11. 107 For details, see Table 4.13. 108 Cf. n. 77 on p. 162, above.

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exactly the case of the Sterbbüchlein when examined against Vom leiblichen Todt. Table 4.11 presents a few examples of such similarities.

Table 4.11 Examples of close textual correspondences outside formal quotations between Specker and Garcaeus109

Specker (1560) Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) Der heylige Joannes / meldet Dis gesicht stimmet mit dem vorigen / vnd erkläret hierinn etliche herrliche/ vnd vnd erkleret diese notwendige lere / notwendige lehren/ als nemlich wie es vmb die stehe/so wie es vmb die stehe /so den Antichrist verwerffen / entweder vmb Christus willen getödtet werden oder vmb Christus willen getödtet werden / / oder den Antichrist verwerfen/ das nemlich jre seelen nit schlaffen das nemlich jre Seelen nicht schlaffen / biß an das Jüngste gericht/ bis an das zukünfftige gericht/ sonder bey vnd mit Christo im Hümmel sondern das sie in jrer vnsterbligkeit mit Christo leben/[et]c. leben. (224r) (D1r)

Diß ist ein vnaußsprechliche wirdigung/ Ah das ist eine vnerforschliche wirdigkeit vnnd ein vnaußforschliche liebe/ vnd vnaussprchliche liebe / vns Christen zugesagt / das Christus die menschen theüwr geachtet hat/ das Christus die Menschen so thewr achtet das er vmb jrent willen auff erden kommen /das er vmb vnsernt willen auff Erden komen / ist/ vnd sucht nicht allein das verloren vnd verdorben/ das er sůchet/die verdorben waren/ vnd sie durch seinen todt vnd blůt / zů einwohnern des Hümmels machet/ sondern machet vns auch zu einwonern des Himels durch seinen tod blut vnd gantzen gehorsam / das wir mit jhm in seines Vatters hauß das wir nu mit jm in seines Vaters hause / gemeynschafft hetten/ auch vnsere gemeinschafft vnd mansion / oder bleibende stat haben/ er hat auch nit gewölt / das wir vñ nicht wil/ das wir/ sein fleisch vnd blut/ gar tewr erkaufft/ an orten von jhm vnderscheyden sein/ an besonderen orten von jm vnterscheiden sein sollen sondern sagt/wa ich biñ/da solt jr auch sein. / sondern sagt/ Wo ich bin/da solt jr auch sein. (259r) (M8r/v)

Christus verheißt ein weisses steynlin zů Ja es lautet des Herrn Christi zusag also geben/ Apocalip. 2.110 . . .

109 Words shared between parallel quotations have been italicised. 110 Here follows Rev 2:17b in the original.

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Specker (1560) Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) das ist / nachlassung vnd verzeihung aller das ist/ich will allen bestendigen/ gleubigen sünden/ vnd dasselbig vollkomen.Ð nachlassen vnd verzeihen alle jre sünde/ Denn Christus erlediget recht vnd warlich das sie recht vnd warhafftig von sünden/von der krafft der sünden/ alle jrer sünden/straff vnd von der verdamnußÐ . vnd ewiger verdamnis sollen entlediget werden / Er sihet aber hiemit auff dem brauch der hat hiemit gesehen auff den gerichts brauch bey den Alten in gerichten/ alten / in denen man die leüt mit schwartzen steynlin in welchen man die Leute mit schwartzen steinen zum zům todt verurtheylet / tod verurteilet/ vnnd mit weissen ledig gelassen hat/ mit weisen ledig gelassen hat. (262r) (O2r)

Dann Christus ist der gleübigen weiß kleyd / Denn Christus ist der gelubigen schönes weisses kleid/ gerechtigkeyt vnd vnschuld/ gerechtigkeit vnd vnschuld / er bedecket alle vnserer flecken vnd masen/ bedecket alle vnsere flecken/ er thůt ab die schandtliche blösse/ thut ab alles das vns vngestalt machet/ vnd mit schanden entblöset / er zieret mit allerley tugenden/ zieret vns mit seiner heiligkeit / das wir ehrlich vnd rechtschaffen das wir seine geliebte Braut ehrlich/sein/ schon Psal. 45. geschmücket/ für Gott in heyligem wandel erscheynen. für Gott in aller heiligkeit vnd gerechtigkeit mügen (264r) erscheinen/ (Z6v)

I have purposely selected relatively loosely corresponding excerpts for three reasons. First, they offer a taste of the freedom and creativity with which Garcaeus treated his sources. Second, they are altogether typical of unmarked quotations in the Sterbbüchlein. Many of the borrowings are difficult to detect because he closely paraphrases, rather than quotes verbatim, his source, but in the sixteenth century a greater degree of liberty seems to be admissible in treating one’s sources than we are accustomed to, and the standardisation of orthography is still at an insipient stage, where literal transcription, faithful to the letter, is just not an established norm. Finally, if my argument that the textual parallels decidedly exceed a level that could be written off as coincidence holds for these ‘weaker’ passages, it will all the more work for paragraphs where Garcaeus stayed closer to his sources. The impression that a perusal of Table 4.11 conveys can be expressed in quantitative terms. Comparing the number of shared words against the total length of each quotation, we shall find that the correspondence in terms of the longer version (always Garcaeus’) is between fifty and sixty per cent, and in terms of the shorter text (Specker’s original) it might even

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exceed eighty per cent. The numbers are even more striking if we look at somewhat larger semantic units (clauses or phrases as the text naturally presents, and as is roughly mirrored by the number of lines in Table 4.11), which to some extent cover up the differences in grammatical structure. On this analysis, the correspondence level rises to roughly eighty to ninety per cent in terms of the longer excerpts, and on two occasions we find every single meaningful constituent of Specker’s text repeated by Garcaeus (Table 4.12).

Table 4.12 Quantitative analysis of textual correspondence between passages in Table 4.11

Specker (1560) Words (Units) Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) Page no. % of shared Total Shared Total % of shared Page no. 224r 66.0 (87.5) 50 (8) 33 (7) 51 (8) 54.7 (87.5) D1r 259r 82.7 (100.0) 75 (13) 62 (13) 104 (16) 59.6 (81.2) M8r/v 262r 57.1 (80.0) 63 (10) 36 (8) 67 (10) 53.7 (80) O2r 264r 67.5 (100.0) 40 (7) 27 (7) 52 (9) 51.9 (77.8) Y6r Total 69.3 (92.1) 228 (38) 158 (35) 274 (43) 57.7 (81.4) Total

Further, in the four pairs of a combined complexity of about forty semantic units, there are only four reversals in total. Otherwise the order of the units is also maintained. I find it practically impossible that such overlap would be produced by anything but conscious reliance of the later text on the earlier one as its source. Finally, two last pieces of evidence. A fifty-word commentary on John 5:24 that is probably of Specker’s formulation is reproduced by Garcaeus and Faber at a correspondence rate of 84.9 and 83.3 (or 85.4) per cent, respectively.111 Even more strikingly, commenting on an important passage from Chrysostom’s 28th Homily on the Gospel of Matthew, which I will consider in detail in sections 6.5–6.7, Specker produces a paragraph of roughly 170 words. This passage, like a few others in Vom leiblichen Todt, is set in smaller type, thereby clearly marking it off as Specker’s own. It is picked up by both Garcaeus and Faber, and incorporated in their own works—needless to say, without any acknowledgement. The significance of these correspondences lies not least in the fact that they are Specker’s own wording other than a heading that might be deemed inherent in the topic. Rather, the main issue is that in these instances there is surely no common third (or, actually, fourth) source

111 Of Specker’s 53 words, 45 can be found in Garcaeus’ 53, and 40 in Faber’s 48 (or 41 in 48 if we count as two a word that he writes together, although they appear as separate in Specker). 39 (or 40) words appear in all three texts.

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on which all writers might have independently drawn, however unlikely that is if the corresponding instances number in the hundreds. These passages Garcaeus and Faber could only have found in Specker’s book. I reproduce their respective texts in a three-column comparative format which barely requires further comment or additional quantitative analysis (Table 4.13).

Table 4.13 Some major textual correspondences outside formal quotations between Specker and Faber112

Specker (1560)1560) Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) Faber (1569) Jst diß nicht ein mächtiger Dis ist gar ein gülden Spruch/ Dieses ist ein gewaltiger Spruch/ Spruch/ voll trost vnd lehre / voll reiches trost vnd lehren/ voll trosts vnd lehre / in welchem Christus keyne in welcher der HERR Christus darinne Christus keinen spacia & interualla temporum keine spacia & interualla vnterscheid oder mittel machet & locorum machet/ temporum & locorum machet/ / wie fern vñ lang vom todt zům wie fern vnd lang vom tod zum wie fern oder wie lang es sey vom leben seye / leben sey/ tode zum leben/ sondern fasset also dise beyde sondern fasset beides zusamen/ sondern fasset es also beide zůsamen/Ð zusamen/ das in dem augenblick / das in dem augenblick / das in dem augenblick/ wann die sele auß dem leyb faret / wenn die Seele aus dem Leibe wenn die seele vom leib ausferet/ feret/ sie schon im leben ist. sie schon im leben sey. sie schon im leben ist. (251v) (K7r) (Z5v–6r)

Jn disen worten Chrysostomi / Also hat S. Chrysostomus ist der Teüffel recht abgemalet / den Teuffel recht abgemalet / wie er ein Mörder vnnd Lugner ist. Darumb hüte sich jederman/ Darumb hüte sich ein jeder / vnd bezeuget das aus Gottes word / das er solche wandlende[!] das wir die wallenden das er die wandernde vnnd jrrende Geyster / vnd jrrenden Geister/ vnd jrrende Geister nicht für Seelen nicht für Seelen nicht halte für seelen der Abgestorbenen halte / der abgestorbenen / der verstorbenen/ sondern fur den Teuffel selbs. sondern für Teuffel selbst halten sondern für eitel Teuffel. sollen. Am Jüngsten tag würt Gott Denn am jüngsten tage wird Gott die Seelen erscheynen lassen / die Seelen erscheinen lassen /

112 Words shared between parallel quotations have been italicised.

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Specker (1560)1560) Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) Faber (1569) wie im bůch der Offenbarung wie im buch der Offenbarung am zwenzigsten geschriben stehet / am 20.cap. geschrieben stehet/ vnd Judas Vnd S. Judas in seiner Epistel auß der weyssagung des heyligen aus der weissagung des Patriarchen Enochs bezeüget. Patriarchen Enochs anzeiget. Hie zwischen dem Jungsten tag Für dem Jüngsten tag aber würt gewißlich keyn Seele mehr wird gewißlich keine seele erscheinen. erscheinen. Dann warzů darff es Vnd was darff es auch des erscheynens / des erscheinens/ hat nicht der Sohn Gottes klar dieweil der Sohn Gottes klar bezeuget angezeiget hat / von der Seelen standt vnnd wesen was der seelen stand vnd wesen nach diesem leben? sey nach diesem leben/ Was wöllen wir weyter/ dann er im bůch der wie in S. Johann. Offenbarungen Offenbarung/ durch seinen allenthalben zusehen ist. heyligen Apostel/ (b8v–c1r) vns von den seelen vnd jrer herrlichkeyt vnd seligkeyt gelehret hat? Darumb sollen Bey der Lere wollen wir darbey bleiben / wir bleiben / Gott für dise hohe tröstliche lehre vnd offenbarung/dancken/ heylig leben/vnd stäts bitten/ vnd daneben Gott allezeit anruffen vnd bitten/ er wolle jm vnser Selichen lassen befohlen sein / das wir auch in vnserm letsten das wir in vnserm letzten ende ende/ selig mügen abscheiden / in die gemeynschafft der vnd in die gemeinschafft aller selbigen/ Heiligen/ zu einer ewigen frewdenreichen ruhe mögen auffgenommen werden/ auffgenommen werden/ durch vnsern Herren Jesum durch vnsern Herrn Jhesum Christum/Amen. Christum/ Amen. (278r/v) (M1r)

What is immediately evident from this comparison is not simply that Garcaeus and Faber borrowed from Specker, but also that they borrowed differently, and one cannot have mediated Specker’s original to the other.

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There remains one last issue to consider. I think it is highly unlikely that Garcaeus’ and Faber’s borrowings were not directly from Specker but all three works, including Vom leiblichen Todt, should go back to a common source. The hypothesis is prima facie improbable. Even in the case of two texts, it is usually only a theoretical possibility that they derive from a common third source rather than one depends on the other. That is, of course, the case with the Sterbbüchlein and the Tractetlein, but their correspondences are much more muted than those of either to Specker’s work. For three texts to share the same source and to be independent of each other beyond that, is extremely improbable in my estimate. But in this particular case we can much sharpen the argument. Specker may not have been the most original writer, but his scholarship was quite up-to-date. He was citing works like Johann Funck’s (1518–1566) Chronologia of 1552, David Chyträus’ Onomasticon theologicum and Heinrich Bullinger’s sermon series on Revelation, both of which appeared first in 1557. In fact, he most probably used Ludwig Lavater’s 1558 German translation of the latter work.113 That leaves a very narrow window for a hypothetical common source that had to be written and published, not to mention that it also had to be picked up and read by Specker, between 1558 and 1560.114 Everything considered, I take it to be beyond reasonable doubt that both Garcaeus and Faber were familiar with, and borrowed extensively from, Specker’s work. To insist that Garcaeus and Faber are heavily indebted to Specker is not to suggest that they were slavishly copying their source. That such a claim is untenable should be clear from the foregoing comparisons. I will further analyse their differences in the next chapters when I turn to a theological analysis of the corpus. At this stage, I only want to make a few general remarks. While the Sterbbüchlein is unthinkable in its present form without the Vom leiblichen Todt, the latter work probably only accounts for half or so of the material in Garcaeus’ book and perhaps a somewhat higher proportion of its argument. In other words,

113 Cf., e.g., Specker (1560) 262r (on Rev 2:17), 264r (on Rev 3:4), 223v, 264v–265r and 275r (all on Rev 6:9–10), 250v–51r (on Rev 14:13) and 269v–270r (on Rev 14:4–5) with Bullinger (1558 [1557]) 29r (Rev 2), 37r (Rev 3), 65v, 67v and 66v–67r (Rev 6), 154r–155v and 149v (Rev 14), respectively. If I am right in this conclusion, it might be used—through detailed textual analyses demonstrating Specker’s textual mediation between Garcaeus and Lavater’s Bullinger—further to demonstrate the Sterbbüchlein’s dependence on Vom leiblichen Todt. That thesis, however, has already been sufficiently established. 114 Further analysis of Specker’s sources might confirm the terminus a quo. Since he does occasionally cite Latin texts to which he then adds his own translation, we can presume that where he only cites German versions, he is in fact relying on published translations. If that indeed is the case, then he might be quoting Luther’s Genesisvorlesung from the 1558 edition of his collected works.

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Garcaeus did bring in new material and new ideas in large measure. We have also seen that he frequently expanded or rearranged what he found in Specker. Faber, on the other hand, depends on the Strasbourger to a much larger degree. His work consisted chiefly in thinning out much of what Specker amassed through his copious reading. What he kept was little beyond a significant proportion of the biblical prooftexts and Luther quotations, which he also augmented in a few rare instances. If we extracted everything from the Tractetlein that derives from Vom leiblichen Todt, we would not have much left, and it would be probably unrecognisable as an intellectual achievement. Even so, Faber also left his theological imprint on the finished text.115

4.3 Musculus between Specker and Garcaeus

Such excitingly clear cases as the Specker–Garcaeus–Faber triangle are rare in the history of ideas, and Musculus’ place in relation to the rest of the corpus cannot be determined with any comparable degree of confidence. Chronologically, his treatise is an early text and could possibly be aware only of Specker (and Tacius). Conversely, all other texts might theoretically draw on his arguments. And indeed, the treatises offer some clues that suggest that we should perhaps not consider the later development of the Speckerian tradition entirely independent of Musculus. Considering, first, Musculus’ possible reliance on Specker, it carries no weight that a group of biblical prooftexts such as God holding the righteous souls (Wis 3:1), Christ’s warning that the disciples should ‘not fear those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul’ (Mt 10:28), his retort to the Sadducees (Mt 22:31–32) or promise to the right thief (Lk 23:43), the parable of Lazarus (Lk 16:19–31), John’s vision of the souls under the altar (Rev 6:9–10), Paul’s paradisal ecstasy (2 Cor 12:2–4) or his desire to be with Christ (Phil 1:23) appear both in Specker and Musculus, even if they occur at structurally similar junctures. Those are pivotal scriptural evidence for the immortality of the soul, and are likely to surface

115 I will only allude to a few details as illustration here; they will be treated more fully in subsequent chapters. At the end of chapter 6, Faber significantly replaced a quotation from 2 Maccabees 15 with a sermon by Caspar Cruciger (for a detailed interpretation, see p. 275, below). His discussion of the departed souls’ knowledge is quite original, although Specker is his clearly recognisable source material (cf. section 6.2). Finally, at the end of his eighth chapter, the 2 Maccabees 15 evidence is radically reinterpreted from its reading at the beginning of Specker’s ninth chapter (cf. p. 287, below).

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in any argument on the topic.116 It is an amusing little detail that the last verse can be read as motto on the title pages of both the Sterbbüchlein and the Gelegenheit, but we need more solid ground to build on if any connection is to be established between those two texts. Likewise immaterial is the inclusion of Chrysostom’s homily on Matthew 8:23–24, for that is a widely quoted passage, as foundational, we shall see in chapter 6, for the doctrine as the above Bible verses. Besides, Musculus uses a different translation from Specker.117 Nor is it greatly significant that Wisdom 5 and the parable of Lazarus appear together as prooftexts for the affirmation that the damned think back on their past pleasures. Once the question is raised, they are obvious choices. It is true that the issue is not frequently discussed—Garcaeus is the only one to explicitly make the point—yet the notion itself can easily emerge from reflections on those passages.118 There are also some thematic points of contact beyond the immediately obvious like the fact of the soul’s immortality, the occupation of the righteous souls or the state of the damned. They include the souls’ interim abode and its names as well as the problem of their appearance on earth, but most of Specker’s chief concerns are absent from Musculus and vice versa. The Frankfurt theologian’s is surely one of the most original approaches in the whole corpus, which exhibits no tangible signs of having absorbed any influences from Specker or Tacius. In short, while it is of course possible that Musculus knew Specker’s work, I do not believe we have sufficient evidence to posit any direct connection between them, although they did belong to the same larger tradition of mid- sixteenth-century Lutheranism, and thus did have many presuppositions, ideas, and commitments in common. The question is definitely more open when we turn to the Gelegenheit’s potential impact on later texts. Faber relies on Specker so closely that there is virtually no room for Musculus in the Tractetlein, but Garcaeus’ case is intriguing. Musculus seeks to establish the immortality of the soul in question 2. When he turns to scriptural proofs, he begins with the example of Abel, followed by Enoch, Elijah and Christ, before he returns to Genesis and Abraham and the other patriarchs. The whole section extends over three pages or five hundred words, and Garcaeus’ fifth argument in his immortality chapter exhibits remarkable

116 With perhaps the exception of 2 Cor 12:2–4, which is primarily a witness for the name paradise, but in that context quite elementary. Cf. p. 182, below. 117 See Specker (1560) 277v–278r and Musculus (1565) D5r–6r. 118 Cf. Specker (1560) 288r, Musculus (1565) C4v, and Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) T5v–6r.

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similarities to it. In terms of actual wording, there are only echoes to be heard without the surface correspondences becoming fully convincing. The structure of the text, however, quite closely corresponds to Musculus’. I do not simply mean the examples and their order; the shared topic might perhaps account for that. But the details of what is said of each also run parallel, and they include several semantic units, sometimes as many as half a dozen, for each example. There are only a few more or less significant dissimilarities. The structural pointers (chiefly the numbering of the examples) differ; a generalising remark concerning 1 Corinthians 15 is missing from Garcaeus, who expands on some features of the post-Easter events instead, introduces the story of the transfiguration as well and calls Abraham the father of all believers. But that already comes towards the end of the passage where the Gelegenheit and the Sterbbüchlein already begin to part ways.119 Otherwise, the two texts are structurally very close, and I find it doubtful if such sustained correspondences could be purely accidental (Table 4.14).

Table 4.14 Correspondences in the biblical arguments for the immortality of the soul in Musculus and Garcaeus120

Musculus Garcaeus Topic (1565) (1573 [°1568]) B7r Abel (Gen 4:10) C6r B7r - first of all dead people C6r B7r - though killed by his brother C6r B7r - described by Moses as if still alive C6r B7r - can still call and cry to God C6r B7r - God answers his prayer C6r B7r - and speaks to Cain C6r B7v Enoch (Gen 5:24) C6r B7v - if taken by God, must be alive C6r/v B7v - for God is the God of the living (Mt 19 [i.e. 22:32])121 C6v B7v 3 examples of continued human existence after this life B7v (i) in first age of world, before flood: Enoch C6v B7v (ii) in second age of world, between flood and Christ: Elijah C6v B7v Elijah (2 Kgs 2:11) C6v B7v - taken in chariot of fire C6v B7v–8r - in order to give hope of another life to the saints C6v

119 Musculus (1565) B7r–C1r and Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) C6r–7v. 120 Topics unique to Musculus are italicised; those that only occur in Garcaeus are marked with an asterisk (*). 121 Garcaeus gets the Matthew chapter reference right and adds the Lukan parallel (Lk 20[:38]) as well.

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Musculus Garcaeus Topic (1565) (1573 [°1568]) B8r (iii) in third age of world: Christ’s resurrection In NT: risen Christ spoke with his [disciples]* C6v B8r - as first fruits (1 Cor 15:20) C6v B8r - 1 Cor 15: Paul proves there is a resurrection and an eternal life - went to heaven and proved the power of his resurrection* C6v Transfiguration: (Lk 9:28–36, Mt 17:1–8, Mk 9:2–10)* C7r - Jesus’ impending death in Jerusalem* C7r - Moses and Elijah recognised by disciples, must then be alive* C7r B8r Abraham (Gen 25:8) C7r - father of all believers* C7r B8r/v - gathered to his people C7r B8v - buried according to the body C7r B8v - his [forefathers] also buried before him B8v - yet there is a people still together C7r B8v - Abraham goes to them C7r B8v - Lazarus carried to Abraham’s bosom (Lk 16:22)122 C7v B8v - Abraham and his people must then be and live somewhere B8v - where angels can carry Lazarus B8v - typical of the way OT speaks of patriarchs123 C7r B8v - Isaac, Jacob and others124

If the verbal echoes, though quite distinct, are perhaps statistically not significant in the entirety of the long passage just analysed, and units within which they could be numerically demonstrated are too fragmentary to impress, there are several paragraphs where correspondences can be pointed out not only on the structural level but also on the level of words (Table 4.15).

Table 4.15 Textual echoes of Musculus’ Gelegenheit in Garcaeus’ Sterbbüchlein125

Musculus (1565) Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) NAch dem jederman begeret / Denn dieweil all Menschen/ von Natur/ nicht alleien Christen / sondern auch Heiden sich darumb bekümmern/

122 Expanded on by Garcaeus, who gives a brief summary of the parable and diverges from Musculus from this point on. 123 Moved forward by Garcaeus, after Abraham as father of all believers. 124 Interpreted via Mark 22 [i.e. Mt 22:32] by Musculus, while Garcaeus goes his separate way. 125 Words shared between parallel quotations have been italicised.

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Musculus (1565) Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) auch lust vnd lieb hat zu wissen / vnd darnach mit sonderlichen lust vnd lieb zuforschen sich bemühen/ was es doch mit den verstorbenē was es mit der verstorbenen Seelen müge fur ein gelegenheit haben/ für gelegenheit hab/ was jhr thun vnd wesen sey/ was jr thun vnd wesen/ wo sie sich verhalten bis auff die gemeine Aufferstehung dieses fleisches/ von jrem abschied von jrem abschiede anzurechnen / biss zur aufferstehung der Thoden/ (B7r/v) (B1r)

[JN diesem stück haben sich]126 Das auch die Heiden auch die Heiden hart bemühet/ aus dem natürlichen Liecht/ vnd die lenge aus dem Natürlichen liecht jrer das haben erkündiget vernunfft / dis gewis erkündiget vnnd vnwidersprechlich erforschet/ vnd vnwidersprechlich geschlossen/ das die Seele mit dem leib nicht sterbe / das die Seele ein vnsterblich wesen habe/ sondern vnsterblich sey vnd bleibe / vnd nach dem abschied vom leibe / auch da sie schon vom Leibe abscheidet/ jr leben/ jr leben vnd vnsterbligkeit behalte/ thun vnd wesen habe/ jr thun/natur vnd wesen/ Vnd dis erweisen die Heidnischen Meister vnd dis wird von verstendigen Philosophis vnd Lerer/so starck vnd krefftig/ starck vnd krefftig erweiset. [das jm auch in dem nicht zu wider (C3r/v) sprechen]126 (B6v)

[..zweierley stell vnd ort gemacht / da sie [..die (die Heiden) diese gedancken gehabt/]126 (die Heiden) vermeinet/das] 126 der verstorbenen Seelen sein sollen / das der verstorbenen fromen jre Seelen Als nemlich der fromen auff einer schönen lieblichen grünen Wiesen/ auf einer schönen lieblichen grünen Wiesen wonen/ die sie genant haben Campum Elysium / die sei campum Elysium genant/ Wie wir es nennen möchten das Paradis / Der Bösen aber vnter der Erden/ dagegen der bösen jre wonung haben sollen vnter in einem grausamen vnd der Erden / vnfreundlichen finsteren ort/ an vnfreundlichen finstern örtern / da sie jr qual vnd pein leiden/nach dem sie da sie nach jrem verdienst/ qual vnd pein leiden. im leben verschuldet vnd verdienet. (G4v) (D1r)

126 Bracketed clause excluded from quantitative analysis.

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Musculus (1565) Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) Wo aber derselbige ort sey / WO derselbe ort sey/ ausser dieser Welt / oder in den vntesten orten dieser Welt / können wir eigentlich nicht wissen/ können wir nicht eigentlich berichten / noch etwas gründlichs dauon sagen / weil vns die Schrifft daruon nichts meldet/ dieweil dauon nichts in Gottes wort gemeldet wird / . . . wollē vns auch nicht gros vmb wollen vns auch nichts darumb bekümmern denselbigen Ort bekümmern (H1r) (D4r/v)127

Parallels are undeniable, but one gets the impression from Table 4.15 that the similarities are not as pronounced between Garcaeus and Musculus as they were between Garcaeus and Specker. That is certainly the case on the level of words. The overlap is about fifty percent of the shorter text, not always Musculus’, and only rises once to over seventy per cent, while expressed in proportion to the longer excerpt it once drops as low as under forty per cent. If we analyse the passages in terms of semantic units, however, the figures rise steeply, and the picture changes drastically. The average overlap ratio is now roughly eighty-five percent, or ninety-two percent measured against the shorter versions. The worst figure is a two-thirds common ground, and on two occasions every major semantic element of Musculus’ text has a counterpart in Garcaeus’. The combined semantic complexity of the four pairs amounts to thirty to thirty-two items with only three reversals in all. By and large, Garcaeus’ text flows parallel with Musculus’. The figures based on semantic units fall roughly into the same range as their counterparts in Vom leiblichen Todt and the Sterbbüchlein, where we can know for virtually certain that the latter text was based on the former. Overall, the semantic overlap ratio between selected passages from Musculus and Garcaeus is just slightly under that from Specker and Garcaeus (Table 4.16, cf. Table 4.12).

Table 4.16 Quantitative analysis of textual correspondence between passages in Table 4.15

Musculus (1565) Words (Units) Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) Page no. % of shared Total Shared Total % of shared Page no. B1r 55.3 (100.0) 38 (7) 21 (7) 56 (10) 37.5 (70.0) B7r/v B6v 50.9 (100.0) 53 (10) 27 (10) 54 (11) 50.0 (90.9) C3r/v D1r 53.4 (77.8) 58 (9) 31 (7) 43 (8) 72.1 (87.5) G4v

127 A significant part of the passage omitted. Both texts continue with a prayer to God that we may never see that place, i.e., hell, but they greatly diverge in wording.

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Musculus (1565) Words (Units) Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) Page no. % of shared Total Shared Total % of shared Page no. D4r/v 50.0 (80.0) 36 (5) 18 (4) 37 (6) 48.6 (66.7) H1r Total 52.4 (90.3) 185 (31) 97 (28) 190 (35) 51.1 (80.0) Total

We might further add that the larger context of the passages is usually different in the Sterbbüchlein and the Gelegenheit. In the first instance, Musculus begins the whole treatise and throws the door open to all available evidence; Garcaeus is already commenting on the significance of the parable of Lazarus and Dives. In the second, Musculus is genuinely summarising pagan achievement, while Garcaeus only mentions philosophy to juxtapose the certainty of scriptural witness to it. In the third passage they are virtually at cross purposes; Musculus equates the Elysian fields of classical thought with the Christian paradise, while Garcaeus frames his whole review of ancient concepts with a warning against ‘pagan stupidity’ (‘der Heiden narrenwerck,’ G4v). Only in the last case run the main lines of their reasoning parallel, but even there Musculus takes a more circuitous route whose imprint can be seen, paradoxically, in the options concisely summed up at the beginning of Garcaeus’ version. If we take those factors into consideration, it is rather remarkable that the divergence between Garcaeus and Musculus is not greater. Garcaeus seems to treat passages from Musculus essentially in the same way as he treats his source text from Specker. Consequently, we must conclude that the passages analysed in Table 4.15 and Table 4.16 constitute evidence of Garcaeus’ borrowing from, and thus knowledge of, Musculus’ work. Against this background a few further details are worth noting that might not carry much weight in and of themselves, but as auxiliary evidence are not altogether meaningless. Writing on the abode of departed souls, both authors insert a short paragraph citing Sirach 44:16128 and 2 Corinthians 12:2–4129 as in agreement with, and further supporting, Philippians 1:23.130 More interesting than the structural parallels—either of the larger context which is wrought with such echoes, or of the passages themselves which include the same bits of

128 ‘Enoch pleased the Lord and was taken up, an example of repentance to all generations.’ 129 ‘I know a person in Christ who fourteen years ago was caught up to the third heaven—whether in the body or out of the body I do not know; God knows. And I know that such a person—whether in the body or out of the body I do not know; God knows—was caught up into Paradise and heard things that are not to be told, that no mortal is permitted to repeat.’ 130 Musculus (1565) B3r and Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) G5v.

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quotations and leave the rest at the level of allusion—is that these are the only to occurrences in the whole corpus of the verse from Jesus Sirach. Further, both Garcaeus and Musculus offer it as evidence that Enoch was translated specifically into paradise, hence the parallel with Paul’s vision. Neither the Greek text, however, nor the Luther Bible contains that name.131 Similarly, a few pages later they both quote Luke 16:23132 as a ‘Tartarus’ passage, although the Greek text has Hades, which Luther translates as ‘pain’ and later ‘hell and pain.’133 Again, these are the only examples in the whole corpus where the Lukan verse is cited as evidence of ‘Tartarus.’ While those details are not decisive, they surely point in the same direction as the larger structural and textual correspondences I have documented, and help build a cumulative case for Garcaeus’ reliance on Musculus. The degree of certainty with which we can reach that conclusion is smaller than in the case of Garcaeus’ appropriation of Specker, but perhaps not even commensurately smaller as the Gelegenheit is a lesser source for the Sterbbüchlein than Vom leiblichen Todt is. Ultimately, weighing all available evidence, it seems rational to me to conclude that Garcaeus did know Musculus’ treatise, and occasionally drew on it, although nowhere near as extensively as on Specker’s book.

4.4 Mirus, Pflacher, and Weiser

We need neither savvy detective work nor a particularly keen judgement to conclude that Gregor Weiser relied on Martin Mirus’ Sieben Christliche Predigten. He himself announces his indebtedness as we saw in the previous chapter.134 His case nevertheless has its peculiarity, too, in that Weiser’s Christlicher Bericht appeared in 1583, while Mirus’ work, which it purports to quote, only seven years later in 1590. This surface irregularity is not particularly difficult to explain, though, if we recall that the Regensburg Sermons were originally preached at the Diet in 1575 and suppose, as I submit we should, that subsequently they circulated in manuscript.

131 ‘Enoch gefiel dem Herrn wol, vnd ist weg genomen, das er der welt eine vermanung zur busse were’ (apart from slight changes in spelling, both 1533 and 1545; WA DB 12:270.16, cf. 271.16). 132 ‘In Hades, where he was being tormented, he looked up and saw Abraham far away with Lazarus by his side.’ 133 ‘Als er nu in der Helle vnd in der qual war, hub er seine augen auff, vnd sahe Abraham von ferne, vnd Lazarum in seinem Schos’ (1546); the first clause was simpler in the September Testament (1522), ‘Als er nu ynn der quall war’ (WA DB 6:289.23 and 288.23, respectively). 134 Cf. p. 133, above.

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The close correspondences between Weiser’s quotations in the early 1580s and Mirus’ own publication at the end of the decade bear witness to a rather stable manuscript tradition. In addition to the solution demanded by the dating conundrum, we have further evidence of the manuscript hypothesis in Weiser’s preface, who not only acknowledges his dependence on the Regensburg Sermons and cites Mirus’ permission to use them, but also confirms that they do not yet exist in print: I have ‘taken further explanation, with the a[uthor’s] kind permission, especially from the Regensburg Sermons of Dr. Martin Mirus, court preacher to the elector of Saxony, which, to my knowledge, have not yet come out [in print].’135 Mirus’ fourth sermon, which is the most relevant for my discussion, is quoted by Weiser in six large blocks which, combined, effectively account for the entirety of Mirus’ text. Except for breaking up his source material into smaller units, Weiser only reverses the order of the constituents once. While Mirus’ is logic was to discuss first the state of the blessed and of the damned, then to proceed and draw the lesson from both in turn, Weiser, who separates the fate of the righteous and of the wicked into two questions, moved the first part for the application forward to include it where it thematically belonged. Sermons 5 and 6 are preserved even more intact in his quotations, although there is another reversal in the case of the former, whose shorter first part is cited after the most substantial second section. On the whole, however, Weiser is faithful to his source, which he surely does not attempt to conceal (Table 4.17).

135 ‘..sonderlich aber aus des Herrn D. Martini Miri Churfürstlichen[ ]Sechsischen Hoffpredigers Regenspurgischen Predigten mit seiner A. günstiger verwilligung / weiter erklerung genommen / auff welche weise es / meines wissens nicht ausgegangen’ (A17r). Cf. ‘The venerable and learned Dr. Martin Mirus, court preacher to the elector of Saxony, has also treated, among others, this material very artfully and with special inspiration [in his sermons] on the fifteenth chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians, which he delivered in Regensburg at the election and crowning of the most magnificent lord Rudolph II, the current Roman emperor etc., our most gracious lord. I have, with the permission of the well remembered doctor, fully and entirely incorporated the last four sermons of the same [series], for otherwise they cannot yet be found in print—[namely,] of the immortality of the soul, of purgatory, and of the invocation of the dead saints, [and] of hell and eternal life—and set each part in its due place.’ (‘Vntern andern aber auch diese materiam seher artig/vnd mit sonderlichen Geist gehandelt/ der Ehrwirdige/vnd Hochgelehrte Herr D. Martinus Mirus Churfürstlicher Sechsischer Hoffpredgier vber das 15. Cap. der ersten Epistel an die Corinther / welche er zu Regensprug auffm wahl vnd krönungs tage / des aller Durchleuchtigsten Herrn / Herrn Rudoplhi 2. jtzigen Römischen Keysers/ etc. vnsers aller gnedigsten Herrn / volbracht. Aus denselbigen habe ich mit verwilligung wolgedachtes Herrn Doctoris / die vier letzte Predigten / von vnsterbligkeit der Seelen / vom Fegfewr / vnd von anruffung der verstorbenen Heiligen / von der Hell vnnd ewigen leben (weil sie sonst in offenem druck nicht zu finden) gantz vnd gar mit hirein bracht/ vnd jedes stück an seinen gebührenden ort gesetzt’; B14r/v).

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Table 4.17 The structure of Weiser’s borrowing from Mirus’ Regensburg Sermons

Topic Mirus (1590 [°1575]) Weiser (1583b) Immortality of soul Serm. 4, pt. 1 N1v–3v Pt. 1, q. 1 7–14 Names of souls’ interim abode Serm. 4, pt. 2[.1] N3v–O2r Pt. 1, q. 2 16–23 State of righteous souls Serm. 4, pt. 2[.2] O2r–3r Pt. 1, q. 3 24–28 State of damned souls Serm. 4, pt. 2[.3] O3r/v Pt. 1, q. 4 30–32 Application for the righteous136 Serm. 4, pt. 2 (appl. [1]) O3v–4r Pt. 1, q. 3 28–29 Application for the godless Serm. 4, pt. 2 (appl. [2]) O4r Pt. 1, q. 4 32–33 Appearance of souls on earth137 Serm. 5, pt. 1 O4v–P1v On purgatory 84–87 Purgatory Serm. 5, pt. 2 P1v–Q3r On purgatory 52–72 Invocation of saints Serm. 6 Q3r–T2r On purgatory 88–123

Before we begin to take a detailed look at the correspondences between Mirus and Weiser, there is yet a major factor to consider. The Christlicher Bericht was not the only text in the early 1580s that demonstrably drew on the Regensburg Sermons, although it stands alone in acknowledging the fact. In sermon 10 of Die gantze Lehr, Moses Pflacher also cited them extensively albeit tacitly. He treated his source more liberally than Weiser, both in terms of structural arrangement and actual citation, but substantial blocks of Mirus’ text are clearly recognisable in the antepenultimate homily of his series. In fact, some three quarters of sermon 10 derives structurally-thematically from Sieben Christliche Predigten, and textual correspondences must also be around fifty per cent. Pflacher makes four points which all have their separate applications. They include the soul’s immortality with a catalogue of false views, the place of the departed souls with a rejection of their possible appearance on earth, the circumstances of their arrival at the interim abode with the problem of time- consciousness, and their state with the attendant lessons. All but the third of those correspond more or less closely to a recognisable unit in Mirus’ text (Table 4.18).

Table 4.18 The structure of Pflacher’s borrowing from Mirus’ Regensburg Sermons

Topic Mirus (1590 [°1575]) Pflacher (1582) Deniers of soul’s immortality138 Serm. 4, pt. 1[.1] N1v–2r 10.1 (appl.) 260–61 Arguments for immortality138 Serm. 4, pt. 1[.2] N2r–3v 10.1 257–59139

136 Moved forward, after the state of righteous souls, by Weiser. 137 Quoted later in the discussion by Weiser. 138 For details, see Table 4.19.

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Topic Mirus (1590 [°1575]) Pflacher (1582) Instantaneous arrival of souls140 Serm. 4, pt. 2[.1, .4.1] N4r 10.3[.2] 267–69 Souls’ interim abode141 Serm. 4, pt. 2[.2] N4r–O2r 10.2 261–65139 State of righteous souls142 Serm. 4, pt. 2[.3] O2r–3r 10.4[.2] 272–73 State of damned souls Serm. 4, pt. 2[.4.2] O3r/v 10.4[.3] 273–74 Application for the righteous143 Serm. 4, pt. 2 (appl. [1]) O3v–4r 10.4 (appl. [2]) 275–76 Application for the godless Serm. 4, pt. 2 (appl. [2]) O4r 10.4 (appl. [1]) 274–75 Appearance of souls on earth Serm. 5, pt. 1 O4v–P1v 10.2 (appl.) 266–67144

In the section on the immortality of the soul, Weiser barely alters Mirus. He drops one of the scriptural references (1 Kgs 17:21–22) which actually occurs in his text just before the Mirus quotation, and he leaves out the argument from sanctification in connection with which he also ignores the overarching category of creedal proofs.145 The correspondences with Pflacher are much more limited. The order of the ‘arguments’ and ‘deniers’ sections is reversed in Die gantze Lehr, and the list of those pre-Christian thinkers that affirmed the soul’s immortality also differs from the Regensburg Sermons. Further, only the last two of Mirus’ arguments are effectively taken over by Pflacher, although he does have a section on direct biblical prooftexts, but his selection is rather different from Mirus’ (Table 4.19).

Table 4.19 Detailed outline of the ‘immortality’ section (with deniers) in Mirus, Pflacher, and Weiser

Mirus Pflacher Weiser Topic (1590 Biblical prooftexts146 (1582) (1583b) [°1575]) Many hold Epicurean views147 N1v 261 7

139 Only partial overlap. 140 Minor topic in Mirus mentioned separately for the blessed and the damned; major unit in Pflacher, bringing both aspects together. 141 For details, see Table 4.27. 142 For details, see Table 4.21. 143 For details, see Table 4.23. 144 Thematic correspondence only; details of discussion differ significantly. 145 Cf. n. 96 on p. 235, below. 146 Prooftexts that only appear in Mirus have been italicised. 147 The whole section, together with note on more reasonable pagans, moved after the arguments for immortality by Pflacher. The point that many hold such views today comes between critique of deniers and praise for best pagan minds in Pflacher.

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Mirus Pflacher Weiser Topic (1590 Biblical prooftexts146 (1582) (1583b) [°1575]) Aratus and Zenon N1v 260 7 Many in the church at time of N1v [260]148 8–9 Wis 2[:1–9] prophets and apostles Sadducees at time of Christ N1v–2r 260 9 Pope Paul III N2r 260–61 9 Arabian heresy 261 More reasonable pagans affirmed N2r 261 9 immortality of soul Cyrus in Xenophon N2r 9 Plato 261 Cicero N2r 261 9 Seneca 261 Mt 10[:28],150 16[:26],151 Immortality taught by word of N2r/v 257–58 10 22[:32]150; 1 Kgs 17[:21– God149 22]; Gen 4[:10]151 Also by 3 articles of creed N2v Gen 2[:7], 1[:27]; 1 Cor Argument from creation N2v 10–11 15[:45] 1 Cor 15[:49]; Jn 5[:25]; Argument from redemption N2v–3r 11–12 Rev 18; 1 Cor 15 Argument from sanctification N3r Eph 2[:1]; Rev 20[:5] Argument from death and blood Heb 11[:37–40]; Acts 9 N3r 258 12–13 of martyrs [i.e. 7:55]; 2 Tim 4[:6] Argument from conscience N3r/v 259 13–14

Even so, the list and details of the exponents of false views as well as the arguments from martyrs and from conscience correspond very closely. The penultimate item is especially significant because shared features here include blunders such as slightly mistaken biblical chapter references and a scriptural passage that coincides in the three versions verbatim despite the fact that it has been considerably condensed from the original (Table 4.20).

148 Pflacher quotes Wis 2:2–3 and simply speaks of those described in the passage, without mention of church, prophets or apostles. 149 The topic appears in Pflacher, but does not closely correspond to Mirus. It also includes a series of independent prooftexts: Eccl 12[:7], Ps 31[:6] = Lk 23[:46]; Acts 7[:59]; Lk 16[:22]; Phil 1[:23]; Rev 6[:9–10]. 150 Mt 10:28 and 22:32 are cited, in reverse order, by Pflacher between Eccl 12:7 and Ps 31:6. 151 Not quoted by Pflacher.

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Table 4.20 Hebrews 11:37–40152 as quoted by Mirus, Pflacher, and Weiser153

Mirus Pflacher Weiser Luther Bible (1590 [°1575]) N3r (1582) 259 (1583b) 12 (1546)154 Sie sind gesteiniget/ Sie seind gesteiniget/ Sie sind gesteiniget/ Sie sind gesteiniget, zerhackt/ zerstochen/ zerhackt/ zerstochen/ zerhackt/ zerstochen/ zuhackt, zustochen, durchs Schwerd getödtet/ durchs schwerdt getödt/ durchs Schwert getödtet/ durchs Schwert getoedtet. vnd haben hie vnnd haben vnd haben hie . . . vnd [haben] keine Erlösung nicht empfangen die kein erlösung erlangt / keine erlösung erlanget/ erlanget/ Verheissung, darumb das Gott darumb/ daßGott darumb das Gotte darumb, das Gott etwas bessers etwas bessers etwas bessers etwas bessers fur sie versehen hat. für sie versehen hat. für sie versehen hat. fur vns zu vor versehen hat,

The quotation is followed by the same short list of prooftexts (Acts 7:55 and 2 Tim 5:6) in all three works, which is all the more remarkable, for the first verse is identified by all three as taken from Acts 9.155 Describing the occupation of the blessed souls in heaven, the three authors not only list the same details in the same order, but also use the same words and cite the same prooftexts with very few differences. The only disagreements between Mirus and Weiser are two omissions by the latter, of a Bible verse and of the closing sentence, before which he breaks off his quotation. That is an essentially complete agreement over four hundred words! Pflacher is slightly more different, only sharing seven of nine prooftexts and adding one of his own. He also changes a few phrases and odd words (amounting to twenty or so words in all), and omits a longer passage of about sixty words. Given the length of the passage, however, he is still remarkably close to the other two, agreeing with them not only in the overall structure of the argument but also sharing entire sentences with them (Table 4.21).

152 ‘They were stoned to death, they were sawn in two, they were killed by the sword . . . Yet in all these . . . they . . . did not receive what was promised, since God had provided something better.’ 153 Shared words italicised. 154 WA DB 7:375.37–377.39. 155 The allusion is to Stephen’s dying vision, not Paul’s conversion. Page references as in the heading of Table 4.20.

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Table 4.21 The state of blessed souls: examples of textual and structural correspondences between Mirus, Pflacher, and Weiser156

Mirus Pflacher Weiser Prooftexts157 (1590 [°1575]) O2r–3r (1582) 272–73 (1583b) 27–28 Erstlich sehen sie Gott von 1. Wie die Schrifft Erstlich/ sehen sie Gott 1 Cor 13[:12] angesicht zu angesicht/ bezeuget / sehen sie von Angesicht zu Jn 17[:24.3]158 Gott von angesicht zu Angesicht. Jn 14[:19]159 angesicht/ Rev 7[:15]160 Zum andern / Loben vnd 2. Loben vnnd preisen sie Zum Andern / Loben vnd Rev 6[:9] preisen sie Gott ohn Gott/ohn unterlaß/mit preisen sie Gott ohn Rev 7[:9–15a]161 vnterlas/ mit den lieben den lieben Engeln/ vnterlass/mit den lieben Engeln/singen jr singen jhr Sanctus, Engeln singen jhr Sauctus, Magnificat vnd Magnificat, vnd Te Sauctus[!], Magnificat Te Deum laudamus. Deum laudamus. vnd Te Deum laudamus. Zum dritten/ Haben sie 3. So haben die seelen Zum Dritten/haben sie Ps 16[:11] grosse freude vnd der abgestorbenen grosse Freude vnd Lk 16[:25]162 Seligkeit/ damit sie jres bey Gott grosse freud Seligkeit / damit sie Rev 7[:15–16]163 vorigen Creutzes vnd vnd seligkeit/damit sie jhres vorigen Creutzes Trübsals ergetzet werden jhres vorigen creutzes vnd vnd Trübsals ergetzet trübsals ergetzet werden. werden On zweiffel kennen sie sich Ohne zweiffel kennen sie auch unter einander/ sich auch . . . undereinander/ . . .

156 Words shared between parallel quotations have been italicised. 157 Italicised verses cited by one author only. 158 Quoted in reverse, i.e. in the biblical, order by Pflacher. 159 Omitted by Pflacher. 160 Only in Mirus. 161 Pflacher cites vv. 9–10. 162 Only in Pflacher. 163 Pflacher also cites v. 17.

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Mirus Pflacher Weiser Prooftexts157 (1590 [°1575]) O2r–3r (1582) 272–73 (1583b) 27–28 Letzlich aber ist zu wissen Gleichwohl ist zu Letzlich aber ist zu Rev 6[:9–11] / das jre Freude diese wissen/ daß jhr freud wissen/ das jre Freude zeit fur dem Jüngsten diese zeit vber/ vor dem diese zeit vorm Jüngsten Tage nicht aller dinge jüngsten tag/ nicht Tage / nicht aller dinge volkomen ist/ wie sie allerdings vollkommen vollkommen ist/ wie sie wol hernach in der ist/ wie sie wol hernach wol hernach in der Ewigkeit sein wird/ in ewigkeit seyn wirt. Ewigkeit sein Denn weil jre Leibe noch Dann weil jhre leib noch wird/Denn weil jre vnter der Erden liegen / vnter der erden ligen/ Leibe noch vnter der sehnen sie sich vnd sehnen sie sich/ vnd Erden liegen/ sehnen sie seufftzen teglich nach seufftzen täglich nach sich/ vnd seufftzen derselben Erlösung. derselbigen erlösung. teglich nach derselbigen Erlösung. So viel haben wir in Gottes Vnd so viel haben wir in Wort vom zustande der Gottes Wort vom thun Gleubigen Seelen. vnnd wesen der gläubigen seelen nach dem leiblichen Todt.

The three authors further share lists of prooftexts between them. In connection with the unbelievers’ souls’ place in hell, they all cite Psalm 49[:15], Psalm 55[:16] and Numbers 16[:31–33] in that order.164 Likewise, to argue that believers come to Christ, all of them quote Philippians 1[:23], 2 Corinthians 5[:8] and John 17[:24].165 For ‘land of the living’ as a name of the righteous souls’ abode, all of them supply two prooftexts, Psalm 27:13 and a few lines from the hymn ‘Mitten wir im Leben.’ The reference for the first is given as Psalm 28 by Mirus and Pflacher, while Weiser, who admittedly quotes the former, corrects the number. The hymn is cited only in these three instances in the whole corpus.166 In addition to the parallels already identified, there are several further instances where passages of a hundred words or more overlap between the three works to a degree that far exceeds possible coincidence (Table 4.22).

164 Mirus (1590 [°1575]) O3r, Pflacher (1582) 265, Weiser (1583b) 30–31. Weiser has Ps 40 for 49, but that is clearly a misprint, for he quotes the same text (Ps 49:15) as the other two authors. Pflacher slightly diverges from the others in the extent of his quotations. 165 Mirus (1590 [°1575]) N4r, Pflacher (1582) 263, Weiser (1583b) 17. Pflacher has Jn 7 instead of Jn 17, but that is also a printer’s error. The others have longer lists. 166 Mirus (1590 [°1575]) O1r, Pflacher (1582) 264, Weiser (1583b) 20.

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Table 4.22 Some loci of textual parallels between Mirus, Pflacher, and Weiser

Length Mirus Pflacher Weiser Topic (Words) (1590 [°1575]) (1582) (1583b) Deniers of the soul’s immortality c.230 N1v–2r 260–61 7–9 Arguments for the soul’s c.240 N3r/v 258–59 12–14 immortality167 Metempsychosis and other pagan c.100 N3v–4r 261–62 16 teachings Abraham’s bosom c.140 N4v 264–65 19 State of damned souls c.130 O3v 273–74 31–32 Consolation against loss of loved c.100 O3v–4r 275–76 28–29 ones168

The correspondence rates are even higher than between Specker and his followers. They are such that a simple reading of the texts will convince, and there is no need of detailed quantitative analyses. I only quote one example. A passage on the uses of the immortality doctrine that extends over a hundred words is identical to more than ninety percent in all three texts. Mirus and Weiser only differ in three words, and both diverge from Pflacher in three words (of which they share two between them) and a short clause of five or six words (Table 4.23).

Table 4.23 Example of textual correspondence between Mirus, Pflacher, and Weiser169

Mirus (1590 [°1575]) O3v–4r Pflacher (1582) 275–76 Weiser (1583b) 28–29 Diese Lehre dienet / Erstlich …so dienet diese lehr Diese Lere dienet gleubigen Christen zu Trost/ den glaubigen Christen zu trost/ den gleubigen Christen zu Trost/ weñ jnen Gott jre getauffte wann Gott jhnen jre getauffte wenn jhnen Gott jre getauffte Kindelein/Man/Weib/ Eltern kinder/ mann/weib/eltern Kinderlein/Mann/Weib/Eltern oder Freunde abfordert/ oder freund abfordert/ / oder Freunde abfordert / das sie wissen/ daß sie wissen/ das sie wissen sie sein an einem solchen ort sie gehen an einem solchen ort/ sie sein an einem solchen ort /da jhnen wol ist / da jhnen wol ist/ /da jhnen wol ist / von allen vnglück erlöset / von allem vnglück erlöset/ von allen Vnglück erlöset / haben sich nichts mehr zubefahren/ habē sich nichts mehr zu befahren/ haben sich nichts mehr ...... zubefahren/. . .

167 Including Heb 11:37–40, cited in Table 4.20. 168 For details, see Table 4.23. 169 Words shared between the texts are marked by italics in the lines quoted.

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Mirus (1590 [°1575]) O3v–4r Pflacher (1582) 275–76 Weiser (1583b) 28–29 Sie haben auch vnser nicht gar Sie habē auch vnser nicht gar Sie haben auch vnser nicht gar vergessen/ vergessen/ vergessen/ und wir haben sie keines weges vnd wir haben sie keins wegs und wir haben sie keines weges verloren / verloren / verloren/ sondern wenn kömpt Dies sonder wann da kompt dies sondern wenn kompt dies restitutionis omnium, restitutionis omnium, restitutionis omnium / dauon Petrus Actorum am 3. sagt/ Dauon Petrus / Actor. 3. saget/ Da wollen wir einander in freuden da wollen wir einander in freuden Da wollen wir einander in freuden wider sehen / wider sehen/ wider sehen / vnd sol vns kein Todt in ewigkeit vnd sol vns kein Todt in ewigkeit vnd sol vns kein Todt in Ewigkeit mehr scheiden/ mehr scheiden. nicht mehr scheiden / Drumb wir mitler weile sollen Mitlerweil sollen wir vnsere seelen Drumb wir mitler weile vnser vnsere Seelen mit gedult fassen / mit gedult fassen/ Seele sollen mit gedult fassen/ vnd vns derselben seligen hoffnung vnd vns derselbigen seligen hoffnung vnd vns derselben seligen Hoffnung trösten. trösten/ trösten.

It is thus entirely impossible that the three texts should not go back to a common written source. That source, however, cannot be anything else but Mirus’ manuscript. Pflacher alone would allow for an independent common source, but Weiser correctly and consistently identifies the Reichstag homilies, including their internal division. Theoretically, it is, of course, possible that both Mirus and Pflacher share a common source that was mediated to Weiser by the Regensburg Sermons, but that simply seems an unnecessary hypothesis. Far more likely, a copy of Mirus’ manuscript had reached not only Weiser but also Pflacher by the early 1580s, many years before it was published by its own author. Unfortunately, I have not been able to locate any extant copies of the manuscript, however strongly I am convinced that numerous specimens must have existed of it, but the circumstantial evidence is so strong that it would be unwarranted to doubt the manuscript circulation hypothesis even though Pflacher felt less constrained by it and treated it more liberally than Weiser.

4.5 The Mirus group and the Speckerian tradition

We have now discovered two groups of closely related texts, Garcaeus and Faber drawing on Specker on the one hand, and Pflacher and Weiser appropriating Mirus, on the other. The general thematic correspondences between the two groups invite a closer investigation of their possible connection. An obvious place to begin is an inventory of common topics.

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Major issues raised by Mirus include false views concerning the soul’s fate after the death of the body, arguments for immortality, names of the departed souls’ dwelling place, state and occupation of the blessed and damned souls as well as the possible appearance of ghosts. All of them are familiar from Vom leiblichen Todt, and the parallel extends to such lesser concerns as when the souls come to their interim abode or the saints recognising each other in the hereafter. Things do get more complicated, however, when we turn to the details of each topic. Except for Faber and Musculus, the other five authors offer critical remarks on false teachings concerning the soul’s fate. Mirus, Pflacher and Weiser, we have seen, are very close (Table 4.19), but at least two key items on their list (Aratus and Zenon, and Pope Paul III) do not appear in Specker, who mentions Pope John XXII and the sect of the Dormitians that, in turn, are missing from the Mirus group. The overlap in terms of Epicureans, Sadducees and those described at the beginning of Wisdom 2 proves rather insignificant against such discrepancies. Garcaeus, however, comes much closer to Mirus and his imitators in that he has both Aratus with Zenon and Paul III, and excludes Specker’s special items. Further, elsewhere in the text he also rejects, partly echoing Musculus, the concept of metempsychosis and the fable of the Elysian fields (cf. Table 4.15), which are again picked up by the Regensburg Sermons and the texts that depend on it (Table 4.24).

Table 4.24 Catalogues of false teachings from Specker to Weiser

Garcaeus Mirus Specker Musculus Faber Pflacher Weiser Topic (1573 (1590 (1560) (1565) (1569) (1582) (1583b) [°1568]) [°1575]) Many hold Epicurean [224r/v]171 [D3r]172 [Y5r]173 N1v 261 7 views170 Pope John XXII 224v

170 The whole section, together with note on more reasonable pagans, moved after the arguments for immortality by Pflacher. The point that many hold such views today comes between critique of deniers and praise for best pagan minds in Pflacher. 171 Epicureans and Sadducees grouped together by Specker. 172 Speaks of an ‘Epicurean [and] Sadducean life’ (‘ein Epicureisch Saduceisch leben’) as a consequence of giving up right doctrine of immortality. 173 Faber simply mentions the ‘raving of the Epicureans’ (‘der Epicureer schwermerey’).

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Garcaeus Mirus Specker Musculus Faber Pflacher Weiser Topic (1573 (1590 (1560) (1565) (1569) (1582) (1583b) [°1568]) [°1575]) Dormitians174 224v–225r Aratus and Zenon D1v–2r N1v 260 7 Wis 2:1ff175 224r/v D2v–3r N1v 260 8–9 Sadducees 224v [D3r]172 N1v–2r 260 9 Pope Paul III D5v–6r N2r 260–61 9 Arabian heresy 261 Metempsychosis G3v N3v 261–62 16 Elysian fields D1r G4v N3v–4r 262 16 Papacy: 5 places, including 244r/v 262 limbo and purgatory

That evidence invites the hypothesis that the Speckerian tradition reached the Mirus group through Garcaeus’ mediation. There also appear a couple of odd items in the various polemic sections that complicate the matter such as the Arabian heresy mentioned only by Pflacher, or Catholic teaching on manifold options for the soul after the body’s death which include purgatory and the limbo of unbaptised children as well as the limbo of the fathers, discussed by him and Specker.176 An analysis of the arguments proposed in favour of the soul’s immortality leads to a similar conclusion. We have seen that Weiser follows Mirus rather narrowly while Pflacher is more selective, but his arguments also seem derivative of Mirus’, who offers the fullest list (Table 4.19). Comparing him with the Specker group, we will see that there are altogether eleven arguments proposed. Specker offers five under four headings, which Faber reproduces except for dropping one half of the double entry. Garcaeus enumerates nine arguments of which four are shared with Specker and three with Faber, for he lets go of the other half of the double entry than Faber. He also produces five new arguments of his own. Mirus’ list includes six items, but one of them is merely a heading that holds the next three together. His five actual arguments include four of Specker’s and one that only occurs in Garcaeus. Further, not only does he follow the latter author in halving the double entry, but he also moves that item to the end of the list, after the argument that does not appear in

174 Cf. n. 77 on p. 162, above. 175 Precise extent of quotation and interpretation of passage varies somewhat from one author to the next. 176 The latter item probably derives from Luther (cf. p. 55, above).

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Specker. That was exactly the arrangement in the Sterbbüchlein. In other words, Mirus’ list is structurally very similar to that of the Specker group, but it resembles Garcaeus’ more closely than either Specker’s or Faber’s. It includes an item that cannot be found in those (only in Garcaeus); it modifies one item differently than Faber (but exactly like Garcaeus); and it rearranges the order of the item with respect to the rest of the list (again, like Garcaeus). It is true that the prooftexts, when deployed, only overlap to a significant degree within each group but not between the Specker and Mirus groups, but the structural parallels of the arguments are still noteworthy (Table 4.25).

Table 4.25 Arguments for the soul’s immortality proposed by the Specker group and Mirus

Specker Garcaeus Faber Mirus Argument from… (1560) (1573 [°1568]) (1569) (1590 [°1575]) ..creation 221v–222r C3v–4v Y4v N2v ..redemption 222r/v C4v–5r Y4v–5r N2v–3r ..Christ’s resurrection C5r/v ..sanctification N3r ..judgement 222v177 Y5r/v ..conscience 222v D1v N3r/v ..specific texts178 222v–224r C5v–6r Y5v–6r N2r/v ..examples C6r–7v ..death and blood of martyrs C7v–8r N3r ..prophecies C8r/v ..John’s revelations C8v–D1r

A look at the prooftexts that souls arrive instantaneously at the interim abode after death will not significantly alter the picture. Divided into two groups, first for the righteous then for the damned souls, Specker introduces almost a dozen Bible verses and several excerpts from theologians. The latter are either ignored or incorporated into his followers’ text, and scriptural evidence is also selectively adopted, yet the twofold division is maintained except that Garcaeus ‘prefaces’ that arrangement with two Bible verses that encapsulate the twofold structure (Jn 3:18 and 36) quoted in full. Mirus picks up four of Specker’s prooftexts for the blessed and only one for the damned souls. They can all be found in Faber as well, and three plus one also in Garcaeus, but Mirus’ sequence differs from all three of them. That

177 Grouped together with conscience by Specker. 178 Or, by some authors, immortality taught by word of God.

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he, unlike Garcaeus, includes Luke 23:43 does not carry much weight, for ‘today’ makes it a self-evident choice in the given context, and Mirus may have thought of it by himself. Pflacher also has that verse and another item that is neither in Garcaeus nor in Mirus (Lk 16:22–23 for the damned), but he also adds two more loci for the list on the godless souls that are new even with respect to Specker’s selection. It seems, then, that there is a general convergence between the two text groups, more in the case of Mirus (and Weiser, who has no independent material on this issue) than in the case of Pflacher. Mirus’ agreement with Specker against Garcaeus does not warrant any significant conclusion, nor do Pflacher’s differences from Mirus and Garcaeus (Table 4.26).

Table 4.26 Order of biblical prooftexts for the souls’ instantaneous arrival at their interim abode from Specker to Pflacher179

Specker Garcaeus Faber Mirus Pflacher Biblical prooftexts (1560) (1573 [°1568]) (1569) (1590 [°1575]) (1582) 249v–252r K5v–7v180 Z5v–6r N4r 267–69 Lk 23:43 B-1 B-3 B-4 B-2 Gen 49:33–50:1 B-2 Rev 14:13 B-3 B-1 B-1 B-2 B-4 Lk 16:22 B-4 B-2 B-2 B-3 B-1 Jn 3:18a B-5 B-4 Jn 5:24 B-6 B-3 B-5 B-1 B-3 Lk 16:22–23 D-1 D-1 D-2 Jn 3:18b D-2 D-2 D-2 D-1 Jn 3:36 D-3 D-3 D-3 Jn 8:24 D-4 2 Cor 2:15–16 D-5 Lk 16:24 D-1 Job 21:13 D-1 Lk 12:20 D-3

The names of the righteous souls’ abode pose a much greater challenge than the previous topics. Specker, we recall, enumerated fifteen biblical names, of which Faber echoed all but three (Table 4.3), while Garcaeus mentioned nine, of which two are not

179 B-1..6 and D-1..5 designate the order of prooftexts within each treatise or sermon for the blessed and the damned souls, respectively. 180 The section begins with Jn 3:18 and 36 quoted in full as a kind of introduction that pertains to both the righteous and the damned.

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common with Faber.181 Mirus has eight names, including heaven and a triple designation. Weiser is again so close to Mirus that we can safely ignore him as an independent type in this comparative analysis. Pflacher refers to five names, including heaven. All of Mirus’ synonyms except for heaven and the triple name appear not only in Specker but also in Garcaeus. While heaven is buried in the middle of Specker’s inventory, it is singled out in the Regensburg Sermons. It is not primarily used as a name, but is introduced to describe the general state of the righteous souls. The actual catalogue begins with Abraham’s bosom afterwards. The triple title (temple, altar and seat of God) is supported with Revelation 6:9 and a handful of other texts, mostly from the same book. That suggests its kinship with the place of the martyrs’ souls under the altar, which does occur both in Specker and Garcaeus but not in Faber. With those allowances, then, all of Mirus’ names may have been taken from the Sterbbüchlein. Further, their order is the same as in Garcaeus’ tract with the single exception that the eternal tabernacle or tent (Hütte) is moved to the penultimate position, before his own triple name. On the other hand, Mirus’ sequence is very different from Specker’s, they only run parallel in a couple of instances. Finally, in addition to the somewhat problematic ‘under the altar,’ another name definitely included by Mirus (the Father’s house) is also missing from Faber. It is thus very unlikely that Faber should have provided the point of contact between Specker and Mirus. Far more probable is the hypothesis that Garcaeus served as the connecting link between the two groups of texts (Table 4.27).

181 Actually, Specker’s list includes a few more than fifteen names because some were presented together as one item. Garcaeus’ list (cf. p. 154, above) consists of ten names, but they correspond to nine numbered items in Specker.

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Table 4.27 Shared names of the righteous souls’ abode between the Specker and the Mirus groups182

Garcaeus Mirus Specker Faber Pflacher Weiser (1573 (1590 Name (1560) (1569) (1582) (1583b) [°1568]) [°1575]) 228r–236v Y7r–Z3r 264–65 18–23 G6r–7r N4r–O2r #1 Bundle of OT-3 OT-2 1 Sam the living 1 Sam 25:29 1 Sam 25:29 25:29183 Ps 116:15 The eternal OT-4 #4 #6 #6 tent (or holy Ps 15:1 [no Lk 16:9 Lk 16:9 hill of the Lk 16:9 prooftexts] 2 Pt 3:10 2 Pt 3:10 Lord) Heb 8:2 OT-5 #5 OT-3 Land of the #3 #2 #3 Ps 27:13 Ps 27:13184 Ps 27:13 living Ps 27:13184 Ps 27:13184 Ps 27:13 Ps 116:9–10 Ps 116:9–10 Ps 116:9–10 OT-7 OT-5 Ps 31:5 #3 Ps 31:5 #2 #3 #2 Hand of the Ps 3:5 [no Ps 3:5 Wis 3:1 Wis 3:1 Wis 3:1 Lord Ps 4:8 prooftexts] Ps 4:8 Ps 31:5 Ps 31:5 Ps 31:5 Wis 3:1–4 Wis 3:1–4 Deut 33:3 #1 #4 #1 Abraham’s NT-1 #1 NT-1 Lk 16:22185 Lk 16:22185 Lk bosom Lk 16:22 Lk 16:22 Lk 16:22 16:22185 NT-3 NT-3 #4 Heavenly Heb 11:10 Heb 11:10 #4 #7–#8 Heb (homeland, Heb 11:13–16 Heb 11:13–16 Heb 12:22–24 [no 12:22–24 new) Heb 12:22–24 Heb 12:22–24 Rev 21:2 prooftexts] Rev 21:2 Jerusalem Rev 3:12186 Rev 3:12186 2 Cor 7:5 2 Cor 7:5 Rev 21:1–3 Rev 21:1–3 #5 #5 Jn 14:2 Jn 14:2 NT-4 #9 NT-4 Father’s Phil 3:20 Phil 3:20 Jn 14:2–3 Jn 14:2–3 Jn 14:2–3 house 2 Cor 5:8 2 Cor 5:8 2 Cor 5:1 2 Cor 5:1 2 Cor 5:1 (Gen 3) (Gen 3) Jn 14:3 Jn 14:3

182 First line of each cell (italicised) indicates order of names within each author. Italicised biblical loci signify prooftexts shared between the two groups. 183 Locus given as 1 Sam 15 by Pflacher. 184 Locus given as Ps 28 by Garcaeus, Mirus and Pflacher. Number corrected by Weiser. 185 Followed by a sequence of interpretive prooftexts, taken from Gen 12, 18, 22, Isa 58 and Jn 8, on the promise given to Abraham. 186 Locus given as Rev 2 by Specker and Faber.

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Garcaeus Mirus Specker Faber Pflacher Weiser (1573 (1590 Name (1560) (1569) (1582) (1583b) [°1568]) [°1575]) 228r–236v Y7r–Z3r 264–65 18–23 G6r–7r N4r–O2r [Basic] NT-7 NT-6 [Basic] Jn 17:24 [Basic] Heb 9:24 Heb 9:24 2 Cor 5:1 Phil 1:23 2 Cor 5:1 Mt 5:3 Mt 5:3 Gen 5 2 Cor 5:8 Gen 5 Heaven Mt 11:12 Mt 11:12 2 Kgs 2 Mt 26 = Lk 2 Kgs 2 Mt 23:13 Mt 23:13 2 Cor 12:2 12 2 Cor 12:2 2 Tim 4:18 2 Tim 4:18 2 Tim 4:18 Jn 14 2 Tim 4:18 Rev 5:13

(Martyrs’ #10 NT-8 souls) under [no Rev 6:9 the altar prooftexts] #7 #7 Rev 6:9 Rev 6:9 Temple, altar Rev 4:10 Rev 4:10 and seat of Rev 21:22 Rev 21:22 God Isa 60 Isa 60 Rm 3 Rm 3

The prooftexts demand special attention. There are occasional overlaps across the two groups, but correspondences are not outstanding. What is somewhat surprising in the light of our earlier findings is that three cases where Garcaeus cites no prooftexts at all, Mirus still echoes Specker’s choices as if there might be some direct connection between them. While it would be extremely difficult positively to disprove such a link, I think we need not suppose it. In each case, Mirus excludes some, usually several, prooftexts that Specker offers. What he includes are the obvious choices like Wisdom 3:1 and Psalm 31:5 for the hand of the Lord, or Hebrews 12:22–24 and Revelation 21:2 for the heavenly Jerusalem. Mirus did not need Specker to single out those Bible verses once he had, say, from Garcaeus, the names that he wanted to support with scriptural evidence. All that was required was some working knowledge of the Bible, and we can safely suppose that Mirus, a doctor of theology, was thoroughly familiar with the texts of the Christian canon. Less well educated sixteenth-century divines would probably still deeply impress us with their knowledge of the Bible, should we have an opportunity to experience it at first hand. Particularly revealing is the case of the eternal tent, for which Mirus, like Specker, cites Luke

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16:9.187 Both in Specker and in Garcaeus, however, the name appeared as ‘(your) tent or the holy hill of the Lord.’ It is taken from the first verse of Psalm 15, but only Specker cites that. Garcaeus obviously got it right, for he included the possessive adjective in the name (Specker left it out of the title of his entry, but it is there in his quotation). Mirus probably missed the full force of it, or simply could not locate the reference that Garcaeus failed to supply, so he included a suitable ‘tent’ verse and left out the holy hill part, which was unavailable in Luke.188 On the other hand, the only prooftext Mirus offers for ‘the land of the living’ is Psalm 27:13,189 a verse that occurs both in Specker and Garcaeus. However, only the former author gets the reference right; the latter writes Psalm 28 instead, and that is exactly what we find in Mirus, too190 (Table 4.27). This time we again have an oddity within the later text group. Pflacher’s list is much shorter than Mirus’, yet it does contain a name (bundle of the living) that is neither in the Regensburg Sermons nor in Garcaeus, but can be found in Specker. Further, the order of Pflacher’s four names corresponds with Specker’s, but not with Garcaeus’ or Mirus’. Somewhat disturbingly, though, Pflacher also misnumbers Psalm 27, but that is probably due to Mirus’ influence, and he simply failed to correct it from Specker if indeed he had direct access to Vom leiblichen Todt. Some evidence is slowly accumulating that points in that direction, and the misnumbered psalm is surely not enough counterweight to cancel it out. Much of that is admittedly conjectural reconstruction, but the thrust of my argument should be valid without it, too. The correspondences in prooftexts between Specker and Mirus where Garcaeus is silent do not constitute sufficient grounds to suppose that Mirus must have been directly acquainted with Vom leiblichen Todt. We might further note that essentially all the prooftexts that are common between Specker and Mirus in a given context are also available in Garcaeus in the same position. There are dozens of examples of that, and only a very few contrary cases. Most of those we have already seen in the discussion of the names of the interim abode, and the remaining one

187 ‘And I tell you, make friends for yourselves by means of dishonest wealth so that when it is gone, they may welcome you into the eternal homes.’ The Luther Bible had Hütte in the requisite place: ‘Vnd ich sage euch auch, Machet euch Freunde mit dem vngerechten Mammon, Auff das, wenn jr nu darbet, sie euch auffnemen in die ewige Huetten’ (apart from minor changes in spelling, both 1522 and 1546; WA DB 6:287.9, cf. 286.9). 188 Specker (1560) 228v; Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) G6r; Mirus (1590 [°1575]) O1v. 189 ‘I believe that I shall see the goodness of the Lord in the land of the living.’ 190 Specker (1560) 228v; Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) G6v; Mirus (1590 [°1575]) O1r.

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or two are equally unimportant like Luke 23:43 among the loci that prove that the soul arrives at its dwelling place right upon death.191 Conversely, however, of the many more instances when prooftexts correspond only between Garcaeus and Mirus, at least two more are noteworthy. Earlier I called attention to a small sequence of biblical loci that occur together in all three texts of the Mirus group. Now we can add that the same three verses are cited in the same order in a comparable context by Garcaeus.192 For two of them (Num 16 and Ps 55) that is the only other occurrence in the whole corpus before 1590. Similarly, in the discussion of the appearance of ghosts, both the Sterbbüchlein and the Regensburg Sermons quote 2 Samuel 12:23 and Sirach 38:21. Neither of those verses can be found in the corpus elsewhere before 1580. That adds to a growing body of evidence that suggests that Mirus was probably familiar with Garcaeus’ work. The claim that the two text groups had contacts cannot be verified with certainty, but I have built up a cumulative case that surely makes it more likely than the opposite hypothesis of entirely independent development. The overlap is too extensive to simply write it off as inherent in the shared topic. Thematically, there is fairly little in the Regensburg Sermons that is not also available in the Speckerian tradition, and we have also seen numerous correspondences in the details, even if they do not readily lend themselves to quantitative analysis, and explicit verbal echoes are virtually impossible to detect. We have also seen that essentially everything that Mirus adapts from the previous text group is available in the Sterbbüchlein but not in the Tractetlein, and on several points he also agrees with, and includes details only present in, Garcaeus against Vom leiblichen Todt. It seems, then, that the Speckerian tradition was known to the authors of the Mirus group, and the crucial connection was provided by Mirus’ own knowledge of the Sterbbüchlein. That the conclusion can be established less securely than either Pflacher’s and Weiser’s dependence on him or Faber’s and Garcaeus’ reliance on Specker is also a measure of the greater freedom with which Mirus treated his source, and the details I shall explore in the next two chapters. The outlines of the two text groups’ connections are now visible, but a few more strokes are needed to complete the picture. Pflacher’s appropriation of the Speckerian tradition does not comfortably fit into the box of Mirus’ transmission. We have already seen

191 Specker (1560) 149v and Mirus (1590 [°1575]) N4r. 192 Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) G7v and see p. 190, above.

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a couple of instances with the limbo and purgatory on the one hand, and the names of the righteous souls’ dwelling place on the other.193 There are, further, those segments of his tenth homily that cannot be derived from Mirus (cf. Table 4.18). They include the means of the souls’ arrival at their interim abode (serm. 10, pt. 3), the length of time spent in the grave (serm. 10, pt. 3, appl.) and the problem of psychopannychism (beginning of serm. 10, pt. 4). With the exception of the middle item, which is fairly rare if not unique in the corpus, the other two are treated by Specker and his followers. Unfortunately, the details are such that will not add much to the discussion. Little deserves mention beyond a general thematic correspondence between Die gantze Lehr and the Specker group that extends further than its counterpart between the Regensburg Sermons and the reference texts. A short commentary on John 5:24 that concludes the first section of the ‘when’ chapter in Specker, which is also echoed by Garcaeus and Faber (cf. Table 4.13), raises two issues, first the brevity of the intervening time between death and the beginning of a new life, and the refutation of soul sleep. Those are exactly the two topics that Pflacher discusses in the next two units of his sermon (pt. 3, appl., and beginning of pt. 4). Those are admittedly weak connections, but connections nonetheless. It is therefore certainly not to be excluded that Pflacher might have had some direct access to the Speckerian tradition or, at any rate, some access that was independent of Mirus. Of the three treatises in the Specker group, Vom leiblichen Todt is the most likely candidate for his acquaintance. That, of course, does not invalidate his dependence on the Regensburg Sermons. Whatever connection Pflacher may have had to Specker (or his imitators), it is to be understood as augmenting, and by no means as replacing, Mirus’ mediating influence. In the foregoing discussion, I have looked at Weiser only in so far as he quoted Mirus with the result that he essentially did not have to be distinguished from his immediate source. That approach is justified inasmuch as the ‘independent’ sections of the Christlicher Bericht that are not direct citations from Mirus by and large only repeat the same points and do not cover significant new ground. Somewhat paradoxically, we can still assert Weiser’s stance in relation to two further texts in the corpus with a high degree of probability. First, however little direct influence he betrays of the Tractetlein, he did know Faber’ work. He mentions the devout and erudite author’s ‘golden booklet’ in the somewhat apologetic

193 Cf. pp. 194 and 200, above.

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introductory address to the reader at the beginning of his book. It is out in the open daylight that here and there very much has been written of these things and written by such people to whom I cannot in the least compare in life, art, skill, experience, age and reputation. Specifically, there is a really golden booklet by Mr. Basilius Faber, a very pious and learned man, available on the topic so it is unnecessary to write again on the subject, and, further, I also confess myself, meo calculo, inept and far too little for the job.194

That he did proceed to write a book, or that the protestation comes in its preface, is amusing but besides the point. The very title of Weiser’s work, Christian Report of the Souls’ Immortality and State after Their Departure and of the Last Affairs of the World, is a tribute to Faber’s Necessary and Useful Christian Teachings on the Last Affairs of the World [and a] Small Treatise of the Souls of the Dead and of All Their State and Opportunity.195 Yet he never seems to prefer Faber to his more immediate source Mirus as can be seen, for example, in his inclusion of names like the eternal tent or (under) the altar via the Regensburg Sermons, although they do not appear in the Tractetlein (Table 4.27). Similarly, his omissions of prooftexts also mirror Mirus rather than Faber.196 It is somewhat ironic that Weiser was probably unaware that ultimately Faber and himself were both indebted to the same, and by then apparently forgotten, Melchior Specker of Strasbourg for most of their insights. On the other hand, we can be fairly sure that he did not know Musculus’ work. At least he says in the same passage that he chose the catechism structure because ‘this material is, as far as I know, nowhere else available in question format [than in Jakob Heerbrand’s Compendium Theologicum].’197 We have no reason to challenge his trustworthiness, and can thus conclude that he had not read the Gelegenheit, Thun vnd Wesen (1565). Musculus’ influence, like Specker’s, reached the Mirus group most probably through Garcaeus’ mediation.

194 ‘Es ist offentlich vnd am tage das von diesen dingen sehr viel hin vnd wider / vnnd zwar von solchen Leuten geschrieben / denen ich am leben / kunst/geschickligkeit/erfahrung/alter vnd ansehen im geringsten nicht zuuergleichen. Jnsonderheit ist hieuon vorhanden ein recht gülden Büchlein Herrn Basilij Fabrij / eines sehr frommen vnd gelehrten Mannes / das also vnnötig von newes dauon zu schreiben / dazu ich mich auch selbst meo calculo vntůchtig/vnd viel zu wenig erkenne’ (Weiser (1583a) B13r). Cf. Brady (1971) 828. 195 For the main title, I adopt Barnes’ translation (2000:270) although the original word order with ‘Christian’ in the lead would make Weiser’s allusion even more visible. Barnes does not translate the title of the Tractetlein. 196 E.g. Ps 3:5 and 4:8 excluded, as in Mirus, from the list for the hand of the Lord, although they can be found in Faber (Table 4.27). 197 Cf. n. 73 on p. 133, above.

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4.6 Tacius, Chyträus, Frölich, Roth, and the limits of the Speckerian trajectory

There is a very significant textual trajectory starting with Specker’s Vom leiblichen Todt. In writing their own treatises, Faber and Garcaeus, in their different ways, both drew on that piece rather heavily in the late 1560s. Despite its far more numerous editions, Faber’s treatise proved less influential in transmitting the Speckerian heritage than Garcaeus, who seems to have been known and appropriated by both Mirus and perhaps Chyträus, although the latter link is admittedly tenuous as we shall presently see. Garcaeus’ further significance is that he probably also knew Musculus’ work and channelled some of his ideas into the later Speckerian tradition. Mirus was thus also recipient of the stream flowing from the Gelegenheit, and he, in turn, was copied by Pflacher and Weiser, who also had direct knowledge of Specker and Faber, respectively. Weiser’s case is virtually certain but of no great significance, for without the explicit admission of his knowledge of Faber we could not recognise the influence of the Tractetlein from his text. Pflacher’s immediate access to Specker is more questionable, but it is exactly some details of his reasoning that invite the hypothesis (Figure 4.1). Chyträus is the most distinguished theologian among the authors of my corpus, and it is very difficult to determine how he relates to the texts so far discussed. I do not think it can be convincingly demonstrated that he was aware of any particular work that ultimately depended on Vom leiblichen Todt, yet the immortality chapter of De morte (1581–1582) is thematically so close to the Speckerian tradition that it also appears rather preposterous to suggest that he was totally unaware of that body of literature and his ideas developed utterly independently. Chyträus’ immortality chapter has no typographical signals of further subdivision, but its internal structure is still fairly transparent. He begins with a discussion of the soul’s nature in the course of which he raises issues like its spiritual qualities, individual creation and traducianism, which also feature in Garcaeus’ opening chapters. Yet the closest parallel we find is the threefold analysis of the imago Dei in the soul as wisdom, righteousness and free will.198 Chyträus then offers a long section on the soul’s immortality, combining biblical prooftexts and philosophical arguments, followed by prooftexts for the blessed state. It also

198 Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) E2r–3r and Chyträus (1591 [1582]) B2r–3r.

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entails a brief review of false pagan views where Chyträus’ rejection of metempsychosis or the soul’s evaporation exhibits similarities to that of the Speckerian tradition, and is markedly different from, say, Frölich’s take. Again, Pope John XXII is only mentioned, both times critically, in Vom leiblichen Todt and Vom Tode.199 Needless to say, that establishes no necessary connection.

1560 Specker

1565 Musculus

1568 Garcaeus 1569 Faber

1575 Mirus

1582 Pflacher Chyträus 1583 Weiser

Figure 4.1 Textual dependences in the Speckerian tradition

Throughout the chapter, Chyträus’ scriptural citations are usually centred on a collection of already familiar Bible verses,200 but I have not been able to discover any significant overlaps between his specific lists in a given context and corresponding inventories in other texts. He quotes, for example, John 5:24, Luke 23:43, Revelation 14:13,

199 Specker (1560) 224v) and Chyträus (1591 [1582]) D1v. 200 E.g. Ps 31:5, Isa 57:1–2, Wis 3:1, Mt 10:28, Lk 16:19–31, Lk 23:43, Jn 5:24, Acts 7:55–59, Phil 1:23, Rev 6:9– 10 etc.

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Isaiah 25:8, 35:10 and 57:1–2, Luke 2:29, and Wisdom 3:1 to argue for the soul’s instantaneous arrival at the interim abode.201 The majority of those verses are stock-in-trade of the locus, and all except Isaiah 35:10 can be found in at least one or two other texts, yet the list as a whole does not correspond to its equivalent in the ‘when’ chapter of other works (cf. Table 4.26). It is perhaps noteworthy that of the forty or so scriptural prooftexts that Chyträus cites, some repeatedly, in the course of the immortality chapter, at least thirty-five can be found in texts that depend on Vom leiblichen Todt, and those passages that are not unique to him but are rarely quoted by others most often surface in the Sterbbüchlein.202 The particulars that he highlights of the blessed souls’ life—their seeing, thanking, praising God as well as conversation and prayer203—are again details that we saw in the Speckerian tradition as are a group of Bible verses that are commonly considered counterevidence.204 Likewise familiar are his last topics in the chapter, the problem of the souls’ appearance on earth, the ban on soothsaying and the rejection of purgatory. In other words, there is very little in Chyträus’ work, except for the outstanding philosophical section, that is new in comparison to the Speckerian tradition, but the correspondences are not close enough to warrant more than a merely conjectural interdependence. It is certainly no match for some authors’ clearly demonstrable appropriation of earlier texts that we have seen in this chapter. The remaining three authors are, in a textual sense, independent of the main body of texts whose development and interconnections I have now mapped out. I have not been able to establish any philological connection between them and the Speckerian tradition. Their function in the corpus is both to mark and to extend the limits of that tradition. They are useful counterweights against the danger of overinterpreting the texts that ultimately derive from Vom leiblichen Todt. In their different ways, Tacius (1556), Frölich (1590) and Roth (1591) all exhibit some similarities with the core texts of the trajectory from Specker to Weiser, but they do not seem to directly depend on them. As the earliest text in the corpus, Tacius’ sermon could not draw on Specker or any other author for obvious chronological reasons. Yet neither his methodology nor his topics

201 Chyträus (1591 [1582]) C8v–D1r. 202 E.g. Job 7:9–10, Isa 25:8, Sir 38:21, Lk 2:29, and, less exclusively, 2 Sam 12:23, Eccl 12:7, 1 Jn 3:2. 203 Chyträus (1591 [1582]) D1v–3r. 204 Job 14:21, Isa 63:16, 2 Kgs 22:20. For an analysis, see section 6.4, below.

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are very far from the ‘grand tradition.’ Only the first half of his homily is on the Zwischenzustand with the second half, like in Musculus, on the resurrection. His supporting evidence taken from scripture and the theological tradition, especially the fathers, is a fundamental organising principle in Specker, and his biblical prooftexts answer our expectations. He also includes a substantial review of false teachings, argues for the immortality thesis and considers the quality of the interim state in some detail. Those are all topics that will prominently feature in Vom leiblichen Todt and subsequent texts. Frölich’s case is particularly interesting as the Seelen-Trost is comparable to virtually any of the core texts, although it is closer to some than to others. It does not offer a close parallel to Musculus, but the Gelegenheit does stand alone and is in many ways unlike texts in the ‘grand tradition.’ In terms of both themes and approach, Frölich’s is akin to Specker’s, Garcaeus’, Faber’s, or Weiser’s, but even Chyträus’ treatises or Mirus’ and Pflacher’s sermon series. I see no inherent reason why it should not have scored a comparable marketing success, yet it never got reprinted. That may have to do, on the one hand, with his lesser status and presumably more limited access to crucial resources. On the other hand, it may also be a sign of changing times. Bluntly put, it may have arrived too late to be picked up as the new age of funeral sermons and an upsurge of Latin scholarship was setting in. Whatever the explanation, the thematic connections to the Speckerian trajectory are undeniable. His review of false teachings, including the five-fold structure of the interim state in Catholic doctrine and, especially, purgatory, arguments for immortality and the unspeakable qualities of the blessed state, his concern for the art of dying and the personal recognition of saints in the hereafter are all topics readily available in Specker and his followers. Nor does he bring methodological novelty with the threefold reasoning from scripture, church fathers, and contemporary theologians, and his scriptural prooftexts hold little surprise in store. All those aspects tie him in with the core texts, but he is more like Tacius than Chyträus in eluding demonstrable indebtedness on the textual level. Finally, Roth’s sermon is quite unique not only with its transitional character205 but also in its exegetical commitment. As Weiser’s appropriation of the Regensburg Sermons most clearly illustrates, the borderlines between homiletic and other devotional genres—and, witness the copious quotations from Luther’s and Bullinger’s work, even commentaries—are

205 Cf. pp. 2–3 and 139, above.

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highly permeable, but that also means that neither sermons nor commentaries maintain a narrow exegetical focus. Roth’s sustained attention to, and unpacking of, the few Bible verses he is preaching on is quite unparalleled in the corpus. As a result, however, the Zwischenzustand does not take centre stage in his interpretation, and only a relatively small part of his homily engages questions pivotal to my enquiry. Where he does raise such issues, however, he is squarely within the Speckerian tradition even without tangible textual connections. Works outside the main trajectory thus bear witness to a wider theological culture of which texts from Vom leiblichen Todt to the Christlicher Bericht are prominent but by no means the only expressions. Recognition of their textual connections will allow us better to see the true theological significance of their agreements and divergences, and awareness of thematically related pieces outside the narrower trajectory will serve as a reminder that ideas embodied in the corpus are not simply the property of a handful of interdependent works, but represent a larger theological consensus that developed over a considerable body of teaching by the second half of the sixteenth century. A fundamental issue that I have left unexplored here is how the tradition whose development I have followed from Specker to Weiser or, more broadly, from Tacius to Roth, relates to Luther and Melanchthon, the foundational figures of the North German Reformation. That will be a central question in the remaining two chapters of my investigation, as I now turn to a theological analysis of the later-sixteenth-century corpus.

5 The Immortality Doctrine in the Later Sixteenth Century

German Lutheran theology produced a fairly clear doctrine of the Zwischenzustand in the second half of the sixteenth century. It extended well beyond the assertion of the soul’s immortality, and covered several aspects of its state between the body’s death and resurrection. In the previous chapters, I discussed the ‘textual’ qualities of the corpus arguing, on the one hand, that it substantially represents the Lutheran lands of the Empire in the latter half of the century and, on the other, that its development left a shiny trace behind: tangible influences from Specker via Garcaeus and Mirus all the way to the 1590s cannot only be felt but in most cases effectively demonstrated. The result is a remarkably close-knit corpus in which both broad tracts of shared common ground and significant local variations can be fruitfully studied. The aim of this chapter is to offer such a study, but—going beyond a simple historical reconstruction of the doctrine as a complex set of ideas—I shall also try to uncover some of the roots and formative influences that led to its development. I shall thus argue that while the tradition absorbed several important impulses from Melanchthon, it was even more profoundly shaped by Luther’s theological insights, especially as encapsulated in his commentary on Abraham’s and Jacob’s death in the Genesisvorlesung.1

5.1 The core doctrine and its context

The central tenets of the doctrine that make up the consensus in the half-century after Luther’s death can be easily summarised. The soul, or spirit, does not die with the body but is carried, without delay upon the latter’s death, either by angels into God’s hand to be with

1 Cf. section 1.5, above.

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Christ or by devils into hell. Both places have several biblical names of which heaven, paradise, to his people, land of the living, and Abraham’s bosom are the most popular for the righteous. It is widely agreed, however, that all these names denote the same locality. The blessed souls are redeemed from all suffering, enjoy rest, peace and everything good while contemplating and worshipping God. They recognise each other and also care for what is going on on earth. They are aware of the fate of the damned and of God’s judgement. They do not appear on earth as ghosts, although the devil might abuse their shape and appear in their stead. Finally, the fate and state of the damned are outlined in comparable (but reverse) terms. They have no rest but suffer ceaselessly; they continue to reject God, for which they are under divine curse; they are plagued by pangs of conscience and fire. They also recognise each other, are aware of the blessedness of the righteous and the dangers run by their fellows on earth, and they cannot appear as ghosts, either. Most of these details will deserve a closer look, but there are also several ‘optional’ elements around this core that are unlikely to provoke harsh dissent, and are in that sense part of the consensus, but, though still repeatedly stated, they are less frequently articulated within the immortality locus than the central tenets. They include views such as the rejection of purgatory, a catalogue of related false teachings and their representatives, the nature of the soul, an interpretation of death as the dissolution of soul and body. Most of these details concern the doctrine’s wider context, and appear peripheral only from the centre of this locus, but contribute to a better understanding of its functions and of the intellectual forces that shaped its development. The immortality doctrine may logically presuppose a concept of the soul, but it by no means requires a discussion or explicit definition of it. Specker opened the third part, on the Zwischenzustand, of his book with a chapter on this question, but Faber essentially ignored it, while Garcaeus considerably extended the discussion and devoted the first five chapters to it. Chyträus also spent an entire signature on the topic, but the latter two theologians are rather the exception than the rule.2 On the whole, the anthropological question is of little interest to the authors. There are only a few recurrent traits that characterise the discussion. First and foremost, the distinction between soul and spirit (Seele und Geist) is consistently blurred. In

2 Specker (1560) 219v–221r, Faber (1569) Y4v, Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) B7v–E6r, Chyträus (1591 [1582]) A4v– B4v.

5 Doctrine 211 practical terms, the two words are used interchangeably. Tacius already says, recounting the martyrdom of Polycarp, that the Bishop of Smyrna ‘would appear, in his soul or spirit, before the face of God on the very same day.’3 Specker specifically raises the question of the differences between the two terms, soon to conclude that their distinction is not consistently maintained in scripture,4 and from then on he routinely employs both terms, usually conjoined with or, in his rubrics.5 Likewise, Garcaeus repeatedly uses Geist for Seele.6 At other times he uses both side by side,7 and on occasion he explicitly equates them.8 Similar tendencies could be demonstrated in virtually every text.9 What we do not find is a threefold anthropology so painstakingly reconstructed for Luther by Heidler. Those who care to define the soul, notably Specker, Garcaeus and Chyträus,10 all include the element of immortality in the very definition. The virtually ubiquitous interpretation of death as the dissolution of the bond between body and soul points in the same direction. That is very Melanchthonian, for in the Liber de anima (1553) the Wittenberger defined ‘the rational soul [as] an intelligent spirit which is the second part of the human being’s substance, and it is not extinguished when it leaves the body but is immortal.’11 That is indeed the understanding of the soul that is being echoed throughout the texts. Both Specker and Garcaeus speak of the soul as the second part of the human being,12

3 ‘Er werde an seinem geist oder seele noch denselbigen tage vor dem angesicht Gottes gestellet werden’ (Tacius (1556) B2r, italics added). 4 ‘Holy scripture keeps this distinction at some places but not at some others. It uses the words soul and spirit for one and the same thing, namely for the second part of the human being which is invisible and imperceptible to the outward senses, and cannot be killed with the body but remains in its nature even after the body’s death and lives forever.’ In the original: ‘Die heylige schrifft/hellt an etlichen orten disen vnderscheyd / an etlichen orten aber nit. Brauchet das wort Seele vnd Gest/für einerley/ das ist für den andern theyl des menschen / so vnsichtbar / vnnd vnbegreifflich ist/von den eüsserlichen sinnen/vnd mit dem leyb nit mag getödted werden/sonder bleibt in seiner natur / auch nach des leybs todt/ warhafftig/vñ lebt ewig’ (1560:220v–221r). 5 E.g. (1560) 221v, 237r, 252v, 269r, 272v, 275v, 278v, 281r. 6 E.g. (1573 [°1568]) B3v, E6v, F3v, F5v, G2r, M5v, M6v, M8r, Q5r. 7 E.g. (1573 [°1568]) B7v, B8r, C3r, P1r. 8 E.g. (1573 [°1568]) A8r, B8v, C2r/v. 9 See, e.g., Tacius (1556) A3v; Faber (1569) Y4v; Chyträus (1591 [1582]) A5v–6v; Pflacher (1582) 27, 70, 257; Weiser (1583b) 5. 10 Cf. Specker (1560) 220v–221r; Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) B8r–C1r, Chyträus (1591 [1582]) A5v. 11 ‘Anima rationalis est spiritus intelligens, qui est altera past substantiae hominis, nec extinguitur, cum a corpore discessit, sed immortalis est’ (CR 13:16). 12 For Specker, see his definition in n. 4 on p. 211, above. Garcaeus: ‘The rational soul is a reasonable spirit [and is] the second part of the human being, and does not disappear like steam or smoke when it departs from

5 Doctrine 212 and when Chyträus equates that with the ‘essential [i.e. substantial] form of the human being,’ the Aristotelian roots of the interpretation also come to the fore even as he claims to ground that view on scriptural witness.13 Chyträus’ gesture of importing an Aristotelian notion and prooftexting it with biblical quotations is a clear indication of how self-evident a Melanchthonian frame of reference was for the understanding of the soul to later-sixteenth- century authors. One form in which that fundamental orientation finds expression is the critique of alternative views. It typically appears as a catalogue of false teachings. Tacius already includes such a list in the introduction to his sermon, although most of what he presents as historical evidence is either broad generalisation or an interpretation of biblical passages.14 Thus he mentions the Sadducees, Corinthians, the rich man (apparently taking the parable for history)15 as well as those contemporaries whose dissolute life belies any belief in an afterlife (where justice would be meted out) and specifically some in ‘Welschland,’ which may be a faint echo of Luther’s verdict on Lateran V or, perhaps, of an anecdote we will meet again in later texts.16 Specker also offers a short catalogue of three (actually, four) damnable positions, the Epicureans and Sadducees, Pope John XXII, and the contemporary sect of Dormitians.17 That indicates a step forward in the direction of historical evidence,18 but the list plays a less prominent role than in Tacius’ sermon, and it does not catch on for the next decade and a half.

the body but is an immortal being.’ In the original: ‘Die vernünfftige Seele ist ein verstendiger Geist / als das ander teil des Menschen / vnd verschwindet nicht/wie ein dampff oder rauch / da er von dem Cörper abweichet/ sondern ist ein vnsterbliches wesen’ (1573 [°1568]: C1r). 13 ‘Das die vernünfftige Seele sey das ander theil oder die wesentliche form des Menschen / beweiset die beschriebung der erschaffung des Menschen / vnd andere mehr oben gezogene gezeugnis [der Schrift]’ (1591 [1582]: B3r). 14 Tacius (1556) A2r–3v. 15 Cf. Mt 22:23–33 (and parallels) and Acts 23:1–8 for the Sadducees; 1 Cor 15:12–34 for the Corinthians, and Lk 16:19–31 for the rich man. Tacius gives no or vague references to loci. 16 In northern and eastern parts of the Empire, the term was used to denote Italy. Tacius’ reference is to those who ‘prove with their life and teaching that they do not hold much of this article’ (‘beweisens mit jrem leben vnd lehre / das sie von diesen Artickel nicht sonderlich halten,’ 1556:A2v, emphasis mine) may point to Lateran V or, perhaps, Pope Paul III (on whom more in n. 20 on p. 213, below). 17 Specker (1560) 224r–225r; cf. n. 77 on p. 162, above. 18 Wis 2:1–2 and Acts 23:8 are his prooftexts for the first (double) entry, but the papal story is recounted from Johann Funck’s (1518–1566) Chronologia (1552), and Bullinger’ homiletic Revelation commentary is the source of the third item.

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Mirus is the next author to offer an enumeration of mistaken views although Garcaeus mentions several of them at various points at least via embedded quotations,19 and Mirus may have taken some of his clues from him. In addition to naming the Sadducees and those depicted at the beginning of Wisdom 2, he mentions Aratus and Zenon and Pope Paul III by name.20 The list is adopted and slightly expanded by his followers. Pflacher adds a heresy from Arabia, while Weiser, in a section that is his own composition rather than a quotation from Mirus, continues the story of Paul III with a critique of Lateran V, taken from Luther,21 and the dispute staged by Julius II and/or Leo X, obviously also deriving from the Reformer’s table talk. Chyträus declares his disregard for contrary opinions, but he does proceed to survey some ambiguous or problematic philosophical doctrines that do not altogether deny the soul’s immortality but do not sufficiently affirm it, either. Such middle positions include the teachings of Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and Seneca, with a reference to Democritus.22 Since Chyträus is more concerned to use what he can from secular learning, the negative catalogue receives somewhat less emphasis than its counterparts by other authors. His list also stands apart in that it is limited to ancient philosophies and, moreover, seems to be based on more or less direct acquaintance with the views in question rather than on stylised accounts or secondary sources. Frölich produces an even longer, and largely independent, section on the topic. In addition to Wisdom 2–3 and the Sadducees, he includes several ancient philosophers like Pythagoras, Democritus, Epicurus, Aratus (but Zenon is not mentioned) and Panaetius as well as opponents of early

19 See (1573 [°1568]) C1v (some denying substantiality of soul), D1v–2r (Aratus and Zenon), D5v–6r (Pope Paul III and an unnamed bishop in Westphalia), G3v (Pythagoreans), M4r (Dormitians), M6v (Epimenides). 20 The first pair of references ultimately derives from Gennadius’ De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus, ch. 16, a work earlier attributed to Augustine. The papal anecdote (whose punch line is that the pope declares on his deathbed that he will now learn what he has never believed, namely if there is a God and whether the soul is immortal) must have enjoyed some circulation even before its dissemination by the Garcaeus-Mirus-Pflacher/Weiser line. If we discount Tacius as evidence, Weiser’s earlier work still offers a telling detail. It includes a longer version of the story, but without specifically identifying its protagonist (1577:A3v–4r). It seems as if Weiser must have picked up the anecdote some time before 1577, but then came across it, presumably in Mirus’ Regensburg Sermons, with more specific details before revising his work in 1582. 21 The same detail appears, apart from the list, in Pflacher’s last sermon, on the resurrection (1582:328). In both instances, the dogmatic pronouncement of Lateran V is interpreted as a sign of grave and widespread disbelief in the Roman church. Interestingly, while Weiser correctly speaks of the dogmatisation of the soul’s immortality, Pflacher takes the council to have decreed ‘that there is a resurrection of the body’ (‘daß ein aufferstehung des fleischs sey’). Underlying the latter position is surely Luther’s table talk discussed on p. 46, above, although Pflacher cites no sources. 22 Chyträus (1591 [1582]) C3r–5v.

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Christian orthodoxy like Marcion, Mani, Julianus Apostata or the Arabian heresy refuted by Origen, mostly deriving his information from patristic sources.23 From the sixteenth century, he identifies Popes Julius II and Leo X by name, probably taking the hint from Luther. Such lists do not appear to be directly inspired by either Luther or Melanchthon, but are a later development. They may have emerged in the way suggested above as a result of ‘infratheological’ reflection on scriptural evidence which is then gradually shifted to properly historical and philosophical sources. If so, their development might in fact be a sign of the approaching age of orthodoxy. Or the lists were perhaps inspired by, if not directly derived from, the church fathers whose struggle for right teaching led them to combat unacceptable views also of individual eschatology. Be that as it may, they are, broadly speaking, more Lutheran than Melanchthonian in character.24 It is true that Melanchthon did explicitly criticise the Stoics’ views on the soul,25 but he did not mention any other mistaken schools of thought, and his approach to philosophical arguments is much more appreciative than critical, even if he does set clear limits to their applicability.26 Thus the ‘blacklists’ are closer to Luther in sentiment, who was ever happy to underline the inadequacy of purely rational thought in theological matters. While the catalogue of false teachings itself is a fairly standard feature of later- sixteenth-century discussions of the locus, the lists’ content is only as stable as the interrelatedness of the texts makes it. In other words, the concrete items on the lists vary a good deal, anecdotes and details float fairly freely in and out of the tradition, even the precise teachings associated with a given name may change from one text to another.27 Yet there is

23 Esp. from Epiphanius’ Panarion and Cassiodorus’ Historia ecclesiastica tripartita, but there is also a reference to ancient German and Frank tribes based on Julius Caesar’s report. 24 I am not unsaying what I tried to establish in chapter 2, and do not use the ‘Melanchthonian’ and ‘Lutheran’ labels to denote antithetical approaches. Rather, I see them as signalling certain differences in emphasis and theological model within a matrix of shared basic commitments. 25 Melanchthon (1553) 288. 26 Recall that Tacius’ catalogue is but a year younger than the Liber; the sermon was originally preached in 1554. 27 That Aristotle is accepted with reservations by Chyträus (1591 [1582]:C3v–4v) while Frölich (1590:35v) welcomes him whole-heartedly as an advocate of immortality, not only bears witness to Melanchthon’s influence (Luther may have made his peace with the philosopher in some ways, but he would never admit him, even after some hesitation, as a relevant teacher in doctrinal matters), but also illustrates my earlier point that greater learning increases confidence in the context of rational (as opposed to scripturally based) argumentation (cf. p. 142, above). Interestingly, Seneca is treated in the same fashion. Chyträus finds him ambiguous (C3r/v); Pflacher cites him as a pagan thinker who taught immortality (1582:261). The case of Zenon and Aratus is even more pointed. Garcaeus contrasts them as Aratus teaching the soul’s mortality; Zenon, its delayed extinction

5 Doctrine 215 one feature that remains relatively stable throughout. The kinds of false teachings refuted include those who take the soul to be mortal, those who envision a delayed extinction, those who teach soul sleep and, last but not least, champions of metempsychosis. It is really these views that mark off the boundaries of orthodoxy, and the individual labels used to attach names to them are only secondary. While the transmigration of souls has never been a viable option for Christian theology, and there is only a difference in degree between the immediate demise of the soul upon the body’s death and its deferred annihilation, both soul sleep and a denial of the soul’s immortality have been proposed as interpretations of Luther’s position. Whatever the merits of such constructs for systematic theology, in chapter 2 I voiced my reservations as to their historical accuracy in Luther’s case. What is now beginning to emerge is that his near-contemporaries and the generation immediately after him certainly did not read the Reformer the way many of his modern interpreters have, for they defined a box for orthodoxy into which more recent explications of Luther would not fit.

5.2 Dwelling places of departed souls

There is a further type of false teaching that deserves some reflection on its own. It does not so much concern the outer limits of the doctrine’s ‘orthodox space’ as outlined in the previous section as its internal structure. Several texts take issue with the complex Catholic teaching of the soul’s possible dwelling places in the Zwischenzustand, and oppose to it a simplified evangelical doctrine. With the fivefold structure of the old faith is juxtaposed a sharp either–or of Reformation teaching. Instead of separate places for the irrevocably damned (hell), unbaptised children (limbus infantium), those saved but still to be cleansed (purgatory), the righteous dead before Christ’s incarnation (limbus patrum), and the saints (heaven), Protestants insist on only two options, damnation (hell) or redemption (heaven). Our authors, following Luther’s lead,28 repeatedly critique this understanding and underline

(1573 [°1568]:D1v–2r). Mirus attributes the same (mortalist) doctrine to both (1590 [°1575]:N1v), which is repeated by Weiser (1583b:8), but Pflacher again lists them with the differentiated view (1582:260). Finally, Frölich, who does not mention Zenon at all, cites Aratus as a representative of the metempsychosis school (1590:4r/v). 28 Recall that a similar critique occupied a prominent place in his commentary on Abraham’s and Jacob’s death in the Genesisvorlesung, cf. p. 55, above. Cf. also WATR 4:318.28–32, Nr. 4449 (1539).

5 Doctrine 216 an exclusive heaven/hell dichotomy instead.29 The heart of the matter is, of course, purgatory, and it is never far from our texts. That it does not much surface in Specker’s discussion is largely due to the fact that the Strasbourger has already dealt with it in the context of funeral rites in the previous part of his book. Garcaeus allocates three full chapters to the discussion, while, in a characteristic fashion, Faber reduces it to a brief but emphatic passage of dismissal. Similarly in the Mirus group, the substantial second half of the fifth Regensburg sermon delivers a sustained argument against purgatory, while the sixth homily deals with the related topic of services for the dead. Pflacher offers a summary rejection of the fabled doctrine in sermon 10, while Weiser considerably enlarges upon it, making it not only the subject matter of an independent question but also inserting a very long excursus at the end of his first unit (immortality) which, in a few large blocks, duly includes Mirus’ entire fifth and sixth homilies. Chyträus, like Specker, deals with the question essentially outside the bounds of the immortality locus (ch. 4). He allocates the entirety of the next chapter to it. Frölich refutes the doctrine of purgatory in some detail, while in Roth’s funeral sermon there is, understandably, less scope for it, but the central Lutheran claim is nonetheless articulated.30 A close analysis of the argument against Catholic teaching falls beyond the limits of my present enquiry, and it requires no elaboration here that the Reformation, especially in its Lutheran form, had vested interest in the disestablishment of purgatory, both theologically and socially-institutionally.31 As the overview above reveals, various strategies were used to relate the immortality locus to the doctrine of purgatory, but in some way or other practically all texts make the connection. The relative position of the topics in the texts quite accurately mirrors their theological relationship. They are closely linked, but each usually has its own space at the same structural level, and the discussion of immortality only includes pointers to or a brief affirmation of the anti-purgatory thesis rather than its full treatment. That is noteworthy, for the possibility or rejection of post-mortem cleansing logically belongs with

29 Cf. Specker (1560) 244r/v; Musculus (1565) D5v; Pflacher (1582) 262–63; Frölich (1590) 5r, 25r. 30 Cf. Specker (1560) pt. 2, ch. 12, esp. 202r–209r; Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) chs. 9–11; Faber (1569) Z5r; Pflacher (1582) 267–68. In Weiser, the purgatory question proper is relatively short (1583b:34–35), but then comes the related issue of prayer for the dead (36–40) and the excursus (40–123) which is itself twice as long as the whole unit on the soul’s state. Chyträus (1590) 21r–25r; Roth (1591) C4v–D1r. 31 Cf. p. 39, above.

5 Doctrine 217 the discussion of the intermediate state, but, theologically, it is usually treated side by side with, rather than subsumed under, the latter. Thus their theological dependency runs counter to what logic would dictate. It is in fact the doctrine of purgatory, or, more accurately, the desire of its refutation, that drives in large part the development of the teaching on immortality. There are several aspects of the emerging consensus that further bear out that claim. Texts on the soul’s immortality characteristically include a catalogue of names for the departed souls’ abode. Specker presented a long list which then left a highly visible trajectory in the texts dependent upon him. The roots of the cataloguing tradition are more difficult to trace, but since Luther produced several germinal lists, the likes of which are much more typical of the corpus than Specker’s elaborate inventory, I think it likely that the Reformer may have been a major source of inspiration.32 Most of his appellations appear in Vom leiblichen Todt, and ultimately all of them are picked up by one or the other author of my corpus. In what is by far the longest chapter in the third part of his book, alone amounting to a third of the complete immortality section, Specker enumerates fifteen biblical names for the place of righteous souls and eleven for the place of the unrighteous. I provided an analysis of the list in the previous chapter33 and need not repeat the details here. The reception and transmission history of Specker’s names is characterised by two features. First, they were practically never simply ignored. At least in some minor way, the issue surfaces in every text, and those works for which Vom leiblichen Todt provided a major impetus invariably include a clearly recognisable chapter or section on the names, which thus became an established topic within the locus.34 On the other hand, however, none of the later lists is as long and elaborate as Specker’s original, although in some small but not insignificant ways it may even be extended. Overall, then, the direction of doctrinal development in this particular case is towards simplification. The prooftexts offered in support of the names exhibit similar characteristics. It is usually possible to assign a central biblical locus to each name35 that is quoted by all or most

32 Cf. p. 52, above. 33 Cf., esp., Table 4.3. 34 A telling detail of the list’s establishment is that in an early sermon of the sequence, Pflacher uses a very similar collection of names, this time augmenting the nominal forms with a verb like go or be, for death (1582:9). 35 E.g. 1 Sam 25:29 for the bundle of the living, Ps 27:13 for the land of the living, Ps 31:5 and Wis 3:1 for the

5 Doctrine 218 authors that mention the name, but, beyond that, there is considerable variation on the fringes both in terms of how many prooftexts are supplied and what exactly is cited as supporting evidence. It is, further, altogether possible to use a name, or even a list of names, quite casually, without bothering to footnote it with biblical loci.36 Worse still, we find several examples of ‘loose prooftexting’ when the actual name does not appear in the given scriptural passage at all.37 And, to cap it all, names might even be invented, although that happens quite rarely and casually, not within the formal roll call.38 The question whether the interim abode of the souls is ‘geographically’ identical with their final dwelling place after the resurrection, or they will indeed move to a comparable but different place when rejoined with their bodies, remains open. Musculus strongly negates the identity of the pre and post-resurrection dwelling places39; others seem to affirm it,40 but the problem attracts little attention. That is precisely my point. Such details as the exact names or the precise location of the souls’ provisional domicile do not really matter. What counts, instead, is that the various names all refer to the same reality. Whether we call it Abraham’s bosom, the people or fathers to whom one is gathered as is repeatedly said of the patriarchs, the bundle of the living, paradise, heavenly Jerusalem, the Father’s house or any other name,41 including the nice green meadow or the Elysian fields of pagan thought (usually taken to echo the teaching of the Old Testament), it is always one and the same place. It is not accidental that while the exact items vary significantly, their interchangeability is routinely asserted either explicitly or, more often, implicitly.42 Further, and that is the second

hand of God, Lk 16:22 for Abraham’s bosom, Lk 23:42 for Paradise, Jn 14:2 and 2 Cor 5:1 for eternal house, Heb 12:22–24 and Rev 21:1–3 for heavenly Jerusalem, Rev 6:9 for (martyrs’ souls) under the altar, etc. 36 E.g. Faber (1569) c3r; Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) G6r, H1r, M6v. 37 E.g. Musculus (1565) D3r, Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) E6r, G5r/v, G8r; Mirus (1590 [°1575]) O1v; Weiser (1583b) 21. 38 Garcaeus is quite fond of speaking of Christ’s bosom (1573 [°1568]: A8r, B1v, E6r, F1v, F3v, F7v, G6v, J7v, M6v, P1r). It is clear (esp. from E6r) that Lk 16:22, and a kind of christological dissatisfaction with Abraham, underlies the usage, but in fact the term goes back all the way to Luther (cf. p. 54, above). The same Lukan locus could prove productive in the other direction as well. Garcaeus invents the name ‘the bosom of Cain, Saul and Judas’ (‘schos Cain / Sauls vnd Jude,’ K5r) for the place of the damned, and in a similar vein Pflacher speaks of Lucifer’s bosom (‘schoß Lucifers,’ 1582:267). 39 Musculus (1565) C8v. Recall Luther’s similar position in his commentary on Jacob’s death (cf. p. 58, above). 40 Cf. Mirus (1590 [°1575]) N4r, Pflacher (1582) 263. 41 Cf. n. 35 on p. 217, above, and n. 76 on p. 229, below. 42 E.g. Musculus (1565) D1r, D3r; Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) G5r, G6r, G8r, H1r, K2r, K4v–5r, M6v; Faber (1569)

5 Doctrine 219 important point, we might even speak of the souls’ state rather than of their place, for not the venue but the quality is what chiefly matters in the post-mortem existence. That is why names like ‘the hand of God (or Christ or the Lord),’ ‘with Christ’ or plain ‘heaven’ appear far more frequently than some others like ‘chambers’ (on the basis of Isa 26:20) or ‘within the veil’ (Heb 6:19). No matter exactly where, the departed righteous souls are with Christ. Similarly, the souls of the damned are in hell, deprived of divine presence, irrespective of what precise names might be used for their dwelling place or, indeed, where it may be located.43 All that feeds into one central argument. There are only two destinations a soul might be bound for after death. It either goes to be with Christ or to be under God’s curse. There is no middle way; purgatory is out. Thirdly, however, when later-sixteenth-century reflection on the souls’ dwelling places is held against Luther’s, a pronounced literalisation is detectable on the whole. Some writers surely interpret the names more literally than others, but none really takes the point, elaborated in some detail in the Genesisvorlesung, that the receptacle of the souls is God’s promise. We have seen that Garcaeus was the only one to adopt the Reformer’s metaphor of Christ’s bosom which is directly connected to this line of interpretation.44 The reluctance to follow Luther on this point is probably a result of an increasingly substantial, as opposed to relational, understanding of the soul which may not be independent of Melanchthon’s transmission of Aristotelian philosophical commitments. Essentially the same anti-purgatorial logic informs the equally common but much more concise discussion of when souls reach their destination. Following Specker’s lead, it is often treated in a chapter of its own, and even when it is not, the essential point is still made.45 There are only a few differences to note in comparison with the catalogue of place names. A tendency towards simplification is less tangible after Specker, but that is not surprising, given the considerably reduced length of the relevant chapter in Vom leiblichen c3r; Mirus (1590 [°1575]) N4r/v; Pflacher (1582) 264, 269; Chyträus (1591 [1582]) C5v; Weiser (1583b) 15, 18, 21–22; Roth (1591) C3r. 43 Speculations on the latter are explicitly discouraged, e.g., by Musculus (1565) D4r/v and Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) K5v. 44 The phrase, imbedded in the quotation from Luther, occurs in other texts as well (e.g. Specker (1560) 230v, Faber (1569) Z1r/v), but it is not used by them directly. Barnes mistakenly attributes it to Faber himself, apparently not only missing the Speckerian mediation but also the Lutheran origin of the phrase, although that is signalled in the Tractetlein (2000:281–82). 45 Of all post-1560 texts, Musculus (1565) and Roth (1591) are the only exceptions, but in ch. 4 we have seen that they do stand somewhat apart from the Speckerian tradition.

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Todt. Further, there is a greater coherence of prooftexts, centring on Luke 16:22–23 and 23:43, John 3:18 and 5:24 and Revelation 14:13, but again, the ‘when’ question is like one of the names rather than their complete list. The thesis is also more uniformly and explicitly affirmed. Souls are taken to paradise or hell right upon the body’s death. The point is primarily directed not against views like Zenon’s slow evaporation of the soul but, once more, against purgatory. Taken together, the widespread discussion of when and where the soul goes when somebody dies is designed to leave, quite literally, no time and space for post-mortem cleansing. It is doubtless a desire to undercut Catholic doctrine that motivates the development of Lutheran teaching in that regard. The corpus provides a test case for my contention. The third related question that Specker introduces, namely, how souls reach their destination,46 has far less immediate relevance for purgatory and its debunking, and receives, accordingly, much less attention. In Vom leiblichen Todt, it fills more pages than the ‘when’ chapter, yet in most later texts it is reduced to scarcely more than a brief generalisation from Luke 16:22 that the righteous soul is carried by angels, to which its logical counterpart is sometimes added that the unrighteous soul is escorted by devils.47 In the previous chapter, I used evidence from the corresponding chapters in Specker, Faber and Garcaeus to argue the later authors’ dependence on the earlier text (Table 4.4), but we also saw that they followed the Strasbourger’ work rather faithfully overall. It can be therefore fairly suggested that their retention of the theme carries here little weight. On the other hand, no other writer cared to pick up the question for more than a paragraph. It is of no particular interest to them although the ‘how’ question is not intrinsically less exciting than the ‘when’ or ‘where’ question. Moreover, Specker, interpreting the ‘how’ question broadly, includes more properly theological aspects in his answer—like the agency of divine power and the instrumentality of faith—than in the answer to the ‘when’ question that is limited to the single temporal issue. Despite its greater theological surface potential, the point is still essentially ignored by later texts. I believe the explanation lies in its virtual irrelevance for the doctrine of purgatory. That is not to say that the new teaching would be advertised as an attack on Catholic

46 Specker (1560) ch. 5 (252r–256v). 47 In fact, in addition to Specker (1560:255r), Faber (1569:a1r) and Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]:K5r), who constitute the core tradition as regards the ‘how’ question, Pflacher (1582:267) is the only one to assert that much.

5 Doctrine 221 doctrine. The main thrust of the texts is not polemical but devotional. Their purpose is usually stated in a twofold manner, corresponding to a Lutheran law–gospel hermeneutic, to work repentance in the godless and to comfort pious Christians. There are surely variations on the theme. Faber includes a more apologetic-rational element in the doctrine’s function by expecting it to convince doubters, while Pflacher sees its usefulness, in part, in countering deniers of immortality; Musculus wants to strengthen hope by it, and Garcaeus, faith.48 Weiser’s motto ‘In all you do, remember the end of your life, and then you will never sin’ (Sir 7:36)49 is a fit summary of a persistent theme articulated, sometimes through patristic quotations,50 by many other writers as well.51 The frequently expressed concern for the world’s sinfulness and the perceived immediacy of the last day52 surely adds urgency to a reminder of last things, but above and beyond these dark tones, the loudest voice in the later-sixteenth-century corpus is that of comfort.53 As good Lutherans, they are preaching both law and gospel, but the latter must have the last and clearest word. The proximity of doomsday is itself a theme that keeps recurring in Luther’s texts, but one that never undercut his realistic engagement with this world as emblematically witnessed by his apocryphal adage about planting an apple tree on the eve of judgement day. The end did not come on a cosmic scale as expected, but individual lives did end, often early and abruptly, and that also demanded reflection—and preparation. It is noteworthy that many of the texts belong in the broad sense into a reformed ars moriendi tradition.54 It is the pastoral concern implicit in that situation that constitutes a major impetus for the development of the doctrine. And the evangelical message of individual eschatology is ultimately not to frighten with fire and brimstone, but to reassure faith in a merciful God against anxieties of death and hell. In the

48 Faber (1569) Y4r; Pflacher (1582) 260; Musculus (1565) B1v; Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) K6r, N5v. 49 The title page of both the 1583 and 1588 editions carry it, but it is dropped by 1590. 50 Like Chrysostom’s ‘For to remember hell prevents our falling into hell’ (Homily 31 on Romans; NPNF1 11:558). 51 See, e.g., Specker (1560) 291v–293v; Musculus (1565) A6r; Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) B7v and S2r; Frölich (1590) )(3r; Roth (1591) A4r/v, D1v. 52 E.g. Musculus (1565) A2r–5v; Weiser (1583a) A12r/v and B15v; Frölich (1590) 3v–4r. 53 See, e.g., Tacius (1556) A3v, C4v–D1r; Specker (1560) 222v; Musculus (1565) B1v; Faber (1569) Y2v–3r; Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) B7v; Mirus (1590 [°1575]) O3v ; Weiser (1583a) A12v–3r, 28–29; Pflacher (1582) 275– 76; Roth (1591) D1v–2r. For Faber, cf. Barnes (2000) 282. 54 On the early appropriation of the genre by Reformation theology, see Reinis (2007).

5 Doctrine 222 last analysis, that is precisely what these texts do as they develop the new church’s teaching about the soul’s immortality.

5.3 Rational arguments for the immortality of the soul

The very concept of the soul that all our writers subscribe to at least implicitly includes the attribute of immortality, but that does not prevent them from arguing for it, usually at the head of the locus. The ultimate trump card is always propositional revelation, but there is a variety of means to the end that deserve a closer look. There are two fundamental kinds of argument, one based on reason, the other, on revelation. The latter is much broader than a direct appeal to propositional revelation which must be seen as a special case within that category. A particular type of consideration derived from the phenomenological kinship between death and sleep is so complex that it must be analysed separately in sections 5.6 to 5.8. Rational, that is, reason-based, arguments represent the minority, and are certainly not engaged in by all authors. In fact, most of those writers who do not avoid the approach altogether rarely go beyond a mere assertion that pagan philosophers also arrived at the conclusion of immortality, and hardly ever give any hint, let alone account, of the ancients’ actual line of thought. That is the strategy employed by Musculus, Mirus, Pflacher, Weiser and Frölich,55 who only differ in the list of representative authorities and their categorisation of them that ranges from an all-inclusive ‘the pagans’ (‘die Heiden’) in Musculus through Pflacher’s ‘majority’ (‘etliche vnnd der mehrertheil vnder den Heyden’) to Mirus’ ‘more reasonable’ (‘vernünfftiger’) which is repeated by Weiser. Musculus names no names; Mirus and Weiser both cite Xenophon’s Cyrus, and Cicero; Pflacher mentions Plato, Cicero, and Seneca; Frölich, as we have seen, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero. Plato, Xenophon’s Cyrus, and Cicero, not to mention Aristotle, all made distinguished appearances, we recall, in Melanchthon,56 where they are likely to have been taken from by these authors. It is nevertheless noteworthy that Musculus and Pflacher, who declare pagan arguments to be

55 Musculus (1565) B6v–B7r, Mirus (1590 [°1575]) N2r, Pflacher (1582) 261, Weiser (1583b) 9, Frölich (1590) 35v. 56 Cf. section 2.6, above.

5 Doctrine 223 irrefutable,57 still do not care to give the slightest clue as to what they might have been, but proceed straight to scripture. Weiser’s case is equally telling. His work is quite repetitive on the whole because he first makes his point in response to the given catechetical question, and then cites supporting evidence usually from Mirus—from whom his material was derived in the first place—and thus traverses the same ground twice. On this particular point,58 however, he essentially repeats himself thrice. After a review of the doctrine’s deniers, discussed above, he states his case, buttresses it with biblical prooftexts, then, as if drawing the conclusion from what has just been said, he repeats the immortality thesis and proceeds to provide further scriptural evidence. After all this, he turns to Mirus and cites him at length, beginning with his review of the deniers and so on. What stands out in this seemingly endless circularity is the absence of any reference to pagan thought outside the direct quotation from Mirus. In those parts of the text that he himself shaped, he refrained from touching the subject. In fact, Weiser is the most independent of his sources at exactly this point. The reference to philosophy comes at the end of the deniers section, but in the first run it is replaced with a series of anti-papal anecdotes, probably prompted by the appearance of Paul III in the original.59 Garcaeus goes a significant step further, but he does not develop the insight. In a passage that may have been inspired by Musculus at the beginning of the immortality chapter,60 he asserts the strength of pagan arguments for the soul’s immortality but, like every other author, quickly shifts approaches, and moves to scriptural grounds à la Specker. Writing on the appearance of ghosts, however, he observes that just as the righteous souls remain in their appointed place, the souls of the damned also stay put and fearfully await the great day, on which the Lord will appear and hand over all the godless with body and soul to the devil for eternal torture and pain. Philosophers know nothing of this great transformation, although they partly conclude from rational causes that the soul is immortal because it possesses a heavenly nature and being, but it is ridiculous and impossible for them to believe that the decayed flesh should also share and be dressed in immortality.61

57 Musculus: ‘unwidersprechlich’, ‘so stark vnd krefftig/ das . . . nicht zu wider sprechen’ (1565:B6v); Pflacher: ‘mit unwidertreiblichen argumenten’ (1582:261). 58 See Weiser (1583b) 1–14. 59 Cf. p. 213, above. 60 Cf. p. 178, above. 61 ‘..des grossen tags/an welchem der HERR erscheinen wird/vnd alle Gottlosen mit Leib vnd Seele dem Teuffel zu ewiger tortur vnd marter vbergeben. Von dieser verenderung wissen die Philosophi gar nichts / ob

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Here, then, we finally have a glimpse of what kind of rational reflection may lead to the desired conclusion, namely, an analysis of the soul’s nature. Unfortunately, Garcaeus does not carry on with this line of reasoning, but we may have a shrewd guess that he is taking his clue from Melanchthon, who not only elaborated on such Platonic arguments in his Aristotle commentary but made the exact same generalising point as well. It is all the more likely that Garcaeus is drawing on his former teacher since the central claim of this passage is identical with Melanchthon’s mature position in the Liber de anima (1553). Reason may have guided pagan philosophers to a recognition of the soul’s immortality, but knowledge of the body’s resurrection is only available in revelation. Quite significantly, the nature-of-the-soul argument and the juxtaposition of immortality with resurrection in terms of reason and revelation also occur together in the same short passage in Melanchthon: The philosophers have said nothing of the resurrection of bodies that the divine voice most plainly revealed. But if some people believe that after death another life is to follow, they think that souls only survive, since they seem to agree that they are made up of a heavenly nature and not of the elements.62

Given their personal connections,63 it is not to be wondered at that Garcaeus should have picked up Melanchthon’s point. It is more surprising, on the contrary, that he does not run with it but leaves it at this incipient stage despite the fact that the above passage stands at the introduction of philosophical arguments in the Liber. It is worth recalling here that it was the same group of authors in whose texts the pretty green meadow or the Elysian fields of pagan thought appeared in the context of biblical names of the soul’s interim abode. Garcaeus dismissed them as fable; Mirus and, following him, Pflacher and Weiser interpreted them as a faint echo of the ‘doctrine of the patriarchs.’ Only Musculus went as far as acknowledging them, in effect, as independent evidence, but ultimately he also classified them as ‘uncertain tales and fables.’64 On the whole, then, there is a clearly perceptible reluctance to approach the question of the soul’s immortality under the aegis of reason. Only the most highly educated do that, and Chyträus, sie schon ein teils schliessen aus vernünfftigen vrsachen / die seel sey vnsterblich/dieweil sie eine Himlische natur vnd wesen an sich hat / dennoch ist dis jnen lecherlich vnd zu gleuben vnmüglich/ das das verfaulte fleisch /auch die vnsterbligkeit besitzen vnd anziehen solle’ (Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) L5v). 62 Melanchthon (1553) 286. 63 Cf. p. 118, above. 64 See Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) G4v; Mirus (1590 [°1575]) N3v–4r, Pflacher (1582) 262, and Weiser (1583b) 16: ‘der Altveter Lehre’; Musculus (1565) D1v: ‘vngewisse geticht vnd Fabel.’

5 Doctrine 225 an intellectual giant, is alone in deploying rational arguments in any significant and sustained fashion. Chyträus’ review of philosophical proofs comes in the second major thematic unit of his chapter where he is concerned to establish the soul’s immortality, after an introduction that contained general reflection on the definition and origin of the soul, discussed above.65 The transition from scripture to philosophy is introduced with the metaphor of a ship held by two anchors. Reason is accorded a very high place here, higher in fact than by Melanchthon, for it is now apparently understood to contribute to faith. Chyträus enumerates six arguments for the immortality of the soul, taken from pagan philosophy. He derives them from Plato via Cicero, whom he follows relatively closely.66 He argues from the wisdom of the ancients, from universal consensus, from the movement of the elements, from the self-moved mover, from the non-composite nature of the soul, and lastly from deficient recompense for the pious in this life. The first two are essentially arguments from authority67; the next three metaphysical (based on the nature of the soul), and the last is a variety of the moral argument, which Chyträus sees much more clearly attested by the example of the church’s martyrs from Abel to John the Baptist to Christ and the Apostles.68 Melanchthon, drawing on the same classical authorities, elaborated on the last two of those points,69 and he also mentioned Christ, John the Baptist, Paul (that is, an apostle) and Abel in close proximity to each other in the context of the latter. Chyträus surely knew the Liber, and he may have been inspired by Melanchthon’s immortality chapter. If so, he seems to be outdoing his teacher, yet even here there are clear tendencies that subtly undercut the force of reason. Chyträus does not scruple to challenge, if not demolish, rational arguments that support his case if he finds them ill-founded. Thus he objects to the fourth argument, from the soul as the source of its own movement, a favourite with Cicero, that animals’ souls should also be held eternal by the same logic. The key lies in a distinction between moving in

65 Cf. p. 212, above. 66 Cf. Cicero, On Old Age, sec. 21, par. 51. 67 Cicero also clearly marks them off as of a different kind, ‘Nor is it only reason and arguments that have brought me to this belief, but the great fame and authority of the most distinguished philosophers.’ 68 Chyträus (1591 [1582]) B6v–C2v. 69 Cf. section 2.6, above.

5 Doctrine 226 and moving of itself (or having the source of movement in itself and moving by itself). God alone satisfies the stricter requirement, and is alone eternal. In the Commentarius, it took Melanchthon some conscious self-restraint—that left its mark on the text—not to be carried away with the Platonic argument from the simple (non-composite) nature of the soul. He was more reserved in the Liber, but when Chyträus remarks on the same point that Cicero, like Plato, held this reasoning to be decisive and immune to refutation, one even senses some slight distancing from the triumphalism of the ancient authors. Further, the immortality section (within Chyträus’ immortality chapter) has a threefold structure. First comes biblical evidence, followed by arguments from reason, and finally the flipside of the philosophical coin, the catalogue of dubious middle positions. His logic is thus the opposite of the standard approach which begins with the deniers to whom are opposed the best of pagan thinkers, and finally revelation trumps all. The result is that the overall movement of his argument is not from the poverty to the excellence of rational thought but vice versa, and scripture not simply corroborates what the best minds have known anyway, but leads the way, and reason is relegated to a position of providing secondary supporting evidence. Here he is quite close to Melanchthon, who found a similar overarching scheme for his material when he rearranged it for the Liber. After the introduction, he also turns first to biblical prooftexts, then moves to philosophical arguments, spending most time on the three most powerful ones, and then concluding with a brief discussion of Aristotle. It might also be added that Chyträus’ whole reflection on rational arguments is, unlike Melanchthon’s, but a small fraction of the entire chapter, and at that level pure philosophy is certainly no match for revelation-based reasoning. That is not to deny the force of the metaphor of double anchoring, but to put it in perspective. Chyträus undoubtedly assigns a higher role to reason in the discussion of the soul’s immortality than anyone else in the later sixteenth century, but even he limits its scope. At any rate, the Rostock theologian is an exception whose approach is not shared by the others. They are content to confine themselves to properly theological arguments.

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5.4 Theological arguments in the 1560s70

These fall into three broad categories that we might call doctrinal, church historical and revelatory. They might overlap at the edges, nor do they appear in the texts under those headings, but the labels are useful analytical tools, not least because they help show the fluidity of the original categories. Developmentally, there is a trajectory that derives from Specker and includes the first and last types, while historical arguments can be traced back, in a big way, to Garcaeus, who may have been inspired by Musculus. It is important to note, however, that at the end of the day practically all categories turn out to be subtypes of biblical arguments. It may ultimately be an indication of how powerfully the scripture principle of the Reformation works in the theological thinking of later-sixteenth-century authors, but more proximately it exhibits the methodological influence of Melanchthon’s Loci. Specker organised his arguments into four rubrics, from creation,71 redemption, divine judgement and conscience (treated together) and, finally, specific witnesses and revelations. The fourth is quite transparently a code name for straightforward prooftexting, and includes the heavy-weight among relevant biblical passages which might actually include some—like the fate of Lazarus’ soul in Luke 16:22—that could also be categorised, on sixteenth-century understanding, as ‘historical.’ Faber follows his source quite faithfully except that, on the one hand, he omits Specker’s (Latin) overtitle ‘from redemption,’ and simply speaks of arguments from Christ’s suffering and death, and, on the other hand, he omits conscience from the third type. He is the only one to pick up this line from Specker; all others will opt for focusing on conscience and dropping arguments from God’s judgement, thereby shifting from doctrinal to revelatory types in terms of my analytical labels. The novelty of Musculus’ approach is that he argues from examples.72 He is still using

70 I used the corresponding material to establish the texts’ interdependence in the previous chapter (cf., esp., Table 4.14, Table 4.19, Table 4.25). Here, keeping repetition at a minimum, I shall offer a theological analysis. 71 Though without labelling them in a similar fashion, Tacius also quotes the relevant verses from Genesis (1:26 and 2:7) while proving the soul’s immortality (1556:A3v). 72 Tacius also had a section on ‘Exempla’ (1556:D1r–2r), but that comes as the third unit within the application. Nevertheless, he is broader in scope than Musculus because he includes, in addition to biblical figures like Job and Paul, patristic and contemporary stories as well.

5 Doctrine 228 biblical evidence, but he presents it not under doctrinal but historical headings.73 (He also has a section on propositional revelation with the usual loci that he offers as a confirmation of the examples.) He begins with Abel, interpreting his blood crying out to God (Gen 4:10) metonymically rather than metaphorically. Though already killed by Cain, Abel (represented by his blood) still speaks (understood literally) with God and must, therefore, be alive. Musculus continues with Enoch, Elijah and Christ as examples provided by God in the three ages of the world, before the flood, between Noah and Christ, and since the times of the New Testament. That I list these stories as ‘church historical evidence’ is no oversight. Following Luther, it is customary in Reformation and post-Reformation theology to speak of the Old Testament church and consider all those who believed to be saved even before the time of Jesus as members of the one catholic church, and the historicity of the biblical narrative had, of course, not yet been questioned in the sense of Lessing’s ‘broad ugly ditch.’ Further, as witnessed by Protestant martyrologies of the early modern age, or, indeed, the Magdeburg Centuries (1559–1574), church history was an auxiliary discipline to theology in a very different sense than in later periods. It should not go unnoticed that in Melanchthon’s Commentarius there is a comparable list which includes Abel, Enoch, Elijah, Christ and the prophets and patriarchs raised with him.74 There are some differences, however. These figures are not named as examples but as teachers of the doctrine. The point about Abel is not his blood crying out. On the contrary, on Melanchthon’s reading it is God who preaches future punishment for the wicked and reward for the pious. Christ is not singled out in the New Testament but is mentioned together with those he brought back to life, and that is how the patriarchs earn a mention as part of the group he raised and took with him to heaven. Further, by the time it reaches the Liber (1553), the list all but disintegrates and can only support claims of direct textual influence if acquaintance with the earlier version of the text is also presupposed. Even so, the sequence of names is fairly similar in the Commentarius and Musculus, and it is not entirely impossible that Melanchthon’s work may have played a role in the development of this line of reasoning. Also noteworthy is the fact that Musculus cites the above examples of bodily

73 Cf. p. 178, above. 74 Melanchthon (1540a) 305–07.

5 Doctrine 229 translation in the context of the soul’s immortality. They are introduced as evidence that ‘after this life there is another life, and human beings are not quite extinguished after their death like other, unreasonable animals.’75 The latter clause is virtually synonymous with an affirmation of the soul’s continued existence, but the reference to another life is broader and includes resurrection and a realistically understood post-doomsday existence. To the epochal examples are then added the patriarchs of whom it is repeatedly stated that they have been gathered to their fathers or people.76 If gathered, they must be alive, and if to a people, it must exist somewhere. It is with Garcaeus that this stream of argumentation joins the river of the Speckerian tradition. Taking his clues from Specker and Musculus, Garcaeus enumerates nine proofs, beginning with creation and redemption, then he moves to Christ’s resurrection. What, if anything, inspired this item is not clear, and it may very well be Garcaeus’ own contribution. Structurally, this argument replaces Specker’s reasoning from judgement as third on the list. (The other three of Garcaeus’ first four points, including the heavy-weight prooftexts of special revelation as fourth, are identical with Specker’s.) Even if it were too far fetched to argue a highly significant, and in its basic thrust fundamentally Lutheran, christological reinterpretation of the Strasbourger’s approach, Garcaeus clearly takes an independent route on the question of judgement. What I take to be beyond doubt is that he drops the first element of Specker’s conjoined pair of judgement and conscience and, unlike Faber, runs with the second, which he includes on its own as ninth and last argument on his list. Less evident but still probable is that he transforms the judgement theme into prophecy that comes seventh. He cites Jude 14–1577 as evidence, and the only other time that passage occurs in the whole context of establishing the soul’s immortality in the later-sixteenth- century corpus is in Specker’s (and Faber’s) argument from judgement. But even if that connection is conjectural, Garcaeus definitely recontextualised the Jude passage from judgement to prophecy.

75 ‘Das auch nach diesem lebē sey/vñ die mensch en nicht gar zu nicht werden / nach jrem ab sterben / wie andere /vnuernunfftige Thier’ (1565:B7v). 76 Cf. Gen 15:15, 25:8, 25:17, 35:29, 49:33; Num 20:26; Deut 32:50; 2 Chron 34:28. 77 ‘It was also about these that Enoch, in the seventh generation from Adam, prophesied, saying, “See, the Lord is coming with tens of thousands of his holy ones, to execute judgement on all, and to convict everyone of all the deeds of ungodliness that they have committed in such an ungodly way, and of all the harsh things that ungodly sinners have spoken against him.” ’

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Alternatively, Musculus’ influence might also be detected behind the argument from Christ’s resurrection. One minor but significant difference between the two is that Musculus cites the episode as evidence that ‘there is a resurrection of the dead and after this temporal [life] another eternal life,’ while Garcaeus speaks of it as ‘the most beautiful witness of the immortality and of life eternal.’78 I do not think this evidence bears out any other argument, especially considering the context, than the suggestion that resurrection and immortality were not juxtaposed but interchangeable or mutually entailing in the theology of the sixteenth century. More problematic than this terminological divergence for Musculus’ possible influence on Garcaeus at this point is that the Easter story appears again in Garcaeus’ list of examples, the fifth of his nine arguments, at exactly the same position and with the same scriptural allusion (1 Cor 15:2079) as we saw in Musculus. But it may have been the Frankfurt theologian’s example-based approach that prompted Garcaeus to replace the argument from judgement, with which he was clearly uncomfortable, with the example of Christ’s resurrection, invited by the second item adopted from Specker, namely, Christ’s suffering. Further, Garcaeus slightly revises Musculus’ list of examples (Abel, Enoch, Elijah, Christ and the patriarchs) by augmenting it at three points. With Christ, he includes also those raised with him80; immediately thereafter he adds the story of transfiguration and, at the end, appends Lazarus of the parable. This may be read to shift the profile of the catalogue towards human examples motivated by a sense of dissatisfaction with Christ’s simple inclusion as one of several comparable items in a list. The Son of God deserves more singular attention, Garcaeus may have felt, and thus singled out his resurrection as an example sui generis which must be enumerated on its own. A third option is that Garcaeus is indebted to Melanchthon on this point. The

78 Musculus: ‘das da sey ein aufferstehung der thoten/vnd nach diesem zeitlichem/ ein ander ewig leben’ (1565:B8r). Garcaeus: ‘das aller schöneste gezeugnis der vnsterbligkeit vnd vom ewigen leben’ (1573 [°1568]:C5r). 79 ‘But in fact Christ has been raised from the dead, the first fruits of those who have died.’ 80 On this minor exegetical point he is a typical representative of sixteenth-century Lutheranism. Despite the clarity of the Matthean account (‘Then Jesus cried again with a loud voice and breathed his last. At that moment the curtain of the temple was torn in two, from top to bottom. The earth shook, and the rocks were split. The tombs also were opened, and many bodies of the saints who had fallen asleep were raised. After his resurrection they came out of the tombs and entered the holy city and appeared to many,’ 27:50–53) that the saints were raised at the time of Jesus’ death and they appeared in Jerusalem after his resurrection, the passage is uniformly understood as dating their resurrection to Easter. It is 1 Cor 15:20 that is brought to bear on the interpretation and, in fact, trumps the gospel text. If Christ was ‘the first fruits of those who have died,’ nobody can have been raised before him.

5 Doctrine 231 immortality chapter of the Liber began with Christ’s resurrection, and Garcaeus’ third argument is reminiscent of Melanchthon’s opening lines: The third argument one should take from the resurrection of the Lord Christ, for the most beautiful witness of the immortality and of life eternal is presented by the happy resurrection from the dead and victorious triumph of Jesus Christ our Saviour. Otherwise why is my true Messiah risen, and for what reason did he present himself in various ways as alive for a whole forty days? Only in order to prove in these happy encounters and triumphal synod that he was truly alive and that his body in which he lived and lay in the grave before was again united with his soul as he had truly magnificently prophesied it in Psalm 16.81

Garcaeus is keeping in line with a mainstream Lutheran interpretive tradition when he understands Psalm 16 as a christological text, but his prooftext deserves special attention. Psalm 16, esp. verse 11,82 is a popular text in the corpus—Garcaeus himself quotes it a couple of more times—but its context is always the life of the blessed souls or their wakeful existence.83 This is the only instance when it appears in a discussion of the arguments for the soul’s immortality, and it is no accident that it is introduced via christology. Though the psalm is not cited in Melanchthon’s immortality chapter, the Praeceptor includes it in the resurrection chapter of the Loci communes and comments, ‘David is talking abut Christ and including the members of Christ, namely all believers.’84 It is a christological passage, but as such it pertains to Christians as well. A somewhat differently oriented christological interpretation of Psalm 16 Garcaeus may have picked up without much effort from Specker, whose unparalleled excursus on Christ’s descent to hell not only opens with verses 9–10 of this psalm but also includes a substantial portion of Luther’ commentary on it from his

81 ‘DAs dritte Argument sol man nemen aus des HErrn Christi aufferstehung/Denn das aller schönste gezeugnis der vnsterbligkeit vnd vom ewigen leben/ stellet vns für des Heilandes Jhesu Christi fröliche Aufferweckung von todten vnd sieghafftiger triumph/ Warumb ist sonst mein getrewer Messias aufferstanden/vñ aus was vrsachen hat er sich lebendig dargestellet durch mancherley weise gantzer viertzig tage? allein in diesē frölichen gesperch vnd Synodo triumphali zuerweisein/ das er warhafftig lebe/vnd das sein Cörper/darin er zuuor g[e]lebet/ vnd im grabe geruhet / mit der Seelen widerumb verieniget/ wie deuon im 16.Psalm gar herrlich geweissagt’ (Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) C5r/v). Cf. Melanchthon (1553) 284: ‘A shining testimony that perpetual life follows after this mortal life is that the Son of God our Lord Jesus Christ was crucified and died and later rose again. And so that he not be thought an illusion, after forty days he appeared familiarly to his apostles and showed many others that he had truly revived, and further that his soul was truly joined to the body in which he had lived.’ 82 ‘You show me the path of life. In your presence there is fullness of joy; in your right hand are pleasures for evermore.’ 83 Cf. Specker (1560) 263r; Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) M6r, O2v; Mirus (1590 [°1575]) O2v; Weiser (1583b) 27 (quoting Mirus); Pflacher (1582) 272, and, less relevantly, Frölich (1590) 12v and 14r. 84 Melanchthon (1965 [1555]) 283.

5 Doctrine 232 second lecture series on the Psalter.85 Here specifically the soul is associated with hell, ‘We therefore see that scripture allots two places for the dead, the pit for the body and hell for the soul.’86 In Christ, there is redemption from both death and hell. Finally, it might also be significant that Melanchthon also cites Jude 14–15, and cites it in the context of prophecy like Garcaeus.87 He argues that the doctrine of the afterlife is ‘proper to the church, and often thence resounds to the first fathers of the church, as the speech of Enoch recited in the Letter of Jude . . . And in the sermons of the prophets these doctrines were thereafter repeated.’88 That might be as close as we can get to identifying the formative influences on Garcaeus at this point,89 and it is certainly possible that some combination of these factors was at work. Even if some, admittedly speculative, details of my reconstruction are mistaken, it is obvious that Garcaeus does not slavishly follow his sources, but proves rather creative and original in his adaptations, and the general tenor of his alterations is christological. It has also transpired that Garcaeus is the first author to deploy the full array of arguments from all three types I have identified.90 As I argued in the previous chapter, he is important as a key link in the transmission of ideas from Specker down to the last decades of the century.91 The two outstanding items on his list therefore deserve brief mention. His sixth proof—I believe, a properly church historical extension of the logic of the examples imported from Musculus—is the martyrs’ blood. Their steadfastness unto the bitter and bloody end is a sure sign of another life to come. Note, again, that the argument is not

85 Specker (1560) 244v, 246v–247v, cf. WA 5:463.8–34 (Operationes in psalmos, 1519–1521, on Ps 16:10). – ET foreseen for LW ns 3.2. 86 ‘Videmus autem, scripturam duo loca tribuere mortuis, foveam corpori et infernum animae’ (WA 5:463.25– 26). 87 Cf. p. 231, above. 88 Melanchthon (1553) 284–85. 89 In the light of this evidence, it is not altogether to be excluded that Garcaeus took his list of examples directly from Melanchthon rather than via Musculus. Two considerable objections might be made. First, here we saw a connection between the Sterbbüchlein and the Liber, while the list from Abel to Christ and the patriarchs presupposes a correspondence not so much with the revised version of De anima as with the Commentarius. Second, Garcaeus is closer to Musculus than either of them is to Melanchthon. 90 Arguments from creation and redemption would count as doctrinal; examples adapted and expanded from Musculus, Christ’s resurrection and the martyrs as church historical; and specific loci, prophecy, Revelation 6 and 20 as revelatory, under which heading conscience might also be included as a unique case of general revelation. 91 Cf., esp., section 4.5, above.

5 Doctrine 233 narrowly about the immortality of soul, and, second, that it is combined with the ethical argument via the martyrs’ faith unrewarded in this life. Finally, the souls under the altar (Rev 6:9–10), his penultimate point, is again singled out, this time of the propositional list where it appears both in Specker (and Faber) and Musculus. It also gives occasion for Garcaeus to dismiss the notion of soul sleep, a topic I shall treat on its own in section 5.7.

5.5 Argumentation after Mirus

Martin Mirus also reshuffles Specker’s arguments, and he is the first to bring out the full systematic potential of his source. He begins by affirming that the word of God teaches the soul’s immortality, which I take to be a variation on Specker’s fourth argument, from specific texts, especially as there is considerable overlap between their prooftexts. That Mirus also includes the passage on Abel’s blood here is an early signal that he will not follow the Musculus–Garcaeus line as regards examples. Next come Specker’s (and Garcaeus’) first two points, creation and redemption, but with a twist. Mirus is just as unhappy with judgement as the third item as Garcaeus was, but he rectifies it differently. Instead of replacing it with Christ’s resurrection, he adds sanctification, thus completing the argument that we are created, redeemed and sanctified for life eternal. Mirus explicitly unites these three points under the doctrinal heading that, in addition to the word of God, the three articles of the Creed also teach the immortality of the soul. That he then proceeds to cite, after brief introductory remarks, Bible verses rather than creedal formulas indicates, on the one hand, that evangelical theology of the early confessional age is still first and foremost biblical theology and, on the other, that Luther’s mature position, worked out in his treatise On the Councils and the Church (1539)—that the only source of Christian dogma is the Bible, and conciliar pronouncements, including the ecumenical creeds, can be nothing other than restatements of scriptural truth—has established itself among his followers. After revelatory and doctrinal arguments, Mirus does move to church historical ones, but he is content with the martyrs, and excludes the list of examples we saw in Musculus and Garcaeus. Before we take that for an early sign of the compartmentalisation of church history in the modern sense, we ought to recall that while Garcaeus, who introduced the topic, only spoke of the martyrs without any concrete supporting evidence, Mirus does append some proofs here, but no patristic stories—let alone medieval hagiographies—

5 Doctrine 234 rather, a short list of New Testament passages, especially Hebrews 11:37–40, instead. His last argument is from conscience where he, like Garcaeus, cites no prooftexts but simply reasons that even the most obstinate sinners must recognise before their end that it is not all over with death, and punishment awaits them. The structure of Pflacher’s arguments, including his prooftexts, is identical with Mirus’,92 but he omits the doctrinal points altogether, and only includes specific biblical loci, the death and blood of martyrs, and conscience. Interestingly, his list of prooftexts is longer than Mirus’, and contains references not only to the patriarchs and to the souls under the altar but also to David, Christ and Stephen, who, upon dying, commended their souls to the hand of God. Those examples partly occur elsewhere in lists of examples I have called church historical, and are partly altogether new. It is not very difficult to see the logic behind the extension in that the last group is also a type within the historical example category. That the whole list is recontextualised as part of propositional revelation may have been prompted by Mirus, who moves the truncated catalogue of Garcaeus’ examples under that heading, although Pflacher ultimately retains the patriarchs and drops Abel. Be that as it may, the rearrangement surely demonstrates that the dividing lines between the various types of arguments were rather fluid. Finally, Weiser, a figure of lesser theological stature, imitates his model rather closely on the one hand, but on the other seems to miss some important insights. He is repetitive as usual, and in the more independent part of his text, he lists twice half a dozen or so prooftexts. They follow in the order of their biblical sequence, and the first group includes loci that have appeared in various rubrics in earlier authors,93 while the second gathers mostly those of the heavy-weight propositional type.94 This whole section is introduced with the assertion that the word of God alone teaches us aright what we should believe, and is followed by a long quotation from Mirus with only a few, but telling, emendations. Weiser arranges Mirus’ proofs into five units of the same order. They include the teaching of God’s word, the creation of humans, redemption, death and blood of the martyrs, and conscience. In other words, he drops sanctification altogether as well as the

92 Cf., esp., Table 4.19, above. 93 E.g. Gen 1:26 (creation), Gen 15:15 and 25:8 (patriarchs), Ps 31:6 (commending soul), Mt 22:32 (propositional revelation) etc. Incidentally, some of Weiser’s reference include wrong chapter numbers. 94 Mt 10:28; Lk 16:22, 23:43; Acts 7:59; Phil 1:23 and, without locus, Moses and Elijah of the transfiguration.

5 Doctrine 235 references to the creed, and raises the original Speckerian points back to the first order of categorisation. It is noteworthy that Mirus’ more elegant solution should be rejected. Faber, whom Weiser admittedly knew but does not seem closely to imitate,95 might be in the background, for he is closer to Specker than Mirus is. Alternatively, and I find this more likely, a slight irregularity in Mirus’ text may have led the pastor of Peritz astray.96 Whatever the explanation, Mirus’ superior arrangement is ignored, and we end up with yet another slightly idiosyncratic list of arguments, although Weiser probably did not mean to change his source, and was not aware of his own originality here. It is not to be overlooked that the very list is contained in a quotation, and where Weiser writes his own text, he does not mention arguments of any sort, but limits himself to plain biblical prooftexting. The strategy is conspicuous, for it is repeated twice. If we think back on the authors previously discussed, the spectrum extends from Weiser to Chyträus, and the level of theological education seems clearly to correspond to the level of originality and argumentative freedom. The more educated and self-confident an author is, the more liberally he (always he) deploys arguments, including those based on reason rather than revelation. Conversely, the less prominent an author is, the closer he remains to the biblical evidence. With the Mirus group, we reach the end of the properly theological arguments. Chyträus, we have seen in section 5.3, on the one hand goes beyond everyone else in deploying reason-based arguments, on the other, however, limits himself to a catalogue of familiar prooftexts from scripture. Roth’s exegetical, rather than thematic, sermon has little to offer on the topic. Frölich does have a lot to say on it, but his approach is, though not unrelated, different from that of the Specker tradition. He organises his proofs not

95 Cf. p. 203, above. 96 Cf. Mirus (1590 [°1575]) N2v–3r and Weiser (1583b) 10–13. Mirus’ text includes printed marginal notes. It is also in the margin that he numbers his arguments. The single paragraph that contains the three entries for the creed carries the number 2. Thirdway through the paragraph, in line with the beginning of the argument from redemption, there stands the number 3 on the margin. No marginalia corresponds to the argument from sanctification that appears in the continuation of the paragraph, but the next paragraph, on the martyrs, also has a ‘3’ on the side. On my reading, the first ‘3,’ next to redemption, is a mistake, for that should be numbered, on Mirus’ logic, 2.2 or 2b. Weiser, however, keeps ‘2’ for creation, with the creedal introduction omitted, and the first ‘3’ for redemption, which he, significantly, also breaks into a new paragraph. He then drops the part on sanctification and amends Mirus’ second ‘3’ to ‘4’ at the head of the martyrs paragraph. Weiser did not, of course, work from Mirus’ 1590 printed edition, and it is a strong hypothesis that that is faithful—or at least more faithful than Weiser—to the manuscript that must have been used in the early 1580s. If I am right, however, it is a measure of Weiser’s mediocrity that he followed the prima facie numbers rather than the theological logic of his source, although he probably did not notice the discrepancy, and believed to have accurately reproduced Mirus’ text, except for its—to him obvious—printer’s errors.

5 Doctrine 236 thematically but formally, according to the kind of source they are drawn from. He begins with scripture, moves on to the fathers, and concludes with contemporary theological witnesses, citing both Lutheran and Reformed authorities.97 This differentiated form of prooftexting appeared already in Tacius, and is quite prominent in Specker, but the latter author structurally subordinates it to the level of numbered arguments—listing various kinds of supporting evidence separately for each—and, specifically, in the immortality chapter only cites a few non-scriptural passages that do not find their way into Frölich’s catalogue. Tacius’ patristic references, chiefly to Polycarp and Ignatius, are more akin to the list of martyrs than to the propositional passages quoted by Frölich from the fathers. The excerpts included in the Seelen Trost cover a variety of topics and could be materially categorised into various argumentative rubrics, but Frölich does not care to distinguish them along such lines, and must be therefore considered to deploy but one kind of reasoning, namely, prooftexting, which, of course, is not to deny that he achieves great sophistication within those limits. Five observations might be made by way of summarising the findings of the foregoing analysis of how later-sixteenth-century Lutheran theologians sought to prove the soul’s immortality. First, while the immortality doctrine essentially requires some sort of argument to establish its basic claim, there is no real agreement on what, or what kind of, arguments may answer the purpose, except that it is biblical teaching. What changes from author to author is not only the specific details of individual arguments but the very types of reasoning. There is surely a discernible tradition deriving from Specker and, to a lesser degree, probably from Musculus, but each writer shapes it according to his preferences. What remains constant is the scriptural base, undoubtedly the heart of the matter for sixteenth-century Lutheran theologians. Specker’s theme is improved upon in various ways, which development, in my estimate, reaches its peak with Mirus, but his elegant creedal structure is not picked up. Nonetheless, and that is the second point, the general tendency of the changes is christological-trinitarian with the judgement theme definitely receding. That might be another sign of the ultimate gospel, as opposed to law, orientation of the overall corpus. Third, Melanchthon’s influence on the whole tradition would be difficult to deny.

97 Luther, Brenz and Hieronymous Weller of the former, Bullinger and Wolfgang Musculus (1497–1563) of the latter camp.

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Beyond specific points of connection noted above, his Loci seem to provide the methodological inspiration for the entire undertaking, not to mention that in his De anima he offered an early thematisation of the central issue. Fourth, the immortality of the soul is largely understood in ontological rather than relational terms, and this is again more Melanchthonian than Lutheran. The question is nowhere discussed in explicit terms—the very categories would probably be considered alien by contemporary authors—but Luther’s argument from God speaking to the soul98 is never once mentioned in the texts, and the general tenor of the arguments is such that seems to presuppose an ontologising view of the soul. Finally, despite all these Melanchthonian traits, the whole corpus displays a profoundly Lutheran orientation. None of the authors is quite taken with Melanchthon’s enthusiasm for rational arguments. Chyträus is the only one to engage them in any depth, but ultimately even he keeps them at arm’s length. A telling detail is that while conscience as the third philosophical argument is treated in the context of reason in the Liber, it invariably appears in the framework of theological arguments in later-sixteenth-century texts. Whatever place Melanchthon may have carved out for reason and philosophy in the theological enterprise, his students are not overly enthusiastic to fill it in. They follow the professor of Old Testament rather than the professor of Greek, and proceed along quite exclusively biblical lines. Luther’s influence will be even more tangible when we turn to the problem of soul sleep.

5.6 Sleep and death

The topos of the kinship between sleep and death is probably as old as human reflection on death. It is prevalent in pagan philosophy, and sleep language for death also permeates the Bible. No wonder that it became a prominent feature of later-sixteenth-century treatments of the soul’s immortality. The topic surfaces in virtually every author, and receives a major treatment at the hands of some. Sleep as a metaphor for death informs Musculus’ entire approach. He opens the whole discussion on that very note, ‘The death and dying of humans are compared to

98 Cf. p. 51, above.

5 Doctrine 238 temporal and natural sleep not only by holy scripture, but pagans also spoke of it in the same way.’99 He elaborates on their similarities, and points out that breathing is the only difference between them.100 He then develops the entire argument from this base through a complex set of analogies. First, falling asleep is like dying in that one cannot give account of one’s own experience. Second, just as the soul remains active while the body sleeps in this life, the soul also remains immortal and awake after the body’s death. Surely, we come up against an aporia if we try to figure out how that is possible, but we cannot grasp the life of the soul in sleep, either. In the third step, we encounter a double analogy. As we can have an informed guess about someone’s sleep on the basis of how they go to bed, so we can conclude from someone’s dying as to their state in death. If they die happily and softly in Christ, their soul will live in peace and joy until the resurrection of the body. The wicked, however, who die with a bad conscience, will also be tormented and pained after death. So far the discussion of death as a starting point, but Musculus returns to the analogy three more times in the first half of the treatise. First, in the middle section of question 2, he reiterates the double analogy (falling asleep : sleep :: dying : state in death) to overcome a second aporia, concerning the state of the dead.101 In the third part of the same question, dealing with the soul’s life outside the body, he again argues, partly, from the analogy of sleep.102 Repeating the second argument from question 1, he observes that the soul exercises all its powers and functions in the body’s death just as during its sleep. Divinely inspired dreams and visions, visited upon Old Testament characters in sleep, constitute a special case that Musculus chooses to treat separately a little later, but the logic is essentially the same as before.103 In question 4, the double analogy is further developed in the direction of waking up. Death is like sleep. One’s sleep is like one’s falling asleep, peaceful or perturbed. To which is now added a new element; one’s awakening is like one’s going to sleep, happy or sad. (In this context,

99 ‘ES vergleichet nicht allein die heilige schrifft/ dem thod vnd absterben der Menschen / dem zeitlichen vnd Natürlichem schlaff/ sondern die[ ]Heiden haben auch[ ]gleicher weis daruon geredet/’ (1565:B3r) 100 Here follows a summary of his answer to the first question (1565:B3r–6r). 101 Musculus (1565) C2r/v. 102 Another analogy is provided by illnesses and extra-bodily experiences. Musculus probably means ecstatic or dream-like experiences during periods of unconsciousness (1565:C6r/v), and may have taken his clue from Luther (cf. section 1.6, above). 103 Musculus (1565) C5v–8v.

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Musculus ignores the recreational-regenerative function of sleep.) Then is the other side of the analogy completed. Those who fell asleep peacefully in Christ will also be raised up with the hope of life eternal. The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for the godless. Finally, Musculus uses the analogy of sleep to argue the point, familiar from Luther,104 that there is no time consciousness in death.105 Here he in fact returns to the very first point, and extends it to the state of sleep/death and waking up/resurrection. Just as one cannot account for one’s falling asleep, one cannot tell when and how one wakes up, or how much time elapsed in between. Similarly for death and resurrection.106 The grandest investigation of the topic can be found in Pflacher’s sermon series, which on a possible reading suggested by the author himself is an analysis of the metaphor writ large. In sermon 11, he deals with the fate of the body between death and resurrection. After its burial and decomposition, he picks up the sleep of the dead as the third major issue for discussion,107 and makes two points; the one is broadly scriptural; the other, experiential. First, it is customary to speak of death as sleep. Pflacher offers a by now familiar array of prooftexts, chiefly biblical, but augmented with patristic and non-Christian classical evidence. Second, if we consider the qualities of sleep and compare them with those of death, their kinship will be easily discovered. That serves as an introduction to a ten-page review of the whole sequence of preceding sermons which dealt precisely with those qualities. First, sleep and death are alike in their universality and inevitability. Just as everyone is subject to death, everyone must also fall asleep some time; no one can stay awake all the time. Second, death is a separation of body and soul; likewise in sleep, we undress before going to bed. The analogy holds because scripture speaks of death as undressing, for the body is the soul’s clothes.108 Third, death is the wages of sin, and sleep is caused by vapours arising from the stomach. Similarly, from Adam and Eve’s eating of the fruit of the forbidden tree, a mist came over all body parts, not just the head, causing the whole person to be mortal. Further,

104 Cf. p. 61, above. 105 Here, again, is a further analogy provided by extra-bodily experiences. 106 Musculus (1565) D6v–8v. 107 The following is a summary of the last and longest third of sermons 11 (1582:293–305). 108 Cf. 2 Cor 5:2–4: ‘For in this tent we groan, longing to be clothed with our heavenly dwelling—if indeed, when we have taken it off we will not be found naked. For while we are still in this tent, we groan under our burden, because we wish not to be unclothed but to be further clothed, so that what is mortal may be swallowed up by life.’

5 Doctrine 240 one sleeps until the vapours that cloud the brain are consumed, and the body must sleep until sin is consumed, and a spiritual body rises. By slightly shifting the original focus of the sermon from death as divine punishment for sin to the possibility of post-mortem purification, Pflacher comes dangerously close to opening the door to purgatory. He would certainly not want to go down that road, and there might be two reasons that prevent him from seeing the implications. On the one hand, he is reflecting on the body’s fate, and it is souls that Catholic teaching sends to purgatory. On the other hand, he is probably so much taken by the resurrection orientation of the metaphor that he does not notice the danger. It is indeed one of the most productive uses sleep imagery is put to, already by Luther, to counter the irreversibility of death. But Pflacher’s last move is important for another reason. He effects a significant reversal of the analogy’s direction. He began by saying that we can discover that sleep is indeed an image of death if we observe it and hold our findings against what has been said about death. Initially, he followed that logic. Now, however, he has shifted the point of view, and it is no longer sleep that is shown death-like, but death is declared to be sleep-like. He essentially keeps that orientation for the rest of the sequence’s recapitulation. Reviewing the natural effects of death apropos of the fifth sermon,109 Pflacher offers an argument akin to Musculus’ first double analogy. One is preoccupied in sleep with the same things one spent one’s waking hours on. More accurately, thoughts in the twilight zone of falling asleep will be determined by one’s foregoing activities, that is why it is crucial to keep the faith until the very last. The point here made is essentially negative, the natural effects of death fall under the auspices of the law. Sixth, however, we can also look at death through the eyes of faith, that is, under the aegis of the gospel, when the accidental effects of death become visible. Pflacher elaborates on three of them. As sleep refreshes body and mind so does death renew us for the morning of the last day. Second, sleep provides rest from labour, and death releases the righteous from all temporal suffering. Third, sleep makes us unaware of the outside world, and death makes us oblivious to all temporal care and sorrow. The three points are all variations on a theme, but sixteenth-century writers were

109 So far my enumeration has followed Pflacher’s, but his numbering has, in fact, been one off from the second point on. Issues he calls second, third etc. are actually topics of his third, fourth etc. sermons, respectively, for in the summary he tacitly, and perhaps inadvertently, skipped sermon 2, on the kinds of death, of which temporal death, his sole concern here, is but one.

5 Doctrine 241 obviously keen to look at the transformation of death under the gospel from different angles. More important, the summary again exhibits shifts in emphasis in comparison to the original sermon, which was more taken with the ailments, burdens, and troubles of this life. The whole passage is reminiscent of Luther’s commentary on Genesis 25,110 if not in wording at least in sentiment, for Pflacher is considerably more prolix as he elaborates at length on the details, sketched in a few words by Luther, of what is being slept through. Since the Genesisvorlesung is underlying much of the immortality locus, it would not be surprising if Pflacher were indeed enlarging upon the Reformer’s insight. One small detail that points in the same direction is that his description of the sleeper’s altered consciousness as including her unawareness of time also corresponds to Luther’s exposition. However, that remains implicit in Pflacher, who quite consistently maintains the focus of his discussion, and soul sleep is a topic he treats elsewhere. The seventh sermon dealt with the circumstances of death. They again provide for a threefold comparison. Sleep can be natural or induced: death can be natural or violent. One can both sleep and die either at home in one’s bed or away in a foreign land, under a strange sky. Third, both sleep and death can overtake one at an unexpected hour. In the summary of the eighth homily we return, fleetingly, to an argument from death to sleep. This is Pflacher’s ars moriendi piece, and the first advice he gives to his listeners is that they should recall, when preparing for bedtime, that we cannot take anything with us from the world and, accordingly, should leave all cares behind. The point is corroborated from scripture (Sir 31:1–2),111 experience and Seneca, but he quickly switches back to the overriding pattern of logic: death is like sleep, and we should therefore set everything in order, both earthly and heavenly matters, in preparation for a gentle and peaceful departure. Sermon 9 contains the second half of the art of dying, instruction on how to behave in the hour of death. In the actual homily, there is no mention of sleep,112 but that does not keep Pflacher from gesturing towards an alternative sermon outline, based on the metaphor of sleep, in the recapitulation. As we sing to children to help them fall asleep, we should have God’s word recited to us on

110 Cf. section 1.5, above. 111 ‘Wakefulness over wealth wastes away one’s flesh, and anxiety about it drives away sleep. Wakeful anxiety prevents slumber, and a severe illness carries off sleep.’ 112 Instead, its central metaphor is shooting: one must keep one’s eyes on the target, which, in the case of dying, means Jesus Christ, and that is best achieved through faith, prayer, and patience (231–52).

5 Doctrine 242 our deathbed. The point of the immortality sermon’s review is the continued wakefulness and activity of the soul in both sleep and death, which, beyond the very affirmation of its survival, is the central concern of later-sixteenth-century authors, and must be looked at more closely in the next section. Finally, Pflacher brings his eleventh homily full circle by including its opening part in the recapitulation at the end. We do not go to bed in order to lie there forever, but expect to get up when the right time comes. Likewise, we do not die in order to remain dead forever, but expect a resurrection. That is yet another instance of shifting emphasis from the actual homily, foregrounding burial and decomposition, to the final summary, pointing forward to the resurrection sermon that rounds off the whole sequence. Whatever his stated purpose at the beginning, Pflacher does not in fact try to establish the kinship of sleep with death. Rather, presupposing that connection, he seeks to draw conclusions as regards the state and nature of death. His actual performance very much resembles Musculus’ strategy. This time I am not arguing for any direct influence, but want to point out a basic thought pattern in the later-sixteenth-century corpus. Even if sustained discussions like Musculus’ and Pflacher’s are not typical, they help us see in clearer light what is also characteristic of other texts in which the metaphor is introduced locally for the sake of a minor observation, and its full potential is not explored. Musculus’ complex parallelisms and, especially, Pflacher’s elaborate analysis graphically illustrate the productivity of analogical reasoning through the metaphor of sleep. Virtually every aspect and feature of sleep can be put to good use and applied analogously to death. That bears pointing out because sleep is, of course, like and unlike death. The irreversibility of the latter and the body’s attendant dissolution are perhaps their most conspicuous differences. That is not, however, the way sixteenth-century writers see the matter, of which Musculus’ point that only the presence or absence of breathing distinguishes sleep and death gives an early hint. Our authors never allow dissimilarities to set a limit to the analogy. Rather, they superimpose the logic of analogy on the divergences. Once the fundamental parallel is established, it is made to work in the details. The methodological implication is that conclusions drawn from sleep, which prima facie seem to hover between rational and scriptural arguments since they can be supported from philosophical as well as revelatory sources, actually constitute a variety of the latter kind. Another way of putting it would be to say that in arguments from sleep, analogy

5 Doctrine 243 trumps experience. If such reasoning were indeed experiential, the finality of death could not be denied. That, however, is not what happens. Writers use the analogy to contradict what reason and experience tell them, namely, that there is no way back from death, and a body that has dissolved is never reconstituted. To argue that point is perhaps the most creative use to which the metaphor of sleep is put. We have seen it in Musculus and Pflacher, but many others also reason in a similar fashion. When in chapter 1 of the first part of his book Specker lists four reasons why death is called sleep, three of them concern the resurrection. Garcaeus repeatedly presents robust forms of the argument, while the point is rather implicit in Weiser. He does not reason from waking up to resurrection via the analogy, but he uses sleep as a simile for death precisely because there is a resurrection that will put an end to it. That is a clear indication that revelation has primacy over experience on this point. Indeed, Specker also cited copious scriptural evidence on two occasions for the applicability of the name ‘sleep’ to death before proceeding to explain the reasons for that usage. Similarly in Frölich, who also reasons from sleep to waking up to resurrection, but the entire section is introduced with strong biblical proofs that establish the analogy of sleep and death in the first place. We saw essentially the same logic in Pflacher above, even though his rubrics made somewhat different claims. Equally emblematic is Roth’s arrangement, who puts the point in the application part of his sermon, under the heading of words of comfort. Death is like sleep because we shall not remain in it forever.113 Finally, a specific type of the argument, deriving from Luther,114 is when the death of the pious is called sleep, or Christ is said to have transformed death into sleep for the believer.115 It is clear from the foregoing that the analogy of sleep must be considered a biblically based theological argument rather than an experientially based rational one. We have also seen that more often than not the analogy is employed to establish that a resurrection of the dead is to be expected. The resurrection itself constitutes a terminal point for the locus of immortality, but even within the limits of the Zwischenzustand, the expectation of the final reconstitution is emphasised with a view to the body rather than the soul. It is not accidental

113 See Specker (1560) 10r/v, 3r–4r, 6v–7r, 256v; Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) A8r, B1v, M7v; Weiser (1583b) 34; Frölich (1590) 37v–40r; and Roth (1591) D3v. 114 Cf., e.g., WA 43:358.41–359.4. 115 E.g. Specker (1560) 93r–96r; Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) A6v–7r, T8r.

5 Doctrine 244 that some of the most spectacular evidence adduced in the above analysis, including Pflacher’s eleventh sermon, is taken not directly from the immortality section of the texts but from adjacent parts. To that extent, then, arguments from sleep are only tangentially relevant for my investigation. The analogy of sleep is, nevertheless, a major theme running through the immortality corpus and is not to be overlooked. Besides establishing the transitional character of death, it is also used to make some lesser points. A secondary aspect of the transformation of death under the gospel, seen in Pflacher and echoed by others as well, is the theme of rest. That is applied not only to the body but also to the soul. It has peace, is released from cares and sorrows, nothing troubles it.116 Two further conclusions drawn from the analogy of sleep and pertaining to the soul include the contrast between the body that rests and the soul that remains active, and the fact that there is no time consciousness either in sleep or in death. Those problems, however, take me to, and must be considered as part of, the most important issue in the context of death and sleep, namely, the question of soul sleep.

5.7 Soul sleep

Melanchthon has very little to say on the subject. There is only a passing reference to it in the Liber. Commenting on Luke 23:43, he writes, ‘And paradise means not the sleep of Epimenides, but a blessed life in which God disperses a new light in minds, and lives in hearts, so that they be just and full of joy, namely in harmony with him.’117 Even that is revealing, however, for the Epimenides phrase is new in the 1553 edition. The Commentarius text ran like this: ‘And paradise means a blessed life which is a new life complete with light, wisdom, justice and joy.’118 By 1553, Melanchthon obviously felt a need, which had not been there in 1540, to counter, however briefly, the concept of psychopannychism. That is clearly a sign of changing times, and he is definitely not mistaken in his sensitivity. Whether he is acutely assessing the situation is difficult to say to the extent that he may still be on the

116 Cf. Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) B1r, M5v; Weiser (1583b) 33; Roth (1591) C3r/v. 117 Melanchthon (1553) 285. For purposes of comparison, it is worth quoting the original: ‘Ac paradisus significat non Epimenideum somnum, sed vitam beatam, in qua sparsit Deus in mentes novam lucem, et habitat in pectoribus, ut sint iusta et plena laeticiae, videlicet congruentia cum ipso’ (CR 13:173). 118 ‘Ac paradisus significat uitam beatam, quæ est uita noua, luce, sapientia, iusticia, ac læticia cumulata’ (1540a:308).

5 Doctrine 245 conservative side, underestimating the force of the change. The relatively unknown Tacius preached a sermon the following year in which the refutation of soul sleep was a central theme. If it was already reaching the provincial pulpit by then, cutting edge scholarship should perhaps take more notice of it than Melanchthon does in the Liber. There is a universal consensus among later-sixteenth-century authors that the soul’s survival of the body’s death is to be understood in active terms. The soul is not only alive but retains its powers and continues in a wakeful existence. Nobody contradicts that opinion, and the majority of writers devote considerable energy to proving it. It is a major theme in Tacius, who quotes both biblical and patristic sources to demonstrate it. Specker does not explicitly make the point in his own words, but he repeatedly cites passages from Bullinger that make precisely that claim. We have seen that Musculus engages the question in some depth.119 Garcaeus echoes Specker’s Bullinger quotations, and devotes a full chapter to the refutation of the error of the Dormitians. Imitating Specker’s arrangement, that is the first in a series of chapters dealing with the qualities of life in the Zwischenzustand, and it lays the ground for the description that follows. Garcaeus explicitly recalls the point at later stages of the argument. To say that they do not sleep is Faber’s first concern when he turns to the state of the departed souls, and he comes back to the issue several times in the course of chapters 5 to 7. Chyträus dismisses the concept of psychopannychism concisely but repeatedly and in no uncertain terms. Mirus avoids the issue, yet both of his immediate followers introduce it. Pflacher, like Specker, Garcaeus and Faber, predicates his review of the departed souls’ state on that very proposition, while Weiser makes it the subject matter of a brief but independent question of his catechism.120 A particular form of the rejection of soul sleep is when authors include it, together with the extinction of the soul or metempsychosis, in their lists of false teachings.121 Another, harking back to my earlier observation that a major function of the sleep metaphor is to establish the expected resurrection of the flesh,122 when they affirm that only the body sleeps, to which they may

119 Cf. p. 238, above. 120 Tacius (1556) B1r–2r; Specker (1560) 223v–224r, 256v, 265r; Musculus (1565) B4v–5v, C5r–8v; Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) C8v–D1r, M4r–7v, P1v, Q3v; Faber (1569) a1v, a3v–4r, b1r, b4v (cf. also Z6r); Chyträus (1591 [1582]) C5r/v, D1v; Pflacher (1582) 270–72; Weiser (1583b) 33–34 (cf. also 14). 121 Tacius (1556) A4r, Specker (1560) 224v–225r, Chyträus (1591 [1582]) C5r/v, Pflacher (1582) 270–71. 122 Cf. p. 240, above.

5 Doctrine 246 add, what is always implied, that the soul remains awake.123 By the second half of the sixteenth century the denial of soul sleep had thus become a pivotal feature of the immortality locus. It is difficult to say on the basis of available evidence what may have motivated this rising concern. The general impression my selected corpus conveys is that we have to do with a theological topos rather than any real-life encounter with, or threat from, expounders of psychopannychism. No contemporary names, other than labels, are ever named. More often than not, the reference is highly stylised, usually simply to ‘some’ who teach the false doctrine. Tacius is no exception here, for he attributes a mortalist view to the Anabaptists, and those who teach soul sleep are simply designated as ‘others.’124 Specker, Garcaeus and Faber ultimately all rely on Bullinger for their information.125 It is tempting to suggest, and is indeed possible, that Lutheranism adopted the fear of ‘Dormitians’ from the Swiss Reformed tradition, which may have had first-hand experience of Anabaptists advocating such views. We have to be careful with overhasty conclusions in that direction, though, for as both Melanchthon’s and Tacius’ texts demonstrate, the problem had reached North German Lutherans by the early mid-1550s, years before we have any evidence of direct Reformed contacts via Specker.126 Further, Calvin, who devoted one of his earliest works to the refutation of soul sleep, had to base his reconstruction of the damnable views on rumours rather than hard and fast evidence. He writes in the Preface of his Psychopannychia, ‘They [the opponents] are said to circulate their follies in a kind of Tracts, which I have never happened to see. I have only received some notes from a friend, who had taken down what he had cursorily heard from their lips, or collected by some other means.’127 In other words, even the experience of Swiss Reformed theologians may not have been really first-hand. Calvin scholarship has not been able to identify the Reformer’s antagonists with any great precision, and we are even much further from seeing whom, if anyone, Lutheran authors might specifically have in mind when

123 Tacius (1556) A4r/v, Specker (1560) 256v, Musculus (1565) B4v–5r, Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) M7r/v, Pflacher (1582) 271, Weiser (1583b) 33–34. 124 Tacius (1556) A4r. 125 Not to mention that the latter two authors depend on Specker, and thus do not constitute independent evidence even as far as the Zurich Reformer is concerned. 126 Indeed, before the first edition of Bullinger’s highly popular sermon series on Revelation in 1557. 127 Calvin (1958 [1542]) 414. The treatise was actually composed in 1534.

5 Doctrine 247 debating against soul sleep. What seems extremely unlikely to me is that they might be reacting to Luther himself. That deserves clarification not only because of interpretations like Werner Thiede’s,128 but also because the Wittenberger has been seen among those attacked by Calvin.129 By contrast, theologians of the Augsburg Confession in the later sixteenth century, as we shall presently see, understood themselves to be in continuity with Luther on this point, too. Arguments proposed in support of the soul’s wakefulness exhibit some variation, and one broad class is predicated on fundamental qualities and habits of the soul. Simply put, it is against the soul’s nature to sleep. The sweeping claim is sometimes made in its broad form130; sometimes it is further fleshed out in more specific detail. The general logic is usually this. The soul is active in this life, and the same is even more true of post-mortem existence, which is a better or improved form of life. Tacius interprets that improvement in terms of knowledge of God; more commonly, however, it is only asserted that the soul does not sleep in this life, so much less in the next.131 Occasionally, the soul’s activity during the body’s sleep might be brought in for comparison. Generally, it is implied or stated that the soul does not sleep when the body does (dreams and visions are cited as proofs), but Faber actually contrasts the soul’s post-mortem state with this worldly sleep characterised by unconsciousness.132 Musculus is alone among the authors to go as far as argue from the soul’s this worldly experiences and activities outside the body.133 Otherwise the soul’s robust existence is straightforwardly assumed despite its disembodiment. Another overarching category of relevant arguments is based on biblical prooftexts and includes various forms of the reasoning that souls that enjoy the divine presence face to face must be awake. That much is sometimes more presupposed than explained as when the soul’s conscious existence is self-evidently derived from its fellowship with God, and the supporting biblical loci cited are those used to establish the soul’s immortality.134 On this

128 Cf. p. 25, above. 129 George (1987) 310–11; cf. Burns (1972) esp. 28–32; Oberman (1991) 31 [=135]; Tavard (2000) 31 and 54. 130 Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) M6r, Pflacher (1582) 271–72, Weiser (1583b) 33. 131 Tacius (1556) B1r, Specker (1560) 256v, Pflacher (1582) 271–72, Weiser (1583b) 33. 132 See, in addition to passages just cited, Musculus (1565) C5v, C6v–8v, and cf. Faber (1569) b1r. 133 Musculus (1565) C5v–6v. 134 Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) M5v–6v, Faber (1569) a1v–2r, b1r.

5 Doctrine 248 view, life itself entails wakefulness, an assumption that hardly holds for bodily existence and is probably motivated by the perceived inadequacy of a view that would allow souls to fall asleep in the presence of God. We find an indication of how deep-seated that conviction may have been in Musculus’ reluctance to acknowledge even the body’s decomposition in God’s sight, ‘the body falls asleep in the dying person, will be laid in the grave, decays and putrefies there, but to God it does not decay and does not putrefy, but it remains unspoilt before God.’135 An affirmation of the resurrection, with which Musculus continues, does not itself require such a strong statement. It is the antithesis of corruption and death to God as an immutable source of life that likely stimulates the forceful remark. And the same probably underlies the whole argument for the soul’s vigilance, for which some further rationale is at times nevertheless presented. Thus Moses and Elijah’s appearance on the mount of transfiguration might be invoked. If they speak with Christ, they cannot be asleep. Similarly, Tacius comments on Philippians 1:23,136 one of a few verses that recur in an otherwise varied pool of prooftexts, ‘Now, that will not be called to be with Christ when the soul is deprived of all its powers; otherwise he [Paul] would have been more with Christ in this life when he preached, praised and extolled him.’137 The favourite version of this type of argument draws on the description of heavenly worship which Revelation offers in active terms.138 If the righteous come, see, fall down, sing, pray, praise and do the like, they must be awake. The passage on the souls under the altar (6:9–10) gains significance precisely because it is on what souls do. On the whole, however, all that might be secondary, prompted by the underlying conviction that the divine presence excludes the possibility of the soul’s unconsciousness.

5.8 Continuities and discontinuities with Luther

There is one more layer of the metaphorical tradition of sleep and death that must be considered, namely, its indebtedness to Luther. Unlike Melanchthon, who is nowhere

135 ‘..der Leib entschlaffe in dem absterbenden menschen/ werde ins Grab geleget/verwese vnd verfaule darinnen/ Aber Gott verweset vnd verfau let er nicht/sondern bleibet Gott vnuerdorben’ (1565:B4v). 136 ‘I am hard pressed between the two: my desire is to depart and be with Christ, for that is far better.’ 137 ‘Nu wil das ia nicht bey dem Herrn Christo heissen sein / wenn da sein seele aller wirckunge beraubt sey/Sonst were er im leben mehr bey dem Herrn Christo Jhesu gewesen / da er jn geprediget / gelobet vnd gepreiset’ (1556:B1v). 138 Specker (1560) 223v–224r, 265r; Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) C8v–D1r, K2v–3r; Faber (1569) a3v–4r.

5 Doctrine 249 explicitly quoted in the discussion—although the revised text of the Liber might be echoed by Garcaeus’ repeated references to Epimenides139—Luther is both often and extensively cited. It is his commentary on Abraham’s death (Gen 25:7–10) that is substantially drawn on by Specker and his immediate followers. Since I analysed the passage in chapter 1 as well as its reception history in chapter 4,140 and since we have seen it surface repeatedly in this chapter,141 it will suffice briefly to recapitulate the essential points. Specker includes a substantial pericope which is then taken over by Garcaeus, while Faber extends the quotation in both directions and uses a different translation, presumably his own.142 Less significantly, Frölich paraphrases a passage on Jacob’s death (Gen 49:33) in which Luther avows an aporia as regards the respite of the dead in God.143 While the longer text is also essentially a piece of negative theology, Luther asserts four points there. Departed souls of the righteous rest and in that sense sleep. Their sleep is not like sleep in this life—and I have argued that he ultimately undermines any straightforward applicability of the sleep metaphor, which does not keep him from actually employing it throughout. In the course of continuous qualifications, Luther does affirm both the soul’s wakefulness and that the sleep of death profoundly transforms the subject’s consciousness. Finally, Christ holds the righteous dead.144 While I think it is an oversimplification to understand Luther as expounding the soul’s wakeful post-mortem existence here, it is not difficult to see why his near- contemporaries should read him as such. There are enough restrictions introduced on the sleep metaphor to approximate Luther’s usage to that of his followers. Given their frame of reference, it is no wonder that they did not perceive any distance between their position and that of their great forerunner. Thus Faber both denies the applicability of the term ‘sleep’ to the soul and nonetheless proceeds right away to call its state a sleep in a qualified sense.145

139 See Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) M5v, M6v. 140 Cf. section 1.5 and p. 160, above. 141 Cf. nn. 28, 32, 39, 102, 114 in this chapter. 142 Cf. WA 43:360.18–361.3 (LW 4:313) with Specker (1560) 256v–257v and Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) M4r–5v; and WA 43:359.31–361.23 (LW 4:312–14) with Faber (1569) a4v–8r. 143 Cf. Frölich (1590) 19r/v with WA 44:811.24–25 and 813.7–15 (LW 8:315, 317). Specker (1560) 244r/v also has a corresponding citation (WA 44:812.9–26 and 813.7–8; cf. LW 8:316, 317), but it breaks off just before the interpretive comment on the nature of rest. 144 The elaboration on the last point is only included in Faber. 145 See (1569) b1r, b4v. Garcaeus is more consistent in that he repeatedly says that the soul’s rest is not like

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Indeed, the difference between Luther and the later sixteenth century does not so much lie in their usage—for both are fluid and variable, even if the Reformer’s virtuosity is not quite matched—as in their conceptualisation. Luther is more committed than his followers to an aporia about the interim state. And what he does say is more dynamically christocentric and less ontological than in later generations. Writers of the confessional age settle on a clear rejection of psychopannychism and prominently incorporate a notion of conscious existence in their doctrine of the soul’s immortality. There is no sign in the corpus, however, that later-sixteenth-century writers might have sensed any discontinuity of teaching between themselves and Luther. A brief look at the insight that there is no time consciousness in sleep or death will serve to illustrate both continuities and discontinuities from the Reformer to the second half of the century. In Specker and his followers, the point remains implicit, for they only make it via the excerpt from the Lectures on Genesis.146 Needless to say, quoting an observation is not quite the same as presenting it as one’s own, and it is hardly an accident that this particular note is muted in the texts by Specker and others. It does not square so well with their position on soul sleep as with Luther’s somewhat different emphasis. Musculus elaborates on the topic in question 4 as he extends the analogy of sleep and death to include the resurrection.147 His logic is reminiscent of Luther’s, but he is more methodical, and the context has shifted somewhat. Musculus presents the case not as part of his description of the interim state, but as a prelude to the resurrection. Pflacher develops the insight in the application of the third point in his tenth sermon. He no longer speaks of the soul or the person losing track of time in sleep or death, but reassures his audience against fear of a long time intervening between death and resurrection, by pointing out that the soul begins to participate in heavenly joy as soon as the body dies.148 Luther’s echo is still audible, but the cantus firmus is rather different. The emphatic point is not that the soul is unaware of the intervening time, but that there is no intervening time for the soul, only for the unconscious decayed body. In all five cases, authors may easily conceive of themselves as sharing Luther’s natural sleep, and, interpreting the excerpt from the Genesisvorlesung, he declares scriptural usage metaphorical (1573 [°1568]:K2v–3r, M5v). 146 Specker (1560) 257r (cf. also 10v), Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) M5r, Faber (1569) A6v. 147 Musculus (1565) D8r/v. 148 Pflacher (1582) 270.

5 Doctrine 251 position, yet to a belated observer they appear to have shifted emphasis in subtle but significant ways. To sum up, the metaphor of sleep permeates the later-sixteenth-century corpus. There are at least three factors that contribute to its currency. It is sanctioned by biblical usage; it is an old and valuable heritage from a broader intellectual ancestry that includes both the church’s theological tradition and classical thought; and it is a useful tool that can be productively applied in various forms of analogical reasoning.149 There are, on the other hand, no clearly defined rules as to its application. Broadly speaking, it is primarily interpreted with reference to the body, where its arguably most important function is to analogously ground resurrection hope. Even so, sleep language remains in use with respect to the soul as well, especially when talking about its rest, its altered consciousness (lack of awareness of time) or, to anticipate, its knowledge and the intercession of saints. It is hardly surprising, then, that some authors build complex arguments on the analogy of sleep and death, others affirm that they are both alike and profoundly dissimilar, while again others consider sleep language altogether metaphorical. In all that fluidity, there is but one stable line never crossed. It is not the experiential limit set by the dissimilarities of sleep and death such as the irreversibility of the latter. That divergence is subjugated to a scripturally based logic of analogy. Rather, a distinctive core teaching is constituted by the uniform commitment to the rejection of psychopannychism. Whatever sense it makes to speak of the soul’s interim state as a kind of sleep, it can, writers of the confessional age unreservedly agree, in no way mean that it is not in full command of its faculties, or that it is not fully conscious. It is not entirely clear what motivates that uniform conviction. There might be some historical factors also at work, but the main driving force is probably internal to the doctrine, an ontologising understanding of the nature of the soul and a widely shared belief that participation in divine life entails wakefulness. It will be manifest to a twenty-first- century observer that the later sixteenth century went beyond Luther on this point, but it is equally obvious that his followers did so unawares and understood themselves to be in continuity with him. Luther’s own paradoxical approach may in fact underlie at least some of the fluidity of later positions, but even if his influence cannot be demonstrated so directly, he surely helped shape the development of this aspect of the immortality locus, while

149 On a further area of application, see p. 273, below.

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Melanchthon’s contribution is negligible.150 The situation is more balanced when we look at the broader picture beyond the sleep metaphor. Melanchthon’s impact is greater there both in terms of approaches and arguments. It is true that since he set up his immortality chapter primarily to prove that the soul is immortal and has little to say on the content or qualities of its life, Luther’s influence is still more tangible materially as we have seen, among other areas, in the names of the souls’ abode, the critique of the limbos and purgatory, or soul sleep and related issues. Nevertheless, Melanchthon also left a profound mark on the development of the doctrine, and not only in terms of rational arguments that play a minor role overall. The contours and foundations of the doctrine bear his imprint. The tradition seems to follow him in its understanding of the soul, and the very systematisation of the whole question probably owes a good deal to his efforts and example. Naturally, even the combined effect of Luther and Melanchthon cannot fully account for the development in the second half of the sixteenth century. We have already begun to see other factors also playing a role, like the rejection of purgatory (a pastoral concern that promotes the evangelical over the legal aspect of the doctrine), or an engagement with patristic sources which are brought in by several authors between the Bible and contemporary theological reflection. The next chapter will not only continue to explore further components of the immortality doctrine but will also throw further light on some of the influences that helped shape it.

150 It would be a mistake to construe the Liber’s Epimenides reference as a trend-setter rather than an expression of a changing climate. Melanchthon follows, as much as he does, rather than leads the way in denying soul sleep (cf. p. 244, above).

6 What Blessed Souls Do and Know

What do departed souls do if they do not sleep? The question is raised in some form by every single author in the corpus, and, after an initial survey of the larger picture, I shall continue the exploration of the new doctrine of the souls’ state between the body’s death and resurrection by focusing on two aspects of their existence. Both make sense only if their consciousness is presupposed, and both are characteristic of the interim state, and can help delimit it from eternal life. The first concerns the knowledge of departed souls; the second, their possible appearance on earth. We shall see that there is both a common core of the doctrine that is shared by all authors of the corpus and considerable variation in their views on several detail questions. I shall argue that the development of these chapters of the locus was profoundly shaped by an evangelical opposition to the Catholic doctrine of purgatory on the one hand, and by Luther’s theological insights on the other.

6.1 Occupation of the blessed souls

Insistence on the souls’ wakefulness, which we saw in the previous chapter as a major concern of later-sixteenth-century writers, naturally invites reflections on their state and activity, and the two issues frequently appear together in the corpus. Tacius, we recall, is mostly concerned to establish that souls do not sleep, but he also affirms that blessed souls live with Christ, and touches upon the state of the damned. Beyond that, he has very little to say on the details of the departed souls’ life, simply avers that they have joy or pain according as they deserve, and that they expect reunification with the body.1 If my argument in chapter 4 holds, it is no accident that Specker’s treatment of the

1 Tacius (1556) A4v–B3v.

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topic should be quite typical of the corpus.2 I provided a detailed analysis of much of his text in chapter 4, and shall here only highlight the salient features. In chapter 6 of Vom leiblichen Todt, Specker describes the life of the righteous by first emphasising their fellowship with the Trinity and the angels, and then enumerating in eight, somewhat repetitive, points the ways in which they are freed from all need, suffering, thirst, hunger, cold, pain, sadness, persecution, divine wrath, weakness, sin, shame, anxiety and the like, but eat and drink at Christ’s table, enjoy grace, mercy, peace, rest, security, blessedness, honour, and all kinds of reward. Chapter 8 is on their actions. The material is organised into four numbered lists. First and foremost, they see the Trinity face to face and walk in light on the one hand, and serve Father, Son and Holy Spirit on the other. Then follow the particulars of the heavenly worship service, mostly drawn from Revelation. Three aspects of its content are foregrounded: adoration, praise, and thanksgiving. The third list enumerates what blessed souls give thanks for. It includes creation, redemption, divine judgement and all works and wonders of God as well as for God’s lordship, power, might, truth, goodness and faithfulness.3 The description is completed with the circumstances of the service. The six- item list is somewhat awkward, for only the first four entries contain the actual qualities such as reverence, humility and prostration, joy and delight, sanctity and righteousness, diligence, care and desire to please the Godhead. The remaining two items give the impression that they had to be included somewhere, and no better place was found for them than the end of the last list, when they could no longer be deferred. Thus Specker mentions that the souls under the altar call for revenge, and the heavenly church, including the angels, prays for God’s people still on earth4 (Table 6.1). The state of the damned is outlined in comparable terms in chapter 10, except that there is only one list of nine items.5 They have no rest or peace, must live in fear and constant expectation of the last day. They are full of shame and disgrace, must suffer God’s curse and are punished with hell fire, which topic engages Specker’s attention extensively as

2 Specker (1560) 256v–265v, 269r–275r, 278v–287r, 289r–291v. 3 Note the parallel between the first three, simpler, items and Specker’s list of arguments for the immortality of the soul (cf. Table 4.2 and Table 4.25). 4 I shall return to this question, cf. pp. 274–275, below. 5 There are two Nr. 5’s so Specker’s numbering actually ends with eight.

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he fills eight of the chapter’s eighteen pages with it. Damned souls are also plagued with darkness, see the blessedness of those they despised in this world, desperately desire but are not granted any refreshment and, worst of all, have no hope of redemption. Chapter 12, uniquely in the corpus, deals with their volition. Arguing, as is his wont, from the analogy of sleep and from biblical prooftexts, and reflecting on various aspects of the post-mortem existence of the righteous and the damned in turns, Musculus briefly states the essentials in the middle section of question 2. The blessed are vindicated and enjoy peace with God; the godless are literally without God, and suffer pain and anxiety. Like Tacius, he does not elaborate on the details, but devotes his energies to establishing the main points via a series of prooftexts. The most original aspect of his reflections is the thematisation of the soul’s existence outside the body. He argues from biblical evidence and experience during illnesses and sleep that the soul is ultimately not bound to the body for the exercise of its faculties.6 Garcaeus and Faber follow, in their different ways, the pattern established by Specker.7 The righteous souls are treated in a threefold manner, beginning with their communion with Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and followed by their state and actions. While Faber generally condenses the material and skips—except for the last two odd items—the circumstances of the heavenly worship service, he also extends it at the beginning with an introduction on our limited knowledge and the wakeful state of the souls. After affirming that souls do not sleep, Garcaeus first offers a condensed overview of Specker’s material, then elaborates both on the formal circumstances of the their adoration and on the reasons why God is to be praised, on the basis of Revelation 4:9–11 and 5:11–13, respectively (Table 6.1).

6 Musculus (1565) C2r–5r (cf. D3v–4r), C5r–8v. 7 Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) M7v–P8r, R3r–T4v, T6v–7v; Faber (1569) a1r–b2v, c3v–5v, and cf. Table 4.6.

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Table 6.1 The occupation of departed righteous souls according to Specker, Garcaeus, and Faber

Garcaeus Structure Specker Faber (1573 Topic (in (1560) (1569) Biblical prooftexts8 [°1568]) Specker) Pt. 3, ch. 8 ch. 6 ch. 18 Souls do not sleep P1v–2r b1r [What blessed souls do] 8.1 Ps 89[:16–18]; Mic 4[:5]; Jn 12[:26]S, 14[:3]S, See the Trinity face to 8.1.1 269r–270r P2r/v b1r 17[:24]; 2 Cor 5[:8]S; face and walk in light Phil 1[:23]S; Rev 14[:4– 5]9 Serve the Trinity 8.1.2 270r P2r/v b1r/v Rm 14[:8]S; Rev 7[:15] Content of the heavenly worship 8.2 270v service Adoration 8.2.1 270v P2r Rev 15[:4]S Dan 3[:86]S; Ps 145[:1– 2]; Rev 4[:8]10; Ps Praise 8.2.2 270v–271r P2r, P3v–4r b1v 69[:35]S, 79 [i.e. 89:6– 9]S, 145[:6–9] Ps [140:14], 145[:10–11, Thanksgiving 8.2.3 271r P2r, P3v–4r b1v 13]S What to give thanks for 8.3 271v Creation 8.3.1 271v b1v Rev 4[:11]S Redemption 8.3.2 271v b1v Rev 5[:8–10]S Judgement on God’s 8.3.3 271v–272r b1v Rev 19[:1–3]S enemies All works, wonders, Rev 12 [i.e. 11:15–18],11 8.3.4 272r/v P3r/v b1v power, truth etc. 15[:2–4]S, 19[:6–7]12

8 Loci cited by one author only are marked with their initial. Unmarked texts are quoted by Specker and Garcaeus. Passages cited by all three authors appear in italics. Bible verses only alluded to are marked with an asterisk. All other cases are explained in the footnotes. 9 Cited after Rev 7:15 by Garcaeus. Followed by Bullinger’s commentary in Specker, also quoted by Garcaeus. 10 Not cited by Garcaeus, but he alludes to Isa 6:3 for the sanctus (see below in table). 11 Cited earlier, after Rev 14:4–5 (with Bullinger’s commentary) by Garcaeus. Locus given as Rev 12 by both Specker and Garcaeus. 12 Reference given as Rev 16 by Garcaeus, who cites this passage—together with Rev 11:15–18—earlier, between Rev 14 and Ps 145. In Faber, only summary references supplied, without actual quotations, to Rev 5, 7, 12, 15, 19.

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Garcaeus Structure Specker Faber (1573 Topic (in (1560) (1569) Biblical prooftexts8 [°1568]) Specker) Pt. 3, ch. 8 ch. 6 ch. 18 Circumstances of the heavenly worship 8.4 272v service Rm 14[:11]S; Phil 2[:9– Reverence and humility 8.4.1 272v–274r P4r, P5r/v 11]; Rev 4[:9–11], 5 etc. and 7 [i.e. 5:11–14]13 Joy and delight 8.4.2 274r/v P4r Ps 100[:1–2]S; Rev 19[:7]S Sanctity and 8.4.3 274v P4r Lk 1[:74–75]S righteousness Diligence and desire to 8.4.4 274v P4r 2 Cor 5[:9]S; Heb 12[:28]S please the Godhead By falling down14 P4v 1 Pt 5:6G Praise only the Trinity P5r Taking off their crowns P5r Praising God for…15 P5v ..power P5v ..richness and Christ as P5v–6r greatest treasure ..wisdom P6r ..strength P6r ..honour P6r ..glory P6r ..redemption and all Isa 6[:3]G*; Ps 48 [i.e. other deeds of P6r/v 84:5]G16 benevolence Souls of those killed Rev 6[:9–10]17; Ps for the gospel call 8.4.5 274v–275r P6v–7r b1v–2r 79[:10]F for revenge Prayer for the service and the people of 8.4.6 275r b2r/v 2 Macc 15[:12, 14]S God still on earth

13 Only vv. 11–13 cited later, after exegesis of Rev 4:9–11 including the quotation of 1 Pt 5:6, by Garcaeus. Locus given as Rev 5 and 7 by both Specker and Garcaeus. 14 Briefly mentioned in the first item of the fourth list by Specker (1560:272v–274r). This and the following points are essentially an unpacking of Rev 4:9–11 by Garcaeus. 15 The following points are essentially an unpacking of Rev 5:11–13 by Garcaeus. 16 Followed by a summary reference, without actual quotations, to Rev 4, 5, 7, 14, 19. 17 Followed by Bullinger’s commentary in Specker, also quoted by Garcaeus.

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Garcaeus Structure Specker Faber (1573 Topic (in (1560) (1569) Biblical prooftexts8 [°1568]) Specker) Pt. 3, ch. 8 ch. 6 ch. 18 2 Tim 1[:10]G; Rm 6[:9]G; Worship service P7r–8r 1 Cor 15[:42–49]G*; 2 offered eternally Cor 4[:17–18]G

Both Faber and Garcaeus conclude their work, like Specker, with reflection on the state of the damned. Garcaeus extends the discussion by adding a chapter in each case (chs. 21 and 25) on the departed souls’ distinction in glory or pain. Chyträus has no interest in the fate of the damned at this stage, and foregrounds worshipfulness as the primary characteristic of the life of the blessed in the interim state. Again, he spends little time in describing the qualities of the souls’ existence, only mentioning thanksgiving, praise, conversation and prayer, drawing on Jesus’ transfiguration and on Revelation, especially chapters 4–7 and 15. Authors of the Mirus group present a more condensed discussion than Specker and his followers, but they each devote a section of their texts to these issues recalling, in simplified fashion, the Strasbourger’s position. The blessed souls are in God’s presence, ceaselessly praising God and redeemed from all afflictions but still expecting reunification with the body. Mirus and Weiser also add that they recognise each other (Table 4.21). The damned are in the company of devils, suffer pain, and scream. Finally, Frölich and Roth in the early 1590s place more emphasis on resting in peace. That is quite natural for Roth, who is preaching on Wisdom 3:1–5. Thus in the second point of his sermon, devoted to the state of the righteous after death, three privileges are attributed to the soul. They come into God’s hand, suffer no pain, and have complete peace. Roth will not say more on the details. The thrust of Frölich’s reasoning is very similar, and although his discussion is considerably more extensive, materially he does not advance the argument far beyond what we see in Roth. He does speak somewhat more on both the blessed souls’ proximity to divine presence and the state of the damned.18 The occupation of the departed souls is thus reflected upon in some measure in the

18 Chyträus (1591 [1582]) C5v–D3r; Mirus (1590 [°1575]) O2r–3v; Pflacher (1582) 272–74; Weiser (1583b) 23– 28, 31–32; Frölich (1590) 5v–14r, 17r–20v, 24v–25v; Roth (1591) C3r–D1v.

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corpus, and it holds generally true that the righteous receive more attention than the damned, and what is said of the latter is predicated on the pattern of the former. However, authors rarely go beyond generalities, and Specker and Garcaeus, who consider the state of the departed souls in greatest depth, stand quite apart from the rest. In most texts, two central facts are asserted about the post-mortem state of the righteous: they rest and are in peace, and they participate in worship and enjoy the divine presence. Neither of them is an exclusive feature of the Zwischenzustand. Both in general descriptions and in the more detailed sketches of the Specker group, it is difficult to draw a sharp line between post-mortem and post-resurrection existence. There appears no clear-cut distinction between the interim state and life eternal. It is quite typical, in fact, that a relevant section is headed with something like ‘the souls’ state and actions in the interim state’, but what is then spoken of is not simply ‘that life,’ as opposed to this, but quite routinely life eternal. That is probably a result of the fact that the biblical evidence that pertains specifically to the Zwischenzustand is scant, and writers draw on material, chiefly John’s visions, which is traditionally interpreted with regard to eternal life. There are nonetheless two qualities, so far not included in my overview, that allow us to explore specificities of the interim state. The first is the departed souls’ knowledge and recognition—but not because epistemology before the general resurrection should sharply differ from that after judgement day. What makes this issue special for the Zwischenzustand is some of the objects of knowledge that will no longer be there after the last day. The second area is the souls’ possible appearance on earth, which, again, has obvious ‘boundary conditions’ that empty it of significance after the general resurrection. In the remaining sections of this chapter, I will turn to those issues.

6.2 Knowledge of the blessed souls

Numerous texts in the corpus include an analysis, often formally demarcated, of what and how disembodied souls know, and some more draw similar conclusions in passing. The fullest discussion can be found in Specker and his direct imitators.19 The subject matter of chapters 7 and 11 of Vom leiblichen Todt is the knowledge of the righteous and the damned,

19 Specker (1560) 266r–269r, 287r–288v; Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) P8r–R3r, T4v–6r; Faber (1569) b1r–7r.

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respectively. The former is better developed and begins with a partially numbered list of six items of knowledge, of which the first stands apart. The blessed souls recognise the Trinity and the secrets of God’s kingdom. The other five pieces, essentially drawn from the parable of Lazarus and Dives (Lk 16:19–31) and from the episode of the transfiguration (Lk 9:28– 36),20 circle around a central theme, namely, life on earth after the soul’s departure. Knowing God’s judgement on the wicked might be added as a second focus, but that is really an aspect of having a right understanding of the temporal world after one’s death. After the review of what is known, Specker turns to the problem of how disembodied souls know, that is, the source of their knowledge, and comes up with an Augustinian answer. He cites paragraph 18 of On Care to Be Had for the Dead,21 where the bishop of Hippo suggests that departed souls may gain information about events in this life from newly arriving souls, from angels or by God’s direct revelation. The last section of Specker’s chapter 7 deals with contrary evidence which leads to a brief assertion that departed souls recognise each other. That topic appears more emphatically in the otherwise shorter chapter 11 on the knowledge of the damned souls, which includes three more items. After death, the godless recognise their own damnation and the blessedness of the righteous, think of their relatives, and remember their past joy and happiness, but all that only gives them more pain and no pleasure. Garcaeus follows Specker’s list, including his scriptural proofs, quite closely, although in a running text without numbered items or headings, and with some changes. He moves contrary evidence forward, in a way appending it to the list as part of the topic, souls know what’s going on in this world. He also adapts the Augustinian position on how souls gain information, but turns personal recognition into a major topic in a new chapter. The fourfold list of what the godless souls know diverges from Specker even less. Table 6.2 summarises the correspondences between Vom leiblichen Todt and the Sterbbüchlein in terms of objects of knowledge, and it also presents evidence from Faber’s Tractetlein. There the review

20 Both Specker and his followers cite all three synoptic gospels by the chapter (Matthew 17, Mark 9, Luke 9), irrespective of the fact that the relevant detail, Moses and Elijah know that Jesus will die in Jerusalem (v. 31), is Lukan Sondergut. That surely implies that they think in terms of an additive gospel harmony which is then assumed to contain complete historical truth. 21 NPNF1 3:548.

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of contrary scriptural loci is moved to the fore. A list of five items follows which is somewhat differently organised from Specker’s, and is only in partial, but substantial, overlap with it. The souls’ recognition of each other is directly affirmed in the previous chapter via a quotation from Caspar Cruciger, Sr. (1504–1548),22 and is also implicit in the last and biggest item on the list, preceding the passage from De cura. Faber there considers the righteous souls’ concern for their relatives left behind. As this question is relocated from the context of the godless to the pious, Faber leaves out the epistemology of the damned altogether.

Table 6.2 Knowledge of the blessed souls according to Specker, Garcaeus, and Faber

Piece of knowledge Specker Garcaeus Faber (with biblical prooftexts) (1560) (1573 [°1568]) (1569) Blessed souls recognise the Trinity and all ch. 7, 1 ch. 19, [1] secrets of God’s kingdom (Mt 11:2723; Jn (266r) (P8v–Q1r) 14:17, 19–20, 21, 17:324). Abraham knows the rich man’s godless life ch. 7, 2 ch. 19, [3] 1[.a] (b3r/v) and Lazarus’ misery (Lk 16:25). (266v) (Q1v) Blessed souls know God’s judgement on the ch. 7, 3 ch. 19, [4.b]25 3 (b3v–4r) godless in this life until the last days (Rev (266v–267r) (Q1v–2r) 18:20,23 19:1–3). Blessed souls know God’s special ch. 7, [4] ch. 19, [4.a] 1[.b] (b3v)26 judgement and how each has lived in this (267r) (Q1v) life (Lk 16:25). Abraham knows that his descendents have ch. 7, [5] ch. 19, [5] 1[.c] (b3v) Moses and the prophets, who lived (267r) (Q2r) several hundred years after him (Lk 16:29). Moses and Elijah know of Jesus’ impending ch. 7, [6] ch. 19, [6] 2 (b3v) death in Jerusalem (Lk 9:31).27 (267r/v) (Q2r) Blessed souls know how those pious and ch. 19, [7] 4 (b4r) faithful live who are still in this life (Q2r/v)

22 Von der Geburt vnsers Heilands Jhesu Christi/ Fur die einfeltigen vnd kinder (Wittenberg: Hans Lufft, 1548), VD16 ZV 3999. Cf. p. 275, below. 23 Cited only by Specker. 24 Cited as first item by Garcaeus. 25 Generalisation from Lk 16:25, no reference to Revelation. 26 Faber makes the more specific point that Abraham knows of God’s judgement concerning both Lazarus and the rich man. 27 Matthew 17 and Mark 9 also cited despite their irrelevance, cf. n. 20 on p. 260, above.

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Piece of knowledge Specker Garcaeus Faber (with biblical prooftexts) (1560) (1573 [°1568]) (1569) Blessed souls have complete knowledge of ch. 19, [2] creation and creatures (Gen 2:19–20) (Q1r/v) Departed [faithful] souls think of their 5 (b4v–6r) relatives left behind (Lk 16:27–28) The damned recognise their own damnation ch. 11, 1 ch. 24, [1] and the blessedness of the righteous (287v) (T5r) The damned think of their relatives (Lk ch. 11, 2 ch. 24, [2] 16:28) (287v) (T5r) The damned think on their past joy and ch. 11, 3 ch. 24, [3] happiness (Lk 16:25, Wis 5:8–9) (288r) (T5v–6r) The damned recognise each other (Isa ch. 11, 4 ch. 24, [4] 14:16–19; Ez 32:20–21, 31)28 (288v) (T6r)

It is easy to see why epistemology becomes important for the Zwischenzustand. It is not so much a theory of knowledge that matters as the objects of knowledge. The temporal world, on which singular attention is lavished, is in a sense constitutive of the interim state. We can speak of an in-between stage, that is, a special realm between death and resurrection, as long as this world continues to exist. Eschatological expectations of a final conflagration and a general resurrection at the second coming make this world and the Zwischenzustand coterminous. Thus it is this world and the possible contact departed souls can establish to it by way of knowledge or otherwise that uniquely delimit the interim state, and mark it off from eternal life proper after judgement day. Interestingly, however, the direction in which this topic will be developed will prove somewhat self-defeating in the sense that it results in the undermining of the singularity of epistemology for the interim state. What we can observe in Specker, Garcaeus and Faber is not simply the adaptation, by now familiar, of the Strasbourger by the North German authors, but a subtle yet significant shift in the focus of the doctrinal locus. Some of the variation, like Faber’s exclusion of the knowledge of the damned, can be judged accidental with hindsight, and developments will have to be traced in two directions. First, the personal aspect of knowledge will acquire growing significance. Specker makes a cursory reference to saints recognising each other. Faber turns a related issue into a major topic, and devotes nearly half

28 Old Testament loci cited only by Specker; Garcaeus alludes to Lk 16:23.

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of the entire chapter to it. Garcaeus treats it in a whole new chapter. When we look at the broader picture, we can register a similar tendency. The question shows up in Tacius to the extent of a one-sentence remark in which he simply avers the fact.29 Nonetheless, that is his only comment on the epistemology of departed souls. The subject is still largely absent from Musculus. Drawing chiefly on Wisdom 5 and Luke 16, his logic is vaguely reminiscent of Specker’s points about both the damned and the righteous, but here we find them in a rather embryonic form, with not much explicit reflection on knowledge. In terms of epistemology, Musculus seems a little more interested in the damned, but even that is not very much, and the question whether souls recognise each other is not raised.30 However, in texts after the late 1560s, that is precisely the most important, if not the only, epistemological issue. Mirus sums up Garcaeus’ position in a few lines. Blessed souls recognise each other, care and pray for those left behind on earth, and gain information about them through angels or newly arriving souls. Taken together, they constitute the fourth entry on a list of five items. Interestingly, the first three are duly numbered, while the epistemological point is introduced, ‘Without doubt they [the righteous souls] also know each other among themselves.’31 The protestation might be a clue that this view was not yet entirely self- evident. Be that as it may, Augustine is not mentioned, although De cura undoubtedly underlies the latter point. The personal recognition and concern of the damned are stated even more concisely. Pflacher passes over the epistemological question in silence, but Weiser, as usual, takes his clue from Mirus, and quotes the relevant passages. In his own, rather short, initial answer to the question on the blessed souls’ occupation, he does not mention their knowledge, nor does he turn any aspect of epistemology into an independent question of his catechism.32 Nevertheless, there is a paragraph by Mirus in the concluding, application, part of the fourth Regensburg Sermon where he comforts those bereft of a family member with the assurance that they are not altogether lost, but will be seen again on the

29 The notion must have been floating around in theological discussion, for we have seen it make a brief appearance in Faber’s excerpt from Cruciger’s 1548 Nativity sermon (1569:b2v; cf. p. 261, above). It is worth noting, however, that Cruciger does not engage the matter any more substantially than Tacius and Specker. 30 Tacius (1556) B3r; Musculus (1565) C2v–5r. 31 Mirus (1590 [°1575]) O2v; for the original, cf. Table 4.21. 32 Mirus (1590 [°1575]) O2v, O3v; Weiser (1583b) 23–24, 27, 32.

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‘Dies restitutionis omnium. . . . That is why we should gird our souls with patience in the meantime and console ourselves with the same hope.’ The entire passage is cited by both Pflacher and Weiser (cf. Table 4.23). It might be suggested that this line of interpretation diverges significantly from Specker and his immediate followers, and makes personal recognition a privilege of resurrected humans, but I do not find that argument convincing. The textual counterevidence is delivered by Mirus, who does say that souls recognise each other before judgement day. In fact, he offers the problematic passage as an upshot of that insight (as application of the foregoing teaching). I think, therefore, that here we again have to do with a blurred borderline between qualities of post-mortem and post-resurrection existence, and a sharp juxtaposition does not even occur to the authors. The most plausible interpretation is that both Pflacher and Weiser agree with Mirus and other writers on this point, even if they do not explicitly say so in their own words. Chyträus, drawing on the story of transfiguration, clearly implies the standard view, although, as we shall later see,33 he puts the emphasis elsewhere. Frölich again treats the topic in a grand fashion, making it the subject matter of his fifth chapter. He responds to what he regards as a widespread popular misconception that only cousins and godparents34 will recognise each other in the hereafter. Interestingly, he takes a broad epistemological sweep in order to build up a well-founded answer, and covers much the same ground as Specker in the process. Here we see the consummation of the development began from Tacius and Specker in the sense that now we are back full circle at the rich epistemological picture of Vom leiblichen Todt, but this time the departed souls’ personal recognition is not a tangentially treated minor point at the end, but constitutes the overarching problem and framework within which the entire discussion is situated. It must be noted, however, that it remains undecided throughout Frölich’s chapter whether the argument pertains to the post- resurrection or to the post-mortem state. Finally, Roth’s sermon contains a passage on comfort against loss of a beloved person that is remotely similar to Mirus’, but its logic cuts differently, and the epistemological issue is in fact not raised in the whole homily at all.35

33 Cf. p. 275, below. 34 ‘Gefettern vnnd Paten’ (Frölich (1590) 81v). 35 Chyträus (1591 [1582]) D1v; Frölich (1590) 81v–89v; Roth (1591) D1v–2r.

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6.3 Personal recognition

The growing interest in the personal recognition of souls naturally results in increasingly sophisticated reflection, and Tacius’ and Specker’s fleeting assertions are later replaced, at least in the major treatments, by complex sets of arguments. The question is accorded the most thorough consideration by Garcaeus.36 He enumerates no fewer than ten arguments for the sweeping thesis that the blessed know all that fall asleep in Christ, that is, in the community of the righteous everyone knows everyone else personally. First, Peter immediately recognised Moses and Elijah with his eyes ‘weighed down with sleep’ on the mount of transfiguration (Lk 9:32–33).37 Second, Christ was recognised by his disciples when he appeared in his glorified body after Easter. Third, Adam recognised each animal when God had brought them before him to name them, nor did he need any introduction to Eve (Gen 2:19–23). Fourth, Elizabeth and little Johnny38 in her womb recognised Jesus when Mary came to visit them, as did the Baptist again at the Jordan, although he had never seen Jesus before (Lk 1:39–45 and Mt 3:13–15). Note that in Garcaeus’ reconstruction, probably developing Luke 1:45,39 Elizabeth is supposed to have been providentially aware of the whole angelic message given to Mary (Lk 1:35). Fifth, Abraham knows both Lazarus and the rich man (Lk 16:25–31). Sixth, the godless recognise the righteous whom they have oppressed (Wis 5:1–5). Seventh, we know, hear and see our friends and acquaintances in this life. Eighth, we will see God and the angels face to face, how much more the elect who are but humans. Ninth, if the ‘wise shall shine like the brightness of the sky’ (Dan 12:3), there will be a difference in glory among the elect, which is impossible unless God’s exceptional servants40 are recognised. Tenth and last, the righteous with Christ will recognise both themselves and their Saviour (Jn 17:24–25).41 Garcaeus appends three unnumbered sets of

36 Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) P8r–R3r. 37 Garcaeus simply alludes to the story without citing any reference, but the sleepy eyes again mark out Luke. 38 ‘Henselein’ (Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) Q7r). 39 ‘And blessed is she who believed that there would be a fulfilment of what was spoken to her by the Lord.’ 40 Cf. ‘wunderleute’ (Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) Q8v). 41 In the original, the locus is cited as John 7 (Q8v).

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further prooftexts to this list. The first is on the new Jerusalem,42 the second includes Jeremiah’s and Paul’s prophecies about an immediate and complete knowledge of God,43 and the third is a general allusion to promises of our future Christiform shape.44 The point in each case is that perfect knowledge includes knowing and recognising one another. The line between ‘arguments’ and ‘prooftexts’ is thus fluid; all but the seventh argument are scripture-based. The overarching logic, with the exception of a few items, is always the same, namely, that the existence of the righteous in the hereafter is a perfected form of their current being. In other words, their new life is ‘backwards compatible’ with their earthly life; everything they were capable of here, they will retain the power—and that to a greater degree—to do there. If such and such is the case in the examples cited, how much more so in our improved state—and it is of secondary significance whether the parallels are inferior because they are taken from the godless, the sinful world, or the pristine condition of creation. Garcaeus sets out to discuss a feature of the interim state (souls recognising each other), yet many of the arguments, not to mention the concluding sets of biblical excerpts, may, and some do, pertain to life eternal after the general resurrection. Disregarding several ambiguous items, the second and the ninth arguments are practically impossible to interpret with regard to the Zwischenzustand. Jesus was recognised in his clarified body (#2) to which the departed souls have not yet attained, and the Danielic verse (#9) is part of a resurrection prophecy. Even if we allow that the new Jerusalem might be interpreted to denote the righteous souls’ interim abode as in Specker,45 the assumption of a glorified body like Christ’s (Phil 3:21) cannot commence before the general resurrection. In drawing the desired conclusion from a given example, Garcaeus also frequently speaks of eternal life, and never specifically of souls. In other words, while epistemology is a helpful test case to examine qualities of the interim state, the arguably most important aspect of knowledge after death, individual recognition of other persons, does not sharply distinguish between pre and post-resurrection states.

42 Isa 65:17–20, 2 Pt 3:13, and Rev 21:1–2. 43 Jer 31:33–34 and 1 Cor 13:9–12. 44 Garcaeus might have passages like Rm 8:29, 1 Cor 15:49 or Phil 3:21 in mind, and, since he evokes the witness of Paul, Peter and John (R2v), also 2 Pt 1:4 and 1 Jn 3:2. His actual wording is closest to Phil 3:21. 45 Cf., esp., Table 4.3.

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There is only one passage in the whole chapter where Garcaeus seems to differentiate between various stages of knowing. He draws the conclusion from the third argument, Adam, through God’s created image in him, likewise had knowledge and recognition of all things; nor can his bodily natural deep sleep hinder him in the same in his complete righteousness, wisdom and understanding. How much more shall we have such wisdom, recognise each other [and] converse with each other in life eternal, since in the sate where we possess our glory eternally without loss and danger we shall receive much greater glory [and] more complete clarity than Adam [originally had].46

Here we see three distinct states delineated, with a fourth implied. First, prelapsarian Adam had perfect knowledge of all things. The second stage, earthly life as we know it after the fall, is only implicitly there; it will be reflected upon in the seventh argument. Third, Adam in the post-mortem state (during ‘his bodily natural deep sleep’) has again recovered his undiminished epistemic powers. Presumably, the same applies to us as well, although that is not made explicit. It is a relatively short but densely packed sentence that deserves a closer look. The Zwischenzustand is identified with the help of the sleep metaphor, and it is qualified by three adjectives. It is deep: death is analogous to, but is even ‘more so,’ than sleep. It is nonetheless natural because Adam is ultimately numbered among the righteous for whom Christ has tamed death. Finally, it is bodily or, literally, fleshly: sleep is predicated of Adam the whole person, but the first adjective helps avoid any misunderstanding. Sleep is only to be understood of his body. His soul, by implication, is awake, and indeed enjoys its epistemic functions to the full, purged of the noetic effects of sin (‘in his complete . . . wisdom and understanding’). In a few words, then, Garcaeus successfully invokes an entire tradition of the interpretation of the sleep metaphor. That he can effectively do so—and can expect his audience to understand the import of his three adjectives—is a testimony to the strength of the later-sixteenth-century consensus on that point.47 The fourth epistemic state is introduced with a comparison that signals a contrast,

46 ‘Also hat Adam/ durch Gottes bilde / in jm erschaffen/gehabt die wissenschaft vnd erkentnis aller dinge / in seiner volkomenē gerechtigkeit / weisheit vnd verstand/mus jn daran auch nichts hindern/ sein fleischlicher natürlicher tieffer schlaff. Wie viel mehr werden wir im ewigen leben solche weisheit haben / einander kennen/mit einander reden /da wir viel höher herrlicher/vollkomener klarheit empfangen werden/ denn Adam / in dem stand/da wir vnser herrligkeit on verlust vnd gefahr ewig besitzen’ (Q6r). 47 Cf. sections 5.6–5.7, above.

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‘How much more…’ The contrast is drawn in terms of eternality and immunity to change on the one hand, and of perfection (glory and clarity) on the other. Eternal life is superior both because of the inherent qualities of our knowing and because there will be no external factors limiting it either. As the additional words supplied in my translation above already indicated, the comparison, on my reading, is not between the post-resurrection state and the Zwischenzustand, but between life eternal and Adam’s original condition. Promising as the three (or four)fold structure of the passage is, it ultimately reveals nothing of an appreciable epistemological distinction between the interim state and life after judgement day. Faber rather presupposes than seeks to establish that souls will recognise each other. His thesis is the further point that even before meeting in the hereafter, they remember and think of their relatives.48 The latter surely entails the former conviction, for what would be gained by confirming it if the longed-for acquaintance would not be recognised upon joining the company of the righteous souls? The advantage of his approach is that it properly pertains to the Zwischenzustand. Faber offers three lines of thought in support of his thesis. First, souls do not sleep—or, rather, their sleep is such that it does not prevent thinking and recognition. Prima facie, the argument hardly strikes us as convincing, yet it is not altogether atypical. It is akin to reasoning we have seen that the souls are alive after the body’s death, therefore, they must be awake. They make sense if we add a silently assumed premise, namely, ‘backwards compatibility.’ People recognised each other on earth; if their souls continue in a conscious existence after death, they must also be able to recognise familiar persons.49 The logic is articulated in the second argument that since people care for relatives and friends in this life, they will have all the more and purer compassion for them once cleansed and liberated from sin. He adds two further considerations, one constructive, the other defensive. It is often said when a mother dies soon after the death of her child, Faber observes with approval, that the baby has begged God that she might also come.

48 Faber (1569) b4v–6r. 49 Nowhere in the entire corpus is the problem raised if a limit might be set to recognition not so much by the knowing subject as by the object of knowledge in that souls, not (bodily) faces, must be recognised. Authors might insist that existence in the interim state is somehow imperfect until the body is reunited with the soul (e.g. Mirus (1590 [°1575]) O3r; Pflacher (1582) 273; Weiser (1583b) 27–28), but for all practical intents and purposes the soul is assumed to carry complete personhood.

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Defensively, Faber, imitating Specker,50 takes issue with Augustine’s notion that souls in the Zwischenzustand have no compassion. He also goes beyond his source by questioning the authenticity of De cura. It is only with the third argument that he turns to scripture. ‘He [the rich man] said [to Abraham], “Then, father, I beg you to send him to my father’s house—for I have five brothers—that he may warn them, so that they will not also come into this place of torment” ’ (Lk 16:27–28). If the damned think of their nearest and dearest, how much more the righteous!51 Details of Faber’s reasoning such as the locus classicus from the Lukan parable or the Augustinian problem of compassion clearly link his approach to other treatments of souls recognising each other, but the general direction of his interpretation—that is, the emphasis on thinking of those left behind rather than recognising them when they arrive at their interim abode, which allows Faber to combine the personal aspect of epistemology with its specificity for the interim state—will not be picked up by later authors. There was not much at stake in a clear-cut distinction between eternal life and the Zwischenzustand for sixteenth-century minds. Frölich is the third author to argue the question in detail.52 His reasoning, though somewhat narrower in scope, is very similar to Garcaeus’, and their theses are equally broad, too. Frölich is also convinced that all the righteous will know each other, and that also better than in this life. He also employs the argument from ‘backwards compatibility,’ but the bottom line, presented in various forms, is that the redeemed will have perfect knowledge, which necessarily entails personal recognition as well. He grounds the claim christologically via Romans 5:15–19 that Christ has not won back what was lost by Adam, unless the personal aspect of knowledge is also included. Ultimately, creatures—and Frölich is much taken by the prospect of our recognising the angels individually—will be known in God; conversely, the promised perfect knowledge of God logically necessitates our knowledge of angels and humans as well. He selects four prooftexts that he analyses in some detail: Lazarus and Dives of Luke 16, Jesus’ transfiguration from Matthew 17,53 the surprise of the

50 Cf. p. 272, below. 51 Note that this is yet another version of the ‘backwards compatibility’ argument. 52 Frölich (1590) 81v–89v. 53 Like Specker and his followers above (cf. n. 20 on p. 260, above), he also cites Matthew, but in fact includes the specifically Lukan detail of Jesus’ impending death in Jerusalem.

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damned from Wisdom 5, and Paul’s expectation of full knowledge from 1 Corinthians 13. All four are familiar from Garcaeus,54 and the interpretation of the latter two is based on the logic of ‘analogous but more perfect.’ As I have already noted, his discussion also draws no sharp line between post-mortem and post-resurrection epistemology. What this survey has revealed is, then, a development with a double twist. On the one hand, epistemology that helps mark off the Zwischenzustand in the mysterious realm beyond death becomes an established chapter in the immortality locus. The topic that receives most attention in this area is the possibility of personal recognition in the hereafter. It is part of the patristic tradition to which the Reformation is also beholden, but there must have been some specific factors at work to bring it to the fore as the century progressed. One of them may indeed have been challenges from popular religion such as Frölich responds to.55 Some others are inherent in the subject matter, and they are probably more decisive. To argue, as later-sixteenth-century authors powerfully do, that humans will recognise each other in the hereafter is, like the insistence that both the righteous and the damned remember their past life, one way to emphasise the continuity of personhood and individual identity beyond death. The point may not be surrendered, not only because recognising others implies being recognised by others as well, but also because human personhood is to a large extent constituted in interpersonal relationships. Here we move beyond the individual to the communal level. Personal recognition not only assures individual identity, but is also a prerequisite of community. Beyond Luther’s influence, the roots of the ‘gathered in’ passages must also reach here.56 They are attractive not so much as place names as in their capacity to convey, more than other names, the reality of a living community on the far side of the grave. Both the continuation of personhood and a reconstitution of community are deeply theological arguments in that they make significant contributions to the unpacking of Christ’s victory over death. To all appearances, death destroys the self, and rends the social fabric as well. By confessing an afterlife where individuals are recognised, family members can reunite, and friends meet again, early modern

54 Cf. pp. 265–266, above. 55 Cf. p. 264, above. 56 Cf. section 1.5, above.

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writers expressed their faith in a God who upholds the core of the human person, and overcomes the ultimate isolation of death. However, and here is the second twist in the development, the emphasis on the personal aspect of knowledge undercuts the distinction between the post-mortem and the post-resurrection states. Where authors go beyond a mere affirmation of the recognition thesis, the two stages of the soul’s existence, disembodied and reunited with the body, are not consistently kept apart in their arguments. That is only an issue with hindsight, however. Lutheran theologians of the early confessional era never seem to have conceptualised the two states in sharp juxtaposition. Luther spoke with reservation of the Zwischenzustand; he always saw it entailed in the doctrine of the resurrection. When his followers, filling the gap left behind by the demise of purgatory, developed a full-scale locus on the subject, they did not intend to contrast it with the article of the resurrection of the body, either. Much rather, they extended qualities of eternal life into the interim state. That move was not without problems, but, overall, it was much more in line with the thrust of Luther’s thought than a modern contrast between immortality and resurrection might imply or capture.

6.4 Interpretation of biblical counterevidence

The other major direction in which the epistemological chapter of the immortality locus developed after Specker concerns the interpretation of biblical counterevidence. Here we find even greater variety and more divergent options than in the assertion of personal recognition. Specker concludes the epistemological chapter with a review and refutation of contrary opinions.57 First he cites three Bible verses which include Job’s reflection on the irreversibility of death,58 Isaiah’s prayer for delivery,59 and God’s gracious message to King Josiah.60 Then follow excerpts from Augustine’s De cura where the church father comments

57 Specker (1560) 268r–269r. 58 ‘Their children come to honour, and they do not know it; they are brought low, and it goes unnoticed’ (Job 14:21). 59 ‘For you are our father, though Abraham does not know us and Israel does not acknowledge us; you, O Lord, are our father; our Redeemer from of old is your name’ (Isa 63:16). 60 ‘Therefore, I will gather you to your ancestors, and you shall be gathered to your grave in peace; your eyes shall not see all the disaster that I will bring on this place’ (2 Kgs 22:20).

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on those passages.61 Specker curtly dismisses Augustine’s denial of compassion as ‘all too Stoic and ungodly,’62 and responds, after touching upon other issues like the appearance of ghosts and offerings for the dead, to the original problem posed by the biblical quotations that they are to be interpreted, in the light of the earlier Augustinian description of the departed souls’ epistemic sources,63 as a confirmation that the righteous have no knowledge of this world by themselves, but must learn such information from external sources like newly arriving souls or angels. Garcaeus works with essentially the same material, but reshuffles it somewhat.64 He introduces the biblical quotations, leaving out Job, with the interpretation offered by Specker afterwards. ‘That the dear saints, though redeemed from all evil and living in places where no affliction disturbs their joy, do not come to such knowledge by themselves is demonstrated by St. Augustine from Isaiah 64 . . . and 2 Kings 22.’65 Then follows the excerpt from De cura 16 slightly paraphrased, with the result that it becomes entirely inconspicuous. It is left to stand on its own; the problem of compassion is not raised. The quotation requires no explanation from Garcaeus other than is already provided by the new arrangement. Augustine, whom Specker had to interpret—quite ingeniously—through himself against himself, is now presented as an ally from the start. Faber differs from Garcaeus in that he acknowledges the difficulty created by the Bible verses, although he also excludes Job, but he also parts ways with Specker in that he

61 ‘If so great Patriarchs were ignorant what was doing towards the People of them begotten, they to whom, believing God, the People itself to spring from their stock was promised; how are the dead mixed up with affairs and doings of the living, either for cognizance or help? . . . There then are the spirits of the departed, where they see not whatever things are doing, or events happening, in this life to men. Then how do they see their own graves, or their own bodies, whether they lie cast away, or buried? How do they take part in the misery of the living, when they are either suffering their own evils, if they have contracted such merits; or do rest in peace, as was promised to this Josiah, where they undergo no evils, either by suffering themselves, or by compassionate suffering with others, freed from all evils which by suffering themselves or with others while they lived here they did undergo?’ (Par. 16, NPNF1 3:547–48.) 62 Cf. ‘all zů Stoisch vnd vngöttlich’ (Specker (1560) 268v). 63 Cf. p. 260, above. 64 Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) Q4r/v. 65 ‘Das aber die lieben Heiligen von sich selbst zu solcher erkentnis nicht komen/auch von allem vbel erlöset/ an denen orten leben/ darinnen jre frewde kein trübsal zustöret / beweiset S. Augustinus aus dem Esaia Cap. 64. . . . Jtem aus dem andern buch der Könige im 22. Cap.’ (Q4r).

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faces the difficulty up front, moving the whole issue to the beginning of the chapter.66 His answer is nevertheless rather evasive. On Isaiah 63:16, he cites Luther, who was quite fond of that verse as ‘a good locus against the invocation of saints.’ For this gloss does not hold at all: Abraham did not know us, namely, when he was alive. Abraham surely believed and knew by faith that he would have descendants. The Schoolmen debate here whether the saints see our misery. But scripture says that they are sleeping. We know therefore, and should indeed think, that they are dead to us. But how they live to God is none of our concern, for such things are not revealed to us through the word. It is sufficient to know that they are asleep to us. They are therefore not to be invoked by us.67

Such a position, putting the sleep metaphor to good use again, is much more consistent with Luther’s overall agnosticism as regards the state of the dead than with Faber’s insistence that departed souls continue in conscious existence. However, points must be scored locally, and a single polemic argument is not necessarily expected to bridge over wide expanses and be coherent across different contexts. On closer inspection, Faber’s move is hardly convincing in its local context, either. Logically, the point that Isaiah’s text can be applied to counter another Catholic doctrine is irrelevant as a rejoinder to the accusation that righteous souls are ignorant of what goes on in this world. If anything, Luther seems to confirm the view Faber seeks to disqualify. Rhetorically, however, the interpretive quotation—ultimately emphasising our ignorance—effectively blunts the critical edge of the original passage. In the case of the Josiah quotation, even less is offered in terms of reinterpretation. It is simply drowned out with a flood of opposing prooftexts introduced with an emphatic ‘But scripture does clearly report to the contrary…’68 Augustine’s denial of compassion is challenged, without actual quotation or much argument, simply as unattractive. That comes somewhat later in the

66 Faber (1569) b2v–3r. 67 ‘Est bonus locus contra invocationem sanctorum. Nihil enim glossa illa valet: Abraham nescivit nos, scilicet cum viveret. Imo credidit Abraham et per fidem scivit se habiturum posteritatem. Hic disputant Scolastici, an sancti nostras miserias videant. Scriptura autem dicit, quod dormiant. Scimus igitur nos et sentire debemus, quod sint nobis mortui. Quomodo autem Deo vivant, nihil ad nos, neque enim illa per verbum nobis sunt revelata. Et satis est nosse, quod sint nobis mortui. Non ergo a nobis sunt invocandi’ (Vorlesung über Jesaja [1528/30, printed 1532/34], WA 25:379.26–33). Only the middle section (‘Hic disputant . . . revelata’) is quoted by Faber, in GT. See also WA 39II: 173.31–33, 174.4–11, 21–24 (Disputatio D. Iohannis Machabaei Scoti praeside D. Doctore Mart. Luthero, 1542); WA TR 2:244.15–16 (1532, #1875) and 5:37.13–18 (1540, #5267), and recall that in the Lectures on Genesis (1535–1545) Luther also cited this verse in support of the contrast he drew between the sleeping saints and the active Christ, i.e. he also took the Isaiah text at face value (cf. p. 62, above). 68 ‘Aber doch meldet die Schrifft dagegen auch klerlich…’ (b3r).

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reasoning, and is buttressed by questioning the treatise’s authorship.69 Although the chapter is concluded with a long excerpt from De cura on the departed souls’ sources of information,70 nowhere is that text brought to bear on the interpretation of the difficult biblical passages in a Speckerian fashion. Faber only offers one constructive, as opposed to evasive or forceful, suggestion to solve the original conundrum. Having articulated some features of post-mortem epistemology quite boldly, he concludes on a rather modest note that harks back to the opening of the chapter. The whole question is clouded in uncertainty for us in order that we may not despise it like other common and everyday issues. It is only in this retraction that the problematic passages may, implicitly, find an explanation. Mirus, we recall, has a short paragraph on the epistemological problem, concisely summing up the essentials of the tradition.71 Nor does he stop to consider counterevidence. It is precisely his prooftext that makes his contribution interesting. He includes the heavenly church’s prayer for those still on earth with the affirmation of their concern for the same, thus joining two items from two separate chapters in Specker. Personal recognition appears as part of the epistemological chapter 7 in Vom leiblichen Todt; the prayer of the righteous for the church on earth, as the sixth and last item of the description of the qualities of the heavenly worship service, itself included in chapter 8 on the actions of the souls in heaven.72 Specker cites Judas’ dream of the high priest Onias and the prophet Jeremiah from 2 Maccabees 15:12–14 as supporting evidence, and Mirus does the same.73 That, however, was not acceptable to all. Garcaeus, though he follows Specker’s eighth chapter in his own eighteenth relatively closely, skips the sixth point of the relevant list, and avoids the issue of the saints’ prayer altogether (Table 4.6). Faber’s solution is even more remarkable. He reproduces Specker’s list in a condensed form, including the prayer for the church on earth,

69 See p. 269, above. 70 It is another indication of how local arguments can be that the text that was challenged as possibly the work of ‘inapt monks’ (‘ungeschickter Mönche,’ b5v) but two pages earlier is now cited with self-evident approval. 71 Cf. p. 263, above. 72 Cf. p. 254, above. 73 I am merely pointing out thematic parallelisms and not arguing for Mirus’ direct reliance on Vom leiblichen Todt. As I concluded in chapter 4, the Speckerian tradition probably reached him via Garcaeus. This single instance is not enough counterevidence to reverse my earlier finding. It is more likely that the heavenly saints’ prayer for the church on earth, prominently supported by 2 Maccabees 15, was a widely spread theological concept whose acceptance or otherwise was under discussion in the evangelical camp.

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but he drops the verses from 2 Maccabees 15. What follows in his treatise, instead, is the passage from Cruciger’s Nativity sermon74 where the author speaks of Mary and the heavenly church celebrating the feast and also praying for the church on earth, but immediately adds that it does not follow that they should be invoked. Faber, in other words, replaced verses from an apocryphal book of the Bible with a contemporary Lutheran sermon as his prooftext. Whatever his precise weighing of authoritativeness versus orthodoxy, he ultimately found recent theological reflection that undoubtedly taught right doctrine preferable to a biblical, if deuterocanonical, quotation that was confessionally problematic.75 In a similar fashion, Weiser cites verbatim the entire section on the righteous souls’ state from Mirus, including supporting evidence76—except that he skips Judas’ dream.77 And to complete an intriguing parallel of the Mirus–Pflacher–Weiser line with the Specker– Garcaeus–Faber tradition, Pflacher, like Garcaeus, omits the epistemological entry from the five-item list of the blessed souls’ activities he otherwise takes over from Mirus.78 Finally, Chyträus represents a rather original approach to the whole problem of scriptural counterevidence.79 To begin with, he cites largely different Bible verses from what we have seen so far. Psalms 6:580 and 115:1781 are easy to explain away. They are to be understood of preaching, teaching, and praising God in this life. The implication gives occasion for Chyträus to carefully comment on Judas’ dream. It is thinkable that teachers like John the Baptist, Stephen, Timothy or Titus pray for the church in heaven, ‘but we have no

74 Cf. n. 22 on p. 261, above. 75 Cf. Specker (1560) 269r–275r and Faber (1569) b1r–2v. 76 Cf. Mirus (1590 [°1575]) O2r–3r, esp. O2v–3r, and Weiser (1583b) 24–28, esp. 27. 77 He is consistent in that, for some ten pages later, discussing, and rejecting, intercessions for the dead, he undercuts the favourite Catholic argument from Judas’ prayer and sacrifice (2 Macc 12:39–45) in part by questioning the canonical status of the book (1583b:38–39). Mirus, less consistently, does the same in his fifth sermon on purgatory (1590 [°1575]:P4v), which is, in turn, repeated again by Weiser (1583b:65). The move is altogether typical of the corpus; Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]:H7r/v) and Frölich (1590:22v–23v) also make it when interpreting the significance of the same passage for purgatory. Incidentally, Garcaeus does not entirely disallow prayer for the dead if it is done modestly (H7v–J1r). 78 Cf. Mirus (1590 [°1575]) O2r–3r and Pflacher (1582) 272–73. 79 Chyträus (1591 [1582]) D3v–4v. 80 ‘For in death there is no remembrance of you; in Sheol who can give you praise?’ 81 ‘The dead do not praise the Lord, nor do any that go down into silence.’

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explicit example of that in the Bible except for Maccabeus’ dream that clearly testifies that the saints’ souls pray for the church struggling on earth.’82 Chyträus does not challenge the book’s canonicity, and accepts the passage as genuine evidence. What makes him cautious is the scarcity of comparable data. Here he recognises the prayer of departed souls as a possibility, but treats it rather carefully as uncertain—apparently without noticing the tension with his previous point where, describing the activities of the blessed souls, he self-evidently affirmed that they prayed for the church on earth.83 That is not only an illustration of how locally polemic arguments are contextualised but also a sign of Chyträus’ unease about 2 Maccabees 15. He proceeds at once to emphasise that it cannot be shown that the saints in heaven hear our prayers. There is no shortage of prooftexts for that thesis since scripture says that they do not even know what is going on in the temporal world! We have come full circle because, in addition to Ecclesiastes 9:5,84 Chyträus now cites as supporting evidence the very same verses Specker felt the need to interpret away.85 Augustine’s patriarchs commentary86 finds its place perfectly naturally here. All those question-begging details can be now interpreted at face value. When in his last move Chyträus brings in the Augustinian theory of the souls’ sources of knowledge as a possible explanation, but by no means as self- evident truth, it decidedly comes as an easing-up of his hardliner position. His main concern is clearly to emphasise the limitations, if not complete lack, of the souls’ knowledge of, and concern for, those still on earth. In that, he is surely motivated by a confessional commitment to leave no foothold for the false teaching of purgatory. There is thus no consensus among the writers of the corpus on the interpretation of contrary evidence; they do not even agree on what exactly counts as contrary evidence! Nevertheless, two overriding concerns emerge as guiding forces of their theological reflection, even if the results produced by them vary from author to author. The first is a

82 ‘Doch haben wir dessen kein ausdrücklich Exempel in der Bibel/ausser dem Traum Maccabæi, der da klar zeuget/ das die Seelen der Heiligen beten vor die streitende Kirch auff Erden’ (1591 [1582]:D4r). 83 Chyträus (1591 [1582]) D1v–2r. 84 ‘The living know that they will die, but the dead know nothing; they have no more reward, and even the memory of them is lost.’ 85 See nn. 58–60 on p. 271, above. 86 See n. 61 on p. 272, above; only the first sentence is included by Chyträus.

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resolve to ward off Catholic doctrine; the second, a desire to harmonise biblical evidence, or at least to marshal critical passages on their own side. Any solution that can claim to answer to both expectations will be deemed acceptable. That sixteenth-century Lutheran authors should reject the invocation of saints is neither surprising nor particularly interesting in and of itself. Strictly speaking, that question is not really part of the immortality doctrine, but belongs with the problem of purgatory, which is an adjacent but different locus. What we have seen in the corpus, however, is that the rejection had repercussions for their interpretation of the state and activities of departed souls as well. Apparently, early modern Lutheran theologians have no inherent objection to the notion that the heavenly church should care, and even pray, for those left behind. It is the attendant possibility of our soliciting their prayer that puts them on their guard. They seek to forestall that danger by severing direct contact between the living and the souls of the dead, chiefly via Augustine’s epistemological suggestion. Although the development from Specker to Chyträus is anything but linear, a general tendency of growing wariness of the whole issue can be observed in the texts, yet even the more restrained solutions provide grist to the mill of my claim that one factor profoundly influencing the development of Lutheran teaching on the soul’s immortality was polemic against the Catholic doctrine of purgatory.

6.5 Appearance of ghosts: Specker

The appearance of departed souls on earth is a widely discussed issue within the immortality locus. Tacius is the only author in the corpus who does not reflect on it. Specker, Garcaeus and Faber all allocate a whole chapter to it in the context of the righteous souls’ life, but Specker and Faber leave the question to the end, while Garcaeus starts with it. Musculus contextualises it with the place of the souls, and thus essentially concludes his whole analysis of the interim state with it, before turning to the general resurrection. Mirus originally proposed the topic as part of the third point, purgatory and related issues, under the title of the soul’s state in the Zwischenzustand in the fourth Regensburg sermon. In the actual delivery, however, it ended up constituting the initial unit of his fifth sermon, which is the first of two on purgatory. Pflacher found a place for the appearance of souls in connection with the souls’ abode like Musculus, but—like many other authors—moved that topic to the front.

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Weiser follows Mirus in including it under the heading of purgatory, but in his case that means moving it farther away from the context of the life of the soul because the long section on purgatory is almost like an appendix to the unit on the interim state. Chyträus leaves it to the end of the immortality chapter where it is preceded by a review of the souls’ life, including their activities and knowledge, and it explicitly sets the stage for a transition to the next chapter, on purgatory. Frölich is alone among the authors not to raise the problem of appearances as a formally recognised topic. He does speak of it quite extensively, but only via a couple of excerpts from Chrysostom and Bullinger. They are listed among the prooftexts, organised not thematically but roughly chronologically, on the overarching theme of the soul’s immortality and the qualities of its disembodied life. Finally, Roth references the question briefly in the context of purgatory, itself a minor issue under the privileges of the soul once freed from the body.87 In other words, the topic is quite literally ubiquitous. It finds its way into nearly every text, but it does not find a set place within the locus. In a minority of the texts, it is discussed together with the place of the souls; more often, either as a feature of the departed souls’ life or in the context of purgatory, with further variation of its precise location within those thematic units. It is generally felt that no treatment of the soul’s interim state can be complete without clarifying this detail, but its wavering position indicates strong affinities to the locus of purgatory as well. The problem of appearances creates a link, most graphically in Chyträus’ work, between the two loci, immortality and purgatory. Conversely, and this impression will be thrown into even sharper relief as we look closer at the details, the appearance of souls is yet another area where the impact of the rejection of purgatory can be detected on the development of the immortality doctrine, for both at the time of Gregory the Great (c.540–604, pope after 590) and in the century of the Reformation Catholic claims were widely supported by appeals to appearance stories, against which interpretation much of the Lutheran discussion is directed. Ultimately, there is uniform agreement among later-sixteenth-century evangelical authors that departed souls cannot return to earth and appear as ghosts. That might seem

87 Specker (1560) 275v–278v; Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) L4v–M3v; Faber (1569) b7v–c3v; Musculus (1565) D3v–6v; Mirus (1590 [°1575]) O4v–P1v; Pflacher (1582) 266–67; Weiser (1583b) 73–87; Chyträus (1591 [1582]) D5r–8r; Frölich (1590) 18r–19r; Roth (1591) D1r.

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trivial to twenty-first-century sensibilities, but we will see that the consensus must be qualified in some ways, and the conclusion was not altogether straightforward for early modern writers. In fact, Melanchthon’s position creates a spectacular backdrop against which to measure later developments. Both the Commentarius (1540) and the Liber (1553) contained a reference to the appearance of ghosts, but the revision between the two editions altered it somewhat.88 What did not change was Melanchthon’s fundamentally positive approach to the phenomenon. He accepted poltergeists in both versions of the text as genuine evidence from which pagan philosophers had rightly concluded that the soul was immortal. What did change was a tone of personal approval. In 1540, he had immediately offered scripture as an even better source of knowledge than ghosts concerning the afterlife. In 1553, the new context—immortality versus the earlier resurrection—allowed Melanchthon to embrace the matter wholeheartedly. And the pagan writers expressly say that they are convinced that the souls of men survive after death, since it is most certain that many ghosts wander about everywhere, and often are heard and seen, and often even talk with men. And examples need not be taken just from books. I have seen some myself, and known many trustworthy men who affirmed that they had not only seen ghosts but have even spoken with them at length. However they thought most of them were the souls of the ancients.89

What matters is not that Melanchthon trumps bookish knowledge with personal experience, nor whether his clairvoyant claims are well founded, but rather that he champions the appearance of ghosts. In the present context, the most important implication of the passage is that he accepted ghosts for real, and interpreted them at face value as the souls of some dead persons. That is what will quickly alter in the latter half of the century. Specker’s text embodies the change in a fascinating way, and it can also serve as a helpful introduction to the building blocks of interpretation used by later authors in the corpus.90 Typographically, chapter 9 of Vom leiblichen Todt is divided into four units. It starts where chapter 8 left off, with Judas Maccabeus’ dream of Onias and Jeremiah (2 Macc 15:11–16). The passage, earlier cited as a proof of the heavenly church’s prayer for those left behind, is now repeated on the verso of the same page in a new context as evidence whether

88 Cf. section 2.6, above. 89 Melanchthon (1553) 286–87; cf. (1540a) 307–08. 90 Specker (1560) 275v–278v.

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souls can appear. The first section further contains the appearance of Moses and Elijah on the mount of transfiguration—quoted after Luke 9:30–33, but again referenced with all three synoptic gospels91—after which Specker comments, These witnesses clearly show that the souls of the righteous may appear at God’s behest and command and how they appear and are recognised. However, since we have no other examples, we should henceforth disregard such appearances and be satisfied with the sure scriptures.92

The chapter thus begins with two biblical prooftexts that souls can appear. Specker obviously accepts their import, yet proceeds to dismiss the whole phenomenon, despite its admitted biblical base, with the rather weak argument that the foundation is not substantial enough. Note that the reliability of 2 Maccabees is not questioned; two apparently solid scriptural witnesses are dismissed simply because they, taken together, are still declared not to reach critical mass. The same logic might be equally well used to challenge the translation of Enoch and Elijah, not to suggest more outrageous options, which of course never occurs to any of the sixteenth-century authors. The next unit in Specker’s text has a double heading—‘Augustine’s opinion of the appearance of martyrs’ and ‘In the book On Care to Be Had for the Dead’93—and there follows a passage from sections 19–20 of that work on the special status of martyrs. While Augustine leaves it in doubt whether they do and can appear personally at all, the option is not yet altogether excluded though certainly limited to them and disallowed for ordinary mortals.94

91 Cf. n. 20 on p. 260, above. 92 ‘Dise zeügnuß zeygen offentlich an/das die seelen der gerechten/auß Gottes geheyß vnd gebott/erscheynen mögen/ vnnd wie sie erscheynen / vnnd erkennen werden. Dieweyl wir aber keyn andere exampel haben/sollen wir hinfürt auff solche erscheynungen nichts halten / vnd vns lassen an der gewissen schrifft vernůgen’ (275v–276r). 93 ‘Augustini meynung von der erscheynung der Martyrer’ and ‘Jn lib. de cura pro mortuis gerenda’ (1560:276r). 94 ‘We are not to think then, that to be interested in the affairs of the living is in the power of any departed who please, only because to some men’s healing or help the Martyrs be present: but rather we are to understand that it must needs be by a Divine power that the Martyrs are interested in affairs of the living, from the very fact that for the departed to be by their proper nature interested in affairs of the living is impossible. Howbeit it is a question which surpasses the strength of my understanding, after what manner the Martyrs aid them who by them, it is certain, are helped; whether themselves by themselves be present at the same time in so different places, and by so great distance lying apart one from another, either where their Memorials are, or beside their Memorials, wheresoever they are felt to be present: or whether, while they themselves, in a place congruous with their merits, are removed from all converse with mortals, and yet do in a general sort pray for the needs of their suppliants, (like as we pray for the dead, to whom however we are not present, nor know where they be or what they be doing,) God Almighty, Who is every where present, neither bounded in with us nor remote from

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The double heading of the passage is significant because the next excerpt ‘On the gospel for Epiphany’95 might easily by taken to be from Augustine as well. Neither the work, nor the author is further identified, but it is in fact a long quotation, with ellipses, from Luther’s 1522 Weihnachtspostille.96 It is itself a telling detail that Specker, who otherwise named his sources quite meticulously, found it unnecessary to put the Reformer’s name over it. Luther offers several arguments or prooftexts to counter the appearance of souls. The first is Abraham’s denial of the rich man’s request (Lk 16:27–31); then comes the Old Testament law against seeking advice from the dead.97 The lack of scriptural examples of the saints turning to departed souls is the third point. Skipping a good deal of Luther’s text, Specker offers Isaiah 8:19–20,98 a passage closest to the Deuteronomistic prohibition, as supporting evidence, but lest ‘consulting their gods’ should be misunderstood as legitimisation of some private revelation, Luther brings the Lukan scene to bear on its interpretation, and limits the rightful means of such consultation to the scriptures. Notably, the Reformer does not altogether deny the appearance of ghosts, but gives advice on how to counter them when they come one’s way, Therefore how and where[ver] a spirit comes to you, ask it not whether it is evil or good, but only throw this word promptly and scornfully in its face, ‘They have Moses and the prophets.’ It will soon feel what you mean. If it is good, it will only like you all the better because you keep its, and your, God’s word so freely and joyfully; if it is not good as all are that rumble, it will soon say goodbye.’99

us, hearing and granting the Martyrs’ prayers, doth by angelic ministries every where diffused afford to men those solaces, to whom in the misery of this life He seeth meet to afford the same, and, touching His Martyrs, doth where He will, when He will, how He will, and chiefest through their Memorials, because this He knoweth to be expedient for us unto edifying of the faith of Christ for Whose confession they suffered, by marvellous and ineffable power and goodness cause their merits to be had in honor. A matter is this, too high that I should have power to attain unto it, too abstruse that I should be able to search it out; and therefore which of these two be the case, or whether perchance both one and the other be the case, that sometimes these things be done by very presence of the Martyrs, sometimes by Angels taking upon them the person of the Martyrs. I dare not define’ (NPNF1 3:549). 95 ‘Vber das Euangelium an der heyligen drey König tag’ (276v). 96 WA 10I/1:587.3–590.12. 97 ‘No one shall be found among you . . . who consults ghosts or spirits, or who seeks oracles from the dead. For whoever does these things is abhorrent to the Lord’ (Deut 18:10–12). 98 ‘Now if people say to you, ‘Consult the ghosts and the familiar spirits that chirp and mutter; should not a people consult their gods, the dead on behalf of the living, for teaching and for instruction?’ surely, those who speak like this will have no dawn!’ 99 ‘Drumb wie und wo dyr eyn geyst tzukompt, ßo frage nur nichts, ob er boß oder gut sey, sondern stoß ihm

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Here even the possibility is admitted that good spirits might appear although later in the text Luther will speak of ‘no example ever heard or read in scripture of such spirits and their being, therefore it should be scorned and avoided surely like the devil’s ghost.’100 That approach becomes more pronounced in the last section of Specker’s chapter, on Saul’s visit to the medium at Endor.101 The unit consists of three parts. The first has no editorial pointers, typographically might even seem Specker’s own text, but it is taken from the middle of the previous Luther passage102 where a large portion is skipped before the Isaiah reference. The Reformer makes three points, all of which concern the interpretation of Samuel’s appearance as a fake vision, although he does not explicitly say that it was the devil appearing in the prophet’s stead. The conclusion is first to be drawn from the fact that conjuration is against God’s law. What is implied is that, dead or alive, a true servant of God like Samuel would definitely not be party to such a monstrous crime. The third point is the consideration that the sorcerer cannot have power over the saints held by God’s hand. That is the logical complement to the previous observation, namely, that Samuel could not have been forcefully dragged from his restful abode against his will. In the middle of the passage, Luther reflects on scripture’s silence on the actual truth of the matter, for the Bible simply speaks of Samuel appearing, and does not clarify that it is a false spirit. Luther, probably again thinking of Luke 16:29, suggests that it is to keep us on our toes and know that clairvoyance is strictly outlawed by God’s irrefutable word. The second part of the last section of Specker’s chapter is much easier to identify, for it has its own accurate heading, but it in fact does not deal with Saul’s Endor visit at all; it does not even contain an allusion to Samuel. It is an extended and almost continuous quotation from section 3 of Chrysostom’s 28th sermon on the Gospel of Matthew, though its

nur frisch ditz wortt kurtzlich und vorechtlich ynn die naßen: Habent Mosen et prophetas, ßo wird er bald fulen, was du meynist. Ist er gutt, ßo hatt er dich nur deste lieber drumb, das du deyniß und seynis gottis wortt ßo frey und froelich furist; ist er nitt gutt, wie sie alle sind, die do polltern, ßo wirt er bald ade sagen’ (WA 10I/1:587.9–14). 100 ‘Es ist kein exempel yhe gehort noch geleßen ynn der schrifft von solchen geystern und yhrem weßen, drumb sey es tzuuorachten und meyden als eyn teuffelsgespenst gewißlich’ (WA 10I/1:588.8–10). 101 Specker (1560) 277r–278v. 102 WA 10I/1:588.11–19, cf. n. 96 on p. 281, above.

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number is not given.103 In the original context, the church father argues against a view that the souls of the dead are turned into demons.104 Two details of his reasoning are especially significant. First, he cites a handful of biblical prooftexts,105 and, even more importantly, he employs a binary logic by which he seems to cover the whole ground. In short, the souls of the righteous are in God’s hand; those of the wicked are not allowed to return as we learn from the Lukan parable. That is surely welcome to Protestant thinkers preoccupied with the rejection of purgatory, often argued by their Catholic opponents with an appeal to souls returning from it and requesting the assistance of the living. If we compare Specker’s citation with Chrysostom’s original on the first point, however, we will find that the church father’s text is slightly modified. At certain points in his reasoning, he had offered a few rational arguments.106 Those lines are nonetheless passed over in silence in the sixteenth century, and clauses like ‘it stands not to reason’ or ‘nor is the reason hard to see’ are replaced with an affirmation that we can draw the given conclusion from the biblical witness. Chrysostom’s meaning is not thereby radically transformed or falsified, but the presentation certainly makes him a closer ally of the evangelical cause than his unaltered text would. Not speaking of Samuel, Chrysostom cannot affirm that his image is a devilish pretence, but he makes a similar point in connection with the strangled children’s alleged souls, ‘it is not the spirit of the dead that cries out, but the evil spirit that feigns these things in order to deceive the hearers.’107 Specker’s chapter is concluded with a short reflection—typographically marked off, and probably of his own authorship—on the foregoing passages where he adds a couple of further prooftexts,108 and articulates the thesis more pointedly than any of his sources. ‘Let

103 NPNF1 10:191–92, on Mt 8:23–24. 104 This time his focus is children killed by sorcerers ostensibly to enslave their souls, but in his sermons on the parable of Lazarus and ives he made the same point, in defence of martyrs, with respect to those dying a violent death (1984 [°c.388]:41; cf. NPNF1 10:191n). 105 Wis 3:1, Lk 16:27–28, Lk 12:20, Acts 7:59, Phil 1:23, Gen 15:15 and parallels. 106 E.g., he objects to the possibility of changing souls into demons that even the substance of bodies cannot be altered (e.g. that of a human into that of an ass), let alone that of souls. And to the return of departed souls to their bodies, that upon leaving the body, souls are in an utterly strange land, and they would simply not find their way back. 107 NPNF1 10:191. 108 Rev 20:12–15 and Jude 14–15.

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everyone therefore beware that they should not take such wandering and errant spirits for the souls of the dead but for the devil himself. . . . [Before] the last day surely no souls will any more appear here.’109 That is the nucleus of the new consensus at which ultimately Specker also arrives before he is finished with the topic. His short chapter, with the distance he travels between the opening and the closing lines, neatly encapsulates the emergence of the new orthodoxy, behind which the strongest driving force—through, and in addition to, a rejection of purgatory and the need to undercut its ‘empirical basis’ in the appearance stories—is Luther’s position.

6.6 Garcaeus and Faber

Specker’s closest followers produced notable variations on the theme. Garcaeus begins where the Strasbourger left off,110 with the thesis that souls cannot return before the last day, which immediately gives occasion to reflect on the expected resurrection of both the righteous and the damned. When a couple of pages later he (re)turns to the actual topic of the chapter, he admits the story of Jesus’ transfiguration, recounted with the wonted Lukan flavour under the threefold aegis of all synoptic gospels, as the only scriptural instance. The possibility of Moses and Elijah coming back from purgatory is dismissed with a sneer; 2 Maccabees 15 is simply passed over in silence, and Saul’s story is likewise ignored throughout the chapter. Garcaeus brings biblical witnesses to his claim, all of which appear either only in his text or are here first introduced to the discussion.111 He moves on to reference Plato’s concept of purer souls rising upwards but the souls of lesser people hanging around and be seen as ghosts, only to juxtapose God’s word (Wis 3:1 and Acts 7:59) to ‘these philosophical dreams.’112 That is a significant departure from his teacher Melanchthon, whom the same Platonic notion led to affirm that pagan philosophers could

109 Specker (1560) 278r; for the original, see Table 4.13. 110 Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) L4v–M3v. 111 2 Sam 12:23, Ps 88:11, Job 7:9–10, Sir 38:11, and Phil 1:23, which does appear in other texts embedded in the Chrysostom quotation, but only here as the author’s direct citation. 112 Cf. ‘diesen Philosophischen trewmen’ (Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) L6v).

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also rightly see the immortality of the soul.113 Having marshalled biblical evidence, Garcaeus now lines up patristic support. First comes a shorter paraphrase from chapter 57 of Tertullian’s De anima,114 then three quotations from Chrysostom. Tertullian specifically negates a disembodied return of the soul, for biblical miracle stories of raising dead people are in the forefront of his mind. There, he suggests, the body serves as tangible proof of divine power.115 Nonetheless, the return of the soul to its former abode as a—under special circumstances—legitimate option that must be taken account of is a new element in the sixteenth-century discussion. The first of Garcaeus’ Chrysostom citations is already familiar. He is the first to give the number of the sermon (though he says homily 29 instead of 28), but his German translation is the same as Specker’s, including the abridgement and the interpolation that helps shift the focus to sola scriptura.116 He appends a shorter, sufficiently scriptocentric, quotation from the fourth sermon on Lazarus and Dives and a brief citation from another of the Homilies on Matthew117 before he repeats Specker’s final thesis, including its prayerful conclusion. So far we have seen an intensification of the argument for the consensual view. What is more unexpected is that more than a fifth of Garcaeus’ chapter is still left, and it will be filled with a series of appearance stories, introduced as evidence of devilish deception. Even more astonishingly, they are all contemporary accounts not only taken from evangelical authorities but in fact undergone by prominent evangelical figures. The hero of the first is Nikolaus von Amsdorf, to whom two devils in the shape of noblemen dictate a letter which he later handed over to the elector. Garcaeus’ source is undoubtedly Luther, whose table talk he almost verbatim follows both here and in the third anecdote, whose provenance is more

113 Recall that an instance where Garcaeus was most clearly drawing on Melanchthon concerned precisely this passage in the Liber; cf. pp. 223–224, above. 114 ANF 3:234. 115 There need no be any tension between Tertullian and Chrysostom (cf. n. 106 on p. 283, above), for divine power working the miracle can be easily accommodated to the latter’s understanding as a sufficient guide to point out the way for the soul back to its former abode. 116 Cf. Specker (1560) 278r, Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) L7v–8r, and NPNF1 10:191–92; Garcaeus adds some further extra text here. 117 Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) L8v–M1r; cf. Chrysostom (1984 [°c.388]) 85–86 and .

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meticulously related.118 No lesser man had recounted it to the Reformer than Elector John Frederick himself, and it is as much more bizarre! It relates of a man to whom his deceased wife, or a devil in her shape, came back. Not only did she resume her wonted household duties, but they had children together—until the husband broke his promise and, bursting out swearing, caused the woman disappear without a trace leaving her clothes behind. Between those two stories comes a third, of Melanchthon’s aunt, disseminated in print by Master Philip himself. It is of the classical ‘proof of purgatory’ type. Accompanied by a Franciscan monk, the deceased husband comes back to the widow to instruct her to endow masses for him. Garcaeus does not much interpret the stories, but lets them stand on their own. We are never told what was in Amsdorf’s letter, although it should be available in the electoral archives. A fairly long discussion of the problem of the devil’s children that follows the third episode in the Table Talks is cut off, nor is the detail problematised why exactly cursing should drive a devil away. Even the obviously needed defence against the false teaching of purgatory is withheld. Instead of explaining what was actually wrong with the appearances— none hurt anybody, and at least the wife did some good—Garcaeus merely underlines in the last paragraph of the chapter that they are horrendous examples of how the devil can afflict people. That, I think, is a sign of the strength of the interpretive matrix within which the stories are situated. We could surely reflect on what might be termed, at least by twenty-first century standards, the superstition of the Lutheran intellectual elite,119 but that would still not explain why Garcaeus, a member of that elite, was not afraid of supplying grist to the Catholic mills by the stories. Superstitious he may have been on our understanding, but he cannot be accused of crypto-Catholicism. If we give him credit for not being utterly inconsistent, we must conclude that, whatever their face value, the strange anecdotes were, for him, indeed episodes in a long history of devilish deceit. For him (and probably for the authorities whom he quotes) that was the face value of the stories. If that is true, it serves, in turn, as a measure of the strength of their theological reinterpretation of the world. A modern

118 See Table Talk #3676 (1530); WA TR 3:517.1–6 (cf. 515.26–32) for the first, and 517.16–37 for the third anecdote. 119 Scribner (1987) remains a classical treatment of the phenomenon.

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mind would challenge the narratives at a phenomenological level. They are not true; if not downright trumped up, their reality is merely imaginary. Not so the sixteenth-century authors. They deny neither the phenomenon nor that it has metaphysical reality. What they take issue with is the kind of metaphysical reality behind it, that is, with its interpretation offered by the Catholic side. They are devils not souls, Lutherans counter—because no other interpretation is consistent with biblical faith. Faber stays closer to Specker, but he also opens with the thesis that souls cannot appear.120 The backbone of the three-part chapter is built by some extended quotations. He moves the long Chrysostom passage to the fore, rightly sensing that its place under the heading of Samuel’s appearance, of which it does not treat, is somewhat odd. Needless to say, his translation, including the interpolation, is the same as Specker’s. He also adopts the short commentary, excluding the prayer, that follows at the end of the Strasbourger’s chapter (cf. Table 4.13). The second large block is Luther’s retort against ghosts,121 again with the same ellipses as in Vom leiblichen Todt. Specker’s double heading must have misled Faber, however, for he puts Augustine’s name over it.122 He summarily repeats the central claim, after which he considers apparent biblical counterevidence. 2 Maccabees 15 is emptied of harmful significance via its status as ‘vision’123 which is then interpreted—through Luke 1, probably verse 22 against the background of verses 11–20124—as being of angels, that is, of divine origin. There is nothing objectionable in Jeremiah appearing in a divinely inspired dream. It is a sign of the metaphysical realism of the age that an ontological distinction is not drawn between, say, Samuel appearing to a wakeful Saul and Jeremiah appearing in a dream to Judas. On the transfiguration Faber comments, it is ‘another thing and not put in scripture in order that one should ground on it the appearance of souls or should confirm it

120 Faber (1569) b7r–c3v. 121 Cf. n. 96 on p. 281, above. 122 See p. 281, above. 123 ‘Gesichte’ (Faber (1569) c2v). 124 Incidentally, Lk 24:23 (in WA DB 6:322.22–323.23) might serve Faber even better, ‘Auch haben vns erschreckt etliche Weiber der vnsern, die sind fruee bey dem Grabe gewesen, haben seinen Leib nicht funden, Komen vnd sagen, sie haben ein gesichte der Engeln gesehen, welche sagen, er lebe.’

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thereby.’125 He is honest enough to face the difficulty of the passage; the theological framework of interpretation is definitely stronger than the uncomfortable evidence, but he is at a loss for actual arguments to reconcile the discrepancy, and can merely state the desired conclusion, but not show the way to reach it. Finally, 1 Samuel 28 is explained in two paragraphs, both of which sound quite Lutheran, but I have not been able to locate the source of the first. It may perhaps be Faber’s extended paraphrase of the last part of the shorter quotation from Luther’s Weihnachtspostille which is underlying, without any hint of alien authorship, the second paragraph.126 Faber is a devout admirer of Luther, and he would probably not consciously appropriate any material from the great Reformer without giving him due credit. That here he seems to borrow from him tacitly is likely due to Specker’s mediation, in whose text the Luther passage exerting formative influence on the Tractetlein at this point is not identified.127 In any case, Faber presents two arguments familiar from Specker’s Luther, but slightly elaborates on them. First, the devil, let alone a sorcerer, has no power to rend righteous souls from their resting place in God’s hand. Second, in addition to Luther’s ground, scripture does not say that the ghost is not really Samuel because both Saul and the medium mistake it for him. In the course of the chapter, Faber thus moves from a general denial of souls appearing as ghosts to the further affirmation that what does appear is the devil. His treatment is not only more concise than Garcaeus’ but also more coherent than either of the other two authors. Nevertheless, the difficulty posed by biblical evidence, especially the transfiguration, is not yet convincingly resolved in every detail.

6.7 Authors outside the Specker group

Few of the other authors engage the question in comparable depth. The heart of Musculus’ answer to the problem is Chrysostom’s homily on Matthew 8.128 It is preceded with a brief

125 ‘So ist di erschenung Mose vnd Helia auff dem berge Thabor Matth 17. vnd Luc. 9. auch ein ander ding / vnd nicht darumb in die Schrifft gesetzet / das man daraus die erscheinung der verstorbenen gründen/oder sie damit bestätigen sol’ (1569:c2v). 126 WA 10I/1:588.14–18, cf. n. 102 on p. 282, above. 127 Cf. p. 282, above. 128 Musculus (1565) D3v–6v.

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statement of the thesis that souls stay put in their place until judgement day, which he argues ex silencio. He offers no scriptural prooftexts except for those embedded in the patristic passage, but squarely denies that the Bible contained any witnesses to the contrary. That need not be disingenuous, for as the short commentary on Chrysostom which rounds off his third question reveals, he is also convinced that it is the devil himself that appears in the shape of souls. He may not have bothered to explain in depth how that thesis applied to the various biblical episodes that opponents might wish to cite as evidence in their favour. As for Chrysostom’s sermon, his translation differs from Specker’s. He also skips the beginning, and cuts right to the chase with the scriptural prooftexts. Interestingly, however, he also leaves out the rational arguments and, though marking the ellipsis, includes a very similar emphasis on biblical witness as Specker and his closest followers. Though more limited in scope and detail, Musculus still voices the key elements of the consensual view. Mirus also opens with the no appearance thesis supported by David’s resolve upon his son’s death (2 Sam 12:23) and Sirach’s counsel of moderation in grief (Sir 38:21), both familiar from Garcaeus,129 and the great chasm between Lazarus and the rich man (Lk 16:26).130 The latter marks a small shift from Abraham’s theologically based rejection towards the topography and thereby the physical roadblocks to the souls’ return. Mirus’ discussion nevertheless centres on the story of Saul, which he offers as proof that ostensible souls are appearances of the devil. He approaches the text in an entirely unapologetic fashion. There is no hint that it might pose any difficulty. It is treated throughout as supporting evidence for his own cause. He enumerates four arguments for his reading, including those we encountered in Luther, namely, that the whole conjuration is against God’s law, and that the devil has no power over righteous souls.131 Saul’s admission that God is no longer with him and he receives no answer from God (1 Sam 28:15) further undercuts ‘Samuel’s’ credibility, but it is ultimately his own words that seal the verdict. The heart of Musculus’ reasoning is that his feet give the devil away. The words of the apparition seek nothing but to throw Saul in despair. ‘Samuel’s’ sermon contains nothing of Christ, God’s mercy or forgiveness of sins,

129 Cf. n. 111 on p. 284, above. 130 Mirus (1590 [°1575]) O4v–P1v. 131 Cf. p. 282, above.

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only God’s wrath. An incomplete Lutheran homily pounding only on the law but withholding the gospel is a sure sign by which to recognise the devil! All that remains is to transfer the logic to ostensible appearances undergirding the doctrine of purgatory. Though the messages are apparently nice, they advocate works righteousness and lure people away from Christ. The overarching logic is the same as, but here more easily detectable than, in Garcaeus, who was so immune to the false allure of the appearances’ seeming decency as not to deem it worthy of comment. Pflacher summarises the quintessential points without including any major quotations from any source.132 His fundamental argument is the excluded middle. Souls are either in heaven or in hell so they cannot be seen on earth. He repeats the point three times in just over an octavo page. To the objection based on 1 Samuel 28 he responds that it is the devil. As evidence he offers the fact that purgatory is founded on such appearances, but because souls are either in God’s hand or in hell, they must be the devil assuming the shape of souls. His argument is somewhat circular; in fact, he completes two full cycles in forty lines, but that is a testimony that by the early 1580s the twofold thesis that souls cannot appear on earth and what appears is the devil is so well established that it can essentially stand on its own, without much argumentative scaffolding. It is just unthinkable for a Lutheran mind that it should be otherwise, for then they could not longer avoid papacy’s pitfall of purgatory. Weiser naturally includes Mirus’ entire section, but he goes beyond his source in his own text.133 The pro-purgatorial claim he dismisses on the force of the Lukan parable and Chrysostom’s homily on Matthew 8. Underlying his approach is again the excluded middle, for the texts clearly show that neither righteous nor damned souls have any business on earth. The Samualite objection is dismissed as usual, now on the single ground of a sorcerer’s insufficient power. Weiser’s most original point is when he faces the difficulty posed by the transfiguration, and proposes a twofold argument to blunt its edge. First, he denies the validity of an induction from the particular to the universal, and, second, claims that Moses and Elijah appeared in their resurrected body. On the one hand, that pulls the rug from

132 Pflacher (1582) 266–67. 133 Weiser (1583b) 73–87.

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under the pericope as evidence for appearance of disembodied souls. On the other, it turns it into a foreshadowing of what will happen to all souls in heaven, and thus tames it by legitimising it. In the light of Weiser’s overall performance, I find it doubtful that those arguments would be of his own invention, although I have not been able to trace them to any definite source. Whatever their provenance, however, the main issue is that at least by the early 1580s even the story of the transfiguration was being interpretively brought into line with the central tenets of the locus. That Chyträus should also begin with the affirmation of the thesis is to be expected.134 His three prooftexts all correspond to Garcaeus’ list.135 Then comes the usual dismissal of the Endor scene as counterevidence, followed by Chrysostom’s by now standard quotation on the binary option for departed souls.136 Chyträus takes a somewhat different route from Garcaeus when from the contemporary anecdote pool he cites two examples from Erasmus of Roman clergy staging fake appearances. Where he moves most visibly beyond his contemporaries is the way he presents what is probably his version of Luther’s argument in the Weihnachtspostille.137 He attributes such overriding significance to God’s prohibitive law that he is willing hypothetically to concede the truth of appearances—a concession other authors were not prepared to make. Even if souls can appear, we are not to consult them. Chyträus’ bold move could take care of several difficulties presented by uncomfortable biblical pericopes, but he does not draw such conclusions, which might bear witness to how deep-seated the Lutheran conviction of their theological impossibility was. What Chyträus does is insist on the purity of doctrine by rejecting purgatory, which will be the subject matter of his next major investigation. Frölich and Roth are only marginally important. Except for Tacius’ early sermon, the Seelen Trost is the only text in the corpus which does not discuss the question as such, although the soul’s possible appearance on earth does surface in some quotations, chiefly in the Chrysostom excerpt. Unlike his predecessors, Frölich also cites a Latin translation of the

134 Chyträus (1591 [1582]) D5r–8r. 135 Cf. n. 111 on p. 284, above. 136 The sermon is cited as 29th in the sequence, just like in Garcaeus. 137 See p. 281, above. Chyträus also cites Lk 16:29, Isa 8:19–20 and Lev 19:31, a parallel to Deut 18:10–12.

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passage, and his German differs from those versions we have seen so far. It quite possibly found its way into his text from his own patristic research rather than through the mediation of some contemporary treatise. Either way, Chrysostom’s centrality to this chapter of the locus cannot be denied. That, however, is perhaps as much an appropriation facilitated by the church father’s suitability to Lutheran concerns as a formative influence. Finally, Roth reaches the problem of appearances while unpacking the beginning of Wisdom 3. He is not prooftexting a doctrinal point, but drawing out the theological implication of a Bible verse. That is in a way a fitting conclusion to my overview of the establishment of a later-sixteenth- century Lutheran consensus, for there is nothing inherent in the Wisdom text on the death of the righteous that would demand the conclusion that souls cannot appear on earth, even if the devil abuses their shape like Samuel’s at Endor. That Roth finds all that in his chosen text is a clear sign that the core teaching of this chapter of the immortality locus had indeed been widely established by the last decade of the sixteenth century.138 After the 1550s, we thus find an increasing agreement among Lutheran writers that souls cannot return from the Zwischenzustand and appear on earth. Here we can detect a clear development from Melanchthon, who allowed for the genuine appearance of ghosts. By the latter half of the century, that position became theologically untenable because of its appropriation by Catholic argumentation as evidence for purgatory. Two major complicating factors had to be dealt with in the process. Both empirical evidence and some biblical passages were against the new orthodoxy. The two issues received a common solution. Protestant theologians did not categorically deny the appearance of ghosts as objective reality. Instead of taking issue with the phenomenon, which they in fact accepted, they challenged its interpretation. Usually, they did not argue that the appearances were not real as such, but they strongly insisted that they were of devilish origin rather than substantially identical with the departed souls. On the other hand, several biblical passages also demanded explanation if the new teaching was to be upheld, and the writers’ interpretive strategies varied greatly with regard to those. Difficult loci were sometimes simply ignored, but by the 1580s most of them had been squarely faced and given an evangelical reading. Some, where the ‘good appearance’ could not be denied such as the story of the transfiguration, were

138 Frölich (1590) 18r–19r; Roth (1591) D1r.

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severed from the context. Other instances were blamed, like contemporary apparitions, on the devil’s deception. In articulating that view, authors of the early confessional age were inspired by Luther as is witnessed by his prominent presence in the later-sixteenth-century corpus via frequent and extensive, though sometimes unwitting, quotations. However, they did not adopt his restrained position concerning the state of the souls. Rather, it was the ammunition he, seconded by Chrysostom, supplied for a robust interpretation of the metaphysical content of the apparitions that fuelled the new explanation. A similar conclusion can be drawn if we look at the broader picture. The demise of purgatory in the wake of Luther’s critique that became not only a battle cry but a hallmark of the new theology called for a rethinking of the post-mortem state in evangelical circles, and a new consensus was developed with constant reference to its twofold origins. On the one hand, a return to the old faith was to be avoided, and that desire impacted theological positions on issues that might have developed differently in and of themselves (recall the problem of the heavenly church’s prayer for those on earth). On the other hand, as ‘the German Elijah,’139 a prophetic figure of virtually unsurpassable theological significance for his followers, Luther’s theology proved formative not only in the critical but also in the constructive phase of the development. Yet, and this must also be added, the way the later tradition chose to deal with the question was not exactly the same as Luther’s. Despite protestations that we can know very little of it and that the matter is unspeakable,140 the gap the Reformer’s critique had created was filled in, probably in part under the influence of Melanchthon’s Aristotelian metaphysics, rather than acknowledged as an aporia. While Luther ultimately took seriously his nescimus and refrained from overcoming the unknowable with clear propositional statements, later-sixteenth-century Lutherans developed a well- defined and solid doctrine of the soul’s immortality whose outline, emergence and development I have documented.

139 An epithet Roth uses more than once: ‘vnser deutscher Elias der Mann Gottes D. Luther’ (1591:C1v), cf. E2r. See also Barnes (1988) 60–61. 140 E.g. Musculus (1565) C2r; Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) N5v, N7r, R5v, R6r; Mirus (1590 [°1575]) O2r; Weiser (1583b) 24–25 Frölich (1590) 25r/v, 26r, 36v.

Conclusion

Having completed the survey and analysis of the developing new doctrine of the immortality of the soul in the North German Reformation from Luther to the last decade of the sixteenth century, we can now briefly reflect on themes that have persisted throughout the discussion but not been in the main focus of attention.

1. Genres and functions

The organisational principle of the foregoing analysis was primarily chronological—from Luther to Melanchthon to the later sixteenth century, and again, repeatedly, within the latter corpus from Tacius and Specker to Frölich and Roth—and secondarily thematic, centring on various chapters of the immortality locus such as arguments to establish it, or the appearance of ghosts. While I frequently referred to the texts’ genres, I did not employ the generic principle in the same constructive way, which now calls for some reflection in conclusion. The selected corpus itself limited the evidence to some extent, as early Latin systematics were excluded on the one hand, and German hymns and prayers on the other. In the case of the leading Reformers, I also drew on Latin sources, but we have seen that the most important Latin texts by Luther and Melanchthon, and certainly by Chyträus, were available in German translation, even if their actual influence was probably—or, in Melanchthon’s case, definitely—greater in their original form. The genres included still represent a variety, the most obvious categorisation presenting itself in terms of homilies and tracts. Throughout my explorations, I have argued for the permeability of those categories. The most obvious example of their interpenetration is Weiser’s incorporation of Mirus’ sermons into his catechism. Yet, like the printed sermon in general, Weiser’s work itself carries a generic duality within it. Though a kind of catechetical treatise in its final form,

294 Conclusion 295 in the opening address to the reader he refers to it as a sermon, and explains that he occasionally read parts of the text from the pulpit,1 that is, the work was also preached. We have also encountered numerous excerpts from homiletic sources in virtually every tract. Further, both versions of Melanchthon’s De anima, arguably the most academic theological text of all sources analysed in my dissertation, include a sermon-like set piece on Luke 23:43.2 For that matter, Musculus’ Gelegenheit and Frölich’s Seelen Trost also contain similar, though probably independent, homiletic inserts on the very same Bible verse.3 If passages taken from sermons are disallowed as relevant examples on the basis that, once removed from their original context and stripped of the overall rhetorical construct in which they originally functioned, they can no longer fulfil their intended homiletic purpose, the set pieces—and Melanchthon’s is especially well constructed—must be recognised as indeed constituting a link to sermonic literature. And if direct address and exhortatory appeal, with appropriate content, are considered defining qualities of homiletic texts, small units of text with such qualities pervade the treatises of the corpus as well, even Specker makes use of them. It is noteworthy that argumentative structures might be shared across generic dividing lines even where direct textual dependence does not come into play. Argumentation from biblical, patristic and contemporary theological authorities is a determining characteristic of at least Tacius’, Specker’s and Frölich’s approaches. With the notable exception of Roth, the sermons in the corpus are no less thematic or more exegetical- expository than the treatises. Likewise, there is no correlation between a text’s genre and its propensity to deploy exempla rather than convey truth in propositional form. The key factor that seems to determine a work’s argumentative strategy is its author’s person or, less individualistically, his educational level that in a way appears to correlate with his theological creativity. Bluntly put, all works in the corpus are devotional texts. Preaching is always also teaching, and systematic pieces like Luther’s university lecture, Melanchthon’s locus or Specker’s florilegium are also designed not simply to transmit knowledge but to move the audience to greater piety. That is not to deny generic differences altogether, and Specker’s work is a case in

1 Weiser (1583a) B15v and B13v. 2 Cf. p. 96, above. 3 Musculus (1565) D2r/v; Frölich (1590) 12r–13r.

Conclusion 296 point. We have seen how foundational Vom leiblichen Todt was for the subsequent tradition in general, and how narrowly inspirational it proved for Garcaeus and Faber in particular. Yet both of the latter authors scored a much greater publication success with their titles than Specker—from whom most of their material derived—did with his. Surely, an argument drawing on such a comparison must inevitably oversimplify the case, for there were other differentiating factors at work besides generic divergences, and their influence cannot be completely filtered out. While Garcaeus relied heavily on Specker, the Sterbbüchlein also contained considerable amount of material from independent sources. It is impossible to determine how much the presence of the latter element contributed to the overall triumph of the book, especially in comparison with the generic shift. Faber’s Tractetlein, by contrast, is essentially a thinned-out version of Vom leiblichen Todt, but it was never published on its own. We cannot tell how much it drove the success of the Vnterrichtungen, or how far it simply rode the wave of the containing treatise. Further considerations like Strasbourg versus Saxony as the place of publication should also, but practically cannot, be factored in. Those uncertainties notwithstanding, it stands to reason that part of the greater appeal Garcaeus’ and Faber’s works achieved, as witnessed by their wider dissemination, derived from their re- presentation of the material, amounting to a generic shift in the work. Instead of the rich but fragmented internal structure of a florilegium, they both gave the reader a smooth text essentially with but one level of division. As we saw in the detailed analyses of the preceding chapters, they had retained a great many of Specker’s rubrics, biblical prooftexts and excerpts from theological commentaries, but they incorporated them into full and connected paragraphs, often not even calling attention to their original authorship, and thereby further simplifying the text. Instead of a large collection of independent passages, they produced a continuous text flow. The material is no longer characterised by hierarchical complexity, and the reading experience is not so prominently an intellectual exercise as with Specker’s text, but touches other registers of the personality as well and allows, and invites, an existential response from the reader. As a handbook or reference work, Specker’s piece is much more useful and user-friendly, but as devotional pieces, both the Sterbbüchlein and the Tractetlein exhibit more appealing qualities, and in the later-sixteenth-century context that appears to have been the determining—or, at any rate, a more influential—factor. In terms of the cumulative number of editions, the texts of the Specker group, thanks to Faber’s stellar performance, significantly outdo the texts of the Mirus group, but

Conclusion 297 the latter’s achievement is also impressive. It surely shows, especially through Pflacher’s example, that once printed, homilies could fulfil a function comparable to tracts. There are nevertheless two aspects in which sermons do differ from treatises. First, they are usually shorter. Insofar as homilies are not stylised beyond recognition for publication, they should be readable in an hour or less, witness Mirus’ ‘sprouting’ strategy in the Regensburg Sermons (cf. Table 3.5). There is no limit, of course, on the overall length of a sermon sequence, and in Pflacher’s case his constituent homilies indeed function like chapters in other genres. On the other hand, actual chapters can be shorter than most sermons. I suspect that the brevity and conciseness of Faber’s chapters, making them eminently readable, contributed in some measure to the overall popularity of the Tractetlein.4 The other persistent generic specificity of sermons, even of those incorporated in larger sequences, is that they usually preserve their original structure, and the rhetorical demands made on them are higher than those made on chapters in a treatise. While a chapter may be, and usually is, a freely flowing text, later- sixteenth-century sermons are customarily divided into points which are introduced and announced at the beginning. Further, the double function of texts as teaching and motivation is more perceptible in the case of homilies, as can be seen in their ‘points’ (usually of teaching) and ‘application’ section, supplied either collectively at the end of the sermon or individually for each of its points. Generic differences also go hand in hand with changes in the intended audience. Luther’s Lectures on Genesis or Melanchthon’s De anima originated in the university, and served as textbooks in the training of future intellectuals, in large part for the ministry. The homilies we have surveyed were all actually preached from the pulpit, although it is difficult to reconstruct how much their text was altered in the publication process. With the exception of Roth’s Leichenpredigt, however, they are all didactic sermons, and were probably published with the same kind of literate lay readership in mind that Musculus’, Faber’s, Garcaeus’ or Frölich’s tracts were meant for. Roth’s work, too, is somewhat atypical for a funeral sermon, and moves a step closer to the rest of the corpus in that it was included in a larger, and to some extent thematically organised, collection and reprinted a year after its original publication, suggesting that it perhaps reached an audience beyond the immediate circle of

4 It may not be accidental after all that the most often republished title in the second and third-generation corpus is the work of an educator rather than of a professional theologian. Cf. Barnes (2000), esp. 271–72.

Conclusion 298 the deceased. Specker’s florilegium and Chyträus’, originally Latin, locus represent a middle ground, with presumably less appeal to the devotional market and closer to the academically- minded professional circles. The transmigration of the material of the one into devotional tracts and sermons, and the successful German translation of the other indicate, however, that it was their original form rather than their content that marked them off for a special segment of the general readership. A facet of the texts that perhaps correlates with the target audience is the extent to which rational arguments are deployed. They have a natural place in Melanchthon’s university textbook, especially if we bear in mind that it was used in the philosophical faculty, and are also understandable in Chyträus’ Latin locus. But they also feature, though to a lesser degree, in Musculus’ piece that is a combination of catechism, German locus and devotional treatise, and Garcaeus’ Sterbbüchlein that is even more clearly intended for private devotional use. Thus my operative hypothesis that the presence or absence of reason-based arguments depends primarily on the person of the author (education, theological creativity and self- confidence) still appears to me an equally effective and adequate interpretive tool. The function the doctrine is assigned in a given text does not seem to depend on the text’s genre, either. The issue should be considered from two perspectives. First, there is a dichotomy of didactic and hortatory functions, mentioned above as a persistent feature of sermons. One large thematic group that repeatedly appear in the latter position is a view of the given topic through a hermeneutic of law and gospel, which I will consider more closely below. It is present in all four homiletic texts, and accounts for all that Tacius and Mirus have to say in terms of application. Pflacher and Roth, however, include a variety of further topics in corresponding sections. Both of them discuss the appearance of ghosts here, which is part and parcel with a wholesale rejection of purgatory by the latter author. On the one hand, that is somewhat surprising in a funeral sermon, but on the other, the genre may explain why the issue surfaces here. As a ‘use,’ it found a place in the homily whereas there was no room for it in the teaching sections of the text—concerned with the reassurance of the bereaved—especially as Roth is quite unswervingly trying to unpack his chosen text (Wis 3:1–5) in a genuinely exegetical fashion. In Pflacher’s case, we find a summary of false opinions and the problem of time in the Zwischenzustand also ordered under the category of application. All those issues are presented as part of the teaching points by Mirus. What is regarded as the instructional and motivational functions of the doctrine—and they are

Conclusion 299 definitely not an exclusive property of sermons, even though they are structurally more visible in them—is thus largely independent of the text’s genre and depends on other, probably highly personal and in large measure accidental, factors. Another approach to the doctrine’s functions seems far more significant to me. They can be subordinated to the two large categories of law and gospel, which hermeneutical dichotomy is a hallmark of Lutheran theology. This duality (immortality as law and immortality as gospel) profoundly characterise all texts in the corpus. In a typical fashion, the locus, or any chapter of it, can assume a function as admonition and consolation. It can threaten, move to repentance, guard against sin, or comfort, strengthen faith and hope, edify and purify the soul. Both aspects are present in all texts with, to my mind, no appreciable distribution along generic lines. It should be noted, however, that explicit law–gospel language is rarely used in the sources. The matter is far more often presented in terms of the doctrine’s function against the godless and for Christians. I can see no clear thematic correlation between law or gospel on the one hand, and individual topics within the locus on the other. That is to say, the law–gospel dichotomy truly functions as a hermeneutical insight that can be brought to bear on any issue. It is not any particular detail of the doctrine’s content that makes it law or gospel, but the individual’s existential stance in faith or unbelief that determines the soteriological function of the given part. Even sleep language with its implied rest and renewal that is largely applied in an evangelical sense can assume a legal function for the godless. Their sleep is restless, and, much worse, they will have a rude awakening, crushing their hopes of annihilation. It does not follow, however, that law and gospel are equally distributed over the whole corpus. On the contrary, as I have repeatedly pointed out in the course of the analysis, there is an imbalance between them. The gospel as God’s ultimate word has the upper hand. It is customary to lament the contemporary sinfulness of the world, and to advocate preaching the last judgement as an effective antidote, but the texts are far more taken with the promise of eternal life and the blessedness of the pious in the hereafter, and the soul’s immortality is seen as a token and divinely created guarantee of that happy future. Again, this evangelical outlook—itself evidence of a profound continuity with both Luther and Melanchthon—characterises every text I have discussed. As a foundational aspect of the new doctrine, it surely marks a crucial way in which the rejection of purgatory with the ensuing rethinking of the individual’s post-mortem fate resulted in an effective renewal of pastoral

Conclusion 300 theology by the Reformation. Overall, it seems to me that continuities in the corpus far outweigh discontinuities across generic boundaries. That is no doubt largely due to my selection of texts. Had works been included that anticipated, or in the late 1500s were representative of, the twofold development that set in towards the end of the sixteenth century,5 the same continuities could hardly be asserted between them and the current corpus. Specifically, an analysis of the application of the doctrine at the graveside based on a substantial body of evidence would be surely instructive. What Roth’s piece, chiefly included as a reminder of the limitations of my corpus, can achieve is, at best, to point the way to further research. My enquiry, however, was directed primarily at the content of the new doctrine rather than its uses. Funeral sermons, almost exclusively evidencing the second aspect and saying little on the first, which they routinely presuppose, would have contributed little to that end.

2. Body and soul

The later-sixteenth-century corpus leaves no room for doubt that Lutheran theologians of the early confessional era affirmed the immortality of the soul and its conscious disembodied existence between the individual’s death and resurrection. Part of my thesis has been that despite perceptible shifts in emphasis, they not only understood themselves to be, but effectively were, in continuity with Luther in that regard. Nevertheless, we have also seen that emphases did shift, and some quite significantly. For Luther, the immortality of the soul is an article of faith, part and parcel of the creedal confession of the resurrection of the body. He, pace Stange and his colleagues, was never prepared to contrast or play out the one against the other. Luther insisted on the theological insight that even if they speak of it, unbelievers can never be certain of either article (or, better, of either aspect of the one and the same article of faith). Melanchthon, giving more scope to the phenomenological truth that at least some ancient philosophers also arrived at an affirmation of the soul’s immortality, saw the difference between pagan philosophy and Christian faith not in terms of varying degrees of certainty as regards a single insight, but compartmentalised that insight in terms of reason and revelation. In other

5 Cf. pp. 2–3, above.

Conclusion 301 words, for Luther, no matter what philosophers say and what can be affirmed on purely rational grounds, nobody can believe in the immortality of the soul who has no living faith in Christ, while in the later Melanchthon’s view reason can recognise the truth of the soul’s immortality, but not that of the resurrection of the body, which is exclusively available in revelation. Luther, relentlessly maintaining an apophatic approach to the whole question, nevertheless affirmed a few essentials of the soul’s post-mortem life. He insisted that death does not annihilate individual existence, but we continue to live on in Christ; yet he never wavered from a relational-theological rather than metaphysical interpretation of that insight. It is God’s promise that receives and holds the individual after death, and it is not a quality of our being but God’s faithfulness, stronger than death, that makes us immortal. Consequently, we really cannot say anything about the qualities of that existence; even the most fundamental categories of our world of time and space are inapplicable to it. All that might be ventured is perhaps some metaphorical, and preferably paradoxical, statements, knowing full well that neither our thought nor our language is adequate to the task. Paradoxically, Melanchthon did in fact say less on the content of the Zwischenzustand than his older colleague, but he opened the way to saying more. His aim in both versions of De anima was to establish the soul’s immortality, and he stopped short, except for a brief affirmation of its wakeful existence in the Liber, of describing the pre-resurrection existence of the soul in any detail. By accepting the Aristotelian ontological definition of the soul and understanding its immortality as a quality that reason could also recognise, he greatly influenced the development of an emerging new evangelical consensus. I have contended that he was within his theological rights to propose such a philosophical interpretation of the soul the way he did, but that view ultimately got mixed in with theological discussions of the soul’s immortality in the latter half of the sixteenth century. Authors of the early confessional era took a largely biblical approach, and few of them were eager to use the liberty Melanchthon’s model created for them to deploy rational arguments, but they carried out their biblical reflection in a far more ontologising framework than Luther seems to have entertained. While they paid lip-service to the unspeakability of the soul’s interim condition, they in fact went far beyond Luther’s aporia, and fleshed out the life of departed souls in considerable detail. One major driving force behind that development was a polemic against the doctrine of purgatory that Tridentine Catholicism represented with renewed vigour. The

Conclusion 302 new teaching thus played a modest role in confessionalisation, at least as far as the Protestant/Roman divide was concerned. On the other hand, I have found very few critical references to Reformed presentations of the doctrine, and several instances where the Lutheran/Calvinist line was ignored or crossed over with apparent freedom. On the whole, the immortality doctrine seems not so much a driving force of confessionalisation as perhaps an indicator of how far that process penetrated the theological enterprise as a whole. While Luther insisted on the nonspatial and atemporal character of the Zwischenzustand, and Melanchthon kept silent on the matter, theologians in the second half of the century mostly conceptualised the receptacle of departed souls as a locality which in a way occupied the same temporal continuum as the physical world. Parallel to this ontologisation of the interim state, we can witness an even more striking development concerning the souls themselves. As their conscious existence was insisted on, and the details of their disembodied life spelled out, a range of experiences were ascribed to them that normally presuppose bodily functions. Tacius is still largely immune to the charge as his emphasis is on the souls’ knowledge of God, beyond which he admits, following Augustine, a desire for the body and, following Gerson, their mutual recognition in the light of the Trinity. It is not irrelevant that he does not discuss the names of the souls’ abode, and interprets their whereabouts in christological terms as a rest in, and communion with, the Son. In other words, he is quite close to Luther. At the other end of the chronological spectrum, Roth is likewise restrained, and expounds a similar theological interpretation of the state of the dead which does not involve any apparently bodily aspects. That comes at a price, however, for he quite casually calls the body the soul’s prison.6 The ‘grand tradition’ dependent on Vom leiblichen Todt presents a rather different picture. Specker’s strategy to pattern the life of disembodied souls on John’s visions of the heavenly worship service had momentous consequences. When it is affirmed of them that they do not suffer thirst, hunger or frost, the implication is that they could, just as it is said, in a tradition that reaches back beyond patristic sources to biblical roots, of the damned souls that they are plagued with fire. Specker’s separated souls can speak, sing and cry as well as see. And when more spiritual qualities of their worship are described such as fear,

6 Cf., esp., Tacius (1556) B2v–B3r; Roth (1591) C3r.

Conclusion 303 reverence and humility, it is still exemplified with prostration, a characteristically bodily gesture. Perhaps most strikingly, Specker elaborates at some length on the fact that blessed souls eat and drink. Even if all of that is interpreted away as spiritual reality, the body is nonetheless very strongly present, at least on the metaphorical level.7 In Garcaeus and Faber, those tendencies become more subdued. The Tractetlein simply excludes, with so much else from Specker, most of the contentious material. In Garcaeus’ case the adjustment seems more deliberate. He explicitly comments that eating and drinking or the white clothes are to be understood in a spiritual sense, and leaves out prostration as an instance of humility. He is not quite consistent, though, for falling down is soon reintroduced in another context, and the pre and post-resurrection states are distinguished, usually, on the linguistic level, but not in terms of their actual qualities. Disembodied souls ultimately do essentially the same as souls in their glorified bodies. Some of the Speckerian details like seeing or singing find their way into texts of the Mirus group, too, but they are more muted. They all repeat the Augustinian point, familiar from Tacius, that the souls yearn for the body, which does not prevent Pflacher from reiterating Roth’s point that the body is the soul’s prison as well.8 Musculus also assigns bodily functions to the souls like hearing, seeing, speaking, eating and drinking, but he, alone among the authors, repeatedly problematises the question, and formally reflects upon the paradoxicality of those assertions. His solution—in so far as he offers one while stressing that we are ultimately facing an aporia—is the analogy of the soul’s activity during sleep and in sickness. We can see dreams and visions, although our eyes are closed, and bodily sense perception does not provide the input for the soul. Musculus may have taken his clues from Luther, but the Reformer’s point was to argue that in infancy, sleep and sickness God maintains the identity of the self without the individual understanding or even perceiving it, which is certainly not the same as Musculus’ suggestion that the soul is capable of sensory experiences and similar functions without the body. Again, it was Musculus who once went as far as saying that even the body was not dead before God, and it was also he who enumerated examples of bodily translation as evidence of the soul’s immortality. Finally, Chyträus’ stance is reminiscent of that of the later Speckerian

7 Specker (1560) pt. III, chs. 6, 8, 10, esp. 260v–261v, 272r/v, 281r. 8 Cf., esp., Garcaeus (1573 [°1568]) N8v–O1r, P4r/v; Mirus (1590 [°1575]) O3r; Pflacher (1582) 271–73; Weiser (1583b) 23–24, 27–28.

Conclusion 304 tradition, while Frölich, who also represents—at least via a patristic quotation—the disparaging view of the body as prison, blissfully operates with the concept of the disembodied souls’ gnashing of teeth.9 There is obvious tension between some of those approaches. The depreciatory remarks, although repeatedly voiced, are always casually made, and should probably be interpreted as a literary topos resorted to for its limited local applicability rather than as the authors’ considered opinion. Earlier we also saw Luther make a not entirely dissimilar comment in a table talk.10 None of the writers is likely to uphold the view with all its implications. The opposite outlook of the soul longing for the body is much more likely to be accepted by them, but here, when and where the point is made, patristic authority may be a more important factor behind the assertion than any thought-through theology of desire. Between Tacius and Roth, we encounter a different paradigm in and around the Speckerian tradition. In their different ways, Specker and Musculus are its most prominent representatives, but other authors probably entertained similar convictions. They conceptualised the soul as a self-sufficient, substantial entity that was capable of performing all activities that a human person in full functionality of her body could. When Luther rejected purgatory, he was not eager to fill the vacuum in great detail. Post-mortem cleansing was replaced with the promise of unconditional acceptance by a loving God, but the interim state was declared essentially unknowable and discontinuous, except for God, with this world. As the century progressed, it increasingly came to be understood as a place; the souls that populated it acquired bodily qualities, and their world looked more and more like a shadowy image of this life where individuals acted, knew and felt like here. Melanchthon provided a major impetus for the ontologisation of the Zwischenzustand, but Luther himself inspired, though unwittingly, many of its concrete details. It would be a mistake to consider these developments as a return to the late medieval status quo or a failure of the Reformation. If the Lutheran intermediate place bears any similarity to Catholic purgatory, it is purely philosophical. Theologically, it is interpreted in a thoroughly Protestant fashion. Rather than slide back into the old faith, early confessional era Lutheran theologians gradually ascribed to the interim state qualities originally associated

9 Cf., esp., Musculus (1565) B4v–6r, C5r–8v; Frölich (1590) 6r/v, 17r. 10 Cf. p. 66, above.

Conclusion 305 with the post-resurrection condition. It is a telling detail that one of the most fundamental biblical prooftexts for the soul’s immortality is Jesus’ famous reply to the Sadducees that God is God of the living not of the dead (Mt 22:32), a clause that, in its original dominical setting, was the punch-line of a pro-resurrection argument. As we have seen time and again in later-sixteenth-century discussions, the line between the Zwischenzustand and eternal life frequently becomes blurred. That is not a sign of a failed Reformation but an expression of a deeply evangelical theological insight that immortality is ultimately not an anthropological given, but a divine gift entailed in the promise of life everlasting and part and parcel of resurrection faith.

Works Cited

1. Ancient to early modern sources1

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AUGUSTINE, Aurelius, On Care to Be Had for the Dead, trans. H. Browne in NPNF1 3:537–51.

BULLINGER, Henry (1558 [1557]) Die Offenbarung Jesu Christi Anfangs durch den heiligen Engel Gottes/ Joanni dem säligen Apostel vnd Euangelisten geoffenbaret/ vnd von jm gesähen vnd geschriben/ jetzvnd aber mit hundert Predigen erklärt, trans. Ludwig Lavater (Mühlhausen: Peter Schmidt) – VD16: B 9639; also available in microform in BPal C3120–22.

BULLINGER, Henry (1568 [1549–1551]) Haußbuch Dariñ funfftzig predigten . . . Jn welchē nicht allein die zehen gebot Gottes / die zwölff Artickel des Christlichen glaubens/ vñ das heilig vatter vnser / sonder auch alle andere Artickel/lehren vnd haubtstuck vnserer Christlichen vnd Euangelischen religion/weitlauffig/einfaltig vñ ordenlich gehandlet/ vnd erklärt: Dargegē die fürnemsten einreden aller widersächer freundlich aus der H. schrifft/Auch aus den heiligen Vättern widerlegt werden, trans. Johann Haller (Heidelberg: Martin Agricola) – VD16: B 9702; also available in microform in BPal C3907–15.

BULLINGER, Henry (1849–1852 [1549–1551]) The Decades of Henry Bullinger, trans. H.I., ed. Thomas Harding, 5 vols. in 4 (Parker Society Publications 7–10; Cambridge: Cambridge UP).

CALVIN, John (1958 [1542]) Psychopannychia, trans. Henry Beveridge, ed. Thomas F. Torrance in Tracts and Treatises in Defense of the Reformed Faith, 3 vols. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans) 3:413–90 – repr. of the Calvin Translation Society edition (Edinburgh, 1851).

CHRYSOSTOM, St. John, Homilies on the Gospel of St. Matthew, trans. George Prevost, rev. M.B. Riddle in NPNF1 10.

1 Not included are individual works by Luther (identified, as far as possible, by title and date in the footnotes) and works and editions whose data can be found in notes and tables at relevant points in the discussion, but which are not verbatim cited in the dissertation.

306 Works Cited 307

CHRYSOSTOM, St. John, Homilies on Romans, trans. J.B. Morris and W.H. Simcox, rev. George B. Stevens in NPNF1 11:329–564.

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CHYTRÄUS, David (1581) De morte, et vita æterna (Wittenberg: Johann Krafft, Sr. (Heirs)) – VD16: C 2652.

CHYTRÄUS, David (1582) Altera pars Libelli Davidis Chytraei De Morte & vita æterna: continens locos DE Animarum Immortalitate et statu post corporis mortem. Purgatorio Animarum Pontificio. Fine Mundi et Resurrectione corporum. Extremo IVDICIO et Poenis INFERNI aeternis (Wittenberg: Johann Krafft, Sr. (Heirs)) – VD16: ZV 3328.

CHYTRÄUS, David (1590 [1581]) Christlicher / Tröstlicher und in Gottes Wort gegründetter vnterricht. Vom Tode und Ewigen Leben. Erstlich durch den Ehrwirdigen vnd Hochgelarten Herrn David Chytraevm, der heiligen Schrifft Doctorn, vnd Professorn zu Rosstock etc. in Lateinischer Sprach verfast / vnd an tag gegeben / Vnd von jhm jtzo auffs new vbersehen vnd gemehret / vnd auff desselbten erinnerung vnnd begeren mit bestem vleis verdeutscht. Durch Heinrich Räteln zu Sagan (Berlin: Johann & Friedrich Hartman) – VD16: C 2655.

CHYTRÄUS, David (1591 [1582]) Christlicher, Tröstlicher und in Gottes Wort gegründter unterricht. I. Von Unsterbligkeit der Seelen und jhrem Zustand nach dem Leibstodt. II. Von dem Fegefewr. III. Vom Ende der Welt und Auferstehung der Todten. IIII. Vom Jüngsten Gericht. V. Von der Ewigen Marter und Pein der Gottlosen in der Helle. (Frankfurt a.d.O.: Johann & Friedrich Hartmann & Nikolaus Voltz, 1592) – VD16: C 2656.

CICERO, Marcus Tullius, On Old Age in Letters of Marcus Tullius Cicero: With His Treatises on Friendship and Old Age, tans. E.S. Shuckburgh (Harvard Classics 9; New York: Collier, 1909).

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FRÖLICH, Bartholomaeus (1590) Seelen Trost/ Das ist/ [C]hristlicher bericht vom Zustande vnd Glück der lieben Seelen/ in jener Welt/ biß an den jüngsten Tag. 2. Vnd das gleubige Christen keine Vrsach haben / sich für dem Tode oder Sterben zu fürchten. 3. Auch wie die Seelen seliglich abscheiden/ vnd der Mensch in seinem Todskampff wider alle Anfechtun bestehen kan. 4. Jtem/ Was der Mensch für Gedancken in seiner letzten Hinfarth haben / vnd wie er sich verhalten sol. 5. Schließlichen/Ob wir einander auch in jener Welt kennen vnd ansprechen werden. Sampt sehr schönen Gebetlein/ aus Göttlicher Schrifft Reimweise gestellet/in Sterbens vnd andern Nöthen zu beten gantz tröstlich (Leipzig: Johann Beyer) – VD 16: F 3066.

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GLEICH, Johann A. (1730) Annales ecclesiastici, oder, Gründliche Nachrichten der Reformations- Historie chur-sächss. albertinischer Linie: wobey [z]ugleich von der churfl. sächss Schloss-Kirche zu Dressden, und dem darinnen angeordneten Gottes-Dienste gehandelt wird (Dresden & Leipzig: Saueressig) – also available in microform: German Baroque Literature: Harold Jantz Collection (New Haven: Research Publications, 1973) no. 1104, reel 218.

MELANCHTHON, Philip (1518) ‘On Correcting the Studies of Youth,’ ET of ‘De corrigendis adolescentiae studiis’ in MR 47–57. For the Latin text, see CR 11:15–25 (#2). GT: ‘Wittenberger Antrittsrede,’ trans. Gerhard Steinger in Md 1:41–63.

MELANCHTHON, Philip (1536) ‘On Philosophy,’ ET of ‘De philosophia’ in MR 65–70. For the Latin text, see CR 11:278–84 (#38). GT: ‘Rede über die Philosophie,’ trans. Günter Frank in Md 1:125–35.

MELANCHTHON, Philip (1537) ‘On the Life of Aristotle,’ ET of ‘De Aristotele [Oratio de vita Aristotelis]’ in MR 71–77. For the Latin text, see CR 11:342–49 (#47). GT: ‘Rede über Aristoteles,’ trans. Günter Frank in Md 1:157–69.

MELANCHTHON, Philip (1538) ‘De Platone,’ CR 11:413–25 (#54). GT: ‘Rede über Platon,’ trans. Günter Frank in Md 1:136–56.

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MELANCHTHON, Philip (1540b) Von dem leben vnd vnsterbligkeit der Seelen, trans. Heinrich Knaust (Berlin: Hans Weiss) – VD16: M 2790.

MELANCHTHON, Philip (1544) ‘Oration on Aristotle,’ ET of ‘De Aristotele [Oratio de Aristotele]’ in MR 78–87. For the Latin text, see CR 11:647–58 (#78).

MELANCHTHON, Philip (1553) On the Soul, abridged ET of Liber de anima in MR 239–89. For a full Latin text, see CR 13:5–178.

MELANCHTHON, Philip (1965 [1555]) Melanchthon on Christian Doctrine: Loci Communes 1555, trans. and ed. Clyde L. Manschreck (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1982).

MIRUS, Martin (1590 [°1575]) Sieben[ ]Christliche Predigten Auff dem Reichstage zu Regenspurg gethan / als Anno 1575. vnser aller Gnedigster Keiser Rudolphus II. zum Reich erwehlet worden / etc. Dorinnen die furnemesten Artickel vnser waren Christlichen Religion ausführlich erkleret/ vnd die jrrige Meinung falscher Lehre vnd Abgötterey des Bapstums mit sattem Grunde widerleget worden (Erfurt: Esaias Mechler) – VD16: M 5471.

MUSCULUS, Andreas (1559) Vnterrichtung vom Himel vñ der Hell, wie es in beiden/nach der zukunfft vñ gericht des HErrn Christi / zugehen werde/ Mit was grosser vnd vnbegreifflicher frewd vnd

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PFLACHER, Moses (1582) Die gantze Lehr Vom Tod vnd Absterben des Menschen/ in ein richtige ordnung Kurtz verfasset/ vnd gepredigt ([Herborn:] Christoph Rab, 1589) – VD16: P 2388.

POMPONAZZI, Pietro (1948 [1516]) On the Immortality of the Soul, trans. William H. Hay II and John H. Randall, Jr., ed. by Paul O. Kristeller in Ernst Cassirer, Paul O. Kristeller & John H. Randall, Jr., The Renaissance Philosophy of Man (9th ed.; Chicago & London: U of Chicago P, 1965) 255–381.

ROTH, Friedrich (1591) Fünff tröstliche vnd nützliche Predigten. Die Erste. Auß dem dritten Capitel/des Buchs der Weissheit/ vom herrlichen Zustande der Gerechten nach diesem Leben. Die Ander. Aus dem 38. Cap. Esaiæ / wie sich ein jeder in diesen fehrlichen Leufften zu seinem sterbstündlein bereiten soll. Die Dritte. Auss dem 41. Capitel Syrachs / de comtemnenda morte, das man den Todt nicht fürchten soll. Die Vierdte. Vom Adiutorio Domini, aus dem 121. Psalm. Die Fünffte. Aus dem 14.[ ]Capitel Johannis/von den Ewigen himlischen Wohnungen / von dem rechten Wege zum Ewigen leben (Mühlhausen: Andreas Hantzsch & Otto von Riswick) – VD16: R 3218.

SHAKESPEARE, William (1603 [°1600]) Hamlet, ed. Harold Jenkins (The Arden Shakespeare; London and New York: Methuen, 1982).

SPECKER, Melchior (1560) Vom Leiblichen Todt. Was er sey/waher er kome/vndÐ wie man sich darzů bereyten solle/ Auch Von der Begräbniß vñ Begäncknussen/vnd wie man sich der Abgestorbenen halben trösten vnd halten solle. Jtem Von der Selen vnd jrem ort/ stand/ vnd wesen/biß auff den Jüngsten tag. Alles auß H. Schrifft/vnd der Vätter außlegung / fleyssig zůsamenÐ gebracht (Strasbourg: Samuel Emmel) – VD16: S 8169; also available in microform in BPal F3819–20.

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