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Introduction Is there such a thing as ‘youth politics’ in Anti-Thesis Is There A Youth the way we have gender politics, working Politics? class politics, or poor people’s politics; and if there is, what are its attributes and modes of expression? After all, what is the significance of youth politics, if any? Even though some have expressed doubts about ‘youth’ as a meaningful category or considered it as a mere construct, here I would like to propose an analytical lens which may help understanding youth as a useful category with distinct politics. In this sense ‘youth politics’ will be viewed in terms of the conflicts and negotiations over claiming or defending youthfulness; but this is a politics that is mediated by the position of the young in class, gender, racial, sexual and other involved social structures. In brief, the political outlook of a young person may be shaped not just by Asef Bayat the exclusive preoccupation with ‘youth- fulness’, but also by his/her positionality What is the nature of ‘youth politics’, if that the political outlook of a young per- as citizen, poor, female, or a member of any? This article proposes an analytical son may be shaped not just by the exclu- a sexual minority. The propositions lens which may help us consider ‘youth’ sive preoccupation with ‘youthfulness’, advanced here are informed by my obser- as a useful category, and ‘youth politics’ but also by his/her position in society as vations on young people’s lives in the con- in terms of the conflicts and negotiations citizen, poor, female, or a member of a temporary Middle East, where the spec- over claiming or defending youthfulness. sexual minority. tacular Arab uprisings brought youth to Understood in this fashion, youth politics the forefront of politics. is mediated by the position of the young Keywords: Youth, Arab Spring, politics, A review of popular discourse as well as in class, gender, racial, sexual and other Middle East, youthfulness, youth activism scholarly works on the Arab revolutions involved social structures. It concludes leaves little doubt about the leading pres-

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ence of the young people in these tious politics, the uprising, or activism in For these, we need to delve into ‘youth momentous political episodes. Perhaps certain times or places in which youth hap- politics’. no other social group has gained as much pen to play a key role, such that if we were credence in these transformative events as to substitute youth with a different group, In Historical Movements youth, and in no other times in its history it would have no significant bearings on There is globally a sizeable scholarship has Middle East politics witnessed so the analyses and narratives. At the same that takes ‘youth politics’ as its central much attention to youth—whether as vic- time, in the studies where ‘youth’ do take focus. Here youth politics is construed tims of economic marginalization or a more prominent place, there are little or from the sociological reality of the young agents of transformation. A range of writ- no discussions about the specificities of in terms of their transitional position from ings narrates the prominent role of the youth claims and presence in such events; childhood and dependence to adulthood young and students in the region’s national youth often appears as a term to desig- and responsibility. While some in this movements and revolutions. They discuss nate an age cohort rather than a concep- genre tend to view the young as emo- how, for instance, the indignant youth suf- tual category with particular analytical tional, inexperienced, and potential insti- fered from the highest rate of unemploy- meanings. In fact, many of the writings on gators of ‘youth war’, most see them as ment in the world, how they moved from ‘youth movements’ are of this nature; they creative producers of subcultures and being passive subjects into active agents, are not about ‘youth movements’ per se, new lifestyles, as well as carriers of revolu- in what way the rising ‘youth movements’ but about certain political organizations, tionary posture and politics.1 In fact, here initiated the revolutions, or how the Coptic parties, or networks—such as the Kefaya, youth appear as key players in the major youth turned into a political player in post- the Egyptian democracy movement of the political movements in history all the way revolution Egypt (Erlich; Sayer and Yousef; mid-2000s—in which young people hap- from Ancient Greece to the English Desai et al; Abdalla; Shehata; Delgado). pen to be active. This kind of treatment is Revolution, Protestant Reformation, the Indeed, the notion of ‘youth revolutions’ not limited to the Middle East, but seems early 19th Century, and down to the referring to the Arab Spring readily to inform much of the literature on youth momentous episode of the 1960s. In the pointed to an assumed propensity of and politics in general. This strand of inter-war period, youth as a distinct social youth for radical politics. scholarship on youth then tends to exam- group assumed such an import as to make While we have certainly learnt more about ine not youth politics per se, but youth in both the right and leftist political blocks the involvement of young people in poli- politics. The discussions of ‘youth in poli- invest heavily in the transformative poten- tics, much of the literature displays the tics’ do certainly teach us a great deal tial of the youth. This gave rise to myriad perennial problem of treating youth sim- about the extent to which young people ‘youth movements’ with intimate links to ply as incidental or at best tangential to care about or get engaged in public life. communist or fascist ideologies and the core stories and analyses. As such, this But they say little about the particularities— personas, including Mussolini, who con- genre of writing discusses not the youth concerns, forms, direction, pitfalls or sidered youth as the “avant-garde of per se, but rather such subjects of conten- promises—of such political engagement. the fascist revolution” (Kalman 343–366;

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Passerini). Indeed, the old idea of associat- ‘youth as class’ and university as a new from the working class punk subculture. ing youth with nature, body building, and bastion of revolutionary politics resonated For their part, Arab youth went through a soul searching was reincarnated after the strongly with some major social theorists process of hibernation for decades before Second World War in the ministries of ranging from Jerome Ferrand, Fred joining the 2011 uprisings; young people Youth and Sports in most postcolonial Halliday, C. Wright Mills, and Herbert in Tunisia were constricted by the police nations, where a variety of ‘young move- Marcuse. For the sociologist Alain state under the Ben Ali, and those in ments’ such as the Young Officers in Egypt Touraine, the university came to occupy Egypt showed little interest during the or Young Turks in the Turkish Republic the same position as the great capitalist 1990s in any sort of civic activism let alone ascended to the political stage (Sukarieh enterprise (Touraine). The idea of ‘revolu- revolutionary politics, if they had not and Tannock 81-82). tionary youth’ also permeated into the dis- joined the Islamist Jihadi fringes. Large- The historic events of the 1960s brought course of the Arab uprisings, which young scale surveys of Arab youth conducted youth more than ever onto the forefront of people had initiated. Some observers after the 2011 revolutions point to an esca- revolutionary politics. The student revolts went so far as to describe key historical lating apathy and aversion to politics fol- in Berkeley and its Free Speech Movement moments in the Middle East far prior to lowing an earlier political fervor that spreading through the US campuses, the Arab uprisings in terms of the revolu- marked the uprisings. In fact, some together with youth and student rebel- tionary role of youth. As “an age group observers have concluded that Arab lions in Europe, Latin America, Africa, and and as an educated public”, youth and stu- youth usually display apathy when it Asia, and especially the May 1968 general dents are suggested to have burst into the comes to the conventional politics, politi- strike in factories and colleges presented political scene to shape nationalist move- cal parties, or elections, simply because of the youth as if they possessed an inherent ments, liberation struggles, and revolu- their deep disenchantment with formal radical habitus. Such notions as ‘youthful tions, as well as Islamism and liberalism intuitions. Yet the very same passive youth rebelliousness’ and ‘youth war’ virtually (Erlich x). may turn political in particular political cir- linked those revolutionary moments to a A longitudinal look at the young people’s cumstances, such as during the Arab youthful disposition, assumed to be behavior, however, would make the uprisings (Desai et al 165). shaped by a specific ‘stage of life’, a mix of claims of ‘radical youth’ untenable. Young alienation and presence, or the genera- people, whether in the West or in the From Passive to Active tion war (Matza 110; Keniston 7). While Middle East, have also exhibited both Why and how do the young turn from pas- some argued that age conflict had taken passive and conservative orientations. It is sive individuals into active and even revo- the place of class conflict, others took the well known that the political youth of the lutionary agents? More specifically, how young as the new revolutionary class that 1960s and 1970s in the US and Britain do we explain the widespread political had replaced the proletariat as the agent turned by the 1980s into Yuppies or the turn among the Arab youth in the 2011 of political transformation (Turner 398; self-absorbed and conservative young events? One suggestion is that youth apa- Rowntree and Rowntree). The idea of professionals—orientations very different thy changes when their discontent rises so

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high that they resort to radical and dra- ties, achievements, and eventually their own household did complain about matic action with perceived impact on income; the more well-off the family is, the pressure of bad economic conditions. government and cost to themselves (Desai the better chance for better degrees and A year before the Egyptian Revolution, the et al 165). Here the sources of discontent opportunities.3 Even those non-privi- veteran columnist Hasan Nafaa published are invariably attributed to a series of mis- leged high school or college students a piece in Al-Masry Al-Youm where he fortunes, chiefly exclusion and unemploy- (in a 2016 MENA youth survey by the suggested that new social actors were ment. Thus, in the common narrative, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 37% of youth emerging onto Egypt’s political scene Arab world’s highest youth unemploy- between 16-30 years of age were stu- (Nafaa). He described three occasions ment—25% compared to world average dents) who do live with and depend on where young people (with work and fami- 14.4% in pre-revolution—meant late mar- parents may not experience the hardship lies) approached him to start a campaign riage (until 30s) and ‘waithood’, leading to of unemployment or economic exclusion to change the political status quo in frustration and ultimately revolt.2 as long as they remain outside of job Egypt—to support the opposition leader There is certainly a great plausibility in market; it is their parents who in their role Mohamed Baradei, endorse groups these narratives, in particular when it as providers for these youngsters should demanding to amend the constitution, comes to uncertainty and ‘waithood’, feel the crunch of socio-economic exclu- and help them push the parliament to which indeed appear to be mostly youth sion. Unlike in, say, the US or Britain, reform things. Nafaa then suggested that problems. But broadly speaking, unem- where the autonomous youth depend we are facing a new category of youth in ployment and economic and social exclu- mostly on themselves to subsist, in Arab their 30s and 40s who hold responsibili- sion are hardly the exclusive predicament societies it is the families that usually bear ties for their nuclear families as parents of the young; adults have also suffered the burden of youths, sometimes even and for their jobs in public and private sec- from these misfortunes. But if the focus is after their children get married.4 In other tors; these youth are inclined not for revo- on youth, what type of youth we are words, the economic pressure falls more lution to alter everything, but towards speaking about—college students, gradu- on parents than on their children, and cooperation and peaceful, managed ates, rich, poor, those living with parents, thus it is these parents who should be change. These young activists, he argued, or married young couples who must rely rebelling. This might explain why a large were different from the radical students of on themselves? The youth of the rich and number of the young respondents (71%) the 1970s or those in the April 6th Youth privileged families are not supposed to in the MENA youth survey described Movement in Egypt. These youth were not feel social and economic exclusion, and their economic situation as “very good” simply interested in their own individual or should not, by definition, be outraged despite the relative economic downturn, family matters, but were also concerned and rebellious. Studies on the economics because these young people were living about the public good. Deeply worried of Middle Eastern youth show that family on their parents’ income. However, mar- about the failure of the state, they wanted income has the greatest bearing on ried couples who were responsible for to do something about it; they sensed that young people’s educational opportuni- the alarming situation could lead to an

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explosion, especially when neither the about the young (Sukarieh and Tannock). her own family or children. This seems to regime nor the traditional opposition were But this is no less problematic. It is true that be in line with the perceptions of young able to bring about reforms. “I do not think elders, the state, or moral authorities do Egyptians who, in my interviews with them, I exaggerate in stating”, Nafaa concluded, intervene to construct different images of broadly described themselves as being “that the advent of this new age cohort youth as, for instance, ‘rebellious’, ‘brave’, less experienced and less responsible.5 In (generation) in the political stage consti- the ‘future’, or ‘dangerous’. This however modern times, mass schooling has played tutes a turning point in mobilization for does not mean that youth lack any reality a crucial role in the production of youth change.” of their own. Perhaps we should be asking and prolongation of the time in which the how the young define themselves; for this individual lives and operates as young. Who are Youth? can help us to identify those particular ‘Youth’ in the sense of ‘behaving young’ This interesting observation raises serious traits that, beyond external attributions, represents a sort of Bourdieuian habitus— conceptual questions about and compli- shape young people’s image of them- a series of mental and cognitive disposi- cates the meaning of youth and youth selves and their behavior. Denying the tions, ways of being, feeling, and carrying political agency. Can one consider this young the ability to define their own real- oneself that are associated with the socio- 30-40 year-old age cohort with marriage, ity, or overlooking their paradoxical posi- logical position of structural irresponsibil- work and responsibility ‘youth’? Is ‘youth’ tionality in the social structure, can lead to ity. This is how young people experience simply an age-category? Is it simply a con- such inaccurate conclusions that, as ‘youthfulness’. struction imagined and presented by oth- Bourdieu put is, youth is “nothing but a Of course the reality of young people’s ers? Or is there no such thing as ‘youth’ at word”. lives is more complex and may vary across all? The policy circles such as the United I have suggested that “youth” in the sense cultural, class, and gender divides. For Nations Development Program (UNDP) of young persons is in part related to a instance, many adolescents in poor fami- usually define youth in terms of certain particular life stage and thus a particular lies may have to seek work to earn a living age groups—some take it as those 15-25 location in the social structure, where the instead of attending school; girls may get year of age, others 15-30, while others up individuals navigate between the world of married early thus assuming the respon- to 40 (UNDP 22). Even though operation- childhood (as the time of vulnerability, sibility of being a parent and spouse alization is necessary for policy purposes, innocence and need of protection) and before experiencing youthfulness; unmar- such designations with varied ranges adulthood, the world of work and respon- ried girls, even in the middle class fami- remain inevitably arbitrary. It is therefore sibility. Theoretically, a young person lies, often take some responsibilities to not a surprise that some scholars reject experiences a life of relative autonomy, a help their mothers in cooking, cleaning, the category of ‘youth’ in terms of ‘life kind of ‘structural irresponsibility’, where or caring for the children. There is also the stage’ or in terms of generation altogether, the individual neither substantially possibility of the young couples who, considering it instead as a ‘construction’—a depends on other people such as parents, once married, may appear as if they have social identity that is imagined by others nor is responsible for others, such as his/ moved out of the youth world into adult-

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hood (in 2016, 29% of youth were inter- such subgroups should be acknowledged hand, youth politics is also distinct from viewed for the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung’s and highlighted. However, if the purpose such things as the ‘youth chapters’ of dif- MENA youth survey either married or is, as in this essay, to understand what kind ferent political movements or organiza- divorced, and 15% of ‘youth’ in Egypt of politics youth espouse, then we should tions, be they Fascist, Ba’athist, or leftist. described themselves as ‘adults’). focus on their positionality in the social Rather, youth politics, strictly speaking, is Interestingly, anecdotal evidence sug- structure to determine if the individuals essentially about claiming or reclaiming gests that the youngsters who did not assume some sort of youth habitus or live youthfulness; it expresses the collective experience youthfulness in their young and behave like adults even in their young challenge whose central goal consists of age may tend to ‘experience’ it years after age. defending and extending the youth habi- they move to adult life. A 40-year-old tus—a set of dispositions, ways of being, woman from Lebanon stated recently that Youth Politics feeling, and carrying oneself (e.g., a she did not want to get married and be If we conceive of ‘youth’ in this fashion, greater demand for autonomy, individual- responsible at this age, because she “had youth politics then takes a different form ity, mobility, and security of transition to lost her youthfulness during the civil war”, from what is commonly perceived and the adult world) that are shaped by the and “now want[ed] to experience it”. In presented. In this sense, youth politics is sociological fact of being young. fact, there seems to be a trend of 30+ not the same as ‘student politics’, which is Countering or curtailing this habitus is working or non-working women who do concerned with student rights, tuition cost, likely to generate youth dissent.6 not wish to get married but desire to live and educational policies, as well as con- Conceptual precision notwithstanding, independently, while we also may tentions that are shaped by the school real life is of course more complex. The encounter young males who hold jobs environment. Curricula can potentially cul- fact is that most youth are students, most and earn a living but remain unmarried tivate critical awareness about, say, racism students are young, and almost all are at and live with parents. or colonialism, or a university’s objection- the same time citizens carrying broader How can we account for these sub-groups able investments in certain countries can concerns. In other words, young people’s of the young? Are they not youth? If they potentially cause campaigns of divest- politics encapsulate contentions that are, what make them so? Simply age? If so, ment, all of which are facilitated by the fact derive from their multiple positionalities what then accounts for their positionality that college campuses brings students as youth, students, and citizens, filtering in the social structure? The relevance of together helping collective action. The through class, gender, racial, and other these questions boils down to the reason protests in Spain’s universities in 2010 or identities. So even though young people we strive to conceptualize ‘youth’ in the those led by Camila Vellejo in Chile in often pursue their exclusively youthful first place. If the purpose is to identify 2011, concerning public spending on edu- claims through cultural politics (e.g. in the youth groups with particular needs and cation and an end to the commercializa- way that the Iranian youth followed par- abilities in order to devise policies to tion of schooling, exemplify what I mean ticular a lifestyle in the 1990s), they may address them, then the particularities of by a ‘student movement’. On the other blend their youthful claims with other con-

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Asef Bayat cerns in their positions as students and choices, and they offer venues to express ful agency and societal structures, medi- citizens to mobilize against corruption, individuality as well as collective identity. ated by political culture and political is Professor of Sociology, and Bastian political repression, or urban exclusion, as Mass media, urban spaces, public parks, opportunity. Youthful claims are articu- Professor of Global and Transnational we saw during the Arab uprisings and shopping malls, cultural complexes, and lated mostly at the cultural level and in the Studies, at the University of Illinois, after. Yet in their involvement in the local street corners provide arenas for the form of claims over lifestyle. But youth Urbana-Champaign, USA. His research broader political campaigns, the young formation and expression of collective often get involved in both cultural politics interests navigate between social often bring to them a good degree of identities. Individuals may bond and con- as well as wider political contentions. Thus, movements and social change, to youthful tastes and sensibilities often dis- struct identities through such deliberate to serve as transformative agents, the religion and public life, to urban space played in political graffiti, sociality, fun, associations and networks as schools, young would often have to go beyond and politics. His latest book is Revolution and youthful energy. street corners circles, peer groups, and their exclusive youthful claims to draw on without Revolutionaries: Making Sense The mere presence of young people sub- youth magazines. However, identities are the broader concerns of citizenry. Such of the Arab Spring (Stanford University ject to moral and political discipline does formed mostly through ‘passive net- was the conduct of the Arab youth who Press, 2017). not necessarily render them carriers of a works’—that is, instantaneous communica- played the leading role in the 2011 upris- email: [email protected] youth movement, because young per- tions among atomized individuals that are ings, opening a new chapter in the history sons (as age category) are unable to forge established by the tacit recognition of of the Middle East. a collective challenge to the moral and their commonalities and that are medi- political authority without first turning into ated directly through the gaze in public youth as a social category, that is, turning space, or indirectly through mass media.7 into social actors. Youth as a social cate- As present agents in the public space, the gory, as collective agents, are an essen- young recognize common traits by notic- tially modern, mostly urban, phenome- ing (seeing) shared symbols, for instance, non. It is in modern cities that “young inscribed in styles (T-shirts, blue jeans, persons” turn into “youth,” by experienc- hairstyle), types of activities (attending ing and developing a particular con- particular sports, music stores, and stroll- sciousness about themselves as being ing in streets), and places (stadiums, hik- young. Schooling, prevalent in urban ing trails, street corners). areas, serves as a key factor in producing Whether the young behave in their sheer and prolonging the period of youth, while youthful impulses or respond to the it cultivates status, expectations, and, pos- broader and shifting power structures—of sibly, critical awareness. Cities, as loci of class, gender, race, or age—has been diversity, creativity, and anonymity, pres- widely debated, but youth political behav- ent opportunities for young people to ior cannot conceivably be understood explore alternative role models and without considering the interplay of youth-

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Notes 4 In 2016, 69% of youth, 16-30 Works Cited Erlich, Haggai. Youth and Passerini, Luisa. “Youth as a year old, in the Arab world Revolution in the Changing Metaphor for Social Change: 1 Like the US Institute of (Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Abdalla, Nadine. “Youth Middle East 1908-1914. Lynn Fascist Italy and America Peace, “Youth Revolt” (Amara) Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Movements in the Egyptian Rienner Publishers, 2015. in the 1950s.” A History of Tunisia, Yemen, including Transformation: Strategies Young People in the West, 2 See for instance Shahata the Syrian refugees) were and repertoires of political Gertel, Jörg, and Ralf edited by Giovanni Levi and Dina. “Youth Movements and living with their parents in participation.” Mediterranean Hexel, editors. Coping with Jean-Claude Schmitt, Harvard the 25th Jan Revolution”, one household; see Arab Politics, vol. 21, no. 1, 2016. Uncertainty: Youth in the University, 1997, vol. 2. Arab Spring in Egypt: Youth Survey 2016 conducted Middle East and North Africa. Revolution and Beyond. by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Amara, Jomana. “The Youth Saqi, 2018. In Print. Sayer, Edward and Tarik edited by Bahgat Korany and Berlin. Aspects of this pattern Revolt: A New Frontier of Yousef, eds., Young Rabab El-Mahdi, American have emerged recently in the Conflict”, A Report, United Kalman, Samuel, “Faisceau Generation Awakening: University of Cairo Press, countries hit by financial crisis States Institute of Peace, 2012. Visions of Physical and Moral Economics, Society, and 2014; similarly Edward Sayer such as Spain and Greece, Transformation and the Cult Policy on the Eve of the Arab and Tarik Yousef ascribe the where youth unemployment Bourdieu, Pierre. “‘Youth’ of Youth in Inter-war France.” Spring, Oxford University emergence of the uprisings has resulted in diminishing is just a word.” 1980. In: European History Quarterly, Press, 2016. generally to ‘youth exclusion’, parents’ pension funds. Bourdieu: Sociology in 2003, vol. 33(3). see Sayer, Edward and question, Sage, 1993, pp. Shehata, Dina, “Youth Tarik Yousef, eds., Young 5 Bayat, Asef, Interviews I, 94–102. Keniston, Kenneth. Youth and Movements and the 25th Generation Awakening: Cairo, July 2003. Dissent: The Rise of a New January Revolution.” Arab Economics, Society, and Delgado, Magdalena. Opposition, Harcourt Brace Spring in Egypt: Revolution Policy on the Eve of the Arab 6 More details may found “Contentious Copts: the Jovanovich Inc., 1972. and Beyond, edited by Spring, Oxford UP, 2016, pp. in Bayat, Asef. “Muslim Emergence, Success, and Bahgat Korany and Rabab El- 1-2. Youth and the Claims of Decline of the Maspero Matza, David. “Subterranean Mahdi, American University in Youthfulness”, Being Young Youth Movement in Egypt.” Traditions of Youths.” The Cairo Press, 2012, pp. 105-124. 3 See Salehi-Esfahani, Djavad, and Muslim: Cultural Politics Contentious Politics in the Annals of the American “Schooling and Leaning in in the Global South and Middle East, edited by Fawaz Academy of Political and Touraine, Alain. “1968.” Le the MENA: The Roles of the North, edited by in Linda Gerges, Palgrave, 2015. Social Sciences, 1961. Monde, 1968. Family and the State”, Young Herrera and Asef Bayat, Generation Awakening: Oxford University Press, 2013. Desai, Raj M. et al. “Days of Nafaa, Hasan. “Egyptian Sukarieh, Mayssoun and Economics, Society, and Rage and Silence: Explaining Youth Knock the Doors of Stuart Tannock, Youth Rising?. Policy on the Eve of the Arab 7 For an elaborate exposition Political Action by Arab Change.” Al-Masry Al-Youm, 3 Routledge, 2015. Spring, edited by Edward of “passive networks,” see Youth.” Young Generation January 2010. Sayer and Tarek Yousef, pp. Bayat Asef. Street Politics: Awakening: Economics, Turner, Ralph H. “The Theme 44-45. Poor Peoples Movements in Society, and Policy on the Eve of Contemporary Social Iran. New York: Columbia of the Arab Spring, edited Movements.” British Journal University Press, 1997, by Edward Sayer and Tarik of Sociology, Vol. 20, 1969 chapter 1. Yousef, eds., Oxford UP. p. 398.

––›

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––› Rowntree, John and Margaret Rowntree. “Youth as Class.” International Socialist Journal, no. 25, 1968.

UNDP, Arab Human Development Report 2016: Youth and the Prospect for Human Development in a Changing Reality, New York: UNDP, 2016.

ISSN: 2196-629X http://dx.doi.org/10.17192/ meta.2017.9.7219

Middle East – Topics & Arguments #09–2017