Chapter Three

2008032. Markovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 7-5-2008:11.24, page 83.

chapter three

ARGUMENTS AND ORNAMENTS

In the introduction we made a case for Epicurean argumentation as an essentially rhetorical phenomenon. Before we enter rhetorical analysis of the arguments advanced in DRN, let us corroborate this starting point with some further explanation. The word ‘argument’ denotes a kind of proof. The differentia specifica of this kind of proof is best understood vis-à-vis demonstration. Demon- stration is a formal logical proof; argument is a rhetorical proof. Unlike demonstrations, which may use artificial language (in logic or mathematics for example) to present objectively true conclusions, regardless of an audience, arguments always use natural language, present relative truths, and are addressed to an audience. The distinction between the two types of proof goes back to Aristotle’s distinction between “ana- lytical” (demonstrative) reasoning, discussed in the Prior and Posterior Analytics, and “dialectical” (argumentative) reasoning, discussed in the Topics, Rhetoric,andSophistical Refutations.1 Within this division Epicurus’ scientific discourse falls under the heading of argumentation. While Epicurus did claim that he dealt with absolute truths, his explanations were entirely audience-oriented, and he used reasoning to explain notoriously controversial phenomena, such as the nature of gods. Although he somewhat confusingly aspired to use natural language in the way in which artificial languages are used, i.e., with one-to-one correspondence between significans and signi- ficatum,2 and although he maintained certain standards of proof, Epicu- rus rejected formal logic and mathematics. Ignoring the development which these disciplines had undergone in Aristotle’s philosophical sys- tem, Epicurus introduced a radically empirical scientific methodology, based entirely on sensations as the fundamental means of acquiring correct knowledge.3 The main principle of Epicurus’ methodology was that an explanation must be in accordance with the data provided by

1 Ar. To p . 1.1, 100a–b; cf. Perelman 1977, 15–16, 23–24. 2 Her. 37–38. 3 D.L. 10.31. The other criteria of Epicurus, namely general concept and feelings, 2008032. Markovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 7-5-2008:11.24, page 84.

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the senses, and must not contradict these data. Equipped with this sim- ple parameter (καν"ν),4 Epicurus set out to explore areas inaccessible to our senses, such as the microscopic realm of atoms, the nature and workings of our soul, and astronomical phenomena. It is clear that Epicurus’ empirical method is conceptually analogous to rhetorical argumentation and its prerogatives. First, both methods rely upon perceptions, which are necessarily taken to be true and, as such, lay down the foundations of our knowledge.5 Second, both methods develop inferences about unknown things on the basis of things known. It is on account of these analogies that the authors of the Hel- lenistic period who undertook to defend rhetoric against Plato’s charge that it was a mere knack could deﬁne it as a τ νη based on empirical observations and inductive inferences.6 Still, Epicurus and his followers denied the theoretical similarity between their empirical method and rhetorical method most energetically. The denial was in fact a defense of the central practical aim of Epicureanism: there was nothing more distant from the Epicurean ideal of the lack of disturbance than a life devoted to politics and rhetoric. Philodemus, for example, allowed that everyone reasoning about a phenomenon inaccessible to the senses has to make inferences about the invisible on the basis of what is visible;7 as we saw, under the inﬂuence of Zeno of Sidon he even granted to “sophistic” (i.e., epideictic) rhetoric the status of τ νη;8 but on the other hand he criticized at length Epicurus’ teacher Nausiphanes9 (who actu- ally made the connection between physics, ethics, and rhetoric that

and a further criterion added by the Epicureans, the image-making contact of the mind, are all derivatives of sensation. 4 As it has often been pointed out, the principle is a version of Anaxagoras’ “the visible is an image of the invisible” ('ψις τν δλων τ8 αινμενα, 59 B 21aDK).I would like to add that the thought is also a popular maxim and common literary motif: e.g., Solon’s “infer about invisible things by means of visible things” (τ8 αν7 τ<ς ανερ<ς τεκμαρυ,Stob.3.1.172 .g Wachsmuth-Hense), Euripides’ “let us infer about invisible things by means of things at hand” (τεκμαιρμεσ(α τ<ς παρ%σι τ αν7,fr.574 Kannicht), and Isocrates’ “for the invisible is discerned most quickly by means of the visible” (τ γ8ρ ανς κ τ% ανερ% τα στην B ει δι,γνωσιν, Dem. 34). 5 According to Protagoras, knowledge is nothing but perception (Plat. Tht. 151e); the view goes back to Leucippus and Democritus, who “thought that the truth is in the appearing” (9hντ τλη(ς ν τ9 ανεσ(αι,Ar.GC 315b=67 A 9 DK). 6 For an overview see DeLacy 1978, 174–181. 7 ;Ε [με]νν γ8ρ παν[τ$] τ, α [κλ]υ(ε[<] τι τν δλων τι τα<ς α1σ(σεσι (εωρ%ντι τ δι8 τ% ανερ% τ ανς συλλγ@εσ(αι, Rh. 2.38 Sudhaus. 8 Above, pp. 8–9. 9 Rh. 2.1–50 Sudhaus.