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The Philosophical Polemics in Lucretius : a Study in the History of Epicurean Criticism

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The Philosophical Polemics in Lucretius : a Study in the History of Epicurean Criticism The philosophical polemics in Lucretius : a study in the history of Epicurean criticism Autor(en): Kleve, Knut Objekttyp: Article Zeitschrift: Entretiens sur l'Antiquité classique Band (Jahr): 24 (1978) PDF erstellt am: 10.10.2021 Persistenter Link: http://doi.org/10.5169/seals-660664 Nutzungsbedingungen Die ETH-Bibliothek ist Anbieterin der digitalisierten Zeitschriften. Sie besitzt keine Urheberrechte an den Inhalten der Zeitschriften. Die Rechte liegen in der Regel bei den Herausgebern. Die auf der Plattform e-periodica veröffentlichten Dokumente stehen für nicht-kommerzielle Zwecke in Lehre und Forschung sowie für die private Nutzung frei zur Verfügung. Einzelne Dateien oder Ausdrucke aus diesem Angebot können zusammen mit diesen Nutzungsbedingungen und den korrekten Herkunftsbezeichnungen weitergegeben werden. Das Veröffentlichen von Bildern in Print- und Online-Publikationen ist nur mit vorheriger Genehmigung der Rechteinhaber erlaubt. Die systematische Speicherung von Teilen des elektronischen Angebots auf anderen Servern bedarf ebenfalls des schriftlichen Einverständnisses der Rechteinhaber. Haftungsausschluss Alle Angaben erfolgen ohne Gewähr für Vollständigkeit oder Richtigkeit. Es wird keine Haftung übernommen für Schäden durch die Verwendung von Informationen aus diesem Online-Angebot oder durch das Fehlen von Informationen. Dies gilt auch für Inhalte Dritter, die über dieses Angebot zugänglich sind. Ein Dienst der ETH-Bibliothek ETH Zürich, Rämistrasse 101, 8092 Zürich, Schweiz, www.library.ethz.ch http://www.e-periodica.ch II Knut Kleve THE PHILOSOPHICAL POLEMICS IN LUCRETIUS A Study in the History of Epicurean Criticism I. THE PROBLEM The main problem in Lucretius' polemics has been who were his opponents. He names four of them, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Democritus, the others remain anonymous. For at least a hundred years the commentators have collected sources referring to thinkers who conceivably could have been attacked by him, and, at least since C. Bailey, it has seemed an established fact that the polemics covered the whole history of philosophy up to Lucretius' own time, and that his targets foremost and above all were the Stoics. Then there appeared the paper of Furley in 1966 contending that the polemics in Lucretius mainly reflect Epicurus' polemics and hardly go beyond his time h Furley tries to show that in no passage where the commentators find attacks against the Stoics, this need be the case; Lucretius' targets may as easily or even more probably be others, especially Plato and the young Aristotle, or perhaps nobody at all. Furley's thesis has not remained unchallenged. It has most vigorously been met by Schmidt in his dissertation * D. J. Furley, "Lucretius and the Stoics", in -B/Cd" 13 (1966), 13-33. 40 KNUT KLEVE from 1975 \ Schmidt goes through Furley point by point and believes he proves, often by digging even deeper in the sources, that in a number of cases the Stoics and only the Stoics can possibly have been Lucretius' opponents. By now, then, every possible source regarding the opponents of Lucretius seems to have been explored. The material is scanty enough, relating as it does to such obscure topics as the young Aristotle and Old and Middle Stoicism. Final conclusions are therefore difficult to reach. Even if, for instance, it can be shown that the Stoics actually held a certain theory which is attacked by Lucretius, this does not exclude the possibility that the same theory also was held by earlier philosophers known to Epicurus. We therefore seem to have come to way's end on this line of inquiry. There is a need of seeing the polemics in Lucretius from a new angle. Pinning down the opponents of Lucretius is only one part of the problem ; in addition we have the contents of his arguments, his ways of arguing and above all his place in a polemical tradition which goes back more than two centuries before his own time. However, the history of Epicurean polemics still has to be written. The present paper can be regarded as a preliminary attempt. 2. DEFINITION OF POLEMICS Against every dogmatic assertion in Lucretius it is possible to put a contrary assertion which can be shown to have been made by one or more of the ancient schools outside the Epi- curean. If we do this and contend that Lucretius' assertions are criticisms of those others views, then almost every passage in him will become polemical. This is exactly what modern commentators have done, and sometimes one can wonder how even people in antiquity were able to read Lucretius without having, say, Bailey or Giussani at hand. * J. Schmidt, Z.a£re£ «»</4/'« J/oàéer. £«e//e»H»/er.rHe>&H«ge« De rer«w (Diss. Marburg/Lahn 1975). THE PHILOSOPHICAL POLEMICS IN LUCRETIUS 41 However, such a wide concept of polemics is a difficult starting-point for our investigation, which would then simply become endless. We will therefore make a limitation: Only if Lucretius expressly states that there exists a rival view and criticizes it, shall we speak of polemics. This limitation may lead to the exclusion of much that has hitherto been regarded as polemical in Lucretius, but, on the other hand, we will be able to concentrate on what Lucretius himself consciously wanted to present as polemics. The poem of Lucretius is a sort of introduction to Epicureanism, covering the physical part of it. It certainly is of interest to determine what kind of polemics aw offered in a first course of Epicurean philosophy h Even with this restriction there remains a considerable bulk of polemics in the poem. Of a total of 7411 verses 115 3 are openly devoted to criticism of rival views, which makes a good sixth, equivalent to an average Lucretian book. By comparison it may be mentioned that of the only other fully preserved introductions to physics, namely Epicurus' /o iAvot/otar and 10 paragraphs of a total of 80 are openly polemical, which makes an eighth. The need for polemics in introductions does not seem to have decreased in the course of history. In works like Epicurus' 0« ([23] ff. Arrighetti) and Philodemus' O» (ed. H. Diels) which also move in the realm of physics, it is difficult to estimate accurately the share of polemics because of their fragmentary state. But it has obviously been considerably higher even than in Lucretius. This was to be expected. These works were highly advanced studies containing accurate examinations of every attempted solution of current problems. * Cf. Diog. Oen. NF 13, 8-12: M. F. Smith, 7Î&/V/W» Afew 0/ 0/ O««oa«ah, Öst. Akad. d. Wiss., Denkschr., Bd.117 (Wien 1974), 45 t. with note /<?f. p. 47: "It seems clear that the physics treatise was written before the ethical treatise, and was intended to be read before it." Cf. also order of points in the Terpacpâpfiaxoç, [196] Arrighetti Epicuro. 0/>ere. A cura di Graziano Arrighetti. Nuova ediz. (Torino 1973)). 42 KNUT KLEVE }. IMPORTANCE OF POLEMICS IN THE EPICUREAN SCHOOL Polemics played a necessary part in Epicurean philosophy. The Epicurean compared himself to a physician whose task it was not only to cure everybody who sought his treatment, but also to keep him in health b One of his most powerful prophylactics was polemics. Epicurus calls his doctrine an antidote against false opinions of other schools b Lucretius, then, was not alone in feeling like a doctor giving the sick child a cup of loathsome medicine to swallow (IV 11 if.). This was certainly a realistic attitude. To be sure, the philo- sophy of Epicurus was the only one which could secure man's mental health (Lucr. Ill 41 ff.), but it belonged to the sad realities of life that even adherents of Right Philosophy did not always understand their own good b It was bad enough that some were too prone to play with minor deviations from the right doctrine *, but it was really serious that some became regular deserters and behaved like madmen against their former friends and benefactors. Notorious names are Epicurus' pupil Timocrates who wrote a calumnious book against his Master, Colotes' pupil Menedemus who joined the Cynics, and Metro- dorus of Stratonicia who went over to Carneades b There was every reason to keep the remedies fresh and ready. 4. CICERO'S ACADEMIC HISTORY OF EPICUREAN POLEMICS Cicero gives A7a/. r/eor. I 33, 93 f. an historical survey of Epicurean polemics. Although his account is both incomplete * [196] Arrighetti; Diog. Oen. Fr. z IV-V Chilton; Cic. H/«. I 21, 71; Lucr. V 82 ff. VI 58 ff.). ® [29.3] Arrighetti. ® Lucr. IV 912 ff.; cf. 1150. * Phld. ifg«. 31, 8 ff. De Lacy; Cic. Aï». I 17, 55; 20, 66; II 26, 82; R. Philippson, iWa/oKar, in AH XIX 2, 2452; 2461; 2464; 2477. ® Diog. Laert. X 4 ff.; 9 ; W. Crönert, Ho/ofe aœ? Afswe4mo.r (Repr. Amsterdam 1963), 4; H. Steckel, Hpàèarar, in AH Suppl.-Bd. XI 590. THE PHILOSOPHICAL POLEMICS IN LUCRETIUS 43 and biased, it gives two essential pieces of information: the Epicureans took care that their polemics should be up to date, in the end crossing swords with the Stoics; and as time went on, also paid due attention to their Roman adherents h Cicero gives the impression that Epicurean polemics exclusively consisted of insults. Although the Epicureans really exibit a wide choice of abusive words against their opponents (cf. z«/hz pp. 60 f.), this is only part of the truth. The Academic intention of the survey becomes apparent in the conclusion: If so many wise men and enemies of Epicureanism have not managed to find the truth, it is to be feared that there is no truth to be found. We will try to fill in the gaps in Cicero.
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