KEES DE JONG A SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INDONESIA The Radicalisation of Religions during the Reformation Period Introduction In this article I will describe recent tensions in Indonesia that involved, among others, several radical Islamic organisations and sometimes resulted in interre- ligious violence. I will first give a bit of the historical background of the Indo- nesian political and religious situation, then a few examples of recent threads and violence. I will subsequently discuss the most radical and violent transna- tional organisation, Jema’ah Islamiy’ah, and two nonviolent radical and inter- national Islamic movements. In this survey I am not at all suggesting that Islam is a violent religion; rather, I am simply showing the development of more radical movements, including those in Christianity, their background, and influence in the present Indonesian context. I will start with some main lines of political developments since the indepen- dence of Indonesia. Sukarno and Hatta declared Indonesia’s independence on 17 August 1945 with the Pancasila (five pillars) philosophy and the UUD 45, the 1945 Constitution, as the basis for the nation. After the war of inde- pendence against the Dutch colonizers (1945-1950), the Old Order (1950-1965) began. This period was characterized by the feeling of Indonesian nationalism and by the growing independence of the old colonial, imperialistic forces (the USA, the USSR, and the West). The organisation of the Asia-Africa Confer- ence in Bandung from 18-24 April 1955 by the first Indonesian president, Sukarno, was a clear sign of this growing independence. Freedom of religion1 was explicitly formulated in the first pillar of the Pancasila, “belief in the one Godhead,” and Article 29 of the Constitution: “every inhabitant in Indonesia has the right to worship and pray according to his own religion or conviction.” Members of several religions worked together harmoniously to build the new state of Indonesia. Only a minority group of Muslims, called Darul Islam, did not agree with this Pancasila basis for the state. They wanted to establish an Islamic State and started a guerrilla war in West Java, South Celebes, and Aceh. 1 This freedom did not extend to secular worldviews. 99 STUDIES IN INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE 22 (2012) 1 At this time there were no formal meetings between the religions organised by the state. The Department of Religious Affairs started to develop, and gradual- ly five religions were represented: Islam (1946), Protestant Christianity (1946), Catholic Christianity (1946), Hinduism (1958) and Buddhism (1969).2 Because the growing influence of the Communist Party in Indonesia and a “so- called” attempt by the communists to take power on 30 September 1965,3 Su- harto in fact took over power from Sukarno, and after that communism (in- cluding Chinese influence and the public celebrations of Chinese religions) was forbidden in Indonesia. Because of several interreligious conflicts the gov- ernment started an official dialogue program between religions in 1967. At this time, a new marriage law was promulgated in 1974, whose most important regulation was that people who want to marry have to marry ac- cording to their religion or religious conviction. In 1978 the MPR (National Assembly) resolved that “cultural” mystical movements would not be accepted any more as religions, so people could marry only according to the five reli- gions recognized by the state, i.e. the five religions represented in the De- partment of Religious Affairs. All Indonesian inhabitants were then also obliged to choose one of these five religions to be included on their identity card. During the New Order (1965-1998), one of the most important points of the Suharto government was to avoid religious and ethnic conflicts by means of the SARA (Suku, Agama, Ras dan Antar golongan = tribe, religion, race, and between groups) regulation. The main goal was to keep public peace and order so that there would be a good basis for economic prosperity. There was also the subversion law. People who protested against the government were often accused of subversion and directly arrested and thrown into jail. In this way many people were suppressed. The press was also forbidden to publish anything about “SARA conflicts.” The basis for the development in Indonesia’s New Order was the trans- formation of the state philosophy, Pancasila, so that it became a kind of ideo- logical civil religion. For instance, all primary and secondary schools in Indo- nesia were obliged to have a special celebration of the Pancasila every 2 See De Jong 1990: 18-39: “1.3. Het Ministerie van Godsdienst.” Before Hindu- ism and Buddhism became officially part of the department, the phrase “other religions and religious mystical movements” was used. 3 This coup d’état is called G30S/PKI (Gerakan 30 September/Partai Komunis Indonesia, the so-called revolt of the Indonesian Communist Party on 30 September 1965). It is still not clear what happened precisely. Some people believe that the Communist Party indeed planned a coup d’état, whereas others are suspicious concerning the “strange” role played by Suharto and think that he may have been the brain behind this “revolution.” 100 RADICALISATION OF RELIGIONS IN INDONESIA Monday, with the raising and saluting of the national Indonesia Flag as the high point of the celebration. All pupils and students were obliged to follow a Pancasila course for almost a week before starting at a new school or new uni- versity, and the teachers were also obliged to follow a Pancasila course. If they did not, they were not allowed to teach. In 1983, even all political and social organisations in Indonesia were obliged to accept the Pancasila as the only, sole and official basis of their organisation. Because all religions in Indonesia also include social activities, all religions were also obliged to take the Panca- sila as their first and only base. At the end of the Suharto administration, it was clear that this ideology did not succeed in building a more prosperous country, diminishing corruption, decreasing poverty, removing tensions between differ- ent religions, tribes, and races. In this period the anxiety of Muslims con- cerning “Christianisation” and that of Christians for “Islamisation” was always present beneath the surface (Mujiburrahman 2006). After Suharto resigned on 21 May 1998,4 the Reformation Period started in In- donesia with President Habibie who started the transition process to a more democratic society. He is responsible for the referendum in East Timor, at that time a province of Indonesia, where the people had voted to become an inde- pendent country, Timor Leste. He also started the decentralisation process with two laws in 1999: no. 22 concerning local government and no 25 concerning financial proportionality between the central national government and the local governments. In this way, the local governments were given more autonomy, also in making their own regulations about religion, including regional Shar- i’ah regulations.5 With the parliamentary elections of 1999 and the election of Abdurrahman Wahid as President, the process to a more democratic system really began. Although there were many conflicts in this period, freedom of religion was reestablished. In 1967 a decree by Suharto prohibited Confucian- ism and other Chinese religions from holding public celebrations, but in 2000, Gus Dur—as the President was called by his sympathisers—scratched this decree and was even present at a large public celebration of Imlek, the Chinese New Year, and he gave them the right to take an optional holiday for this celebration. Since 2003, Imlek is acknowledged as a public national holiday in Indonesia by his successor, President Megawati Sukarnoputri. This means that Confucianism is accepted again as a public religion in Indonesia.6 In this Reformation period many people felt free to express themselves without fear of being arrested and of coming into conflict with others or being sup- 4 For the background of the resignation of Suharto see Van Dijk 2001: 185-217. 5 For an evaluation of these regulations see Bush 2008: 174-91. 6 As far as I know, in Indonesia Confucianism is still represented by the Buddhist division of the Department of Religious Affairs. 101 STUDIES IN INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE 22 (2012) 1 pressed by state regulations. After a while, the government dared not to take any more armed action against demonstrators and activists. Although there were (and still are!) good harmonious relations in most places in Indonesia be- tween people of different religions and religious movements, also many inter- religious conflicts occurred in this reformation period as a result of a process of the radicalisation of religions. In some circles, a fundamental interpretation of religion was considered a good alternative for the unsuccessful ideologizing of Pancasila. Several religions also received (financial) international support to become more radical. In this article, based mostly on a study of the literature available,7 we will describe this process of internationally or transnationally supported radicalisation, the roots of this process, and its impact on present in- terreligious relations in Indonesia. The Present Situation: Cases of Conflict Two reports and an article in the Indonesian Newspaper Kompas on the same day (6 April 2011) describe the present crisis in Indonesia. The first report8 de- scribes the problem of terrorism and the de-radicalisation of religions in Indo- nesia. On 30 October 2010, the chairman of the largest Muslim organisation in Indonesia, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Said Aqil Siradj, was appointed by the National Board for the Eradication of Terrorism to become the national co- ordinator of the Movement for the De-radicalisation of Religions. According to him, the government is not doing anything to de-radicalise religions, with the result that there are still major economic gaps between the rich and the poor, terrorism, and violence in the name of religions and conflicts based on sectari- anism and ethnocentricity.