A Survey of Recent Developments in Indonesia

KEES DE JONG

A SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INDONESIA

The Radicalisation of Religions during the Reformation Period

Introduction In this article I will describe recent tensions in Indonesia that involved, among others, several radical Islamic organisations and sometimes resulted in interreligious violence. I will first give a bit of the historical background of the Indo- nesian political and religious situation, then a few examples of recent threads and violence. I will subsequently discuss the most radical and violent transnational organisation, Jema’ah Islamiy’ah, and two nonviolent radical and international Islamic movements. In this survey I am not at all suggesting that Islam is a violent religion; rather, I am simply showing the development of more radical movements, including those in Christianity, their background, and influence in the present Indonesian context.

I will start with some main lines of political developments since the independence of Indonesia. Sukarno and Hatta declared Indonesia’s independence on 17 August 1945 with the Pancasila (five pillars) philosophy and the UUD 45, the 1945 Constitution, as the basis for the nation. After the war of independence against the Dutch colonizers (1945-1950), the Old Order (1950-1965) began. This period was characterized by the feeling of Indonesian nationalism and by the growing independence of the old colonial, imperialistic forces (the USA, the USSR, and the West). The organisation of the Asia-Africa Confer- ence in Bandung from 18-24 April 1955 by the first Indonesian president, Sukarno, was a clear sign of this growing independence. Freedom of religion1 was explicitly formulated in the first pillar of the Pancasila, “belief in the one Godhead,” and Article 29 of the Constitution: “every inhabitant in Indonesia has the right to worship and pray according to his own religion or conviction.” Members of several religions worked together harmoniously to build the new state of Indonesia. Only a minority group of Muslims, called Darul Islam, did not agree with this Pancasila basis for the state. They wanted to establish an Islamic State and started a guerrilla war in West Java, South Celebes, and Aceh.

1 This freedom did not extend to secular worldviews.

99 STUDIES IN INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE 22 (2012) 1

At this time there were no formal meetings between the religions organised by the state. The Department of Religious Affairs started to develop, and gradual- ly five religions were represented: Islam (1946), Protestant Christianity (1946), Catholic Christianity (1946), Hinduism (1958) and Buddhism (1969).2

Because the growing influence of the Communist Party in Indonesia and a “so- called” attempt by the communists to take power on 30 September 1965,3 Su- harto in fact took over power from Sukarno, and after that communism (including Chinese influence and the public celebrations of Chinese religions) was forbidden in Indonesia. Because of several interreligious conflicts the government started an official dialogue program between religions in 1967.

At this time, a new marriage law was promulgated in 1974, whose most important regulation was that people who want to marry have to marry according to their religion or religious conviction. In 1978 the MPR (National Assembly) resolved that “cultural” mystical movements would not be accepted any more as religions, so people could marry only according to the five religions recognized by the state, i.e. the five religions represented in the De- partment of Religious Affairs. All Indonesian inhabitants were then also obliged to choose one of these five religions to be included on their identity card. During the New Order (1965-1998), one of the most important points of the Suharto government was to avoid religious and ethnic conflicts by means of the SARA (Suku, Agama, Ras dan Antar golongan = tribe, religion, race, and between groups) regulation. The main goal was to keep public peace and order so that there would be a good basis for economic prosperity. There was also the subversion law. People who protested against the government were often accused of subversion and directly arrested and thrown into jail. In this way many people were suppressed. The press was also forbidden to publish anything about “SARA conflicts.”

The basis for the development in Indonesia’s New Order was the transformation of the state philosophy, Pancasila, so that it became a kind of ideological civil religion. For instance, all primary and secondary schools in Indo- nesia were obliged to have a special celebration of the Pancasila every

2 See De Jong 1990: 18-39: “1.3. Het Ministerie van Godsdienst.” Before Hindu- ism and Buddhism became officially part of the department, the phrase “other religions and religious mystical movements” was used. 3 This coup d’état is called G30S/PKI (Gerakan 30 September/Partai Komunis Indonesia, the so-called revolt of the Indonesian Communist Party on 30 September 1965). It is still not clear what happened precisely. Some people believe that the Communist Party indeed planned a coup d’état, whereas others are suspicious concerning the “strange” role played by Suharto and think that he may have been the brain behind this “revolution.”

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Monday, with the raising and saluting of the national Indonesia Flag as the high point of the celebration. All pupils and students were obliged to follow a Pancasila course for almost a week before starting at a new school or new university, and the teachers were also obliged to follow a Pancasila course. If they did not, they were not allowed to teach. In 1983, even all political and social organisations in Indonesia were obliged to accept the Pancasila as the only, sole and official basis of their organisation. Because all religions in Indonesia also include social activities, all religions were also obliged to take the Panca- sila as their first and only base. At the end of the Suharto administration, it was clear that this ideology did not succeed in building a more prosperous country, diminishing corruption, decreasing poverty, removing tensions between different religions, tribes, and races. In this period the anxiety of Muslims concerning “Christianisation” and that of Christians for “Islamisation” was always present beneath the surface (Mujiburrahman 2006).

After Suharto resigned on 21 May 1998,4 the Reformation Period started in In- donesia with President Habibie who started the transition process to a more democratic society. He is responsible for the referendum in East Timor, at that time a province of Indonesia, where the people had voted to become an independent country, Timor Leste. He also started the decentralisation process with two laws in 1999: no. 22 concerning local government and no 25 concerning financial proportionality between the central national government and the local governments. In this way, the local governments were given more autonomy, also in making their own regulations about religion, including regional Shar- i’ah regulations.5 With the parliamentary elections of 1999 and the election of Abdurrahman Wahid as President, the process to a more democratic system really began. Although there were many conflicts in this period, freedom of religion was reestablished. In 1967 a decree by Suharto prohibited Confucian- ism and other Chinese religions from holding public celebrations, but in 2000, Gus Dur—as the President was called by his sympathisers—scratched this decree and was even present at a large public celebration of Imlek, the Chinese New Year, and he gave them the right to take an optional holiday for this celebration. Since 2003, Imlek is acknowledged as a public national holiday in Indonesia by his successor, President Megawati Sukarnoputri. This means that Confucianism is accepted again as a public religion in Indonesia.6

In this Reformation period many people felt free to express themselves without fear of being arrested and of coming into conflict with others or being sup-

4 For the background of the resignation of Suharto see Van Dijk 2001: 185-217. 5 For an evaluation of these regulations see Bush 2008: 174-91. 6 As far as I know, in Indonesia Confucianism is still represented by the Buddhist division of the Department of Religious Affairs.

101 STUDIES IN INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE 22 (2012) 1 pressed by state regulations. After a while, the government dared not to take any more armed action against demonstrators and activists. Although there were (and still are!) good harmonious relations in most places in Indonesia between people of different religions and religious movements, also many interreligious conflicts occurred in this reformation period as a result of a process of the radicalisation of religions. In some circles, a fundamental interpretation of religion was considered a good alternative for the unsuccessful ideologizing of Pancasila. Several religions also received (financial) international support to become more radical. In this article, based mostly on a study of the literature available,7 we will describe this process of internationally or transnationally supported radicalisation, the roots of this process, and its impact on present interreligious relations in Indonesia.

The Present Situation: Cases of Conflict Two reports and an article in the Indonesian Newspaper Kompas on the same day (6 April 2011) describe the present crisis in Indonesia. The first report8 describes the problem of terrorism and the de-radicalisation of religions in Indo- nesia. On 30 October 2010, the chairman of the largest Muslim organisation in Indonesia, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Said Aqil Siradj, was appointed by the National Board for the Eradication of Terrorism to become the national co- ordinator of the Movement for the De-radicalisation of Religions. According to him, the government is not doing anything to de-radicalise religions, with the result that there are still major economic gaps between the rich and the poor, terrorism, and violence in the name of religions and conflicts based on sectari- anism and ethnocentricity. He wonders if terrorism is perhaps deliberately de- signed to serve a political goal. The NU is a strong movement that can help and wants to help the government with the de-radicalisation of religions as a means for the transformation of culture within Islam. In the second report,9 several moderate Islamic, Catholic, and Protestant religious leaders accuse the government of negating the national constitution of 1945. In their view, there is a serious situation of public lying, which they make concrete by describing nine old lies and nine new lies told by the government.10

7 The literature is added with some personal impressions by the author who lived in Indonesia during this whole period. 8 BIL, “Deradikalisasi Agama: Pemerintah Harus Lakukan Langkah Serius,” Kompas (6 April 2011): 2 (De-Radicalisation of Religion: The Government has to Take a Serious Step”). 9 LOK, “Masalah Kebangsaan: Tokoh Lintas Agama Nilai Ada Pengingkaran UUD,” Kompas (6 April 2011): 4 (“National Problem: Personalities across Religious Boundaries Feel the National Constitution has been Disavowed”). I inserted the num- bering from 1 to 9 for the lies (see below). 10 According to Frans Magnis Suseno, the word “lie” is not polite in the Indone-

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The nine old lies are: 1) the decrease in poverty, 2) providing for the needs of the people (providing for the food they need themselves), 3) providing enough food and energy, 4) fighting terrorism, 5) respecting human rights, 6) providing funds for education, and 7) finishing the cases of Lapindo, 8) Newmont, and 9) Freeport. The nine new lies are: 1) the freedom of religion, 2) the unity of the nation, 3) freedom of the press, 4) protection of Indonesian workers abroad, 5) transparency of government, 6) fighting corruption, suspicious bank accounts (large bank accounts) of officers of the Indonesian Republic police force, 7) decent, clean, and ethical politics, 8) fighting the judicial mafia (the Gayus Tambunan case) and 9) the autonomy of the Republic of Indonesia as a united nation in relation to the case of three civil servants of the Ministry of Sea and Fishery.

Many in the population consider these points to government propaganda because nearly nothing has changed. The third article11 contains an interesting sentence that shows that every individual who had some capital and was in fact free to do everything he or she wants to do with the money often received high interest (for instance 10% per month) on money lent out to poor people: In the Reformation period, in which all is allowed in the name of the sacred freedom, the state allows people of independent means to make profit until the increase in terrorist organisations. The state as the protector and supporter of the common people is not preventive and educative regarding what it allows in the name of individual freedom.

Two Examples of Church Cases That the state is not preventive enough became a cruel reality on Sunday, 25 September 2011, when a suicide bomber killed himself and severely wounded 22 people in the front of a church in Solo, the GBIS (Gereja Bethel Injil Se- penuh) Kepunton. The government knew it would happen—two secret agents were present. According to them, the suicide bomber came after the service so they could not do anything. But according to an eyewitness who visited the church shortly after the attack, the suicide bomber was also present in the service and waited until many people had gathered around the door of the church immediately after the service. The Indonesian Intelligence Service knew that there was a network of six persons involved in a bomb attack in Cirebon on a “military” mosque earlier in the year on 15 April 2011. They had the names and pictures of these individuals, and the suicide bomber in Solo was one of them. In the weeks after the bombing several of them were arrested. But there sian context because it can be interpreted to mean that one can no longer trust the individuals behind the lies, and thus this accusation can arouse only emotional reactions. 11 Jakob Sumardjo, “Penagih Utang,” Kompas (6 April 2011): 6 (“Creditor”, i.e. people who loan money to poor people, as described in the sentence before the quota- tion).

103 STUDIES IN INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE 22 (2012) 1 were also rumours that a new group of nine individuals had already been trained to as suicide bombers.12

During the reformation period, quite a number of churches were destroyed, burned down, or closed by order of the authorities. An example of the last is the GKI Yasmin church in Bogor, which was closed by order of the mayor of Bogor. The members of the community felt that they followed all regulations in opening their church building and went to court. Even the High Court de- cided that GKI Yasmin had followed all regulations and had the right to re- open the church. But until now the mayor still refused to give permission to re- open the church. It is a sign that the power of small pressure groups in Indone- sia is greater than the legal authority, even though Indonesia is considered to be a constitutional state.13

Another example, from the perspective of freedom of religion and religious conviction, is the Ahmadiyah movement. In 2008 three ministers, the Minister of Religious Affairs, the Minister of Home Affairs, and the Minister of Justice made a common decision about the Ahmadiyah. According to this decision, the Ahmadiyah was not totally forbidden, but their members were no longer allowed to practise their religion in public. In a report,14 several human rights and peace organisations asked the government to revoke the decision of 200815 because there were many violent acts against the Ahmadiyah in the last two

12 I met the eye-witness personally on 26 September 2011, the day after the bombing, in Jakarta. A few days after the bombing, this news was also mentioned in several newspapers. 13 According to the Annual Report of the CRCS about the Religious life in Indo- nesia, there were 18 cases in 2009 and 39 in 2010 concerning places of worship; cf. Bagir et al. 2011: 34. The case of GKI Yasmin was mentioned by the Secretary General of the PGI (Indonesian Council of Churches) Gomar Gultom in a presentation with the title “Fundamental Problems for the Church in the Midst of the Pluralistic Indonesian Nation” on 8 November 2011 on the occasion of the opening of a workshop “The Rela- tion of Mainline Churches to the Charismatic Movement” in the office of the Synod of the GKPB (Protestant Church in Bali) Mangupura, Bali. 14 LOK, “Kasus Ahmadiyah: Pemerintah Diminta Cabut SKB Tiga Menteri”, Kompas (7 April 2011): 2 (The Ahmadiyah Case: The Government is requested to revoke the Joint Decision of the Three Ministers). 15 On 6 February three members of the Ahmadiyah were killed and seven wounded in Cikeusik, and in the beginning of April five houses belonging to members of the Ahmadiyah in Kampong Cimanggu III (near Bogor) were partly destroyed for the third time in two months by throwing stones through the windows and the roofs. These acts were always well prepared. The perpetrators disappear immediately afterwards. The government does not do anything against it to protect Indonesian citizens. Cf. report “Ahmadiyah diserang lagi,” Tempo, Majalah Berita Mingguan, Edisi (11-17 April 2011): 21.

104 RADICALISATION OF RELIGIONS IN INDONESIA years and they are still going on.16 According to several human rights organisations, the government is not doing anything to stop these acts. One of the reasons therefore is that there are already representatives of fundamentalist, radical Islamic groups who have high positions in the government and who look upon the Ahmadiyah as a heretical movement within Islam that insults Islam and thus has to be forbidden.

The Revival of the Darul Islam Movement Another actual case is the open revival of the NII (Negara Islam Indonesia = an Islamic Indonesian State) movement, also called N11, a movement that wants to create an Islamic Indonesian state, like the one the Darul Islam movement fought for at the beginning of the Republic. This is a result of the still present disappointment in Islamic circles at the removal of the so-called Pia- gam Jakarta, the Jakarta Charter. On 22 June 1945, several weeks before Indo- nesia declared itself independent, there was a draft of the national ideology, Pancasila, with its first pillar: belief in the one Godhead “with the obligation to carry out the shari’ah Islam for its adherents.”17 But at the last moment this sentence, called the Jakarta Charter, was omitted to emphasize the equality of all religions in Indonesia, even though Islam was and still is by far the largest majority religion in Indonesia, which is also the nation with the most adherents of Islam in the whole world.

The Increase in Global, Fundamentalist Arab Influence in Indonesian Cultural Islam As a part of the course in mission and dialogue, on 19 November 2007 students at the Abdiel seminary invited a well-known Islamic religious leader, Kiai Haji Nuril Arifin Husein, called Gus Nuril, to dialogue with him. Nuril is the leader of the Pondok Pesantren (an Islamic boarding school) Soko Tunggal Abdurrahman Wahid in Jakarta and Semarang. His pesantren is multireligious, meaning that students of all religions are welcome to live there. In the discussion he stated that the present and most urgent problem in Indonesia is the development of an Arab type of Islam. This form of Islam is not according to, or even contrary, to the original Indonesian Islam, i.e. a cultural Islam, an Islam that adapts to the local and national culture. The national slogan in Indonesia is Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, Unity in Diversity, and according to Gus Nuril, Islam is in fact a religion that highly respects the convictions of other people and wants to live in good harmony with them. He said: “If there are Christian communi-

16 For more information on this Ahmadiyah case see De Jong, 2011: 263-64. 17 Translation of: Ketuhanan yang Mahaesa dengan kewajiban menjalankan Syaria’at Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya, See Anshari 1983/2: 32.

105 STUDIES IN INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE 22 (2012) 1 ties that are threatened by fundamentalist Islamic groups in Indonesia, they may call me and I will do everything possible to defend them.”

This gives a good picture of what went on in Indonesia during this reformation period, a struggle between fundamentalist, radical (and sometimes terrorist), exclusive Islamic groups and the more moderate, cultural, inclusive-pluralistic, even liberal Islamic groups. It is interesting that there are quite a number of research projects and articles on radical Islam in Indonesia, mostly done and written by moderate Islamic scholars. Perhaps the most critical is a book published as the result of a research project edited by the late Abdurrahman Wahid (he died a few months after the publication of this book on 30 December 2009) called: Ilusi Negara Islam: Ekspansi Gerakan Islam Transnasional di Indo- nesia (The Illusion of an Islamic State: Expansion of the Transnational Islamic Movement in Indonesia) (Wahid 2009).18 It shows clearly how globalisation influences local Islamic cultures in Indonesia.

In the present Indonesian context, there are all kinds of political, economic, cultural, racial, and religious forces that play a role. Thus, the description of the development of an “international” radical Islam and a bit of radical Chris- tianity in Indonesia in this article is only a part of a more complex situation, one of the possible answers given in Indonesia to try to overcome the “crisis.”

The Complexity of Radical Islamic and Religious Movements in Indonesia There are at least four different Islamic movements in Indonesia that can be called radical: two transnational movements, the Jema’ah Islamiyah (JI) movement, a Southeast Asian movement with Indonesian roots with Kiai Abu Bakar Ba’asyir dari Pesantren Al Muk’min di Ngruki, Solo, as one of its Indonesian spiritual leaders. Ba’asyir also became the spiritual leader of the MMI, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, which wants to make Shari’ah the official law in Indo- nesia. I will expand on his role later on. Several members of the JI are in fact

18 With a prologue by Ahmad Syafii Maarif and an epilogue by A. Mustofa Bisri, This book is a joint publication of three institutes: Gerakan Bhinneka Tunggal Ika de- fends the national Pancasila philosophy, the Wahid Institute is a pluralistic group within the Nahdlatul Ulama and the Maarif Institute is a pluralistic group within the Muham- madiyah, The last two organizations with about 40 (60?)-30 (40?) million members are the largest Muslim organizations in Indonesia and perhaps in the whole world. When the book was published, radical Indonesian Islamic movements threatened to burn down every bookshop that sold it. People who wanted to read the book were forced to download it via the internet! It is a very critical book, in my view, because it describes openly the influence of radical Islamic movements in Indonesia, often sponsored by “Arab” capital and their hidden agenda to institute an Islamic State in Indonesia. The term illusion suggests that the radical movements will not succeed in reaching their aim, despite all attempts.

106 RADICALISATION OF RELIGIONS IN INDONESIA still linked with the Darul Islam movement by family ties.19 There is also a more “Arab” (and up until now more peaceful) movement, supported from the Middle East, that includes, among others, the political party PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Party for Prosperous Justice) as its Indonesian exponents supported by the Ikhwanul Muslimin, the Islamic Brotherhood movement with its base in Egypt, and the original Middle East Hizbut Tharir, which is forbidden in the most Middle East states but is allowed in Indonesia as Hizbut Tharir Indonesia (HTI). Both are implicitly and explicitly striving for the Khilafah Islamiyah, a world governed by God’s law (Shari’ah), which can only be interpreted legitimately by one khalif, the representative of Allah in this world, for all Muslims. They will be described more extensively later on in this article.

In addition to these transnational movements there are several “more national- istic” movements. One is trying to revitalise the Jakarta Charter by a law that makes it possible for regional leaders to have the authority to make their own regional regulations, including Shari’ah regulations. (But in one region in In- donesia, Manokwari, a draft for Christian regulations was also drawn up! [International Crisis Group 2008: 2-7]. We will come back to this later on in this article.) There is, furthermore, the national continuation of the Darul Islam movement, which we already mentioned, called the NII or N11, which still holds to the ideal of Indonesia as an Islamic state with the Shari’ah as the national law. In addition to these national movements, there are also several movements that want to defend Islam against “foreign” influence (Westernisa- tion, including Christianity) such as the FPI and Laskar (Army) Jihad,20 but there is also a Laskar Kristus!21 The international influence in the process of religious radicalisation in Indonesia can be shown by a description of the background and development of one radical violent Islamic movement, the Je- ma’ah Islamiyah and two more “peaceful” movements PKS and HTI.

A More General Stress on Religious Identity: Growing Intolerance Before presenting these movements, however, it is important to mention that there is a tendency within other religions as well in Indonesia to become more outspoken. For instance, on Bali inhabitants are now obliged to fill in Hindu- ism as their religion on their local identity card. Only if adherents of other religions can prove that they also practice the Balinese culture are they (even

19 See, among others, Fealy 2006: 25-26. 20 For a detailed description of the background en development of Laskar Jihad see Hasan 2006. 21 During the Conflict in Ambon 1999-2003 Laskar Kristus (founded in 1998, before the conflict) and Laskar Jihad (founded in 2000 during the conflict) were both active. See Mulyadi 2003.

107 STUDIES IN INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE 22 (2012) 1 though they are Balinese!) accepted as Balinese inhabitants. If not, they are registered as Indonesian inhabitants, Indonesian people “coming from outside Bali.”22

A research report on radicalism within Christianity in Indonesia came to the conclusion that the majority of Christians in Indonesia have also become more radical as a reaction to the radicalisation of several Islamic movements (Ke- menterian Koordinator 2007). Moreover, there are also international and local aggressive Evangelical Christian movements that are proselytising in Muslim strongholds like Bekasi in West Java, for instance (International Crisis Group 2010: 1). Some of the international organisations that are active in West Java are: - The Joshua project, which targets ethnic communities around the world “with the least followers of Christ” and thus presumably most in need of salvation. The Sundanese of West Java are regarded as one of these groups; - Lampstand (Beja Kabungahan), started by an American missionary in 1969, focuses on “evangelism and church planting among the Sun- danese people of West Java”; - Partners International, based in Spokane, Washington also targets “un- reached populations” and planting “culturally appropriate” churches. It supports Vison Indonesia 1:1:1, which aims at having missionaries plant one church in one village in one generation. It also supports the Sundanese Fellowship of about a dozen groups around West Java (In- ternational Crisis Group 2010: 3). But there are also local Indonesian Christian Evangelical organisations in Be- kasi committed to converting Muslims: - Yayasan Mahanaim, one of the wealthiest and most active, is partic- ularly loathed by the Islamist community because of its programmes targeting the Muslim poor; - Another, Yayasan Bethmidrash Talmiddin, run by a Muslim convert to Christianity, uses Arabic calligraphy on the cover of its booklets, suggesting they are Islamic in content, and requires every student at its school to convert five people as a graduation requirement. - A theological school in south Bekasi, Integrated Bible Training School (Sekolah Alkitab Terampil dan Terpadu), is run by Edhie Sapto, a Madurese convert who recruits in Muslim communities by using

22 I Ketut Eddy Cahyana’s master’s thesis (2009) mentions explicitly how the Christian Protestant Church on Bali (GKPB) is wrestling with this obligation to also have a Balinese cultural (adat) structure, so that the members of this church can be recognized as Balinese citizens.

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pamphlets with Arabic titles that look like Islamic tracts but are in fact Bible teachings. Each student in his school is required to convert ten others before graduating (International Crisis Group 2010: 1, 3). Another example that can be given, already mentioned briefly above, is the situation in the kabupaten (an administrative region within a province) Manok- wari of West Papua, where Christianity is the majority religion. In 2005 Chris- tians wanted to prevent a mosque from being built and drafted a Christian Reg- ulation afterwards. A candidate for the post of governor in the 2006 elections of West Irian Jaya (still called by that name before 2007) promised in 2005 that he would support the plan to build an Islamic centre (mosque) on Mansinam Island, just off Manokwari’s coast. Two German missionaries who went ashore there on 5 February 1855 to bring Christianity to Manokwari had declared Mansinam Island holy ground and, therefore, Manokwari is known as the “Gospel City.” The mosque would be a larger building, larger than the churches in this region. Before asking permission from the Bupati (head of the ka- pubaten), the commission formed to build the mosque had already organised a ground-breaking ceremony. “As the day approached, Manokwari’s Christians began to protest, and banners rejecting the mosque appeared all over the city.” This was followed by larger demonstrations, and even in Jayapura there was a demonstration against the building of the mosque. “They demanded that the provincial Parliament immediately issue a regulation formally declaring Man- okwari ‘Gospel City’.” On 1-2 February 2007 local church leaders held a seminar where they showed their concern for the spread of Islam in Papua. On 7 March 2007 they publicized a draft document known as the “Gospel Regula- tions.” They defined the gospel as “Good news that says the coming of Jesus Christ was the beginning of God’s government on earth, giving new life to the values of compassion, peace, brotherhood, prosperity, justice, partnership, and openness.” In several articles, such as Article 26, it is mentioned that Christian symbols should hang in public places and offices and in Article 28 that “all business activities would be prohibited, at least for half a day” on Sunday as a day of worship. It is precisely on Sunday that the harbour of Manokwari is booming. This draft was immediately denounced by Muslim and Christian leaders alike and even became a national issue (International Crisis Group 2010: 2-6).

On Papua as well, new religious Islamic and Christian groups that are doc- trinally intolerant have started to develop in areas where there were good relations between Christians en Muslims. These groups see other faiths as their enemy (International Crisis Group 2010: 17). From the Christian side, these included partly Pentecostal and Charismatic movements, especially the neo-Pen- tecostals. These groups want to convert Muslims and sometimes also have government and military backing. They preach the blessings of the Holy Spirit that also lead to miracles like the healing of the sick. They like meetings in big places, where people sometimes also give witness of their conversion: In Feb-

109 STUDIES IN INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE 22 (2012) 1 ruary 2008 in Sorong a woman from Madura “testified how she had been a Muslim and now was joyful because she had found Christ” (International Crisis Group 2010: 19-21). In fact, everywhere in Indonesia neo-Pentecostal Charismatic movements are arising and attracting many people by proclaiming the prosperity Gospel. When asking God for something, one is to be firm in praying for it, and God will certainly answer that prayer. One church that is spreading over all Indonesia is the Bethany Church, the happy Family Church. In Solo there is a Mega Bethel Church, called Keluarga Allah, the Family of God, which already has several branches in Yogyakarta as well as elsewhere. This church has as its slogan: “Save every soul at any cost.” These churches are led by businessmen and take their inspiration from the prosperity churches of South Korea, notably the Yoido Full Gospel Church of David Yonggi Cho, the United States, and Singapore.23

It is not surprising that Islamic organisations are reacting to these more or less “extreme” Evangelical movements. Aside from this, most Muslims in Indone- sia find it difficult to understand why there are so many different denomina- tions within Christianity, and because the “aggressive” movements are more in the foreground, Muslims sometimes think all Christians are aggressive and want to convert Muslims into Christians.

The Illusion of Indonesia as an Islamic State Another point to mention here is that although Muslims form about 88% of the total Indonesian population (Indonesia’s population is about 240 million at this time), the influence of Islamic political parties is limited because they do not have an absolute majority. Nine Islamic parties received only 29% of all votes in the last national elections in 2009 for Parliament (DPR).24 This shows that, politically speaking, Indonesian people vote more for nationalist25 parties than Islamic parties. So, it can be interpreted as a sign that the majority of the Indo- nesian population do not want Indonesia to become an Islamic state. Neverthe- less, in this reformation period radical Islamic movements felt free to come to

23 An interesting study on the Bethany Church and the Keluarga Allah Church can be found in Kristanto 2010. The title of his book means: The Gospel for Rich People? Prosperity Theology as Common People Theology. 24 Karim 2011: 5-6. In 1955 they got 39% with four parties during the Orde Baru (1965-1998); the Islamic parties were reduced to only one party in a system where the president was also the chairman of the reigning Golkar Party, in 1999, with 19 parties, and in 2004, with 7 parties, they received about 39% of the votes. 25 Nationalist Parties in Indonesia are parties, whether on a religious or a secular basis, that want to build, together with other parties, a new, better Indonesian nation. This happened after the colonial period and now also after the New Order in the reformation period.

110 RADICALISATION OF RELIGIONS IN INDONESIA the fore. They now publicly proclaim their ideas and are thus certain to exer- cise influence within Indonesian society.

Radical Islam: Jema’ah Islamiy’ah (JI) One of the Islamic movements most prone to radicalism with a history of violence is Jema’ah Islamiy’ah (JI). According to the United Nations, JI, which has its roots in Indonesia, is to be considered a terrorist group in Southeast Asia (Thayer 2005: 68).26 The origins of the contemporary JI organisation may be traced to 1967 (if not earlier) when remnants of the Darul Islam movement revived under the name Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII). DDII engaged in religious proselytising and worked closely with the Saudi-funded World Islamic League to promote Wahabi fundamentalist belief. (Thayer 2005: 68) In 1980 Saudi Arabia established the LPBA (Institute for the Arabic Language) in Jakarta, which became the LIPIA (Islamic Institute for the Knowledge of Is- lam and the Arabic Language), the centre of Wahabi Influence in Indonesia (Noorhaidi 2006: 220). One of the most palpable impacts of this campaign was a sense of Islamic resurgence on university campuses marked by an increase in students’ observation in Islamic obli- gations, an interest in the wearing jilbab, and the spread of Islamic books. (Noorhaidi 2006: 220) This Wahabi movement succeeded in starting an exclusive trend within the Islamic movement, which publicly organises several propaganda activities in mosques on the outskirts of the Indonesian cities and on the countryside (Noorhaidi 2006: 273).

Let us return to the JI. In 1963, two Indonesian Islamic religious leaders, Ab- dullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, met for the first time and two years later started a campaign to establish an Islamic state. In 1972 they founded the Pesantren Al Mukmin in Ngruki, a village near Solo, in order to promote Wa- habi fundamentalist teachings. “Graduates of this school would later form the extremist hardcore of the terrorist organisation JI” (Thayer 2005: 68). Also, other Islamic hard-line movements like remnants of the Darul Islam, such as Komando Jihad, Ali Imron and Terror Warman appeared in the 1970s and the 1980s. They were supported at first by Ali Murtopo, the Indonesian intelligence chief, under the guise of fighting communism in Indonesia, but was in- tended to discredit fundamental Islam in Indonesia (Thayer 2005: 68-69; Kingsbury and Fernandes 2005: 18; Jamhari 2003: 8).

26 For an Indonesian description of Jema’ah Islamiyah see Mubarak 2008: 316- 44.

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In 1978, Murtopo moved to clip the wings of the very organisation he had encouraged. Sungkar and Ba’asyir were detained, tried and sentenced to jail in 1982. They were released on appeal, but when threatened by further legal action, they fled to Malaysia in 1985. (Thayer 2005: 69) In Johor, the part of Malaysia bordering with Singapore, they founded a religious school to propagate their extremist views. They still had strong links with the Ngruki group in Indonesia. They travelled to Saudi Arabia to raise funds and actively recruited volunteers in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia to study in Pakistan and to follow, between 1985 and 1994, paramilitary training in Afghanistan. They thus worked on the internationalisation of their organisation. In 1992, there was a conflict with the Darul Islam (DI) movement, and they renamed their separate organisation Jema’ah Islamiy’ah (Thayer 2005: 69). Fealy describes several differences between DI and JI. The most important is “the broader objective of JI to create a transnational Islamic state under the leadership of a caliph ... to re-establishing Islamic pre-eminence in the world” (Fealy 2006: 26). Other differences27 are: the JI follows a long tra- dition within Islam that divides the world into a good Islamic world (darul Is- lam) and a bad, infidel world (darul harb). A more important difference is the doctrine on jihad. The DI based jihad on scripture and medieval concepts, interpreted aggressively as a real war, which already went beyond what was ac- ceptable in a holy war. The concept of jihad in JI was deeply influenced by Middle Eastern thinkers from the 1960s onwards such as Sayyid Qutb and Osama bin Laden. They rejected traditional limitations for jihad and gave a pan-Islamic perspective to the jihadist struggle so that it became a global struggle against all the enemies of Islam. A last difference between DI and JI is that they have markedly different attitudes to the practice of the faith. Whereas DI members were traditionalist in orientation, with heavy folk and mystical influences, JI is puritanical and reformist. JI described itself as “salafist,” which means that it sought to emulate the “pristine” form of Islam practised by the first three generations of Muslims. A central tenet of salafism is that all non-Is- lamic accretions to the faith must be eliminated in order to return the religious life and thought of the faithful to their original and pure form (Fealy 2006: 26- 30). This was a reason for A. Sungkar and A.B. Ba’asyir to leave the DI in the early 1990s.

In 1994 Southeast Asian Islamic militants in Afghanistan moved their training facilities to Camp Abu Bakar in Mindanao, Philippines, where students were trained by Indonesian veterans from Afghanistan, by Arabs and other for- eigners connected with Al Qaeda (Thayer 2005: 69). After Suharto resigned on 22 May 1998, a conflict broke out at the beginning of 1999 between Christians and Muslims in Ambon. Toward the end of 1999, Sungkar and Ba’asyir re-

27 This is a short summary of Fealy 2006: 26-30.

112 RADICALISATION OF RELIGIONS IN INDONESIA turned to Indonesia with most of the JI members “convinced that the time was ripe for Jihad” (Jones 2006: 8). JI was also involved in the Ambon conflict. Sungkar died at the end of 1999. Because some JI members, the more militant younger ones, did not see Ba’asyir as the ideal leader for the jihad, a more militant leader came to the fore: Hambali (Thayer 2005: 70). He was held responsible for the bombings of churches on Christmas Eve 2000, whereby 18 people were killed, together with 30 JI members for the bombing of two night- clubs in Bali on 12 October 2002, which killed 202 people and the bombing of the Marriot Hotel in Jakarta on 5 August 2003 which killed 14 people. He was arrested on 12 August 2003 in Thailand (Kingsbury and Fernandes 2005: 20).

Ba’asyir continued his activities in Indonesia in the direction of the Khilafah Islamiy’ah: After Ba’asyir’s return, in addition to running Pondok Ngruki, he helped found the Indonesia Mujahidin Council (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia-MMI), formed in Yogya- karta in 2000 as an umbrella group for those wishing to build an Islamic state and ... an Islamic leadership in the country as well as in Muslim communities throughout the world. Ba’asyir was elected as the MMI’s amir of its governing council. (Kingsbury and Fernandes 2005: 20) The main goal of the MMI was again to oblige all inhabitants in Indonesia to follow Shari’ah, Islamic law.

As the leader of the Jema’ah Islamiy’ah, Ba’asyir was arrested on 15 October 2004. He was accused of being involved in the bomb attack on the Marriot Ho- tel in 2003 and the 2002 Bali bombings. On 3 March 2005 he was acquitted of charges of being involved in the bombing of the Marriot Hotel but found guilty of conspiracy over the 2002 attacks and sentenced to two and a half years imprisonment. On 14 June 2006, he was released from prison but was rearrested on 13 December 2010. The charge against him was inciting others to commit terrorism by providing funds for weapons and military training in Aceh. On 16 June 2011, Ba’asyir was sentenced to 15 years in prison, but, on 27 October 2011, an Indonesian High Court cut his sentence from 15 years to 9.

Although many members of the JI have already been arrested and sentenced to death or imprisonment, the movement is still spreading by a kind of cell system. New members are often not radical students or members of radical Islam- ic families, but younger people who are unemployed and also have no pros- pects for a better future, so they can be easily influenced to join a new group that is preparing for suicide bombings like the above-mentioned “Cirebon group.” This description of the JI depicts the exponent of the most violent radical Islamic movement active in Indonesia, sometimes linked with Al Qaeda. In Indonesia itself, this movement is not considered a religious movement but a terrorist organisation that has to be fought with all possible means. There is still fear of further actions of the JI. The final paragraph of an article called “The Danger of Terrorism after Osama” is about the JI: 113 STUDIES IN INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE 22 (2012) 1

The Jema’ah Islamiyah (JI), which is constantly on the move in Southeast Asia, has still to be watched closely. In recent years, there are several times suspected terroristic persons of the JI arrested and imprisoned. Just like the activist of Al Shabaab and Boko Haram, activists of the JI also changed the target of their attacks to government symbols. Perhaps they are also “withdrawing” to plan a new strategy. (Bin Saju 2011: 8) There is still the fear of new attacks by the JI in Indonesia. That is why, for instance, most of the churches in Indonesia were protected by the police on Christmas Eve 2011 so that the Christians could celebrate Christmas “safely.”28

PKS and HTI: “Peaceful” Radical Transnational Islamic Movements The book Ilusi Negara Islam mentions the Political Party PKS (affiliated with Ikhwanul Muslimin) and the movement HTI several times as hard-line radical movements that use the cell system to attract new members, including students and other intellectuals “because in that way they can more easily and effec- tively manipulate their members. Recruitment by the cell system is the easiest medium to reorientation or brainwashing based on the ideology of the movement” (Wahid (2009): 91).29 Most of the leaders are trained by the LIPIA program, sponsored by the Wahabi movement in Saudi Arabia. As members of a transnational movement they became Salafi (Wahabi) agents and Tarbiyah (Ikhwanul Muslimin) agents in Indonesia. Nowadays, the Ikhwanul Muslimin (PKS) and Hizbut Tharir are open in Indonesia. “Till now the movement of these powerful groups is already spread as cancer in the whole body of the nation, they are already infiltrated from into the National Palace (residence of the President of Indonesia) till the mountain (remote) areas” (Wahid (2009): 95-97). The most important goal for them is the introduction of the shari’ah as positive law. To reach that goal they use and understand literally certain texts in the Qur’an and the Hadiths that support their ideology and omit other texts that do not support their interests. They also do not translate these texts, which were born in another context, into the present situation. To give an example: according to them, the regulation that the hands of a thief have to be cut off has also to be practised nowadays (Wahid (2009): 103-05). It is clear that the book Ilusi sees the activities of the PKS and the HTI as a major threat to good harmonious relations in Indonesia and as a transnational attempt to found a radical fundamentalist “Arab” type of Islam in Indonesia. This is the reason to take a closer look at these two movements in Indonesia.

28 For me it was a strange feeling on Christmas Eve to be body-searched by policemen before entering the church, which could only be entered by two doors whereas normally there were six! 29 The cell system is used not only within Islam—several Charismatic Prosperity Gospel churches in Indonesia use it as well.

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PKS The PKS started as the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan, PK) on 9 August 1998. It was established by several Muslim intellectuals working at the university level. Its philosophical basis was the universality of Islam, so it can be called a religious party that wants to practise Islamic values holistically on all levels: religion, politics, state, and society. According to them, a political party is the most effective way of realising an Islamic structured society. In 2003 they changed their name to PKS. Most of the members of the party are former activists in campus mosques. The PKS consolidates its activities through KAMMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia = Union for Action of Muslim Students in Indonesia). This movement is spreading on most of the non-religious universities and academies of Java and also outside Java, where they have a dominant place. Another centre for activities of the PKS in the world of students is the Jamaah Tarbiyah movement for religious education, which has also an important place on many universities (Mubarak 2008: 138- 41). The purpose of this programme is the formation of fundamentalist, pious Muslims called Salafi. In the PKS, this fundamentalism is dialectically united with pragmatic politics. They are ready to work together with other political parties and even to compromise with the ideas of other parties. In this way, the PKS began, in fact, with a new paradigm in Indonesia that had changed from political Islam to Islamic Politics and wanted to contribute to truly Islamic democracy (see Hilmy 2007: 1-45).30

In the 1999 national parliamentary elections they received (still as PK) only 1.36% of the votes, in 2004 7.34% and in 2009 7.88% of the votes. With these results, it is the only Islamic based political party in Indonesia that grew during the reformation period. There are several reasons for this. The first reason is the change in name from PK to PKS in 2003. As PK, the party’s “chief campaign was an ideological Islam, such as the application of Shari’ah and how to make the state more Islamic.” In 2003 “PKS changed their campaign strategy, from promoting an exclusivist Islamic programme to advertising more pragmatic universal issues such as clean government, anti-violence, and anti-corruption” (Assyaukanie 2009: 197). A second reason is that the PKS has a strong systematic method for the development of its strength by simultaneous practising a continuous process of forming cadre and political education. Other than most political parties, which only get in touch with their constituents if there is an election near at hand, the PKS maintains continual, intensive contact with its supporters (and sympathizers) through dakwah activities and rou- tine education even without showing any characteristic of the party (Karim 2011: 6).

30 Another interesting article in the same volume is Noor 2007.

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In moderate and liberal Islamic circles in Indonesia, the Madinah Charter (Pia- gam Madinah) is often used “as a genuine document of Islam that highly stresses religious pluralism” and is rarely used by more “puritanist” Islamic movements. “PK(S), a political party which has been considered ‘puritanist’, ... adopts the term ‘Piagam Madinah’ as a sign that they are ready to become an inclusive party” (Assyaukanie 2009: 195). On this basis, since the general parliamentary elections of 2009, they have been one of the parties taking part in the government under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. But according to Abdul Gaffar Karim, their participation in the political system is perhaps only a strategy for reaching their goal: It is important to note that, as a political party which inherited the mentality of the Ikhwanul Muslimin, the PKS, which explicitly calls itself a dakwah party, still holds to its ideal of achieving an Islamic state. An Islamic state is the fourth level in the dakwah process, after the levels of the individual, family, and society. That means that possibly in the future the PKS has the opportunity to develop the means to lay the basis for an Islamic state, even though the form and the way to reach that goal will almost certainly be entirely in line with the electoral political spectrum in Indonesia. (Karim 2011: 17). In a word, it is still an open question whether the PKS, as a Islamic based political party, really wants to contribute constructively to the Pancasila state of Indonesia so that Indonesia will become a more prosperous and just state or is only following the political path as a strategy to realise it Islamic ideals, i.e. that Indonesia become an Islamic state with the Shari’ah as national law. HTI Hizbut Tahrir (HT means “liberation party”) is, in fact, an international organisation, established in 1953 in Jerusalem by a Palestinian ulama (Islamic jurist) Taqiyuddin al-Nabhani, who visited Indonesia in 1972. Since that time, the ideology of HT has become known in Indonesia (Ahnaf 2004: 694). In the mid of the 1980s Abdurrahman al Baghdadi, a mubalig (a proclaimer of faith) from Jordan, visited a pesantren in Bogor and had contact with several students and young leaders of Islamic movements in Indonesia. He started to present the HT and, through intensive contacts with him, the HT movement entered and started to develop in Indonesia. During the 1980s, it was mostly active on several campuses, and its activities were usually clandestine. The name Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia became popular in Indonesia after the reformation in 1998. Since 2000, the HTI has often been involved in demonstrations. In comparison with other Islamic movements, the Khilafah Islamiyah is the special element of the HTI (Mubarak 2008: 128-29).

Ir. Dwi Chondro M.Si, an active member of the HTI, explained the Khilafah ideology of the HTI as follows.31 His starting point was that people every-

31 He gave a PowerPoint presentation on the ideology of HTI during SITI III, on 14 July 2004 at the GHCC Duta Wacana, Kaliurang, Yogyakarta.

116 RADICALISATION OF RELIGIONS IN INDONESIA where are experiencing many problems and every human being is faced with three existential questions: What is the origin of human life? What is the goal of human life? And where are people going after death? For human beings, the answers will be that the origin of a human being is material, that he or she is free to decide what he or she will do during his or her life on earth and that there always will be life on earth. Islam’s answers are different. Humans, nature, and life are created by Allah; the goal of human life is to become a servant of God (abdullah) and to become a representative of Allah to order life on earth (khalifatullah fil ardh). After one’s earthly life, there is an eternal life that starts on qiyamat day, Judgment Day, when the good deeds a human performs during his life on earth will be rewarded.

To become a servant of God, a human has to follow God’s commandments given in the Qur’an and in the Sunnah, the commandments, sayings, and acts of the Prophet Muhammad during his life, known as Shari’ah law. Why do people have to follow Shari’ah law? Most of the major problems on this earth are the result of interactions between people and have to do with the power of government, economy, and social life. Human laws are always influenced by personal interest, by their environment, are made at a certain place at a certain time, always lead to reactions by others, and there are always victims. The laws instituted by Allah are good because He knows all His creatures, He does not have any special interests, is not bound to time and place, does not cause reactions, and these regulations are just for all parties. Shari’ah covers all human relations; human relations with God, the relation of a human being with himself, and interhuman relations. All that is needed is an institution that explains how the Shari’ah has to be practised, and that institution is the state that is called Khilafah Islamiyah. Because the Islamic community has to be one and united on the whole earth, only one khalifah, caliph, is needed, who has the right to explain how the divine law, Shari’ah, is to be practised. This is the system of the Khilafah, which can also be called Pan-Islamism.

This ideology makes clear why the HTI does not want to become a political party in Indonesia. Because all human government is made by people, Panca- sila is also of human origin and thus is not perfect. In Indonesia, all political parties are obliged to subscribe to Pancasila as their sole basis, but the Panca- sila is not part of Shari’ah. The HTI also does not agree with democracy because it is of human origin, thus a kuffar system. It is interesting to see that the HT is not allowed in the Kingdom of Arab Saudi and other Arab Nations but can only be found in democratic states (Karim 2011: 4; Ahnaf 2004: 699-700)! In their struggle to build up the khilafah Islamiyah the HTI has to pass through four phases: First promoting the HTI methodology, second interaction with the society to socialize the HTI ideas and to criticize (up-root) the secular system and third to take over the power. (Ahnaf 2004: 701).

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The fourth phase is the establishment of the Khilafah Islamiyah. For them, people who do not want the follow Shari’ah law and the establishment of the Khilafah Islamiyah are the “others,” i.e. all non-Muslims and inclusive Mus- lims whose view is different from theirs. They highlight America and the West (the representatives of the power of Christians and Jews) as the most danger- ous “others” (Ahnaf 2004: 704). The HTI is thus also an anti-Westernisation movement. For instance, when France issued a new law prohibiting the wearing of religious symbols in all public offices and buildings on 2 September 2004, the HTI participated in the organisation of a large demonstration in front of the French consulate in Surabaya. They also organize discussions all over Indonesia, preferably in big stadiums, on all kind of themes. For instance in 2002 they organised a discussion on the slogan “Save Indonesia through Shar- i’ah.” They are convinced that Shari’ah will solve all Indonesia’s problems. Most of their activities are still taking place from and within universities (Mu- barak 2008: 129-31).

In Indonesia the HTI movement is more moderate than (i.e. not as radical as) in the Middle East. Their influence in Indonesia is not as great as that of the PKS, which is now working for and with the common people in Indonesia.

Conclusion During the reformation period (1998-) Indonesia has been searching for a new direction after the New Order of Suharto. As stated in the first part of this article, all kinds of powers are playing a role in the search for a new direction, and want to show their presence by struggling for their ideals. There are all kinds of conflicts, but there are also initiatives at reconciliation, at a search for a better future for Indonesia. Religions also play an important role in this reformation process. In certain Islamic circles there is still the frustration at the fact that the Jakarta Charter, “with the obligation to implement Shari’ah Islam for its adherents,” was removed from Pancasila at the last moment in the declara- tion of independence on 17 August 1945. Because Indonesia is the state with the highest number of Muslims in the world, there is also international Islamic involvement in making Indonesia a purer Islamic state. In this article special attention was given to three “transnational” movements: JI, PKS and HTI. JI is linked to Al Qaida, and can be seen as a movement that uses violence (jihad) against all anti-Islamic powers in Southeast Asia. As a political party, PKS, linked with the Ikhwanul Muslimin, tries to contribute peacefully to the building of a more prosperous and just society in the hope that Shari’ah will one day be acknowledged as the national law in Indonesia. The goal of HTI is the establishment of the Khilafah Islamiyah, a new Pan-Islamic world based on Shari’ah law, with one official interpreter of the Islamic law, the Kalifah, as the representative of God on earth.

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These radical religious movements influence, of course, the present Indonesian context on interreligious relations and also the relations within the different religions themselves. There are some violent acts, there is fear and suspicion, and intolerance is also increasing in some regions. But there is also hope for a better future. Within interreligious relations in this reformation period, the de- sire to build up a secular, civil society in the pluralistic Indonesian context in which all religions can develop well is becoming increasingly apparent. Ac- cording to Assyaukanie, there are three different democratic models that are supported by certain Islamic groups in Indonesia: an Islamic democratic state, a religious democratic state and a liberal democratic state. Although the last model is not yet supported by a majority of Muslims in Indonesia, he con- cludes that there is hope: The defeat of Islamic political parties and the rise of new Islamic civil societies pro- moted by the younger Muslim generation give hope that democracy will grow in Indo- nesia. There is hope for liberal democracy to stand firmly in the world’s largest Muslim country.... Only a liberal civic culture can accommodate and support liberal-democratic values. And, this means that the future of liberal democracy in Indonesia is very much determined by the role of Liberal Islam there. (Assyaukanie 2009: 232) This was once affirmed by Abdul Munir Mulkhan, who said at a presentation of SITI that the ideas of liberal Islam in Indonesia now can be freely expressed and discussed in Indonesia—something that was not possible ten years ago. There is also an interesting publication by Budhy Munawar-Rachman to present a New Indonesian Islamic paradigm (Munawar-Rachman 2010).

There are several Islamic movements In Indonesia at this time—radical, moderate, liberal, cultural—that all have their own ideals and also influence interreligious relations in Indonesia. A special feature of Indonesian Islam is cultural Islam, Islam as adapted to local Indonesian cultures, where cosmic harmony is a very important factor. That also means harmony and tolerance between religions. In this reformation period a crucial question is if it is possible that the relatively new international radical Islamic movements, as described above, can be de-radicalised and integrated within this cultural Islam so that there can be a peaceful co-existence of religions in a hopefully more just and prosperous Indonesian society. The same crucial question can be put to the churches in Indonesia. A number of churches are trying to adapt themselves to the Indonesian cultural context. The more radical, Evangelical and neo-Pente- costal, Charismatic churches also fit certain aspects of the local cultures and for that reason are appeal to quite a number of people. But to develop properly in the Indonesian context they also need to lessen their radical exclusive atti- tude, to be de-radicalised as well. Within this framework, it is noteworthy that within the churches in Indonesia the Indonesian Council of Churches, supported by the Protestant Church of the Netherlands, started a dialogue with

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Neo-Pentecostal Churches.32 Hopefully, an intensive dialogue between religions and also within religions can help integrate the harmony and tolerance between religions as a special characteristic of Indonesian culture within radical national and transnational religious movements.

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32 The Protestant Church of Bali (GKPB), as the chair of the working group, organised the first meeting with a workshop on “the relations between the mainline churches and the Charismatic movement in Indonesia” from 7-9 November 2011 on Bali. I am a member of the steering committee of this working group, which wants to continue the dialogue between mainline churches and Charismatic churches. There is also working group of the PGI/PKN that has been active for a longer period on the relations of the churches with the Islam, with the East Java Christian Church (GKJW) as chair. I am very grateful for the critical comments by Josien Folbert and Jaspert Slop on a draft of this article; they have been actively involved in the dialogue between Islam and Christianity in Indonesia for many years, including in the working group last mentioned.

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