The China Environment Yearbook (2005) the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Yearbooks: Environment

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The China Environment Yearbook (2005) The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Yearbooks: Environment

Volume 1

BEIJING 2007 The China Environment Yearbook (2005)

Crisis and Breakthrough of China’s Environment

Edited by LIANG Congjie and YANG Dongping

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2007 This yearbook is a co-publication with Social Sciences Academic Press (SSAP), Bei- jing, China. It was translated into English from the original Huanjing Lüpi Shu 2005 Nian: Zhongguo de Huanjing Weiju yu Tuwei with ﬁ nancial support from the State Council Information Ofﬁ ce of China.

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Huanjing lüpi shu 2005 nian The China environment yearbook (2005) : crisis and breakthrough of China’s environment / edited by Liang Congjie and Yang Dongping. p. cm. Published in association with Social Sciences Academic Press, Beijing, China. Summary: “This yearbook from the publishing wing of CASS features voices of experts and witnesses from the People’s Republic of China describing and commenting upon the environment and protection measures in the PRC in 2005. This work can also serve as a primary source for analysis of the political climate for NGOs and public intellectual and policy discourse China”—Provided by publisher. ISBN 978-90-04-15636-4 (alk. paper) 1. Environmental protection—China. 2. Environmental policy—China. 3. Environmentalism—China. I. Liang, Congjie. II. Yang, Dongping. III. Title.

TD171.5.C6H86 2007 333.720951--dc22

2007013409

ISSN 1872-7212 ISBN 978 90 04 15636 4

Copyright 2007 by Social Sciences Academic Press, Beijing, China, and by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishers, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher.

Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. printed in the netherlands CONTENTS

Contributors ...... ix

Preface ...... xv Liang Congjie

Acknowledgements ...... xix

General Report: China’s Environmental Protection at the Crossroads ...... xxi Yang Dongping

PART ONE FOCAL ISSUES

1. “Environmental Impact Assessment”—A Storm Stirs in 2005 ...... 3 Xiong Zhihong 2. Warnings and Lessons from the Songhua River Toxic Spill Crisis ...... 19 Qie Jianrong 3. Hard-won Progress in Protecting Environmental Rights ..... 37 Li Xingwang, Ning Chen and Liu Xin 4. “The Yuanmingyuan Park Lake Incident” and Its Impact on Public Awareness ...... 51 Zhao Yongxin 5. Highly Controversial Hydropower Development in Western China ...... 63 Xue Ye and Wang Yongchen 6. Avian Inﬂ uenza Lands in China ...... 89 Liang Hong vi contents

7. Memorandum Concerning the Asian Pulp and Paper Co. Ltd (APP) Incident ...... 103 Chang Li 8. Different Voices in the Debate on “Revering Nature” ...... 117 Bao Hongmei and Liu Bing

PART TWO SPECIAL REPORTS

9. Using Public Policy to Promote the Cradle-to-cradle Economy ...... 133 Gui Zhiming 10. China’s Water Crisis ...... 155 Li Lifeng and Zou Lan 11. The Shadow of Environmental Pollution in China ...... 179 Zhang Kejia 12. Policy Options for China’s Sustainable Energy Development ...... 197 Hu Min and Yang Fuqiang 13. Ecological Recovery: Believing in Nature ...... 217 Jiang Gaoming 14. Land Resource Protection and Management in China ..... 233 Bao Xiaobin 15. “Great Leap Forward”-style Rush to Urbanize Puts Environment in the Spotlight ...... 251 Zhou Weifeng 16. A Fragile Balance: Observations on Protecting Biodiversity 267 Xue Dayuan and Xie Yan 17. Development of Environmental NGOs in China ...... 291 Fu Tao 18. Diverse Approaches to Environmental Education by Chinese NGOs ...... 311 Wang Peng contents vii

PART THREE CASE STUDIES

19. The 26 Degrees Campaign: Saving Energy ...... 331 Qiao Liming and Wang Peng 20. Electric Vehicles and Autos with Small Engines: Should We Ban or Promote Them? ...... 341 Wang Peng 21. The Obsession with Harvesting Cordycep Mushrooms in the Three Rivers Source Area ...... 351 Zhu Huiying and Mu Jingliang 22. The Green Hanjiang River NGO Helps Resolve a Trans-boundary River Pollution Problem ...... 363 Jin Fen 23. Safeguarding Environmental Rights: Activist Efforts by Residents of Beijing’s Baiwang Jiayuan Neighborhood ..... 373 Zhang Jingjing and Liang Xiaoyan 24. Dongwu Banner County Paper Mill: Polluting and Violating Legal Rights ...... 383 Chen Jiqun and Li Junhui 25. Jisha in Yunnan: Environmental and Cultural Protection in the Development of Tourism ...... 393 Li Bo 26. Alxa SEE Association: A New Initiative by Entrepreneurs 407 Yang Peng 27. Countering the Incursion of Genetically Modiﬁ ed Food in China ...... 417 Lin Zhiguang, Wang Peng 28. Community-Based Sustainable Living: Cases in Beijing .... 427 Liao Xiaoyi

Postscript ...... 435

CONTRIBUTORS

Throughout this volume, Chinese names are always ordered according to standard practice in China, with surnames preceding given names. To clarify this ordering, surnames are in all capital letters in the following list of contributors.

BAO Hongmei is a lecturer from the Department of Philosophy of the College of Humanities, Inner Mongolia University. She has published several academic papers on grassland ecology. In 2004 she went to Inner Mongolia to conduct research on the desertiﬁ cation of grasslands.

BAO Xiaobin holds a PhD in environmental economics. He is an associate researcher with the Rural Development Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. He was a visiting scholar at Wageningen University in the Netherlands. He has published dozens of academic papers on land resource management. He won an award for technical progress granted by the State Forestry Administration.

CHANG Li is a member of Friends of Nature and has participated in many activities organized by FON as a volunteer. Chang has worked as a journalist for more than ten years, covering environmental issues in China.

CHEN Jiqun is chief of the Working Committee of Friends of Nature Steppe Network for Steppe Protection and is in charge of the Echoing Steppe website. Chen has devoted himself to environmental protection on the grasslands in Inner Mongolia and environmental education among the herdsmen there. Since 2000 he has contributed to the publication of 14 bilingual books in Mandarin and Mongolian on increasing the legal awareness of the herders.

FU Tao is the chief editor of the Chinese Edition of the China Development Brief, an independent, non-proﬁ t newspaper focusing on the development of Chinese civil society. Fu Tao has written a great number of articles on the development of Chinese NGOs of different types. x contributors

GUI Zhiming has taken an active part in environmental protection and is a volunteer for Friends of Nature.

HU Min works at the Energy Fund.

JIANG Gaoming is a professor from the Botanical Institution of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Dr. Jiang’s areas of research cover botany, plant ecology, pollution ecology, biodiversity conservation and nature conservation. He is a member of the Plant Ecology Branch of the Chinese Association of Botany and a member of the Ecotourism Branch of the Chinese Association of Ecology. He is an editor of Acta Phytoecologica Sinica and Chinese Bulletin of Botany. He is also president of the Chinese Young Plant Ecologist Association. Since 1985 Dr. Jiang has published over 100 papers based on his research in botany and China’s ecology both at home and abroad.

JIN Fen has taken an active part in environmental protection and is a volunteer for Friends of Nature.

LI Bo majored in Natural Resources Management of Cornell Univer- sity. Currently he is project ofﬁ cer of the Center for Biodiversity and Indigenous Knowledge based in Yunnan Province. He is engaged in various projects concerning ecological tourism and cultural protection in Yunnan Province.

LI Junhui is a council member and executive director of Friends of Nature. She has participated in many environmental projects sponsored by Friends of Nature.

LI Lifeng works for the World Wildlife Fund. He is the director of the Fresh Water and Ocean Project for WWF in Beijing. He earned his doctoral degree from the Institute of Geology and Geophysics of the Chinese Academy of Sciences.

LI Xingwang, Ning Chen and Liu Xin were all MA students from the Department of Environment and Resources of the School of Civil Law of China University of Political Science and Law when they wrote this article. They collaborated in writing this paper under the supervision of Professor Wang Canfa, a leading scholar in the ﬁ eld of Chinese law. contributors xi

LIANG Congjie is founder and president of Friends of Nature, the fi rst offi cial environmental NGO in China. He is a professor of history with the Institute of Green Culture of the International Academy of Chinese Culture. Liang is a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and has made important proposals to the CPPCC at each conference. He is devoted to environmental education and has given over a hundred speeches on the importance of environmental protection to university students. Liang Congjie has received several national and international awards including the Ramon Magsaysay Award for public service in 2000. In 2005 he was selected as one of the fi ve Figures of Green China.

LIANG Hong was doing research at the College of Life Sciences at South China Normal University and the Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy of Sciences when writing this paper.

LIANG Xiaoyan is a founder and council member of Friends of Nature. She is head of Beijing Tianxiaxi Education Research Institution.

LIAO Xiaoyi (Sheri Liao) is president and founder of Global Village of Beijing. She has been widely recognized for her outstanding contributions to advocating a green way of life. She was one of those who initiated the “26°C Air-Conditioning Energy-Saving Campaign.” She was winner of the 2000 Sophie Environmental Protection Fund Prize in Norway, widely regarded as the Nobel Prize of environmental protection. She has also been awarded the Australian Banksia International Award, Women of China “2001 Person of the Year,” Public Welfare Award for the Top Chinese Economic Figures of 2005 and the 2006 Figure of Green China award.

LIN Zhiguang is project director of Greenpeace China, Beijing Liai- son Ofﬁ ce. He is in charge of promoting food safety and developing sustainable agriculture.

LIU Bing is a professor from the Institute of Science, Technology and Society under the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at Tsinghua University. He is a visiting professor at Shanghai Jiaotong University. He has published 6 books and over 150 academic papers. He is a member of the standing council of the Chinese Association for the History of Science and Technology. He is also a member of Friends of Nature. xii contributors

MU Jingliang is a volunteer for legal support for the Ecological and Environmental Protection Association at the Source of the Three Rivers. Before he became engaged with the association’s work, he was a judge in the Haidian District People’s Court in Beijing.

QIAO Liming is an associate for the Energy and Climate Program, WWF China.

QIE Jianrong is a senior reporter for Legal Daily. Over the past 20 years she has focused her reporting on China’s environmental issues and has witnessed many major environmental events and accidents occurring throughout China. She has interviewed many important fi gures in the fi eld of environmental policy on various levels from the top government offi cials to grassroots environmentalists and thus she is well informed about major environmental issues in China.

WANG Peng graduated from the Department of Sociology of Peking University. He is an active member and volunteer of Friends of Nature. He is committed to environmental protection in China and has participated in many campaigns to conserve the environment.

WANG Yongchen is president of Green Earth Volunteers, a Chinese environmental non-governmental organization, and a senior environmental reporter for the Beijing-based China National Radio. She was one of the organizers of an unprecedented public campaign to save the Nujiang River in southwest China. The initiative brought together non-governmental organizations, scientists, government ofﬁ cials as well as the general public to oppose a project to build 13 dams on the river and to call instead for development along the Nujiang that respects the environment and local communities.

XIE Yan is an associate researcher from the Institute of Zoology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. He is the coordinator for the Biodi- versity Protection Task Force under the leadership of the International Cooperation Commission on Chinese Environment and Development. With his colleagues Xie Yan completed his research project on the protected areas in China.

XIONG Zhihong is a senior reporter for China Environment Journal and a director on the editorial board. In the past 20 years she has published contributors xiii hundreds of articles covering environmental issues in China, many of which have won national awards. Her articles exposing environmental problems often pushed the local authorities to solve these problems. She ﬁ rmly supports environmental NGOs in China, serves as a council member of Friends of Nature and is actively involved in activities organized by Green Earth Volunteers. She is also a contributor to the website “Our Attachment to the Nujiang River.”

XUE Dayuan is Chief of Conservation Division of Nanjing Institute of Environmental Science of the State Environmental Protection Administration. He worked as a postdoctoral research fellow at the Department of Economics of University of Queensland, Australia. He also served as international consultant for UNDP and ESC AP/UN. He is a member of the World Commission on Protected Areas of IUCN (The World Conservation Union). His research areas include biodiversity and biosafety. He has published over ten books and dozens of papers in these ﬁ elds.

XUE Ye is an environmentalist and was the general executive of Friends of Nature when he co-wrote this article with Wang Yongchen. In the capacity of the general executive of FON, Xue Ye attended many conferences and symposia on China’s environmental issues. He spoke at the public hearing on the “Yuanmingyuan Park Lake Incident” on behalf of FON and debated forcefully against the building of dams on the free ﬂ owing Nujiang River on a symposium on the Nujiang River held in Kunming. His remarks were widely reported on the media and on the Internet.

YANG Dongping is vice president of Friends of Nature. A professor of education with the Beijing Institute of Technology, Yang has published books and numerous articles on educational problems in China. He is also the head planner of the Century Lyceum on Phoenix Satellite TV where leading Chinese scholars have been invited to give speeches to a nationwide television audience.

YANG Fuqiang is vice president of the Energy Fund and chief representative of the Beijing Ofﬁ ce of the World Wildlife Fund. He earned his doctoral degree from the University of West Virginia. Before joining WWF, he worked for the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Energy Research Institute of the National Planning Committee. xiv contributors

YANG Peng is a coordinator for the specialists group of Alxa See Association and director of the Cultural Research Institute of Beijing Tianxiagu Entrepreneurs. He worked for the Research Center for Environmental and Economic Policies under the State Environmental Protection Administration.

ZHANG Jingjing is director of the Litigation Session of the Law Service Center for Pollution Victims at China’s University of Political Science and Law. She has acted as a lawyer in many lawsuit cases concerning environmental pollution.

ZHANG Kejia is a senior reporter with China Youth Daily. Over 20 years, she has written more than a thousand articles on China’s environment, many of which have had a signiﬁ cant social impact. Now she is a media consultant for The Nature Conservancy (TNC). She is founder of Green Island, an environmental NGO which has sponsored many activities for environmental protection. She is in charge of their website: www.cydgi.org.

ZHAO Yongxin is an active reporter for the People’s Daily. He was the fi rst journalist to cover the “Yuanmingyuan Park Lake Incident.” His article attracted wide social attention and led to a public hearing on this issue, the fi rst public hearing of its kind in China. He wrote some 20 follow-up articles on the Yuanmingyuan Incident. Zhao has covered environmental problems for seven years with over 1000 articles published. He is known for his in-depth investigative reporting. He was chosen as one of the fi ve Figures of Green China in 2005.

ZHOU Weifeng has taken an active part in environmental protection and is a volunteer for Friends of Nature.

ZHU Huiying is a lawyer of the Haiwen Law Firm in Beijing, and she is an environmental protection volunteer. Over a long period of time she has given her attention to resource problems at the Source of the Three Rivers in Qinghai Province.

ZOU Lan is director of the Institution for Economic Research of the Shenzhen Business Newspaper. She is also a project ofﬁ cer of UNDP and was a visiting professor at Birmingham University in Britain. She has been involved in many research projects on both provincial and national levels. She has published academic papers both in Chinese and English. PREFACE

The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development passed at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 proclaimed important principles concerning sustainable development: in order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development process; environmental issues are best handled with participation of all concerned citizens. Public participation is indispensable for the true application of a scientiﬁ c outlook on development, the achievement of sustainable development and the building of a resource-conserving and environment-friendly society. Without citizen involvement, all these goals will become empty slogans. Hence, orderly public participation is one of the most important social conditions for best handling environmental issues. Under the current social framework, neither the government, however strong, nor the market economy, however developed, can replace the function of civil society. Civil society, also known as the third sector, functions in conjunction with the government and market economy. In civil society the role of NGOs (non-governmental and nonproﬁ t organizations) is a representation of conscientious, voluntary and orderly participation and involvement in public issues. NGOs serve as a major expression of and a major vehicle for public participation. Owing to their independence, NGOs are able to integrate different social forces by being a social mediator. NGOs should play a bigger role in promoting public participation in environmental protection, and therefore they should be encouraged, better supported and more understood. As far as most NGOs are concerned, their efforts and experiments of various kinds highlight the social awakening of civil society. It goes without saying that an NGO only represents a particular group of citizens who share the same views. The China Environment Yearbook (2005), known as the Green Book of Environment 2005 in the original Chinese version, is an attempt by an NGO to gather a large number of experts to observe the current record and consider the process of environmental protection in China from the public perspective. xvi preface

“Friends of Nature” was China’s fi rst environmental NGO, and we have compiled our fi rst environmental yearbook. To our knowledge, this is the fi rst attempt made by a Chinese NGO in the fi eld of environmental protection. We admit that our access to information is limited; the expertise we rely on is comparatively weak; the human resources, fi nancial resources and time that we have devoted to the compilation are all inadequate. Because we lacked experience, problems and shortcomings were unavoidable in organizing and compiling this book. Nevertheless, our effort is not without merit. The biggest strength is that our work is written from a non-governmental perspective. Our perspective and stance will certainly contribute to rational decision-making and selection of focal topics of research by governmental departments, media organs and academic circles. Currently, public involvement in environmental issues is somewhat unbalanced in China. In the yearbook, we try to allow as many environmentalists, reporters, lawyers, NGO representatives and concerned citizens who work in the front line to air their views. Meanwhile, we pay due attention to comments and attitudes of people from all walks of life. While adhering to a non-government perspective and stance, the authors of the book are encouraged to step outside their own professions and occupations so as to objectively examine and record China’s progress and problems in environmental protection in the past year. Considering our target audience, the yearbook does not follow a strictly academic style but rather tries to make the contents of the book easy to understand. By presenting the experts’ academic research fi ndings in a simple and popular manner the book enables non-academic readers to have access to this information. At this stage this is only a goal. We may not reach our goal, and so we welcome criticism and suggestions with the hope that we will be able to make all-round improvements when we compile our environment yearbook next year. For the publication of this book, I would, fi rst of all, like to express my thanks to each author and editor. Almost without exception, they are busy with multiple responsibilities. Out of their trust in “Friends of Nature” they voluntarily supported and took part in the compilation of this book. To meet the deadline, they worked day and night. We give our deep thanks to our supporter and partner Delta Envi- ronmental and Educational Foundation, without whose support the publication of the book would have been almost impossible. Further preface xvii thanks must be expressed to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences for their support and endorsement of this work. I also give thanks to many friends involved in editing the book. They include members and council members of “Friends of Nature” and volunteers. It is impossible for me to mention all their names, so allow me to express my gratitude to them all. Finally, it should be noted that although the book is edited and published by Friends of Nature and endorsed by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, it does not mean that the opinions of each article represent those of the organization. Similarly, the book as a whole does not represent the opinions of the individual authors.

Liang Congjie December 27, 2005

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The China Environment Yearbook (English edition) involved a great deal of work. Thirty articles totaling about 250,000 Chinese characters from the original Green Book of Environment 2005 had to be translated into English within a little more than three months. Fortunately we received extensive and enthusiastic support from volunteers. Altogether 108 volunteers participated in the project with Wang Lili, Liang Hong and Zhai Zheng, teachers from the School of English and International Studies of Beijing Foreign Studies University (BFSU), serving as coordinators. The volunteers were divided into three groups. The ﬁ rst group completed the draft translation. The ﬁ rst group was mostly composed of students from the School of Translation and Interpretation and the School of English and International Studies of BFSU. Those engaged in the translation are Ai Di, Cai Jindong, Chen Chen, Chen Jie, Chen Jin, Chen Min, Cheng Mei, Cheng Xixu, Cui Li, Ding Yanyan, Du Qian, Fu Li, Fu Qi, Geng Jiamin, Gu Cuicui, Guan Hui, Guo Li, Guo Liangliang, Guo Ying, Hu Min, Hu Yi, Hu Yiting, Ji Fang, Jia Wei, Kong Chuixia, Kong Qinghua, Li Jia, Li Peijie, Li Yanlei, Li Zhihong, Lin Minhua, Liu Hongli, Liu Yan, Luo Junxiao, Ma Shuangshuang, Shen Fei, Shi Qing, Song Rui, Sun Jingyi, Sun Meng, Tan Qi, Tao Qian, Wan Ye, Wang Feng, Wang Jing, Wang Lili, Wang Min, Wang Xiujiong, Wang Yingchong, Wang Zhou, Wen Chaowei, Wu Beini, Wu Qi, Wu Yan, Yan Jinying, Yang Liuqing, Yao Mengyao, Yu Dongwen, Zhai Pei, Zhai Zheng, Zhai Zhiliang, Zhang Bozhi, Zhang Qian, Zhang Shuo, Zhang Tong, Zhang Weiping, Zhang Yang, Zheng Wenbo, Zhu Jinshan, Zhu Weizhen and Zhu Yan. The second stage of the work was to revise the draft, which was accomplished by teachers from the School of English and International Studies of BFSU. Their revision greatly improved the quality of the translation. They are Dai Ning, Dou Wei, Jia Ning, Ke Ke’er, Li Yuan, Li Zhaohui, Liang Hong, Qiu Feng, Shen Changying, Song Ying, Wang Lili, Wu Qing, Yi Rui, Yi Yan, Zhai Runlei, Zhang Chunbo, and Zhou Dujuan. Next, all chapters were edited and proofread by native speakers of English from various countries including Australia, Britain, Canada, xx acknowledgements

Malaysia, New Zealand, and the U.S. They carefully went over the translation pieces and made corrections wherever necessary. Their work vastly improved the quality of this volume. These foreign colleagues include Bob Adams, Jill Van Alstyne, Helen Wylie Bartle, Brian Garms, Connie Grenz, Daryl Grenz, Dean Grenz, Sara Grimes, Sean Halse, Chris Haughee, Khoo Po Ai, Titus Levi, Ly Luu, Bill Lyons, Mary Montgomery, Thomas Peart, Aaron Sachs, Beth Schultz, Besty Wahl, William White and Helen Young. Titus Levi also worked with Wang Lili on a ﬁ nal revision of each chapter to further polish the English translation. We are grateful to all of the people mentioned above, for without their hard work the publication of the English edition of The China Environment Yearbook (2005) would have been impossible. We deeply appreciate their volunteer spirit and hope that this spirit will inspire more people to work for environmental protection in China and throughout the whole world.

Friends of Nature January 5, 2007 CHINA’S ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AT THE CROSSROADS

Yang Dongping

The year 2005 witnessed a range of ups and downs in China’s environmental protection. It began with an exciting “Environmental Impact Assessment Storm” launched by the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), but ended tragically with the Songhua River toxic spill crisis—an indication of China’s serious environmental challenges in an era of rapid economic growth. Overall, China’s environmental protection has experienced stable and signifi cant development. China’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan on National Economy and Social Development (2006–2010) has laid out a grandiose roadmap for the country consistent with “a scientifi c outlook on development,” that is to achieve economic growth while taking into consideration the welfare of disadvantaged sectors as well as environmental concerns. Some new goals and measures for sustainable social and economic development include building a resource-conserving society, promoting a circular economy,1 and launching pilot programs for “Green GDP” (i.e., accounting for the environment in welfare measurement). The importance and infl uence of environmental protection as a basic national policy have been greatly strengthened. The public’s participation in environmental protection programs has reached unprecedented proportions. China’s environmental problems and ecological crises in 2005 are still stark. Pollution and ecological deterioration have become worse, while the booming economy and the rising population are adding to the pressure. Are we able to avoid the traditional route of industrialization

1 “Circular economy” means interlinked manufacturing and service businesses seeking the enhancement of economy and environmental performance through collaboration in managing environmental and resource issues. The theme is the exchange of materials where one facility’s waste, including energy, water, materials—as well as information—is another facility’s input. By working together, the community of businesses seeks a collective beneﬁ t that is larger than the sum of the individual beneﬁ ts each enterprise, industry and community would realize if it intended to optimize its performance on an individual basis. xxii yang dongping and embark on the path of sustainable development? China’s environmental protection is at a critical juncture.

I. Milestones in China’s Environmental Protection in 2005

A. Songhua River Toxic Spill Crisis On November 13, 2005, an explosion occurred at a petrochemical plant of PetroChina Jilin Petrochemical Company, killing fi ve and injuring nearly 30 people. Another person was missing. The explosion led to a spill of an estimated 100 tons of toxic substances made up of a mixture of benzene, aniline and nitrobenzene into the Songhua River. The spill resulted in cutting water supply in Harbin for four days and polluting the water in some downstream Russian cities. A mysterious gap of 10 days occurred between November 13 and 23, when SEPA fi rst disclosed the news to the public on November 23. According to SEPA, it had not received any report on the accident from the environmental authorities in Jilin Province, so it missed the best timing for alleviating the impact of the disaster. SEPA was not alone in missing the opportunity. In Harbin, the provincial capital of neighboring Heilongjiang Province, citizens rushed to buy bottled water on November 21. The fi rst notice issued by the municipal government, however, said, “Water supply would be cut for four days due to pipeline and infrastructure inspection” as of noon November 22. Scare and panic took over the city. Rumors, including an impending earthquake, fl ew across the town. People swarmed to the airport and train station, and the highway was heavily congested for some time. In the evening of November 21, the Harbin Municipal Government issued an urgent notice, offi cially explaining the real cause of the cut. On November 30, Xie Zhenhua, minister of SEPA, resigned and was held accountable for inappropriate handling of the Songhua River toxic spill crisis. He was replaced by Zhou Shengxian, former director of the State Forestry Administration. On December 26, SEPA issued the last press release on the situation of the Songhua River—data on all monitoring sections along the Songhua River within China showed the concentrations of nitrobenzene and benzene were lower than the permissible national standards for surface water quality. Barely a month later, on December 16, Shaoguan Smelting Plant released an unspecifi ed amount of cadmium waste into the Beijiang china’s environmental protection at the crossroads xxiii

River. Ironically, the smelting plant had been awarded “National Model Plant for Pollution Prevention” for a number of times. In recent years, such major accidents are nothing new. On December 23, 2003, a toxic gas blowout at an oil and gas well in Kai County, Chongqing killed 234 people. In March 2004, Sichuan Chemical Co., Ltd. discharged a large amount of wastewater containing high-concentration ammonia and nitrogen into the Tuojiang River. These accidents have shed light on some major problems in the geographical distribution of heavy industrial companies, production safety and environmental protection. Furthermore, inadequacies in the crisis management and information disclosure procedures of local governments are also brought under the limelight.

B. Bird Flu Striking China In 2005, the world was hit by simultaneous outbreaks of bird fl u again. The epidemic struck both the Chinese mainland and Taiwan. From mid-October, when the fi rst bird fl u case of the year was reported in Taiwan, to December 14, 112 villages, 55 townships, 30 counties, 23 prefectures or cities and 11 provinces in China had suffered from 30 highly pathogenic avian infl uenza (HPAI) outbreaks. An HPAI outbreak in migratory birds was confi rmed in Qinghai Province. In total, 158,200 birds were affected, 151,200 were dead and 22,225,800 had to be culled. On December 13, the quarantine ban was lifted in 23 affected areas and initial success of bird fl u control was achieved in China.2 However, on December 16, another bird fl u case was reported in Suichuan County, Jiangxi Province, where 319,600 poultry were culled. During the outbreaks, a number of human cases of bird fl u were reported. On November 16, two cases involving human infection with the highly pathogenic H5N1 avian infl uenza were confi rmed—one in Hunan Province, the other in Anhui Province. On December 6, a human case of highly pathogenic avian infl uenza was reported in Ziyuan County, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, and the victim was a 10-year-old girl. On December 8, a human case was confi rmed in Heishan County, Liaoning Province; on December 15, a human

2 “Initial Success of Bird Flu Control Achieved in China,” http://www.agri.gov.cn/ xxlb/t20051215_516161.htm (accessed December 15, 2005). xxiv yang dongping case was reported in Suichuan County, Jiangxi Province; and on December 19, a human case of highly pathogenic avian infl uenza was confi rmed in Sanming City, Fujian Province, and the patient died on December 21. Since 1980, some 30 new animal epidemic diseases have been discovered in China or introduced from foreign countries. The direct economic loss resulting from livestock and domestic animal diseases amounts to over RMB 20 billion every year and the indirect economic loss is about 3 to 5 times bigger. The spread of the mad cow disease, AIDS, Ebola, SARS and bird fl u on a global scale is a new challenge for the entire humankind. Countries around the world are cooperating to prevent a possible global outbreak of the bird fl u disease. Research has shown that the causes of bird fl u include virus mutation, changes in the ecological environment and human activities. Recurring cases of epidemic diseases contracted commonly by both human beings and livestock have shed more light on not just the inseparable connection between humans, animals and the ecological system, but the importance in understanding such a connection as well.

C. SEPA Launching an “Environmental Impact Assessment Storm” On January 13, SEPA, China’s top environment watchdog, issued a notice, describing the illegality of 30 infrastructure projects (construction started before their environmental impact assessment reports were approved by environmental authorities), including some projects of the China Three Gorges Project Corporation, and ordered construction to be suspended. It was SEPA’s ﬁ rst such disclosure of illegal infrastructure projects since the establishment of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). On the list were some large state- owned enterprises and key projects, including plants constructed by the China Three Gorges Project Corporation (the Xiluodu Hydropower Station on the Jisha River, the Three Gorges Underground Power Plant and the Three Gorges Project Electric Power Supply Plant). On February 2, Pan Yue, vice minister of SEPA, announced that all the 30 projects had stopped construction and were waiting for approval of their EIA documents. This move has had a huge impact on the entire society. EIA has since drawn unprecedented attention. By the end of October 2005, SEPA had received 725 EIA reports for infrastructure projects and approved 850 reports (including 5 tables), which is an increase of around 30% from the 500 reports received in 2004. china’s environmental protection at the crossroads xxv

To assist the central government in the macro-control of economic development programs, the environmental authorities have also stepped up their efforts in monitoring the legal compliance of energy projects. In the beginning of 2005, SEPA detailed the progress of the desulfurization programs at key coal-fi red or natural gas fi red power plants during the Tenth Five-Year Plan Period (2001–2005) in acid rain and sulfur dioxide pollution control areas, and disclosed a list of 46 coal-fi red power plants which had not initiated the desulphurization program, including Wangting Thermal Power Plant and Huadian Power International Zouxian Power Plant. In July of 2005, the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Land and Resources, the Minis- try of Water Resources, and SEPA issued a joint notice, ordering the suspension of construction at 32 law-breaking power plant projects. In handling the Yuanmingyuan plastic membrane crisis, SEPA made another bold move in holding China’s fi rst public hearing over an environmental issue since the introduction of the EIA regime. Public participation and EIA led to the fi nal resolution of the problem.

D. Central Government Setting Sustainable Development as a New Goal In an effort to implement a scientifi c outlook on development and a strategy for sustainable development, the central government has initiated some new goals for environmental protection, such as: building a “resource-conserving” society; building an environmentally friendly society; “developing a circular economy.” The central government’s attitude toward environmental protection has experienced a vast change. Environmental issues are now high on the agenda of the government, and a “basic national policy” which asserts the importance of environmental protection has been developed. In the Report on the Work of the Government delivered at the National People’s Congress in March 2005, Premier Wen Jiabao proposed to: promote economic restructuring and transformation of the pattern of economic growth; pay close attention to conservation and the rational use of energy and resources; focus on prevention and control of water pollution; and solve environmental pollution problems that seriously affect the well-being of the people. In June 2005, Premier Wen chaired an executive meeting of the State Council with the themes of a resource-conserving society and a circular economy. Participants at the meeting reached a consensus that a resource-conserving society is a new model of industrialization. Resource exploitation should run parallel to conservation while the xxvi yang dongping latter should be given priority. Conservation and more effi cient use of energy and resources should be emphasized. The work will be focused on saving energy, water, materials, and land resources. All resources should be used in a comprehensive manner and recycling should be encouraged. The government will work vigorously to improve traditional institutions, mechanisms, technology and management through reforms and scientifi c advances. The ultimate goal is to change the pattern of economic growth and establish a conservation-oriented production, consumption and urban development model through the introduction of appropriate policies in economy, law, administration, technology and education.3 The Communiqué of the Fifth Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) released in October 2005 states: the central government shall “step up its efforts in building a society that conserves resources and is environmentally friendly. It shall develop a circular economy. It shall strengthen environmental and ecological protection, and solve environmental pollution problems that seriously affect the social-economic development and, in particular, the health of the people. The goal is to achieve economic growth and the consumption model will be characterized by resource-conservation.”4 The CPC Central Committee’s Proposal on the Eleventh Five-Year Plan on National Economy and Social Development states that in order to implement a scientifi c outlook on development, China’s pattern of economic growth must be changed immediately. “Resource conservation should be regarded as a basic national policy. With such a guideline, promoting a circular economy, environmental protection and the building of a resource- conserving and environmentally friendly society would ultimately result in a balance among economic growth, population, resources and the environment. The government should advocate an information-based national economy and society, explore a new model of industrialization, and achieve energy-effi cient development, clean development, safe development and sustainable development.”5

3 Wen Jiabao, “Stepping up our efforts in building a resource-conserving society,” People’s Daily, July 4, 2005. 4 “Fifth Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of CPC held in Beijing,” Guangming Daily, October 12, 2005. 5 “CPC Central Committee’s Proposal on the Eleventh Five-Year Plan on National Economy and Social Development,” China Youth Daily, October 9, 2005. china’s environmental protection at the crossroads xxvii

On November 23, Premier Wen Jiabao chaired an executive meeting of the State Council on how to strengthen environmental protection. The Decision of the State Council on Strengthening Environmental Protection was discussed and endorsed at the meeting. The Decision sets forth the fundamental principles, priorities, measures and mechanisms for sustainable development as well as the targets of environmental governance by 2010.

E. Yuanmingyuan Plastic Membrane Crisis Indicating Growing Trend of Public Participation in Environmental Governance A large number of environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have become a close partner with the government by playing an active and positive role in some major environmental protection events. After the “Environmental Impact Assessment Storm” was launched by SEPA in January of 2005, 56 non-governmental environmental groups, including Friends of Nature, Global Village of Beijing, Green Earth Volunteers, and China Association for NGO Cooperation, delivered a joint letter to SEPA, supporting its stricter enforcement of environmental laws. In early April, the administrative offi ce of Yuanmingyuan, which is a national cultural heritage park,6 ordered lakebeds in the park be lined with plastic membrane to help stem the seepage of water from the lake. The park restoration project soon provoked a public outcry because of the signifi cant environmental and ecological implications. The handling of this crisis has become a model for the successful partnership between environmental NGOs and the government’s environmental authorities. The NGOs helped disclose the information and established a mechanism for public participation. The public hearing sponsored by SEPA over the anti-seepage project of Yuanmingyuan was a breakthrough in the cause of China’s environmental protection. Among the 73 representatives attending the hearing, some ten people were from non-governmental environmental organizations. A representative from Friends of Nature made fi ve recommendations jointly proposed by seven environmental groups including Friends of Nature and the

6 Yuanmingyuan was the emperor’s private pleasure garden. Founded in the early 18th century, it was burned down by British and French infantry in 1860. xxviii yang dongping

Global Village of Beijing. Representatives from all walks of life had an in-depth discussion and evaluation on the Yuanmingyuan project. Shortly afterwards, the entire EIA Report on the Lakebed Anti-seepage Project in Eastern Yuanmingyuan prepared by Tsinghua University was published on the ofﬁ cial website of SEPA. This level of openness is unprecedented. Additionally Friends of Nature held two seminars on the project, both of which were broadcast live online at www.bokee. com. On July 7, 2005, Pan Yue, vice minister of SEPA, announced that SEPA had carefully reviewed and approved the EIA Report prepared by Tsinghua University, and ordered the revision of the original program. Xie Zhenhua, the minister of SEPA at the time, said, “When it comes to sensitive issues and issues concerning public interest, environmental authorities should hold public hearings and make decisions in a democratic and lawful manner.”

F. Debate on Construction of Hydropower Projects in Western China The proposal of China’s hydropower authorities to develop a series of large hydropower plants on major rivers in Western China, such as: the Minjiang River, Dadu River, Yagong River, Nujiang River, Jinsha River, and Lancang River, engaged the close attention of the public, the media and NGOs. A 2-resevoir and 13-dam-cascade development plan along the Nujiang River, where the ecological system is fairly well preserved, has become the focus of public attention. Discussions on the plan started in 2004 and continued into 2005. The advantages of hydropower include the absence of coal or other fossil fuels as well as the reduced emission of toxic gases such as greenhouse gases. In this sense, it has been regarded as a clean energy. Nonetheless, large hydropower projects will result in an irreversible negative impact upon the eco-system and a huge evacuee resettlement problem. China’s southwest, rich in hydraulic resources but prone to geological hazards, has been recognized throughout the world as a terrestrial eco-region with some of the richest and the most fragile biodiversity. It is also a region with extremely rich cultural diversity, where many ethic minority groups reside. Accordingly, it is extremely shortsighted to only think of the potential for electricity generation while ignoring or underestimating other social environmental factors. Hydropower projects in Western China must go through adequate EIA studies. A rational decision should be made by considering the china’s environmental protection at the crossroads xxix preservation of the river bio-system, natural heritage and cultural diversity. Procedural equity should be maintained and the interests of local inhabitants should be protected. In January 2005, a hot debate on “whether man should revere Nature” was featured in the Chinese press, shedding light on the confl icts in values and the patterns of development. In April, some scientists, including He Zuoxiu and Lu Youmei, who support the massive hydropower projects on the Nujiang River, visited the Nujiang River. The Yunnan Provincial Government held a seminar, where Xue Ye, a representative of Friends of Nature, listed ten reasons why large dams should not be built on the Nujiang River. In August, 61 non-governmental environmental organizations and 99 environmental activists signed a joint Call for Public Disclosure of Nujiang Hydropower Development in Accordance with the Law. In October, the section on hydropower development in the CPC Central Committee’s Proposal on the Eleventh Five-Year Plan on National Economy and Social Development was changed from “proactively develop hydropower projects” into “develop hydropower projects in an orderly manner while protecting the environment.” In November, representatives from Chinese environmental NGOs participated in a general meeting of Rivers Watch East and Southeast Asia (RWESA) held in Siem Reap, Cambodia. Experts and NGO representatives from countries at the lower reaches of the Nujiang River and Lancang River pointed out at the meeting that China’s dam construction projects in the upper reaches of the rivers as well as in Southeast Asia have affected the local eco-environment and the livelihood of fi shermen. In December, construction of the Xiluodu Hydropower Station on the Jinsha River formally began, marking the fi rst step of hydropower projects on the river. The two hydropower stations, Xiluodu and Xiangjiaba, will have a total installed capacity of 18,600MW, bigger than that of the Three Gorges Projects (18,200MW). The debate on hydropower projects in Western China will certainly continue. Such debates could help to shape the rational decision-making process per- taining to hydropower development and dam construction projects. They are also signifi cant in generating diverse voices and sources of information and fostering a mechanism for public participation and checks and balances. Through such debates, the public may take part in the EIA process. xxx yang dongping

II. Worsening Environmental Crisis

Some of the environmental problems we face now are the result of years of pollution, while others are the result of rapid economic growth in recent years. The latest developments in the environmental condition have the following characteristics detailed as follows.

A. Pollution-control Goals for the Tenth Five-Year Plan Period (2001–2005) Not Met According to the National Tenth Five-Year Plan for Environmental Protection drafted in December 2001, the national environmental protection goals were: By 2005, environmental pollution should be somewhat alleviated; the deterioration of eco-environment should be curbed; and the improvement of environmental quality should be made in urban and rural areas, especially in medium-sized and large cities as well as key areas. Additionally, by 2005, the emission of major pollutants across the country (such as sulfur dioxide and Chemical Oxygen Demand) should be 10% lower than the level in 2000; the rate of municipal wastewater treatment should reach 45%; and the air quality in over 50% of the prefectures or cities should reach Grade II or higher (Grade I is the best and Grade V the worst). In 2003, the rate of municipal wastewater treatment reached 45.67%, but only 39.5% of the prefectures or cities had an air quality of Grade II or higher, which is a short fall of 10 percentage points. The most serious problem, however, is that the discharge of industrial waste increased signiﬁ cantly. In 2003, the emission of sulfur dioxide witnessed a drastic increase in acid rain and sulfur dioxide pollution control areas as well as across the entire country, up by 1.81 million and 2.93 million tons respectively from the 2002 level. The volume of particulate emission increased by 360,000 tons from the 2002 level. The number of cities with acid rain events of the time increased by 7.2 percentage points.7 The emission of sulfur dioxide increased from 19.95 million tons in 2000 to 22.549 million tons in 2004, or up by 13%. Hu Angang et al.’s research concludes that there are four major ﬁ elds where the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001–2005) goals fell short. First, the

7 Hu Angang, Wang Yahua, and Yan Yilong, “Where Did the Tenth Five-Year Plan Plan Fall Short?” Reference for Reform, Issue No. 34, 2003. china’s environmental protection at the crossroads xxxi industrial restructuring deviated from the original goal—the secondary industry experienced a rapid growth while the tertiary industry experienced a slow growth. Second, adjustment in the employment structure did not meet its expectations—the problem of “high growth rate and low employment rate” is all the more evident. Third, energy supply cannot meet the drastic growth in demand—the production and consumption of coal have experienced an abnormally high growth rate, and the problems in the energy infrastructure are getting worse. Fourth, the emission of major pollutants has risen again after a brief period of decline—air pollution and acid rain pollution have become worse. The increase in pollutant emissions represents an excessive shift in the pattern of economic growth to heavy industries. The contribution of heavy industries in the gross value of industrial products has been increasing since 1988, reaching 64.3% in 2003, comparable to the Great Leap Forward period.8 Resource-, energy- and pollution-intensive industries, such as steel, cement, aluminum and coal industries, have grown too rapidly. A “black” pattern of traditional industrialization characterized by high energy consumption and pollution has emerged. The growth rate of energy consumption during the Tenth Five-Year Plan period (2001–2005) exceeded the GDP growth rate. Coal production almost doubled between 2001 and 2004. The average growth rate was 18.3% per year, which was much higher than the planned 3.23%. The accelerated growth in heavy industries and coal consumption has led to the failure in reducing the emissions of sulfur dioxide. Experts predict that by 2025, China’s total emission of sulfur dioxide may well likely surpass that of the United States, thus becoming a “World Champion” in sulfur dioxide emissions. The discharge of industrial pollution has risen sharply while the pace of pollution control and prevention has been extremely slow. The key environmental protection projects proposed for the Tenth Five-Year Plan period (2001–2005) simply cannot be completed on schedule. For instance, 279 key projects were proposed for sulfur dioxide control during the ﬁ ve-year period. Only 61 had been completed by the end of 2003, representing 21.9% of the total, and an additional 72 projects were under construction, representing 25.8%. Even if all projects

8 The Great Leap Forward (1958–1960) was an economic and social plan to rapidly transform China from a primarily agrarian economy into a modern, industrialized society. The plan did not achieve the intended results. xxxii yang dongping under construction were completed, they would only account for one half of the original target. By the end of 2004, of the 279 (which was later adjusted to 266) key pollution control and prevention projects proposed in acid rain and sulfur dioxide pollution control areas, only 96 had been completed, representing 36% of the total. Similarly, by the end of 2004, among the 2,130 projects in the “Key River Basic Program,” 851 had been completed, representing 40% of the total; by July 2005, among the 265 projects in the “Bohai Sea Program” proposed by Shandong, Liaoning, Tianjin and Hebei, four areas, that surround the Bohai Sea, only 134 had been completed, representing 50.6% of the total. In other words, the completion rate of the pollution control and prevention projects detailed in the Tenth Five-Year Plan period (2001–2005) is only between 36% and 50%!9 The completion rate for the “Three-river and Three-lake Project” (water pollution prevention and control plans and programs for three rivers and three lakes) is relatively higher, with the completion rates for projects on the Huahe River, Haihe River and Liaohe River being 76%, 55% and 52% respectively, and on Taihu Lake, Chaohu Lake and Dianchi Lake being 87%, 59% and 52% respectively. On the one hand, local governments are enthusiastic in launching high-pollution projects. On the other hand, they are not serious with pollution control. Despite the fact that SEPA regularly updates pollution projects in an effort to draw the attention of local governments, the effect is rather limited.

B. China’s Environmental Situation Entering a High-risk Period with an Increased Frequency of Accidents

1. Increased Frequency of Environmental Accidents The Songhua River toxic spill crisis in October and the Beijiang River cadmium pollution crisis in December 2005 are not isolated incidents. In 2004, SEPA received 67 environmental accident reports, 6 of which were extraordinarily serious accidents and 13 were serious accidents. The direct economic loss amounted to over RMB 550 million. These accidents indicate that against the background of rapid economic

9 Liang Xiaoliang, “Wang Jinnan, Chief Engineer of Chinese Academy for Envi- ronmental Protection, Reviews China’s Environmental Condition during the Tenth Five-Year Plan Plan Period,” Economic Daily, October 27, 2005. china’s environmental protection at the crossroads xxxiii growth and social transformation, China has entered an era of frequent environmental accidents attributed to long-term negligence in environmental protection and the inadequacy in environmental management and supervision.

2. Serious Water and Air Pollution in Urban Areas to Continue According to the Report on the State of the Environment in China in 2004 published by SEPA, “The state of the environment in China is basically stable. The air quality in urban areas is at a similar level with that of the previous year but the air is severely polluted in some cities. Acid rain pollution is intensifying. There is no visible change in the quality of surface water. The quality of off-shore sea water is at a similar level with that of the previous year while the water in the Donghai Sea and Bohai Sea is heavily polluted.” This means China’s water, air and marine environment are seriously polluted, or in a “stable” condition of heavy pollution. The air quality of two thirds of Chinese cities is either at or below Grade III. In the seven major water bodies in China, 60% of the water has the non-drinkable levels of IV, V and even Below- V. Eighty percent of the sea areas near pollutant discharging outlets are heavily polluted. If the current environmental management and restoration goals are met, “by 2010, the environmental quality in key areas and cities will improve,” “the air quality of key cities, the water quality at the source of drinking water in urban areas and rural areas, and the quality of surface water and offshore sea water nationwide will improve.”10 This implies that until 2010, such a condition of heavy pollution will continue.

3. Natural and Ecological Disasters to be More Frequent The same is true for natural and ecological disasters. According to the Offi ce of State Flood Control and Drought Relief Headquarters (SFDH), during the 2005 fl ood season, big and large fl oods occurred in the Pearl River, Minjiang River (Fujian Province), Hunhe River and Taizi River in the Lianghe River Basin; and the middle and lower reaches of the Xijiang River in the Pearl River Basin experienced extreme fl oods not seen in the past 100 years. The Hanjiang River, a tributary of the Yangtze River, and Weihe River, a tributary of the

10 “Decision of the State Council on Strengthening Environmental Protection,” ofﬁ cial site of SEPA, http://www.zhb.gov.cn. xxxiv yang dongping

Yellow River, witnessed severe fl oods in the fall. Serious mountain torrents, mudslides and landslides occurred in Hunan and Heilongjiang. In the meantime, Hainan, Yunnan and Guangxi experienced serious spring drought while Inner Mongolia, Ningxia and Hunan experienced serious summer drought. Frequent typhoons and tropical storms have resulted in heavy losses in Fujian, Zhejiang, Hainan and Anhui provinces.11 The Ministry of Civil Affairs acknowledged at the Asian Conference on Disaster Reduction, which was held in September 2005, that two thirds of China’s territory is threatened by fl oods of varying degrees and almost half of the cities are located along the earthquake fault zone. With the climate change on the earth, the frequency of natural disasters and the ensuing losses have been on the rise. Since the 1990s, China’s disaster-affected population has been 370 million, the area of affected crops has reached 740 million mu (around 122 million acres), and the direct economic loss has amounted to RMB 100 billion per annum. The fi gures are 40% higher than those in the 1980s.12 We have experienced ecological disasters and crises before. The abnormal climate conditions in Western Sichuan, such as frequent summer droughts, rainstorms and hails, can be attributed to over-logging. The shrinking forest area in the Changbai Mountain led to regional climate changes and severe soil erosion. The destruction of the forest in Daxing’anling resulted in the climate deterioration in the Hulun Buir Grassland. The extreme fl oods in the Yangtze River Basin and Songhua River Basin in 1998 were mainly a result of the massive logging along the upper reaches of the rivers. The frequency of natural disasters correlates to climate change on the earth. According to a WWF report, 2005 marks “the worst year of global climate change in recorded history:” the global average temperature was the highest; the melting of the Arctic ice cap was the most serious; Atlantic hurricanes were the wildest; and water temperatures were the highest in the Caribbean. It was also the driest year for the Amazon River Basin in decades, and drought conditions were worse than anytime in the 20th century.13 Due to the signifi cant degradation

11 “SFDH Discloses Flood Control and Drought Relief Situation in 2005,” ofﬁ cial site of Ministry of Water Resources (accessed October 8, 2005). 12 Jiang Yanxin, “Natural-disaster-related Economic Loss Exceeding RMB 100 Bil- lion over the Past 15 Years,” the Beijing News, September 28, 2005. 13 “WWF: 2005 Has the Worst Global Climate,” Nanfang Daily, December 10, 2005. china’s environmental protection at the crossroads xxxv of China’s ecological system, more and more natural disasters and ecological crises are taking place at a higher frequency.

C. Freshwater Environment Becoming China’s Most Urgent and Important Environmental Problem The freshwater environment covers a wide range of issues such as serious pollution of lakes and rivers and groundwater, the shortage of water resources, and serious soil erosion. With implications in pollution, resources and ecology, the freshwater environment aptly reﬂ ects China’s current environmental crisis.

1. Serious Pollution of Rivers and Groundwater Among the 412 sections of the seven major water bodies monitored in 2004, 41.8% were on Levels I to III (drinkable water), 30.3% were on Levels IV to V (seriously polluted water that people should not touch directly and that could only be used for industrial or agricultural purposes), and 27.9% were on Level Below-V (the function of water environment is totally lost). In rural China, some 300 million people have no access to safe drinking water; the drinking water for 190 million people has harmful substances that exceed the prescribed limits; 63 million people drink high ﬂ uoride water; 2 million people drink high arsenic water; 38 million people drink high-salinity water, and some 11 million people in schistosome-stricken areas have no access to safe water.14 By now, 25% of China’s groundwater aquifers have been polluted, 35% of the groundwater sources have fallen below the national standard; some 54% of the groundwater in the plain areas does not meet the quality standard for domestic water, and the groundwater of over half of the cities has been heavily polluted. Data on the groundwater of 118 medium-sized to large cities gathered in or around 2000 indicate that aquifers in 64% of the cities was seriously polluted and 33% was slightly polluted. The scope of groundwater pollution has been expanding, and the degree and depth of pollution has been on the rise—in some cases, pollutants have even been found in groundwater aquifers. According to the China Geological Survey (CGS), among the

14 Di Duohua, “Experts: Environmental Protection Fails to Keep up with Environ- mental Destruction,” China Youth Daily, August 19, 2005. xxxvi yang dongping

253 major sources of groundwater in 185 cities, 25% has experienced worsening pollution. For instance, over 100 organic pollutants have been found in the groundwater in the Jingjintang Area (including Beijing, Tianjin, Tangshan, Qinhuangdao and Langfang, with a total area of around 21,235 square miles), and the pollution in the groundwater in Beijing is even worse.15

2. Shortage of Water Resources and Over Exploitation Rapid social and economic growth has intensiﬁ ed the shortage of water supply—nearly two thirds of the cities in China have inadequate water supply and one sixth is in severe water shortage. To meet consumption demand, water resources have been excessively exploited. As a result, China now has 164 areas of excessive groundwater exploitation with a total area of 190,000 km2 (around 73,359 square miles), and the annual excessive groundwater exploitation is over 10 billion tons. Ground subsidence and inundation from seawater have occurred in some areas. The total area with ground subsidence has reached 640,000 km2 (around 247,104 square miles) and over 50 cities are experiencing signiﬁ cant ground subsidence.16 The exploitation rate of the Yellow River, Huahe River and Haihe River has exceeded 50% (while 40% is the safe threshold acknowledged internationally), and that of the Haihe River is as high as 95%. Such an over-exploitation has greatly reduced the amount of water for ecological needs, leading to the deterioration of the ecology of the river basins concerned. In some ecologically fragile areas, the water environment has reached such a point that people’s livelihood has been seriously threatened and social and economic development cannot be sustained. According to statistics, some 90 rivers, including major rivers like the Yellow River and Liaohe River, have experienced dry-ups and the river function has declined. Compared with the early 1950s, the total area of lakes has decreased by 15%, the number of lakes along the middle- and lower-reaches of the Yangtze River has decreased by over 50%, and the area of natural wetlands has decreased by 26%.17

15 Liu Wenguo and Wu Yong, “Serious Pollution of Aquifers in Most Medium- to Large-sized Cities in China,” http://www.xinhuanet.com (accessed October 13, 2005). 16 Yao Runfeng, “Over Half of Chinese Cities Have Heavily Polluted Aquifers,” Market News, October 25, 2005. 17 Ibid. china’s environmental protection at the crossroads xxxvii

D. China Facing Intensifying Environmental Pressures The seriousness of China’s environmental problems lies in the following two factors. First, the outdated pattern of economic growth demands such a large supply of energy and resources that China’s serious pollution is not likely to be reversed for a long time. Second, local protectionism, inadequate corporate and government environmental investment, delay of pollution-control projects and serious structural pollution implies that pollution management and restoration can never keep up with environmental destruction. China is now experiencing many pollution hazards that only emerged during the middle- or late-stages of industrialization in developed countries, and no more sustainable environmental capacity is left to sustain the current pattern of economic growth. In the next 15 years, China’s population will reach 1.46 billion and the GDP will quadruple. The expansive growth of the economy and population will bring huge pressures on resources and the environment. At the present level of resource consumption and pollution control, the pollution load will increase by 4 to 5 times. Now, especially during the Eleventh Five-Year Plan period (2006–2010), is the period when the conﬂ ict between the environment and economic development is the most visible. In the meantime, China’s resources are dwindling. The shortage of key mineral resources will intensify. By 2020, among the 45 key mineral resources, the supply of 24 resources would be guaranteed, 2 would be basically guaranteed, 10 would fall short of demand, and 9 would fall signiﬁ cantly short of demand. The domestic supply of major resources necessary for the national economy, such as oil, iron, copper, aluminum and potassium, cannot meet the demand. The shortfall of copper is 3.57 million tons and that of aluminum, 10.55 million tons.18 China is paying a steep price for pollution. Over one third of China’s territory suffers from acid rain, 30% of the water in major water bodies is Level Below-V, and the air quality in 60% of the cities is Grade III or below where citizens cannot breathe in clean air. Among the top 20 most polluted cities cited in the World Bank’s World Development Report 2001, 16 were Chinese cities. In many large cities, the number of people who died from lung cancer has increased by 8 to 10 times. Research has shown that because of air pollution, chronic respiratory

18 “China’s Supply of Major Metal Resources Falling Greater Short of Demand,” China Quality News, August 19, 2005. xxxviii yang dongping diseases have become the major killer of people. The pollution and economic cost resulting from air pollution accounts for around 3–8% of China’s GDP, reaching RMB 128 billion, or the aggregate of the GDP of Guangdong and Shanghai.19 Statistics also show that by 2020, China’s medical expenditure on coal-burning-induced diseases alone would reach USD 390 billion, representing 13% of the GDP. This means even if China could maintain an annual growth rate of 9%, this increase would still fall short of the medical expenditure.20

E. Ecological Deterioration Damaging the Basis of Our Survival Compared with environmental pollution, ecological degradation is more subtle and less easily noticed by city dwellers. However, its damages and consequences are far more serious than those of environmental pollution and most ecological disasters are irreversible. Soil erosion, grassland degradation, desertifi cation and the disappearance of biodiversity will destroy the physical foundation vital for the survival of the Chinese people. The ecological deterioration in recent years is the result of the global climate change and global warming as well as economic activities and the population pressure in China. Statistics from the Ministry of Water Resources indicate that at present, the area affected with soil erosion is 4.8253 million km2 (around 1.8631 million square miles), or a little over half of China’s entire territory. Over the past fi ve decades, some 40 million mu (around 6.59 million acres) of farmland has disappeared as a result of soil erosion, with an annual loss of over 1 million mu (around 164,737 acres). Since the 1990s, the annual increase of desert is 2,460 km2 (around 607,879 acres). Large amounts of sand are washed into rivers and lakes and they are silted up.21 As a result of soil erosion, the area of degraded, sandy and saline- alkali grasslands is now some 1 million km2 (around 247 million acres), or 50% of China’s total grassland area. According to Yellow River at Risk, a report prepared by Greenpeace, over the past fi ve decades, the average temperature in the source region of the Yellow River

19 Hu Zuliu, “Environment, Energy and Economic Growth (Speech),” The Economic Observer, April 25, 2005. 20 Huang Yikun, “Voices from SEPA,” The Economic Observer, January 24, 2005. 21 Tie Zheng, “Soil Erosion Still is China’s Top Environmental Problem,” China Education News, November 22, 2004. china’s environmental protection at the crossroads xxxix has increased by 0.88°C (around 33.6F). It only took 30 years for the glaciers at the source to shrink by 17% and to back off by some one kilometer (around 0.62 miles). The direct water loss is 2.39 billion tons. The major reason behind the recent ecological deterioration in the source region of the Yellow River is climate change.22 As a result of population growth and the expansion of grazing activities over the past 30 years, the pristine area with no human trace on the Qinghai- Tibet Plateau has decreased by some 200,000 km2 (around 49.42 million acres) from 500,000 km2 (around 123.55 million acres). The third survey on desertiﬁ cation conducted by Sichuan Province indicates that as of 2004, the area of desertiﬁ cation in the Ruoergai Grassland had reached 10,000 hectares (around 24,710 acres) and it is growing at an annual rate of around 11%. Experts worry that if the trend is not reversed soon, the entire Ruoergai Grassland would be turned into one of the desert plateaus with the highest elevation in the world. The ensuing sandstorm would “visit” the Chengdu Plain, which is only 300 kilometers (around 186 miles) away from Ruoergai.23 Fifty years ago, the fertile black soil layer in “Beidahuang” (since the late 1950s, hundred of thousands of people have been sent to Beidahuang, literally Great Northern Wasteland, which is in Heilongjiang Province, to reclaim land and promote agricultural development; now it has been dubbed “Beidacang,” literally Great Northern Granary) was as thick as 60–80 cm (around 24–31 inches) with the deepest section reaching 1 meter (around 3 feet). Now, the layer is only half as thick—a thin layer is left in many places and some lands have even become sterile. Among the 140 million mu (around 23 million acres) of farmland in Heilongjiang Province, 80 million mu (around 13 million acres) is suffering from soil erosion and 1.4 million mu (around 230,631 acres) is already gone due to gully erosion.24 China is one of the countries in the world with the richest biodiversity. However, thanks to population growth and over-exploitation, the precious biological species are decreasing at an alarming rate. Researches have shown that 20–40% of the biological species in China

22 “Climate Change: Director of the Contemporary Version of ‘Safeguarding the Yellow River’,” Scientifi c Times, November 1, 2005. 23 Ming Quan and Xia Xianqing, “Sandstorm Approaching the Chengdu Plains,” Sichuan Daily, October 17, 2005. 24 Gao Guangzhi and Sun Yingwei, “Beidahuang to Come Back?” China Youth Daily, April 8, 2003. xl yang dongping are threatened. According to a survey conducted in 1999, some of the domestic animal germplasm resources are extinct and 37 domestic animal species were on the brink of extinction.25 In January 2005, the 2005 Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) was released in Davos, Switzerland at the World Economic Forum. Finland (100 points) ranked fi rst in the world in environmental sustainability out of 144 countries and territories. China (38.6 points) placed 133rd, or 14th from the bottom, in the rankings, just behind Iran. In 2002, when ESI was fi rst produced, China ranked 129th out of 142 countries and territories.

F. Environmental Equity an Emerging Problem; Social Confl icts Intensifying A new feature of today’s environmental problems is that pollution is shifting from urban to rural areas and from eastern China to western China. The environment in urban areas, especially metropolitan cities and more economically developed areas, has witnessed some improvement. The composition of pollutants in urban areas has experienced a material change with exhaust emission becoming the major source of air pollution. In the meantime, however, water sources in rural areas have become more and more polluted due to the industrialization in such areas. Almost all money spent on pollution prevention and control has been allocated in the industrial sector and urban areas while rural areas got next to nothing. The collection treatment of sewage has improved the water quality of urban areas but deteriorated that of rural areas. The simple land fi lling of municipal garbage has made urban areas cleaner but increased the secondary pollution in suburban areas. To a certain extent, the regional improvement in the environment in urban areas is achieved by sacrifi cing that in rural areas. Similarly, the environmental gap between developed and less developed areas is bigger and bigger. According to the 2004 Report on Urban Environmental Management and Comprehensive Control prepared by SEPA, among the 500 cities that had submitted their reports, the rate of centralized treatment of hazardous waste was zero in 155 cities; the rate of centralized treatment of municipal wastewater was zero in 193 cities; and the rate of municipal solid waste treatment was zero

25 People’s Daily, November 30, 2005. china’s environmental protection at the crossroads xli in 160 cities. Most of these cities are small- to medium-sized cities in less developed areas. With the progress of China’s initiative to develop its western regions, large-scale infrastructure projects in energy, hydropower, railroad and pipelines as well as tourism promotion will add greater pressures to the fragile environment in China’s West. In the absence of a proper ecological compensation mechanism, the developed regions have enjoyed the benefi ts of environmental protection while the less developed regions are lagging behind in the competition, resulting in the inequality among regions. While the environmental threshold has been prescribed and polluting enterprises have been restricted in more and more developed regions, many technically outdated and heavily polluting enterprises are moving westward, which has disastrous implications. For instance, Dongwuzhumuqin Banner, Inner Mongolia has introduced a number of polluting enterprises. They not only exploit large amounts of groundwater for ore cleaning and paper making but also discharge tens of thousands of tons of industrial wastewater directly to the grassland, leading to the drying up of numerous lakes and the pollution of the grassland. Wulagai Wetlands, a major wetlands in China, is on the verge of disappearance. Among the 20 industrial zones supported by the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, about half features high energy-consumption enterprises. The immediate manifestation of environmental equity problems is the increased number of cases of environmental rights seeking and environment-related confrontations. Since 1997, the number of pollution-related disputes has been increasing at an annual rate of 25%, with the total number in 2002 over 500,000.26 Statistics from SEPA indicate that over the past three years, the number of environment- related complaints received by environmental authorities throughout the country has been rising at an annual rate of 30%. In 2003 alone, some 500,000 letters were received and over 85,000 petitioners visited relevant government agencies, hoping for resolution of unresolved complaints. The fi gures increased by nearly 70,000 letters and 1,400 petitioners in 2004. It signifi es that the public has a sharpened environmental awareness and seeks to defend their rights. Defending environmental rights has thus become an important issue of public concern. According

26 Xia Guang and Chen Sai, “What Should Be the Basis of Safeguarding Environ- mental Equity?” China Environmental News, March 8, 2005. xlii yang dongping to the Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims at the China University of Political Science and Law, some of the most common environmental disputes and pollution-related legal cases from 1999 to 2005, in descending order, are about noise pollution, air pollution, water pollution and solid waste pollution. During the social transformation, environmental problems are more and more interest-based, involving confl icts in interest between the public and interest groups, the eastern region and the western region, the central government and local governments, and powerful interest groups and weak interest groups, as well as the interest distribution on a global basis. The hydropower projects in southwestern China, the introduction of genetically modifi ed food to China’s market by multinational corporations, and pollution-related environmental justice cases would usually involve an asymmetrical power struggle between the central government, local governments, corporations and local residents. This illustrates the complexity of interest-based environmental problems. Some offi cials seek “the development of the few” at the cost of the majority in the name of “economic development.” The over-exploitation of resources and the destruction of the eco-environment are simply unfair to our future generations. Since 2004, more and more massive protests and confl icts (including those in Hanyuan, Sichuan Province; Dongyang, Zhejiang Province; and Shanwei, Guangdong Province) have occurred because of environmental disputes such as power plant development and corporate pollution, driving home the urgency and seriousness of environmental equity. Bimonthly Talk, a current affairs magazine edited by Xinhua News Agency, for instance, disclosed a ten-year long environmental rights- defending and massive protest case in Baisha Township, Fuchuan County, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. Local offi cials, in the name of attracting investment, had an arsenic factory constructed near the drinking water source of the village.27 “A large number of villagers” gathered to protest inadequate compensation and relocation arrangements for the seizure of land and homes to make way for the Pubugou dam in Hanyuan County, Sich- uan Province in October 2004. The protracted standoff between the police and protesters drew the attention of the central government.

27 “The 10-year-long Environmental Conﬂ ict in a Small Town,” Bimonthly Talk, Issue No. 10, 2005. china’s environmental protection at the crossroads xliii

Subsequent investigations have shown that it was a typical corruption- induced social confl ict. There was “offi cial-businessman collaboration” with Tang Fujin, former party secretary of Hanyuan, and the Peng brothers, unscrupulous businessmen, at the core and a whole group of offi cials in the local government. The collaboration of offi cials and businessmen led to widespread corruption, the negligence of market principles, and ultimately, the chaos of society. The Sichuan government has cracked down on the group.28 On April 10, 2005, a large number of villagers clashed with police in Huashui Township, Dongyang County, Zhejiang Province. Angered by the heavy pollution from local chemical plants, the villagers demanded the plants moved. They believed that the high profi t margin of the plants and the interests of the local government had led to the neglect of the villagers’ survival right. They chanted slogans like “Give my farmland back—I need to survive; Give my farmland back—I need to stay healthy; Give my farmland back—I need my offspring; Give my farmland back—I need to eat; Give my farmland back—I need a good environment.”29 On December 6, 2005, a serious clash between villagers and the police took place in Dongzhou Township, Shanwei City, Guangdong Province, resulting in many casualties and deaths. The villagers were protesting against unfair compensation for having land confi scated by the government for a power plant project.30 Environmental equity is a part of social justice. Environmental injustice will lead to not only more social injustice, but also serious social confl icts and unrests because the basic survival rights of the disadvantaged are taken away.

G. Global Commitment and Obligation China has become the fourth largest economy in terms of the GDP size, and it has also become the largest consumer of resources. Therefore, China’s consumption and utilization of the environment, resources and energy have implications in international trade, diplomacy and national

28 Liu Kang et al., “Distorted Path of ‘Power Capitalization’,” Outlook Weekly, Issue No. 22, 2005. 29 Phoenix Weekly, Issue No. 13, 2005 (No. 182). 30 “The Truth behind Honghai Bay Unrest,” Xinhua News Agency wire, December 10, 2005. xliv yang dongping security. Further, China assumes signifi cant environmental obligations for global climate change. The new version of the “China Threat Theory” talks not only on the impact of China’s waste discharge on the earth’s environment, but also on the country’s enormous consumption of resources. Over the past few years, the international community has been paying attention to the following environmental problems in China: sandstorms, electronic waste generation, tropical forests devastation, genetically modifi ed food, shrinking glaciers and the Songhua River toxic spill at the end of 2005. The following facts are clear evidence of China’s impact on the global environment: China is the second largest emitter of greenhouse gases just behind the US; China is the world’s largest pesticide producer and pesticide abuse is still very common in the country; China’s sandstorms drifted to Western US; acid rain from China hit Korea and Japan; and garbage from the Yangtze River was even washed to the seashores in Japan. China has become the world’s largest importer of tropical forest wood products, with a market share of around 50%. China’s hydropower projects will have signifi cant environmental and social impacts upon local areas—some have even drawn the serious concern of countries in the lower reaches of the Lancang River and Nujiang River. According to the Global Environment Outlook 2004/5 commissioned by the United Nations Environment Program, industrial pollution and high usage in China of the Ili River is one of the major reasons that might lead to the dry up of Kazakhstan’s Lake Balkhash, the second largest lake in Central Asia. On the other hand, on February 16, 2005, the Kyoto Protocol of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change came into force, signifying a giant step forward in environmental protection. Although the Kyoto Protocol is only binding over developed nations, it still is a real challenge to China. Exempt from the emission-reduction requirement during the fi rst commitment period, China, as the world’s second-largest emitter of carbon dioxide, nonetheless faces pressure from other countries. On the one hand, China should be vigilant to the global relocation of carbon-intensive and high-energy-consumption projects to China and should prevent from “cross-border pollution” and the invasion of alien species. On the other hand, China should adapt to the “green barrier” at the international market. If no immediate measures are taken, China will suffer from employment and growth setbacks. Only by raising the “green bar” and promoting energy-saving china’s environmental protection at the crossroads xlv and low-pollution technologies and products can China’s businesses take a foothold in the global market. On September 6, China also became a signatory to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. The Protocol, as a supplement to the Conven- tion on Biological Diversity, is a legally binding international document aimed at ensuring the safety of genetically modifi ed products. As a major importer and producer of genetically modifi ed organisms, China’s obligations will be greater since it signed the Protocol. The whole world has realized the environmental challenges China faces as well as the hopes to overcome such diffi culties. In June 2005, Nature ran a cover story on China’s environment. In a feature entitled “China’s Environment in a Globalizing World,” the writers wrote, “Its [China’s] large population and booming economy mean that China’s lurches carry more momentum than those of other countries. In the past two decades, China has created an economic miracle. We hope that, over the next two decades, China can also create an environmental miracle and set a good example for other nations to achieve both socioeconomic and environmental sustainability. The outcome will affect not just China, but the entire world.”31 An article entitled “China Could Lead Global Efforts” published at the website of Conservation International goes like this: China has both vast natural resources and a burgeoning economy; with the highly commendable commitment of the central government to the environment and the opportunity to host a ‘Green’ Olympics, China is poised to assume a world conservation leadership role. . . . The greatest gift China can offer to the world is to make use of the mighty engines of its enormous and rapid growth to steer the world towards the protection of the Earth.32 Prof. Lester Brown, president of the Earth Policy Institute, stressed that China must look for a new economic model, which is different from the traditional pattern of industrialization. “The Western economic model will not work for China . . . it will not work for India . . . [and] the existing economic model will not work for industrial countries either.” To effectively solve environmental problems, China must replace its

31 “Nature Runs Cover Story: China’s Environment in a Globalizing World,” Legal Mirror, July 16, 2005. 32 “China Could Lead Global Efforts,” Conservation International, http://www. conservation.org.cn/cn/news/content_67.shtml. xlvi yang dongping current “fossil-fuel-based, automobile-centered, throwaway economy” with a new economic model, which will be characterized by “renewable energy,” “far more diverse transportation systems” and “a comprehensive reuse/recycle economy.”33

III. New Progress in Sustainable Development

The concept of sustainable development is nothing new, and China’s Agenda 21 (a white paper on China’s population, environment, and development in the 21st century) was drafted in as early as 1994. However, the real shift in the national social and economic policy to sustainable development only took place in the past one or two years. Whether China can maintain sustained economic growth and social stability depends upon our wisdom, courage and farsightedness.

A. Central Government Setting up a New Goal of Sustainable Development Based on the new goal of sustainable development, the central government initiated a series of pertinent laws, regulations, plans, and measures. On February 28, 2005 the Renewable Energy Law was adopted by the Standing Committee of the 10th National People’s Congress (NPC) and came into effect on January 1, 2006. In April 2005, the newly revised Law on Prevention of Environmental Pollution Caused by Solid Waste became effective. In terms of the authority to issue polluting enterprises the order to bring their pollution under control within a speciﬁ ed period of time, the revised law has shifted the authority from the local government to competent environmental authorities. In addition, the law has introduced the concept of producer responsibility for the ﬁ rst time, so that producers will have to be responsible for their pollution; set up a recall system; and set forth provisions on the prevention of environmental pollution caused by solid waste in rural areas. SEPA also issued the SEPA Guidelines for Promoting a Circular Economy. The law on promoting a circular economy has been on the agenda of the NPC Standing Com- mittee, and the Committee of Environmental Protection and Natural

33 Lester R Brown, Plan B, Oriental Press (Chinese Edition), 2003. china’s environmental protection at the crossroads xlvii

Resource Conservation of NPC is working with relevant departments under the State Council to draft the law, which is expected to be fi nalized and promulgated in or around 2010. The National Development and Reform Commission launched the fi rst pilot program for a circular economy, involving some 42 enterprises in seven key industries such as steel, non-ferrous metal and chemical industries. To build a resource-conserving society and a water-saving society, the government has initiated a series of policies. In October, both Premier Wen Jiabao and Vice Premier Zeng Peiyan made written instructions on giving priority to the development of public transportation in urban areas. The General Offi ce of the State Council also distributed a circular to local governments, requesting that the public transportation policy be seriously implemented. The National Develop- ment and Reform Commission, Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of Water Resources, Ministry of Construction and Ministry of Agriculture jointly issued the Policy Outline for China’s Water Conserva- tion Technologies, which covers agriculture, industry and urban domestic water conservation. The Mid- to Long-term Plan for Energy Conserva- tion launched by the National Development and Reform Commission proposes ten major energy conservation projects and a target of saving 240 million tons of standard coal during the Eleventh Five-Year Plan period (2006–2010). The Ministry of Construction has worked out the target for construction-related energy conservation. The goal is by 2020, most existing buildings would have been remodeled for the purpose of energy conservation and all new buildings would have met the energy-conservation target of 65%. SEPA has also advocated green procurement by the government, which will set an example for sustainable consumption.

B. SEPA’s Roles Strengthened In 2005, SEPA took a series of active, constructive and innovative measures. Its “EIA Storm” became a highlight in China’s environmental protection efforts. The EIA Storm launched at the beginning of 2005 was meant to strengthen SEPA’s authority in interpreting and implementing environmental laws. The move was shortly transformed into a new mechanism: through “green GDP accounting” (commonly known as “Green GDP”) and “strategic environmental assessment,” SEPA has been gradually expanding its powers. xlviii yang dongping

SEPA and the National Bureau of Statistics jointly launched a pilot program on “green GDP accounting.” The program, which has been initiated in 10 provinces and municipalities including Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Zhejiang, Anhui, Guangdong, Hainan, Chongqing and Sichuan, features environmental accounting and surveys on pollution-induced economic losses. Strategic EIA combines the environmental impact assessment on a project, economic plan and policy at the decision-making stage. Moving EIA to a much earlier stage may help prevent pollution from its source. Strategic EIA has been put on the government’s agenda and been implemented. Speciﬁ cally, EIA has been conducted for the river basin plans of the Nujiang River, Yagong River, middle to lower reaches of Lancang River, and Dadu River. SEPA has actively promoted the EIA for the planning of such key industries as hydropower, coal, ports, transportation and electricity. It has launched pilot regional EIA programs at Chengdu Chemical Industry Zone and Ningxia Ningdong Energy Zone. It has also completed planning and regional EIA for the overall plan of Yingkou Port and the Shengli Min- ing Area in Inner Mongolia. In the meantime, SEPA has launched a pilot program of top-down management in Shaanxi Province so as to strengthen its law enforcement and supervision functions.

C. The Public’s Growing Participation in Environmental Protection To build a sustainable society means to introduce a new perception on social development, a new method of production and a new way of life. It also means the increased environmental awareness throughout the society. This precondition and basis is broad and in-depth public participation. Over the recent years, the public’s participation in environmental protection has grown both in exposure and understanding. The collaboration between NGOs and the government is a major feature and a new trend in China’s environmental protection. Since the ﬁ rst environmental NGO was established in the early 1990s, the number, competence and inﬂ uence of Chinese environmental NGOs have been growing. According to conservative estimates, China now boasts around 1,000 local environmental NGOs, among which over 100 are grassroots organizations, 500 are student societies and the remaining are environmental GONGOs (government organized NGOs). China’s environmental NGOs have played a major role in conducting environmental education and raising the public’s environmental awareness. china’s environmental protection at the crossroads xlix

Initially, environmental NGOs focused on environmental education. In the past couple of years, however, Chinese NGOs have been a conspicuous player in the handling of a number of environmental crises. They have begun to play the advocacy role in an attempt to infl uence decision-making. A new era has dawned with these organizations. Since 2003, environmental NGOs have taken part in a number of major public events, such as questioning the feasibility of such dam projects as the Yangliu Lake Dam at Dujiangyan Water Irrigation System, the Mugecuo Dam, and the Tiger Leaping Gorge Dam on the Nujiang River and Jinsha River; as well as the discussion on the possible relocation of Beijing Zoo. Their concerns and requests have been directed towards the government’s public policies and corporate interest groups. NGOs were the major driving force behind the solution of the Yuanmingyuan plastic membrane crisis as well as the criticism over the improper hydropower development projects in southwestern China. Environmental NGOs have done many detailed and practical studies on the proposal to develop hydropower stations on the Nujiang River. They are concerned with both the environment and the resettlement of villagers, which signifi es a deeper understanding of the social nature of ecological and environmental problems. During the “campaign” of questioning the construction of dams, the NGOs successfully gained a lot of exposure in the media, exerted an extensive infl uence on the public, and demonstrated their skills in consolidating resources of the society. On learning the revised plan for the Nujiang River dam project had been approved by planning and environmental authorities, some environmental NGOs drafted a Call for Public Disclosure of Nujiang Hydropower Development in Accordance with the Law, soliciting signatures and requesting the approval authorities to disclose the EIA before making the decision so as to ensure the public’s right to know. Besides grassroots NGOs, there are a large number of GONGOs. Thanks to their expertise, the recognition from the government and the better communication channels, these organizations have played a positive role in the decision-making process of public policies. For instance, the two national associations under SEPA are very active, one being the China Environmental Culture Promotion Association (CECPA) (with Pan Yue as the chairman), and the other being the All-China Environment Federation, which was only established in April 2005. Furthermore, international NGOs have also played an important and positive role in China’s environmental protection. l yang dongping

A new development in the public’s participation in environmental protection is the contribution of Chinese enterprises and entrepreneurs. On June 5, 2004, nearly 100 entrepreneurs (including some twenty from Taiwan) gathered in Alxa League, Inner Mongolia, issued the Alxa Declaration, and established the Alxa SEE (short for “Society, Entrepreneur & Ecology”) Ecological Association. It was a milestone event, indicating the willingness of Chinese entrepreneurs to pay back. On April 22, 2005, China’s fi rst private environmental award—Alxa SEE Award—was given out in Beijing. With a total prize of RMB 3 million, it is China’s biggest environmental award. Another new award that has drawn public attention is the Cases of “Sustainable Develop- ment in China” Competition sponsored by the Beijing-based Economic Observer newspaper, Shell China and a number of NGOs. There also are more diverse channels for public participation. In an effort to increase the level of openness and participation, as well as capitalizing on the wisdom of the entire society, the All-China Envi- ronment Federation launched a nation-wide program to solicit public opinions and suggestions on the drafting of China’s Eleventh Five-Year Environmental Plan. This unprecedented initiative has won broad and active support from the public. Some 4 million people around China took part in the program, a record high in China’s history of public participation in governance. An opinion poll indicates that 71% of the people believe the environment in the cities where they live has improved from fi ve years ago. In the meantime, the public is very concerned with China’s severe environmental situation. As many as 94.9% of the people think the situation is urgent enough to warrant immediate actions. The public’s top environmental concern is the pollution of the sources of drinking water, especially in small- to medium-sized cities and rural areas. Other concerns are, in descending order: air pollution; municipal garbage pollution; disposal of industrial waste; destruction of vegetation and desertifi cation; shortage of water resources; noise pollution; and automobile exhaust pollution. City dwellers are the least satisfi ed with air pollution. As many as 97.5% of the people agree that an environmental index should be incorporated into the performance evaluation of offi cials and that the Environmental Protection Law be revised as soon as possible. Enacted in 1989, the law cannot refl ect many of the changes in social development and environmental protection. Most people have come to realize the negative effects of dams on the eco-environment. Some 65.7% of the people believe that dams will disrupt the ecological china’s environmental protection at the crossroads li system of rivers; 53.1% believe they would affect the local climate; and 50.4% believe they would destroy biodiversity.

IV. Problems and Challenges of China’s Environmental Protection

Even though China has channeled huge investments and human resources in curbing pollution, we still haven’t seen a visible change because pollution is closely related to the pattern of economic growth, industrial structure and energy structure, and we still face many structural and technical barriers. Technical barriers and insufﬁ cient funding are but two of the many problems in the whole picture, given the complicated nature of environmental problems. Further, China’s environmental challenges are more than developmental or economic problems such as industrial restructuring and the change in the pattern of economic growth. It is a crucial political problem as well. Only by examining the seriousness and signiﬁ cance of China’s environmental problems in light of national security, political stability and the destiny of the Chinese people can we avoid the narrow approaches of economism (i.e., the belief that the economic mode of production absolutely determines a society’s social, political and intellectual life) and techno-determinism. We certainly will have to face different challenges if we want to embark on a road of green and sustainable development. Most importantly, however, we should abandon the outdated philosophies, mechanisms and models associated with the “Grey Civilization” (an economy driven by smoke-stacks). We should seek innovative concepts and mechanisms so as to identify a new model of socioeconomic growth and environmental protection.

A. Growth vs. Protection—A Contest That Will Determine the Destiny of the Chinese People Research has shown that China has reached the maximum carrying capacity of population. Sustainable growth is the only option available to us. Otherwise, the Chinese people will face a severe crisis for survival. As Pan Yue put it correctly, China had been a latecomer in terms of traditional industrial civilization and we simply could not afford to lag behind in the journey of ecological civilization again. “Economic crises may be remedied through macro-control measures; social crises lii yang dongping may be solved by investing huge political capital; but an environmental crisis will end up in an irreversible disaster for the entire population.”34 Accordingly, China must be determined to deal with its environmental problems at any cost. Even now, some people still believe that we cannot avoid the pollution-fi rst-control-next model of developed countries. They think the environment will naturally improve when the economy has reached a certain level. However, if we could prevent and control pollution earlier, the environmental cost would be much lower. A case in point is that even though China has spent 10 years and tens of billions of RMB on restoring the environment of the Huahe River and the Dianchi Lake, there is still no visible improvement. It appears that the deterioration and destruction of the ecology (such as soil erosion, desertifi cation, reduction of farmland, and the disappearance of biodiversity) is simply irreversible. In this sense, Prof. Lester Brown said China is at the brink of a war—a battle fought with the expanding desert to safeguard the land. Should we solve China’s environmental problems fi rst or should we focus more on economic growth and effi ciency? Chinese offi cials have yet to come to a consensus. Some still subscribe to the “law” of “pollution fi rst and restoration next.” They stress that the development of thermal power plants and heavy chemical industries is inevitable. They are “drinking poison to quench thirst” by proactively developing hydraulic and water transfer projects while neglecting the potentials in water and energy conservation as well as alternative energies. Such outdated philosophies have become the barrier to implement a scientifi c outlook on development. We should re-evaluate the economic value of “conservation.” Accord- ing to the study of Asian Development Bank, if China’s electric effi - ciency reached the global average, China would not have to build any new power plants before 2015.35 That is, through the introduction of proper policies, we could save a lot of energy with a small investment. Likewise, the potential for water conservation is also bigger than what many of us thought. According to experts, if the water utilization rate in China’s agricultural sector could rise by 10%, we could save some

34 Huang Yikun, “Voices from SEPA,” The Economic Observer, January 24, 2005. 35 Wang Yongchen, “A Resource-conserving Society Calls for Virtue Power Plants,” the Beijing News, January 1, 2006. china’s environmental protection at the crossroads liii

40 billion tons of water every year, or the aggregate amount of the Eastern and Central Routes of the South-to-North Water Diversion Project. The Project proposes to move 44 billion tons of water per year through three canals (Eastern, Central and Western) from the Yangtze River Basin to the parched areas of northern China. The Eastern and Central Routes will have moderate environmental impact and construction began at the end of 2002 and 2003 respectively. The potentially devastating Western Route is still under discussion. The amount of water thus saved is bigger than the water shortfall (30 billion tons) for irrigation in an average year and is nearly 7 times that of the water shortfall in urban areas (6 billion tons) in an average year.36 That is to say, we can make up for the shortage in water resources by saving water. Public policy is the thermometer of values—our values determine the shape of social and economic policy. In this sense, then, the massive education on environmental protection is far from over, and the key audience should be ofﬁ cials at varying levels. Furthermore, the existing production and consumption model characterized by high energy consumption and high pollution has a huge inertia and is resistant to change. Unfortunately, against this dire environmental reality, China’s mainstream culture still sings high praise of consumerism. Waste and extravagance are still prevalent in the society. The policy of encouraging the use of high-emission cars while discouraging that of low-emission cars and electric bikes is in sharp contrast with China’s reality—resources are extremely scarce. The philosophy of achieving economic growth without considering the environmental cost, coupled with a big fanfare of consumerism, is dangerously nurturing extravagance and promoting the old pattern of economic growth.

B. Integrating Economic Growth with Environmental Protection, Promoting the Shift in the Pattern of Economic Growth The shift in the pattern of economic growth is a major task for China’s sustainable development as well as the key to China’s environmental protection. One of the reasons why it is so difﬁ cult to make such a shift is that for years, the economic policy has been detached from the

36 Jiefang Daily, June 20, 2000. liv yang dongping environmental policy. Economic growth has been deemed as the overarching “hard truth” while environmentally friendly policies in taxation, credit, trade and land have been absent. An economic plan based on a circular economy, clean manufacturing and a resource-constrained approach will integrate economic growth with environmental protection and community development, and will be the ultimate key to facilitate the shift in the pattern of economic growth. Another major reason for the diffi culty in the shift is the scarcity of resources and the signifi cant distortion of energy prices. The extremely low electricity tariff, land price and pollution control and prevention fees are in effect encouraging the growth of heavy industries with high energy consumption and high pollution. Research from the World Bank indicates that among the factors contributing to the reduction of energy utilization, 55% is attributable to price adjustment and 17%, research and development. The price reform in energy-based products should be placed high on the government’s agenda. We also need policies that are favorable to the development of new technologies in environmental protection and alternative energy. As renewable energy is a fairly new concept in China, we should work hard to raise the public awareness and come up with more favorable policies. Co-generation (combustion of waste and grain stalks) as well as windmill farms will play a positive role in developing the local economy, raising farmer income and improving the environment in rural China. The government should offer appropriate subsidies and favorable incentives for renewable energy companies, such as a preemptive right to be connected to the power grid, category-based electricity pricing and tax breaks. On the other hand, the government should stop subsidizing fossil fuel or nuclear energy companies so as to curb their growth. Many local governments have had valuable experiences in this regard. The most important thing, though, is to give up the traditional pro- tectionist model. Through public participation, the government could integrate poverty alleviation with ecological protection. The government should help local residents upgrade their method of production, so that they could become the benefi ciary rather than the victim in environmental protection programs. Two such successful cases include the Black-necked Crane Reserve in Caohai and the Asian Elephant Protection Program in Xishuangbanna. china’s environmental protection at the crossroads lv

C. Institutional Innovation for Environmental Protection The government should channel more funds to and perform more active management of environmental protection, a form of public product. The reason why environmental protection is so ineffective is that for years, the government has been interested in directly engaging in economic activities, to the neglect of providing public products, public services and market supervision. China is now at the early stage of pollution control—we face not only new problems but also heritage problems. The overall investment in environmental protection is still inadequate. In water pollution prevention and control alone, there is a shortfall of over RMB 40 billion. According to SEPA, in the next ﬁ ve years, China’s environmental investment will double from the Tenth Five-Year Plan period (2001–2005). Investment in environmental protection has been growing: RMB 47.642 billion during the Seventh Five-Year Plan period (1986–1990); RMB 130.657 billion during the Eighth Five-Year Plan period (1991–1995); RMB 344.752 billion during the Ninth Five-Year Plan period (1996–2000); and over RMB 700 billion during the Tenth Five-Year Plan period (2001–2005), and the environmental investment accounted for 1.4% of the GDP in 2004. Some RMB 1,375 billion has been earmarked for environmental investment during the Eleventh Five-Year Plan period (2006–2010), representing some 1.6% of the GDP during the period.37 Even so, given the serious challenges China faces, many environmental experts hope that the total sum could increase by 0.4–0.6%, or around 2% of the GDP. An equally important task is to reform China’s administrative institutions for environmental and ecological protection. On the one hand, the supervision of environmental authorities is weak due to local protectionism. On the other hand, overlapping management as well as undeﬁ ned responsibilities and obligations plague the current administrative system. For instance, in the ecological protection and pollution control programs involving large river basins or multiple provinces, municipalities and regions, local governments are more interested in vying for control than assuming responsibilities.

37 Ma Li, “RMB 1.3 trillion Earmarked for Environmental Investment During the Eleventh Five-Year Plan Period,” the Beijing News, October 29, 2005. lvi yang dongping

The administration of natural reserves is another case in point. At present, there are nine major categories of natural reserves in China, namely, forest, wild fauna, wetlands, desert, wild fl ora, ocean, grassland, natural heritage, and prehistoric life heritage. These reserves are under the administration of forestry, agricultural, marine and mining authorities, and SEPA is only responsible for coordination. Furthermore, the hiring authority resides with local governments, which are usually not fi nancially capable enough to support the reserves. As a result, staff members of the reserves have to think of ways to “make money.” Even though the reserves have vital and long-term implications for the nation, they are still under the administration of local governments. To make matters worse, many local governments are only concerned with short-term economic benefi ts at the cost of ecological protection, and some even have structures or hydropower stations built right in the core area of protection. The solution to such problems lies in the reform of the administrative system. For instance, pollution compensation procedures and cross-regional coordination could help better manage large river basins. The centralized and top-down management system could lead to more effective management of the reserves as well as receiving funds directly from the central government.

D. Exploring New Procedures for Environmental Protection Besides introducing “green GDP accounting” and setting up a new offi cial evaluation procedures incorporating environmental performance, another important measure is to foster the ecological compensation procedures and environmental tax. According to the applicable laws in China, the fi ne for illegal waste discharge is usually below RMB 100,000 with a ceiling of RMB 1 million. The fi ne is nothing compared to the damage thus incurred. Furthermore, the environmental authorities are not entitled to restrict or suspend the production of polluting enterprises. As a result, even though some projects or enterprises have been ordered by SEPA to be suspended, they could still resume their activities after “making up” for the procedures or turning in a small amount of fi ne. China is in dire need of a taxation regime that is favorable to the cause of environmental protection. Taxation will be an effective tool to promote environmental protection. Spearheaded by the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Finance and the Energy Foundation are drafting a plan for an “environmental protection tax” china’s environmental protection at the crossroads lvii or a broader “ecological tax.” The ecological compensation process, which can be used to practically protect the economic interest of the people in the areas concerned, is a key measure to effectively protect the environment and ensure environmental equity. Two major aspects in improving the effectiveness of environmental restoration are to base the management on scientifi c principles and to make decisions in a democratic manner. For example, we should re- evaluate the effectiveness in building a massive shelter forest system in arid regions and grassland regions. Launched in 1978, the reforestation system, the Three-North Shelter Forest project, also known as China’s “Green Great Wall,” covers a total area of 1.57 million square feet in 13 provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions in the northwestern, northern and northeastern parts of China, or 42.4% of the country’s total land space. What is the best approach to restore the ecological balance in the desert? It is a sad fact that in these areas, land degradation occurs while ecological management and restoration is in progress and restoration cannot keep up with the pace of degradation. We should identify the reasons and learn from the lessons so as to avoid spending large sums of money in “environmental protection projects” that are simply against the law of the nature. The ecological restoration test in the Otindag Sandy Land conducted by the Institute of Botany of the Chinese Academy of Sciences is proven to have achieved visible ecological, social and economic benefi ts at an extremely low cost.

E. Further Expanding Public Participation and Promoting the Development of NGOs China’s Agenda 21, which was formulated by the government in 1994, states, “The support and participation of public and social groups is essential to the achievement of sustainable development. The form and degree of their participation determine the rate at which the objectives of sustainable development are realized.” “New mechanisms are needed for public participation in sustainable development. It is necessary for the public to not only participate in policy-making related to the environment and development, particularly in areas which may bear direct impact on their living and working communities, but also to supervise the implementation of the policies.” The Law on Environmental Impact Assessment, which came into effect on September 1, 2003, stipulates, “The state shall encourage the institutions concerned, experts, and the public to participate in EIA in an appropriate manner.” “The task force responsible for drafting the plan lviii yang dongping shall, in the event that the plan may lead to negative environmental impact and is directly related to the public’s environmental interest, hold seminars, public hearings or take other appropriate measures to solicit the opinions of the institutions concerned, experts, and the public on the EIA draft before such draft is submitted for review and approval.” The Decision of the State Council on Strengthening Environmental Protection, which was made in November 2005, states, “The government shall encourage the development of social groups, encourage the report on violations of environmental laws to authorities, and encourage public welfare litigation on the environment. Corporations shall disclose environmental information to the public. For development plans and infrastructure projects concerning the public’s environmental interest, public hearings and seminars should be held, or other measures to keep the public informed should be taken so as to solicit the opinion of the public and strengthen public supervision.” NGOs can play an irreplaceable role in public participation of environmental protection. Since the late 1970s, the number of China’s non- governmental organizations has been increasing. However, the number is still not big enough. Furthermore, many social groups are politicized, incompetent, used by the government to perform administrative functions and not totally independent from the government. According to statistics, the numbers of non-governmental organizations per 10,000 people are 110 in France, 97 in Japan and only 2.1 in China. The total expenditure of China’s NGOs merely accounts for 0.73% of the GDP, which is far lower than the ﬁ gure in developed nations (7%) and the global average (4.6%).38 The existence of active social and non-governmental organizations is a basic feature of the modern society, and is the requirement of “small government, big society”—the modern approach to social governance. The development of NGOs can help “shed the weight” of the government and improve the effectiveness of public governance. It is also a key mechanism for the expression of public interest and democratic decision-making. The government should promote the growth of NGOs so that they could play a vigorous role in building a harmonious society, a sustainable society and an environmentally friendly society.

38 Fu Xin, “Creating a More Friendly Atmosphere for NGOs,” China Youth Daily, September 3, 2005. china’s environmental protection at the crossroads lix

As the EIA is gradually moving towards strategic EIA and planning EIA, the channel for public participation must be broadened so as to turn a spontaneous participation into a systematic participation. The most important thing is information disclosure, that is, to meet the public’s need to know. The breakdown of the information monopoly by interest groups will empower the public and NGOs in their confrontation with the interest groups. The only institutional measure to safeguard the public’s right of supervision lies in the system of public welfare litigation. Public welfare litigation on the environment means any citizen, social group, or government agency may, for the interest of public welfare, fi le a lawsuit in the court in the name of the individual. Accordingly, relevant laws should be revised to grant any entity or individual with the right to sue. A government agency, a citizen or any other organization may become the plaintiff, accusing the entity or individual that has polluted or destroyed the environment. Against the background of pluralism in social life and social interest, the cases of environmentally related confl icts and mass demonstrations are on the rise. This is an indication that in some places, the current procedure has failed to achieve effective environmental management. A new procedure to prevent, remedy and coordinate environmentally related confl icts is urgently needed. It also underlies the importance of public participation and the expression of diversifi ed interests. The government, therefore, should grant more powers to the public, who can exercise checks and balance on pollution activities. Only by so doing can the government transform its environmental management model from a “government-oriented” one to one characterized by “public checks and balances.”

Yang Dongping January 3, 2006

PART ONE

FOCAL ISSUES

“ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT”—A STORM STIRS IN 2005

Xiong Zhihong

The beginning of 2005 marked a notable event in the history of Chinese environmental protection. On January 18, in an effort to conform to the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Environmental Impact Assessment (hereinafter referred to as “the EIA Law”), the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) suspended 30 large-scale ongoing projects which started construction before getting their EIA reports approved by the environmental protection authorities. This action stirred up a social storm in China. At that time, some local government ofﬁ cials, enterprise leaders and other stakeholders tried to shirk responsibility and escape penalties with the excuse that their actions were necessary for economic development or to solve issues of energy shortage. However, the public, the media, and the State Council were very responsive and supportive of SEPA’s action, exerting great pressure on the owners of the suspended projects, who had to go back and complete the whole EIA process. This episode has come to be referred to as the “EIA storm.”

I. “EIA Storm” Background and Core Issues

A. How Did the EIA Storm Begin? What is EIA? According to the EIA Law, “EIA is a tool used to predict, analyze and assess the possible environmental impacts for a particular strategic program or construction project, to fi nd ways and means to avoid or reduce adverse impacts and exercise follow-up supervision.” Therefore, EIA is the very fi rst step in preventing environmental damage and pollution. At the end of 2004, following the publication of the Urgent Notice of the State Council to Implement the Proposal by the National Development and Reform Commission on Resolutely Stopping the Disorderly Construction of Power Stations, SEPA discovered, through information offered by others and 4 xiong zhihong on-the-scene investigation, that some enterprises initiated projects without submitting an Environmental Impact Assessment report to relevant environmental protection authorities for approval. This was not in compliance with the EIA Law. On January 18, 2005, Pan Yue, vice minister of SEPA announced that 30 non-compliant projects would be suspended and their names disclosed to the public. He also advised relevant authorities to give administrative penalties to persons directly responsible. According to preliminary data, these 30 non-compliant projects involved a total investment of RMB 117.94 billion. They included twenty thermal power projects, with a total investment of RMB 62.33 billion and total installed capacity of 13.84 million kW; three hydropower projects, with a total investment of RMB 52.02 billion and total installed capacity of 16.90 kW; three 500 kV power transmission and transformation projects, with a total investment of RMB 440 million; and additional petrochemical, paper-making, road-building, and dike and embankment projects. All of these non-compliant projects have serious environmental problems. For instance, Xiluodu Hydropower Station on the Jinsha River and the Xiangjiaba Hydropower Station on a connected reservoir are the fi rst phase of a hydropower project at the lower reaches of the Jinsha River. In April 2000, the State Council identifi ed this river section of the Yangtze River, e.g. the Hejiang-Leibo section, a national-level nature reserve for rare and endangered fi sh species, in an effort to protect aquatic animals during the construction of the Three Gorges Project. Xiluodu Hydropower Station covered a part of the nature reserve, while Xiangjiaba Hydropower Station lay at the central location of the reserve. This section of the Yangtze River is home to Chinese paddlefi sh and Dabry’s sturgeon, both Class I species under state protection. It is also home to myxocyprinus asiaticus, a Class II species under state protection. The dams will block the migrating channels for some rare, endangered species as well as for special local fi sh species. To accommodate the dam projects the nature reserve had to be readjusted. However, construction work had already started before the adjustment plan was approved by the State Council. The already initiated construction work included the construction of roads, relocation and settlement of the people living on the site, and the leveling of land. Another non-compliant project was the Dengkou-Balagong section of the Dandong-Lhasa national trunk highway. This section is 17.2 km long and involves a total investment of RMB 718 million. It goes across “environmental impact assessment” 5 the desert and desertifi ed grassland at Wulanbuhe. Not having gone through the proper EIA process and with no environmental protection measures, the project resulted in water and soil erosion which adversely impacted the local ecological environment. Final examples of suspended projects come from Fuzhou, the capital city of Fujian Province, where a fl ood control project, located on the south Beigang bank of Minjiang River, added earth to the ecologically sensitive Puxiazhou Wetlands. And the South Jiangbin Road Construc- tion Project went across the entire wetlands. Both projects will have signifi cant adverse impacts on the Puxiazhou Wetlands. The suspension of these non-compliant projects was reported by hundreds of newspapers, websites and TV stations and has drawn great attention from all sectors.

B. The Background of the EIA Storm The concept of EIA was fi rst brought up in China in 1978. From then on, China started to regard EIA as one of the three most important components in the environmental protection system. In 1979, the Envi- ronmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China ( for Trial Implemen- tation) offi cially recognized EIA and the “three meantimes” system (a system to ensure that the design, construction and operation of proper supplementary pollution prevention facilities is carried on at the same time as the project itself ) as legal requirements. This step laid the legal foundation for the EIA requirements written into various environmental protection laws and regulations over the following years. In 1998, the State Council promulgated the Environmental Protection Supervision Rules for Construction Projects, which further improved the EIA supervisory system for construction projects and provided enforcement tools for EIA. On Sept. 1, 2003, the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Environ- mental Impact Assessment came into force, which offered still clearer legal provisions for this practice. According to the EIA Law, any project that may impact the environment must submit an EIA report to relevant environmental authorities before construction work starts. Assessment must come before construction. Needless to say, such an EIA process is an effective way to prevent any environmental damages and pollution from the very beginning. It is conducive to the sound performance of China’s national economy and can help curb redundant and poor- quality construction. More important, it is conducive to a rational and scientifi c distribution of productive forces. 6 xiong zhihong

Nevertheless, over a year after the EIA Law came into force, there were still many problems regarding EIA. To address the problems, on Dec. 9, 2004, SEPA issued a document entitled “To Strictly Imple- ment EIA and Resolutely Curb the Disorderly Construction of Power Stations,” emphasizing that the EIA Law must be observed. On Dec. 27, SEPA publicly announced punishment decisions for 68 unqualifi ed EIA operators in an effort to restore order in the EIA sector and to penalize all illegal and non-compliant behaviors. SEPA’s determination in rectifying illegal behaviors and initiating the EIA Storm from the end of 2004 to 2005 is closely linked with the overall national background. At that time, China’s new leadership proposed a scientifi c outlook on development, which was to become the guiding principle for the economic and social development of China. The decision to follow a scientifi c outlook on development, to strengthen law enforcement, and to curb disorderly construction so as to protect the dignity of China’s environmental laws and regulations has great political signifi cance. The grave reality of China’s environment and limited resources makes it impossible for the country to follow the example of developed countries to “pollute fi rst and remedy later.”

C. Analysis of Core Issues

1. Confl icts between Economic Growth and Environmental Protection— The Issue of Energy Shortage Taking a close look at the 30 suspended projects, we fi nd that coal-fi red power projects make up two-thirds. In 2003, SO2 emissions from thermal power plants were about 11 million tons, an increase of 4.34 million tons over the previous year, up by 65.2%. From January to November of 2004, SEPA received 200 EIA reports as parts of applications for thermal power projects. The proposed projects added up to a total installed capacity of 175.59 million kW. Of these potential projects, 94 were approved with a total installed capacity of 80.82 million kW. If all these projects were launched without following the proper EIA process, they would add over 5 million tons of SO2 emissions to the air each year. It is true that China’s electric power production capacity is quite limited. However, the power projects currently under construction are likely to supply more power than we need in the future. According to the Urgent Notice of the State Council to Implement the Proposal by the National “environmental impact assessment” 7

Development and Reform Commission on Resolutely Stopping the Disorderly Con- struction of Power Stations issued at the beginning of December 2004, power station projects with a total installed capacity of 61.1 million kW had been approved in 2004 and were expected to satisfy the market demand within the next two years. However, in fact, the year 2004 saw the initiation of construction of power plants with a total installed capacity of 150 million kW, an increase of 1.5 times over the approved quota. Of the power projects under construction with a total installed capacity of 280 million kW nationwide, almost half, accounting for 120 million kW, were initiated without going through the proper EIA process. Some people believe that the suspension of these projects will result in fi nancial losses of billions of RMB. But if this trend continues, greenhouse gas emissions from the burning of coal in coal-fried power plants would exceed 4 tons per capita, and if that were the case, the cost for China to honor its commitment to the international community would reach RMB 50 billion each year. According to the World Bank estimate, from 2020 on, it would cost China USD 390 billion, or 13% of China’s GDP, simply to treat diseases caused by pollution from coal burning. This is indeed a lot of money. Worse still, if China’s power generating capacity were overbuilt and left unused, the non-performing loans in banks would surge and as a result, bring instability to China’s banking sector. It is easy to imagine tremendous losses to our national economy worth hundreds of billions of RMB. Our present way of calculating GDP cannot refl ect the real economic picture of our country because it does not take environmental and ecological losses into consideration. We sometimes come up with ridiculous fi gures which tell people that pollution and ecological damage can bring about increases in our GDP. For example, fl oods require dike construction, which result in more investment and more pay to construction workers. Then statistically our GDP increases too. Here is another example: Pollution makes more people ill, which is clearly something bad and painful, nevertheless, it boosts the medical industry, which in turn pushes up our GDP. For over two decades, China has been the fastest growing economy in the world. But how much of this growth is achieved at great cost to our environmental and ecological well-being? 8 xiong zhihong

2. Confl icts between EIA and the Interests of Stakeholders—Privileges of Large Projects The EIA Storm helped the public to know a piece of inside information: large projects enjoy the privilege of initiating construction while going through the EIA process. In simple words, these projects can “get on the bus before buying a ticket,” meaning to start project construction, they don’t have to wait until their EIA is approved. As a matter of fact, SEPA may ask for some adjustments in the project design and even reject the project application after examining the EIA reports of large or super-large projects. Yet some state-owned enterprises, especially key national projects, often make use of their special identity to ignore EIA, equating maximum economic benefi ts with the overall national interest. These projects usually involve huge investment (almost all the 30 suspended projects involve investment of hundreds of millions to tens of billions of RMB each) and all of the project investors are state-owned enterprises. These facts have made them too arrogant to pay attention to any rules. Take the Xiluodu Hydropower Station as an example. Nearly RMB 2 billion has been invested in the fi rst phase; how could anyone imagine it would really be stopped because of EIA? On the one hand, the government is attaching more and more importance to environmental issues and the environmental authorities have been given more power to enforce laws. On the other hand, it is quite common for project investors and local governments to ignore the authority of environmental authorities, due to the persistence of an old mentality and the promises of economic benefi ts. Based on past experiences with these kinds of problems, what the environmental authorities would do was to ask such non-compliant projects to submit an EIA report and go through a relevant approval process before they could continue their construction. And that is all. For example, an EIA report was submitted to SEPA for approval half a year after construction began on an additional power generator project of the Dafanpu Power Plant in Zhunge’er, Inner Mongolia. Maliantai Power Plant in Ningxia Province initiated the construction of two 330,000 kW generators in December 2003, but not until November 2004 did it submit its EIA report for approval. “environmental impact assessment” 9

3. Confl icts between Environmental Protection and Individual Interests—Pursuit of Personal Achievement by Local Government Offi cials Although EIA has been implemented for years, many project investors still ignore national laws and proceed with plans that will potentially cause pollution and ecological damage. A very important reason for this phenomenon is the heedless pursuit of personal achievement by some local government offi cials. In some places, GDP growth is regarded as an important parameter to measure the performance of local offi cials. Therefore, to pursue economic growth, some local government offi cials simplify the approval process and shorten the time required to go through the relevant procedures without considering the environmental consequences or the availability of resources. When a project with high polluting potential is to be launched, local government leaders quickly give the go-ahead before the environmental authorities can fi nish the EIA process and propose matching pollution treatment facilities because these projects mean huge tax revenues for the local government. So it is not uncom- mon throughout China for local government leaders to intervene in the EIA process.

4. Diffi culty in Implementing the EIA Law In the past two decades, China has formulated more than 20 environment and resources protection laws, roughly making up one tenth of the laws promulgated by the National People’s Congress and its standing committee. The enforcement of these laws, however, is not satisfactory. Since the EIA Law came into force on Sept. 1, 2003, it has not been well-enforced. According to SEPA, only 30% to 40% of the enterprises below county level in the mid-western region have gone through EIA. Investigation in 2004 showed that many major projects were initiated without the proper EIA process, and that some projects offi cially banned by the State, including iron and steel, cement and aluminum projects, were spreading in some areas. In 2003 and 2004 alone, 87 iron and steel plants were built in Jiangsu Province, of which only 34 went through the EIA process, indicating that 61% of these completed projects were non-compliant. Out of 65 projects that were under construction, 20 went through the EIA process, leaving 69% of them non-compliant. In Shanxi Province, 126 out of 248 iron and steel projects were initiated without a proper EIA process, accounting for 51%. At a national EIA symposium, SEPA’s Vice Minister Pan Yue commented that, according to the investigation by SEPA, only 50% to 60% of eligible projects went 10 xiong zhihong through the EIA process since the EIA Law came into force. If things keep going on like this, new environmental problems will come along in China, adding to the old ones remaining unsolved. Although the EIA Law technically gives the power of a veto to environmental authorities, the effect is quite limited and with regard to the implementation of the EIA Law, we see that some fl aws remain in practice. The power authorized to the environmental authorities by the existing environmental protection laws in China is not strong enough to serve as a deterrent force to polluting enterprises. For instance, according to the EIA Law, the maximum fi ne for non-compliant projects is RMB 200,000, which is really nothing for such large projects. Inadequate law enforcement has made the EIA system a mere formality. On the one hand, some project investors try to get through the EIA process by all kinds of tricks. On the other hand, the environmental authorities are not processing EIA in a transparent and open way, thus leaving open possibilities for frequent backstage deals. Due to the lack of effective supervisory and disciplinary mechanisms, it is quite rare that an EIA report is not approved. Even if EIA reports are prepared at the cost of tens of thousands of RMB, the EIA proposals often remain mere formalities after approval, without any follow-up action being taken. Some EIA agencies and experts do not have a strong sense of responsibility, and some of them even take sides with investors, without considering environmental consequences. It is rather diffi cult to penalize EIA agencies and experts once problems occur in the approval process or after pollution is produced by the projects that they have approved. The competence of the EIA team is uneven, thus the quality of EIA cannot be guaranteed. At present, China has nearly a thousand EIA agencies employing over 20,000 licensed people. In 2004, SEPA carried out a thorough check in 198 Grade A EIA agencies and 728 Grade B ones. The result showed that 858 of them, or 92.7% were qualifi ed, while 68, or 7.3% are unqualifi ed. SEPA drew the conclusion that in general China’s present EIA teams put emphasis on economic benefi ts and are not adequately devoted to their work and responsibility, that sometimes they prepare poor or even false EIA documents and that they have already exerted adverse impacts on EIA and its management. According to the List of Construction Projects Subject to Environmental Protection Supervision, some projects need to submit an EIA report and matching forms. Large enterprises can afford the cost of the prepa- ration of such documents in accordance with national requirements “environmental impact assessment” 11 while smaller ones may fi nd the cost unacceptable if the same rate of charge is applied to both large and small enterprises. In addition, the EIA Storm also refl ects the defects in our supervisory system from a different perspective.

D. The Signifi cance and Infl uence of the EIA Storm The EIA Storm is over, but its infl uence is far-reaching:

1. The Support from the Central Government and the State Council Demmonstrates the New Leadership’s Clear Commitment to the Scientiﬁ c Outlook on Development Premier Wen Jiabao has made positive comments on this move, and wrote the following comments, “The State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) should improve its EIA work and related mechanisms and cooperate with relevant authorities in order to establish a project accountability tracking mechanism that is consistent with our effort to reform the investment system.”

2. Environmental NGOs are Playing an Important Role in Promoting Public Participation The EIA Storm raised people’s concerns over information disclosure, people’s right to be informed and public hearings. With their environmental awareness greatly enhanced, the public cares more about the environment and is eager to participate in environmental protection. In response to the loud voice from society, SEPA in November 2005 formulated the “Measures to Promote Public Participation in Environ- ment Impact Assessment” (Draft for comments), taking a further step forward towards public participation in environmental protection.

3. Unprecedented Attention on EIA has Effectively Facilitated EIA Activities By the end of October 2005, SEPA had dealt with 724 EIA reports for construction projects and had responded to 850 reports (5 of which were report forms), up by almost 30% compared with over 500 reports in 2004. In December 2005, SEPA formulated a number of regulations and rules, including Procedures for the State Environmental Protection Administration’s Examination and Approval of Environmental Impact Assessment Documents of Construction Projects, Qualifi cation Management Methods for Envi- ronmental Impact Assessment of Construction Projects, Provisional Regulations on Qualifi cation of Environmental Impact Assessment Engineers, Implementation Rules 12 xiong zhihong on Professional Qualifi cation Test for Environmental Impact Assessment Engineers and the Professional Qualifi cation Assessment Regulation for Environmental Impact Assessment Engineers. Soon the newly-formulated Code of Conduct and Supervisory Methods for Examination and Approval of Environmental Impact Assessment of Construction Projects will become effective across China.

4. EIA of Overall Planning Has Been Put on the Agenda, which Helps to Curb Environmental Damage and Pollution from the Very Beginning EIA was carried out during strategic planning for the valleys of the Nujiang River, the Yalong River, the Dadu River of Sichuan and the middle and lower reaches of the Lancang River. Such strategic EIA has also been carried out in such key sectors as hydropower, coal, port, transportation, electric power as well as for some pilot projects such as the Chengdu Chemical Base of Sichuan and the Ningdong Energy Base of Ningxia. In addition, strategic EIA and regional EIA have been completed for Yingkou Port and the Shengli Coal Mine of Inner Mongolia. By November 2005, various matching regulations on EIA had been worked out in places like Shanghai, Tianjin, Hebei, Shandong, Shaanxi, Inner Mongolia, Dalian, Shenzhen, and Hangzhou. Pilot projects of strategic EIA have been launched in Inner Mongolia, Dalian and Wuhan. According to a SEPA ofﬁ cial, after this EIA Strom, EIA of overall planning will come before EIA for individual projects in the future. SEPA will take further actions to promote strategic EIA across China and make every effort to prevent environmental pollution and ecologic damage from the very beginning.

II. Public Participation in EIA at Present and Proposals for Improvement

A. The Responsibilities and Obligations of Public Participation in EIA Within one week of SEPA’s decision to suspend 30 non-compliant construction projects on January 18, 56 environmental NGOs including Friends of Nature, Global Village of Beijing, Green Earth Volunteers, and the China Association for NGO Cooperation released a joint open letter showing staunch support for SEPA’s move. These environmental NGOs consider public participation a solid foundation of scientiﬁ c and democratic decision-making. SEPA’s move “environmental impact assessment” 13 not only serves to solve the problem of environmental pollution and ecologic degradation, but also to effectively tackle social problems from the very source. It will help reduce social conﬂ icts caused by unauthorized development projects and facilitate social justice, stability and harmony. It has also attracted great attention and involvement from the media, which demonstrate enormous enthusiasm and sense of responsibility on the part of the public.

B. Public Participation at Present and the Forms of Participation Article 5 of Chapter 1 and Article 21 of Chapter 3 of the EIA Law give clear provision regarding public participation in EIA. Unfortunately, there are no clear stipulations as to exactly how the public can participate. In the past, public participation took mainly the following two forms: experts and environmental administrative bodies participated by means of listening to voices from various parties through consultation, assessment and joint research on environment management policies and complex decision making matters; the general public usually participated by ﬁ lling out questionnaires, the results of which were subjected to qualitative analysis. The limitations of these two forms have led to the following problems:

• Lack of Access to Information by the Public At present, the fact that China doesn’t have a proper public information disclosure system makes it difﬁ cult for the public to have access to relevant information regarding construction projects. Such an incomplete, insufﬁ cient and untimely information supply hampers the public understanding of major environmental issues, dampens their enthusiasm and prevents them from making correct judgments when offering their comments and suggestions.

• Limited Public Representation Most of the time, public participation remains a merely token aspect of the decision-making process. Many EIA agencies are biased when selecting the participants, and prefer to invite experts or people who are supportive of the projects. Therefore the assessment result is partial and hardly reﬂ ects real public opinion. 14 xiong zhihong

• Limited Forms of Participation Surveys are the dominant method used for public participation in most cases. They make communication diffi cult and people often fi nd it diffi cult to express their ideas and opinions freely in this way.

• Lack of Transparency in the Results At present, more often than not, EIA agencies include the result of public participation in their EIA report as a kind of reference for governmental authorities and relevant institutions. But the public doesn’t receive necessary feedback, which makes it difﬁ cult for it to exercise supervision over the projects at a later stage.

• Lack of Technical Procedures for Public Participation Currently there are no feasible technical standards for public participation. For example, there are no clearly deﬁ ned rules regarding who should participate, how they can get information, or the time, form, procedure, scope and content of public participation.

C. Measures and Suggestions to Improve Public Participation in EIA To make public participation more effective, we need to strengthen the legal position of public participation and improve the relevant technical procedures. Meanwhile we need to raise public awareness concerning participation. a) A legal framework for public participation in EIA needs to be established. It should be legally stipulated that citizens are entitled to environmental protection and have associated rights to information and powers of supervision. Detailed implementation rules for the EIA Law should also be formulated and implemented, including stipulations regarding the parties to be involved in public participation, the procedures of participation, and so on. b) Technical standards on public participation should be established. A uniform standard regarding the time, form and content of public participation should be worked out so as to improve the effectiveness of public participation and to reduce the randomness and subjectivity of EIA. c) The public should be informed of the EIA. The project owners, the agencies preparing the EIA reports and the environmental authorities should adopt easy ways to keep the public informed, for “environmental impact assessment” 15

instance, through newspapers, public websites or special websites. They should also make efforts to collect public opinions and suggestions regarding construction projects or particular EIA work. d) Various forms should be adopted to solicit public opinions, such as public surveys, expert consultations, workshops, technical discussions and public hearings. Members of the public should be able to offer their suggestions and opinions on EIA or EIA documents by telephone, fax, letter or email. e) Statements of public opinion and suggestions should come from organizations, social groups, grassroots autonomous organizations like neighborhood committees and village committees, and individuals who are located in the project area and likely to be affected during the construction or after the completion of the project. f ) When the project owners, the agencies preparing the EIA reports, the entrusted agents or the environmental authorities solicit public opinions and suggestions, they should select appropriate target organizations and individuals according to the principles of openness, equality, extensiveness and representativeness, and after taking into consideration their occupation, location, professional background, presentation skills and vulnerability to environmental changes. g) Project owners or the agencies preparing the EIA reports should attach notes to the EIA documents, indicating whether public opinions and suggestions have been adopted or not. The environmental authorities, when examining the EIA documents, should also examine the notes and seriously consider the expressed public opinions. h) If the public ﬁ nds that the project owners, the agencies preparing the EIA reports, or the entrusted agents refuse to accept their opinions without any explanation, they are entitled to complain to the environmental authorities who are examining the EIA documents and ask them to investigate into the matter.

III. Promotion of Sound and Positive Development of EIA

Facing severe problems, China’s EIA cannot pin its hope on one or two “storms.” Instead we need to put into place a long-term mechanism by taking steps: 16 xiong zhihong

a) To ramp up efforts to give more publicity to the EIA Law Such publicity efforts will help policymakers and leaders at all levels to be more strategically minded, base their decisions on sustainable economic and social development, and fully recognize the important role of the EIA. b) To govern strictly according to the law, respect the authority of the law and penalize violators resolutely Only when the EIA Law is strictly followed can it exert its legal infl uence effectively. Projects skipping the application and approval procedures of EIA shall be asked to suspend construction and punished in accordance with the law. Those failing to build matching environmental protection facilities or to pass environmental protection checks upon completion should be asked to suspend production. Local environmental authorities should not accept and approve projects that divide themselves into smaller projects and submit separate applications. c) To establish an accountability system to provide an institutional guarantee to EIA A complete supervisory and accountability mechanism should be established to guarantee the effective implementation of the EIA Law. Leaders and persons who fail to examine EIA reports according to the law, or to conduct EIA implementation checks of projects upon their completion, or to fulfi ll their duty of supervision, or to investigate and punish violators should be subject to administrative sanctions. Those whose actions have had severe environmental consequences should be held responsible for any economic loss and should be subject to criminal penalties. d) To tighten the environmental protection approval system and implement a macroeconomic control policy at the central government level Aiming to curb excessive investment in high-energy-consuming industries such as steel, cement and aluminum as well as over- investment in power plant projects, SEPA has listed 10 categories of projects that cannot get EIA approval. Such rules must be strictly followed when EIA is conducted. In line with relevant policy requirements of the State Council to curb over-investment in some sectors and the macroeconomic control requirements, efforts should be stepped up to fi nd violators and penalize them. e) To promote strategic EIA and implement environmental protection guidelines focusing on “prevention fi rst” “environmental impact assessment” 17

To protect our environment and use our resources in a sustainable way, we cannot rely only on the EIA for individual construction projects. We should also carry out EIA for major economic development plans and programs in order to prevent new pollution and ecological damage from the very beginning and try to achieve a harmony between economic growth, social progress and environmental protection. f ) To attach importance to EIA of construction projects with ecological implications As public awareness rises, hydropower development is receiving more and more public attention. While it is vital to our economic development, it brings about ecological problems that may affect the sustainability of our river basins. Therefore, great importance should be attached to the problem of ecological risks in river basin development. g) To improve the public participation mechanism so as to fully utilize its impact Given the large quantity of construction projects, supervision by the government alone is not enough. We should encourage various social groups and the public to participate in EIA through public hearings and discussions and help them play an important role in EIA decision making. A mechanism of information disclosure and public participation should be established. Project owners and environmental authorities may listen directly to the opinions and suggestions of the local people’s congress deputies, CPPCC committees, NGOs, academic groups, and neighborhood or village committee representatives. Or else, the local people’s congress, CPPCC committees or NGOs can solicit public opinions in area that is likely to be affected. When examining and approving major projects or environmentally-sensitive projects, SEPA should fully expose itself to public opinion and supervision. A mechanism should also be established to offer feedback to the public so that public opinions and suggestions are fully utilized. h) To strengthen the EIA team and to adopt a professional qualiﬁ cation system EIA agencies should be strictly checked for their qualiﬁ cations in order to improve the overall competence of EIA professionals and ensure the quality of EIA results. At the same time, to ensure proper competition, foreign EIA agencies should be given permission to enter the EIA market in China. 18 xiong zhihong

References

Liu Weisheng, “EIA: A Perplexity in Economic Development,” Environmental Economics, No. 3 (2005). SEPA, “Measures to Promote Public Participation in Environment Impact Assessment,” (A draft for comments). Wang Dongmei, “Insufﬁ ciencies in Law Enforcement Revealed in EIA Storm,” Work- ers’ Daily, Feb. 17, 2005. WARNINGS AND LESSONS FROM THE SONGHUA RIVER TOXIC SPILL CRISIS

Qie Jianrong

Introduction

On November 13, 2005 an explosion rocked PetroChina Jilin Petro- chemical Company’s aniline workshop, precipitating one of the most serious toxic spills in China since the Revolution. This crisis not only imposed a threat to safe drinking water for residents along the river, it caused huge property losses, and also produced serious and widespread environmental and social impacts. Fallout of these events led a minister of the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) to resign, making him the highest-ranking environmental ofﬁ cial to do so as a result of this kind of crisis. His resignation gives some indication of the breadth of long-standing problems in China’s environmental management system. Since this incident, faulty management has given rise to other mishandled pollution crises in China. Each has endangered public health and safety to varying degrees. Such frequent environmental mishaps have sounded the alarm that China faces a severe challenge in achieving sustainable development while protecting the environment.

A Complete Review of the Toxic Spill Crisis

The Accident: The Explosion on November 13 in PetroChina Jilin Petrochemical Company’s Plant At 1:45 p.m. on November 13, a ﬁ re and explosion spread through the benzene processing section of a chemical plant operated by PetroChina Jilin Petrochemical Company (referred to as “Jilin Plant” below). Soon thereafter, witnesses reported that a vast mushroom cloud and chemical fog enshrouded the whole of Jilin City. Reports soon established that the explosion killed ﬁ ve people, with one person missing. 20 qie jianrong

Jilin Petrochemical provided an explanation of the explosion’s cause in a press release issued that evening: a mishandled blockage in a chemical processing tower with the designation P102 produced a ﬁ re in that unit, which in turn triggered an explosion in the nitrifying unit used for aniline processing. On November 15, a report in the Chinese Environmental Newspaper entitled “The Explosion in a Double Benzene Plant of Jilin Petro- chemical: Emergency Pollution Monitoring Launched” written by Xinhua, disclosed the possibility that air pollution could result from the explosion: Ofﬁ cials with the Environmental Supervision Branch of the Jilin Envi- ronmental Protection Bureau claim that benzene and phenol were found in the air above the explosion spot. Fortunately these chemicals disperse quickly. Residents can expect to return home and resume their normal lives after a short evacuation period.

The Key Question: Why Did a Safety Accident Become an Environmental Crisis? Why did a safety accident develop into an environmental crisis? Why did the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) eventually end up “paying the bill?” Various media told different and confl icting stories, thus a defi nitive answer cannot be identifi ed.

The Crisis Grows: The Water Stoppage in Harbin After November 23 For eight days, from November 13 to the 21, reports and news concerning the explosion gradually quieted. On November 23, however, residents of Harbin—a city downstream of Jilin and on the Songhua River, which draws its drinking water from the river—started to spread the rumor that the Songhua River had probably been contaminated as the result of the explosion. People began to stockpile water. Soon thereafter, rumors spread that an earthquake might strike Harbin, precipitating a run on supermarkets to buy fl our, cooking oil, salt and, of course, water. On November 21, the Municipal Government of Harbin made an announcement that the water supply would be cut off for four days starting from 12:00 a.m., November 22, for the overall examination and maintenance of the city’s pipeline network. Later that day, the municipal government made another announcement confi rming water songhua river toxic spill crisis 21 contamination in the Songhua River as the result of the explosion in the Jilin Plant. This announcement emphatically ended the eight days of silence regarding the chemical accident. Offi cials and citizens alike recognized the impending crisis.

The State Environmental Protection Administration’s Response Following the Water Stoppage On November 23, the State Environmental Protection Administration broke the government’s silence by offi cially acknowledging the Song- hua River toxic spill through News Release (NO. 84), which the SEPA circulated via email while simultaneously posting the news release on its website. The text follows: The Songhua River toxic spill was caused by an explosion in a Petro- China Jilin Petrochemical factory; environmental monitoring found that a benzene-based pollutant, a chemical harmful to human health, has contaminated the Songhua River. The State Environmental Protection Administration attaches great importance to this report, and has immediately sent experts to Heilongjiang Province to assist the local government in handling the crisis. Hourly monitoring of water fl ow has been started in order to provide up-to-the-minute information on the Songhua River’s water quality. At the press conference held by the State Council Information Offi ce on November 24, Zhang Lijun, Vice Minister of the State Environmental Protection Administration, who is in charge of pollution control, briefed the press on the Songhua River toxic spill. He revealed that the accident should be categorized as a major environmental crisis since more than 100 tons of benzene-based pollutant entered the Songhua River after the explosion. To keep the press and the public informed, the SEPA adopted a daily briefi ng system on the crisis beginning November 25. On December 1, the SEPA held the National Environmental Pollution Accident Videoconference in Beijing’s Video-Conference Center. From the very beginning many attendees perceived an unusual atmosphere to the conference. First, Minister Xie Zhenhua did not attend; given the importance of the conference, this aroused suspicions that something was amiss. Secondly, offi cials told reporters at the start of the conference that no printed texts of speeches would be available; reporters had to make their own recordings of the proceedings. Thirdly, 22 qie jianrong the usually amiable Vice Minister Wang Yuqing made an uncharac- teristically harsh statement: In the few days after the eruption of the Songhua River toxic spill crisis, i.e. from the 14th to 17th of November, the State Environmental Protec- tion Administration had received no information from Jilin Province’s environmental agencies concerning this severe pollution accident, and thus the SEPA missed the best opportunity to contain the crisis. With this pronouncement he brought to light the embarrassing and potentially catastrophic situation faced by the State Environmental Protection Administration.

The Response of Ofﬁ cials in Jilin Province A report in China Youth on December 3, 2005 recapped important events of the Songhua River toxic spill crisis: At the press conference held on the morning of November 14, a vice mayor of Jilin City told the press that expert analysis found no evidence of signiﬁ cant pollution resulting from explosion; no toxic gases or contaminated water was detected at the site or in surrounding areas. On November 22, a director from Jilin Petrochemical emphasized the point that the explosion would not cause any water contamination since it only produced carbon dioxide and water, and that Jilin Petrochemical had its own wastewater treatment plant so no harmful wastewater would be discharged into the Songhua River. On the afternoon of November 23, Jiao Zhengzhong, Vice Governor and the Party Secretary of Jilin Province, rushed to Heilongjiang Province with his assistants. In a meeting with the leaders of Heilongjiang Province, he expressed sympathy and regret over this serious pollution accident. The report also recorded that: On the same day, Zeng Yukang, Vice President of PetroChina Company Ltd. and President of the Daqing Petroleum Administration Bureau, went to Harbin and apologized formally to the Party Committee and the Government of Heilongjiang Province for the Songhua River toxic spill caused by its chemical plant.

Premier Wen Jiabao Attends an Inspection in Harbin on November 26 where the Seriousness of the Crisis becomes Apparent On November 26, Wen Jiabao, Chinese Premier and Member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party songhua river toxic spill crisis 23 of China (CPC) Central Committee, arrived in Harbin to inspect the Songhua River toxic spill and the public water supply. Representing the CPC Central Committee, the State Council and President Hu Jintao, Premier Wen met local leaders and citizens of Harbin. The Premier put forward seven instructions, most importantly, “To earnestly investigate and handle the crisis and to identify those responsible for causing it.”

Missing Pieces

Many questions about the crisis triggered by the explosion still remain unanswered.

Statements Made by Jilin Environmental Agencies and the State Environmental Protection Administration Confl ict China Newsweek quoted Zhao Jing, Director of Changchun Environment Monitoring Station, in the report entitled “Eight Days—Time Wasted”: “Upon receiving the instructions from both the Jilin Environmental Protection Bureau and Changchun Environmental Protection Bureau on November 16, we spent three hours preparing initial data without any delay.” There is a noticeable difference between this statement and the aforementioned and far more pointed quote given by Wang Yuqing on December 1. A number of the SEPA offi cials have confi rmed that Wang Yuqing’s comments from the December 1 videoconference more faithfully described responses to the situation.

The Possibility that the Jilin Environmental Protection Bureau was Excluded from Involvement A previously overlooked detail came to light in the same report: Later on, Zhao Jing received a phone call from a schoolmate who worked for the Jilin Environmental Protection Bureau. Her schoolmate said in dismay, “Our bureau is under more pressure than yours. As a matter of fact, after the explosion, we were not allowed to get involved in the monitoring. Instead, the Field Ofﬁ ce appointed the Ninth Mineral Institute of PetroChina to conduct the pollution monitoring.” This quote suggests that local bureaucrats had been silenced early on, but it is not clear if this occurred before or after the ﬁ rst press 24 qie jianrong announcement from the Jilin Environmental Protection Bureau as reported on November 15.

Some Reports Claim that the Songhua River had been Contaminated on the Day of the Explosion A news report in China Youth on December 27, entitled “Looking Back on the Year of 2005: The Contamination of the North Songhua River Led to the Resignation of a SEPA Minister” said, An engineer from the Jilin Environmental Protection Bureau told our correspondent that on November 23 the water in the Songhua River was contaminated on the day of the explosion. This, however, was not made public immediately. Fortunately, Jilin authorities did warn Heilongjiang Province about the possible contaminated water and that saved a little face. It is clear from these statements that the Jilin Environmental Protec- tion Bureau was aware of the pollution early on. A report from Caijing Magazine, entitled “Pains of the Songhua River,” said: The Jilin Environmental Protection Bureau must have learned about the possibility and reality of benzene pollution right after the explosion. But apparently, neither PetroChina Jilin Petrochemical, nor the government of Jilin Province or Jilin City, wished to make the crisis public as soon as possible . . . On the contrary, on November 13, Zou Haifeng, Vice President of Jilin Petrochemical, claimed that the explosion did not cause any air pollution based on the real-time monitoring they had conducted. Regard- ing the possible water contamination, Zou did not say a word.

The Aftermath: Holding High-Ranking Ofﬁ cials Responsible and Other Actions

On December 1, the staff of the State Environmental Protection Administration all worked overtime. The Secretary-General of the State Council1 went to the SEPA ofﬁ ces at 5 p.m. to announce the appoint- ment of Zhou Shengxian as the new Minister of the State Environ- mental Protection Administration as a replacement for Xie Zhenhua,

1 The State Council in China is the executive department of the supreme organ of state power, which is the top state administrative organ of the Central People’s Gov- ernment, composed of Premier and Vice Premiers, State Councilors, and Ministers in charge of various Ministries and Commissions. songhua river toxic spill crisis 25 who had resigned. The Xinhua News Agency released a report on this matter in their December 2 edition: “Xie Zhenhua, the highest-ranking environment offi cial to leave a job in such a case, resigned after 30 years of service in environmental protection.” Xie Zhenhua won over the general public by taking responsibility for the crisis. And by removing a leading offi cial, the public noted the central government’s effectiveness in holding high-level offi cials accountable for their actions.

The State Council Creates a Team to Thoroughly Investigate the Crisis On December 6—fi ve days after the resignation of Xie Zhenhua—the State Council organized a team in Beijing to investigate the explosion and the water pollution it produced. The team, dubbed The State Council Investigation Team, issued a statement that it would conduct a thoroughgoing investigation into the causes of the explosion, determine responsibility for the explosion and the resulting toxic chemical spill and its spread, and fi nally, propose solutions to resolving the issue. Li Yizhong, Director of the State Administration of Work Safety, led the team. His colleagues included deputy directors Sun Huashan, Deputy Director of the State Adminis- tration of Work Safety; Chen Changzhi, Vice Minister of Supervision; Wang Ruixiang, Deputy Director of the State-owned Assets Supervi- sion and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC); Wang Yuqing, Vice Minister of the State Environmental Protection Administration; Zhang Mingqi, member of the Secretariat of the All- China Federation of Trade Unions and Director of the Disciplinary Inspection Offi ce; Niu Haijun, Vice Governor of Jilin Province, and Shen Liguo, Vice Governor of Heilongjiang Province.

The Construction of a Diversionary Dam on the Fuyuan Waterway in Heilongjiang Province Started on December 16 Wang Canfa, a professor from the Department of Environmental Law at the China University of Political Science and Law, noted that the resignation of Xie Zhenhua changed the international impact of the Songhua River toxic spill crisis. Regardless of this observation, Russia’s reaction to the crisis has clearly affected its relations with China. With regards to this incident, the SEPA, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, and even General Secretary Hu Jintao have made 26 qie jianrong contacts and conducted dialogues with their Russian counterparts. After a series of such engagements, China has accepted Russia’s requests to provide more monitoring instruments and joint monitoring of the river, and to construct a diversionary dam on the Fuyuan waterway in Heilongjiang Province to prevent the spread of pollution in this and future cases. Sina.com connected the dam project to Russian demands in a report issued on December 16, 2005: “At 8:30 a.m., December 16, the construction of a diversionary dam on the Fuyuan waterway was begun after a week of negotiations and preparations involving Russia.”

The Story Continues to Play Out

The Songhua River Toxic Spill Crisis is Named One of the “Top Ten Legal News Events in China for 2005” A report titled The Songhua River Pollution Incident Sounds the Public Safely Alarm was selected as one of the “Top Ten Legal News Events” by Legal Daily. The journal selected these stories based on experts’ discussion and assessment of several hundred thousand nominees forwarded by mail, fax and email. Selecting this story as one of the ten most important of the year indicates the deep impact of the Songhua River pollution incident.

An Ecological Assessment and Restoration Plan are Being Formulated On November 29 the SEPA organized an expert panel of fi fteen academicians and renowned specialists to develop “The Assessment and Restoration Plan for Addressing the Ecological Impact of the Songhua River Toxic Spill”. The group departed for Jilin the following day to gather data on air and water conditions. Two weeks later, on December 13, Zhu Guangyao, Vice Minister of the SEPA, announced the launch of the expert team’s work. The group’s purpose was to propose solutions to problems such as moving and processing pollutants, handling frozen pollutants, assessing the environmental impact of these activities, and fi nally to assure the security of drinking water and fi sheries. As part of this effort, environmental technical programs have been revised; in particular those concerning measurement of ice, silt, groundwater, and environmental songhua river toxic spill crisis 27 pollutants are being implemented. These efforts have provided important technical data for governmental decision-making. On December 26, the SEPA publicized the most up-to-date results of tests on the Songhua River’s condition. Happily these tests showed that concentrations of Nitro-Benzene and Benzene at all monitoring stations came in under national limits for these chemicals. Furthermore, since China imposes stricter standards for these chemicals than Russia, the Russians would likely be mollifi ed by these fi ndings. The State Council initiated a parallel investigation on December 7. Findings from this effort have yet to be announced. This is crucial since the State Council Investigation Team’s results will inform decision makers with fi nal jurisdiction over resolving the crisis.

Long-Standing Problems were Uncovered within the “Songhua River Toxic Spill Crisis”

The Songhua River toxic spill and the resulting crisis have uncovered problems hidden in China’s environmental management system. First, in many cases offi cials’ power can go unchecked; the Jilin offi cial’s failure to be honest and engaged in containing pollution as a result of the explosion provides ample demonstration of this problem. Second, establishing responsibility for actions can be diffi cult; in the case of the Songhua River spill, it took weeks. Third, many persons staffi ng local environmental agencies lack the expertise or commitment to effectively manage environmental policy and conditions, especially in a crisis. Finally, performance measures and evaluations remain lax and unclear. These problems will be addressed in turn below.

Problem One: Holding Environmental Agencies Responsible for their Actions Without Granting them Sufﬁ cient Powers to Fulﬁ ll their Duties

The State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) could not fulﬁ ll its responsibilities following the dissolution of its predecessor, the Environmental Protection Commission In 1997 the State Council instituted management reforms that charged the State Environmental Protection Administration to take over the bailiwick of the National Environmental Protection Agency. In a related move, the Environmental Protection Commission under the State Coun- cil headed by former State Councilor Song Jian was dismantled. 28 qie jianrong

In some sense, dismantling the Environmental Protection Commis- sion (EPC) under the State Council set back the development of sound environmental protection in China. The EPC enjoyed more power and independence than the SEPA. According to a correspondent with the Xinhua News Agency covering the Environmental Protection Commis- sion under the State Council at that time, the EPC included ministers of relevant departments and offi cials of provincial governments. A quarterly meeting with the participation of all members was required. Most of the relevant environmental issues would go through the review of the State Councilor Song Jian; members would also discuss issues and move forward on action plans once a majority of the members indicated their support. According to a senior environmental expert, the SEPA found it hard to assume its appropriate role. At the same time, more serious environmental problems emerged at the end of the 20th century as the Chinese economy kicked into overdrive. Charged with balancing economic development against environmental security for 1.3 billion people, the SEPA found that it lacked the necessary resources and authority to coordinate policy and action among the array of departments directly and indirectly involved in activities managing environmental impacts. In short, as a department directly under the State Council, the SEPA has had diffi culties coordinating policy and action involving ministries and local governments with authority greater than its own. Additionally, the absence of a direct managerial and regulatory link to the central government results in such problems as inadequate environmental information gathering, indecisive handling of environmental crises, and ineffi cient environmental monitoring.

Unqualifi ed Staff at Local Environmental Protection Agencies, Especially among Entry-Level Employees Clearly, working in an environmental protection and regulation agency requires staff members to have specifi c expertise in this area; having such expertise is crucial for pollution monitoring. However, many staffers in environmental agencies, especially those serving the most basic functions, lack the necessary expertise. At the local and municipal level, environmental agencies are routinely treated as ordinary administrative agencies. Typically, staffi ng such agencies depends on political and social connections rather than expertise. It has become all too common that persons like retired servicemen and township leaders with the right political pedigree and connections will songhua river toxic spill crisis 29 be hired ahead of professionals with technical expertise who lack strong social and political connections. This affects day-to-day function. In particular, the low-quality staff hampers one of the few executive functions enabling environmental agencies: applying legislative powers. Environmental agencies usually have broader legislative powers compared to other government branches. However, some experts have identifi ed problems in applying such authority because the staff members of local and municipal environmental agencies lack the necessary expertise to develop, analyze, and implement policy through these legislative powers.

The Involvement of Several Government Agencies in Water Management made Pollution Control in Major River Basins more Difﬁ cult At present, both water conservancy organizations and environmental organizations operate their own water management agencies in major river basins. In the Songhua River region, the Ministry of Water Resources has its “Songliao Committee” while the SEPA operates a state-controlled monitoring station. The situation is the same along other rivers, such as the Huaihe River in central China. If local resource management agencies are involved, further complications arise regarding the use and management of river water. Without a “super agency” drawing together different regulators and policymakers, a role served by the Environmental Protection Commission under the State Council, poor coordination and cooperation inevitably result. Each agency serves a different set of constituencies and interests; when agencies have to come together to handle pollution in a major river basin, these competing interests undermine overall effectiveness. This problem needs to be addressed in a timely fashion.

Difﬁ culties in the Investigation of Environmental Crimes According to Zhang Lijun, Vice Minister of the SEPA, by the end of September 2005, a total of 23,000 environmental cases have been processed. This number is corroborated by other sources showing that 1500–2200 environmental pollution accidents and about 20,000 environmental cases are ﬁ led annually. Among these, few receive thorough investigation; only three have resulted in convictions, in spite of the fact that the “Crimes against the Environment Act” has been part of the Criminal Law of China for years. The most important reason for this, according to some experts, is a bias among local regulators to protect economic and industrial interests. 30 qie jianrong

In order to pursue economic growth, some local governments overlook environmental pollution, even going so far as granting permission to pollute by offering preferential policies to large and proﬁ table—yet highly polluting—enterprises. These large enterprises contribute substantially to local taxes, which increases their leverage and access to special dispensations by local governments. Even if serious pollution accidents occur, punishment is typically light. Chen Shanrong, Deputy Director of the Environmental Emergency Center at the SEPA said frankly: “It is quite likely that government and polluters would collude with each other.” To date, there has been no judicial test of the “Crime against the Environment Act”, which further explains the difﬁ culties in handling environmental crimes.

The Work of the SEPA should Focus on Pollution Prevention and Control The prevention and control of pollution should be the SEPA’s priority, regardless of the environmental situation in China. If the SEPA fails in this regard, China’s environmental security could be threatened. In recent years, however, this task has not been undertaken as effectively as it should be.

Problem Two: Performance Evaluation of Offi cials does not Depend on their Environmental Protection Record In recent years, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council have repeatedly stressed the importance of Scientifi c Development as a cornerstone of economic and social development, since it aims to achieve development within a sustainable framework. However, local governments have not effectively integrated Scientifi c Development goals within policy practices. To address these shortcomings, many policy experts and professionals, as well as the SEPA’s managers, have advocated integrating achievements in environmental protection into performance evaluations of offi cials at all levels. Unfortunately, the decision-makers in key departments have failed to implement this proposal. In the face of the need to encourage economic development, it is no surprise that local offi cials neglect environmental protection proposals. songhua river toxic spill crisis 31

Problem Three: There is no Incentive or Directive to Provide Full Informational Disclosure The absence of informational access and transparency aggravated the severity of the Songhua River toxic spill crisis. The SARS crisis of 2003 also started in denials, which stalled action and left the public unaware of the danger they faced. In fact, the Songhua River spill may prove more harmful in the long run. Correcting these problems goes far beyond any single ofﬁ cial; resig- nations, such as that of Xie Zhenhua, will not correct the underlying systemic problems. Even though he resigned, severe environmental incidents continue to occur, such as the cadmium spill in a Guangdong Province section of the Beijiang River on December 15, 2005.

A Number of Measures Should Be Adopted to Deal With Major Environmental Emergencies

The Central Government Should Propagate Laws Which Would Include Provisions for Environmental Public Interest Litigation

The Immediate Need Mr. Liang Congjie, founder and president of China’s fi rst environmental NGO, Friends of Nature, has proposed promulgating environmental public interest litigation for several years, a policy supported by specialists in the fi eld of environmental law. To date, legislators, policymakers, and government offi cials have not taken action on this proposal. After the Songhua River toxic spill crisis, famous environmental experts, including Professor Wang Canfa, one of China’s top public interest environmental lawyers; Mr. Wang Jin, Professor at Peking University’s Environmental and Resources Law Institute; and Mr. Wang Mingyuan, Executive Director of the Center for Environmental, Natural Resources & Energy Law, Tsinghua University (THCEREL), all proposed that environmental public interest representatives are needed to seek compensation for ecological losses. Environmental NGOs could take a leading role in developing such an effort. During the Songhua River crisis, both Songyan City in Jilin Prov- ince and Harbin in Heilongjiang Province, were affected by the water stoppage. Millions lost access to piped-in water. Jilin Petrochemical 32 qie jianrong

Plant should take responsibility for the harm caused to these persons and compensate them in line with the law. Even conservative estimates would place the ﬁ gure into the millions of yuan. The problem is organization: “It is impossible for millions of people to get to court and sue the plant. Moreover, who will step forward and take on this work? It would be much easier if we had a public interest litigation system in place,” notes Professor Wang Canfa, who also serves on the faculty of China University of Political Science and Law. He also mentioned that, in a time when environmental cases keep emerging, it is imperative to establish public interest litigation sooner rather than later. Experts believe that by cultivating a group of public interest representatives, major pollution cases causing widespread damage and large losses to a broad area could be referred to courts in a timely manner. Plaintiffs, including cities and counties, could receive due compensation. Furthermore, by having polluters pay for the harm they cause, they—and by extension potential polluters—would face real costs for polluting. This should produce a substantial incentive to institute pollution control measures.

Compulsory Environmental Liability Insurance Should be Bequired in Dangerous Industries Renowned experts in the ﬁ eld of environmental law, such as Mr. Bie Tao, Director of the Environmental Law Enforcement Supervision Division, Department of Policy and Law with the SEPA; Mr. Zhang Xintai, professor of Eastern China Law University; and Mr. Wang Canfa proposed adopting a requirement that companies operating in dangerous industries would have to carry environmental liability insurance. This kind of insurance covers those insured for reasonable liabilities faced by potential harms caused by pollution. The system is conducive to protecting the environment by rationalizing costs, risk, and risk monitoring both for producers and those affected by pollution. Experts proposed that the central government should require companies operating in industries that cause serious pollution, such as those in the petrochemical, mining, chemical processing, toxic waste treatment and radioactive processing and containment sectors, carry such insurance. Companies operating in industries producing less pollution can buy liability insurance on a voluntary basis. songhua river toxic spill crisis 33

The Laws Requiring Open Access to Information should be Enforced, Especially in Cases where the Public Faces Harm from Pollution “During the Songhua River crisis, the release of two notices with different stories within a day and the spread of a rumor about a potential earthquake have clearly shown the poor access to environmental information,” Professor Wang observed. He insisted that the public lacks access to information on pollution and related threats because legal precedent and enforcement does not promote informational transparency and dissemination. This problem can be remedied through legislation.

Environmental Protection Agencies Need to Identify and Locate Risky Enterprises and make this Information Available to the Public Many chemical enterprises date back to the 1950s and 60s; many of these operate along rivers, including the Sichuan Chemical Works Group Ltd. and the Jilin Petrochemical plant. It was not until these plants caused pollution accidents that the public realized the danger of this situation. This realization prompts many questions. How many enterprises have problems similar to those of these plants which produced such widespread harm? What is their potential for causing severe environmental harm? Which department(s) understands these potential hazards? No government agency has addressed these questions. In order to become better informed, relevant environmental regulatory agencies should begin investigating these enterprises. From this they can generate an analysis of risks; this information can be provided to producers, the public, and the media. Furthermore, investigators need to take measures which improve environmental security and public safety. Such efforts should reduce the risks faced by the public and reduce environmental losses. The “Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Assessment of Environment Impacts” requires that environmental planning and impact assessment reports be produced. In spite of this, such reports have languished for more than two years. Such reports can help to resolve the location problem identiﬁ ed above. By clarifying the risks imposed by precariously placed operations, regulators can reduce pollution. 34 qie jianrong

China Should Maintain Environmental Standards and Regulations Even in High Growth Sectors According to Wang Yuqing, Vice Minister of the SEPA, China now faces an acute environmental crisis. In November 2005, the SEPA has received reports of 36 environmental crisis cases, including 10 major cases and 3 extremely serious ones. Wang observes that great environmental risks exist, especially in some chemical processing and manufacturing sectors, as well as in extraction industries like mining and petrochemicals, because they use old equipment and have poor management. In some areas, establishments continue operations even though they are technically obsolete or have failed to gain approval for continuing their operations. Many businesses operate in downtown areas, and as noted earlier, near bodies of water; in both cases the potential harm to the public is greatly increased. The cadmium spill on the Beijiang River fi ts this profi le. According to the Xinhua News Agency, cadmium prices have increased by 1000% in the past two years. High prices encouraged the rapid development of small factories. Many hastily built facilities lacked proper equipment, especially technologies and facilities that did not contribute directly to production, like waste water treatment. Without such equipment some factories discharged their untreated or inadequately treated waste water into the Beijiang River. The energy sector faces equally intense pressures. Since late 2002, China has faced an unprecedented energy shortage, with coal, oil and electricity in short supply. These shortages have driven price increases, which in turn stimulates producers to increase output. With greater output—e.g., more coal-fi red plants going into production—the general impact of pollution increases. Moreover, the probability of accidents also increases. If an accident occurs, China needs to treat energy producers and regulators on a more equal footing; too often heavier punishments fall on the latter, while producers rarely pay for their lapses. Implementing more even-handed treatment would have two benefi ts: the public would see the government as promoting fairness, and by being subject to some form of control, energy companies could improve their public image.

Those Committing Major Environmental Crimes should be Investigated and Prosecuted According to the provisions of relevant laws, the contamination of the Songhua River may be a prosecutable offense. Local environmental songhua river toxic spill crisis 35 authorities should transfer or submit relevant materials as required and cooperate with judicial departments in their investigation of this incident so that the responsible parties are identiﬁ ed and prosecuted for criminal acts.

Compensation for Losses should be Assessed Experts point out that the Songhua River toxic spill caused great damage and losses. These include losses suffered by local residents and enterprises that did not have access to running water and whose water safety could not be assured. The ﬁ shing industry suffered acute losses. As well, the water ecology in the area has suffered unknown, and possibly long-lasting, effects. Jilin Petrochemical, whose negligence precipitated these losses, should provide compensation to those affected.

Conclusion

According to senior environmental specialists, pollution problems have occurred as a result of rapid economic growth in the past 20 years. In this period, China experienced a seven-fold increase in GDP; many developing countries required a century or more to achieve such growth. Rapid growth forced China to make a great many social and policy adjustments in a very short time compared to other countries. Other countries tackled problems one at a time; China must wrestle with many simultaneously. Moreover, the problems of environmental protection and economic development remain completely separate issues in some regions. This is the grim reality we are facing today. It not only tests the Chinese government’s principles and administrative acumen, but also its capacity to ensure environmental sustainability in China. It is the duty of the Chinese government to provide its 1.3 billion people with a safe natural environment. That means economic development must continue to advance, but it must be balanced against the need for environmental security.

HARD-WON PROGRESS IN PROTECTING ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS

Li Xingwang, Ning Chen and Liu Xin

Introduction

China’s environmental legal system has improved remarkably in recent years, with environmental rights protection in a key position. At the Central Population Resources and Environment Forum held in 2003, Mr. Hu Jintao, President of the People’s Republic of China, pointed out that in environmental protection, we “must make sure that the people have clean water to drink, fresh and clean air to breathe and safe food to eat,” thus providing direction for defending environmental rights. Since 1993, the number of environmental disputes in China has continually increased. Since 1996, this number has increased more than 20 percent every year, demonstrating the urgent necessity of protecting environmental rights (see Table 1).

I. The Current Situation of the Legal Defense of Environmental Rights

A. Environmental Disputes in China Steadily Increasing, Often with Conﬂ icts Involving Environmental Protection The numerous environmental disputes have led to an emphasis on environmental rights defense. Accurate statistics on the number of environmental disputes occurring in China every year are not yet available; however, the annual reports released by the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), demonstrate that the issue is serious. These reports also suggest that the legal defense of environmental rights is essential and urgent (see Table 1). From this table, it is possible to determine an environmental dispute yearly curve; continuing from 1993, environmental disputes in China have continuously escalated, and in recent years the scope has widened, surpassing 20% every year since 1996. 38 li xingwang, ning chen and liu xin

Table 1. Statistics of China’s environmental disputes

Year Total Total Amount Number of Number Number Number Number Number of Pollution Air Pollution of Water of Noise of Solid of Other of Compensations Disputes Pollution Disputes Waste Environmental Disputes Disputes Disputes

1989 128,823 52.65 39,752 33,644 30,500 – – 1990 131,851 97.43 48,878 32,654 33,423 8,208 7,125 1991 111,359 41.09 36,340 35,331 27,814 3,935 7,939 1992 95,309 51.9 35,027 21,606 28,517 3,079 7,080 1993 98,207 41.24 35,585 22,999 29,862 2,910 6,851 1994 107,338 44.511 33,537 59,848 35,410 3,322 6,903 1995 109,650 38.547 38,433 22,688 39,991 3,684 5,835 1996 114,982 26.244 40,432 19,885 43,025 3,978 7,009 1997 135,226 26.943 47,244 23,825 54,921 3,606 5,630 1998 187,924 18.5166 63,739 28,279 85,017 4,618 6,271 1999 253,656 21.1632 89,273 33,892 116,645 7,224 6,622 2000 307,322 31.4493 117,089 42,691 132,694 8,152 6,696

Source: Teaching material for the Fourth National Seminar on Environmental Law, hosted by the Chinese University of Political Science and Law

Confl ict between environment and development is becoming increasingly sharp as the economy rapidly expands. Pollution has spread from urban to rural areas, and from developed to underdeveloped areas. As pollution becomes worse, a grave and complex situation is developing in which pollution from a single source coexists with area-wide pollution, municipal pollution overlaps industrial discharge, and old and new sources of pollutants are complicated by secondary pollution. In this critical situation, environmental confl icts frequently occur. In 2005, there was a series of environmental confl icts with wide social consequences: an environmental dispute in Dongyang City, Zhejiang Province; a dispute concerning pollution in Xinxiang City, Henan Province; environmental confl icts arising from the blockage of the river in Danyang in Jiangsu Province by people living downriver; petitions from sericulturists on the south bank of Taihu Lake in Zhejiang and Jiangsu Provinces concerning the widespread poisoning of silkworms. Citizens of Huashui Town of Dongyang City, Zhejiang Province complained of pollution from a chemical industrial park: “Vegetables and fruits cannot grow because of pollution. The gases discharged by industrial enterprises make our eyes water.” Data from one investigation shows that in the past the single-season rice yield reached as high as 700 kg per mu [15 mu = one hectare] but now the yield is half that. The people in Dongyang, Zhejiang Province indignantly claimed: “Pollution has damaged our lifeline!” and confl icts erupted between local offi cials hard-won progress in protecting environmental rights 39 and the people. On the 15th of March 2005, the villagers went to the mayor of Dongyang to bring the pollution issue to light. Although that was the day the mayor received visitors, the villagers did not meet with any relevant offi cials. Beginning on March 20, the villagers built a number of bamboo sheds by the crossroads of the chemical industrial parks. Elderly villagers stayed in the sheds at night and blocked the roads by day, demanding that the chemical and pesticide factories move out of the area. On April 1, the Dongyang government issued “four instructions,” which stated that to solve the problem the thirteen industrial enterprises in the industrial zone must suspend operations as of April 2. On the 6th of April, the Dongyang police, after issuing a public warning, moved in to clear out the bamboo sheds. Law enforcers isolated the bamboo sheds, preventing the villagers from entering the site, resulting in a severe social confl ict.1 In another case, the sewage discharge of a paper mill badly polluted the groundwater of Sanwangzhuang Village of Xinxiang City, Henan Province, creating severe problems with the drinking water for thousands of villagers who reported that the water drawn from deep wells was yellow and brownish, causing long-term dysentery. Sewage was discharged directly from the paper mill into the river, on the banks of which are large wheat fi elds. Even the villagers themselves would not eat the wheat harvested from their own fi elds. The villagers in Xinxiang, Henan Province had reported the ill effects of pollution to the local government more than once, to no avail. They fi nally took extreme action, resulting in confl ict with the police. According to statistics provided by SEPA, there has been a steady increase in incidents arising from environmental pollution and ecological damage every year since 2001, and the number of complaints about environmental pollution has remained high. In addition, letters from and visits to the offi ces of offi cials by the public are rising 10% each year. The series of environmental confl icts demonstrates that the old practice of developing the economy at the expense of the environment has resulted in grave consequences. Mr. Wang Yuqing, Vice Director of SEPA said: “The worsening ecological environment has brought about

1 Beijing Dajun Economic Observation and Research Centre, “Conferring Democ- racy and Public Participation in Environmental Prevention and Control,” http:// www.chinaelections.org/readnews.asp?newsid=%7B997159BE-D604–480C-912E- 383795D4E581%7D. 40 li xingwang, ning chen and liu xin huge economic losses. It also threatens human health and affects social stability. If the traditional practice continues, the environmental situation will continue to grow worse.”2 This demonstrates that in view of the severity of environmental disputes, legal defense of environmental justice must be instituted immediately.

B. Legislation Concerning Defense of Environmental Rights Gradually Improving The legal defense of environmental rights fi rst requires that our government enact sound laws and statutes offering systematic guarantees for civil environmental rights. In addition, the government should publicize these environmental laws and statutes so that citizens will be able to understand what environmental rights they are entitled to and how they can safeguard their rights when they are violated. Environmental legislation began in 1978 with the revision of the Constitution of the PRC, when protecting the environment and preventing pollution were incorporated within the fundamental law. On September 13, 1979, the Fifth Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress approved the fi rst environmental protection law, the People’s Republic of China Law on Environmental Protection (Trial). There now are six environmental protection laws, nine resource management laws, seven related enforcement regulations, eleven laws related to sustainable development, nearly thirty environmental administrative regulations, more than seventy departmental regulations and more than 400 national environmental standards. China has also signed more than thirty bilateral and multilateral international environmental treaties. It is also worth mentioning that in 1997, the criminal law was modifi ed to designate causing damage to environmental resources and corresponding accusations, as crimes. Thus, environmental legislation entered a new stage in which environmental legislation is combined with both criminal and civil laws. Environmental standards are a signifi cant component of the environmental protection legal system, and form the basis for enforcement of the law and environmental protection management. In 1973, the fi rst environmental standard, Industrial ‘Three Wastes’ Discharge Trial Standard

2 Bimonthly Talk, http://news.xinhuanet.com/mrdx/2005–09/11/content_3473787. htm. hard-won progress in protecting environmental rights 41 was formally promulgated. At present, environmental legislation in China mainly consists of management regulations on environmental standards and hundreds of environment standards. China has created a system of regulations on protecting environmental resources based on the Constitution. In this system, comprehensive, fundamental environmental laws are primary, and other environmental protection regulations promulgated by the relevant departments are supplementary. This system also includes laws, regulations and environmental standards on pollution prevention, nature conservation, resolution of environmental disputes, damage relief and environmental management organizations.

C. Stronger Environmental Law Enforcement Whether environmental law is comprehensively, strictly, fairly and effectively enforced is an important indicator of the fulﬁ llment of environmental justice. If environmental laws cannot be enforced, public awareness of environmental justice will be weakened. Since implementing environmental administrative law is of great importance in China at the present time, improving the implementation of environmental law is especially important. As environmental pollution grows worse, the public is demanding that our government improve the implementation of environmental laws and enforce laws against the crimes of polluting and damaging the environment. In 2000, there were 55,209 environmental administrative sanction cases and 246 environmental cases that the administration agreed to reconsider.3 In 2001, there were 1842 environmental pollution cases that led to compensations of RMB 122.724 million. In the same year, there were 71,089 environmental administrative sanction cases and 290 environmental administrative review cases.4 In 2002, there were 1,921 environmental pollution cases leading to compensation of RMB 46.409 million. There were 100,103 environmental administrative

3 China Environment Report, 2000, http://www.cpirc.org.cn/tjsj/tjsj_gb_detail. asp?id=2070. 4 China Environment Report, 2001, http://www.cpirc.org.cn/tjsj/tjsj_gb_detail. asp?id=2071. 42 li xingwang, ning chen and liu xin punishment cases and 285 environmental administrative review cases.5 In 2003, 1843 environmental sanction cases led to compensation of RMB 33.749 million, and there were 92,818 environmental administrative sanction cases and 230 environmental administrative review cases.6 In 2004, 1,441 environmental pollution cases led to compensation of RMB 363.657 million, and there were 80,079 environmental administrative sanction cases and 271 environmental administrative review cases.7 These fi gures are incomplete. According to statistics, by 2004 there were 3,063 environment supervisory organs in China. SEPA has set up some supervisory bureaus and adopted a vertical management system of law enforcement. It has also established 1319 environmental supervisory stations. The supervisory system requires the stations to submit quarterly, semiannual and annual reports. In this way, supervision has been greatly improved.8 Meanwhile, law enforcement has been strengthened. In 2004, the rate of qualifi ed construction projects was 95.7%. Qualifi ed projects of construction refer to those which meet the requirement that the construction project proper and its supplementary pollution control project are simultaneously designed, constructed and initiated. RMB 14.64 billion, an increase of 19.1% compared with the previous year, was invested in managing the projects within limited time. The number of the enterprises that were required to close down, to suspend operation, and to merge or transform production increased by 16.1%.9 On May 10, 2005, SEPA held a press conference and circulated information about the nine cases in violation of environmental laws that were the fi rst group of cases given a waning and put under supervision in 2005. The nine cases include: 1) pollution by calcium carbide and iron alloy in the border region of Shanxi, Shaanxi, Inner Mongolia and Ningxia provinces; 2) pollution of the Weihe River by Dongfang Paper Corporation in Wugong, Shaanxi Province; 3) discharge of sewage

5 China Environment Report, 2002, http://www.cpirc.org.cn/tjsj/tjsj_gb_detail. asp?id=2072. 6 China Environment Report, 2003, http://www.zhb.gov.cn/eic/64937157165947 2896/20040602/1050945.shtml. 7 China Environment Report, 2004, http://202.103.233.155/common/View.aspx? mid=35&id=17524&back=1 (October 18, 2005). 8 National environmental protection development, “Eleventh Five-year plan” (May 2005 Edition), http://www.gsep.gansu.gov.cn/xwdt/ztbd/sywgh/2005621173002.htm (October 18, 2005). 9 China Environment report, 2004, http://202.103.233.155/common/View.aspx? mid=35&id=17524&back=1 (October 17, 2005). hard-won progress in protecting environmental rights 43 in violation of regulations by Pingxiang Lotus Paper Corporation in Jiangxi Province; 4) pollution caused by the demolition process by the Shuichipu township paper pulp factory in Shangqiu, Henan Province; 5) environmental pollution caused by the Hongguang Corporation and the Linping Papermaking Corporation in Xiaoxian County, Suzhou, Anhui Province; 6) damage to the grasslands by the Xiaobaliang gold and copper mines, the Bing Copper Reﬁ nery, and the Dianhua paper pulp factory in Dongwu Banner, Inner Mongolia; 7) serious pollution of the Xianhe River by industrial waste water discharged by the Fumin bio-chemical factory in Yunxi County, Hubei Province; 8) repeated pollution and violations of regulations by papermaking enterprises in Tongliang County, Chongqing City; 9) excessive discharge of waste by the Xiyang Steel Corporation in Haining city, Liaoning Province.10

D. Weak Judicial Remedy in Environmental Disputes There is no doubt that it is good for everyone in society to have an enhanced awareness of environmental justice. However, it does not mean the road to protecting environmental rights will be smooth. According to Zhang Jun, Vice President of the Supreme Court of the People’s Republic of China, from 1998 to the end of 2001, Chinese courts at different levels accepted and heard 21,015 criminal, civil and administrative cases related to environmental protection, an increase of 25.35% per year.11 It is clear that the number of environmental cases is steadily on the rise. According to statistics provided by Lü Zhongmei, Vice President of the Hubei Supreme Court, in the 13 years from 1990 to 2003, Chinese courts at different levels accepted and heard 14,920 environmental administrative cases. However there was no accurate ﬁ gure for environmental civil lawsuits of the corresponding period. Statistics indicate that environmental cases in China may be divided into four types: environmental administrative review cases, environmental administrative litigation cases, environmental administrative compensation cases and environmental criminal cases. The ﬁ rst two

10 Nine environmental illegal cases are supervised and managed, http://www.ben. com.cn/WLZB/20050510/GB/WLZB%5E1383%5E4%5E10W6002.htm (October 17, 2005. 11 http://www2.qglt.com.cn/wsrmlt/jbzl/z/zhangjun/zhangj7.html, people net, giving the judicature strong support for environmental protection—visiting justice, vice leader of the supreme court of the People’s Republic of China, Jun Zhang. 44 li xingwang, ning chen and liu xin

Table 2. The type of environmental cases in 2003 and 2004

Year Total Number of Total Number Total Number of Total Number Environmental of Ended up Environmental of Ended up Administrative Environmental Administrative Environmental Reconsidering Administrative Compensation Criminal Cases Cases Proceedings Cases

2003 230 579 18 1 2004 271 616 17 2 Increase 41 37 –1 1

China Environment Report, 2004 and China Environment Report, 2003 by State Environmental Protec- tion Administration types make up the majority, while environmental criminal cases are rare. In recent years, some of the environmental criminal cases have aroused social concern. From February to March 2004, the Tuojiang River in Sichuan Province suffered an exceptional ecological disaster. Because industrial high-density sewage was discharged into the Tuojiang River, about 1 million people in fi ve cities had no access to clean water and their daily life became extremely diffi cult. Direct fi nancial loss was estimated to be 219 million RMB. The State Environment Protection Administration classifi ed this as one of the most serious water pollution incidents in China. At the beginning of 2005, a court session was opened and the case was tried in court in Chengdu. As shown in Table 2, in 2003, there were 828 environmental cases. The total number of environmental administrative litigation cases was 579, making up 69.93% of the total. However, only one environmental criminal case was concluded, accounting for 0.12% of the total. In 2004, the total number of these four types of environmental cases rose to 906, and the total number of environmental administrative litigation cases was 616, making up 67.99 % of the total. But only two environmental criminal cases were concluded (see Table 2). Lü Zhongmei pointed out that these facts illustrated that legal relief in environmental pollution disputes was very weak and that the role the judiciary played in environmental protection was rather limited. At present, very few articles in civil procedure law were quoted as the basis of environmental civil cases. In the trial process, judges were subject to pressures from all sides, and factors outside the cases also had great infl uence on the trial process. Now, within China’s environmental justice system, neither a specialized procedural law nor a specialized law enforcement organ exists. Therefore, it is imperative that we strengthen our judicial organs and systems for environmental cases; improve the hard-won progress in protecting environmental rights 45 system of environmental administrative, civil and criminal proceedings; reinforce the protection to environmental resources, and enhance the effect and effi ciency of environmental judicial authority.

II. Main Approaches for the Defense of Environmental Rights

Until the present, the main methods of resolving environmental disputes have been negotiation, mediation, administrative intermediation, arbitration and litigation. In China, citizen’s letters and visits to ofﬁ cials, as well as litigation are the principal approaches, as analyzed in detail in the following.

A. Citizen’s Letters and Visits Data from SEPA revealed that, letters of complaint concerning the environment received by environmental government organs increased 30% every year in the last three years. In 2003, there were more than 500,000 letters and 85,000 visits to ofﬁ cials. In 2004, letters and visits increased by about 70,000 and 1400 respectively, indicating an elevation of people’s awareness of defending environment rights. Defending environmental rights tops the list of hot topics of social concern (see Table 3). However, according to SEPA’ s data on letters and visits received from 2001 to 2003, the situation improved, since letters, environmental litigation, visits, especially those on environmental pollution disputes, decreased by a small margin in 2003 compared with the numbers in 2001 and 2002 (see Table 4).

Table 3. State Environmental Statistics Report in 2003 and 2004 Year Total People’s Total People’s Number of Letters Number of Visits 2003 525988 503333 85028 72939 2004 595852 574293 86414 70735 Increase 69864 70960 1386 –2204 Percentage of Increase 13.30% 14.10% 1.60% –3.00%

SEPA, “State Environmental Statistics Report, 2003,” http://www.zhb.gov.cn/eic/ 649371571659472896/20040602/1050945.shtml, “State Environmental Statistics Report, 2004,” http://202.103.233.155/common/View.aspx?mid=35&id=17524&b ack=1 46 li xingwang, ning chen and liu xin

Table 4. Statistics on People’s Letters and Visits Received by SEPA, 2001–2003

Year Total Number Complaints Number of Group Visit Public Visits about of People’s involving People’s Visits Environmental Letters from Environmental from the Public Pollution Disputes the Public Pollution

2001 2310 1297 489 246 181 2002 2204 1346 604 245 179 2003 2151 1250 484 225 169

China Environment Yearbook, 2002, p. 352; China Environment Yearbook, 2003, p. 337; China Environment Yearbook, 2004, p. 274, (China Environmental Yearbook Society).

B. Litigation

1. Analysis of the Characteristics of Environmental Litigation Environmental litigation is always regarded as a diffi cult matter to handle. It takes several years in many cases from commencing litigation to the fi nal judgment, involving a variety of problems throughout the process of the lawsuit. Prof. Wang Canfa, Director of CLAPV,12 who has engaged in legal aid for plaintiffs in cases of environmental pollution for fi ve years, summed up the diffi culties in environmental litigation in seven points: diffi culty of bringing an action, diffi culty of demonstrating proof, diffi culty in appraisal and evaluation, diffi culty of fi nding an evaluating institution, diffi culty of proving the causation, diffi culty in prevailing, diffi culty of enforcement. Currently, 24 of the 70 environmental cases CLAPV undertook from 1999 to 2004 are still in trial, in appeal or in the midst of investigation for instituting an action: 7 in 2002, 8 in 2003, and 5 in 2004. These numbers provides us with suffi cient evidence of the time consuming diffi culties of environmental litigation.

2. Analysis on Types of Environmental Litigations On Nov. 1, 1999, CLAPV initiated the ﬁ rst hot line in China for free legal assistance to pollution victims. The hot line revealed the main problems in environmental disputes in China, such as air pollution, noise pollution, water pollution, solid waste pollution, radiation and so on.

12 Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims at the China University of Political Science and Law. hard-won progress in protecting environmental rights 47

The data indicates that air pollution, noise pollution, and water pollution have been prominent in complaints involving environmental pollution since 1999. Since these forms of pollution have a great impact on daily life, they demand sufﬁ cient attention, and should become the next focus in the management of the environment.

III. Suggestions and Expectations for the Protection of Environmental Rights in China

This chapter has outlined the general situation of environmental rights protection in China. With the improvement in legislation concerning the protections of environmental rights and the rising of awareness of the need to safeguard environmental rights, we have experienced some progress. However, there is still a long way to go.

A. China’s Environmental Legislation Still Incomplete As stated above, although we have made great achievements in environmental legislation in the past 20 years, there are some weaknesses acting as barriers to the defense of environmental rights: 1. Lack of such vital environmental laws as those addressing the protection of health and relevant environmental factors, resulting in a lack of justice in environmental disputes. 2. Lack of an essential environmental administrative management system, creating a situation in which an increase in the infringement of environmental rights occurs. A good environmental administrative management system provides “control at the source,” and can effectively expand the environmental rights justice. 3. Lack of an adequate legal system for solution of environmental disputes. There is no speciﬁ c law addressing the resolution of environmental disputes and the related problems of damage compensation. Presently the legal basis for environmental dispute resolution is Article 41, Article 42 of the People’s Republic of China’s Environmental Protection Law, and Article 124 of General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China. However, those few statutes are inadequate in meeting the demand, thus adding to the difﬁ culties in defending environmental rights. 48 li xingwang, ning chen and liu xin

B. Environmental Law Implementation not Supported by the Rule of Law Judging objectively, in spite of the fl aws and weaknesses cited above, environmental legislation in China is among the most advanced in the world. The problems of environmental law enforcement have a more negative infl uence on environmental rights justice than does legislation. We can demonstrate this by the following: First, the enforcement of environmental law is insuffi cient and local protectionism is a serious problem. As seen in environmental cases in recent years, plaintiffs in environmental litigation have to confront not only the enterprises causing pollution, but also the strong administrative power behind the enterprises. The imbalance between parties in litigation makes the defense more diffi cult and more dangerous. Second, a mechanism in legal practice for public participation is absent, reducing participation to merely form without substance, despite provisions in statutes addressing public participation. As a result, the defense of environmental rights begins from an inferior position, and requires recovery of environmental rights and interests previously infringed when the environmental disputes arose.

C. Imperfect Judicial System As stated above, judicial relief is of little help in defending environmental interests. The road to environmental litigation is long and hard. The basic reason for this situation is that the whole judicial system is imperfect. The problems of environmental litigation are: (1) diffi culty in fi ling a case for investigation and prosecution; (2) diffi culty in meeting the limited qualifi cations required of the victim; (3) diffi culty in collecting evidence; (4) confusion in the evaluation system, and (5) diffi culty in implementing decisions. These diffi culties originate from the imperfect laws, the characteristics of environmental rights infringement, or unmodifi ed administration. No matter what has caused the problems, we must overcome these obstacles to promote environmental rights defense. From this we can see that the defense of China’s environmental rights does not appear hopeful. The capability for defending environmental rights is too ineffectual when compared to the continual increase in pollution. When people attempt to control environmental problems arising from the economic boom through environment litigation, they have little recourse. However, both the environmental legal practices abroad and the present achievements we have obtained in this fi eld prove that implementing environment laws it is the key in carrying out hard-won progress in protecting environmental rights 49 the strategy of sustainable development, if we can construct effective legal mechanisms for environmental justice.

D. Advantages of Developing Environmental Rights Justice in China Despite diffi culties and problems, there are still some advantages in China for developing the defense of environmental rights. First, the government has become increasingly active in environmental protection and more cognizant of the importance of environmental rights defense. Second, improvements in government by law will have a positive infl u- ence on the legal defense of environmental rights. In terms of legislation, several vital environmental laws are in the process of enactment, and others are being amended in response to social progress. For example, the issue of including environmental rights in the constitution, and compensation for environmental damage are now under discussion. In terms of law implementation, enforcement is being strengthened while the government has modifi ed the environmental management system and is eliminating local protectionism. In addition, SEPA is working on Measures for Promoting Public Participation in EIA. In terms of environmental litigation, there is encouraging news from discussion of public interest lawsuits and attention to environmental litigation.

E. Some Forces in Environmental Rights Defense The fi rst force is the public. Regarding public participation as important would result in allowing the public to participate in environmental rights protection through a series of mechanisms. For example, the system of public hearings should be included as an important component in EIA and other vital environmental legal systems. Another point is that information disclosure should be practiced to encourage the public to supervise environmental administration and administrative law enforcement. Also, environmental laws should be publicized in various channels to strengthen public awareness of environmental rights protection. In addition, new ways have been introduced so that the sphere of public participation is broadened and public participation takes on different forms. For example, China’s fi rst “special account for the defense of environmental rights fund” was opened on July 24, 2005, allowing people to send text messages to donate money to the fund, to offer suggestions on environmental protection, or to disclose cases of environmental pollution. This is a positive experiment in terms of public participation. The second force in environmental rights protection is 50 li xingwang, ning chen and liu xin the NGOs. Developing over the last ten years, environmental NGOs have grown to be the most active and infl uential grassroots organizations in China. According to incomplete statistics, the more infl uential environmental NGOs in China number nearly 100. With improved organization, environmental NGOs will defi nitely play a much more signifi cant role in the defense of environmental rights defense and environmental protection. As the largest developing country in the world, China must solve the confl icts arising from the demands of a fast and steady economic growth, limited environment capacity, and natural resources. Whether or not sustainable development can be realized largely depends on the successful resolution of these confl icting factors. The promotion of environmental rights protection will certainly contribute to resolving the issues. At the same time, we must acknowledge that environmental rights protection is a heavy and complex task, demanding improvement of laws, concerted effort by legislative, law-enforcement and judicial organs, and participation of the public. Given this understanding, environmental rights protection deserves more concern and better development. “THE YUANMINGYUAN PARK LAKE INCIDENT” AND ITS IMPACT ON PUBLIC AWARENESS

Zhao Yongxin

Looking back on the year 2005, the Yuanmingyuan Park Project Inci- dent in Beijing was easily the most important and controversial environmental protection event in China, with extensive public participation and media coverage. The incident had a profound impact on China’s environmental protection and far beyond, illustrating how the country is making progress in certain ways at the beginning of the 21st century while still facing many hardships and difﬁ culties.

I. A Brief Review of Events Leading to the Halt of the Yuanmingyuan Project

With no crises like a sudden outbreak of SARS or Avian Flu in early 2005, things were relatively quiet in China’s capital. However, that was to change shortly after the convention in March of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Con- ference, which were directing their attention to ways of implementing a scientifi c approach to development. On March 21 ( just one day before the United Nations’ World Water Day), a visiting scholar specializing in the ecosystems of classical gardens happened to pay a visit to Beijing’s Yuanmingyuan Park during a business trip. Yuanmingyuan is one of the most important historic and cultural sites in the country, a public park on the site of Beijing’s Old Summer Palace amid lakes and ruins of imperial palaces burned to the ground in 1860 by British and French troops and further destroyed in 1900 by the Eight-Power Allied Forces. Walking in the park, Zhang Zhengchun from Lanzhou in Gansu Province was shocked by what he saw: hundreds of construction workers with bulldozers and other powerful machinery draining the lake beds and waterways of Yuanmingyuan and laying down sheets of plastic on their beds. Local residents apparently were undisturbed by this since the project, begun in 2004 to conserve water by preventing seepage, 52 zhao yongxin was nearing completion. But Zhang saw potential disaster—irreversible damage to the waterways and birds and plants dependent on them, and he contacted the media both in and outside Beijing. On Monday, March 28, People’s Daily published a story headlined: “Yuanmingyuan Park Anti-infi ltration Project: Protection or Destruc- tion? Some Experts See Eco-Disaster.” The story also was posted on People’s Daily Online along with several photographs of the project and Zhang’s written plea, “Please Save Yuanmingyuan Park!” As websites began relaying the story that same day, and media response intensifi ed. Beijing Times Daily and China News Agency printed excerpts of “Protection or Destruction.” By March 29, follow-up reports were published not only in the People’s Daily, but also in other newspapers including Southern Weekend and China Youth Daily. And as media reports from around the country stirred public response, this in turn generated action by relevant governmental departments. On March 30, the Beijing Environmental Protection Bureau started an investigation into the project. On March 31, the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) ordered suspension of the project, on the grounds that it violated the Environmental Impact Assessment Law. On April 1, the Haidian District of Beijing, where the Park is located, ruled to suspend the project.

A. A State Environmental Protection Administration Hearing Inspires Heated Debate With this public attention focused on the Yuanmingyuan Project, opposing views formed around its pros and cons. The Yuanmingyuan Administration Bureau and most water resource experts supported it and downplayed any negative impact on the environment. They argued that the project should continue. On the other side, most environmentalists, conservationists, social science scholars as well as residents of Beijing criticized the project for having ignored laws, both in regard to environmental protection and cultural heritage preservation. They wanted to see the project halted and the original landform of Yuan- mingyuan restored. They also asked that those individuals responsible be held accountable. How would all this turn out? Some relevant governmental agencies (cultural heritage protection, water resources and landscaping, for example) stood by and watched. This left the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) to struggle on its own. On April 6, “the yuanmingyuan park lake incident” 53

SEPA announced a public hearing for April 13 on the environmental impact of the project. This hearing, which marked the next phase of the whole incident, was the fi rst of its kind following the enactment in 2003 of Environmental Impact Assessment Law. While the State Environmental Protection Administration was being bombarded by requests both on-line and by phone from those who wanted to register for its April 13 hearing, non-governmental organizations had already taken action. On April 1, Friends of Nature, China’s fi rst environmental NGO cooperating with www.blogchina.org (since changed to www.bokee.com) held a symposium on the ecology of the historic Yuanmingyuan Park attended by specialists in many fi elds. Most strongly urged an immediate halt to the project and removal of the plastic liner. On April 13, SEPA’s hearing was held right on schedule with people from all walks of life attending. Covering the occasion were journalists from over 10 media outlets including People’s Daily Online and Xinhua Online, which did a live broadcast. Attending were some 70 selected representatives from various concerned public organizations. Represen- tative government offi cials and specialists were there from the Yuan- mingyuan Administration Bureau, the Beijing Bureau of Cultural Relics Protection, Landscaping and Water Resources. From the environmental NGOs were such groups as Friends of Nature, Global Village Beijing and Green Earth Volunteers. Also attending were students, local residents, and other specialists from various fi elds. The credentials of the specialists attending the meeting were beyond question. They included three academicians from the Chinese Academy of Sciences and of Engineering—namely Wu Liangyong, Qian Yi and Li Wenhua—along with a dozen university professors from Tsinghua University, Peking University, Peoples’ University and Beijing Normal University. Some people came from outside Beijing. Because of a registration quota, many had to remain outside. With Pan Yue, vice minister of the State Environmental Protection Administration sitting with him on stage, Zhu Xingxiang, head of SEPA’s department for environmental impact, chaired the meeting. Xie Zhenhua, minister of SEPA, also sat quietly in the back for over an hour during the proceedings. Beginning at 9 a.m., the hearing was divided into two sessions: open debate followed by summaries by each side. Speakers were given fi ve minutes each. Because of the earlier discussions, participants were already clear on their positions and divided into two camps, those for the project and 54 zhao yongxin those against. The format called for the two sides to air their opinions in turns. Heated debate ensued. Despite the chairman’s pleas for calm, many openly expressed their outrage. The hearing nearly went out of control after Professor Yu Kongjian of Peking University showed photographs of extensive cutting down of trees in the Park. When Li Dun, a Tsinghua professor, condemned the project in no uncertain terms and concluded that the Yuanmingyuan Administration Bureau should be held legally responsible, his remarks provoked Li Jingqi, director of the Bureau, to leave in the middle of the hearing. With all this excitement, the meeting lasted an hour beyond its scheduled time. Afterwards, Zhu Xingxiang told the media that the hearing’s purpose was simply to hear views from all concerned and that no action could be taken until after an assessment was made under the Environmental Impact Assessment Law. But one thing was clear: the majority of the 29 speakers were clearly against the project of lining Yuanmingyuan lake beds with impermeable plastic. No one could have expected that just one week after SEPA’s hearing, more debate would erupt. On April 20, a forum called “Water Resources, Water Conservation and Refl ections on the Yuanmingyuan Park Anti-infi ltration Project” was organized by China Water Power Press, Beijing Huashang International Logistics Company and Tom. com. Eight experts participated in this forum, while another three submitted articles. Academic titles of participating specialists ranged from ‘expert of water resources,’ ‘counselor of the State Council’ to ‘member of the Standing Committee of Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.’ Yet all spoke with one voice: The Yuanmingyuan project was illegal and wrong. This forum received little media attention, but added to the complexity of the situation.

B. The Situation Intensifi es The SEPA hearing brought to public attention the Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) law and its application to the Yuanmingyuan project—an obvious hot potato (and for reasons other than technical, of course). The Yuanmingyuan Administration Bureau claimed at fi rst no EIA agency could be found willing to undertake the task but fi nally it had been able to fi nd an agency, one that requested anonymity. Just as everyone was eagerly awaiting the results of this agency, it suddenly withdrew. SEPA openly named the group as being affi liated with the “the yuanmingyuan park lake incident” 55

Beijing Normal University and criticized it for its wavering position. All this made the issue even more controversial. Then the Environmental Impact Agency of Tsinghua University agreed to take on the task, and so the EIA evaluation was able to continue. At that moment more breaking news attracted the public’s concern: On May 16, China Legal News reported that Yuanmingyuan Park had rented out an island in the park to private interests. Worse, on May 21, The Beijing News reported that personal villas were under construction inside Yuanmingyuan, a national state-level historic and cultural heritage site. This news, besides adding more fuel to the fi re, brought forth an extremely prompt response from both the Yuanmingyuan Administration Bureau and Haidian District government—surprising in that both previously had reacted slowly towards the project to prevent seepage in the waterways at Yuanmingyuan. The Park made a quick reversal on renting the island, and the Haidian government announced an investigation into the villa construction. To everyone’s even greater surprise, the Beijing municipal government—having all along remained silent—suddenly held a one-hour press conference on May 23 to announce its positions on the ‘Yuan- mingyuan Park Project’. The press conference was chaired by the Publicity Department of the Beijing Municipal Committee. Yu Jun, vice director of Haidian District and Kong Fanzhi, deputy director of the Beijing Bureau of Cultural Relics Protection gave briefi ngs for close to 50 minutes, leaving only 10 minutes for questions. After a few questions from the media, the press conference was brought to a quick end. This represented the fi rst time in six months that the Beijing government had anything openly to say about the controversy. Relative peace then prevailed while people waited in mid-June for the results of the Environmental Impact Assessment report. But for some reason before the offi cial disclosure, word spread that the assessment report favored the project. On July 2, Beijing Times announced that the EIA report received by the State Environmental Protection Administra- tion claimed that the plastic lining on the lake and waterways beds in Yuanmingyuan Park was harmless. Beijing Times said the announcement could be expected in a week. This article raised tensions, and the media urged that the offi cial report be announced as soon as possible. On the morning of July 5, the State Environmental Protection Administration published on its website the full text of the report made 56 zhao yongxin by the EIA Agency of Tsinghua University. The rumors proved untrue. Although rather lengthy, essentially the project was held to be illegal since it had been initiated without going through an environmental impact assessment, as required by law. The report also concluded that the ecosystem of the Park had already been damaged and that the situation needed to be rectifi ed.

C. The Environmental Impact Assessment Report The key points of the EIA report were as follows: • Without having gone through the environmental impact assessment required by law, the original plan of the Yuanmingyuan Project was deeply fl awed. The lack of comprehensive planning had damaged biodiversity by causing a rapid breakdown the Park’s ecosystem, evidenced by a decrease of birds and other wildlife. • The project had a signifi cant and negative impact on the total azotes and phosphor of the lake water. • Given the serious water shortage in Beijing, methods are needed in Yuanmingyuan Park to conserve water, including methods to prevent seepage. However, those methods must take into account specifi c geological conditions, amount of water control needed and environmental impact. • As to the choice of plastic, toxicity was not considered. However, generally speaking, plastic is less environmentally-friendly than natural clay. Given Yuanmingyuan’s stature as a state-level cultural heritage and historic site, consideration must be given to what material might be most appropriate to line its waterways. • Can Yuanmingyuan use recycled water? In the report, recycled water was recommended as a way of adding to the available water supply for Yuanmingyuan Park, on condition that it be fi ltered and strictly monitored to meet certain standards. • What about the damage already infl icted? The report acknowledged social, economic and environmental problems caused by the project. Practical and reasonable solutions to correct the situation must be found through a multi-faceted approach that takes in both the long and short term impact on all interests. • The report also said that the restoration of the waterways that are an integral part of Yuanmingyuan Park should not be solely the responsibility of the park. It recommended that relevant departments of “the yuanmingyuan park lake incident” 57

the Beijing municipal government coordinate various water resources in Beijing to guarantee a regular water supply for the park. On July 7, while many experts were still analyzing the EIA report, the State Environmental Protection Administration made a ruling on the Yuanmingyuan Project: 1. For the eastern part of the Park where the project had not yet started, natural clay should be used instead of plastic; 2. For Yichunyuan, a garden within the Park, all plastic in place to prevent water seepage must be removed immediately and replaced with natural clay. The water entrance could be left as it is. 3. For the lake bed above 40.7 meters in Changchunyuan, another garden within the Park, all plastic must be removed immediately and be replaced with natural clay. No plastic lining will be allowed along the lake shore. 4. For Fuhai, the central lake of the Park, a full-scale correction of the plastic liner already in place was ordered. With this ruling, SEPA took a ﬁ rm and clear position for the ﬁ rst time since the revelation of problems surrounding the Yuanmingyuan Project.

D. Remedies Remain Elusive The Yuanmingyuan Administration Bureau and Haidian District Gov- ernment promised to adhere to SEPA’s ruling and to do everything possible to remedy and improve the project. Then on August 8, after remaining silent for a month, the Yuan- mingyuan Administration Bureau announced work would to be started in mid-August to make the necessary fi xes. On August 16, both Beijing Times and Beijing Youth Daily reported the ‘offi cial kick off ’ of the effort had happened on the day before. However, according to reliable sources, the restoration project had begun in secret as early as a week earlier. One of the sources was the China Times newspaper, which in an exclusive report on August 11 reported that the Park workers had started to remove the plastic. In contrast to earlier openness, Park authorities began going about fi xing the problems behind closed doors. Media requests for interviews were turned down. So no one on the outside really knew what was going on. For example, how much plastic liner was being removed and 58 zhao yongxin how much natural clay was being used as replacement? Everything remained mysterious—even until today. On September 6, the media reported the completion of the project, saying it would be inspected and passed by Beijing Environmental Pro- tection Administration. On September 9, without any news about the result of inspections, however, the Park started to refi ll the lake with water in anticipation of tourist revenue through boat rentals during the National Holiday in October. By then, then public interest in the Yuanmingyuan Park Incident had dwindled. A few scholars, like Li Dihua of Peking University, called for strict monitoring of what was going on in the park, but in general there was little response. After nearly half year, the Yuanmingyuan Project Incident came to an end, although not in an ideal manner.

II. The Larger Implications of the Yuanmingyuan Park Incident

“A few puddles turned the whole city of Beijing upside down,” was one vivid comment on the whole Yuanmingyuan Park controversy. Really, compared with other state affairs occurring at the same time—the fi rst visit to the Mainland by the delegation of the Kuomintang Party from Taiwan and the worsening relations between China and Japan, for instance—a project involving the lining of a lake bed should not have attracted such wide attention. However, as the saying goes, a drop of water can refl ect a myriad of things. The incident had symbolic meanings refl ecting on China’s modernization drive. Although it began and ended as an environmental issue, the Yuanmingyuan Park controversy came to have far wider implications. Looking back on the incident that shook Beijing for 100 days then ended on an anticlimactic note, we are encouraged to see remarkable progress in protection of the environment and cultural heritage, public participation and democratic decision-making. On the other hand, we can see the problems that still exist and how much more needs to be done. Since the lakebed lining project occurred in the Yuanmingyuan Park, a key cultural heritage site under state protection, it seemed to be unrelated to environmental protection. Yet the incident both began and ended as an environmental issue, and included several “Firsts”: it was the fi rst time for the State Environmental Protection Administration to hold a public hearing on a project; it was the fi rst time that SEPA “the yuanmingyuan park lake incident” 59 openly criticized an Environmental Impact Assessment agency for being irresponsible; it was the fi rst time for a sensitive EIA report to be disclosed to the public. It also can be said that this Incident was unprecedented for the attention it gave SEPA, for environmental laws to weigh in with such authority and for the public to show such passionate interest in environmental protection. This is because SEPA respected public opinion and dared to act on its obligations according to law—and also because public awareness of environmental protection was greatly raised. In the past three decades, the need for enforcement of environmental laws has been asserted time and again. Campaigns for environmental protection have been launched one after another. For instance, the “Three-Rivers” and Three-Lakes” Projects have been implemented and industrial enterprises have been required to meet standards on the discharge of waste. Yet actual enforcement of environmental laws has faced many obstacles under the pressures imposed by the principle that “development is of overriding importance,” by powerful departments of the central government and by the severe protectionism of the local governments. Environmental departments have had little say in decision-making and environmental laws have not been fully implemented. Consequently, efforts for environmental protection often end in failure. Since the beginning of the 21st century, the State Envi- ronmental Protection Administration has tried hard to change this embarrassing situation. The Environment Impact Assessment Law (the EIA Law), which came into effect on September 1, 2003, gives environmental protection precedence over economic considerations. In other words, environment impact assessment law can be a powerful weapon. In the two years following the enactment of the law, SEPA worked to reinforce it and to improve related institutions, leading up to the EIA storm in the spring of 2005. With the support of some leaders from the central government, SEPA prevailed. The subsequent Yuanmingyuan Park Incident was regarded as another test for SEPA for implementing the EIA Law. While other related departments adopted a wait-and-see attitude, SEPA withstood the pressure and stuck through it to the end. The victory for the public in the Yuanmingyuan Incident is in the heightened public awareness for environmental protection that has been the result of nearly 20 years of environmental education in China promoted by environmental departments, grassroots NGOs and the 60 zhao yongxin media. Without an understanding of the water and biodiversity issues involved, the public would not have been able to have such an extensive and strong reaction to the Yuanmingyuan project. Without a doubt, the incident also revealed certain problems in enforcement of the EIA Law. For instance, an agency hires an EIA organization to produce a report, which then will be likely to be in favor of the agency. Just imagine what would have happened in this instance if Tsinghua University hadn’t agreed to continue the EIA mission. However, the problems pale in comparison with the achievements. Because of its signifi cance, The Yuanmingyuan Park Incident is a milestone in China’s environmental protection history. The Yuanmingyuan Park Incident also illustrates the force of public participation and its signifi cance in the healthy development of society. The cooperation among experts, media, the general public and NGOs played a key role in bringing the Incident to a satisfactory end. This can be seen from the following points: Firstly, media acted as a “generator” in which its role changed from spreading information to creating infl uence. The media brought the Incident to light in the fi rst place and then later spared no efforts in covering the story. All different branches of media took part in the coverage, including the offi cial and commercial media; the traditional media and the Internet. The progress of the incident was covered throughout, and comments were published. We can say that the media coverage of the event was thorough and it infl uence profound. The journalists fought a great battle in 2005. Secondly, experts and scholars are deserving of praise. These people include Prof. Zhang Zhengchun who fi rst exposed the project to the media, university professors like Yu Kongjian, Wang Rusong, Li Dun, Cui Haiting, Li Dihua, Ge Jianxiong and authoritative scholars like Wu Liangyong, Qian Yi and Li Wenhua and younger scholars like Jiang Wenlai, and Tang Kewang. They stood and voiced their opinions with courage. They inspired government offi cials and educated the general public with their strong sense of social responsibility and rich expertise. The importance of their role cannot be overestimated. In the scientifi c spirit of “letting a hundred schools contend,” the hot debate between the “for” and “against” sides of the project also gave signifi cance to the event. Through debate, people got a clearer idea about ecological protection, protection of cultural heritage, scientifi c and technical measures, administration of the law, and democratic decision-making. Of course, here were some behaviors in the debate that “the yuanmingyuan park lake incident” 61 were not scientifi c or rational. Some people with questionable motives made personal attacks or used “political labels,” which reminded us of what happened during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). This reveals that some unfortunate habits exist in academic circles. Thirdly, NGOs for environmental protection played a vital role. Friends of Nature and www.blogchina.org jointly held a symposium prior to the hearing. At the public hearing, the representatives from Friends of Nature, Beijing Earthview Environment Education and Research Center and Global Village of Beijing made convincing presentations. Representing public opinions and good sense, the NGOs helped expand the consequences of the incident. Finally, the average citizens’ performance was inspiring. With great enthusiasm, Beijing citizens as well as students talked about the project on the streets, expressed their opinions on the Internet, reported what they had seen in the Park to the media or appeared and aired their voices on the media. The extensive participation of the general public provided a solid social foundation for the way Yuanmingyuan Park Incident progressed.

Conclusion

Having touched the public nerve, the Yuanmingyuan Park Incident had great social impact. In the past, similar incidents often ended without a decision. This time, the Yuanmingyuan Incident escaped this fate. Thus it became a symbol of progress in the political life of the Chinese people. For the fi rst time, the outcome of the incident was not decided by the instruction of a particular leader on a high level, as was usually the case in the past, but by an EIA report conducted on the basis of compliance with the law. From this case we see that scientifi c and democratic decision-making and law-based administration are no longer empty slogans. We might regard Beijing municipal government’s silence on the issue, except for the unexpected press release it held, as respect for the public and laws. But might we also interpret its attitude in an opposite way? Mention should be made about the Beijing Bureau of Cultural Relics and the State Bureau of Cultural Relics. They kept their mouths shut after expressing their viewpoint at the beginning and later tried to explain away damage caused the Yuanmingyuan Park by the project. They also turned a deaf ear to the questions and appeals by experts 62 zhao yongxin and media. The Beijing Bureau of Water Resources and Beijing Bureau of Landscaping, directly connected with the event, kept silent the whole time. The behavior of these departments was truly odd and disappointing. On the surface, the incident is about environmental protection, but on a deeper level it is about the protection of historic heritage sites. As an offi cial from the Beijing Bureau of Cultural Relics put it, in the past they missed the best opportunity to protect the Old Summer Palace and this time they missed another chance. Many people described the incident as “an unfi nished game of chess.” The protection and administration of the Yuanmingyuan Park refl ects the protection and administration of the Chinese cultural and natural heritage. The Old Summer Palace stands as a monument to both the glory and trauma of Chinese history that should not be forgotten. Those committed to the protection of the environment and cultural heritage and to the healthy development of public participation should strive to fi nish this “game of chess” in a fi rm and positive manner. HIGHLY CONTROVERSIAL HYDROPOWER DEVELOPMENT IN WESTERN CHINA

Xue Ye and Wang Yongchen

2005 saw an all-out push by the central government to put its “scientifi c development concept” into practice, with some impressive progress towards becoming a resource-effi cient and environmentally-friendly society. However, no substantial headway was made against certain fundamental problems that have begun to emerge. Since 2003, hydropower development in southwest China has raised concerns across the social spectrum and drawn global attention as well. The issue raises many fundamental questions for China’s sustainable development plans and policies: how can a balance be struck between the various stakeholders and their diverse range of interests? How can a more “scientifi c” decision-making system be put in place across the board? How can the issues involved be better defi ned and more broadly debated? How can the “scientifi c development concept” be translated into a new model that provides integrated, balanced and harmonious development? How can considerations of overall costs and a long-term perspective be guaranteed in critical decision making? And how can all stakeholders enjoy guaranteed equitable participation in decision- making processes? Clearly, it will take quite some time before a fi nal historical conclusion can be drawn on certain issues of principle and of engineering in relation to China’s hydropower development program. However, open discussion and debate have led to a number of visible changes in program implementation, and the public has a much better understanding of these issues than previously. This is a natural product of social progress. The Eleventh Five-Year Development Program covering the years 2006–2010, adopted at the Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC), states the Central Government’s clear position on hydropower. Whereas the Tenth Five-Year Plan called for “great efforts to develop hydropower,” the Eleventh Five-Year “Development Program” cautions that China must “develop hydropower without degrading the [ecological] environment.” The new wording refl ects a fundamental change of tack by the 64 xue ye and wang yongchen top leadership. However, whether this will result in action from others, especially those working for local governments and hydropower developers, remains an open question. A multitude of problems remain to be addressed before this happens.

I. Driving Factors Behind Southwest China’s Blind Rush to Develop Hydropower

When the power generation monopoly was ended, the fi ve major power companies (enumerated below) immediately began competing for market share in the Southwest China energy sector. Fierce competition led to nearly all major rivers being parceled out to different players. Beijing State Power Corporation won control of the Dadu and Nujiang (aka Salween) Rivers; Huaneng Corporation got the Minjiang River; the China Three Gorges Project Corporation won exclusive rights to exploit the Jinsha River; while the Wujiang and Lancang (aka Mekong) Rivers are to be developed by Huadian Corporation.1 To facilitate project management, the China Three Gorges Project Corporation is even planning to move its headquarters from Yichang, near the Three Gorges Dam, to Chengdu. Meanwhile, foreign companies have also increased their investment in hydropower in the region, expecting high returns.2 Given the huge potential profi ts of hydropower, a number of private companies from Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong provinces as well as local investors from all the southwestern provinces have also scrambled to start dams on smaller tributaries of the major rivers, which the dominant power companies above have neglected or have no time to develop. A 2004 survey points to some 3000 small-scale hydropower stations nationwide being implanted with “four no’s”: no feasibility study, no offi cial approval, no environmental impact assessment and no acceptance certifi cate.3

1 “Five Major Companies Competing for Hydropower in Southwest China with Invest- ment of 100 Billion,” http://www.china-project.com/end/west/2003030301.html. 2 Chen Lei and Zhao Qian, “What’s Behind the Foreign Investment Craze in China’s Hydropower Market,” Oriental Outlook Weekly, November 11, 2004, http://cn.news.yahoo. com/041111/346/26ss1.html. 3 Zhang Zhitong, “Summary of Experience Gained in Combating Droughts and Floods in 2005 and Advice for the 2006 Agenda,” http://www.rcdr.org.cn/remedy/news. asp?tid=1&ﬁ d=12. highly controversial hydropower development 65

Nearly all rivers in the region are due to be dammed. The Minjiang River development program is forecast to have a capacity of 28.48 million kilowatts. The Zipingpu hydropower station under construction is even located near a world heritage site—the Dujiangyan Irrigation System. The Dadu River plan includes 356 hydro stations with a total capacity of 15.40 million kilowatts. The Pubugou hydro development program is expected to have an installed capacity of 3.3 million kilowatts with an estimated 100,000 people due to be resettled. The 21 dams planned for the Yaqing River have a total capacity of 12.19 million kilowatts; one of these, Ertan hydropower dam, has already been completed. The 24-dam cascade development along the Lancang River will have a generating capacity of 23.66 million kilowatts. The completed Manwan hydropower station, with its 1.25 million kilowatt capacity, has the largest installed generating capacity in Yunnan Prov- ince. The development plan for the Nujiang River is a two-reservoir and 13-dam cascade project. 12 dams are to be built over the Jinsha River. One of these dams will be built over the Tiger Leaping Gorge, a world natural heritage site. Planned generating capacity on the Jialing River is 12.18 million kilowatts involving 17 dams. Over the Wujiang River, 10 dams will be constructed with a total generating capacity of 7 million kilowatts. A hydropower expert observes that “Competition over the hydro development rights is getting fi ercer . . . there are fewer than ten kilometers between every hydropower station you see on the Minjiang River.”4 It is a shocking sight to behold when decisions on such an enormous development program are made in such a hasty manner. In only 20 years more than 10 large power stations are to be planned and built with a total capacity exceeding 3 million kilowatts. With Ertan power station added in, capacity will be equal to fi ve Three Gorges Proj- ects. But here’s the difference: the Three Gorges Project only started construction after decades of planning, feasibility studies and debate plus a review by the National People’s Congress. The project is still the subject of wide-ranging debate, given that a scientifi c study on its overall long-term impact began only a few years ago. In general, more time is defi nitely needed to draw sound conclusions on issues of geology, ecology and water quality. In view of all these factors, prudence is paramount.

4 “Headquarters to Be Moved to Chengdu, Major Power Corporations Accelerate Market Grabbing,” China Business, April 10, 2005. 66 xue ye and wang yongchen

These hydropower development projects also involve colossal investments. The Nujiang River development plan alone requires 100 billion RMB.5 The total investment in hydropower in this region could run into the trillions. This amounts to “a scramble for hydropower” reminiscent of the Great Leap Forward in the 1950s when crude steel smelters cropped up everywhere. Chen Guojie, a senior research fellow at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, comments: There is a messy free-for-all going on. Nobody seriously considers the consequences . . . Nobody listens to diverging views. No river is being left undammed. Small, medium and large dams are springing up at the same time. It’s each for their own, with the builders of each dam acting with no regard for the collective interest in a rush to grab development rights for rivers. This is government-sponsored anarchy. Chen frets that in the next decades, the Yangtze, Nujiang and other rivers will end up like staircases—a chain of short stretches broken up by hydro stations.6 In recent years authorities have noted the social risks of this unchecked development craze. For instance, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) only authorized an additional generation capacity of 60 million kilowatts in 2004, but actual generation, at 180 million kilowatts, was twice as much again. In view of this the State Council immediately issued Circular Number 32 ordering a halt to the unchecked construction of power stations.7 This unprecedented, rapid and large-scale hydropower development push is destined to have equally unprecedented impacts in social, environment, cultural and political terms. Some projects have already become a focus of attention: Yangliuhu Dam, hydropower stations along the Dadu River and the Nujiang River, stations on the Minya Konka, and over the Tiger Leaping Gorge. The Zipingpu water control program was started in 2000. Part of the program, Yangliuhu Dam, is only 1310 meters away from the Dujiangyan Irrigation System in Sichuan Province. An exceptional

5 Wang Chong, “Investment Amounted to 100 billion, Confl icts of Interest behind Nujiang River Hydropower Development,” Elite Reference, March 18, 2004, http://www. china5e.com/news/water/200403/200403180009.html. 6 Chen Guojie, “Chaotic Hydropower Development in Southwest China Provokes Worries; Questions to be Asked to Clarify the Issue,” Science Times, September 1, 2004. 7 Tan Lisha, “Hundreds of Billions in Hydropower Investment; the State Council calls for Suspension of Major Power Projects,” China Business Times, December 1, 2004. highly controversial hydropower development 67 example of ancient ecological engineering that avoids the need for dams, this system’s fl awless design has remained intact and functional for over 2200 years. Due to its unique value, UNESCO listed the Duji- angyan Irrigation System as a world heritage site in 2000. So, naturally, when the building of the Yangliuhu dam near the Irrigation System was announced in 2003, it caused an uproar throughout the country. This modern-day fl outing of the value of this ancient treasure is truly shameful. This incident also refl ects the open violation and ignorance of history, culture, and law, which is truly astonishing. Fortunately this callousness was offset by the efforts of relevant agencies at provincial and state levels together with public opinion, which played a critical role in persuading the authorities of Sichuan Province to sensibly order that the project be stopped. As the top section of the Yangtze River, the Tiger Leaping Gorge represents a key part of the Three Parallel Rivers World Heritage Area. Some of the greatest gorges in the world, these boast 200,000 mu (around 32,947 acres) of highly productive land along their perimeters, where local people live and work in peace and contentment. This is a relatively rich area in Yunnan Province. However, the hydropower development plan will disrupt this social system by resettling 100,000 people from dozens of ethnic groups. With the help of non-governmental organizations, Mr. Ge Quanxiao, a local farmer, took part in the 2004 United Nations Symposium on Hydropower and Sustain- able Development held in Beijing, the fi rst time a Chinese farmer has attended such an event.8 In his paper entitled Hydropower Development and the Participation Rights of Indigenous Inhabitants, he argues that excluding the community from decision-making is resulting in a misconception on this issue. In the eyes of dam builders, these farmers represent only a group of people or an obstacle to fulfi lling abstract development plans. However, the inundation of the community’s living space by dammed water stands to be much more disastrous than fl oods, droughts or earth- quakes; even more devastating than war. The damming of this gorge will destroy the local ecosystem, and neither the local government nor the developer can afford to compensate for this. Located in the eastern part of the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, the upper and middle reaches of the Dadu River serve as the headwaters of the

8 Dong Wei, He Lei, “Local People Have a Say in International Forum,” China Youth Daily, October 24, 2004. 68 xue ye and wang yongchen

Yangtze River. The Yangtze’s upper reaches are also a well-known ecologically sensitive area. Renowned natural reserves, ecological parks and geological parks dot the course of the river, which is also an emblematic center of the Tibetan, Jiarong Tibetan, Kangba Tibetan, Qiang and Yi ethnic cultures and Chinese culture generally. Despite all this, the entire area stands to be damaged by a program, already approved, of the State Power Co. This 3-reservoir, 22-dam cascade project is slated to have a capacity of 23.40 million kilowatts. This cascade of dams will leave only about 50 kilometers of open river between each dam. Within this program, the Pubugou project, which was originally set to fi nish in December 2004, will submerge 84 square kilometers of land and force the resettlement of 102,000 people. This land seizure and the poor compensation offered to those displaced, as well as the murky process by which these decisions were ratifi ed, has set off massive protests. Such actions have alerted the nation and its central government to the social risks that the present model of hydropower development can involve.9 Minya Konka, the biggest single nature reserve and one enjoying state-level protection, is also the largest glaciated peak in the eastern part of the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, and a critical water source area. A prehistoric ecosystem, a complete vertical plant spectrum, and large areas of virgin forest all thrive there. This mountainous area also harbors rich fauna, endangered species and a biological gene bank. Developers, however, have fl outed the relevant laws against development activity in order to build on Renzonghai and Bawanghai, the central area of this reserve. More alarmingly, the Renzonghai project started without even obtaining government approval. Despite public pressure, the developer resumed the project in May 2004 after a short hiatus. It is also worth mentioning that these two areas are located along the Luhuo-Kangding earthquake belt, a highly active earthquake zone. Cheng Li, an expert in tourism management and regional development from Sichuan Uni- versity, argues that development of this area will produce crises in four areas: ecology, ethnic culture, safety and resettlement. The law itself seems toothless in the face of the powerful lobbies involved: some local governments turn a blind eye to development activities that contravene

9 Yan Lieshan, “Distortion of Power by Money,” Outlook Weekly, No. 1111; Tian Gang, Huang Huo, “Hanyuan: Collusion between Corrupt Offi cials and Profi teers,” Xinhua Daily Telegraph, June 4, 2005. highly controversial hydropower development 69 domestic and international laws and then pressure the media not to report on them.10 The most heated debate has been over the Nujiang River development, with the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) holding a symposium on “Environmental Issues Involved in the Hydro- power Development along the Nujiang River” in Beijing in September 2003. The majority of the 36 domestic and international experts present were against this hydropower development. Backing up their case with reference to local ecology, geology, environmental protection, cultural preservation and endangered fauna and fl ora species, they argued that the development of hydropower along the Nujiang River would do more harm than good. At another SEPA symposium in Kunming, Yunnan in October 2003, bitter divisions emerged between government offi cials and a broad range of sociology, biology, zoology, economics, environmental protection and landscape experts. Interestingly, experts from Yunnan Province favor the project; those from Beijing oppose it. Three years later, the debate has become even more acrimonious. Many infl uential news media have taken up the program as a major public concern. A rough estimate by Wang Yongchen, co-author of this article, suggests there have been hundreds of reports on the issue in 2003 and up to September 2004. This news coverage has tackled numerous aspects of the controversy: ecology, culture, politics, society, science and technology, laws, ethnic issues, philosophy as well as environmental protection, with a wide range of viewpoints aired. The following part of this article aims to explore the major issues involved by using the example of the Nujiang River hydropower development.

II. Several Major Issues Involved in the Damming of the Nujiang River

Since 2005, the most signiﬁ cant issues relating to the damming of the Nujiang River have been the following:11

10 Cheng Li, “Challenging the Hydropower Projects over the Dadu River and on the Minya Konka,” The Scientiﬁ c Development Outlook and the Development of Rivers (Huaxia Press, March 2005). 11 See Zheng Yisheng, “Why should Decisions Concerning Nujiang River Hydro- power Development be Made Carefully?” New Youth and Balance, Trial Issue. Zheng Yisheng, Lu Zhi, “Careful with Damming,” unpublished manuscript. Some views in this part are quoted from Zheng’s articles with the author’s permission. 70 xue ye and wang yongchen

A. How Should the Value of the Three Parallel Rivers of the Yunnan Protected Area as a World Natural Heritage Site Be Perceived?12 Electricity generated by a dam can save a large quantity of non-renewable fuels like coal. Other resources in the reservoir area, however, could be irreversibly lost: its biodiversity, natural landscape and cultural heritage. Any solution must strike a balance between the two. Some people respond to doomsday critiques by arguing that the heart of this protected area is 2500 meters above sea level, the buffer zone is at an altitude of over 2000 meters , and the highest point to be developed only 1570 meters, concluding that the protected area would not be overly affected by hydropower development. Any scientifi c answer to the question requires looking at the facts. Take the impact on the landscape for instance. First, the development program should be analyzed together with the different elements of the area’s natural heritage. Second, specifi c fi eld impact studies and an environmental impact assessment should be conducted. Third, environmental experts, rather than laymen, should be in charge of the assessment. To the authors’ knowledge, only the Graduate School of Landscape Architecture of Peking University conducted research in line with these principles in the 2004 Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) of this program. The researchers drew the conclusion that “the damming of the Nujiang River will radically change the aesthetic values of rapid fl owing waters and spectacular gorges. Some of these changes will be an irreversible loss for China and the world. Indeed, these changes will never be reversible. In addition, the losses involved will be too large to quantify in mere economic terms. Meanwhile, because the area’s non-material cultural heritage is represented by the local landscape, a cascade of 13 dams will end up altering or destroying the non-material cultural heritage built up over thousands of years. Decisions thus need to be made seriously and carefully on whether or not the river is to be dammed. In particular, the researchers stressed the potential impact of the dams on the fl ow of the River, saying that “the dams will radically

12 For a brief introduction on this natural heritage site, please go to http://www. china.org.cn/chinese/zhuanti/worldheritage/470463.htm; http://www.china.org.cn/ chinese/zhuanti/worldheritage/470460.htm; and “Various Parties Call for the World Heritage Conference to focus on the Three Parallel Rivers of the Yunnan Reserve,” http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/huanjing/602588.htm. highly controversial hydropower development 71 transform the natural, free-fl owing river into a series of channels and reservoirs. This will not only produce violent changes in the aquatic system, but also abruptly transform the natural landscape of the River.”13 However, this possible impact on the river landscape was not taken into consideration when decision-makers weighed the pros and cons of the project. In fact, those who favor the project have tried to confuse or mislead people with skewed logic, citing altitude fi gures when defi ning the world heritage site and trying to justify the impact of dam building on the world heritage site. One of their fi rst arguments was that only those places to be submerged in dam building count as losses. They argue that only direct consequences of submergence, such as the loss of farmland, can be regarded as signifi cant effects. Their logic pays lip service to the concerns of natural heritage and ecological conservationists. Develop- ers only calculate those losses they themselves have to pay for, while disregarding any other consequences. They argue that the disappearance of rapid fl owing waters and high and narrow gorges cannot be counted as losses as the water is still there, albeit fl owing more slowly. Therefore, they argue, the transformation of the River will not affect the world heritage site—while blatantly excluding the landscape of the Nujiang River from this calculation. We must note that this heritage site is named after the “Three Parallel Rivers,” namely the Nujiang River, the Lancang River and the Jinsha River. Yet, according to their logic, the protection of this world heritage site is restricted to the protection of the natural park. In response to this skewed line of reasoning, experts regard the integrity of the landscape and the entire ecosystem of the natural heritage site. In the EIA report mentioned above, particular weight is given to the central concept of emphasizing integrity, emphasizing that the aesthetic value of the Nujiang River lies in the rapid fl owing waters and high and narrow gorges; many scenic spots along the River exist thanks to these two features. Scenic spots are of critical importance to the whole landscape of the gorges. If they are damaged, the whole landscape of the gorges is irretrievably altered. Disappearance of these scenic spots due to damming should thus be counted among the losses. Secondly, the above argument blurs the distinction between reversible and irreversible damage. Some damage can be repaired. For instance, soil erosion can be reversed by a policy of stopping overuse However,

13 See the talk between Zheng Yisheng and Li Dihua, September 8, 2005. 72 xue ye and wang yongchen the dam project’s damage to the ecology and landscape of the Nujiang River cannot be reversed or repaired once the landscape is altered and the fi sh species peculiar to rapidly fl owing waters disappear. The Central Government should thus pool the collective wisdom of relevant agencies and scientifi c research departments to deliver a program for integrated protection and sustainable utilization of river basins in southwest China. For example, priority freshwater areas should be singled out for key protection in major streams, rivers and lakes. Scientifi c development dictates that answers be found to the questions of which areas are to be developed and how much development is ecologically sustainable. If water resources are developed to an unsustainable degree, programs should be stopped. Loose compari- sons between the utilization of water resources in this region and in developed countries (regions) have been made to bolster arguments for aggressive hydropower development. This encourages unchecked and chaotic hydropower development. Defi ning an ecologically sustainable level of development requires priority to be given to setting up a scientifi c program for integrated protection and sustainable utilization of the river basins in southwest China. This program must ensure the full participation of all relevant agencies and stakeholders. The program should distinguish between prioritized protection areas and utilizable areas. Hydropower development should be planned and undertaken within the framework of this program.

B. Substituting “Reservoir Evacuees” with “Ecological Evacuees”14—Major Obstacle to Understanding Existing Problems and Conducting Informed Debate A widely parroted argument goes like this: the hydropower program along the Nujiang River will address the imbalance between the community in the valley and the scarcity of land through resettling the reservoir evacuees, thus alleviating poverty. For example, He Zuoxiu, a fellow of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, actually labeled the

14 Ecological evacuation is practiced in cases where a particular area has suffered acute environmental damage and those living in such places are relocated in order to encourage ecological recovery. On the other hand, reservoir evacuation specifi cally refers to those persons removed from their homelands to make way for fl ooding produced by the introduction of a reservoir into a given environment. Confl ating the two terms attempts to provide political and social “cover” by claiming that “reservoir evacuees” are being moved to benefi t a given location’s ecological condition. highly controversial hydropower development 73 evacuees displaced by the hydropower program as ecological evacuees. He said, “The cost to resettle 50,000 evacuees is not high, and I’m in favor of calling them ecological evacuees,” and “if they still live in the mountains without resettlement, they would still practice slash-and-burn agriculture. The only way to conserve the local ecology is to resettle these farmers.”15 Such arguments perpetuate the myth that building dams and reservoirs is the single best thing that can be done for ecological protection(!). But in fact, nothing can be more misleading and troublesome in the future. Intentionally confusing “reservoir evacuees” with “ecological evacuees” runs counter to common sense. 1. The hundreds of thousands of ecological evacuees were the result of the initiative taken by the Nujiang local government to break the vicious circle of ecological degradation, poverty and exploding population fi gures. However, the 50,000-plus reservoir evacuees all result from the hydropower program, and do not want to be resettled. 2. The ecological evacuees used to live in the most ecologically sensitive areas with the harshest living conditions, particularly mountainsides and high mountain elevations. The reservoir evacuees mostly lived in the river valley where the land was fertile. Even the planners of the hydropower development admitted that the reservoir evacuees constituted the richest community in the region. 3. Reservoir evacuees and ecological evacuees have different cultural values. Sociologists know that different ethnic cultures mix in the river valley, which in turn is a critical area for preserving these cultures. The resettlement of reservoir evacuees cannot relieve poverty or solve ecological problems. The resettlement of reservoir evacuees thus does nothing to alleviate the imbalance between population pressures and scarce land—indeed this will intensify, as fertile land will be fl ooded. In other words, the resettlement of ecological evacuees will leave the land undisturbed while the reservoir evacuee resettlement will leave the land destroyed and in even more scarce supply.

15 “Controversy over the Nujiang River: A Hard Choice in Development Modeling,” China Investment, no. 7: 31. 74 xue ye and wang yongchen

Perpetuating this myth will only disrupt the ongoing resettlement of those real ecological evacuees. How will the local authorities manage the relationship between the newly added 50,000 evacuees and the hundreds of thousands of existing ecological evacuees? Once the Nujiang River is dammed, the evacuee resettlement problem is bound to be the hardest nut to crack. What effect will this change have on the original resettlement plan? Should the resettlement of ecological evacuees be delayed? How will the local authorities allocate space between these two groups of evacuees? Obviously, in the absence of an integrated and long-term plan and adequate feasibility studies, rushed decisions will bequeath a series of grave challenges to future generations.

C. Should the EIA and Relevant Information Be Made Public? Transparent information-sharing is a precondition for any scientifi c decision-making process. This is the fi rst step for rational and well-planned hydropower development in China, for it will allow assessment of whether hydropower projects will bring equitable and sustainable benefi ts for the people; whether they will have positive ecological, cultural and social impacts; and whether the risks are evaluated and addressed. If China is committed to becoming a democratic and open country with the rule of law, transparency should be the starting point. A petition from around 90 domestic organizations, signed by a total of 450 individuals, was submitted in August 2005 calling for disclosure of the EIA report on the Nujiang River hydropower program prior to any offi cial decision being made. The signatories included fellows of the China Academy of Engineering, deputies of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference,16 experts and scholars, and fi gures from all walks of life.17 The current decision-making process for this development program falls short of the legal requirement of public participation in major decisions, international practice in decision-making procedures, the provisions of the Administrative Licensing Law, and the State Council’s Guidelines on Administration According to the Law concerning open information sharing.

16 These are the two national legislative bodies. 17 Call for the Public Disclosure of the EIA Report Concerning the Nujiang River Development Program, http://www.fon.org.cn/index.php?id=5440. highly controversial hydropower development 75

The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Environmental Impact Assess- ments, in force as of September 1, 2003, states that: The state encourages relevant bodies, experts and the public to participate in the EIA process in appropriate ways. For projects that may cause negative environmental impacts and directly involve public environmental interests, project planning institutions should seek opinions before the draft is submitted from relevant bodies, experts and the public on the draft EIA report by means of evaluation meetings, hearings and other types of meeting. (The institutions) should seriously consider the opinions of the relevant bodies, experts and the public on the draft EIA report, and should give reasons for accepting or not accepting the comments when submitting the EIA report. While the petition did not receive an offi cial reply, it has captured the signifi cance of the debate on hydropower development. An increasing number of people will look beyond their views on this hydro program and push for consensus on a more central issue: implementation of a scientifi c and democratic decision-making mechanism. As stated in the Call for Public Disclosure of Nujiang Hydropower Development in Accordance with the Law: All stakeholders must be informed and participate in the process. Only under this precondition can the various social objectives involved in hydropower development be properly taken into consideration. Only in this way can the pros and cons be rationally weighed; only in this way can the affected community and environment be suffi ciently compensated; only in this way can alternatives be seriously considered; and only in this way can rivers be utilized in a way that is equitable, open, scientifi c, rational and sustainable. Some argue that as the Nujiang River fl ows across international borders, decision-making details must be kept secret, and that those who demand disclosure are trying to put the Chinese Government in a trap—an argument that sounds like a throwback to thinking from the Cultural Revolution. Development of the Nujiang River affects major interests of a number of parties, so all interested parties must be respected. Open, equitable and democratic consultation should be carried out, rather than resorting to the “confi dential affairs” argument to write off opposing views. China needs to be aware that these kinds of confi dentiality rules could do away with open decision-making on a controversial matter affecting the interests of the general public. Who can imagine how much China stands to lose by failing to practice scientifi c, open and rational decision-making? 76 xue ye and wang yongchen

In addition, since the Chinese government holds China up as a large country with a strong sense of responsibility and pursues a foreign policy whereby it aims to be a “good neighbor and good partner,” is it not necessary to listen to voices from the countries downstream before the development starts? How can China act more like a responsible country in the hydro-power development of the Nujiang River? How can voices from these countries be heard if information is not shared? And if information can indeed be shared with these countries and the world at large, why on Earth can it still not be shared with the public at home?

D. Is Hydropower Development the Best or Only Choice for the Nujiang River? Critics of this program favor considering the alternatives with low social and ecological costs rather than controversial large-scale hydropower developments, so that decisions are not held hostage to vested interests. In the case of the Nujiang River development program, some experts are of the view that, in aggregate terms, the tourism, business and trade alternatives, including some use of hydropower together with the above alternatives, could be as profi table as the proposed hydropower development.18 The key to the latter scheme is that it would require large-scale investment in infrastructure such as roads that the local government cannot provide—which is why the local government also insists on the hydropower program.19 Since the environment and cultural resources belong to the whole country, the Central Government should invest in these regions. Meanwhile, with regard to the local economy, the Cen- tral Government should start by balancing the economic relationship between major provinces with valuable ecological resources. Programs aiming at “fewer fi elds, more forest cover” should be implemented in earnest with genuine fi nancial backing. Given Chinese people’s increasing awareness of environmental protection, ecology and culture will be assigned greater importance. When it is hard to choose from several

18 Sheng Hong, “The Pros and Cons of Hydropower Development of the Nuji- ang River,” http://www.hwcc.com.cn/nsbd/NewsDisplay.asp?Id=138773; Zheng Yisheng,“Survival and Development in the Nujiang Region,” The Scientiﬁ c Development Outlook and the Development of Rivers, (Huaxia Press, March 2005). 19 Detailed Report of the Forum on China’s Hydropower Development and Envi- ronmental Protection, http://city.ﬁ nance.sina.com.cn/zsyz/2005–10–27/72214.html. highly controversial hydropower development 77 alternatives, the Central Government should lean towards the tourism, trade and commerce alternative—this would be a visionary decision as far as future generations are concerned.

E. Should the Nujiang Development Program Be Carried out at Full Speed or at a Cautious Pace? Several other major questions also beg to be asked. 1. Southwest China is vulnerable to landslides and mudslides. Build- ing numerous large dams would lead to worries about their safety and economic viability.20 The billions spent in the Three Gorges project to guard against geological disasters should be a solemn reminder to us.21 2. In terms of the pros and cons of building dams, the international community is bitterly divided.22 Rivers serve as the biggest multi-functional water sources for human survival and development. Sustainable use of these functions is a major challenge for mankind. Therefore, it is far from a waste for the Nujiang River to be spared from hydropower developments. On the contrary, the real waste would be to sacriﬁ ce all the other functions of the River for the sole beneﬁ t of power generation. Developing this project produces many costs. The land submerged in the process will emit huge amounts of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide and methane. The development may also irreversibly damage the ecosystem and its biodiversity. The reservoirs may redistribute the weight of the earth’s crust. The irreversible impact that large hydropower projects have on ecosystems only fully surfaces after several decades, or even centuries.

20 Fan Xiao, “The Geological and Environmental Impacts and Disaster Potentials of Hydropower Projects,” The Scientiﬁ c Development Outlook and the Development of Rivers (Huaxia Press 2005). 21 4 Billion RMB within 2 Years for Geological Disaster Prevention in the Three Gorges Reservoir, http://www.hwcc.com.cn/newsdisplay/newsdisplay.asp?Id=70397. 22 Wang Shucheng, “The Second Elaboration on the Harmonious Coexistence between Man and Nature—the Dams and the Ecology,” http://www.shuigong.com/ forum/archive/index.php?t9108.html; Shen Xiaohui, “Six Questions on the Nujiang River Development—Damming, No Harm to the Three Parallel Rivers?” http://www. wetwonder.org/asp/cnnews/list.asp?id=1718. 78 xue ye and wang yongchen

Hydropower is not renewable energy, since dams have limited life spans, usually of something between several decades and a century. Aging and silted-fi lled reservoirs end up being of no use and need to be demolished. The cost of removal and river restoration is often higher than that of damming. It may take more money to rehabilitate these things than what is generated by this hydropower development. River restoration campaigns in developed countries since the 1990s signify a fresh understanding of the value of rivers. Several decades have passed since China’s fi rst dam was built, too, with certain older dams such as Sanmenxia and Manwan starting to display many problems, resulting in extensive debate. These happenings cannot be ignored; experience and lessons need to be drawn with a view of avoiding their reoccurrence through repeating the same old mistakes. In summary, the Chinese Government should tread carefully when making decisions in this area, and needs to show the courage to recognize a new understanding of the disadvantages brought about by major hydropower projects. At the same time, lessons from the past should be fully analyzed to avoid reoccurrence in new development programs. Current programs must be reviewed, and consideration given to delaying implementation of certain controversial large-scale hydropower developments in southwest China. True science demands room for maneuvering when uncertainties abound and understanding is incomplete. Professor Li Bosheng, who participated in the survey on the Nujiang River, observes, “This river has undergone the most insuffi cient of ecological studies. Our in-depth study on this river has not been completed yet; some sections of the River are still not covered by research.” As is known to all, in some developed countries, even the removal of a small dam requires the government to consult extensively with various stakeholders. Careful, scientifi c monitoring is also a necessity for understanding the impacts of the removal.23 In the light of these countries, why can’t China be as careful and prudent in its decision-making on major hydropower projects? Suspension of the disputed dam developments is also proposed for the following reasons.

23 David D. Hart and N. Leroy Poff, “A Special Section on Dam Removal and River Restoration,” BioScience, August 2002/Vol. 52 No. 8, pp. 653–658. highly controversial hydropower development 79

1. Most of these programs are to be carried out in ecologically vulnerable areas. They should not be carried out until the plan for the relevant river basin is drawn up. 2. The disputes partly result from insufﬁ cient knowledge and understanding of the ecological impact of dam building. It is therefore necessary to monitor and study previous projects such as the Three Gorges, Manwan, and Longtan for quite some time in terms of their ecological, geological and social impacts, so that data can be amassed. Accumulated experience and knowledge will enable the future generations to make decisions through a much better process. 3. Postponing decisions on certain disputed large-scale developments like that of the Nujiang River, will not affect implementation of other programs subject to little dispute and with numerous positive effects. Faced with major uncertainties and unpredictability, rather than acting blindly, one should allow time in order for a rational decision to be made, as President Deng Xiaoping used to do. Such a move may cause hydropower projects in certain regions to be postponed for several years, but it could nevertheless avoid many irreversible and permanent negative consequences for future generations. Evaluating the merits of alternatives to the development of the Nujiang River is an extremely complex process. No development should be started in haste before any substantial conclusions have been drawn. Any action in violation of proper procedures or without a serious EIA will be doomed to result in irremediable losses in the future. One should never oversimplify or over-generalize complex issues. Nor should one rush headlong into action on the basis merely of the narrowly-deﬁ ned interests of certain bodies. While arguments such as “dams are being removed elsewhere, so we shouldn’t build any more dams here either” are excessively simplistic; the same charge applies to the risky argument that “before we reach the same development level, we should not allow other people’s concerns to be imposed on us.” The latter, unfortunately, is what has brought about the hydropower equivalent of the Great Leap Forward. 80 xue ye and wang yongchen

III. New Directions for China to Draw from the Debates over Damming

A. Further Study to Be Conducted on Balancing the Interests of Different Stakeholders Sociologist Sun Liping concludes in his book Fault that China has now become a society made up of a diverse range of groups, each with their own interests. The crisis stems from the absence of a modern and effective balancing mechanism through which all interests can be fairly taken into account. Developing such a mechanism is an urgent need, and at the same time, a natural choice for solving current social confl icts. Without such a mechanism in place, powerful interest groups are wont to unfairly take benefi ts for themselves while leaving an unpredictable bill to be paid by society at large in social, cultural and ethical terms. China needs to be on special alert against this happening. The World Commission on Dams (WCD) was born out of an IUCN (International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources)-World Bank sponsored workshop in April 1997. In a report marking a milestone in human history,24 the Commission points out that “the end of any dam project must be the sustainable improvement of human welfare. This means a signifi cant advance of human development on a basis that is economically viable, socially equitable, and environmentally sustainable.” To this end, the WCD groups the core values informing its understanding of these issues under fi ve principal headings: equity, effi ciency, participatory decision-making, sustainability, and accountability. Decision-making using a rights-and-risks approach was also proposed. Seven criteria were set: gaining the acceptance of the public, comprehensively assessing various options, addressing existing dams, sustaining rivers and livelihoods, recognizing entitlements and sharing benefi ts, ensuring compliance as well as sharing rivers for peace, development and security.

24 The World Commission on Dams (WCD), “Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-making,” 2000. highly controversial hydropower development 81

B. How to Institute and Improve a Scientifi c Decision-making Mechanism? The more complex and more signifi cant a decision is, the more it calls for a sound scientifi c decision-making mechanism, with the essentials of such a mechanism being: guaranteed open sharing of information; equitable, fair and democratic participation of all stakeholders; ensured public and media supervision; inclusion of an effective checks and balances mechanism together with an accountability mechanism; and thorough review of views voiced by independent research units and third parties. Although the complexity of issues regarding Nujiang River development brooks no hasty conclusions and demands careful weighing of the situation, one thing is certain and should be pushed for immediately: making democratic and scientifi c decision-making a reality. One lesson of major hydropower projects both at home and overseas is that when decisions on a major project liable to produce signifi cant long-term effects and involving multiple stakeholders are made without thorough scrutiny, the decisions are not serious and cannot be relied upon. Besides, the institutionalization of public participation and accountability in the evaluation of major projects should begin with current hydropower projects being put on to a legitimate footing. The revised Law of the People’s Republic of China on Environmental Impact Assessments, in force as of September 2003, demands public participation in EIAs. The Temporary Measures for Environmental Protection Administra- tive Licensing state that public hearings must be held on construction projects and project planning, including for big dams. It is a legitimate expectation that these laws and regulations be strictly followed during the evaluation and planning of hydropower developments. The planning and EIA reports should carry the signature of the relevant person(s) in charge as a rule, so as to achieve informational transparency and scientifi c decision-making standards.

C. Clearer Concepts and Coordinated Methodology are Required

1. Merely saying “hydropower development enriches the local people” is not acceptable At the Forum on hydropower development and environmental protection in October 2005, He Zuoxiu, a fellow of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), referred to a letter he and Lu Youmei, another CAS 82 xue ye and wang yongchen fellow, had submitted to the Central leadership, arguing for the development of hydropower. He even claimed that the overarching objective of this was alleviating poverty among local people. Power generation was only a secondary goal.25 Does hydropower development lift local residents out of poverty? A social impact assessment on the Manwan power station in Yunnan Province reveals that despite the huge revenue generated for the provincial and central governments, the social and cultural impacts have unleashed a second crisis.26 The many social problems spawned are more severe and serious than the environmental effects. In the case of Manwan dam, which is one of the fi ve most profi table hydropower stations, the evacuees’ lives have become worse. Some of them even have to collect garbage to survive. This demonstrates that setting up a participatory social impact assessment mechanism for major projects is more urgent than ever. Poverty alleviation cannot be cited as a pretext for ignoring opposition. Taking an even broader perspective, the answer is also negative; Ma Jun estimates in his book The Water Crisis in China that at least two thirds of the 16 million people displaced by hydropower developments since 1949 are now living below the poverty line.27 Hydropower development itself involves a complex interplay between the interests of different stakeholders. This is the crux of the matter; however the community involved often faces a skewed playing fi eld. What mechanism can we use to ensure equitable participation opportunities for local communities? Given that hydropower projects are called development programs, equitable participation opportunities must be ensured for local people and all other stakeholders. Resettlement standards and implementation measures also need to be improved.

2. One cannot say that “hydropower is green energy” without sound analysis Arguments such as “Hydropower is green power” and “Hydropower is clean and renewable” are frequently cited by the proponents of hydropower development. However, these descriptions are somewhat biased.

25 Zhai Chunyang, “Even Hydropower Development can Justify Itself by Poverty Alleviation,” China Economic Times, October 29, 2005, http://www.china5e.com/news/ water/200510/200510290053.html. 26 Yu Xiaogang, “The Participatory Social Impact Assessment of the Manwan Power Station along the Lancang River,” http://www.fon.org.cn/index.php?id=5121. 27 Zhang Kejia, “10 Million out of 16 million Evacuees Displaced by Hydropower Projects Trapped in Poverty,” China Youth Daily, July 28, 2004. highly controversial hydropower development 83

They are neither precise nor scientiﬁ c. At the very least, hydropower cannot be labeled simply as “green energy,” as a power station that damages the environment cannot be called green even if it does not produce emissions. In the pursuit of energy, China should not only protect the health of its people, but also maintain the health of the rivers and the ecological environment. In the eighth national plenary session of the Chinese Hydraulic Engineering Society (CHES), Min- ister of Water Resources Wang Shucheng emphasized that China has already come to the point in its hydropower development where it needs to move on from an approach that focuses exclusively on hydropower, without considering environmental protection.28 Other countries have already taken a new approach to river management; China can learn something from this new outlook. What is critical is not how to deal with existing dams but what positive lessons can be drawn from other countries when assessing proposed new hydroelectric power stations. A tug of war is going on between the old development approach to hydropower and the new one. If the new outlook does not prevail over time, then wrong decisions will be made with grave and irreversible consequences.

D. An Alternative Model of Scientiﬁ c Development—an Integrated and Balanced One—Must Be Explored Several arguments can be made by proponents of the rush to develop hydropower. Among the most persuasive are: 1. Energy shortages are becoming a bottleneck hindering further growth. 2. Power production is overwhelmingly reliant on coal, a major contributor to air pollution and global warming, while hydropower, by contrast, is clean and renewable. 3. China is only scratching the surface of its potential hydropower resources, with less than 30% utilized at the moment, and an even lower proportion in the southwest region which boasts tremendous potential hydroelectric power capacity.

28 Wang Shucheng, “The Second Elaboration on the Harmonious Coexistence between Man and Nature—the Dams and the Ecology,” http://www.shuigong.com/ forum/archive/index.php?t9108.html. 84 xue ye and wang yongchen

However, the current scramble for power is not a market-driven process with numerous different players competing on a “survival of the fi ttest” basis, but more of rush to monopolize development rights with developers teaming up with local administrations. This obviously stands in contradiction to the principles that govern macroeconomic development. The same phenomenon also exists with thermal power development, which has also developed in a random and unchecked fashion. Fragmentation into monopolies and divisions between provinces limit the potential for resources to be allocated more effi ciently on a broader scale, resulting in an underutilized and often distorted electric power map. This leaves the way open for major fl uctuations in power supply. The State Electricity Regulatory Commission and the National Devel- opment and Reform Commission forecast that supply and demand in China’s power market will balance out in 2006, and electricity overca- pacity may follow by 2008. At the same time some local governments, calling attention to power shortages in their jurisdictions and demanding rapid completion of the “west-east power transmission” project, are relying on power-hungry industries for development. Irrational expansion of electricity-intensive industry not only threatens China’s already strained power supply, but also threatens to seriously undermine the unique and fragile ecosystem of the western region. Of course, other considerations and apprehensions lie behind local governments’ decisions as well; the relationship between central and local governments needs to be further coordinated. Energy is a complex issue touching on a wide range of other questions including resources, technology, investment, and even the institutional framework and perceptions through which we understand these issues and their relationships. As far as efforts to bridge the energy gap with hydropower are concerned, insuffi cient integrated long-term planning, inadequate scrutiny of government actions, and lack of discipline on the part of various powerful lobbies, together with a lack of willpower to pursue sustainable development, threaten to create a situation with a small minority reaping huge profi ts, while thousands of evacuees are condemned to tolerate tough living conditions, and the environment sustains damage beyond restoration. The enormous potential for energy-saving, on the other hand, can be seen in the results of the 26°C Air-Conditioning Energy-Saving Campaign29 to set air conditioners at 26 degrees in the summertime

29 This campaign is detailed within this volume. highly controversial hydropower development 85 led by environmentalists and government authorities. In the case of Beijing, an NDRC expert pointed out that turning the air conditioning up from 22–24°C to 26–28°C will save the capital 400 to 600 million kilowatts of electricity, shaving 500,000 to 750,000 kilowatts off peak hour demand and saving consumers some 180 to 270 million RMB in bills. This move could reduce sulfur dioxide emissions by more than 2500 tons to 3500 tons and those of carbon dioxide by 400,000 tons to 600,000 tons. Power shortages will thus be alleviated, costs reduced, and climate change slowed.

E. Towards Permanent Adoption of a Long-term Perspective that Considers Overall Costs Mistaken decisions in previous hydropower developments, which produced massive numbers of evacuees and ecological destruction, can all be chalked up to a disregard for overall costs, especially those that cannot be measured by market criteria. The Nujiang River development threatens to repeat these same mistakes. “Overall” costs means all ultimate costs to the whole of society. Apart from their limited knowledge, another reason that people neglect the overall costs is the difﬁ culty inherent in considering input from the multiplicity of stakeholders and economic interest groups. These groups, more often than not, focus only on the narrow interests of their company, region or department and disregard those of others. With the Nujiang River being an international river, even a national government may be vulnerable to similar mistakes. The overall costs of hydropower development should be calculated by the Central Government as the authority best able to respect the interests of the entire country, instead of being arbitrarily narrowed down by certain interest groups. As Sheng Hong concludes, a society’s lifespan is longer than an individual’s, so only by looking from the point of view of society can a long-term perspective be guaranteed.30 However, it is still individuals who make the decisions, so myopia is hard to prevent. Economic research on sustainable development shows that the government and not just the market can become dysfunctional because ofﬁ cials tend to give priority to short-term achievements. Despite holding itself up

30 Sheng Hong, “The Pros and Cons of Hydropower Development of the Nujiang River,” http://www.hwcc.com.cn/nsbd/NewsDisplay.asp?Id=138773. 86 xue ye and wang yongchen as the champion of the rivers,31 the Ministry of Water Resources frequently fails to think in terms of future generations. Given the frequent failures to take a long-term perspective when considering hydropower development, China needs to focus on cultivating a long-term mentality throughout government and society.

F. How to Ensure Fair Participation by All Stakeholders in Major Decisions? To date, not all people in China fully appreciate the importance of equitable participation by all stakeholders. Even the concept of “stakeholders” itself may not be thoroughly understood. On this particular issue the list of stakeholders does not stop at developers, the local government and the local community. Given its unique and priceless ecological status, the Nujiang River is the shared heritage of all Chi- nese people and the whole of humanity.32 Therefore, any individual or organization deserves the right to participate in the legal process and be informed through proper procedures. 2005 saw improved understanding of the crucial role of public participation at all levels of society. Whatever our point of departure, be it public input or the sound development and functioning of civil society, there are three preconditions which underpin all these arguments: ﬁ rst, transparency of information and citizens’ right to know; second, an independent and responsible expert advisory team providing information and analysis; and last, accessible channels for public involvement. Without the effective, orderly and in-depth involvement typical of NGOs, no real public participation can be achieved. Extensive media coverage has ﬁ rstly upheld people’s right to know, paving the way for real public participation; secondly, as a form of moral and public support for disadvantaged groups involved, the media promotes social justice. At the same time, the media also counterbal- ance powerful lobbies, ensuring more equitable representation of different interests, a more sound development scheme and more effective decision mechanisms. Extensive reporting is encouraging the public to

31 Wang Shucheng, “The Second Elaboration on the Harmony Coexistence between Man and Nature—the Dams and the Ecology,” http://www.shuigong.com/forum/ archive/index.php?t9108.html. 32 Some would even argue that the relevant stakeholders include more than human beings and human interests. See “Different Voices in the Debate on ‘Revering Nature’ ” in this volume. highly controversial hydropower development 87 refl ect back on 50 years of hydropower development, and in particular the last three decades. Regulation of the media also has a balancing role—between powerful lobbies and the central government’s priorities for national development—but obviously over-regulation threatens to impede progress towards the key objective of practicing the scientifi c development concept and building a harmonious society. When reviewing hydropower development in southwest China, one cannot overlook the role played in transforming development models by independent experts and scholars, impartial media and self-regulating NGOs. Independent and conscientious experts and scholars have played a unique role in the debate on this crucial issue. In the past three years they have followed their personal and academic consciences and spoken out in favor of the public interest, heedless of their institutions and positions. So far, though, every failed major projects garnered support from some quarter, backed up by seemingly credible feasibility studies and endorsements conducted by experts and scholars; the problem is that experts with diverging views are typically excluded or ignored. Tsinghua University professor Li Dun has proposed the establishment of seven institutions to ensure rational decision-making, calling for “an accountability system for offi cials, and publicizing the signatures of offi cials and experts,” “an independent expert team mechanism” and the review and improvement of mechanisms for making major decisions.33 China’s NGOs are trying their best in the face of the complex questions and powerful lobbies involved in the hydropower issue. Striving to act in a rational, constructive, democratic and legal manner, they aim to promote open, equitable, democratic and scientifi c decision-making and sustainable planning. Dr. Zheng Hong of Beijing Xingzhi School comments that this signifi es a new direction in the structural evolution of Chinese society. Nonprofi t sector bodies are becoming a third actor in major decision-making after government and the market. This has given the public new perspectives on a host of social, economic, political, and even philosophical issues, and facilitated public involvement in scientifi c, democratic decision mechanisms. The emergence of three

33 Li Dun, Li Yifang, “Public Notice, Public Hearing, Public Participation and Independent Experts Assessment—Institution Building for Putting People First in Sustainable Development,” The Scientiﬁ c Development Outlook and the Development of Rivers (Huaxia Press). 88 xue ye and wang yongchen complementary and counterbalancing forces—government, the market and civil society—heralds a new stage of maturity and forms the basis of a sound, dynamic and sustainable modern society. AVIAN INFLUENZA LANDS IN CHINA

Liang Hong

The spread of avian infl uenza severely threatens social and economic development, imperils ecosystem infrastructure and human health, and poses serious problems for wildlife protection. Outbreaks of diseases, including avian infl uenza, often give rise to international trade confl icts, undermine international cooperation, and consequently lead to new uncertainties in the international arena. Thus any negligence or irresponsibility with regard to avian infl uenza would cost all of humanity dearly.

I. Avian Inﬂ uenza around the World

A. The Origin and History of Avian Infl uenza Avian infl uenza virus goes back more than a hundred years, having been fi rst documented as the “fowl plague” in Italy during 1878. In 1955, scientists proved that Flu A was the pathogenic virus causing this disease, thus leading to the name Avian Infl uenza, or Avian Flu for short. Variants of the basic strain have been identifi ed since. In 1959, researchers in Scotland fi rst identifi ed the highly pathogenic H5N1 avian infl uenza virus. In 1997, the most serious outbreak of avian infl uenza in human history occurred in Hong Kong, with the death of a three- year-old boy, the fi rst recorded case of human infection in the world. By February 11, 1998, eighteen human cases had been confi rmed in Hong Kong, and six people had died. In February 2003, the widest-ever outbreak started in the Netherlands and subsequently human cases were reported in Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia. Avian infl uenza virus belongs to the Infl uenza A group of the Ortho- myxoviridae family, and H5N1 is one of its subtypes. Infl uenza A is commonly found in animals, including mammals, and of course birds. Wildfowl provides the virus’ most compatible host type. In 2005, avian infl uenza swept over the world again, spreading among wild birds and domestic poultry, and even infecting human beings. 90 liang hong

Bird fl u outbreaks were reported in every continent except Antarctica, including such countries as Malawi, Nigeria, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Japan, China, Kuwait, Greece, Croatia, Romania, Russia, Ukraine, Sweden, the UK, Colombia, Canada, and the United States. On December 14, Jia Youling, head of the Veterinary Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture of China, remarked at a press conference for the State Council that in 2005 thirty Human P Avian Infl uenza (HPAI) outbreaks were confi rmed in China, affecting 112 villages, 55 townships, 30 counties, and 23 prefectures or cities in 11 provinces, including one case of migratory bird infection in the remote Qinghai Province. In total, 158,200 birds were infected; 151,200 died of infection. 22,225,800 were culled.1 On December 16, the Ministry of Health announced a case in Suichuan County in Jiangxi Province of 319,600 birds being culled and a little girl having been killed by the avian fl u.

B. The Spread of Avian Infl uenza During the century-long outbreak of avian infl uenza, people have had limited success in fi nding effective means to prevent infection and spread of the disease other than culling birds. Wildfowl are the natural carriers of avian infl uenza virus. In particular, waterfowl are the original source of the virus. Judging by the seasonal outbreak pattern of avian infl uenza and the migration pattern of waterfowl, the virus seems likely to be spread through contaminated water and contact with poultry during migrations. As the travel routes of migratory birds coincide with outbreaks in East Asia, Siberia, Kazakh- stan, and Europe, it is suspected that these wild birds are involved in the spreading of the virus.2 So far, however, scientists haven’t found the source of the avian infl u- enza that hit Asia in 2005. According to an avian infl uenza research group at The Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS), a part of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), the role of migratory birds in spreading the virus has yet to be fully understood. Given the diversity of environments and species, it is hard to control the transmission of avian infl uenza

1 From China Agricultural Information Net: “China Has Achieved Initial Success in Bird Flu Prevention and Control,” http://www.agri.gov.cn/xxlb/t20051215_516161. htm (accessed on December 15, 2005). 2 Fu Leimin, “Wild Birds and Animal Epidemics,” Science Times, January 6, 2005. avian influenza lands in china 91 virus among wild birds. Furthermore, culling wild birds indiscriminately would be ineffective in preventing the virus’ spread. Wholesale destruction of birds could disturb their normal migratory routes, which could increase the risk of spreading the virus globally and possibly leading to the extinction of some wild species. Robert Hepworth, Executive Secretary of CMS, says that migratory birds are only one link in the chain, and that transmission has many other causes. Backward poultry- feeding methods have been implicated. Keeping domestic poultry in unnaturally close proximity to one another, to other farm animals, and to humans, all provide favorable conditions to promote the spread, multiplication, and mutation of the virus. The availability of wild birds at markets, including the legitimate and illegal trade of wild birds for sale as pets and/or food, also promotes these effects.3 For example, on October 23, 2005, the British government announced that a parrot imported form South America died of avian inﬂ uenza.4

C. Avian Infl uenza’s Impact on the World The spread of avian infl uenza poses a grave threat to social and economic development, planetary ecosystems, and human health. The Asian Development Bank estimates that if an avian infl uenza outbreak lasted for six months, economic losses in Asia would amount to 99 billion USD; a yearlong outbreak would double that fi gure.5 According to analyst Clifford Don of Citibank in Singapore, a single outbreak could reduce Asia’s GDP by 5% and cause tourism, manufacturing, and trade to stagnate; in other words, the impact on Asia could be signifi cantly worse than that of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2002–2003. The World Bank estimates that worldwide economic losses resulting from a pandemic could be as high as 800 billion USD or about 2% of global GDP.6 So far, the outbreak of

3 Li, Maoqi, “The Role of Migratory Birds in the Spread of Bird Flu,” http://www. un.org/chinese/av/radio/transcript/ft1101.htm (accessed on November 1, 2005). 4 Cao Lijun, “UK Has Confi rmed that an Imported Parrot Died of H5N1 Virus,” http://news.xinhuanet.com/health/2005–10/24/content_3674631.htm (accessed on October 24, 2005). 5 Yang Xianbi, “Urgent Calls for Research on Animal Epidemics such as Mad Cow Disease and Bird Flu,” http://scitech.people.com.cn/GB/3840631.html (accessed on November 9, 2005). 6 Wang Jianhua and Li Xing, “Transparent Cooperation Shows China’s Responsi- bility in Global Prevention and Control of Bird Flu,” http://www.cctv.com.cn/news/ china/20051117/102848.shtml (accessed on November 17, 2005). 92 liang hong avian infl uenza has led to the culling of 150 million birds worldwide and a direct economic loss of 10 billion USD. However, these statistics do not suffi ciently refl ect the disease’s disastrous effect on the poorest people in the world. In some Southeast Asian countries, like Thailand and Vietnam, most of the culled birds belong to small farm owners and individual farmers. Their governments’ inability to compensate these farmers exacerbates the effects of economic losses. Poverty also undermines attempts to contain the disease; to reduce the magnitude of their total losses, farmers sometimes conceal suspected cases of the disease among their poultry stocks. A more important explanation for the intensity of international attention focused on the avian fl u pandemic is the potential for a highly lethal human fl u epidemic. Since 2003, the virus has killed at least 71 people in Asia. Vietnam ranks fi rst with 42 deaths, with Thailand and Indonesia following. Since the spread of the disease has not been contained, mortality fi gures continue to rise.7 As of 2006, China has confi rmed seven human cases; it is suspected that the fl u killed one 12- year-old girl. These human cases show that the fl u is a serious public health threat in China. Avian fl u also poses a serious threat to wildlife as well. In early May 2005, it was reported that a large number of birds, including bar-headed geese, were found dead of avian fl u at Qinghai Lake in China;8 similar cases were reported in August 2005 at Erhel Lake in Inner Mongolia.9 According to Xinhua Online, thousands of spangled drongos probably died of the fl u in Malawi in southeast Africa.10 The World Wide Fund for Nature’s (WWF’s) Living Planet Report 2004 shows that from 1970 to 2000, wildlife populations, including birds, mammals, reptiles, amphibians, and fi shes, were reduced by roughly 35%. Apart from the well-known causes for these declines, such as habitat loss and fragmentation, the growth of human population and resulting competition with wildlife for resources, environmental pollution, and

7 Xinhua News Agency, http://news.sina.com.cn/w/2005–12–05/13117625366s. shtml (accessed on December 5, 2005). 8 Zhang Lizi and Tan Jia, Today’s Content, 24, August 2005. 9 Hao Lifeng, “No Cases of Infection Found in Mongolia Except in Migratory Birds,” http://world.people.com.cn/BIG5/1029/3600293.html (accessed on August 8, 2005). 10 Shi Shouhe, “Bird Flu May Have Caused the Death of Several Thousand Birds in Malawi,” http://news.sina.com.cn/w/2005–12–16/23167727400s.shtml (accessed on December 16, 2005). avian influenza lands in china 93 over-hunting, disease quietly threatens the health of many wild animals. Wildlife protection experts consider epidemic diseases to be among the key threats to animal survival.11 Disease epidemics, including avian ﬂ u, often cause international trade conﬂ icts, undermining international cooperation and creating new uncertainties in the world by increasing suspicion between countries.12

D. Research on and Countermeasures against Avian Infl uenza At a national meeting on Monitoring Wetlands and the Avian Infl uenza Epidemic among Migratory Birds held by the State Forestry Administra- tion (SFA) on December 1, 2005, it was announced that China had established 150 monitoring stations at the national level and more than 400 at the provincial level along avian migration routes, thereby creating the foundation for a global wildlife epidemic surveillance system focusing on migratory birds.13 Scientists all over the world have been attempting to develop effective vaccines to prevent and control avian fl u outbreaks. Outside of China, there are eight research centers for developing human vaccines, mainly in the United States and Europe, and all are still at the stage of clinical trials.14 In August, the fi rst vaccine for humans developed by American scientists passed a human test. Recently, scientists in the Netherlands announced the development of a poultry vaccine that they hope will help prevent human infection and forestall a human pandemic.15 On November 22, China’s State Food and Drug Administration approved the clinical trial of fl u vaccines for humans.16 Additionally, China has made progress in controlling the virus in avian populations.

11 Song Yanling, “Animal Epidemics Threaten the Survival of Wildlife,” Science Times, January 6, 2005. 12 Li Wei, “Don’t Terrorize Animals,” http://www.sn.xinhuanet.com/2005–11/23/ content_5656442.htm (accessed on November 23, 2005). 13 Gao Baosheng, “China has Set up a Surveillance System on Epidemics, With A Focus on Migratory Birds,” People’s Daily, December 2, 2005. 14 Wang Sihai and Zhang Xu, “China’s Human Bird Flu Vaccine Can Be Put into Production Once Approved,” http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2005–11/18/con- tent_3801367.htm (accessed on November 18, 2005). 15 China Net, “Cope with Bird Flu Immediately,” http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/RS/1062078.htm (accessed on December 15, 2005). 16 China News Net, “China’s Human Bird Flu Vaccine Is Approved for Use in Clinical Trials,” http://www.chinanews.com/news/2005/2005–11–22/8/655162.shtml (accessed on November 22, 2005). 94 liang hong

The Chinese Ministry of Agriculture announced that Chinese scientists have developed a new recombinant vaccine using Newcastle Disease Virus (NDV) as the carrier.17 China is capable of vaccinating 16 billion birds given its current vaccine production capacity. According to an announcement by the Ministry of Agriculture made on November 21, 2005, China had vaccinated 60% of its poultry. However, this does not mean that we can relax our guard against avian infl uenza in the slightest. Outbreaks of SARS, avian infl uenza, and other animal epidemics reveal the defects in the world animal epidemic prevention and control system. Mechanisms for tracking animal diseases, especially among wild animals, are still inadequate. Furthermore, variations in capacities across countries weaken global efforts to monitor, prevent, and control animal disease epidemics. Even more troubling is the lack of fundamental knowledge regarding the molecular basis of cross-species transmission. Because we know so little of these processes, we may well be at risk for exposure to animal viral pathogens. The increasingly virulent avian infl uenza is clearly capable of killing mammals; preventing and controlling cross-species transmission of the disease poses a more pressing challenge to those in charge of managing this aspect of public and environmental health.

II. The Possible Causes of Outbreaks of Animal Epidemics: The Case of the Avian Flu

It is now generally believed three key factors cause outbreaks of avian inﬂ uenza: mutation of the virus, changes in ecosystems, and human activities.18

A. Animal Feeding Methods China has a large poultry-raising industry and produces 14.2 billion birds annually, 60% of which are raised in farmers’ yards. These circumstances not only make it difﬁ cult to identify outbreaks in a timely

17 Dong Jun, “China Has Successfully Developed a New Type of Vaccine for Highly Pathogenic Avian Inﬂ uenza,” http://news.xinhuanet.com/health/2005–10/15/con- tent_3618319.htm (accessed on October 14, 2005). 18 Zhang Zhibin, “Strengthen Inter-agency and Interdisciplinary Cooperation to Rigorously Face the Threat of Animal Epidemics,” Science Times, January 6, 2005. avian influenza lands in china 95 fashion, but will also greatly increase the risk of human infection. The close proximity of poultry, other livestock, and people contributes to an increased risk of cross-species transmission and facilitates the mutation and recombination of the virus. Moreover, poor transportation conditions and traditional live poultry markets have become catalysts in the spread of the virus among animals. All of these conditions increase the likelihood of avian ﬂ u outbreaks.

B. Virus Mutation The avian infl uenza virus mutates quickly and frequently and has the capacity to adapt and spread in a wide range of species. In early 2004, the virus became highly pathogenic; it could potentially kill individuals among a large number of species, including humans and rodents. Not long ago, a strain of avian infl uenza found in two infected people in Vietnam turned out to be resistant to Tamifl u, the most effective anti- fl u medication available. The virulence of avian infl uenza virus has increased generally. The disease has killed large numbers of chickens, waterfowl like ducks and geese which used to be nearly disease-free, migratory birds, and various wild birds. The bird death toll hit a record high globally in 2004. Experts say China’s bird fl u epidemic played a signifi cant role in this process.19 Some experts note the possibility that gene mutation brought about by the excessive use of various medicines on animals may have increased the virulence of the virus. This has made the virus more lethal to humans. Certainly, modern factory-feeding methods have made it easier for animals to become infected, and the increasing resistance of the various viral strains has made the disease harder to cure. Thus, feed- ers often put antibiotics and other medicines, hormones, or pesticides into feed and regularly inject animals with vaccines, oxytocin, and antibiotics. These feeding methods can make animals more vulnerable to some diseases, which then are treated by other medicines and/or higher dosages of these medicines. The frequent use of drugs can

19 Jia Jingfeng, “Ministry of Agriculture: The Virulence of Bird Flu Increases and We Face Six Major Problems,” http://www.ivdc.gov.cn/xinwen/xw/t20051122_21452. htm (accessed on November 21, 2005). 96 liang hong contribute to creating dangerous and drug-resistant super-pathogens, which potentially threaten both animals and people. At the same time, people are also threatened by their own excessive use of various drugs. As our consumption of various medicines increases, the more resistant these diseases can become. This can increase the likelihood of mutation in diseases strains.20

C. Lifestyles and Culture In some parts of China, eating wild animals is a popular tradition and remains prevalent despite laws banning the practice. After the SARS breakout in 2002, it was reported that the Chinese government had confi scated 838,500 wild animals from Guangdong wildlife markets. Each year, though, tens of millions of wild mammals, birds, and reptiles continue to be traded in these markets. Because the practice is so widespread, wildlife populations are overexploited, and, because of the shipping and storing methods used, various known or unknown animal diseases break out and spread. The wildlife trade thus affects humankind’s health. Acquired Immune Defi ciency Syndrome (AIDS), Ebola, SARS and avian infl uenza are all related to the trade, consumption, and migration of wildlife. We have no way of knowing the scope of the global wildlife trade, as its transactions are often informal and illegal, but we can glimpse its signifi cance through statistics gathered by the Wildlife Conservation Society. According to their statistics, each year, the global wildlife trade involves about 4,000,000 birds, 64,000,000,000 reptiles, and 40,000 primates.21

D. Ecosystems Currently, we know little about the relationship between climatological and environmental change and the outbreak and spread of avian infl u- enza in wild birds. Though there is no direct evidence that the outbreak of avian infl uenza has to do with changes in ecological and biological diversity, various signs suggest that such changes may well be among the underlying causes of avian infl uenza and its spread. One theory

20 Yi Xiaofeng and Guo Qun, “Overuse of Antibiotics Is Questioned by Bird Flu Expert: CPPCC Analyzes the Epidemics,” http://unn.people.com.cn/GB/22220/31 780/31786/2337693.html (accessed on February 13, 2004). 21 Pan Feng, “Policymaking Should Be Employed to Strengthen the Regulation of Wildlife Used for Food,” Science Times, May 30, 2003. avian influenza lands in china 97 holds that ecological degradation caused by human activity such as global warming and water and air pollution may have had a particular weakening effect on birds.22 With the rapid growth of human population, humankind invades the territory of wildlife, and therefore contact between wild animals, domestic animals, and people becomes more and more frequent. The wild animals, with their fragmented habitats, become surrounded by humans and their livestock. Even animals in open spaces come into more frequent contact with humans because of ecotourism. Wildlife management policies that change the habitats of both wildlife and animals on farms can also play a role.23 When examining the relationship between human health and the environment, medical science usually neglects upstream factors such as habitat destruction and pollution. In fact, however, decisions on how to use land and water resources are of considerable signiﬁ cance to human health, and lack of relevant knowledge leads to serious and sometimes permanent destruction of ecosystems. If the health of ecosystems directly and indirectly affects the health of the animals in them, preventing epidemics may well depend on better ecosystem management. Finding the means to balance human and environmental health alongside socioeconomic demands is within the realm of possibility, but will require us to change our way of thinking and place a higher value on ecosystem function.

E. The Current Situation in China Many factors affect China’s exposure to avian ﬂ u in particular ways. For instance, three out of the eight major migratory routes of the world’s birds cut through China,24 covering nearly the entire territory of the nation. About 25% of the total global bird population passes through China. More than 1,300 indigenous bird species live in China, including waterfowl. Several unique and rare species are among this group. Birds live in all parts of the country. All these birds need to be monitored and protected, which makes supervision and control of the disease an arduous task.

22 Zhang Shuyi, “Most Major Human Disease Viruses Come from Animals,” http:// tech.sina.com.cn/o/2003–05–25/1643190693.shtml (accessed on May 25, 2003). 23 Li Ming, “The Spread of Wildlife Epidemics,” Science Times, January 6, 2005. 24 Wang Tian, “Three Routes of Migratory Birds Bypassing China,” http://health. people.com.cn/GB/54342/54343/54344/3828635.html. 98 liang hong

Second, 70% of China’s population lives in rural areas. As the overall level of development in rural areas is relatively low, farmers from poor regions may withdraw from reporting the epidemic because they can’t afford the economic loss from culling birds since government compensation typical fails to cover total losses. These farmers are less hygiene-sensitive and generally not suffi ciently alert to the danger of bird fl u. Several cases of human infection in 2005 can be attributed to farmers’ attempts to save resources by eating infected poultry. Another reason for the rapid spread of the epidemic lies in the weakness of the grassroots public hygiene and animal epidemic prevention system. Most village veterinary stations have to cover their expenses via earned income, so they inevitably pay more attention to disease treatment than prevention, which reduces their interest in or ability to prevent epidemics. Besides this, limitations in professional skills and technical conditions prevent the personnel working in such stations from identifying epidemics in a timely manner. Therefore, it is an urgent task to build up an effective, authoritative veterinary system which strengthens the skills of unoffi cial veterinarians, while developing a disease management system that coordinates and oversees their operations. Third, the ineffectiveness of compulsory immunization programs, gaps in vaccine research and development, and confl icts between personal and public interests led to a low percentage of poultry immunization, which is another major reason for the present severity of the epidemics. For example, in mid-September 2005, the national poultry immunization rate was only about 27%.25

III. Responding to the Avian Flu Epidemic

To prevent the spread of avian inﬂ uenza among people and animals, we need to improve our management of the overall relationship between humans and animals. We should carry out extensive studies and strengthen inter-agency and international coordination. Meanwhile, we should adopt suitable measures to identify virus epidemics, taking special care to identify those individuals and groups most susceptible to

25 This ﬁ gure conﬂ icts with the immunization rate stated by the Ministry of Agri- culture. avian influenza lands in china 99 infection. We must also monitor virus mutation in wild birds and the virus’ general impact on wildlife, while increasing our understanding of the virus and its bionomics. Finally, we must explore ways to reduce the virus’ impact on various animal species, particularly humans.

A. Suggestion for the Public: Improve Relations between Humankind and Animals Zoonoses such as mad cow disease, AIDS, plague, and bird ﬂ u have once had or are having a harmful impact on humankind. There may even be other animal pathogens yet unknown to humans. The frequent outbreaks of animal-originated epidemics suggest the need to improve our management of the relations between humanity and animals.

1. Reduce Consumption of Wild Animals The main reason for the excessive eating of wild animals is the misleading traditional idea that it provides health advantages. Currently, there are more than 100 animal diseases which can infect humans; ten of these can seriously endanger human health, such as AIDS, mad cow disease, and avian inﬂ uenza. To help prevent the spread of these diseases from animals to humans we should remember the warning that “illnesses often ﬁ nd their way in by the mouth” and stop eating wild animals.

2. Keep a Safe Distance from Wild Animals Although there is still no direct evidence showing the relationship between avian inﬂ uenza and the migration of birds, the fact that migratory birds have died of avian inﬂ uenza in various places suggests that infected migratory birds can spread the virus to poultry and people through their excrement or other means. Therefore, it is appropriate to keep one’s distance from wild animals. In densely populated cities, it is advisable not to raise birds, and live poultry markets should gradually be closed down. Meanwhile, we should strengthen the management of wildlife markets and livestock farms. Regulations and standards in raising livestock should be strengthened.

3. Use Scientifi c Methods to Raise Poultry and Livestock Livestock production facilities and conditions must be improved signifi - cantly. Through the control of inter-species contact and improvement of livestock health, we can reduce the dissemination of livestock-originated 100 liang hong diseases and realize the dual benefi ts of economic development and environmental protection. A policy applied in the European Union, to raise poultry indoors, could have a signifi cant impact on improving the health of farmed animals by reducing their exposure to migratory birds.

B. A Suggestion for Scientifi c Research: Conduct Comprehensive Studies In fact, pathogens emerging in the past 20 years have long existed in wild animals, but we still do not have suffi cient knowledge of them to develop effective preventive measures and systems. Few comprehensive studies have been completed that would add to our understanding of natural pathogens in our surroundings. Meanwhile, we know practically nothing about the wildlife diseases caused by human activities and the corresponding threats to wildlife.26 It is therefore imperative that we carry out comprehensive studies and establish prevention systems and technologies to lessen humankind’s vulnerability to new infectious diseases. Human health is closely related to that of animals and ecosystems, and a new interdisciplinary subject, conservation medicine, has developed accordingly. Being a populous country with relatively low health levels and seriously damaged ecosystems, China needs to recognize and carry out research in conservation medicine as soon as possible. Certainly, to ensure the future of wildlife species and their habitats, it is not enough simply to study wildlife ecology, animal behavior, and the diseases in isolation. The success of long-term conservation depends on the practice of systemically applied scientifi c insights as the basis of long-standing policies.

C. Suggestions for the Government

1. Control the Illegal Trade of Wild Animals Controlling the illegal trade of wild animals is the top priority in international discussions. The wildlife trade has an enormous impact on public health, agriculture, and wildlife conservation; it must be pointed out that this trade is a serious threat to social and economical security

26 Xie Yan, “Wildlife Epidemics and Human Health,” http://news.xinhuanet.com/ comments/2003–05/28/content_889765.htm (accessed on May 28, 2005). avian influenza lands in china 101 as well. The problems caused by the trade and consumption of wild animals are nonetheless complex. Wildlife has long been a chief protein source for people in poor regions, while economic prosperity gives rise to increasing demand for wildlife. To deal with this dilemma, we must simultaneously consider different, but interrelated, dimensions of these problems such as agriculture, society, economics, and politics. Research colleges and universities should cooperate with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to study the diseases emerging in wild animals during trade and to investigate the role of the wildlife trade in the outbreak of avian inﬂ uenza. Such research is of practical sig- niﬁ cance for the prevention and control of animal epidemics and the formulation of laws and regulations on wildlife conservation.

2. Control Population Growth Global population already exceeds 6 billion and is still increasing. The larger the population is, the less room there is for nature and wildlife. With the increasing conﬂ ict between humans and animals, the chances of viruses spreading from animals to humans also increase.

3. Improve the Surveillance, Prevention, and Treatment System China’s surveillance system for wildlife epidemics has just been set up, and after an investigation of the Ministry of Forestry’s surveillance of wild birds, Chu Guozhong, a famous ornithologist, ﬁ nds that there are many gaps in the system. For instance, the proﬁ ciency of the personnel working at relevant agencies varies widely; surveillance, transportation, and communication facilities are outdated; and the allocation of tens of thousands of RMB for each national surveillance station is far from adequate. We need to improve the early-warning technical system in wildlife epidemic surveillance as well as the management and regulation of the system.

4. Strengthen Departmental and International Cooperation No single governmental department has sufﬁ cient knowledge and resources to prevent the sudden emergence and spread of diseases, nor can any one country reverse the trend of habitat loss and wildlife extinction, which will inevitably endanger the health of people and animals. Only by breaking down the obstacles among nations, organizations, individuals, professions, and departments can we make full use of the knowledge and techniques of all parties to address current threats and future problems. 102 liang hong

5. Increase Investment in Infrastructure and Education To cope with the threat to the public, domestic animals, and wildlife posed by the sudden emergence and spread of diseases, we need to increase our investment in health infrastructure for both human beings and animals. We should enhance quarantine measures and improve personnel training in animal quarantine and preventive hygiene. We should also invest more in education to teach people how to prevent wildlife-related diseases and generally guide the public to live in harmony with both domestic and wild animals. MEMORANDUM CONCERNING THE ASIA PULP AND PAPER CO. LTD (APP) INCIDENT

Chang Li

2005 marks the 1900th anniversary of the invention of papermaking. It is noteworthy that this invention, which has made such a tremendous contribution to human civilization, was hardly commemorated by anyone in China, papermaking’s birthplace. However, some major events related to papermaking did occur in China during 2005. A paper enterprise owned by an overseas Chinese entrepreneur implemented a project called “forest-pulp-paper integration.” The enterprise’s actions in this project as well as the social storm it stirred up became a media sensation. The enterprise, one of the top ten in the global papermaking industry, has been notorious in some countries for a long time,1 according to certain news reports. However, most ordinary people in China did not know its name, Asia Pulp and Paper Co. Ltd (APP), until it received continuous news coverage in 2004. Because its construction of forest operations in Yunnan to supply the “forest-pulp-paper integration” project was described as “a project to

1 Xinhuanet (November 11, 2003) re-published a group of articles from its 94th issue en toto such as “Indonesian Paper Giant APP Reorganized” and “What’s the Choice of Chinese Creditors,” which described APP as the “paper that devoured Sumatra’s tigers” while incurring “a debt of 3.9 billion U.S. dollars, and still becoming embroiled in a quarrel with international creditors on their debt restructuring scheme.” Please visit the link for details: http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2003–11/06/con- tent_1163295.htm. China Youth Daily (December 23, 2004) reported related issues, such as “Experts in Financial Organization at Beijing Normal University Sound an Alarm” and “There is a Huge Black Hole in the Financial Affairs of APP (China).” Please visit the link for details: http://zqb.cyol.com/gb/zqb/2004–12/23/content_1001799.htm. As reported by the website of Hexun Forum, The Wall Street Journal, in an a series of front-page articles published in early 2002, referred to a speech given at a meeting on risk management by Lang Xianping, a ﬁ nancier and economic analyst, on possible impropriety involving APP. In the article “The Sinar Mas Group’s Fraud,” the paper reported that 183 banks in the world were ensnared in APP’s shady dealings, including China Industrial and Commercial Bank. Please visit the link for details: http://bbs. wayup.hexun.com/viewarticle.aspx?aid=29859589&bid=2. 104 chang li destroy China’s forests” by Greenpeace, APP has been swept up in a whirlwind of public opinion. The president of the Chinese Headquar- ters of APP has stated on many occasions that its business behavior in China is legal and beneﬁ cial to China’s ecological development as well as the country’s economic and social development. He denied that APP was engaged in wholesale destruction of forests.

I. APP and the “Forest-pulp-paper Integration” Project

As defi ned in “Special Programming for the Tenth National Five-Year Plan for the Year 2010 on the Forest-Paper Integration Project” enacted by China’s National Development and Reform Commission, forest- paper integration is a new pattern of industrial organization which will alter the traditional mode of managing forests and papermaking as separate functions. This new system will build market-oriented papermaking enterprises, by integrating pulp-making and forest pulp supplies through capital linkages and economic interests. This will transform the industry by having paper manufacturing produce fi nancial support for forestation while forests will provide raw materials for papermaking. This cycle will combine economic, social, and ecological benefi ts within a framework of sustainable development. This integration system is based on the successful experiences of the paper industry in developed countries. It is the inevitable choice for China to protect her natural forests and meet its huge domestic demands for timber. Since 1992 APP has been planting forests in accordance with the forest-pulp-paper integration pattern in many areas in China. They have mainly concentrated on two regions. One region consists of the southern provinces of Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan and Yunnan where mainly eucalyptus trees are planted. For instance, in Yunnan Province eucalyptus trees make up 90% of the total trees planted. The other region consists of Jiangxi, Hunan, and Henan provinces—located more in the center of China—where mainly poplars are planted. Note that poplars are both fast-growing and produce a high yield in timber. According to its estimates, APP has invested more than three billion RMB and planted nearly 267,000 hectares of forests in eight provinces and autonomous regions as of August 2005. memorandum concerning the app incident 105

II. “The Forest Destruction Incident” in Yunnan

In November 2004, Greenpeace China publicized an “Investigative Report on APP’s Forest Destruction in Yunnan,” exposing the fact that Asia Pulp and Paper Co. Ltd (APP) was “logging large quantities of virgin and old-growth forests in Yunnan in order to plant fast-growing eucalyptuses as papermaking raw materials. Their action is in violation of The People’s Republic of China’s Forestry Law and is causing severe damage to the indigenous ecology.” At the same time, Greenpeace described APP as one of the most notorious forest destroyers in the world. Over the years, APP has been exploiting vast Indonesian primeval rain forests to the brink of extermination. Therefore, this corporation has been driven out of Indonesia. We have conclusive evidence that APP is directly involved in illegal logging. Is the alleged “Forest Destruction Incident” exposed by Greenpeace true? In a report submitted to the State Forestry Administration (SFA), the Yunnan Forestry Bureau commented that, “There indeed exist some serious problems in the implementation of the project. And if no great importance is attached to these issues and no timely adjustments are made, the objectives of the project will not be achieved, and a series of grave consequences will result.” The news about APP’s destruction of forests in Yunnan led to a strong popular response. A notice calling for a boycott of APP’s paper products, drafted by the Association of Hotels in Zhejiang Province, appealed to the local 417 hotels with star rankings2 to reject APP’s paper products. The notice demanded that all members of the association refuse to purchase APP’s paper products, as a step toward establishing a system of “green hotels.” The following day thirty hotels called the Association, stating that they would support the appeal by refusing to purchase the paper products of Sinar Mas Group APP (China). Soon, Sinar Mas Group APP China sued the Association (rather than Greenpeace) charging it with liable and attempting to damage the company’s reputation.

2 In China hotels are ranked and given from one to ﬁ ve stars in the order of increasing quality. 106 chang li

Further public concern was aroused by APP’s legal moves against the Zhejiang Hotel Industry Association, which launched an environmental protection action targeting APP. Friends of Nature (FON), a well-known environmental non-governmental organization (NGO) in China, led a large number of domestic and international environmental organizations to jointly sign an open letter in support of the Associa- tion. The newly established All-China Environment Federation fully endorsed the boycott by the Association, and assigned thirteen people to Hangzhou in support of the Association before the court session opened. APP withdrew its lawsuit unconditionally one day before the court was scheduled to begin hearings, either under the pressure of environmental organizations and the public or based on some other considerations. Given all this, what is the real situation regarding APP’s project in Yunnan? It was found that although most facts listed in Greenpeace’s report were well-grounded, the background and interpretation of these facts were quite complicated.

A. “Enclosing 18,300 Square Kilometers of Land” It is an unarguable fact that APP “enclosed 18,300 km2 of land” and destroyed some forests as mentioned in Greenpeace’ report, but many media and the public interpreted this fact as a forest “catastrophe” that had occurred. This interpretation led to a great social commotion. In fact, the “catastrophe” was just at the beginning stage. However, Greenpeace believed that the forests were bound to suffer a catastrophe if Sinar Mas Group APP and the government of Yunnan Province did not stop their exploitation of the forests immediately. Such a conclusion was based on the accurate analysis of the forestation program detailed in the agreements of intent entered into by the different levels local governments and APP. The former signed these agreements in order to attract investment from APP without considering the basic data of local forest resources and their own limited capabilities in monitoring the project. Complicating matters is the fact that different groups examining the case and the relevant data hold different opinions regarding the impact of this amount of logging and the overall state of forests in and around the cutting area. No consensus could be reached among these groups. According to the “Report on the APP’s Forest-pulp-paper Integration Project in Simao City” submitted by the Yunnan Forestry Bureau to memorandum concerning the app incident 107 the Yunnan provincial government on July 20, 2004, Sinar Mas Group APP planned to develop 17,600 km2 of fast-growing trees in Yunnan Province, including 8,000 km2 in Simao City, 3,700 km2 in Wenshan Prefecture, and 6,700 km2 in Lincang City. The report also pointed out that in the Simao area: Barren lands suitable for planting forests cannot satisfy the needs of the project. With the development of the project, Sinar Mas Group APP intends to enlarge the pulp timber base area from 4,000 km2 to 8,000 km2 and the project scale will expand accordingly. Considering the forest resources of Simao, as there are only 1,900 km2 of land without forests, planting new trees for pulp on 8,000 km2 would mean logging the existing forests to make room for fast-growing trees. Sinar Mas Group admitted that although they had this plan in mind and signed the above-mentioned agreement of intent, some aspects of a formal agreement had not been completed. Sinar Mas Group planned to develop 6,100 km2 of raw forest in Yunnan Province following an implementation schedule that called for development of 2,400 km2 in Simao City to be completed in 7 years, and for 3,670 km2 in Wenshan Prefecture to be completed in 8 years. Notably, the company emphasized that even the area in this plan was not the actual size of forestation, and that the ﬁ nal size could only be determined after negotiating with local farmers and conducting ﬁ eld surveys. The Yunnan Forestry Bureau explained that adjustments of logging areas depended on two factors. First, the basic data provided by some counties were inconsistent with the actual situation. Take Funing County, Wenshan City for instance. No surveys of forest resources had been conducted since 1949 when the Republic was founded. Secondly, some requirements of the pulp timber forestation, such as the concentration of trees, site conditions and altitude, were not considered in the exploitation of the existing barren hills. Given this, the agreement could not be implemented.

B. Debating the “Good and Bad” Points of Eucalyptus Trees No tree species should be summarily labeled as good or bad. In the view of short-term economic benefi ts, the eucalyptus is a top-priority in forestation. But it is necessary to do further research on the ecological consequences of large-scale and intensive forestation of the eucalyptus. The worries noted by NGOs and the media about the eucalyptus planting project in Yunnan Province partly originated from the view that the effects of this effort are long term and hard to assess ex ante. Some 108 chang li scientists, including ecologists from the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), also share the same worries and views. Dr. Xie Yan, an expert in exotic species from CAS, described a man-made eucalyptus forest as a “green desert.” Greenpeace, who opposed the large-scale planting of the eucalypts, quoted the views of the SFA in its report:3 Most of the raw materials sources will consist of eucalyptus trees. How- ever, the large-scale planting of the eucalyptus will produce widespread impacts on the productivity of forests in Simao, and in particular, the well-being of particular native pine tree species...... Although large-scale forestations may provide a series of benefi ts to the community, man-made forests cannot provide the same ecological and social benefi ts as natural forests. What’s more, man-made forests may lead to alterations of the ecological and natural environment, which may have negative impacts such as causing the proliferation of forest pests, increasing fi re risks, degradation of soil fertility, and the loss of biodiversity and forest genetic resources. Of course, opinions expressed by APP, a number of eucalyptus experts, and local government disagreed. Through various media these interest stated that it was nonsense to claim that that there were “no birds and no grass in eucalyptus forests.” Presently, it is hard to draw a conclusion since the eucalyptus trees planted by APP are not older than two years; the impact on soil fertility and biodiversity will not become manifest for many years. Although the undergrowth is rather dense in APP’s eucalyptus forests, biodiversity has been affected, and the invasion of harmful invasive species is rampant. It is reasonable to consider the protection and restoration of biodiversity as a factor in considering the development of commercial tree plantations because doing so supports sustainable forestry management. However, the government has not yet laid down specifi c operational standards on forestation or the corresponding evaluation indicators needed in commercial forestry management. Therefore, it is imperative for those involved to take responsibility for this process

3 “Notice from the State Forestry Administration to seriously address the problems of related departments on the administration of forest resources,” with an appendix “Report of the investigation and research on the management of the forest resources in Simao City, Yunnan” (issued with the No. [2004]106 by the SFA), June 15, 2004. memorandum concerning the app incident 109 and consider environmental factors carefully in planning and designing their projects.

C. “Damaging Farmers’ Interests” Before APP entered Yunnan, the land lease rate paid by two local corporations, Yunjing Forestry Paper Co. Ltd. and Jinggu Forestry Co. Ltd., was 2.7 RMB per hectare over fi fty years. The local government granted APP “citizen treatment” in accordance with central government and Yunnan provincial government policies. The provincial government applied the same lease rate when signing the contract with APP. Given that the barren land could bring very little economic benefi t to local farmers, this rate was reasonable. The problem was that APP did not plant trees on barren land only, as they had promised. In fact large areas of woodland and farmland were included in their project. Obviously, the lease rate was too low for woodland and farmland, thus bringing great economic losses to local farmers, as a survey showed. According to the memorandum signed by APP and the Yunnan provincial government on September 30, 2002, APP would rent at the rate of 2.7 RMB per hectare for fi fty years (i.e. 0.054 RMB per hectare each year); timber would be valued at 70 RMB per cubic meter. State-owned forests would be divided into shares producing ongoing payments while the collectively-owned forests would be purchased by APP in cash. An investigation conducted by Greenpeace showed that 3,700 square kilometers of pulp material forest used by APP in Wenshan County was handled in this way. In the “Report on the APP’s Forest-pulp-paper Integration Project in Simao City,” submitted by the Yunnan Forestry Bureau to the Yunnan provincial government, the problems affecting farmers were described as follows: In transferring the benefi ts from forest harvests from Simao’s local government to APP and other timber processing enterprises, irregularities have been noted. These include the government’s setting a rather low price for the output from forest land and giving away benefi ts to local and foreign enterprises. These actions are the main causes driving the loss of state-owned assets and damaging the legal rights and interests of forest farmers. Such actions must be prohibited. What’s more, the report of the SFA shared the same viewpoint: 110 chang li

Because alterations affecting woodlands require government intervention, and because such changes are investigated by agencies unqualifi ed to examine forestry resource planning, the interests of property owners on forest lands cannot be guaranteed. Furthermore, local expertise and interests had no input in the process. For example, local residents did not participate in the process of identifying the range and dimensions of land proposed for use by APP and other papermaking interests. The rights, interests, and duties of citizens are not clear. Whether they would like to be involved is not clear. It is a good thing for the local government to attract merchants and investments, but a good thing should be done the right way. The preferential policy for attracting merchants and investments should never deprive local farmers of their legal rights and interests. Meanwhile, in the implementation of the project, some contradictions and disputes have arisen because of complaints regarding the lease rate of 2.7 RMB per hectare over fi fty years, which is considered extremely low by the farmers involved in the project.4 According to some investigators, APP hired approximately 490,000 day laborers in the Yunnan forest planning project over the past two years. Total salaries for these workers amount to 70 million RMB. This demonstrates that the project provided employment opportunities for local farmers and thus increased their incomes. Noticeably, in Xiangshuihe Village, Lancang County of Simao City, which was mentioned many times in Greenpeace’s report, the head of the village told the investigators that 80% of the 3000 villagers living in 729 households supported the forestation plan and that the project had injected of 300,000 RMB into their village. However, the above statement was strongly questioned by Greenpeace, which argued that farmers could not reveal the truth because of pressure exerted on them by the local government. According to the survey conducted by Greenpeace, most villagers did not get substantial benefi ts from this project; most profi ts went to the contractors. This disparity can be deduced by examining pay scales for work on the project. Villagers could earn one to two cents for digging a tree hole or ten to twenty cents for planting a tree. Given these low pay rates, it seems clear that the lion’s share of money went to the corporate contractors.

4 “Notice from the State Forestry Administration to seriously treat the problems of relevant departments in forest resources administration,” issued with the No. [2004]106 by SFA, June 15, 2004. memorandum concerning the app incident 111

D. How Much Forest was Destroyed? It is recognized by all parties that some forests suffered destruction in the process of APP’s efforts to develop pulp supplies. According to the SFA and Yunnan Province, 6.4 million square meters of forest land had been involved in developing raw material forests in Lancang County in 2003 and 2004. Meanwhile, 24,709 cubic meters of timber were cut without a license. The main controversy is concerned with who should take responsibility for the destruction of forests. The SFA believed that, “Most of the trees were cut by the contractors of the Sinar Mas Group APP, with some being cut by the local villagers before they turned over land included in the project.” The SFA goes on to demand that “those who destroyed forest resources must be dealt with by law.” Although Greenpeace approved of the SFA’s conclusion, it believed that these ﬁ gures were rather conservative. The Yunnan Forestry Bureau offered a different explanation: The forests were mainly cut by the local villagers and the contractors who built the forest. The local villagers cut about 22,000 cubic meters of timber before relinquishing land holdings, while the contractors cut about 2,700 cubic meters . . . The main responsibility should be taken by the local forestry departments, the contractors and the villagers, rather than Sinar Mas Group APP. In stating this, they overthrew the SFA’s conclusion and their own “Report on the APP’s Forest-pulp-paper Integration Project in Simao City” as well. Why did the Yunnan Forestry Bureau have two completely opposite conclusions on the same event? The reason is unknown.

III. Concern Regarding Supply Chains Using Hainan’s Raw Materials

A. APP’s Hainan Project On November 7, 1995, Hainan Jinhai Paper-Pulp Co. Ltd. was founded as a subsidiary of APP and in 1997 APP established Hainan Jinhua Forestry Co. Ltd. as another subsidiary. In March 1997, China’s Inter- national Engineering Consulting Company made a feasibility assessment of the “forest-pulp-paper” integration project drawing upon the expertise of more than sixty well-known experts in China. This group endorsed the plan. Their assessment report concluded that the project 112 chang li was conducive to economic growth in Hainan, especially in the Yangpu Economic Development Zone. In spite of its overall approval, the report did note that, “The raw material demanded by production targets has to be obtained from existing natural forests in Hainan and other areas.” (Quoted from a report written by Shanghai Light Industrial Designing Institute for APP’s Hainan project). It seems doubtless that neither the Hainan provincial government nor Sinar Mas Group would like this point to be widely publicized. On the basis of this report, Hainan Province decided to initiate this project immediately. In March of 1997, through the evaluation of experts from the relevant offi cial units, the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) examined and approved the environmental impact assessment (EIA) for the “forest-pulp-paper” integration project. It is noteworthy that an informed source has stated that the SEPA only confi rmed the EIA focusing on the Jinhai Paper-Pulp Mill. Subsequently, on December 17, the State Council offi cially approved the project of the Hainan Jinhai Paper-Pulp Co. Ltd which will construct a paper bleaching mill with a production capacity of 600,000 tons per year and set up 2,340 square kilometers of forest lands to supply the operation. On December 17, 1998, Hainan Jinhai Paper-Pulp Co. Ltd. held a ceremony marking the installation of its facility’s cornerstone in Yangpu. On July 30, 1999, the Eighth Session of the Standing Committee of the Hainan People’s Congress approved the “Outline Plan of Hainan Provincial Development.” The Outline pointed out that in the near future, forestation would be carried out on a large scale. Included would be a project in which acacia mangium and eucalyptus trees would be planted on 1167 km2 of land yielding three million cubic meters of timber annually to supply the Jinhai Paper-Pulp Co. Ltd. In May, 2003, the construction of the paper-pulp mill started. The company’s fi rst-stage production line was installed and went into trial operation in November 2004. On January 28, 2005, Wei Liucheng, Governor of Hainan Province, presented the provincial governmental report at the Third Session of the Third Hainan Provincial People’s Congress. The government report pointed out that: The Indonesian Sinar Mas Group has built a paper-pulp mill with an annual production capacity of one million tons. In the coming year, it is necessary to expedite the construction of the pulp-paper-forest supply base to complete this one million-ton paper-pulp project. At the same time, a project for producing 1.6 million tons of paper annually will be started to build production capacity and fully develop forest-pulp-paper integration. memorandum concerning the app incident 113

The provincial Party committee and the provincial government listed the “forest-pulp-paper” integration project as the third item on the list of “ten projects” that would be promoted in 2005. On March 25, 2005, the one million-ton paper-pulp project of the Jinhai Paper-Pulp Co. Ltd, with an investment of 10.2 billion RMB, ofﬁ cially went into operation. By the end of June, 2005, 647 square kilometers of forest had been allocated to supply papermaking projects in Hainan Province.

B. Where Does the Raw Material Come From? APP once declared that it would allow no purchase of timber from wild and virgin forests. Moreover, the paper-pulp mill had been required to exclude all tropical rain forest timber which has high ecological value. However, Greenpeace does not believe that these promises have been fulﬁ lled. APP’s Hainan Yangpu Paper-pulp Mill purchases timber at the average price of 400 RMB per ton (about 50 USD) while the market price for paper pulp is around 500 USD per ton. Motivated by such huge savings, the production capacity of Yangpu Paper-pulp Mill keeps increasing: from 600,000 tons to the current one million tons, with a projected output of 1.6 million tons. According to the original plan, APP would, with the cooperation of Hainan Province, develop 2340 square kilometers of manmade fast-growing and high-yield forests, to supply the mill. APP’s huge timber demands cannot possibly be met through its planned raw material forests. To meet its current timber demands, the mill has purchased timber from Hainan, Guangdong and Guangxi provinces because its raw material base of 667 km2 does not supply an adequate volume of pulp. Even with these additional purchases within China, the mill must import 30–40% of its pulp supplies from abroad. To guarantee the supply of timber needed to meet its pulp needs, APP will have to increase its forest holdings by 400 km2 annually in the next few years. Greenpeace as well as several media outlets have expressed great concern regarding the demands of the Jinhai Paper-pulp Co. Ltd. At the beginning of 2005, Greenpeace released the “Investigative Report on Sinar Mas Group Hainan,” pointing out that the raw material supply of the Jinhai Paper-pulp Co. Ltd would impose pressure on the native forests in Hainan Province and the rest of China. Furthermore, the raw material purchasing policy applied in Hainan Province by Jinhai has already triggered abusive logging in parts of Hainan Province. 114 chang li

In the ﬁ rst half of 2005, several media reported an incident in which forests along a highway had been destroyed in Hainan Province. Although not directly responsible, the Sinar Mas Group has been implicated in this incident. Reporting on this and other incidents reﬂ ects the great concern of some news reporters regarding the link between sustainable forest management and raw material demands, especially as related to APP’s Hainan Paper-pulp Mill.

C. The Government Spares No Effort in Backing APP APP has offered generous donations in Hainan in the name of “greenness.” The company has invested in pollution-control and conducted publicity activities to support environmental protection as a response to challenges mounted by some international and domestic environmental organizations. APP’s actions have attracted public attention and helped to build support for the company. On the eve of the launching ceremony for the Yangpu Jinhai pulp-paper project, some international NGOs, primarily represented by Greenpeace and media involved in investigating APP’s activities, put great pressure on APP through its own public persuasion efforts. However, their actions failed to have a signiﬁ cant impact; APP’s political partners had insulated the company from outside pressures. APP’s Hainan pulp-paper project received generous support from various dignitaries in the central government as well as the Party committee and local Hainan Provincial government. Chen Jinhua, former director of the National Development and Reform Commission, member of the State Council and vice chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) attended the ceremony, extending unreserved support on behalf of the central government. Moreover, support given by major leaders of Yunnan and Hainan provinces had become noticeably more resolute and thoroughgoing than had been demonstrated to that point. Major leaders from Hainan, such as the chairman of the Party committee and the governor attended as well, showing APP representatives exceptional affection. Seeing this, the media and public concluded that the ofﬁ cial support for APP was unshakeable. memorandum concerning the app incident 115

IV. Leaving the Assessment of Truth or Falsehood to Later Generations

Although by now the storm that swirled around APP has calmed, many questions and doubts remain. For example, how did APP escape prosecution? The fact that APP has broken the national forestry law is not in dispute and therefore it should be subjected to state adjudica- tion, arbitration, or censure. Greenpeace wondered why this did not happen. According to the Forestry Law, those found illegally logging timber under two cubic meters and cutting fewer than fi fty seedlings shall receive fi nes of three to fi ve times the economical value of these trees. In more severe cases, criminal responsibility shall be investigated and those responsible will be charged to stand for these crimes. This threshold stands at ten to twenty cubic meters of illegally harvested wood. Those found guilty can receive prison time of three to seven years. Note that the range for illegal wood harvested triggers different charges depends on where wood comes from: the threshold for criminal responsibility is twenty cubic meters for wood taken from forest areas and ten cubic meters in non-forest areas. According to the disclosed facts, the “forestation contractors” of APP’s Yunnan project “illegally logged approximately 2,700 cubic meters; villages illegally logged an additional 22,000 cubic meters.” Both should defi nitely be regarded as severe deforestation cases. Although NGOs and the media were engaged in a heated discussion on this issue, what puzzles us is why the relevant governmental departments failed to make any in-depth investigation, let alone establishing responsibility for these crimes. Note as well that APP’s actions and infl uence did not come under serious scrutiny. Only Greenpeace, which has no authority in the matter, made any substantive claims regarding APP’s role in deforestation and alleged illegal logging. To date, APP has completely denied Greenpeace’s accusations. However, if APP was slandered, why did it not seek legal recourse to defend its own image? According to a particular news outlet, Sinar Mas Group APP submitted a letter of commitment to the SFA in a very low-key manner in May 2005 promising that all future projects carried out in China shall: Follow the relevant national laws and policies; the daily business will be run legally. Hereafter, all the forestry administration regulations and forestation operational routines applied by Sinar Mas Group APP will comply with the relevant regulations made by the state and provincial forestry departments. 116 chang li

Thus, APP’s deforestation incident seems to have come to an end. However, Greenpeace believes that whether Sinar Mas Group APP will act as they have promised remains to be seen. APP claims “to do good deeds without boasting” as one of its guiding principles. However, judging by APP’s efforts in promotional campaigns, we can safely say they have thoroughly abandoned this principle. During 2005, APP’s publicity and promotional campaigns achieved unprecedented levels of intensity. In particular, the company asserted its contributions to economic and social development. They did show some prudence in the matter, however, by remaining silent on their other actions. People in China do not expect much from corporate enterprises. It does not matter if they perform good deeds or not. People will be satisfi ed if they do no evil, which ironically fi ts with the philosophy of the late free market proponent and economist Milton Friedman. He claims that “profi t is duty” and that this is a company’s singular business and social responsibility. As long as the corporate entity observes professional ethics, then its social responsibility is to increase its profi t by utilizing its resources. In other words, it should participate in open and free competition, but without engaging in conspiracy or fraud.5 It may yet be too early to judge APP’s behavior based on Friedman’s standard. As well, department administrators and staff members who behaved in strange and sometimes inexplicable ways regarding the APP case will also have to wait until a more appropriate time for judgment.

5 Friedman, Milton, “The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Proﬁ ts,” New York Times Magazine (September 1, 1970). Reprinted in Ethical Theory and Business, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp and Norman E. Bowie (New Jersey: Englewood Cliffs, Prentice- Hall, 1993). DIFFERENT VOICES IN THE DEBATE ON “REVERING NATURE”

Bao Hongmei and Liu Bing

I. The Shock of the Tsunami Triggers a Debate about Nature

A. The Issue: Should People Think of Nature with Respect and Awe? The shock that the world felt in the wake of the tsunami that killed nearly 200,000 people around the Indian Ocean on December 26, 2004 pressed many individuals to take a renewed interest in basic questions about what the relationship between humans and nature should be. Soon after the tsunami, He Zuoxiu, a theoretical physicist and an academician affi liated with the Chinese Academy of Sciences, discussed the lessons of the tsunami in an article entitled “Humans Should Not Revere Nature” published in Globe magazine.1 “We should be aware that humans have a harmonious relationship with nature in some respects, but not in others,” He Zuoxiu said. “If we are not clear about the relationship between humans and nature, we will lose our vigilance with potentially disastrous results.” He Zuoxiu said that when it comes to the relationship between people and nature, people should come fi rst. “Sometimes it is necessary to ‘destroy’ the environment or transform nature for the benefi t of humans,” He Zuoxiu argued. In calling for a human-centered attitude toward nature, he dismissed the contention that humans ought to hold nature in awe and respect as “anti-scientifi c.” This article stirred strong reactions. Wang Yongchen, an environmental activist and head of the non-governmental organization (NGO) Green Earth Volunteers, was the fi rst to respond in an article carried in the January 11 edition of Beijing News entitled, “To Hold Nature in Awe and Respect Is Not Anti-Scientifi c.” She said that people should not be put fi rst because Mother Nature does not exist merely for people. Many species deserve the same rights as humans. She went on to assert that nature should in fact be held in awe and granted respect.

1 He Zuoxiu, “Humans Should Not Revere Nature,” Globe, No. 2, 2005. 118 bao hongmei and liu bing

Lost amidst the debate was the fact that Wang Yongchen had written an article that appeared in Beijing News on January 3 entitled: “Natural Disasters Are a Warning from Mother Nature.” In this article, after listing the tsunami and a string of other natural disasters, Wang concluded: “Natural disasters are a warning from Mother Nature; they may be the most direct and effective way to warn us.” She said that while measures such as earthquake monitoring systems are important, even more important is “to respect nature in our hearts.” Wang and He’s articles followed closely on one another, indicating that these two representatives of what was to develop into a heated debate were affected by the tsunami and that they approached the question of whether people should fear nature from opposite directions. He Zhuoxiu’s article and Wang Yongchen’s response set off a spirited public discussion on the relationship between humans and nature. Two days after Wang’s article appeared, Fang Zhouzi, head of a California- based website “New Threads” (www.xys.org) stood by He Zuoxiu in his article carried in Beijing News on January 13 under the headline, “Fearing Nature is Anti-Scientiﬁ c.” Fang argued that to respect nature is to fear nature. He pointed to the Chinese expression for “reverence” that is made up of two characters: respect and awe. Fang said that awe is fear, which embodies irrational- ity and ignorance towards nature. Therefore, an attitude that involves holding nature in awe is opposed to science. He further concluded that, “Holding nature in awe and with respect goes not only against science but also humanity.”2 Confronted with such strong words, Wang Yongchen responded. In “Fearing Nature Does Not Conﬂ ict with Our Humanity” carried in Beijing News on January 14, 2005, she repudiated Fang Zhouzi’s argument and restated her view. At this time, a new voice joined the debate on the human-centric side: Ke Nan, a private citizen from Beijing. In “Fearing Nature Puts People into a State of Inaction,” he said that reverence for Nature is a call to “attempt nothing and accomplish nothing” in the face of nature. At the same time, more and more people took a stand in support of the nature-oriented views of Wang Yongchen. Articles by Beijing-based environmentalist Yang Bin (“That Humans Need Not Respect Nature is Nonsense”); Zheng Xi, a private citizen from Beijing (“Placing Science

2 Fang Zhouzi, “Fearing Nature Is Anti-scientifi c,” Beijing News, Jan. 13, 2005. different voices in the debate on “revering nature” 119 on an Altar Is Also Anti-scientifi c”); and the scholar Yao Zhongqiu (“The Golden Mean3 is the Correct Way to Treat Nature”) appeared in the press in short order. Another article, written by a 14-year-old middle school girl who identifi ed herself as Xin’er, captivated public attention. In it she asks, “From elementary school to middle school, from nature study class to biology class, the teachers all taught us that we should hold nature in awe and respect. Why is this common knowledge a subject of debate today?” she asked. She then goes onto drive the point home in more defi nitive terms: I wonder if you adults are so blinded by the pursuit of material gain that you can’t accept such basic knowledge. Or is it because of the fast development of science and technology that people tend to have blind faith in science? Those who do not accept common knowledge are anti-scientifi c, and those who regard science as superstition are anti-scientifi c, too. . . . blind faith in science is not based on science.4 Xin’er’s voice may seem small in the din of the adult debate, but it is signifi cant in that it represents the view held by many middle school students, refl ecting how the younger generation has been taught to view nature since educational reform in China. Those engaged in the debate stood steadfast behind their views, helping to keep the debate alive. Between January 19 and 21, 2005 three articles written by Fang Zhouzi appeared in the popular press: “What Has the Tsunami Taught Us?,” “To Awe, to Respect and to Worship [Nature] Are All Anti-scientifi c” and “Revering Nature Spreads the Idea of A False Connection between Humans and Nature,” which appeared in Beijing News, China Youth News and Beijing Science and Technology News, respectively. In his articles, he again criticized the nature-oriented side and even called their views “superstitious.” On January 21 and 22, two articles appeared from Wang Yongchen: “Is Protecting Nature for Humans Only?” and “Respect for Nature Is an Attitude, Not a Means to an End.” He Zuoxiu’s second article—“When Confronted by Natural Forces, People Should Do Something and Do a Lot”—published on Janu- ary 22, pushed the debate to its height. Dismissing Xin’er’s article as

3 This is a Confucian term advocating impartiality, reconciliation and compromise. 4 Xin’er, “Revering Nature Is Common Knowledge,” Beijing News, Jan. 18, 2005. 120 bao hongmei and liu bing childish talk, he focused his criticism on the views held by Wang Yongchen, Zheng Xi and Yao Zhongqiu. He said that to advocate a reverential attitude toward Nature was “calling on humanity to surrender to Nature” by putting humans into “a state of inaction.” He added: “Faced by nature’s challenges, people must get throw off inaction, do something and do a lot of it. Only in so doing can we safeguard our essential interests.” Soon, the debate aroused more public attention with more and more people participating. Ms. Liao Xiaoyi of Global Village of Beijing and Mr. Liang Congjie of Friends of Nature stepped forward to support the nature-oriented side. Ms. Liao said: “In a time characterized by vanity and the pursuit of material gain, it is both courageous and a blessing to stand steadfast in our awe and respect for nature.”5 Mr. Liang’s article took direct aim at two articles by He Zuoxiu: “People or Nature, Which Should Be Put First?” and “Refuting the View that Man Should Revere Nature.” Liang said: “Let us revere Mother Nature, be modest and cautious rather than over-conﬁ dent or arrogant before Nature. . . . There is no harm in this. How can this be called going against science? On the contrary, this is a truly rational attitude towards science.”6 As the debate escalated, Web sites and netizens, those who participate in on-line communities or forums, got involved. In order to provide a platform for direct exchange between the two sides, www.sina.com invited He Zuoxiu for an online chat with Wang Yongchen on Janu- ary 25. On January 27, Liao Xiaoyi and Xin’er chatted online with netizens. Telephone interviews were arranged between Liao Xiaoyi and Zhao Nanyuan and broadcast over the Internet. Additionally an online poll posing the question “Should We Revere Nature?” attracted many netizens. The cultural channel of www.sina.com counted 2850 participants in the poll as of 18:19 on January 27, 2005. Among them 1279 people, or 45.05% of the total, were for revering nature; 1069 or 37.65% were against; 434 or 15.29% were non-committal; the remaining 57, or 2.01%, expressed no interest in this debate. At almost the same time on January 27, 2005, a poll conducted by the science and technology channel of www.sina.com attracted some

5 Liao Xiaoyi, “What’s Wrong with Revering Nature?” Beijing News, Jan. 24, 2005. 6 Liang Congjie, “Revering Nature Is a Truly Rational Attitude,” Beijing News, Jan. 25, 2005. different voices in the debate on “revering nature” 121

16,663 participants. The results were 12,070 or 73.16% for revering nature; 4,020 or 24.37% against this attitude; 355 or 2.15% were non- committal; and 54 or 0.33% expressed no interest in the question. These polls made the debate more accessible to the public. Later, poll results varied over time, sometimes with the human-oriented side climbing slightly. As scholars and other experts joined the debate, the two camps grew and the discussion continued long after it had climaxed. Even now, the discussion has not come to a complete end, serving as a background for many related debates. On December 1, 2005, a search on the key words (in Chinese) for “respecting nature” on www.baidu.com, a popular Chinese Internet search site, produced 42,100 hits. Using “respecting Mother Nature” as key words produced 178,000 hits. On the same day, using the characters for “respecting Mother Nature” as key words on Google (Chinese version) produced 57,000 hits, while “respecting nature” produced 225,000 hits. From this, we can see that “respecting nature” was a hot topic in the year of 2005.

B. The Two Camps: Human-oriented vs. Nature-oriented The website www.sina.com divided the two camps as follows: On the human-oriented side: He Zuoxiu, Fang Zhouzi, Zhao Nanyuan, Tao Shilong, Ke Nan, Si Manan, and Shui Bo; On the nature-oriented side: Wang Yongchen, Liao Xiaoyi, Liang Congjie, Jiang Gaoming, Lin Da, Tang Xiyang, Su Xiangui, Liu Huajie, Liu Bing, Tian Song, Ai Zhong, Yang Guobin, Liu Jun, Xin Puli, Dang Guoying, Yu Kongjian, Li Baoyuan, Fu Tao, Gu Su, Yang Bing, Ma Jun, Zheng Xi, Liu Hongbo, and Xin’er. Undoubtedly, the list is incomplete. The main force on the nature- oriented side included environmentalists, university professors, ordinary citizens and middle school students. This group was headed by Wang Yongchen of Green Earth Volunteers, Liao Xiaoyi of Global Vil- lage of Beijing and Liang Congjie of Friends of Nature—pioneers in China’s environmental protection movement. This side of the debate also included scholars from various ﬁ elds in the Humanities and Social Sciences. Philosophy of science and history of science and technology scholars were especially well represented; they generally expressed a special interest in humanistic concerns for nature and environmental protection. This group included: Su Guizhen and Liu Huajie, associate professors from the Scientiﬁ c Communication Center at Peking 122 bao hongmei and liu bing

University; Tian Song, associate professor of philosophy and science at Beijing Normal University; and Liu Bin, professor from the Center for Research in Science, Technology and Society at Tsinghua University. Equipped with philosophical theories and academic grounding in natural science, the participation of these scholars gave strong theoretical support to the nature-oriented side of the debate. The human-oriented side included notable academics as well: He Zuoxiu, academician for Chinese Academy of Sciences; Fang Zhouzi, possessor of a PhD in Biology; Zhao Nanyuan, professor of Automa- tion at Tsinghua University; Tao Shilong, popular science writer, Sima Na, expert in popular science; Shui Bo (Zhang Boting), vice-chairman of China Hydropower Engineering Association and Ke Nan, the aforementioned citizen from Beijing. Coming from solid backgrounds in natural science, these individuals believe that humans can transform nature; some are known to believe in scientism. Mention should be made that Professor Ge Jianxiong from Fudan University wrote an article for Beijing News stating that the dignity of human beings should be regarded as most important. Obviously, his argument challenged the nature-oriented view.

C. The Focus of Debate: Are Humans the Center of Nature? During the debate, both sides insisted on their own views. Through the process of debate, though, two related questions came up: 1) Does respecting nature imply that humans do not attempt or accomplish anything in the face of nature; and, 2) Does respect for nature go against science? To sum up the views of the human-oriented side, they hold that humans are the center of the natural system, and that nature and non-human life forms are just tools for humanity to use. Nature—and everything in it besides humans—has no intrinsic value or rights; its value exists in its usefulness to humans. Therefore, any human action that serves the basic interests of human beings need not take into account other species or nature itself. An action that benefi ts humanity may require change in or even destruction of a given ecological environment. They argue that the essence of worship is awe, which is equal to fear. “This attitude runs against using scientifi c methods to understand nature and opposes using and changing nature through scientifi c think- different voices in the debate on “revering nature” 123 ing.”7 Therefore, “worshiping nature” is a slogan that is anti-scientifi c, calling on people to avoid attempting change, and therefore, accom- plishing nothing. They argue that for the benefi t of humanity, people must be active and energetic. Human beings must be able to transform and overcome nature through scientifi c means. They must have confi dence in their abilities to conquer nature and have complete faith in science. In contrast, the nature-oriented side of the debate holds that humans are only one part of nature. Since nature nourishes the human race, the latter should be grateful for this. Human beings should respect the value and rights of all species living on Earth instead of regarding them as mere tools for human beings. These species live on their own terms rather than for the sake of human beings. Further, nature has laws that are independent of human will. Human beings should obey these laws. If humans choose to violate natural laws, they will suffer the consequences. SARS, tsunamis and bird fl u are proof of this point. Therefore, human beings must hold nature in awe and respect. “Rever- ing nature expresses our respect for the root of life and the objective laws of nature,” Liao Xiaoyi said. “With this fundamental view, we can benefi t by avoiding disasters and living with nature in harmony.”8 According to Liao Xiaoyi, regarding nature with awe and respect does not mean doing nothing before nature, or making no effort to use and transform nature. This attitude simply reminds people that as we use and transform nature, we should respect and obey basic natural laws. Reverence has two meanings: respect and awe. “On the basis of respect, human beings are encouraged to make positive efforts to use and transform nature within certain limits. In other words, exploitation and consumption of nature should not be excessive, but moderate or appropriate.”9 Awe requires human beings to obey natural laws rather than violate them. Fearing nature is not opposed to science, but shows respect for its deeper principles. What this view does oppose is blind reliance on science and technology to resolve all problems on the planet. Reverence for nature by no means opposes science and technology.

7 Fang Zhouzi, “Fearing Nature Is Anti-scientiﬁ c,” Beijing News, Jan. 13, 2005. 8 Liao Xiaoyi, “What’s Wrong with Revering Nature?” Beijing News, Jan. 14, 2005. 9 Liao Xiaoyi, “Safeguarding Environmental Justice Is A Citizens’ Duty,” Beijing News, Jan. 27, 2005. 124 bao hongmei and liu bing

II. The Theoretical Question under Debate

A. Respect for Nature: Is It about Fear? During the debate each side had its own interpretation of what “respecting nature” means. The nature-oriented side emphasized the two meanings inherent in the Chinese character for reverence, namely respect and awe. As a species capable of thinking, human beings should be respectful and grateful to Mother Nature. This is the moral bottom line. Awe is not equal to fear. On a deeper level, worshiping nature expresses more of a generous attitude toward nature. Rather than seeking a method by which to control nature, we should try to understand it and obey natural laws. The human-oriented side, however, held that respect for nature is a superstitious ideology that drives people to cultivate blind faith in and fear of nature. Fearing nature puts people into a state of inaction. By lacking conﬁ dence in science and expressing doubts about the abilities of people to change and conquer nature, those who believe in worshiping nature follow a slogan calling for humans to surrender to and be totally accepting of mighty nature. By regarding nature in awe, they are opposed to any human activities that might change and destroy the natural environment. We can clearly see the two sides hold different interpretations of the same concept, and so discord became inevitable. In Chinese the word “reverence” is made up of two characters, “respect” and “awe.” In ancient Chinese, the word was often used to stress “awe” (fear) while in modern Chinese the word is used to stress “respect” (regard, esteem). Of course, the meaning of an expression depends on its context. The nature-oriented side believes that holding nature in reverence is “an overall attitude towards the human-nature relationship, reﬂ ecting man’s grateful feelings towards nature. . . . Having or not having this attitude will result in different views and behaviors regarding nature, and different priorities will be given in handling relevant issues.”10 From the perspective of protecting the environment, maintaining ecological balance, and reaching a harmonious relationship with nature, there is nothing wrong with fearing nature.

10 Su Xiangui, Tian Song, Liu Bing and Liu Huajie, (Revering Nature, Hebei Uni- versity Press, 2005), p. 25. different voices in the debate on “revering nature” 125

The key to understanding the different interpretations of the basic concept lies in the ethical foundations behind each view, and that is where we should place special emphasis in our discussion.

B. Ethical Underpinnings: Controversy over Anthropocentrism Although the debate involved arguments for and against scientism, central to its theme was the relationship between humans and nature. The essence of the debate involves whether to believe in anthropocentrism, the view that regards humans as the central element of the universe. In the main, the nature-oriented side stands opposed to anthropocentrism; the human-oriented side identiﬁ es with anthropocentrism.

1. How to Regard Nature The nature-oriented side believes that nature exists for purposes beyond human benefi t. People should not try to dominate nature by regarding themselves as rulers of all creation. These opinions dovetail with theories upheld by non-anthropocentrists, who take nature as an organic whole composed of human beings and all other creatures. In nature all species are equal; humans are not intrinsically better or worse than other living beings. Therefore, human beings cannot place themselves above other species nor can they override nature. Nature has its own rich inherent value beyond its use to humanity, and this value goes beyond any use-value humans assign to nature. Human beings should abide by the laws of nature, protect its inherent value, acknowledge the rights of all animals, plants, other species and the ecological system, and perform their responsibility and obligation to show esteem for all life and nature. Humankind is a single element in this larger mosaic and should see itself as such. In contrast, the human-oriented side identifi es with anthropocentrism, the belief that nature exists to serve human beings. As a result, humans should be regarded as the focus and measurement of everything. Human benefi t should be the measurement used when evaluating and managing the business of the whole world. Anthropocentrists believe that there is no so-called inherent value of nature other than its value for serving human ends. In order to survive and develop, humans must obtain energy from the environment and struggle for survival against other creatures. Changes in the environment are inevitable and normal. Nature will change by 126 bao hongmei and liu bing itself with or without human interference. Therefore, humankind should try hard to transform nature so that nature can better serve humanity’s existence and development. From this line of thinking, it follows that “harming” nature for human ends is reasonable. The relationship between humans and nature can be lucidly stated: to transform and be transformed, to conquer and be conquered.

2. Understanding Environmental Problems Today The human-oriented side believes in scientism, having stated that environmental problems today cannot be blamed on exploitation of nature, nor the ultimate inability of scientiﬁ c means, but rather on the current limits of science and technology. In other words, it is simply the case that science and technology are not sufﬁ ciently advanced to solve all existing environmental problems. However, this does not mean that humans can never solve these problems or that science and technology are useless. As science and technology advance, all the problems on Earth—including environmental pollution—will be solved one by one. This argument actually contains a hypothesis, namely that the future development of science and technology will be able to solve all environmental problems. In fact, this view is based on faith. The nature-oriented side is convinced that most environmental problems are caused by human exploitation and over-use of nature. This situation has to do with the values of industrial society that regard nature as something to be conquered and as a resource to be used for humans. Therefore, environmental protection is not a technical problem nor is it the business of scientists alone, rather it is a public affair, needing public participation. Science and technology cannot solve all problems. Human beings must trace the root cause of environmental problems and try to change their way of living and their outdated values. In other words, to protect the environment, science, technology, and human love for nature are needed. To sum up, people must establish new values and gain a new outlook on nature based on non-anthropocentrism.

C. The Reason for This Debate in China During 2005 Continual natural disasters made people re-examine the relationship between humans and nature. These disasters seem to come more often and strike with more intensity. Calamities like the ﬂ ood along the Yang- tze River in 1998 that killed some 2,000 people and affected some 240 million people, worsening sandstorms in the north and near deserts, the different voices in the debate on “revering nature” 127

SARS outbreak in 2002 and 2003, and the ongoing bird fl u epidemic all pose great challenges to the very lives and living environment of human beings. In the fi nal analysis, all these disasters have much to do with human activity and an attitude that regards nature as an inex- haustible resource. Human beings take whatever they want from nature. Their over-production, unrestrained consumption and waste exceed the carrying capacity of nature. As a consequence, humans suffer the consequences of their actions. Shocked by natural calamities, human beings must refl ect on what they have done, evaluate their behavior, and readjust their relationship with nature. Following these aforementioned catastrophes—and most of all, the tsunami in the Indian Ocean—people felt compelled to refl ect on the condition of the world. Many persons developed a shared concern for the ecology and nature. Voices criticizing human exploitation of nature without regard to its intrinsic value became clearer and more forceful. Given this, it is no coincidence that in 2005 a heated debate took place on the relationship between humans and nature. In this debate, some media such as the Beijing News and Science Times became actively involved. Their facilitation of the debate raised public awareness about environmental protection and social responsibility in the Chinese media. A long-standing and deep-rooted supremacy regarding scientism has not encouraged thoughtful refl ection on examining these issues. For a long time, our educational system has promoted the idea of the absolute authority of science, including the prevailing validity of scientifi c methods along with a general optimism about science and technology. The term “science” has become synonymous with correct and valid views. Those who consider themselves to have mastered the secrets of science take themselves as the embodiment of science, and even of truth. Ultimately these persons, especially scientists, seek to monopolize authority. Naturally, they were terribly displeased with the nature-oriented view. So after the tsunami took place, they seized the opportunity to “safeguard” the dignity of science and what they deemed the dignity of the humankind. Last, the debate reveals sharply distinct understandings about development. People have long acknowledged the confl ict between environmental protection and the kind of economic growth that pursues quantity and speed. Seeking rapid growth at the expense of the environment is in the long run unsustainable development. Although the term “a scientifi c outlook on development” is widely used in China, 128 bao hongmei and liu bing different interpretations of the term exist; this debate reveals many such differences.

III. Post-Debate: What to Think and What to Do

The debate on a human-centered vs. nature-centered approaches lasted the whole of 2005 without reaching a defi nitive resolution. Even so, the debate is of great signifi cance for its far-reaching infl uence on increasing the awareness of environmental ethics, democratizing policymaking, and bolstering efforts aimed at environmental protection.

A. Call for Environmental Ethics The essence of the human-centered vs. nature-centered debate is the core of environmental ethics. Because introduction of these forward- looking theories in environmental ethics came late to China and public awareness about environmental protection was weak, the public had limited understanding of the function of environmental ethics in modern society. The debate showed that although the general public and numerous environmentalists are enthusiastic about environmental protection, they lack the educational background needed to support their arguments, especially in terms of environmental theory. Their views are expressed mainly as a love for nature and commitment to environmental protection. As for the human-oriented side of the debate, they do not understand and are not willing to understand environmental ethics and thus have no idea of ethics’ signiﬁ cance in underpinning environmental protection attitudes and policies. This shows that it is important and necessary to increase awareness about environmental ethics not only among the general public but also among intellectual elites. In its most recent 100 years, environmental ethics has managed different beliefs from within and criticisms from without. These differences and criticisms do more good than harm to the development and maturity of this new branch of science, especially in China, where awareness of environmental protection is weak. A stable structural system in environmental ethics does not yet exist, and at the same time general understanding of ethics is very limited. So there is still a long way to go before scholars and experts develop deeper understanding of these ethical issues. This debate made it possible to identify the different voices in the debate on “revering nature” 129 weak links in environmental ethics so that the theory will improve and become mature.

B. Promoting Ecological Awareness and Participation Actively publicized by several media agencies, this debate attracted public attention and participation. In some sense, the debate reﬂ ects the public’s ecological and environmental awareness. In China, the government has been the guiding force in making laws, regulations and policies for environmental protection and carrying out large projects to control the ecological environment. As a result, people have believed environmental protection to be the business of the government while the ordinary citizens had nothing to do with it. Since more and more serious environmental problems are threatening the survival and development of every species on the planet, some people with vision have devoted themselves to environmental protection, calling for the public to work together to protect the environment. Yet their voices do not yet have a broad impact on the public. For example, unfair criticisms were leveled at the NGOs involved in assessing the Yuanmingyuan Park Lakebed Anti-seepage Project. This controversy and debate centered on whether or not dams should be built on the Nujiang River. The ensuing dispute started in 2003 and lasted into 2005. But this debate over respecting nature led the public to think about and realize the signiﬁ cance of environmental protection and to participate in environmental activities. We believe that debates like this one will play an important role in raising public ecological awareness and its level of participation in ecological actions.

PART TWO

SPECIAL REPORTS

USING PUBLIC POLICY TO PROMOTE THE CRADLE-TO-CRADLE ECONOMY1

Gui Zhiming

To realize the long-term goal of becoming a cradle-to-cradle economy, China’s scholars and policymakers need to consider the political, economic, societal and cultural implications of this challenge. In 2005, China set the goal of fashioning itself as a cradle-to-cradle economy, and to fulﬁ ll this aim, implemented new public policies. This article will analyze and comment on this process.

I. Establishing a Resource-conserving Society

China’s demand for energy and natural resources has grown dramatically during the recent economic boom. In fact, demand has outstripped supplies, leading to shortages. These shortages have become a prominent impediment to China’s growth. Energy and resource shortfalls exist in

1 The designer Bill McDonough coined the term “cradle-to-cradle” to describe design, and production systems that regenerate and are distinct from the typical life cycle of products, which follows a “cradle-to-grave” model. A key part of the thinking underpinning this system is an attempt to imitate natural systems, which do not produce waste. In fact, in natural systems, “waste = food.” Therefore, outputs from production—fi nal products as well as byproducts—can be absorbed into various production processes. For example, Herman Miller, designer and producer of the Aeron chair, applied its version of cradle-to-cradle design and production called Design for the Environment (DfE) to produce the Mirra chair. 96% of the chair’s components can be recycled. Moreover, the base materials are biodegradable. Another example of these principles at work can be seen in the town of Kalundborg, Denmark, where industrial production of several businesses working in different industries are bound together in a symbiotic web of production, byproducts, and wastes required to keep all of the operations functioning. Cradle-to-cradle economic principles promote zero-waste, closed-loop design and production, and the use of almost completely renewable, reusable, and recyclable components. The offi cial term used by Chinese offi cials and journalists is “circular economy,” but since this terminology is not used in the West, we have opted to use “cradle-to-cradle” which expresses the same concept, but does so using more familiar language. 134 gui zhiming practically every category, including electricity, coal, oil and mineral resources. Since the end of 2003, a shortage of electricity has been widespread. By 2004, 24 of 31 provincial-level entities on the Chinese mainland reported electricity problems. This occurred in spite of double-digit growth in electricity generation for the 40-month period ending November 2005. To a great extent, the shortage of electricity and coal occurred at the same time. By 2004, coal shortages had also impacted transportation. There were shortages of coal, electricity, and oil producing pressures on transportation. The constraints on coal and transportation were caused by the shortage of electricity as half of the coal produced in China is used for generating electricity and half of the freight trains cars were used for transporting coal. The fundamental problem was in electricity supplies: in China, half of the production of coal is earmarked for electricity generation. In 2004, the output of coal amounted to 1.956 billion tons, with 980 million tons designated for use in generating electricity; every day 100,000 freight train cars were in operation with 50,000 used for shipping coal.2 Fortunately, the shortages of electricity and coal eased gradually through the implementation of macro-control measures. Some insiders even went so far as to predict that a surplus of electricity and coal would exist after 2006. China has a vast supply of coal so it can successfully adjust production to catch up to demand. This is not the case with oil, where crude shortages continue to worsen. The pattern of steadily rising demand and shortages contrasts with the cyclical pattern of shortages observed in electricity and coal production and distribution. Since China became a net oil importer in 1993, its dependence on imported oil has increased, reaching 117 million tons3 in 2004, representing 6.31% of the total global oil trade. This works out to 40% of the oil consumed in China; preliminary indications suggest that this share continues to rise. (Note that China’s oil output in 2004 was 175 million tons.) According to OPEC estimates, China’s increasing hunger for oil accounted for 36% of the increase in global oil demands. Given China’s growing energy

2 Speech (September 13, 2005) by Zhang Guobao, Deputy Director, National Devel- opment and Reform Commission at the press conference hosted by the Information Ofﬁ ce of the State Council. 3 A ton of oil equals 71 barrels. promote the cradle-to-cradle economy 135 needs and limited productive capacity, oil shortages will continue well into the future. The scenario in mineral resources makes it even harder to be opti- mistic. China’s demand for mineral resources far outstrips its proven reserves. It is estimated that for the coming 20 years, we will demand 60 million tons of copper, three times our current reserves; the total demand of iron ore will be between 3.6 to 4.2 billion tons in the same period, leading to a shortfall of between 160 million to 180 million tons by 2020. The existing reserves of cooper, lead, zinc, aluminum can only sustain China’s demand for some 10 years and those of iron ore for 30 years.4

A. The Reasons for the Shortage of Resources

1. Inadequate Reserves Through the end of 2004, per capita coal reserves equaled 61% of the global per capita amount, with petroleum equaling 5.1% of the global per capita number. Natural gas consumption per head equaled about 5.8% of the global per capital ﬁ gure. Coal is abundant, but proven reserves are limited, making it difﬁ cult to guarantee output. The facts detailed here portray a grave situation indeed.

2. Ineffi ciency in Resource Utilization Even though China’s resources are becoming more constrained, it still uses these resources ineffi ciently. Energy consumption per unit of output in eight high-energy-consumption industries, including steel production, non-ferrous metal production, power generation, and chemical manufacturing, is 40% higher than levels observed in similar operations in advanced countries. Heat consumption per square meter is 2 to 3 times as much as that in developed countries with similar climates. The rate of industrial water reclamation is 15–25% lower in China; the overall rate of mineral resource recovery is 20%5 lower than in advanced countries. The ineffi ciency of resource utilization further aggravates existing resource constraints.

4 Speech (August 28, 2005) entitled “China’s Economic Development and the Bottleneck of Mineral Resources” at the forum “Strategic Impact Assessments and Sustainable Development.” 5 Keynote speech ( June 25, 2005) by Ma Kai, Director of the National Development and Reform Commission at the China Development Forum 2005. 136 gui zhiming

3. Resource prices are not rationalized In China, various forces cause prices to deviate from market value, causing prices to lose their rationing power over consumption and production. Widely applied price subsidies hold prices below their “actual” value, thus undermining the motivation of individual citizens, government operations at all level, and private establishments to conserve energy. For instance, below-market prices for water result in widespread waste and inefﬁ cient use and distribution of water. Even though the South-to-North Water Diversion Project is underway to alleviate the water shortages in North China, where water remains in painfully short supply, Beijing tap water is used to water plants and lawns.

4. The Enormous Population Clearly, a country of 1.3 billion people faces huge resource pressures; and the scale of all challenges is magniﬁ ed by the enormous population. So even though per capita consumption is fairly low, aggregate consumption is gigantic, placing China at or near the top of many lists regarding economic activity and resource consumption. In 2006, per capita primary energy consumption was 1.08 tons of oil equivalent (TOE, a unit for measuring energy), which stands at 66% of the world’s average level of 1.63 tons of oil equivalent. However, when aggregated, China’s total energy consumption ranked the second in 2004. In electricity, a similar pattern emerges: the per capita installed capacity is only 0.3 kilowatts, one tenth of the American average of 3 kilowatts, but as of 2004 total installed capacity of electricity generating plants also places China second in the world. Therefore, as China develops and modernizes, its energy consumption will be unrivaled in human’s history even if the utilization rate is high.

B. The Government Has Attached Great Importance to Developing a Resource-conserving Society Over time, the tension between social and economic development, and energy and resource constraints will increase. The government, therefore, has begun creating policy to support resource conservation and improvements in productive effi ciency. In July 2005, the State Council promulgated the Notice of the State Council on the Important Work of Establishing a Resource-conserving Society. Besides this, the CPC Central Committee’s Proposal on the Eleventh Five-Year Plan on the National Economy and Social Development (hereinafter referred to as the “Proposal”) ratifi ed by promote the cradle-to-cradle economy 137 the 5th Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the Com- munist Party of China (CPC), takes energy conservation as one of the state’s fundamental policies. Some regions and industries have made great progress in establishing and meeting resource conservation goals. Since 2000, the Ministry of Water Resources has chosen the cities of Zhangye in Gansu Province, Xi’an in Shaanxi Province, and Mianyang in Sichuan Province as the test sites for establishing water-conservation systems and policies. The Ministry of Construction has designated Shenzhen and Xi’an as the pilot cities for integrating solar energy into construction projects and putting energy conservation at the core of building projects. On July 1, 2005, The Design Standard for Energy Effi ciency in Public Buildings, the fi rst set of such guidelines in China’s history, went into effect. Shang- hai announced its Regulations on Energy Conservation, the fi rst local-level energy-conservation regulation in China and established the very fi rst energy conservation monitoring center in China. In Tianjin, the Water Conservation Offi ce has developed water utilization caps as well as a schedule of fi nes for those failing to observe these limits. The Offi ce has also introduced tax incentives designed to encourage recycling of wastewater. In Liaoning Province, building projects that do not meet energy conservation standards will not be approved; priority for approval will be given to those projects that apply advanced energy conservation technologies. Monitors will supervise compliance in electricity, energy and water conservation.6 China’s progress in developing a conservation-minded society is far from satisfactory. The concept of energy conservation has not taken root among governments, enterprises, public service units and citizens. The government sector, certain state institutions, and state-owned enterprises have proven especially resistant since they do not have to pay energy bills out of their own pockets. Therefore, they continue to use energy ineffi ciently. From time to time, the departments concerned issue proclamations claiming to curtail waste, but root causes remain untouched. To gauge progress on this front, the Beijing municipal government conducted a survey on energy consumption covering 48 municipal and district government agencies. The result showed that the

6 Resource-conservation and zero-waste efforts extended to paper recycling efforts as well. According to incomplete statistics, there are at least 33 Party and government organs using recycled paper in Shanghai. 138 gui zhiming per capita energy consumption is 4 times that of Beijing residents; per capita annual water consumption is 3 times that of Beijing residents and per capita electricity consumption is 7 times higher. The per capita annual electricity consumption of these government agencies is 9,402 kilowatt-hrs, almost 19 times7 that of the average user in Beijing. This problem is widespread across China.

C. To Build a Resource-conserving Society, the Following Steps Should Be Taken

1. Introduce Greater Competition into Government and Private Enterprises, Including the Promotion of a Rational Pricing System Moving to a market-based pricing system does not necessarily mean prices will increase. At present, state-owned enterprises still monopolize the production and development of resource-based products. The lack of an effective pricing system means that prices do not reﬂ ect the scarcity of these resources. Within the current system of monopolized state-ownership, enterprises do not have an incentive to reduce costs. Even worse, monopolists hold considerable price-setting power; when they use this power, prices usually go up, shifting beneﬁ ts to monopolists. Because energy, mineral, and water resources are necessities for all intents and purposes, such price hikes should be handled with great caution. Consumers may feel frustrated and unconvinced of the credibility of such price hikes.

2. Resource Property Rights Need to be Clearly Defi ned “Resource property rights” refer to an entire “bundle” or collection of rights and protections granted under the law regarding ownership. The resource property rights under discussion mainly refer to land property rights. Land is the most important scarce resource in China. Although China has a vast total land area, much of it is mountainous or desert-like and unsuited for mass habitation. In spite of this scarcity, land is used ineffi ciently in and around urban areas because land property rights are incomplete and poorly defi ned. At the extreme, the State can expropriate land, overlooking any claims made by farmers

7 Xinhuanet, “Electricity Consumption per day of Civil Servants—19 Times that of the Common Man.” promote the cradle-to-cradle economy 139 or other users. Further, the State enjoys the power to set low pieces at will, allowing for rampant acquisition with only meager compensation for current landholders. Because prices have no basis in market forces, there is no efﬁ ciency to speak of. To move toward a more efﬁ cient allocation of land, especially at the edge of urban centers, a reform of land property rights should be engaged. Such reforms will not only lead to better economic performance, it would offer farmers and other landholders greater protection from government excesses.

3. The Government should take a Leading Role in Promoting Conservation Efforts As noted above, the government plays a guiding role in promoting energy conservation. Consequently, relevant government departments should take the lead in developing rational limits on resource consumption. Additionally, they should adopt new conservation-minded technologies in order to promote diffusion of such technologies to the society at-large. Examples of simple, but very powerful steps can be seen in moves to set air-conditioners at 26 degrees Celsius in the summer;8 increasing the amount of two-sided printing of ofﬁ ce documents; and expanding the amount of paper going into recycling as well as buying post-consumer waste paper for government ofﬁ ces.

4. Conservation Needs to Become a Way of Life China’s rapid economic growth has introduced conspicuous consumption to the country. Even though proﬂ igate use of resources and materials is new to China, it is becoming more common. Continuing on such a course works against China’s long-term best interests. Therefore, this tendency should be set aside before it takes hold more broadly, and in its place, resource conservation needs to be promoted throughout China.

II. Creating an Environmentally friendly Society

Since starting on the path of economic reform in 1979, China’s economy has grown extraordinarily, but at considerable cost to the environment. As a result, China now faces serious environmental challenges.

8 This campaign is described at length in this volume. 140 gui zhiming

Environmental damage has been multifaceted and widespread. By 2006, nearly one-third of China’s territory had been contaminated by acid rain; two-fi fths of its major river systems are categorized as experiencing Level V contamination (with V being the worst of fi ve levels for usable water);9 more than 300 million rural residents have no access to clean drinking water; and one-third of the urban population is routinely exposed to seriously polluted air. According to a 2001 World Bank report, China has 16 of the 20 most polluted cities in the world in terms of air quality. A 2002 report from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) pointed out that every year, due to air pollution, 15 million Chinese citizens were affl icted with bronchial diseases and another 13,000 died of heart diseases. Domestic research institutes found that among the 11 largest cities in China, smoke, dust and fi ne particles have caused 50,000 premature deaths and 400,000 cases of chronic bronchitis. The World Bank estimates that by 2020 diseases caused by burning coal will cost China 390 billion USD, or roughly 13% of projected GDP.10 Organic pollution in three of China’s most important waterways, the Haihe River, Liaohe River and Huaihe River, is estimated to be as bad as that found in the River Thames in the mid-19th century. Growth has proceeded at the expense of the environment, especially in the more industrialized East, where air and water quality have suffered most extensively. In response, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao stated in his “Report on the Work of the Government” that, “Our goal is to provide our people with clean water, fresh air, and a better environment for work and study.”

A. Several Factors Have Led to Environmental Problems The single-minded pursuit of economic growth has caused substantial environmental degradation. To achieve development, China has relied on traditional, industrial-age thinking based around growth- based economic policies. These policies seek to increase output and consumption, even if input costs and costs from “externalities” (such

9 There is a “Below Level V” category that is used to describe water that is completely toxic and lacks industrial or environmental utility. 10 The China Academy of Environmental Planning, the State Environmental Pro- tection Administration (SEPA), “2020: Challenges and Options in China’s Resources and Environment,” Economic Reference, November 6, 2005. promote the cradle-to-cradle economy 141 as emissions) remain high. For many years, China’s national economy has tolerated and even encouraged high input usage as part of its goal of maintaining high rates of economic growth. In practice, some local governments even set specifi c targets of GDP growth while making other policy goals subordinate to output goals. Resource conservation is discouraged within such a decision-making system. Environmental protection is given a low priority since environmental damage is considered an “externality;” that is, something outside of the pricing system and productive decision making processes of the market. The logic of policymakers is simple: money put into production will produce more output, and generally speaking, benefi t; if some of this money is spent on environmental protection, profi ts decrease and growth may decline as well. Clearly, policymakers and administrators will want to avoid the latter outcome. Secondly, current policy neglects human needs, social sustainability, and quality-of-life issues. Environmental quality is intimately related to the health and well-being of the people. Also important is the relationship between environmental stewardship and providing future generations of Chinese a clean and thriving environment. However, fulfi lling these goals will require greater attention to the environment right now. For instance, when confl icts between economic development and environmental protection arise, many government and industrial leaders sacrifi ce the environment, which negatively impacts a large swath of the general public. Without incentives, conditions, and laws in place to support a more humane development policy, many municipalities and localities see no way to remedy environmental problems that seriously damage people’s health. For example, the chemical industrial park in Nanyang Township, Xiaoshan District, Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province contains more than 20 chemical plants that are heavy polluters. Some of them use no pollution control equipment, and dump raw sewage into the Qiantang River and its tributaries. The resulting pollution has triggered strong protests from local residents. Such agitation undermines social stability. However, these protests did get the government of Zhe- jiang Province to issue a decree stating that the polluting enterprises will shut down and relocate by the end of 2007. Finally, lax environmental protection has hastened environmental damage. This is largely due to the underdeveloped legal and institutional systems and mechanism available. For instance, many local environmental protection agencies can use the pollution fi nes they collect to cover their costs. This results in a perverse phenomenon: “in places 142 gui zhiming where there are many polluting enterprises, environmental protection administrations are better off, whereas in places where more polluting enterprises are shut down, local environmental protection administrations have diffi culty in even paying their employees.”11 It makes regulators dependent on polluters, which undermines their willingness to aggressively constrain polluting activities. Unsurprisingly, some local environmental protection administrators go so far as to disobey directives from above or to avoid carrying out measurements and tests needed to detect violations of pollution standards. For instance, a September 2005 episode of CCTV’s program Focus exposed the pollution violations of Dongfang Gold and Lead Company in Jiaozuo, Henan Province. The company’s violations were so serious that the majority of local children had to attend school outside of the area. The locals began to agitate for change. What is surprising in this case is that the local regulator, the Jiaozuo Environmental Protection Bureau, approved the location for a company engaged in a process with such signifi cant environmental impacts. The bureau later responded to criticism from locals by declar- ing that it made this decision because of a “lack of experience and limited capability.” In effect, the city environmental protection bureau is in dereliction of its duties. In the foreseeable future, China will continue to industrialize and urbanize, which will exert further pressures on the environment. Since the central government put forward the goal of building an environmentally friendly society, people from all walks of life have shown great interest on the subject, and some governmental agencies have also taken steps to reach the goal. This goal has been incorporated into the “eleventh fi ve-year plans” of many local governments. Compared to resource conservation, however, the environmentally friendly society has not been given enough attention. This is because the acute shortage in resources has hindered economic and social development. Thus, in the eyes of many local regulators, environmental problems pose a lesser threat and therefore could be tackled later. Empty slogans claiming “Green Mountain, Clean Water” or “Beautiful Sea and Blue Sky” will not solve the problem. The governments, rather than environmental regulators and scholars, are the key to promote an environmentally

11 Xinhuanet, “A Perverse Phenomenon: The More Polluted, the More Well Off Local Environmental Protection Administrations Become,” July 11, 2005. http://news. xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2005–07/11/content_3203590.htm. promote the cradle-to-cradle economy 143 friendly society. Despite improvements in the environment in some areas, the overall situation is still getting worse. To push forward the creation of an environmentally friendly society, the following steps are indispensable: First, performance evaluations of administrators and offi cials must include an assessment of their effectiveness in developing and enforcing environmental protection policies. This step has been taken as of December 2005, when the State Council approved the Decision on Implementing the Scientifi c Outlook of Development and Strengthening Environmental Protection (referred to as the “Decision” below). This document states that performance in environmental protection will be an important component in performance evaluations of local governments, leaders, and offi cials. Such performance reports will be announced to the public regularly. This step can have great signifi cance in moving China toward developing a system of environmental protection. Secondly, public participation must be encouraged. After all, who feels the effects of environmental changes more directly than the public? Given the close linkage between environmental quality, health and quality of life, who else would defend the environment as staunchly? Government and its agencies have mixed motives that restrain them from vigorously carrying out local environmental protection, but common people, feeling the effects of environmental damage (as well as improvements), have a genuine vested interest in environmental quality. Moreover, the people often are the fi rst to know of environmental changes; given the number of rivers and streams to test, and the vastness of air to measure, government simply lacks the resources to exhaustively survey the sources, types, and extent of environmental pollution. A case in point is the treatment of the polluted Huaihe River. This river has suffered serious pollution for over ten years, but without any immediate hope for improvement. The Chinese government has attached great importance on clean-up efforts and has allocated large sums to do so. However, the river’s water quality remains largely unchanged, and may be worsening. Worse still, the top-down approach has squeezed out local activism. In such an environment, the prospects for the Huaihe River are not bright. Therefore, the most effective and effi cient way to build an environmentally friendly society is to make government monitoring more transparent and encourage the public to participate in environmental management. As a third step, government officials should be held accountable. China is witnessing more and more environmental accidents. 144 gui zhiming

The public’s expectation regarding environmental quality is rising while the environment faces mounting pressures. To avoid environmental accidents, government offi cials, in addition to environmental regulators and polluting enterprises, should bear responsibility for their oversights, negligence, malfeasance, and corruption. The Environmental Protection Law clearly states that “the local government should bear responsibility for the condition of the environment within its jurisdiction.” In addition, the central government has repeatedly stressed that top local offi cials should be responsible for environmental monitoring. When Sichuan Chemical Company, Ltd. leaked wastewater containing high-concentration ammonia and nitrogen into the Tuojiang River, only three offi cials from the local environmental agency were indicted. This is inexcusable. Surely, the environmental protection agencies should be held accountable for such dereliction of duty. As well, top local offi cials should also take some responsibility. Sadly, this is not an isolated incident: the same pattern is found in the aftermath of the Songhua River Toxic Spill.12 Current laws and regulations have not specifi ed the responsibilities local offi cials should take in the event of environmental accidents. In the absence of a sound accountability system, environmental risks will not be given due attention and an environmentally friendly society will just loom as a castle in the air.

III. Developing the Cradle-to-Cradle Economy

The theory of a cradle-to-cradle economy was established in the 1990s. In the last ﬁ ve years or so, top policymaking ofﬁ cials in China have expressed growing interest in the theory. This interest is clearly stated in Some Opinions on Speeding up the Development of a Cradle-to-Cradle Economy,13 a document produced by the State Council in 2005. It is further stressed at the Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixteenth National People’s Congress (NPC) that a cradle-to-cradle, zero-waste, and renewable resource economy is the key to building a resource-conserving and environmentally friendly society as well as achieving long term development. Later, the National Development and Reform Committee,

12 The spill is described in detail in this volume. 13 As mentioned in Footnote 1, the offi cial translation of this title included the term “Circular Economy,” which we have replaced with “Cradle-to-Cradle Economy.” promote the cradle-to-cradle economy 145 the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Commerce and the State Statistics Bureau jointly issued the Notice on the Organization of Cradle-to- Cradle Pilot Programs, which marked the formal launch of national pilot programs to support the development of this economic system. A few years after its introduction, China’s efforts to build a recycling- oriented, renewable resource economy have achieved good results. A notable success is the effective integration of these concepts into the development of an eco-province. Shandong Province has passed the Resolution on the Establishment of the Eco-province, which stipulates that “developing a cradle-to-cradle economy is the core issue in establishing an eco-province.” Of the 32 provincial entities, 14 are implementing or planning to implement the process of becoming eco-provinces. In September 2005, the Third Forum on Building Eco-provinces, which declared the goal of developing a cradle-to-cradle economy and promoting the establishment of eco-provinces, adopted the Declaration for Developing a Cradle-to-Cradle Economy. This Declaration advocates rational and scientifi c development by giving priority to the environment while developing a zero-waste, renewable resource economy. Rapid progress has been made in strengthening the legal system in support of creating a sustainable, zero-waste economy. The government has drafted laws to implement sustainability and renewable resource use, including the Energy Conservation Law, the Law on Promoting Cleaner Production and the Renewable Energy Law. Mao Rubo, Director of the Environment and Resources Committee of the NPC, disclosed that the standing committee of the NPC has decided to draft a law to help promote a cradle-to-cradle economy, which will be submitted for deliberation in 2007.14 In 2004, Guiyang implemented the fi rst local regulation on zero-waste, renewable resource economics—the Regula- tions on the Establishment of an Eco-city within a Cradle-to-Cradle Economy. Shenzhen has initiated legislative changes in this area with the document the Regulation on the Promotion of a Cradle-to-Cradle Economy, which has been chosen as one of the key legislative programs of the year. The draft edition of the regulation has been submitted to the relevant departments for comments.

14 “Cradle-to-Cradle Economics Boosts Legislative Initiatives,” People’s Daily, October 30, 2005. 146 gui zhiming

Provinces that have promoted the cradle-to-cradle economy have experienced remarkable progress. The government of Guizhou, for example, targets resource-intensive industries, such as coal, phosphorus, aluminum, and iron processing, for implementation of zero-waste recycling and renewable resource programs. Within this framework, regulators proposed setting up 14 pilot programs across the province. Shanghai was the ﬁ rst to introduce the Guide on Industrial Efﬁ ciency. It also compiled a new set of 14 indicators for evaluating performance, such as land use, resource consumption, environmental protection goals, level of employment, economic return as well as technological innovativeness. Now the comprehensive utilization rate of industrial waste in Shanghai is as high as 97% and most construction waste is reused. In Guangdong Province, over 800,000 tons of hazardous wastes are recycled every year by the companies with a permit for handling dangerous wastes. One of Guangdong’s midsized cities, Nanhai, has founded the National Demonstration Eco-Industrial Park. This is an industrial park designed to ensure comprehensive environmental protection; within the park a thriving cradle-to-cradle economy exists. 5 billion RMB have been earmarked for a third-generation industrial park on the Pearl River Delta that will serve as a demonstration project of sustainability for the South China region. Other successful projects have been launched throughout China: in Jiangsu Province, the Yangtze River Industrial Park has implemented zero-waste and recycling measures in metallurgical manufacture; soybean production has begun to employ cradle-to-cradle techniques in Changshu; and the information technology complex in Kunshan has successfully implemented sustainable and renewable technologies. In total, more than 27 key projects across agricultural, industrial, and service sectors are now in place. By and large the cradle-to-cradle economy in China is off to a good start, but lags far behind established efforts in some developed countries. Of the three fronts where the system needs to be implemented—individual enterprises, industrial parks and the general society—enterprises have shown the best results, especially in developing clean production, pollution controls and resource recycling. Industrial parks have produced a mixed record. The Shanghai Chemical Industry Park is a notable success. Unfortunately, such outright successes are few and far between. Moreover, many so-called “ecological industrial parks” and “cradle-to-cradle economy parks” offer sizzle but no steak. For instance, numerous experts have pointed out that Baotou Aluminum Industrial promote the cradle-to-cradle economy 147

Park, a so-called “cradle-to-cradle economy pilot project” registered with the State Environmental Protection Administration, employs only traditional production systems that do not employ energy-saving or recycling techniques or technologies. Further, the Park fails to employ any system that could be called “environmentally friendly.”15 Success stories on the social front are even rarer. In solid waste management, only a small fraction of useable material is used for power generation. The majority of such materials simply ends up in landfi lls after garbage collectors have “salvaged” materials that could be easily reused. Some problems are more pressing, especially the need to develop policies and technologies that will produce success in sustainability, recycling, and renewable resource use. First, incentives must be developed to encourage establishments to implement cradle-to-cradle programs. For instance, a coal-fi red power plant may use limestone-gypsum desulphurization to produce gypsum with waste residue, which is a good practice in terms of recycling. However, since China has abundant gypsum resources, few power plants have implemented such procedures, which leads to a vast increase in the amount of solid waste accumulated from production. Successful models such as the graded use of energy, as well as recovery and processing of recycled resources are not mature enough for practical use. Further slowing adoption of such models is a lack of widely available data on resource use. Policymakers do not know what is being used or by whom, and therefore, do not effectively manage resource usage. In view of China’s national conditions, the country needs to focus on the following three areas in developing cradle-to-cradle programs. First, the country should adopt and improve incentives to encourage a complex of cradle-to-cradle processes. Many senior offi cials claim to commit themselves to the adoption of relevant policies, especially those having an impact on taxation and budgets, but such claims only make a difference if they are implemented. As noted above, the business community should take the lead in these efforts, with the government playing the crucial supporting role of providing regulatory guidelines and enforcement. Clearly, for these new concepts to enjoy widespread adoption, they must be profi table. Empty talk does not offer any incentive.

15 Su Yang, “Green Salon: the Truth of China’s Sustainable Economy,” http://env.people. com.cn/GB/35525/3758340.html. 148 gui zhiming

Also, to achieve the greatest impact in the near-term, policymakers should focus adoption and enforcement efforts on resource-intensive and heavy-polluting enterprises. Second, policymakers, regulators and bureaucrats need to support the development of key technologies and processes needed to develop and strengthen cradle-to-cradle processes and systems. Experience from developed countries shows that investment in key technologies boosts such efforts. Therefore, the government should encourage the development and application of energy-saving and energy-substituting technologies such as clean coal, coal bed gas, green lighting, and recycling. Third, key actors need to strengthen regulators’ monitoring and management capabilities. Firstly, we should raise licensing and other environmental standards for companies wishing to enter the market. At the same time, the policy framework must be strengthened by making sensible but tough regulations and to rigorously enforce these measures. A key area of improvement in regulatory action is pushing producers to replace outmoded equipment, technologies, and processes that produce high rates of environmental contamination. Secondly, we should identify resource-intensive and heavy-polluting projects that operate under the guise of “cradle-to-cradle economics.” For instance, coal refuse can be used in electric power generation. However, surveys show that some efforts claiming to employ such processes really do no such thing: so- called “coal-refuse-power-generation” projects in Shanxi Province use little or even no coal refuse in production; instead, they use raw coal directly.16 Such projects use catch-phrases like “waste recycling” or “cradle-to-cradle-oriented” to curry government approval and favor, such as tax reductions, but they offer little beneﬁ t. Such empty slogan- eering must be rigorously discouraged through monitoring, reporting, and enforcement.

IV. Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) on Planning

The environmental impact assessment used for development planning can help to shape economic and environmental policies in a strategic

16 “Be Alert to the Fake ‘Cradle-to-Cradle’ Economy,” China Comment, Nov. 16, 2005. promote the cradle-to-cradle economy 149 way. The strategic aspect of EIAs refers to the predictions and assessments of policies, as well as planning from the perspectives of environmental conditions and resource carrying capacity, with an eye toward reducing environmental pollution and ecological damage at the source. Loosely based on the U.S.’s National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, the strategic EIA has been universally accepted in principle. Countries implementing similar policies have demonstrated the importance of creating policies that support environmental protection and sustainable development. China’s experience also attests to the importance of strategic EIA in implementing sustainable and renewable development policies. In the past, economic policies were often made without considering environmental consequences. This, together with the disconnection between various policies and plans created the conditions to allow environmental problems to arise. For example, by not fully considering the potential negative effects of ring road networks on city transit, environmental conditions, and land use, Beijing has created a system that is often jammed with traffi c. Jammed traffi c leads to greater levels of emissions. The “urban heat island effect” is also exacerbated. Sadly, this condition not only exists in Beijing, but is still being replicated throughout China, with many cities eager to develop secondary and tertiary ring roads. The lack of advance planning has also affected one of China’s best known environmental resources, the Yellow River. For many years, the river has become more polluted despite efforts in pollution treatment. Why? Because no unifi ed plan exists for preventing and controlling pollution in the upper reaches and lower reaches of the river.17 Aggra- vating the lack of planning is the lack of regulatory coherence and harmonization; management of environmental protection extends over a number of agencies. For instance, the bureaucratic tangle can be seen in how water resources are handled: the Environmental Protection Administration monitors pollution discharge from enterprises; the Water Conservation Department regulates water quality and water fl ow; the City Construction Department oversees sewage treating equipment; the Land Resources Department regulates groundwater resources. Because there are so many departments overseeing water resources, and because there is no coordination between them, serious problems can occur

17 This issue, as well as others brought up in this paper, are addressed throughout this volume. 150 gui zhiming without the means to prevent or treat them.18 Only by implementing strategic EIA at the decision-making stage can overall environmental quality improve. The concept is supported by the top leaders of the country. President Hu Jintao, for instance, pointed out at a seminar on population, resources, and the environment in 2004 that, “In making major decisions for development, we must take the environment into account so that the two may go hand-in-hand.” The Law on Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is a milestone in Chi- na’s environmental protection process. It marks the ﬁ rst comprehensive policy document linking strategic EIA to implementation in controlling environmental pollution. Now environmental impact assessments are grounded in the law. Within this document, environmental concerns are linked with development plans so as to promote economic growth while recognizing environmental carrying capacity and quality. Within such a framework, environmental protection and economic growth mutually linked in order to realize a balanced, coordinated, harmonious and scientiﬁ cally sound development policy. In recent years, under the pressure of environmental agencies, EIAs for development plans have improved in two particular ways. First, regulations and technical documents have been issued. The SEPA published Guidelines for EIA Reports and Guidelines for Compiling EIA Articles and Interpretations, identifying the targets of assessments. Relevant technical guidelines are being formulated. At the provincial level, regulations on environmental impact assessment have been issued in Shandong, Shanghai, Hebei, Tianjin, Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, Guangxi, Dalian, Shenzhen and Hangzhou. Second, regulators have implemented EIAs for development plans in key areas and industries. At the state level, the SEPA set up pilot programs for EIAs in Inner Mongolia, Dalian and Wuhan. Guangzhou, Nantong and Beihai are organizing their own assessment systems. The SEPA, alongside other agencies, has conducted EIAs of development plans in the Tarim Basin, the middle and lower reaches of the Lanchang River, the Dadu River in Sichuan, the upper reaches of the Yalong River and the Yuan River basins. The assessments of The Middle and Long Term Plan of the National Railway, the National Ports Construction Plan, the National Expressway Network Plan have also made use of the strategic EIA.

18 “Why Is the Pollution of the Yellow River Getting Worse?” Xinhua News Agency, http://www.h2o-china.com/news/viewnews.asp?id-=32119. promote the cradle-to-cradle economy 151

Various other plans are also under development, notably the petrochemical industry development plan. Assessment in accordance with local conditions has also been completed in Shanghai, Guangdong, Hebei, Sichuan and Liaoning. Another EIA, covering urban light rail plans in Shanghai and Shenyang, is being developed. Environmental impact assessments play a proven, vital role in decision-making that focuses on solving the accumulated, indirect and direct environmental impacts of various projects. For example, the EIA of the Dadu River Hydropower Station has helped save 28,000 mu (about 1,870 hectares) of farmland and two county seats. It also prevented the forced evacuation of 85,000 people. In general, however, China’s EIA on development plans proceeds rather slowly and does not keep up with the rate of development. The effort to keep up with demand has faltered for many reasons. Firstly, not enough attention has been given to the EIA process. Different from the project assessment, both the development plan and the planning impact assessment are made by the government. In reality, some departments and local governments do not give enough attention to the EIA on development plans. This negligence means that relevant laws and regulations are not correctly applied. Secondly, the regulations on EIA on development plans are not complete. Although the regulations on the drafting, approval and review of such assessments have been stipulated in the Law on Environmental Impact Assessment, some points remain unclear—such as the procedure for making the assessment, funding of the assessment, and public participation and the follow-up monitoring of the assessment. Thirdly, the research of assessment techniques is not suffi cient. Since in the implementation of the development plan there are many uncertainties, and the implementation is subject to many unpredictable factors, the assessment methods should be explored. However, China still lacks a competent assessment team, systematic assessment theories, and technical approaches, which could offer a satisfactory solution to matching assessment with various development plans. The EIA on development plans should play an even greater role in economic development. According to the Proposal passed at the Fifth Session of the Sixteenth Central Committee of the CPC, “Local governments shall defi ne the functions of each region in light of the local environmental capacity and development potential. Within each region, development projects should be classifi ed into priority projects, 152 gui zhiming restricted projects and forbidden projects.” The Decision of the State Council requires that: All regions shall defi ne their function and direction of development in light of resources, environmental capacity, ecological conditions, population, state development plans and industrial policies. A balance shall be maintained between the regional economic development plan and the objectives of environmental protection. The EIA on development plans is a sound mechanism for promoting coordinated harmonization between social and economic development and resource conservation and environment considerations. In order to integrate environmental constraints into social and economic development, we have to seize this good opportunity at a time when the whole nation is working on the Eleventh Five-year Plan. Industries and regions shall transform the economic development system by applying EIA for various projects, thus helping to resolve the confl icts and tensions between resource constraints and conservation demands on one hand, and the environment and social and economic development on the other. Strategic EIAs focusing on development plans have begun to come of age. According to the Decision of the State Council, “EIA on all kinds of development plans shall be conducted in accordance with state regulations.” It also stipulates that “any decision that will have a prominent impact on the environment shall be subject to an EIA.” This marks an important step forward in the impact and stature of EIA. The Decision also makes it clear that the environmental agencies “shall be responsible for reviewing the proposals put forward by relevant experts and representatives of the EIA of development plans,” which strengthens the hand of environmental regulators to put pressure on developers to make accommodations to sustainability, conservation, recycling, and environmental protection in support of cradle-to-cradle economics. Even so, the use of the EIA has a long way to go. It is hoped that all environmental protection agencies will live up to the expectations of the public and will promote the wide application of EIA and enforcement of the assessments. To conclude, sustainable development has not been implemented fully in China. Resource and environmental constraints on social and economic development are increasing. Faced with such challenges, we have to stick to the principle of putting people fi rst. This means promote the cradle-to-cradle economy 153 proceeding with a clear plan that balances environmental and economic considerations in the interests of human development, not merely economic growth. As it stands, EIA provides a powerful tool for integrating and balancing these considerations as China moves toward a conservation-minded and environmentally friendly society. Within these assessments, and through the broader regulatory process, the role of the general public must be better defi ned. A crucial part of this is providing the public ready access to information, and a seat at the table with businessmen and policymakers. While the government always has a pivotal role to play regarding environmental concerns, it should do so in a way that engages the general public. Only through massive public participation can the goal of a cradle-to-cradle economy be achieved so as to maximize the public good.

CHINA’S WATER CRISIS

Li Lifeng and Zou Lan

Life originated in water and life is sustained by water. Without water we would have neither civilization nor social development. The management of water resources has always been very important in daily life and for economic development as well. Water shortages would produce more severe consequences in our society than would shortages of energy and food. In spite of this, the need for adequate and secure sources of water has not been as fully recognised as has the need for adequate and secure sources of food and energy. The annual loss caused by water shortages in the industrial and agricultural sectors is estimated to be 350 billion RMB,1 excluding large indirect losses due to excessive exploitation of water resources. According to a report given by the Nanjing Institute of Geology and Mineral Resources, an evaluation of underground water resources and geological hazards in the Yangtze River delta revealed that the direct and indirect losses caused by excessive extraction of underground water reached 315 billion RMB in the delta region alone.2 The economic losses include the damage done to buildings, bridges, and underground pipelines and cables. The water crisis in China has been brought to the attention of nations around the world. RAND Corporation has proclaimed that water shortages and pollution make up one of the eight bottlenecks hindering sustainable economic development in China. Estimates indicate water shortages may decrease economic growth by 1.5% to 1.9%. This impact is greater than the impact of an increase in energy prices or a decrease in foreign investments of a similar magnitude.3

1 Zhang Shuguang, “Comprehensively Responding the Water Crisis,” The Beijing News, May 8, 2004. http://ﬁ nance.sina.com.cn/g/20040508/0833750235.shtml. 2 Wenhui Daily (Shanghai), “The Loss of 300 Billion RMB Due to Land Subsidence in the Yangtze River Delta, Where the Most Harm Was Done to Shanghai,” March 22, 2005. 3 RAND, “China’s Continued Economic Progress: Possible Adversities and Obstacles,” 5th Annual CRF-RAND Conference, Beijing, Oct. 31 to Nov. 1, 2002. 156 li lifeng and zou lan

The water crisis ultimately puts our national security at risk. Ensuring the security of water resources and the quality of aquatic environments has become essential for social and economic development of China. In 2005, China made signiﬁ cant improvements in the management of its water resources. However, the problem remains and has grown even more severe. The nature of the existing water crisis and solutions for that crisis will be described below. This paper will also present an overview of China’s current water policy.

I. Description of the Water Crisis in China

Scientists and environmental experts describe China’s water crisis by using these six categories: ﬂ oods, water shortages, water pollution, soil erosion, wasteful use of water, and the deterioration of aquatic ecosystems.

A. Floods Flood control has always been a great challenge in China. Currently, fl oods have caused China an average annual loss of approximately 10 billion USD. Ever since the big fl oods in 1998, the government has increased fl ood prevention efforts, granting annual investments of over 20 billion RMB. The improvement of fl ood prevention facilities has seen signifi cant results. However, due to other infl uential elements, fl ood damage still increases. The primary cause for this is the lack of proper management. Management is crucial in a country where over 100 million inhabitants reside within areas affected by fl oods. As long as these areas stay highly populated, fl ood control will remain a challenge.4 According to the Offi ce of State Flood Control and Drought Relief Headquarters’ (SFDH) announcement made October 8, 2005, over 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities nationwide (including the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Region) were affected by varying intensities of fl oods that year. 161,707 km2 of the agricultural land was affected, while 82,940 km2 was damaged. 210.66 million Persons were affected as well. 1292 persons were declared dead

4 Hao Wang, “Current Status and Trends of China’s Water Problems and Measures Used to Solve Them,” http://www.thcscc.org/laogong/wh.htm. china’s water crisis 157 and 332 went missing. 221 of the deaths were caused by typhoons. 1085 deaths were caused by mountain ﬂ oods, landslides, and mudslides. 1.22 million houses were destroyed. The direct economic loss was 155.8 billion RMB. Zhejiang, Fujian, Hainan, Guangxi, Sichuan, Anhui, Jiangxi, and Liaoning provinces were the most heavily affected.

B. Water Shortage—the Uneven Distribution of Water and Low Water Resources per Capita China’s total water resources have decreased from 2785.5 billion m3 in 1997 to 2413 billion m3 in 2004. The 2004 per capita amount is approximately 2300 m3, which puts China at 88th in the world. There are currently 18 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities in China below 2000 m3 per capita according to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Division for Sustainable Development. Among these 18 places 10 provide less than the declared minimum of 1000 m3 of water per capita. By international standards, China is a country with a drastic shortage of water. The global water resource per capita is 12,900 m3; China’s is only 25% of this amount. It is 20% of the American average, 14% of the Russian average, and only 2% of the Canadian average. Since the 1990’s, droughts have damaged an average of 266,667 km2 of fertile farmland, which is 2.3 times the land that was damaged in the fl oods of the 1970’s. Irrigated areas today experience a shortfall of approximately 30 billion m3 of water every year. 400 of 668 cities have water shortages—100 cities have severe shortages. This means that over 20 million urbanites have drinking water access diffi culties. The national shortfall is 6 billion m3. At present, approximately 360 million people in China have diffi culty accessing safe drinking water.5 The availability of water in China varies from region to region and from season to season. More water is available in the South than in the North, and more water is available in the East than in the West. Winter and spring bring too little water; summer and fall bring too much water. This means that water shortages in the North are at their worst during winter and spring. The Northeast, the North and

5 MacroChina, “The Challenges to China’s Water Resources and Prescriptions Address- ing These Problems,” http://www.macrochina.com.cn/gov/zlgh/20001027016332. shtml. 158 li lifeng and zou lan the Northwest combine to make up over 60% of China’s land mass but have only 20% of the total available water resources. 54% of the population lives in China’s Yangtze and southern regions where 81% of the country’s water resources are found. China’s northern regions have an average of 995 m3 of water resources available per capita, while the south-western and southern regions have an average of over 3,000 m3 of water resources available per capita (see details presented in Table 1). In 2005, Hainan, Yunnan and Guangxi provinces experienced serious spring droughts, and Inner Mongolia, Liaoning, and Hunan provinces experienced severe summer droughts. In Hainan, Yunnan and Ningxia provinces, 50% of fertile farmlands were affected by drought during spring. This resulted in drinking water access difﬁ culties for over 1 million inhabitants. In most parts of Shanxi province, spring droughts extended into the summer, and up to 68% of harvested crops, cover-

Table 1. China’s Water Resources and Pollution Data (1997–2004) 1997 2004 Trend Total national water resources 2785.5 2413 – billion m3 billion m3 Total national water usage 556.6 554.8 – billion m3 billion m3 Industrial water usage 20.2% 22.2% + Agricultural water usage 70.4% 64.6% – Domestic water usage 9.4% 11.7% + Ecological water usage NA 1.5% National water usage per capita 458 m3 427 m3 – Urban daily water usage per capita 220 liters 212 liters – Rural daily water usage per capita 84 liters 68 liters – (including water usage for livestock) Irrigation water usage per acre 82 m3 75 m3 – Water usage per 10,000 RMB of 726 m3 399 m3 – GDP Water use per 10,000 RMB of 103 m3 196 m3 + additional industrial value Total waste water discharge 58.4 billion 69.3 billion + m3 m3 Industrial waste water discharge 68% Approx. 66% – Domestic waste water discharge 32% Approx. 33% +

Sources: China Water Bulletins 1997 and 2004 china’s water crisis 159 ing 16,987 km2, were affected. Seven districts and cities within Inner Mongolia experienced similar problems. 420,000 km2 of grasslands were damaged, which amounts to 60% of utilized grasslands in the western region. In the entire country, more than 8.2 million people and 7.3 million livestock were temporarily faced with drinking water diffi culties. Although precipitation was evenly distributed throughout the country during the 2005 fl ood season, because the drought season was so long, water fl ow decreased in rivers and regional hydraulic projects’ sluice water. 148 of 454 reservoirs of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region have dried up. Twelve medium sized reservoirs and 378 small reservoirs in Shanxi Province have dried up. This will make it diffi cult to combat shortages in the coming winter and spring dry seasons. Due to efforts made by the government, the impact of losses from these droughts has been effectively alleviated. However, 30,867 km2 of fertile farmland have been damaged by droughts; 9,400 km2 were gravely damaged and 3,107 km2 are no longer farmed. 5.26 million people and 4.63 million livestock sustained temporary drinking water diffi culties. Due to frequent fl ood and drought disasters, the sustainable development of the food supply is threatened.6 Ma Jun, author of China’s Water Crisis, has pointed out that when water sources serving cities have dried out and when general water supplies are at risk, a program of national water diversion begins. Other than diverting the water of the Luan River to Tianjin and the water of the Yellow River to Qingdao and Shanxi, many other water diversion projects are under construction. A short list includes: the Heihe River water diversion to Xi’an; the Erqisi River water diversion to Urumqi in Xinjiang; the Songhua River diversion to Changchun in Jilin; the Yingna River diversion to Dalian in Liaoning; and the Yuecheng water reservoir diversion to Baiyangdian in Hebei. Water diversion projects are not only imperative in northern regions, but also in many southern regions. Examples of the latter are the diversion of Yangtze River water to Taihu Lake in Jiangsu and water diversion projects in central Yunnan. The major national South-to-North Water Diversion Project plans three diversion routes from the upper reaches, middle reaches, and lower reaches of the Yangtze River to the Yellow River, the Huaihe River plains, and the Shandong Peninsula. The entire project has a

6 Hu Yuemin, “The Policy Choice for China’s Food Safety and Its 1.3 Billion Popu- lation,” Kwan Statement, No. 1, 2006. 160 li lifeng and zou lan budget of 486 billion RMB and is slated for completion by 2050. The majority of people trust that this project will solve major water problems. In practice, it will only partly ease the water shortages of major northern cities and industries, while it will do nothing to ease the water shortages in northern rural areas. Large-scale water diversion projects often have negative impacts upon the environment and society. The South-to-North Water Diversion Project, where the Danjiangkou reservoir expansion alone has caused the migration of 300,000 inhabitants, is no exception. If the management of current water supply systems is not improved, large-scale water diversions that can create increased pressure on water supplies will lead to further water overuse, misuse and pollution. Without the improved management of current water supply systems, even more severe water shortages as well as water crises in diversion source areas may be expected in the future. Beijing’s development within the past 50 years clearly demonstrates that the consequences of simply increasing the water supply only reduce the efﬁ ciency of water usage, which aggravates water shortages.7

C. Water Pollution—Increasingly Serious Water Pollution Has Affected the Country’s Development and People’s Lives China’s water pollution is severe, extending from rivers to the coasts and spreading from surface water to groundwater. China has serious river pollution. Almost all rivers in the north have been polluted and southern rivers that pass through cities also become seriously polluted, resulting in heavy contamination of drinking water sources. In March 2005, the Ministry of Water Resources ofﬁ cially declared that 70% of China’s water bodies have been polluted. The Ministry also referred to an estimate from the World Bank that indicated the annual loss due to air and water pollution was equal to 8% of the GDP. Due to environmental pollution, China’s development costs are 7% higher than the world’s average. Pollution trends show that losses caused by water pollution are very signiﬁ cant.8

7 Ma Jun, “China’s Water Crisis—Prescriptions and the Way Out,” Twenty-First Century, 87, No. 2, 2005. 8 Watersite, http://www.waterinfo.com.cn/ywkd-1/guonei/200503110016.htm. china’s water crisis 161

Local pollution within coastal areas has increased. According to “China’s Environmental Outlook, 2004,” results from 246 coastal monitoring stations showed seawater qualities of Level IV, V, or below9 accounting for approximately 35% of the loss of usable sea water. Note that this ﬁ gure represents a 5% increase when compared with the previous year. During 2004, 96 red tides appeared along the coasts, which is 23 times more often than during the previous year. The accumulated areas of red tides have increased by 83% (to 26,630 km2) since 2003. They most often appear on eastern seacoasts.10 According to the monitoring of underground water performed by environmental protection agencies, water under 33% of 118 cities was slightly contaminated while water under 64% was severely contaminated. On December 27, 2005, China News Service reported that 90% of underground water in cities has more or less been polluted by organic and inorganic toxic substances. This is part of a larger trend that shows the occurrence of pollution extending from local to widespread air pollution and from surface to groundwater pollution. Air pollution and surface water pollution are easily detected, whereas the contamination of underground water is harder to identify. Long-term accumulation of contaminants will eventually lead to severe problems that are hard to remediate. Public health will be severely impacted. According to Zhao Zhangyuan, a researcher from the Chinese Research Academy of Environmental Sciences, health problems are increasing among the nation’s urban residents. These include malignant tumours, teratosis, birth defects, and vascular diseases. In general, the water pollution problem in China has become more complicated. Pollution has increased from common contamination to toxic contamination. Point source pollutions coexist with area source pollution. Old pollutants are combined with new pollutants; polluted places continue to absorb new pollution in many cases. In recent years the water pollution situation has further worsened due to the excessive use of fertilizers and pesticides.

9 Water Quality is rated from Level I to Level V, from best to worst. One additional “below Level V” category is uesd for comletely toxic water sources. 10 Although China’s coasts are generally east-facing, the country has a signiﬁ cant amount of coastline that faces in other directions, most notably in Hainan Province and the Nansha Archipelago (a.k.a., the Spratley Islands) in the South China Sea. 162 li lifeng and zou lan

Adding to these problems is the inadequacy of wastewater treatment capacities.11 By the end of 2004, the total municipal wastewater discharge in China reached 35.6 billion m3. Only 45.7% of this wastewater has been treated. 297 out of 661 cities have no wastewater treatment plants at all. More than half of China’s domestic wastewater from cities and almost all domestic wastewater from small towns have not been effectively treated and are directly discharged into rivers, lakes and seas. This not only seriously pollutes surface water, but also contaminates underground water. Other pollution sources affect groundwater and general water quality. In 2004, Zhao Zhangyuan pointed out that China’s municipal solid waste landﬁ lls often have leakage problems, none of which are addressed by national pollution control standards.12 For many years now, the production in industry, especially mining and other kinds of extraction activities, has caused further environmental pollution. Frequent water pollution accidents in 2005 serve as further warnings to us. The Tuojiang River pollution accident in 2004 had not been completely resolved when subsequent pollution accidents occurred the following year, including the Songhua River chemical spill accident, the Beijiang River pollution incident in Guangdong, the Zijiang River pollution accident in Hunan, and the Dianjiang county water pollution accident in Chongqing. These frequent accidents clearly show the intensifying conﬂ ict between China’s economic development and environmental protection. Whether pollution problems can concurrently be resolved while maintaining economic progress is a great challenge for China’s unique approach to development.

D. Murky Waters—Water Loss and Soil Erosion Water loss and soil erosion make for one of China’s most serious environmental problems, and China is among the world’s most affected countries. According to Ping Ejing, Vice Minister of the Ministry of Water Resources, 3,560,000 km2 of land in China was affected by

11 Chou Baoxing, “The Urban Aquatic Environment: Status, Challenges and Pre- scriptions,” in the First International Symposium of the Development Strategy for Urban Water Issues, http://www.csjs.gov.cn/sys/FirstPage_detail.aspx? TabaleName=tmp2&id=2737. 12 Weekend News, “An Investigation of the Current Status of China’s Water Pollu- tion—360 Million People Had Difﬁ culty Accessing Safe Drinking Water,” April 6, 2005. http://news.sina.com.cn.c/2005–04–06/100086303409.shtml. china’s water crisis 163 water loss and soil erosion. This amounts to 37% of the total land area. Over 200,000 km2 of the affected areas need immediate control measures. To enhance treatment effectiveness, emphasis should be put on interweaving water and wind erosion treatment areas.13 Reuters reported that in 2004, an upstream area of 39,500 km2 around the Danjiangkou Reservoir (the source of China’s South-to-North Water Diversion Project’s mid-route project) was affected by water loss and soil erosion. This accounts for approximately 41.5% of the total land in the water resource area. 275,900 km2 of the chernozem14 belt in Northeast China were affected, or 26.8% of the total land in this region. According to the announcement of the Ministry of Water Resources, on the 26 of December, 2005,15 total soil erosion in 2004 reached 1,622 million tons, which is the equivalent of 1 cm of soil across a surface area of 125,000 km2. Of this, 932 million and 491 million tons of soil have respectively eroded away from the Yangtze and the Yellow River drainage areas. The report based on the monitoring of 11 major river drainage areas indicates that areas affected by water loss and soil erosion have expanded signiﬁ cantly. Most provinces and autonomous regions in China experienced varying intensities of water loss and soil erosion, especially in the upper regions of the Yangtze River, the middle reaches of the Yellow River, the Pearl River region, and the chernozem regions in Northeast China. The report has shown that water loss and soil erosion mainly occur on sloping farmlands. Based on standard monitoring, soil losses in these farmlands are mainly caused by hydraulic erosion and gravitational force, which in turn results in the serious degradation of agricultural land and undermines its productive capacity. Finally, the report pointed out that extensive construction activities have caused serious soil erosion. Many infrastructure construction projects are carried out to bolster industrialisation and urbanisation in China. These projects damage the soil and vegetation and generate considerable amounts of soil and solid wastes.

13 “Water Loss and Soil Erosion are Serious in China’s Four Major Regions,” http://www.shec.gov.cn/sjzx/content.jps?n_info_id=470491. 14 Chernozem is a particularly dark, humus-rich soil. 15 These data come from “China’s Water and Soil Conservation Report, 2004.” 164 li lifeng and zou lan

E. Water Wastage China also lags in the effi cient use of water resources. Over 380 billion m3 of water is annually used in China for irrigation purposes. Chinese farmers use an average of 81.3 m3 of water per acre to irrigate their land, whereas the average Israeli farmer uses only 58.3 m3 per acre. China’s water utilization index is 0.43; most countries have indexes ranging from 0.7 to 0.8. The large amount of water wasted within China’s agricultural sector is due to leakage in water canals, evaporation, and fl ood irrigation. The industrial water reuse rate is about 40%; developed countries have average rates of 75% to 85%.16 As shown in Table 2, water resource utilization effi ciency is the low- est in China’s western regions, although its water supplies are below the nation’s average. Regions where great waste exists also face serious water shortages. According to Xinghua Online on June 7, 2005, China’s municipal water supply pipeline network lost approximately 20% of its water through leaks. This resulted in 10 billion m3 of annual water losses in China, which is about 25% of the South-to-North Water Diversion Project’s mid-route project’s capacity. The average GDP achieved by one m3 of water usage is only 20% of the world average because of China’s low water utilization effi ciency. Given such ineffi ciencies, and the country’s low per capita water allotment, sustaining rapid economic development will be diffi cult.

Table 2. 2004 Water Consumption in Eastern, Central and Western Regions (in m3) East Central West Water use per capita 436 371 487 Water use per 10,000 RMB of GDP 221 392 645 Water use per 10,000 RMB of 135 240 241 additional industrial value Irrigation water use per acre 69 63 97

Sources: China Water Bulletins 1997 and 2004

16 The Ministry of Water Resources, “China’s Aqueous Environmental Problems and Prescriptions,” Water Brieﬁ ngs Nos. 21–23, 2003, http://www.mwr.gov.cn/zwxx/ 20030305/1183.asp. china’s water crisis 165

Chou Baojiu, Vice Minister of the Ministry of Construction,17 indicated that cities could save water. China’s water use per 10,000 RMB of additional industrial value is currently 5 to 10 times greater than that of developed countries. Water leakages in the municipal water supply pipeline networks are 3 times greater than those of developed countries. Pouring more water into a bucket that leaks makes no sense. Non-conventional water sources such as reused water, rainwater, seawater, and brackish water need to be utilized more. The reuse of water is not encouraged and those reuse facilities that do exist are not properly set up. Too much water is used for industrial and domestic purposes, and too much of it is wasted. Used water is often polluted, and little of it is reused or reclaimed. The government has made few policies regarding proper water usage. For the most part, policies and plans are out of date. Unfortunately, existing policies have not been properly implemented. Overall water usage should be made more efﬁ cient. No amount of water diversion will save a system that continues to waste water.18

F. Aquatic Ecosystems—Decreasing Biodiversity and the Deterioration of Ecosystems The improper use of water resources—brought about by a combination of heavy tapping of surface and underground water sources and dumping of industrial and domestic water pollution—have put immense pressure upon aquatic ecosystems. Scientists suggest that 30% to 40% of water in a drainage area can be diverted without serious damage to aquatic life. Most of China’s river drainage areas have more than exceeded that limit. Drainage ﬁ gures from three large rivers illustrate this point: 60% for the Huaihe River, 62% for the Yellow River, and 65% for the Liaohe River.19 Due to the excessive diversion of water, fresh water aquatic populations are declining more rapidly in China than anywhere else in the world. The Yangtze River’s endangered species,

17 Chou Baoxing, “The Urban Aquatic Environment: Status, Challenges and Pre- scriptions,” in the First International Symposium of the Development Strategy for Urban Water Issues, http://www.csjs.gov.cn/sys/FirstPage_detail.aspx?TabaleName=tmp2&id=2737. 18 Yang Dongping, “Saving Water is Better Than Water Diversion,” China Youth Daily, Oct. 17, 2000. 19 Hu Angang and Wang Yahua, China’s National Conditions and Development, (Tsinghua University Press, 2005). 166 li lifeng and zou lan such as the Chinese river dolphin, fi nless porpoise, reeves shad, Chinese sucker and silver fi sh, have signifi cantly decreased in number. Improper development has seriously damaged aquatic systems. Hydraulic projects have played a particularly disruptive role in affecting riparian ecology. These and other forces that disturb river systems reduce the capacity of natural systems to renew and decontaminate themselves. This, in turn, affects reproductive cycles of aquatic species. According to the Ministry of Construction, urban ecosystems face serious challenges.20 In most urban areas, pollution has overwhelmed the capacity of natural systems to renew themselves. Pollution has reduced overall numbers of animals living China’s lakes, rivers, and seas; many species are even faced with extinction, largely due to deterioration of aquatic ecosystems. Pollution has also produced outbreaks of blue algae blooms, which further erodes water quality and depletes resources needed to sustain biodiversity. What fi sh remain in the water are so contaminated that they cannot be safely consumed by humans. This dire situation has been made worse by another consequence of rapid urbanization—the signifi cant reduction of natural surface water. In the past twenty years, 170 km2 of water surface have disappeared in Shanghai alone. This accounts for more than 25% of the total natural and man-made surface water in the area. Unfortunately local governments have chosen to embrace development fi rst and to solve pollution problems later. Once aquatic ecosystems are damaged by urbanization, repairing these systems becomes enor- mously expensive. Pollutants are absorbed by the soil and diffused into underground water, which is not easily or quickly decontaminated. Being at the top of the food chain, humans face the greatest danger when plants and animals accumulate toxic substances from polluted aquatic ecosystems. Thirty years ago, many industrial European countries and the United States experienced severe lake and river pollution due to industrialization. Although corrective measures have been taken, river bottom mud is still contaminated and aquatic life is still inedible due to accumulated toxic substances that exceed the recommended limits. In summary, water shortages and water pollution are more severe than fl ood disasters. Waste water discharge will gradually increase because of

20 Chou Baoxing, “The Urban Aquatic Environment: Status, Challenges and Pre- scriptions,” in the First International Symposium of the Development Strategy for Urban Water Issues, http://www.csjs.gov.cn/sys/FirstPage_detail.aspx?TabaleName=tmp2&id=2737. china’s water crisis 167 rapid industrialization, urbanization, population growth, and improvements in living standards. In general, the deterioration of the aquatic environment is not yet completely under control. Solutions have not kept pace with increased pollution. Worse still, pollution burdens have far exceeded the aquatic environment’s capacity for self-recovery. Water shortages are increasing by the day, and shortages of water coexist with shortages of quality water. These conditions endanger public health. The possibility of sustainable development for China’s society and economy has become a more distant dream.

II. Great Progress in Water Resource Protection in 2005

A. Clean Drinking Water Becomes a National Development Goal The No. 1 Circular of 2005 issued by the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) Central Committee clearly demands that the government should “pay close attention to the security of rural drinking water and solve the problems of drinking water security in the regions with high ﬂ uoride water, high arsenic water, bitter and salty water, schistosomiasis, etc.”21 Improving the quality of drinking water has been designated as a high priority of the Chinese Government. In June of 2005 at the Third Session of the Tenth National People’s Congress, Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council, pledged that people would, “Have clean water, fresh air and a better environment in which to live and work.” Since then, in order to achieve the goal, from the central government to local authorities, relevant departments have actively launched publicity campaigns to focus people’s attention on the quality of drinking water and on water resource protection. In 2005, on World Water Day and during China Water Week, it was declared that “Safe Drinking Water Ensures the Health of Humans and Nature.” Wang Shucheng, Minister of Water Resources, emphasized, while being interviewed by a Xinhua News Agency reporter on March 21,22 that in China over 300 million people in rural areas do not have reliable access to safe drinking water. The Ministry promised to strengthen the

21 “Water Pollution Challenges China; Expecting Water to Be Clear,” http://env. people.com.cn/GB/1073/3258905.html. 22 Xinhuanet, http://news.163.com/05/0321/20/1FD6F6JU0001124T.html (accessed March 21, 2005). 168 li lifeng and zou lan control of pollution in urban and rural areas, and to make, “Safeguarding drinking water and ensuring human and nature’s vitality” the top priority of water resources protection. In March, the State Council deliberated and approved in principle the “Annual Plan for Building Emergency Water Supply Projects in 2005–2006”, in order to tackle the problem of the drinking water safety for more than 20 million people in rural areas.23 According to the plan, the Ministry of Water Resources initiated a survey to determine the quality of drinking water. The plan also called for the creation of a “Master Plan for Rural Drinking Water Safety” and a “Master Plan for Urban Drinking Water Safety” in 2005. Efforts had also been set in motion for the construction of rural safe drinking water projects and the protection of urban water sources.24 In August, the “National Technological Outline for the Safety and Protection of Urban Drinking Water Sources,” which was drafted by relevant departments under the Ministry of Water Resources, was approved in Beijing . It indicated that the drafting of this plan had been fully implemented.25 Meanwhile, all provinces, cities and autonomous regions separately began to conduct surveys of the current status of drinking water in urban and rural areas, to develop local drinking water safety plans and construction plans, and to take protective actions.

B. Saving Water: the Effective Use of Water Becomes an Important Issue for Sustainable Development In 2005, the Chinese Government put forward the guideline of developing a “cradle-to-cradle economy” by utilizing energy and resources more efﬁ ciently, and by strengthening ecological and environmental protection. According to this guideline a resource-conserving and environmentally-friendly society will be built in China. In May, the National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Science and Technology, jointly with the Ministry of Water Resources, the Ministry of Construction and the Ministry of Agriculture, released

23 See this link for details: http://www.shanghaiwater.gov.cn/admin/wjgl/pop_news. jsp?fi leId=10003965&keyword=news. 24 “The Ministry of Water Resources will take four measures to ensure the security of public drinking water,” http://www.shanghaiwater.gov.cn/admin/wjgl/pop_news. jsp?fi leId=10005046&keyword=news. 25 See this link for details: http://www.cenews.com.cn/news/2005–07–22/47601. php. china’s water crisis 169 the “Policy Outline for China’s Water Conservation Technologies.” It is the fi rst policy-based document which covers the technological guidelines for water conservation in agricultural, industrial, and municipal water uses. The guideline contains 5 chapters with 146 articles, which play a guiding role in the following ways. First, it guides the research on water conservatoin technologies, and the key technological, commercial, and economic forces driving their development and implemetnation. Second, it promotes the popularization and application of mature advanced technologies and techniques for water conservation. Third, it introduces a mechanism for removing obsolete technology, techniques and equipment. Fourth, it offers technical support for areas and industries drafting water conservation plans. Fifth, it offers fundamental technological support for areas and industries imposing water use quotas. This document underscores the fact that water conservation is considered a key in building a conservation-minded society.

C. Maintaining Healthy Rivers Is the New Commitment of the Chinese Water Resources Departments Due to the ecological problems endangering China’s rivers, the Ministry of Water Resources, river basin authorities, research institutions, and people in non-governmental circles gradually recognized the importance of a healthy river ecosystem. Maintaining healthy conditions for rivers should be the goal of water resource management and river basin management. On April 16 and 17, 2005, 27 organizations, including the Ministry of Water Resources, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), the Yangtze River Water Conservancy Commission, and others, assembled in Wuhan for the “First Yangtze Forum,” at which “Protection and Development—the Yangtze River Declaration” was passed. On October 20, over 800 representatives from more than 60 countries and regions and more than 20 international organizations issued a declaration on “Maintiniang the Health of Rivers “ at the 2nd International Yellow River Forum in Zhengzhou.26 Both declarations emphasize that rivers have life; humans and rivers are dependent on each other; and that both are intimately

26 Lin Wei, Chen Siwu, International Yellow River Forum, Henan Channel of Xinhuanet, http://www.yellowriver.gov.cn/lib/gjlt/2005–10–22/jj_105609122889. html (accessed October 22, 2005). 170 li lifeng and zou lan related. The declaration calls for “the human race to live in harmony with rivers.” These declarations go beyond considering river basins as mere geographical spaces; they see river basins as unique economic and anthropogeographical systems. The indivisibility of water resources and the interdependence of the ecology, economy, society, and culture within river basins determine that we should regard each basin as a unit and follow the laws of nature, economics and society in managing its uses and health. Integrated river basin management should embrace both direct management of the geography and ecology of river basins and integrate these efforts with managing the various administrative districts included in river basins. Riparian ecosystems have been seriously disturbed and nearly destroyed by upstream water shortages, river channel accretion, river channel reduction, water fl ow exhaustion, and river pollution. The human race is faced with the harsh reality of maintaining healthy rivers, which will require mankind to live within the bounds of nature. This is a requirement for achieving the sustainable development of human society. In 2005, subsidies and support from the Hong Kong and Shang- hai Banking Corporation (HSBC) and the WWF helped launch the WWF-HSBC Yangtze River Program. This program aimed to rebuild a network of rivers and lakes along the Yangtze River. As part of this program, isolated lakes such as the Swan Sandbar, Zhangdu Lake in Wuhan Province, and Honghu Lake and Baidang Lake in Anqing City, among others, opened their dyke gates seasonally to reconnect with the Yangtze River. This program researched how best to resume the seasonal connection between the isolated lakes and the Yangtze River in order to restore the Yangtze. For example, the Sluice Gate of Zhangdu Lake in Wuhan was kept open from June 15 to July 6. During this period, 17.6 million cubic metres of water, 1662 tons of silt and 5.27 million fry were introduced to Zhangdu Lake, with no oncomelanias (a genus of freshwater snail) fl owing into the lake. Two fi sh species—icefi sh and pseudolaubuca engraulis, a kind of minnow—which had not been seen for years, have been successfully reintroduced into the lake. On August 1, Wang Shucheng, Minister of Water Resources, pointed out at the China Today Forum themed “Ecological Impact of Water Projects,”27 that close attention should be paid to ecological and

27 Li Li, “Wang Shucheng: a harmonious development of water projects within the ecological environment,” Economic Daily, August 2, 2005. china’s water crisis 171 environmental problems in water conservancy construction. A major task of water conservancy was to improve and restore the ecology, and to protect the health of rivers. The ecological impact of water conservancy construction should be discussed in a serious and scientiﬁ c manner within this context. “The CPC’s Proposal on the Eleventh Five-Year Plan on National Economic and Social Development”, passed in October 2005 states: “Orderly development of hydropower should be ensured on the basis of ecological protection.” In comparison, the Tenth Five-year Plan emphasized the “positive development of hydropower.” It will be a remarkable change if the new policy is given due attention and carried out by the water conservancy departments.28

D. New Attempts Managing Water Resources and Water Marketing by Trading Water Rights and Pollution Discharge Rights In 2005, China achieved remarkable progress in how to fully allocate water resources through market mechanisms. On January 6, 2005, the fi rst national “Cross-city Water Rights Transaction Project”—The Yiwu-Dongyang Channel Water Project of Hengjin Reservoir was completed. This project is a fi rst step toward allocating water resources through market mechanisms. On June 1, Fujian Province announced that environmental protection focusing on water resources would be undertaken. A key element of this effort would be developing a compensation mechanism for encouraging conservation and protection projects for the Minjiang River. Therefore, the province created a trial project to lay the groundwork for such an effort. This mechanism would assure that areas benefi ting from the river would provide fi nancial compensation to the builders of water protection projects. As part of the overall protection efforts, environmental protection for water resources has been formally included in offi cials’ performance evaluations.29 At least one other project works on a similar principle. In the area of the Yangtze River delta, often called the “main engine of Chinese economic development,” the trading of pollution discharge rights has

28 Liu Shixin, “The Theme of the Times,” China Youth Daily, November 14, 2005. 29 Li Liang, “Environmental protection of the Minjiang River tries out a compensation mechanism,” China Youth Daily, June 1, 2005. 172 li lifeng and zou lan been used to regulate the balance between economic development and environmental protection.30

E. The Public Plays an Increasingly Prominent Role in Water Resources Protection Because they have common goals, high-polluting industrial enterprises and local governments often collude with each other whenever economic development is in confl ict with controlling water pollution. The local environmental protection agencies have no choice but to associate themselves with the local governments. An effective way of changing this condition is to allow the public to participate in the supervision of local environmental protection agencies, to express opinions through the media, to introduce the public welfare litigation system, and to enable the public to prosecute polluting industrial enterprises and poorly performing environmental protection bureaus.31 Despite all kinds of obstacles and diffi culties, public participation became increasingly prominent in water resources protection in 2005. A number of domestic and international NGOs for environmental protection played a signifi cant role in the Yuanmingyuan Park Lakebed Anti-seepage Incident and in opposing large scale hydropower development. They also made their voices heard at “the First Yangtze Forum” and “The International Yellow River Forum.” In accordance with the reality of China’s environmental protection and the desire of the Chinese government to protect water resources, the sixth “Ford Motor Environmental Protection Award” in 2005 called for “Protecting Water Resources and Creating A Harmonious Life.” 22 awards and nominations were offered to public projects involving water resource conservation in China. At the end of 2005, Friends of Nature and Green Watershed, because of their outstandingly constructive efforts in opposing large scale hydropower development in Southwest China, were honored by being listed in Scientifi c American (Sceintifi c American is an extremely infl uential magazine in which articles by over 100 Nobel Prize winners have been printed).

30 “The quota on sewage discharge can be dealt with by the sewage discharge rights transfer system at work in the Changjiang Delta,” http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/ huanjing/921374.htm. 31 Ma Jun, “China’s Water Crisis: The Countermeasure and Outlet,” 21 Century, No. 2 (2005): 87. china’s water crisis 173

Other organizations honored include the World Health Organization (WHO), the Medical College of Harvard University, and the British Royal Society. The reason for selecting the two Chinese NGOs is that “they represented the national environmental protection conscience and a new force in China’s reform drive.” On November 23, 2005, the “Decision of the State Council on Strengthening Environmental Protection” was passed at the executive meeting of the State Council. This decision makes “encouraging citizen participation” one of its seven focal points, which is a prudent step toward meeting the demands of humans and nature. To realize this objective, relevant departments need to make improvements in two ways: encouraging the establishment of NGOs for environmental protection and promoting public participation in legislation, law enforcement, and supervision.

III. Countermeasures for Dealing with the Future Water Crisis in China

During 2005, although China made great progress in the ﬁ eld of water conservation, water ecological protection and relevant policymaking, basic problems remained. To properly respond to the water crisis, strategy needs to be changed. Rather than simply providing money for projects, hydraulic departments should focus on improving public service.32 In order to solve China’s water crisis, breakthroughs should be made in some key ﬁ elds as follows:

A. Formulating a Coordinated and Uniﬁ ed Legal Framework and System of Laws and Regulations Concerning Water Issues Under the present legislative system of China, various departments have left obvious marks on current laws. Currently there are plenty of relevant laws and regulations concerning water issues. Examples include the Water Law of the PRC, the Law on the Prevention and Treatment of Water Pollution, the Law on Water and Soil Conservation, the Flood Con- trol Law of the PRC, the Fishery Law, the Law on Environmental Protection,

32 Hu An’gang, Wang Yahua, “Public Policies on Water Resources Allocation in the Transformation Period: Quasi-market and Political Democratic Consultation,” China Soft Science, no. 5 (2000). 174 li lifeng and zou lan and so forth. However, the existing legal system has diffi culty in playing its role because the relationships between laws are undefi ned and coordination is diffi cult. As a result, confusion exists concerning the functions of administrative departments, and their relevant powers either overlap or fail to cover many relevant points. There is a division of labor but no cooperation. Consequently, because of competition between governmental departments, the health needs of people and long-term water quality interests are neglected. In 2005, the Ministry of Water Resources and the State Environmental Protection Admin- istration had different opinions about how much pollution to allow in the Huaihe River basin. This demonstrates the need for a coordinated effort to resolve legal and administrative ambiguities. In addition, there are obvious gaps in laws and regulations concerning water issues in China. First, the current laws are mainly about water quality protection while there are no specifi c laws and regulations dealing with water quantity protection, or water ecosystem protection and restoration. Secondly, there are only regulations laid down by the Min- istry of Water Resources concerning the supervision and management of waste water outlets; on this point, the “Water Function Divisional Management Measure” is just a normative document. Thirdly, regarding the protection of drinking water sources, the measure in effect is still the “Management Regulations for the Prevention and Control of Pollution in Drinking Water Source Areas” jointly issued in 1989 by the fi ve ministries and commissions; namely the State Environmental Protection Administration, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Construction, the Ministry of Water Resources and the Geology and Mineral Resources Prospecting and Development Bureau.33 However, no new laws and regulations have been made so far to refl ect the new situation and the new problems regarding China’s drinking water that have emerged since the 1990s. Finally, how the river basin administrations exercise their power to protect water resources is a main weak point. No clear law defi nes how the river basin management and the administration district management agencies and departments divide their duties. In order to solve China’s water problems in a systematic way, it is necessary to formulate a coordinated and unifi ed legal framework and

33 See this link for details: http://www.zhb.gov.cn/eic/649647549078044672/200 30514/1038216.shtml. china’s water crisis 175 a system of laws and regulations concerning water issues. It is particularly important to deﬁ ne the duties of different departments in order to emphasize the need for coordination and cooperation in water resource and water quality management. Meanwhile, we need to make laws more scientiﬁ c and practical, while encouraging public participation and supervision in the course of legislating and enforcing laws.34

B. River Basin Administrations Should Act as Spokesmen for Rivers While the structure of the legal system concerning water issues is being strengthened, the management system of water resources should be improved as well. For example, according to the Water Law, the Law on Environmental Protection, the Law on the Prevention and Treatment of Water Pollution, and the “three corrections” scheme of the State Council,35 the water resources bureaus or river basin administrations should undertake responsibilities for water resources protection. In particular, when the government provides water fl ow protection, the environmentally sustainable fl ow of rivers and total amount of water in lakes and reservoirs should be guaranteed. When the government provides water quality protection, water function divisions should be defi ned and implemented. Administrative permission should be required when installing pollution discharge outlets. The pollution carrying capacity of waters should be monitored. Measures of pollution discharge should be publicly proposed and water quality should be monitored to make sure that establishments meet stated standards. The key objective of the water resources management system is to change the present situation. Currently administration over the system lacks effective coordinated mechanisms across departments and across jurisdictional and geographical areas. This problem must be addressed. As well, water resource managers need to establish new water resources administrations as the voice speaking on behalf of the rivers. Presently, water resources sectors are mainly in charge of water sources such as rivers, lakes, reservoirs, rural irrigation works, fl ood

34 Wang Canfa, “On the Issue and Countermeasures for the Legislation on Water Resources,” http://www.zhb.gov.cn/eic/649647549078044672/20030514/1038216. shtml; “The Management of China’s Cross-administrative areas,” Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims at the China University of Political Science and Law, http://www.clapv.org/new/cate.php?catename=ktyj. 35 The Three Corrections are functional correction, procedural correction and organizational correction. 176 li lifeng and zou lan control, drought relief and so on. Construction sectors are responsible for urban water supply, drainage and urban underground water, while underground water outside of cities is under the management of the Geology and Mineral Resources Prospecting and Development Bureau which is under the leadership of state land and resources authorities. Urban pollution discharge is monitored by environmental protection sectors. Fishery authorities under the Ministry of Agriculture are in charge of aquatic life protection. Wetlands closely related to water resources are under the care of forestry sectors. Inland shipping is under the charge of communications sectors. Health authorities are responsible for establishing the standards of drinking water safety. Large-scale hydropower projects are under the charge of the State Electricity Regulatory Commission and the State-owned Assets Supervi- sion and Administration Commission (responsible for the management of state-run electricity companies). There are public utilities bureaus and municipal administration commissions in some cities participating in the management of urban water supply, drainage and so on. Since there are too many leaders, the result is there is no real leader, and inevitably every department is working in its own way and for its own interests. In order to fundamentally resolve the problem of deteriorating river basin ecology—which is mainly about water—river basin administrations should be given enough legal status under the new framework so that they will be able to legitimately “carry an indisputable duty as spokesmen for the ecology of rivers.”36 Following the new “Master Plan on River Basin Integrated Exploitation,” the planning for the economic development, social development, and resource development in the administrative areas within the river basin should be formulated.

C. Allocating Water Resources Rationally Through a Market Mechanism Is Seen as the Fundamental Solution In 2005, water rights transfers became more commonplace. Each transfer offers valuable information for improving policies and regulations related to deﬁ ning water rights and transfering water rights. Saving water is a fundamental way of solving shortages of water resources in China.

36 Wang Shucheng, “The River Basin Administrations Should Responsibly Act as Spokesmen for Rivers,” in Resources Water Conservancy —the Human Race Harmoniously Accomodates Nature, revised edition ( Beijing: Waterpub, 2005). china’s water crisis 177

Only through economic means, particularly the price mechanism, will an equitable distribution of water rights and water conservation policies and measures be fulﬁ lled.

D. Public Participation Is an Effective Force in Improving the Efﬁ ciency of Water Resource Management With the improvement of laws, systems, institutions, and policies concerning water, it is necessary to fully realize the force of the public in tackling water problems. First of all, public consciousness about water issues should be raised through publicity efforts. With raised awareness, the public will conscientiously obey the laws, and participate in water conservation. Second, major information concerning water issues should be disclosed in time so that the public will be informed about state policies as soon as possible. Third, the public and the media should be encouraged to supervise the government and big water customers. Fourth, the public should be encouraged to participate in signiﬁ cant decision-making on water issues through platforms such as public hearings, consultations, and diaologues.

E. Expected Technical Breakthroughs for Building a Water-Conserving Society The “Policy Outline for China’s Water Saving Technologies,” jointly issued in 2005 by six ministries and commissions, proclaims that by implementing water-saving policies, the goals for 2005–2010 will be achieved. That is, industrial water consumption will “increase by a small margin;” agricultural water consumption will “not increase”, and water consumption per capita in urban areas will gradually decrease.37 In order to achieve these goals, it is neccesary to use water-saving economic measures and at the same time to realize and implement technical breakthroughs so that a water-saving society can be built through cost-effective, practical and efﬁ cient means.

37 Xinhuanet, “ Policy Outline for China’s Water Saving Technologies Was Re- leased for the First Time,” http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2005–05/24/con- tent_2995397.htm (accessed May 24, 2005).

THE SHADOW OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION IN CHINA

Zhang Kejia

Controlling and preventing environmental pollution are the most important elements of China’s environmental protection efforts. These efforts started in the 1970s with efforts to control industrial pollution. There are seven types of environmental pollution in China: pollution of the air, sea, fresh water, and soil, as well as pollution from solid waste, excessive noise, and radiation. Of these problems, air pollution, both types of water pollution and problems arising from increasing volumes of solid waste are the most serious. Besides ongoing pollution, there are emergencies that cause especially heavy pollution, such as the Songhua River toxic spill in 2005.1 These emergencies have great impact upon people’s lives and should be a great concern for us all.

I. The General Picture of Environmental Pollution in China

According to the Report on the State of the Environment in China in 2004 issued by the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), the air quality of the country was basically unchanged in 2004. Although most urban areas maintained the same air quality as in the previous year, pollution in some cities remained serious. Acid rain pollution increased slightly; yet the quality of surface water showed no obvious change. Sea water quality along the shore was basically the same as in the previous year, but the East China Sea and the Bohai Sea were heavily polluted. The urban sound environment was of relatively good quality. Radiation basically stayed within the natural safety level. How- ever, the area of arable land continues to decrease, and there was no obvious improvement in the ecological conditions of the country.

1 The Songhua River toxic spill is covered in detail earlier in this volume. 180 zhang kejia

Disturbingly, the “basically steady” air quality means that the present situation of heavy air pollution shows no sign of improvement. So, “basically steady” means that the situation continues to be poor for many of China’s cities.

A. Air Quality Among the 342 cities monitored by the State Environmental Protection Administration in 2004, only 38.6% of them reached the national air quality speciﬁ cation of Level II—considered healthful air; which is 3.1 percentage points less than the proportion in the previous year. There were 141 cities with air quality at Level III, accounting for 41.2% of the total, an increase of 9.7 percentage points over the previous year. Those with air quality below Level III numbered 69, accounting for 20.2% of the total and 6.6 percentage points down from the previous year. Altogether 60.9% of the monitored population lived in cities with air quality below Level II, showing that the overall air quality of the cities in our country was relatively poor.2 Among the 113 cities targeted for air pollution prevention and control in 2004, 33 of them reached Level II in terms of air quality, accounting for 29.2% of the total. 51 reached Level III, accounting for 45.1%, and 29 were below Level III, accounting for 25.7%. Compared with the previous year, there were four less cities with Level II air quality, and seven less cities with air quality below Level III.

Table 1. Categorizing Chinese Cities by Air Quality, 2000–2004 in % Level I2 Level II Level III Level IV–V 2004 0.0 38.6 41.2 20.2 2003 0.0 41.7 31.5 26.8 2002 0.0 34.1 34.7 31.2 2001 2.9 30.5 33.4 33.2 2000 0.0 36.5 33.1 — Source: Report on the State of the Environment in China in 2004, the State Environmental Protection Administration

2 Level I air is considered “high quality air.” However, it is a rare thing to experience air quality at this level in Chinese cities. the shadow of environmental pollution in china 181

The major pollutants affecting urban air quality are aerial particles, which caused the most serious pollution in cities situated in northwest China, North China, the middle and lower reaches of the Yellow River, and the eastern part of Sichuan Province in southwest China. 53.2% of all the cities attained Level II concentrations of aerial particles (PM10), while the concentration of sulfur dioxide in 74.3% of the cities attained at least Level II. Aerial particles are mainly produced by the exhaust of automobiles, which proved to have become a signiﬁ cant source of urban air pollution.3

B. Fresh Water Quality Among the 412 monitored sections of China’s seven major river systems (i.e. the Liaohe River, the Haihe River, the Huaihe River, the Yellow River, the Songhua River, the Pearl River and the Yangtze River), 41.8% met water quality criteria Levels I–III and 30.3% of them achieved Levels IV–V; 27.9% of them were below Level V. The overall water quality of the seven major bodies of water remained the same as that in the previous year, with the water quality of the Pearl River and the Yangtze River staying relatively good. The conditions of the Liaohe, Huaihe, Yellow and Songhua Rivers were relatively poor and that of the Haihe River even worse.

Table 2. Water Quality of China’s Seven Major Water Bodies, 2000–2004 (%) Levels 1–III Level IV Level V Below Level V 2004 41.8 21.6 8.7 27.9 2003 38.1 23.8 8.4 29.7 2002 29.1 18.9 11.1 40.9 2001 29.5 17.7 8.8 44.0 2000 57.8 21.6 6.9 13.8

Source: Report on the State of the Environment in China in 2004, the State Environmental Protection Administration

3 Although much of the particulate pollution in rural areas is caused by burning coal, internal combustion engines are the main culprit in emitting particulates in cities, mostly because there are so many automobiles in cities. For instance, in Beijing well over 2 million privately owned vehicles share the road with corporate and public vehicles. The reader should also note that natural gas is the preferred fuel for heating purposes in urban areas; natural gas produces less particulate pollution, which further swells the proportion of particulate pollution contributed by cars. 182 zhang kejia

Bodies of water ranked at or above Level III are considered usable for purposes such as swimming, and washing; whereas water falling to Levels IV and V is considered heavily polluted: it should only be used only for industrial and agricultural applications. It should not be handled by humans. Water below Level V totally loses its environmental functions as water. There was a rise in the proportion of monitored sections with water quality at or above Level III and a decrease in water quality at and below Level V, showing that the water quality of the seven major river systems has slightly improved in the recent years. However, overall water quality has still not reached levels attained in 2000. The seven major river systems, ranked from worst-to-best are the Liaohe River, the Haihe River, the Huaihe River, the Yellow River, the Songhua River, the Pearl River and the Yangtze River. All of their major polluted sections were in the urban areas. The problem of eutrophication was serious in major lakes. Among the 27 key lakes monitored in 2004, 7.5% of them achieved Level II quality, 18.5% came in at Level III, 14.8% at Level IV, 22.2% at Level V, and 37.0% fell below Level V. This shows that 59.2% of these lakes had water quality of Level V or worse; that is, 16 of the 27 lakes tested were heavily polluted. Among this group are the Three Lakes—Taihu Lake, Chaohu Lake and Dianchi Lake—which all contained very high levels of phosphorus and nitrogen, probably from agricultural runoff. As the centre of economic activities and domestic life, cities produce a large amount of sewage. What’s more, most cities in China do not have effective sewage treatments systems. In 2004, China’s cities produced 35.5 billion tons of sewage, but only 45.6% was treated. Therefore, China now faces a grim situation: 90% of the waters fl owing through cities are considered polluted. The pollution problem extended to groundwater as well. In 2004, out of 187 cities in China, 39 saw a decrease of aquifer pollution, 52 suffered an aggravation of pollution, and underground water quality of 96 cities remained stable. In addition, nearly two-thirds of China’s cities faced water shortages; one-sixth faced acute shortfalls. Rapid economic and social development has intensifi ed the confl ict between water supply and water demand in China. Nationally, 25% of aquifers have been polluted and 35% of the aquifer sources are sub- standard. In the plains, about 54% of aquifers are below the standard for domestically-used water, and more than half of the urban aquifers have been heavily polluted. Now there are 164 aquifers subjected to the shadow of environmental pollution in china 183 excessive exploitation, covering a total area of 190,000 km2. More than 10 billion cubic meters of water on average are overexploited each year. Ground subsidence and inundation from seawater has become a growing problem: 64,000 km2 of ground has subsided and over 50 cities face serious ground subsidence problems.4 As is shown in the “Survey and Evaluation of Aquifer Resources and Geological Disasters in the Yangtze River Delta Region” made by the Nanjing Institute of Geology and Mineral Resources of China’s Ministry of Land Resources, ground subsidence, resulting from excessive exploitation of aquifers, has caused direct and indirect losses of 315 billion RMB (about 39.4 billion USD) in the Yangtze River Delta. Buildings, roads, bridges and underground pipes and wiring have all been affected.5 Monitoring of wetlands in the Haihe River valley carried out by the Haihe Water Conservation Commission of China’s Ministry of Water Resources shows the effects of water resource overexploitation. Wetlands in the region have shrunk by 80% in the past 50 years; the total area of the major 12 wetlands has decreased from 3,801 square kilometers in the 1950s to 538 square kilometers at present. Now the total water supply in the Haihe River valley is 40.2 billion cubic meters, with 98% of it being exploited. This is more than double the internationally accepted upper limit of 40%.6

C. The Quality of Sea Water According to the “Baseline Status of Marine Environmental Quality of China’s Sea Waters in 2004” issued by the State Oceanic Administra- tion, water pollution worsened in the nation’s seas. Shellﬁ sh in offshore sea areas were partly polluted, and the discharge of land-based pollutants into the sea was serious. The deterioration of the offshore ecological system did not slow down. For example, toxic red tides have cropped up frequently in large areas. The more general picture is equally sobering. The monitoring of 43 key discharge outlets for pollutants in four

4 Yao Runfeng, “Over Half of China’s Cities Face Heavy Aquifer Pollution,” Market News, October 25, 2005. 5 Oriental Morning Post, “Ground Subsidence Causes Losses of Nearly 350 Billion RMB to the Yangtze River Delta,” January 1, 2005. 6 Liu Baosen, “Over Exploitation of Water Resources in Haihe River Valley Shrinks Wetlands,” June 18, 2005, via www.xinhuanet.com. 184 zhang kejia

Table 3. Water Quality in China’s Offshore Sea Areas, 2001–2004 (% of stations reporting) Level I Level II Level III Level IV Level IV, V, –V 2004 11.4 38.2 15.4 11.8 23.2 2003 19.8 30.4 19.8 8.5 21.5 2002 21.3 28.4 14.4 8.9 27.0 2001 13.4 28.0 12.2 11.9 34.5 Source: Reports on the State of the Environment in China, the State Environmental Protec- tion Administration categories shows that about 80% of the seas near such outlets were heavily polluted. The total amount of pollutants dumped into the ocean by the Yellow River, the Yangtze River, the Pearl River and other rivers reached 11.45 million tons, a large increase over the 2003 total. This increase has offered the seas no reprieve and the environment around river outlets remained in serious condition. The sea’s ecological system is in an increasingly precarious position as deterioration continues and even expands. Monitoring of offshore areas shows that 49.6% of sea water areas attained either Level I or II status, which is about the same as in 2003. 15.4% of the stations reported nearby waters at Level III quality, a decline of 4.4% from the previous year. Poor quality—that is, Level IV or below—was recorded at 35.0% of the areas surveyed, a 5% increase over 2003 results.

D. The Discharge of Industrial Pollutants In 2004, a total 22.549 million tons of sulfur dioxide was emitted; 18.914 million tons originated from industrial sources and 3.635 million tons came from domestic sources. A total 10.905 million tons of particulates and 9.048 million tons of industrial dust went into the environment. 8.865 million tons of particulate matter came from industry; 2.085 million tons from households. According to the National Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001–2005) for environmental protection, the total amount of emissions, including that of sulfur dioxide, industrial waste water and domestic waste water, should have been 10% less than that of 2000 by 2005. However, attempts to control sulfur dioxide emissions fell short of that goal: the ﬁ rst three the shadow of environmental pollution in china 185

Table 4. Emissions Pollution in China, 2000–2004 (1,000 tons)

Item Sulfur Dioxide Emission Particular Emission Industrial & source & source Dust

Year Total Industrial Domestic Total Industrial Domestic Total 2004 22,549 83.7% 16.1% 1,095 81.0% 19.0% 9,048 2003 21,587 83.0% 17.0% 1,048.7 80.7% 19.3% 10,210 2002 19,266 81.1% 18.9% 1,012.7 79.4% 20.6% 9,410 2001 19,478 80.4% 19.6% 1,069.8 79.6% 20.4% 9,906 2000 19,951.0 80.8% 19.2% 1,165.4 81.8% 18.2% 1,092

Source: Reports on the State of the Environment in China, the State Environmental Protection Administration years covered by the Plan saw decreases, but many of these gains were wiped out by a substantial increase in emissions during 2003.

E. Solid Waste In 2004, China produced 1.2 billion tons of industrial solid waste, 20.0% more than in the previous year. 680 million tons, or 55.7% of the total, was subject to comprehensive utilization, the same proportion as in the previous year. The country also discharged 17.920 million tons of other forms of waste, 7.7% less than that in the previous year. Additionally, the country produced 9.630 million tons of hazardous waste. The construction of urban environmental infrastructure did not keep pace with waste disposal needs; clearly sustainable development of China’s cities has yet to be attained.

II. New Characteristics of China’s Environmental Pollution

A. Sulfur Dioxide Emission Increased According to China’s Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001–2005) for national environmental protection, by 2005 the emitted amount of sulfur dioxide, dust, ammonia, nitrogen and other major pollutants should have dropped by 10% from 2000 levels. Heavy metals, cyanide and petroleum-related pollutants in industrial waste water should have leveled off, and hazardous wastes should have been safely handled. In areas 186 zhang kejia targeted for acid rain control and sulfur dioxide reductions, sulfur dioxide emission should have dropped 20% below 2000 levels, and the frequency of acid rains should have decreased. However, the task of controlling sulfur dioxide was not completed on time. Emissions climbed to levels 13% higher than in 2000, placing China’s sulfur dioxide emissions at Number 1 in the world. More troubling, the current emissions level is 80% above the atmosphere’s sustainable capacity. One consequence of this is that acid rain falls on one third of the country’s land. In China, 90% of sulfur dioxide emission and 70% of nitrous oxide emission are produced by coal-burning, 50% of which was caused by coal-fi red power plants. Therefore, the key to controlling sulfur dioxide pollution is to control the pollution caused by coal-fi red power plants, which emitted as much as 13 million tons of sulfur dioxide in 2004 and are projected to emit 16 million tons in 2005.7 Experts believe that only when the total amount of sulfur dioxide emissions reaches 14 million tons can the acid rain problem be changed. However, coal-fi red power plants alone have already exceeded this limit. Actually, in 2002 sulfur dioxide emissions in the country dropped by 685,000 tons from the 2000 total. Areas targeted for acid rain control also saw improvements, with total emissions dropping from 13.164 million tons to 11.488 million. This improvement seemed to suggest that fi ve-year reductions would be realized. However, industries like thermal power, metallurgy and foundry work have grown far beyond expectation since. High energy consumption industries have grown by over 10% per year on average and the production of steel and iron has grown by 20% annually. At the same time, energy consumption per unit product in China’s energy-intensive industries is 47% above the rate in the advanced countries. To meet these demands, China has turned to coal. In 2003, China’s total consumed amount of coal rose sharply to 1.58 billion tons, 210 million tons more than it consumed in 2002. This led to an increase of 1.32 million tons in sulfur dioxide emissions in acid rain and sulfur dioxide pollution control areas and an increase of 2.32 million tons for the nation. Although China employed macro-control measures in the second half of 2003 to reign in high- energy consumption industries, total coal consumption still reached 1.96 billion tons in 2004. This led to a new high in sulfur dioxide

7 This article was written based on 2004 data. the shadow of environmental pollution in china 187 emissions, as noted above. China now faces a period of unprecedented sulfur dioxide pollution.8

B. Key Environmental Protection Projects in the Tenth Five-Year Plan Failed to Meet the Deadline In 2005, even with rapid economic growth and the acceleration of urbanization, the overall quality of the environment was generally stable across the country. According to a survey conducted by the All- China Environmental Protection Federation, 71% of the general public thought that the environmental conditions of the city in which they lived have become better over the last ﬁ ve years. This popular assessment is supported by statistical evidence. The average concentration of airborne particles and sulfur dioxide declined. The proportion of cities which met the Level II national air quality standard rose from 35.6% in 2000 to 39.5% in 2004, while those below Level III dropped from 34.4% to 19.6%. Air quality generally improved in large and middle-sized cities. The deterioration of water resources was essentially halted. Areas where surface water met the Level III criteria increased from 32.1% in 2000 to 37.7% in 2004. In the meantime, areas falling to Level V or below dropped from 35.0% to 28.2%. The comprehensive utilization of industrial solid waste has been improved considerably and the disposal of hazardous waste and medical waste received due attention. The supervision of road and regional noise continued to be strengthened. Achievements in ecological protection and construction were attained early in such projects. The security of radioactive material was fundamentally under control. In 2004, the emission of particulates, industrial dust, chemical oxygen demand (COD) in waste water, as well as ammonia and nitrogen fell by 5% to 10% from levels recorded in 2000. It is predicted that by 2005 most of the goals set down in the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001–2005) would be realized. With the emission of industrial pollutants dramatically increasing, the overall pace of pollution abatement lagged. Key emissions goals and environmental protection projects detailed in the Tenth Five-Year Plan

8 Xu Qi, “An Interview with Wang Jinnan, Engineer-General of the Chinese Acad- emy for Environmental Planning,” China Environment Daily, October 28, 2005. 188 zhang kejia failed to meet their deadlines. In spite of this, the State Environmen- tal Protection Administration (SEPA) has publicized progress reports in hopes of grabbing the attention of local governments as well as relevant departments. A detailed examination clarifi es the degree of the problem. Of 279 key sulfur dioxide abatement projects spelled out in the Tenth Five-Year Plan, only 61, or 21.9%, were fi nished by the end of 2003. Another 72 projects, or 25.8%, were under construction. When these are completed, the plan will still be short of the halfway mark. By the end of 2004, of the 2130 projects in the “Key River Valleys Program” listed in the Tenth Five-Year Plan, 851 were fi nished, only 40% of the total. In addition, the four provinces around the Bohai Sea included in the “Bohai Sea Program,” where 265 varied projects were slated for completion, only 134 were completed by July 2005. By the end of 2004, only 94 of the 279 key abatement projects in the “Two Control Areas Program” (i.e. acid rain control areas and sulfur dioxide pollution control areas), were fi nished, or just over 1 in 3. Note that due to suspension or overlapping, 13 projects were cancelled, so the real projected number was 266. Even with this adjustment, generally fewer than half of the programs had been fulfi lled on time.9 Unsurprisingly, the projected reduction in sulfur dioxide emissions, 3.037 million tons per year, fell well short of the mark. Likewise, it is estimated that by the end of 2005, 76%, 55% and 52% of the Tenth Five-Year Plan projects would have been completed in Huaihe River, Haihe River and Liaohe River respectively; 87%, 59% and 52% of projects related to Taihu Lake, Chaohu Lake and Dianchi Lake would be completed. These key environmental protection projects of the Tenth Five-Year Plan failed to meet their deadlines, which led to inadequate improvements of water quality in key control areas.

C. The Bottleneck of Municipal Waste Water Treatment Has to Be Overcome The environmental infrastructure in Chinese cities remains quite vulnerable. Moreover, it lacks the capacity necessary to manage centralized treatment of domestic waste water, domestic solid waste treatment, as

9 Liang Xiaoliang, “Wang Jinnan, Chief Engineer of the SEPA Environmental Plan Academy, Reviewed the Tenth Five-Year Plan of the Chinese Environment,” Economy Daily, October 27, 2005. the shadow of environmental pollution in china 189 well as hazardous waste disposal. According to statistics collected on 500 cities in the Quantitative Check of Chinese Cities’ Comprehensive Environ- mental Control in 2004, the domestic waste water treatment rate averaged 32.33% across the country; 193 cities, around 40% of the total, had waste water treatment rates of zero. The domestic solid waste treatment rate averaged 57.76% across the country, with 160 cities, or around 30%, not treating waste in any way. The average centralized treatment rate of hazardous waste across the country, particularly medical wastes, was 60.44%; 155 cities, or around 30%, failed to implement any treatment of these wastes. For instance, in Jiangsu Province, a place of booming economic growth, problems with waste disposal and treatment were widespread. In 2004, only 32% of domestic waste water in the province received centralized treatment. Large amounts of domestic waste water went directly into bodies of water in these cities, harming water quality of rivers, lakes, and aquifers. These problems are common in many places in Jiangsu Province.10 Alas, needed waste water treatment facilities have not come online, possibly because they cost tens of millions of RMB. However, some cities have turned things around. In recent years, some big cities made environmental improvements by preventing and controlling pollution. Guangzhou is one such city. The city contains 231 rivers and streams; their total length is 913 kilometers. Most of them have become drains and some were even open sewers, some of them containing water rated below Level V. However, since 1999, the municipal government has spent over 6 billion RMB to build four domestic waste water treatment plants, whose overall processing capacity was 1.553 million tons per day. Now the domestic waste water treatment rate has reached 70.16% in downtown Guangzhou. Provincial governments have stepped forward as well. The government in Fujian Province proposed to invest 2.2 billion RMB to build 78 urban domestic waste water treatment plants to increase capacity by 2.39 million tons per day in the coming ﬁ ve years to bring the treatment rate up to 60%. The Jilin provincial government put forward the plan to establish a market mechanism in domestic waste water treatment and to promote industrialization in its development. It is expected that

10 Huang Yong, “The Domestic Waste Water Treatment Rate is only 30% in Jiangsu Province,” Southeast Times, September 20, 2005. 190 zhang kejia by the end of 2010, waste water treatment rates in the province’s cities and towns will have reached 60% on average; the rates in big cities will exceed 70%, midsized cities will meet a minimum rate of 50%, and towns will have to meet a 40% minimum rate. At least 30% of water must be recycled in cities suffering from water shortages.

D. Auto Emissions Aggravate Air Pollutions Pressures Since the 1990s, the emission of major air pollutants has been on the increase. Pollution from industry has made up a substantial portion of this increase. The scale, breadth, and speed of economic growth have driven this process. However, some positive signs have appeared. The release of air pollutants from coal burning powerplants and domestic heating has been curbed, producing a concomitant decrease in sulfur dioxide and particulate emissions. However, auto exhaust emissions continue to grow, and have become a major contributor to air pollution in many cities. Big cities have been especially hard hit, and show the greatest change in the type and sources of urban air pollution. According to recent research, motor vehicles have become the largest single source of air pollution in Chinese cities. Among megalopolises like Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, the emission of auto exhaust already makes up more than 50% of the total of air pollutants.11 Satellite pictures show that Beijing has the worst exhaust pollution in the world. By the end of July 2005 car ownership had exceeded 2.46 million; car ownership grows at the rate of over 14% per year. The projected number of automobiles for Beijing in 2008 is 3.5 million.12 Second to Beijing in terms of auto ownership is the Southern metropolis of Guangzhou, which has 1.7 million automobiles. As a result, exhaust has become the major contributor to pollution in the city’s downtown area. Soot from more than 10,000 restaurants, thousands of construction sites and many factories have further worsened conditions. Dust falls as high as ten tons per square kilometer have

11 Zhejiang Daily, “The Motor Vehicle has Become the Most Important Source of Air Pollution in Chinese Cities,” April 28, 2005. 12 Liu Jing, “Satellite Pictures Show that Exhaust Pollution in Beijing is the Worst in the World,” Workers’ Daily, October 30, 2005. the shadow of environmental pollution in china 191 been recorded in downtown Guangzhou. Blues skies are becoming increasingly rare.13 The European Space Agency said that in the past ten years the pollution from factories, power stations and automobiles rose by about 50% over China’s skies; in the same period pollution held steady or declined throughout the United States. The same could be said of Eastern Europe, which operated under very different conditions over the last ten years.

E. Other Forms of Pollution Inﬂ uence the Quality of Peoples’ Lives At present, the sound environment in China is in relatively good condition. In 2004, among the 238 cities and towns across the country, 84.4% had a healthy sound environment in transportation and 61.9% had a healthy regional sound environment. Nevertheless, there remained 38.1% that were suffering from regional noise pollution and 15.6% that were troubled by transportation-generated noise pollution. Other pollution problems have produced ill effects. The garbage problem continued to bother local governments and residents. The total amount of garbage in Guangzhou is increasing at a rate of 6% annually and the amount of domestic solid waste has reached 4,300 tons per year. Volumes of domestic waste continue to grow in many Chinese cities, often at an increasing rate. This poses a great challenge to all Chinese cities. Indoor pollution was another problem that affected people’s day-today lives. Formaldehyde and sulfur dioxide pollution caused by inte- rior decoration continued to draw public attention in 2005. As such decoration becomes more common, and more elaborate, the effects of pollutants used in their construction will become greater. In many places, environmentally sensitive decoration materials—those which impose relatively light resource demands—were not given much attention. People prefer decorations based on their appearance and price. For instance, many persons replaced walls with luxurious glass. Large sheets of glass for French windows and glass doors have been used more widely. These items are very resource-intensive.

13 Li Song, “Difﬁ culties and Achievements in Guangzhou’s Model Building Efforts,” China Environment Daily, September 22, 2005. 192 zhang kejia

Home and ofﬁ ce interiors have also adopted resource-depleting and unnatural heating, cooling, ventilation and lighting technologies. These not only cut off the relationship between humans and nature, but they consume—and waste—large amounts of energy.

III. Questions and Discussion

A. Economic Growth Could Worsen the Pollution Problem Since the long-running structural tension between competing economic, social, and environmental interests shows no sign of abating, and given the sheer scale of China’s economic boom, conﬂ ict between economic development and environmentalist and conservation interests continually intensiﬁ es. The institutional development, design, and investment supporting environmental protection and conservation have fallen short of stated goals. Considerable room for improvement exists in enforcing environmental protection statutes. Past failures in each of these areas have affected the scheduled completion of overall goals in the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001–2005). Various localities and provinces developed their economies at tremendous environmental and public health costs. As economic expansion took hold, they failed to pay attention to pollution treatment; they did not implement control measures as problems worsened. This neglect resulted in a deterioration of overall environmental conditions. Although some measures have been taken to stem the tide, these efforts could not contend with the momentum of economic growth and pollution migration. Worse yet, some local governments even interfered with the enforcement of environmental standards, covering up illegal and environmentally destructive practices. Through strategies such as “breaking up the whole project into pieces” or “getting administrative approval after a project is already underway,”14 some industrialists and bureaucrats hijacked civil and administrative processes. Because they have been effective in doing so, they have received approval for and

14 Both of these practices are described in the chapter on Beijing neighborhoods taking on power companies in this volume. the shadow of environmental pollution in china 193 built projects that pollute the environment and erode the quality of the ecosystem. Some scholars think that achieving overall pollution reductions in a period of booming economic growth will be diffi cult. This belief extends beyond the recent Chinese boom. This pattern has emerged during the middle and mature periods of industrialized development in many countries. Now these problems have appeared in China. The particular challenge for China lies in the scale and speed at which these problems have appeared. Because these problems are pervasive, the environment no longer has the capacity to support the scale of economic growth as it has been implemented. In the next 15 years, the population in China will reach 1.46 billion and the overall economy will have increased two-fold. If current trends regarding resource consumption and inadequate pollution controls continue through this period, the pollution burden will have become four to fi ve times greater than it is now. Thus, the period of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006–2010), will witness a tense and diffi cult confl ict between environmental protection and economic development. Especially important in maintaining development and improving environmental quality is power generation and petrochemical usage. If the ineffi cient means of power production by thermoelectric power plants cannot be overhauled, total sulfur dioxide emissions from electrical power generation will exceed 20 million tons in fi ve years’ time. In other words, this single industry will exceed the current national total. Worse, this further overtaxes the environmental carrying capacity for absorbing such pollutants.

B. Oversight and Enforcement Are Too Lax The underdevelopment of China’s environmental protection capacity has always been the major obstacle to pollution abatement. By October 2005, only 9% of equipment used for testing conditions by 23 provincial environmental protection departments in the central and western parts of China met acceptable operating standards. Among the 272 municipal environmental protection departments, only 33% of the equipment passed muster. The 3,064 environmental law enforcement organizations across the country own on average 1.4 vehicles and 2.7 kits for evidence collection. Bear in mind that these organizations must oversee 230,000 industrial enterprises—and more than 700,000 194 zhang kejia enterprises of all types—and hundreds of thousands of construction sites. In addition, they also monitor the ecological environment, collecting around 7 billion RMB in pollution emission fees every year, while investigating around 60,000 pollution accidents annually.15 The Chinese government stipulates that a 109-item pollution test needs to be conducted for all potable water sources. However, only 29 items are actually carried out. Additionally, the standard system for testing still has room for improvement. The relationship between social customs and obeying regulations has not been harmonized. These shortcomings affect the accurate and comprehensive measurement and monitoring of standards. For example, the Law for the Prevention and Control of Atmospheric Pollution set up prohibitions regarding emission limits, as well as a system for determining what legal responsibility violators would face. Unfortunately other environmental laws have not addressed these issues, so unsurprisingly, emissions continue to exceed standards. Moreover, environmental management and oversight overlaps at several levels. This structure leads to ineffi ciencies. As well, there are many undefi ned responsibilities and obligations that fall through the cracks between relevant departments and administrative agencies. Orga- nizational functions have not been specifi ed. Effective administrative coordination has not been achieved and agency-wide and interagency control continues to be weak. This leads to diffi culties in coordinating key cross-regional environmental events and actions. Even though there is still a long way to go before management effectiveness is achieved, very little has been done to carry out negotiations between the relevant bodies. Moreover, the gap between agencies and bureaucrats in charge of environmental management and those in charge of economic development continues to be very wide. The structure of environmental law in China is not sound. Noncom- pliance and lax enforcement still exist. Many problems were reported to the SEPA, but they remain unresolved owing to inadequate measures taken by the local environmental protection agencies. Thus secret dumping of waste and emitting of pollutants in excess of standards cannot be stopped.16 Aggravating matters, many local governments interfere in the investigation and enforcement process as a way of protecting

15 Xu Qi, “An Interview with Wang Jinnan, Chief Engineer of SEPA Environment Plan Academy,” China Environment Daily, October 28, 2005. 16 Such violations are, in fact, reported to the SEPA, but often this only happens after-the-fact, which does nothing to improve environmental conditions. the shadow of environmental pollution in china 195 economic interests. As a result, some big polluters easily escape punishment because they are important taxpayers in the community. Fur- thermore, the punishments meted out by environmental protection and oversight bodies were rather weak; proper punishments against violators of environmental protection laws were scarcely implemented. The current Law on Air Pollution Prevention and Control and the Law on Water Pollution Prevention and Control cannot coexist with the current economic development regime. This situation calls for the comprehensive revision of these laws. Environmental protection must become an important means of leverage in macroeconomic regulation immediately; to begin the process of meeting this goal changes in these laws should be accelerated. Punishment for violations needs to be more consistently and severely applied. The current condition, where “violating the law incurs costs while obeying the law incurs high cost,” but be completely changed. The SEPA has proposed improvements in the environmental management system in which environmental protection departments exercise general oversight and management of these issues, while the relevant departments subservient to the SEPA carry out more deﬁ ned and narrowly focused tasks. This should reduce organizational redundancy and strengthen oversight and monitoring functions. Suggested changes also include the creation of regional SEPA agencies and a parallel environmental management mechanism that would supervise state and local operations, as well the environmental protection obligations of individual enterprises.

C. Build a Conservation-minded and Environmentally Conscious Society A new environmental goal is expressed in the Decision of the State Council on Strengthening Environmental Protection: By 2010, the environment in key areas and cities is to be improved and the deterioration of the ecological environment is to be basically curbed. The total amount of major pollutants will be under control and the emission from key industries will go down considerably. Improvements will be realized in several key areas: air quality in key cities, centrally distributed water quality in urban areas, general water quality in rural areas, quality of surface water across the country, and offshore water quality. The excessive exploitation of aquifers and their pollution will slow down. The degeneration of grasslands will be under control and the treatment of soil erosion and ecological restoration will be on the increase. Conditions in mines will be greatly improved. The ecological functions at work in key 196 zhang kejia

ecological and natural reserves will be maintained and the environments in towns and villages will be improved. The security of nuclear materials and radiation should be guaranteed.17 One new perspective for pollution reduction is to improve the effi - ciency of resource utilization. The goal of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006–2010) is to cut down the energy consumption per unit of output by 20% from 2005 levels. The World Energy Outlook 2005, issued by the International Energy Agency, states that goal will be hard to achieve. However, if it can be realized, it means that substantial progress toward meeting energy conservation goals will have been made. Improvements in productive effi ciency further imply that pollution will decrease and that ecological damage will generally be curtailed. Besides aiming for this goal, it is necessary to implement resource conservation steps comprehensively. Doing so will help to promote clean production, and the broader goal of realizing a “cradle-to-cradle” economic system. The benefi ts of doing so are manifold: low investment in various forms of clean-up and environmental enforcement; low resource consumption; and low emissions. Taken together, these factors point toward greater economic effi ciency. Taxes and other disincentives should fall on high consumption, heavy pollution, and ineffi cient production techniques and technologies. Such disincentives can be implemented through price and taxation policies. Such measures can prevent and control pollution from the source and at the same time, help to protect the whole ecology by providing substantive and meaningful treatments for our nation’s pollution crisis.

17 State Environmental Protection Administration Website: http://www.zhb.gov.cn/. POLICY OPTIONS FOR CHINA’S SUSTAINABLE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT

Hu Min and Yang Fuqiang

Preface

In 2005, the last year of the “Tenth Five-Year Plan” period, China’s energy issues became the subject of unprecedented interest because key energy usage trends reversed. In particular, “energy intensity” began to increase after twenty years of declines.1 This change in trends for energy usage and economic growth will place tremendous pressure on China’s macroeconomic goals. The stated goal is to quadruple Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 2020, while only doubling energy consumption. At the end of 2005, China’s national leaders stated the fi rst quantifi able strategic goal on improving energy effi ciency. The Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006–2010) sets an ambitious goal to reduce energy intensity by 20% in 2010 compared with 2005. China’s government offi cials, experts, and consultants related to the energy sector need to work hard to address this core issue in China’s economic and social development. This chapter will fi rst consider the various factors causing the energy crisis in China. Then, based on a review of energy policies implemented in 2005 and international best practices, a number of policy prescriptions will be proposed. These recommendations serve two interrelated ends: to help the nation meet its energy effi ciency goal, and to do so within a broader framework of sustainable development.

I. Challenges to China’s Energy and Environmental Development

Most developing countries see an increase in average as well as total energy consumption as their GDP rises. China, in contrast, took a path

1 The precise defi nition is (Total annual energy consumption in an economy)/ GDP. 198 hu min and yang fuqiang of decoupling energy growth from economic growth. Between 1980 and 2000, China’s GDP increased four-fold while energy use only doubled. Therefore, the energy elasticity coeffi cient was less than 0.5. However, in 2000 the trend changed and the energy elasticity coeffi cient rose above .5 that year. By 2002 the energy coeffi cient was 1.19. By 2003 it reached 1.42, and 2004, 1.60. The coeffi cient’s average over the course of the Tenth Five-Year Plan was 1.24. Energy constraints of energy on economic growth began to have an impact.2

A. The Energy Crisis

1. Severe Energy Supply and Demand Imbalances Energy consumption in China is now growing rapidly. Since 2003, China’s energy consumption growth rate has exceeded its economic growth rate. The average energy consumption increase rate from 2000 to 2004 reached 10.09%. In 2004, the total energy consumption was 1.97 billion tons of coal equivalent (TCE), a 15.3% jump from 2003. Coal consumption reached 1.87 billion tons, an 18.5% hike over 2003; 0.19 billion tons of crude oil were consumed, for an increase of 16.8% over 2003. The economy used 41.5 billion cubic meters of natural gas, an increase of 18.5% from 2003. As well, China imported 120 million tons of crude oil, accounting for 40% of total crude oil consumption in 2004.3 Even with these surges in inputs, the electricity shortage remained. China encountered severe electricity shortages in 2004, with more than 24 provinces experiencing blackouts due to a cumulative 30GW gap between supply and demand. In 2005, with rapid expansion of the energy sector, the situation improved, although electricity demands in ten provinces were not met. This caused severe losses in economic output, producing a loss of GDP of between one and two full percentage points.

2 China Statistics 2001, China Statistics Bureau, China Statistics Publication House, September 2005. 3 China Statistics 2005, China Statistics Bureau, China Statistics Publication House, September 2005. policy options for china’s sustainable energy development 199

2. Dependence on Imported Crude Oil and Energy Safety With economy growth and the improvement of living standards, China demands more and more crude oil. These demands exceed the domestic output. Therefore, crude oil imports have rapidly increased. For instance, 2004 saw a 30.1% increase in oil imports compared with 2003. With imports making up a large and increasing proportion of total oil consumption,4 and with overall oil demand also rising, China’s energy security will be threatened by price fl uctuations in the global market as well as from supply fl uctuations caused by civil and regional confl icts.

3. Environmental Degradation Caused by Energy Consumption Coal production and combustion cause severe environmental pollution, especially of water and air. China now emits more sulfur dioxide

(SO2) than any other nation; its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions rank second among the world’s nations. SO2 emissions actually decline from the late 1990s until 2002, but since 2003 they have been on a steep increase, reaching 22.55 million tons5 in 2004. This far exceeds the target set by the Tenth Five-Year Plan.6 Compounding the problem is a similarly rapid increase in CO2 output in recent years. These and other factors have produced widespread and severe pollution. In fact, sixteen of the twenty most air-polluted cities in the world are located in China. This is not simple a relative measure for comparison; the air quality in these cities is lower than the livable standard set by the World Health Organization.

B. Crucial Causes of the Energy Crisis These problems stem from weaknesses in the structure of national economic development, especially as it regards energy usage. Given these underlying problems, introducing new policies regarding sustainable energy development is justiﬁ ed, if not necessary.

4 Data resource: Energy Statistics 2005, Wang Qingyi, October 2005, http://www. efchina.org/chinese/resources.cfm. 5 Data resource: Wang Qingyi, Energy Statistics 2005, October 2005, http://www. efchina.org/chinese/resources.cfm. 6 China’s 10th Five-Year Plan on Environmental Protection, the State Environmental Protection Bureau. 200 hu min and yang fuqiang

1. Coal makes up the bulk of China’s energy reserves China is one of the few countries in the world whose energy needs depend on coal. Coal consumption makes up 67.7% of China’s energy demands; the global average was 25.5% in 2004. For the more advanced nations in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) the number was lower still: 21.1%. On the other hand, China’s workable per capita of crude oil and coal reserves are lower than the world average. China’s 2004 measures of key energy reserves were 1.77 tons of crude oil,7 1716 square meters of natural gas, 145 tons of coal. These ﬁ gures equal 7%, 6.1% and 94.2%8 of the world average, respectively. Note as well that although China pos- sesses huge coal reserves, it does not have enough high quality coal to meet domestic demand.

2. The Driving Forces Behind the Rapid Energy Consumption Increase: Energy Intensity in Economic Development The developed countries typically experienced increases in energy intensity occurring alongside economic growth. However, energy intensity would eventually decrease as technology and policy improved efﬁ ciencies. Japan’s energy and economic development followed this path. Its energy intensity peaked during the 1960’s and 1970’s. Since, its energy intensity declined and leveled off after reaching a new equilibrium between economic structure and technological development. China saw its GDP surge at an annual average growth rate of 9.7% from 1980 to 2000. In contrast, energy consumption registered an annual average growth rate of only 4.6%.9 The energy elasticity coef- ﬁ cient was merely 0.47. Based on year 2000 prices, China witnessed a small increase in its energy consumption of 1.28 metric TCE in 1980 to 1.45 metric TCE in 2000 for each 10,000 RMB increase in GDP. After this, though, the increase in energy demands to fuel China’s economic growth became more pronounced. After dipping to 1.38 metric TCE in 2001, it climbed to 1.42 in 2002, and 1.50 in 2003, before dropping off again in 2004 to 1.44 metric TCE per 10,000 RMB of

7 A ton of oil equals 71 barrels; a barrel equals 42 gallons, or about 159 liters. Therefore, a ton equals about 11,290 liters. 8 Wang Qingyi, Energy Statistics 2005, Wang Qingyi, October 2005, http://www. efchina.org/chinese/resources.cfm. 9 The energy intensity coefﬁ cient = (energy consumption growth rate in %)/(GDP growth rate in %). policy options for china’s sustainable energy development 201

GDP growth.10 Energy consumption began constraining economic growth for two reasons. First, recent energy consumption increases are largely driven by the demands of heavy industry; China’s industrial structure leans heavily toward this kind of industrial production. Furthermore, China has been growing prodigiously in the heavy industry sectors. The proportion of value-added in the economy attributed to heavy industry has increased at more than 60%: in 2002 the proportion reached 60.9%, in 2003 it jumped to 64.3%, and rose still further to 67.6% in 2004. From 1987 to 2003, heavy industry’s contribution to economic value surged from 49.17% to 54.04%. In contrast, the proportion of value-added contributed by light manufacturing industry—the economic segment where many Chinese still make their living—dropped from 33.79% in 1987 to 27.14% in 2003. A second challenge comes from rapid urbanization. In 2003 40% of China’s population lived in cities. This percentage is 10% lower than the world average rate and 15% lower than the proportion for countries with same income per capita. China has committed to increase this rate to between 55 and 60% by 2020. Given that urban residents’ consume energy at 3.5 times of their rural counterparts, we can anticipate that the move towards urbanization will intensify China’s energy needs.11

3. The Impact of Tensions Over Energy Resources All the world’s countries face the challenge of fossil fuel depletion. Recent developments have buffeted world oil markets, including rapid growth in global demand and the emergence of terrorist threats to oil facilities, are bringing new urgency to perennial concerns over the nation’s exposure to oil price shocks and supply disruptions. Given that China imports 60%12 of its annual crude oil consumption, the degree of exposure is already great. Given that this ﬁ gure is expected to increase, these concerns will likely grow more acute.

10 Data resource: China Statistics 2004, China Statistics Bureau, China Statistics Publication House, September 2004. 11 Hu Min, Fuqiang Yang, Public Transportation and Building Energy Efﬁ ciency: Two Priorities of Sustainable Urban Energy Development, Energy Policy Research, December 2004. 12 China National Energy Strategy, the Development Research Center of the State Council, Economics Science Publication House, February 2004. 202 hu min and yang fuqiang

4. Energy Policies are not Sound The recent energy crisis has occurred largely because of shortcomings in China’s energy policies. These policies do not operate effi ciently. The country’s rapid economic growth only aggravates these defi ciencies. First, current policies emphasize total economic growth, while ignoring the need to achieve sustainable development. The overall GDP growth rate—as well as local and provincial economic growth—has been the most important performance evaluation criterion used by governmental offi cials. Sustainable energy usage, energy effi ciency, and the returns to investment of energy inputs are not included in performance evaluations. This is both a cause and consequence of energy conservation’s relatively overlooked role in Chinese administration and management. This lack of policies, regulations, and practices impedes the nation’s progress toward realizing sustainable development. Second, China has no administrative agency developing and implementing a comprehensive energy policy. China’s current energy administrative system lacks coordination. Through reviewing the practices used in foreign countries, one can see that the centralization of regulatory power facilitates the enforcement of regulatory policies. However, the power to regulate the energy sector in China is decentralized. Regu- latory organizations lack clearly defi ned functions. In some cases, regulatory power is even absent. For example, the National Electricity Regulatory Commission lacks essential regulatory powers regarding pricing, accession of administration, and so forth. As with many other aspects of Chinese management and administration, the huge population aggravates other shortcomings. Relative to the population, energy management agencies are severely understaffed. China’s total population is over 1.3 billion; about 12 million workers fi nd employment in the energy sector. Over fi ve 5 million work in the coal industry alone. However, only a few dozen people staff the energy management department in the Chinese Central Government. This compares unfavorably to the United States, where about 150,000 federal employees work for the U.S. Department of Energy.13 Third, investment in energy is woefully ineffi cient and inadequate. China has been putting big investments into the energy sector to meet

13 Feng Fei, Reforming China’s Energy Management System and Establishing a Modern Regu- latory System, Speech at the International Forum on Fiscal and Tax Policies for Clean Energy Development, November 2005, http://www.efchina.org/chinese/resources. cfm. policy options for china’s sustainable energy development 203 booming demand. However, inadequate investment in energy effi ciency has resulted in rising energy intensity. High energy demands and low energy effi ciency have led to serious energy and environmental problems. Fourth, the American socioeconomic model has permeated the Chi- nese culture and economy. The Chinese people pursue an American lifestyle characterized by purchasing bigger houses, bigger cars, and all manner of amenities that accompany this kind of lifestyle. Though this lifestyle is often regarded as the apotheosis of economic development, China’s energy demands, population, and supplies cannot sustain this lifestyle, at least not for a large percentage of Chinese people. In 2004, the US energy consumption per capita was 7.4 times higher than China’s.14 If all Chinese people were to attain the US standard, China’s total energy consumption will be 14.7 billion TCE; this exceeds the current global total of 14.6 billion TCE.15 Clearly, China must fi nd an energy development process that will lessen China’s impact on global energy demand.

II. New Policies Implemented in 2005

In 2005, China adjusted its strategies to bring the energy crisis under control.

A. Strategy Adjustment: Building a Resource-conserving Society China attaches importance on both resource development and conservation. Moves have been had to give priority to effi cient operations and effi ciency improvement so as to achieve the greatest economic and social returns from a given level of resource consumption. Chinese President Hu Jintao made remarks to this effect on June 27, 2006, when presiding over a collective study session of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee on the developing a conservation-minded society. He pointed out that fi nding new resources should be coupled with resource-saving.

14 Notably, Japan’s per capital energy consumption was only 3.7 times higher than that of China, or about half the American personal demand. 15 Data resource: Energy Statistics 2005, Wang Qingyi, October 2005, http://www. efchina.org/chinese/resources.cfm. 204 hu min and yang fuqiang

Premier Wen Jiabao spoke at a videophone conference on the major tasks involved in achieving this goal just a few days later, on June 30. Soon after, a notice was issued by the State Council calling for nationwide efforts to implement this process.

B. Legal Basis The Law on Renewable Energy was approved by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) on February 28, 2005 and was enacted on January 1, 2006. This Law makes the development of renewable energy a priority in China’s energy strategy and provides a host of practices to ensure its production, distribution, and consumption. The National Development and Reform Commission released a detailed renewable energy development plan based on this law that lays down goals and methods of implementation. The State Council called for an amendment of the Law on Energy Conservation, focusing on setting up energy administrative regulations, clarifying incentives for energy conservation, improving capacity building, and strengthening policy implementation. The Finance and Eco- nomics Committee of the NPC has listed this amendment on its agenda. China has set up a taskforce to draft a law on energy. Currently, China does not have a basic law on energy that reﬂ ects its energy strategy and policy orientation. Such a law would regulate the general structure of various energy products and activities, regarding their production, distribution, and consumption. It is urgent for China to formulate such a basic, comprehensive law on energy to ensure national economic security, successful energy exploitation, international cooperation in accessing energy resources, while streamlining the nation’s energy reserve system and emergency response mechanism. In a related step, China’s top legislative body is deliberating a law on a “cradle-to-cradle” economy.16 A law for developing a zero-waste, renewable resource, recycling-based economy is being drafted, and the country’s top legislature is scheduled to deliberate the draft form of this law in 2007. This law will play a key role in China’s overall economic and social development.

16 The Chinese typically use the term “circular economy,” but since this terminology is not familiar to most Westerners, this volume uses the term “cradle-to-cradle,” which has been gaining popularity in recent years. Various papers in this volume touch on this notion in greater detail. policy options for china’s sustainable energy development 205

C. Reforming Energy Administration In May, 2005 the National Energy Leading Group was founded. As a high-level council and coordination institution in charge of China’s current energy work, it is headed by Premier Wen Jiabao and its deputy leaders are Vice-Premiers Huang Ju and Zeng Peiyan. Members of the Leading Group include NDRC Minister Ma Kai, Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, Finance Minister Jin Renqing and Commerce Minister Bo Xilai. The National Energy Leading Group Ofﬁ ce was set up on June 2, 2005, with Ma Kai, Minister of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), taking the lead in the effort. The ofﬁ ce’s work includes: supervising implementation of the decisions of the Leading Group; collecting information on the nation’s energy security condition; forecasting and giving early warning about the overall energy situation and major issues; offering countermeasures and proposals to the Leading Group regarding these points; organizing relevant departments to study energy-related strategies and plans; studying major policies concerning the development and saving of energy, energy security and emergency measures and energy-related cooperation with foreign countries; and undertaking other matters entrusted by the State Council and the National Energy Leading Group.

D. Policy Initiatives

1. Energy Conservation In accordance with the special plan for medium-and-long-term energy conservation for the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006–2010), China has launched ten major projects for energy effi ciency that focus on energy saving in the industrial, transportation and construction sectors. The Plan also addresses commercial and civilian power use, considering the changes in overall conditions brought about through conservation efforts and increasing demands. In the industrial sector, efforts will be focused on energy intensive industries such as power generation; iron and steel fabrication; nonferrous metal manufacturing; oil exploration, drilling, and refi nement; petroleum and chemical processing; construction; coal extraction and distribution, and various forms of heavy machinery production. In transportation, the focus is on emerging energy-saving vehicles. The focus in the construction industry is to strictly enforce the standards of energy-effi ciency in design. Commercial and civilian 206 hu min and yang fuqiang energy conservation achieves gains mainly through improvements in effi ciency. The State Council is calling for government agencies to take a leading role in energy conservation. By issuing the Circular on Strengthening Energy Conservation of the Central Government Agencies, the State Council regulates the fi ner details of how to promote energy, water, and fuel conservation of energy. As well the State Council can implement systems to improve energy effi ciency, move energy effi cient products into the marketplace, and to establish a system for gathering and reporting energy consumption statistics. Government agencies and environmental NGOs have launched various energy conservation campaigns. These campaigns call on the public to adopt an energy effi cient lifestyle, to urge governmental institutions and residents in Beijing to save electricity by setting their air conditioners at 26ºC in summer (“the 26 Degree Campaign”),17 and to observe a Car Free Day as a way of advocating for public transportation. These activities have successfully raised the public’s awareness of energy conservation. The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and State Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (SQSIQ) formulated and issued the “Regulation on Energy-Effi ciency Labeling Administration” on August 13, 2004. Refrigerators and room air conditioners were required to implement the EEL (Energy-effi ciency Labeling) system beginning on March 1, 2005. Products without energy- effi ciency labels would not be allowed into the market. The National Vehicle Fuel Effi ciency Standard Issuance and Enforce- ment Conference was held in Beijing on October 28, 2004. Participants at the conference included offi cials from the General Administration of Quality Supervision Inspection and Quarantine of the People’s Repub- lic of China (PRC), the State Adminsitration of Standardization, the National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Science and Technology, experts from the China Automotive Technol- ogy & Research Center—the standards research and implementation organization in China—and over 20 media representatives. With the approval of the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspec- tion and Quarantine and the State Adminsitration of Standardization, the new standard was issued on September 2, 2004, and was to be formally implemented as of July 1, 2005.

17 This campaign is detailed in this volume. policy options for china’s sustainable energy development 207

On April 26, 2005, The Ministry of Construction formally instituted China’s fi rst integrated state standard for the energy effi cient in the design of public buildings—the Designing Standard of Energy Effi ciency for Public Buildings—which took effect on July 1, 2005. In May 2005, the Ministry of Construction formally put in place the Notice on Strictly Implementing the Standard of Energy Effi cient Design for Residential Buildings. It regulates the design, construction, and sale of residential buildings, mandating strict oversight to ensure that buildings adhere to energy-effi cient design standards.

2. Renewable Energy Development The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) has drafted a mid-and long-term plan for the development of renewable energy for the next 15 years, working out goals and strategic plans. The NDRC also held the APEC Renewable Energy Workshop and Inter- national Renewable Energy Conference in 2005, aiming at promoting international best practices and technology exchange. The government is now conducting studies on renewable energy quota systems and electricity feed-in tariffs to promote commercialization and development of renewable energy. To reach the renewable energy development objective set by the NDRC, an objective quota system will be developed which will regulate the quota allocation among big electricity generating establishments. The NDRC will also provide guidance for renewable energy development through pricing systems and industrialization plans. The government will support the construction of wind power and the utilization of solar energy and biomass. The Shanghai Economic Committee and Shanghai Development and Reform Committee have made joint efforts to formulate the Shanghai Green Power Purchasing & Marketing Trial. In accordance with this trial, Shanghai currently has fi nished the fi rst batch of green power sales. Twelve enterprises such as Baoshan Iron & Steel Co. Ltd., Shanghai Tobacco (Group) Corporation and Panasonic Corporation voluntarily purchased green electricity produced by wind power. While the current level of output is modest, these moves point the way toward establishing China’s fi rst green power framework along with a brand-new way of thinking about energy production and consumption. China has revealed bio-ethanol trial as well, which uses a fuel made up of ten percent ethanol and ninety percent gasoline. The trial will begin in fi ve provinces and 27 cities. To date, four provinces—including northeastern Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning provinces, and central Henan—province have introduced bio-ethanol gasoline province-wide. 208 hu min and yang fuqiang

Launched on June 30, 2002 the use of ethanol is a strategic move taken by the Chinese government to promote sustainable economic and social development and environmental protection. According to its plan for the coming ﬁ ve years, China will build four major manufacturing facilities for bio-ethanol, with a capacity of about one million tons per year.

3. Strategic guidance A social and economic development roadmap for the next fi ve years which aims to raise the living standards of the people was proposed recently by the Communist Party of China (CPC), after concluding the Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixteenth CPC Central Committee, on October 11, 2005. Projections call for a doubling of per capita GDP by 2010 from the 2000 benchmark of 854 USD. This target will be achieved by optimizing the structure of economic activity and its attendant energy needs. As well, productive effi ciencies, especially regarding energy needs, will produce relative decreases energy consumption demands. The energy demands per unit of GDP will decline by 20% from 2005 levels. These two quantifi able goals mentioned the roadmap give some insight into the Central Government’s determination in improving energy effi ciency.

III. Policy Options for Sustainable Energy Development

A. Strengthening the Legal Basis for Energy Conservation Though great efforts have been made to strengthen the legal basis of energy development, including the Law on Coal, the Law on Electricity, the Law on Energy Conservation and the newly issued Law on Renewable Energy, China lacks a basic energy law which reﬂ ects its overall energy strategy and policy orientation. Moreover, no legal measure on the books coordinates the ties between energy regulators and administrative bodies and energy-related activities in a comprehensive manner. This situation impedes China’s efforts to build a prosperous society, while meeting the demands of economic and social sustainability. Therefore, there is an urgent need to formulate such a law. policy options for china’s sustainable energy development 209

B. Energy Regulatory System Reform The sustainable development of energy in China can be achieved through reforms in the government energy management system, as well as through the establishment of a modern regulatory system. China is one of the biggest energy producers and energy consumers in the world. It needs to draw on the successful experience of foreign countries and apply the best practices to its current domestic conditions. A primary goal is to establish a modern management mechanism. The goal of this effort would be to improve the efﬁ ciency of the regulatory system and of the markets being regulated. This effort would bring the PRC closer to realizing a more innovative and sustainable energy production-consumption system.

C. An Environmentally-Friendly Energy Strategy The exploration, utilization and combustion of fossil fuels result in environmental degradation and the emission of greenhouse gases, which in turn, lead to global warming. In order to work within environmental constraints, energy systems must become cleaner, emitting few unhealthful pollutants as well as carbon byproducts. Environmen- tally-friendly energy strategy can help steer China in this direction. Effective implementation will require the government’s guidance and the public’s participation. This energy can be directed toward speciﬁ c policy prescriptions. A binding pollution cap must be put in place, as well as a some form of tradable emission licenses. Enforcement must become more rigorous and various fees and levies must be increased. The general goal must be to internalize external environmental cost within a market framework, and to set up all-in cost pricing system.

D. Changing the Energy and Resource Intensive Economic Growth Pattern China’s GDP growth depends on more and more intensive energy and resource investment. This rate has increased to 43.9% in 2004.18 China needs to direct more investment toward more resource efﬁ cient

18 Chen Qingtai, Speech at the International Forum on Fiscal and Tax Policies for Clean Energy Development, November 18, 2005, http://www.efchina.org/chinese/ resources.cfm. 210 hu min and yang fuqiang industries. Making this shift depends on changing from a “quantity of growth” of growth approach to a “quality of growth” approach. In other words, it means moving from the single-minded drive to increase GDP to a broader goal of social advancement.

E. Improving Energy Effi ciency through Technological Advancement Scientifi c and technological advancement can also contribute to easing the energy crisis in a number of ways: by developing cleaner production systems, by improving energy effi ciency, and creating more effective renewable energy systems. Wider technological cooperation and capacity building, especially in research and development, can move such efforts forward. Investments must be increased in these areas. Market-based incentives must be offered as well to generate more investment in creating and promoting these technical innovations.

F. Using the Market to Realize Effi ciency Improvements in the Energy Sector Chinese energy markets are not yet robust. To change this, a market- based system should be instituted. This system should aim to produce long-term stability in markets. The government’s role should move toward administration and regulation over basic market processes that affect allocation. Obviously, this means that price reforms must be introduced and enforced. A sound price system helps markets readily adjust to change. Prices must become a more accurate and complete refl ection of energy supplies and demands. As well, with the proper regulatory nudges, it can also help to develop a more sustainable energy economy by moving “external costs” within market mechanisms. As a special set of commodities and services, energy pricing should rely on market forces fi rst and foremost, but within a carefully designed market structure and regulatory environment. A particularly pressing need is to change prices which are artifi cially held below market value. As a fi rst step, we should institute an exploration and mining rights system based on known and estimated reserves rather than on production outputs. This reform would impel enterprises to value resources, minimize waste, and maximize effi ciency. Within this framework, competition would more effectively and effi ciently allocate resources and adjust prices. policy options for china’s sustainable energy development 211

G. Changing Energy Inputs Adjusting the type of resources used in energy production can change the Chinese economy in many ways. Changing the mix of energy inputs can reduce the dependence on particular input, like coal. Moreover, by moving away from coal to, say, natural gas, emissions can be cut without sacrifi cing economic growth. In general, moving toward cleaner technologies should be the aim of making adjustments in the mix of energy inputs. The Law on Renewable Energy, enacted on January 1, 2006, goes one step further, by spelling out renewable energy targets. The law calls for 15% of total energy production to come from renewable sources. Though supplementary fi nancial and price policies are needed to ensure that this goal is met, it seems like a benefi cial tradeoff. Not only will the nation be less dependent on coal and imported crude, but the environment will be cleaner as well.

IV. Measures to Realize Energy Efﬁ ciency Targets in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan

A. Reforming Energy Pricing System China’s energy price policy should promote energy conservation and support renewable energy development while ensuring China’s sustained economic competitiveness. The way to do this is to create legal and institutional conditions that allow rational pricing to take hold. In this way, energy prices will reﬂ ect true costs. In building a modern energy price supervision system, we must establish energy price supervisory agencies, improve regulation systems, and form a system of checks and balances among involved parties. Other key target beyond—but related to—price need to be considered. First and foremost should be reducing energy intensity by 20%.

B. Increasing Energy Investment and Reforming the Financing System To meet GDP and energy usage goals set for 2020, China must increase its energy sector investments to 18 trillion RMB (2.2 trillion USD). Investment in new energy-efﬁ cient initiatives and energy-related environmental protection will consume 40% of this total, or about 7.2 trillion RMB. Additional annual investments will be around 400 billion RMB. 212 hu min and yang fuqiang

To meet capital demand, increased government investment is required. Additionally, a more favorable policy framework must be developed to encourage investment by various non-governmental sources. The government should continue to relax restrictions on private capital and social capital investment in energy construction, and break the energy industry monopoly held by state-owned enterprises. Policies should focus on supporting sustainable energy construction projects. They should encourage private enterprises to cooperate with state- owned enterprises in undertaking the construction and operation of traditional energy and new energy source projects. This cooperation can take many forms: joint ventures, cooperatives, fi nancial and technical pooling, and shared project fi nancing, to name a few options. The state should provide fi nancing support, including favorable taxation, investment guarantees, and enterprise bonds. The government should also support the investment activities of private enterprises and of non- traditional developers of cutting edge energy technologies, especially those that produce renewable energy and/or low-or-no emission energy sources. Energy conservation projects can also be encouraged through these fi nancial instruments, as well as through investment subsidies, low-or-no interest loans, or through direct injections of capital. The government should promote reform in existing enterprises, encouraging them to save energy and prevent pollution. Energy-intensive operations or those that produce large emissions because of their energy consumption should be reformed within a time limit. Financial support should go to key projects in different sectors. In the industrial sector, support should go toward subsidies and loan discounts for the projects that transform regional heat supply into combined heat and power. In the transportation sector, the government should support investment in express bus transit systems.

C. Establishing Financial and Taxation Policies In a market economy, fi nancial policies should be the principal means by which the government regulates energy. At the same time, the government should adopt effective economic incentives and penalty policies to help optimize and guide energy consumption, promote energy conservation, optimize energy structure, and stimulate renewable energy development. Considering the fi scal levers available, we can divide energy fi nancial and taxation policies into three categories: positive incentive policies, negative restriction policies, and “cross-subsidizing” policies. policy options for china’s sustainable energy development 213

Positive incentive policies include (1) budget policies that increases investment for particular activities; (2) government bond investment policies; (3) interest rate discount policies; (4) preferential taxation policies; (5) tax-based disbursement systems; and (6) government purchase policies. While holding the total volume under control, we can support individual pilot projects with government funds on a case-by-case basis or bundle existing government-funded projects with top-quality energy projects after reorganization and renovation. Negative restriction policies include (1) establishing a fl exible system of levying fi xed asset investment regulation taxes; (2) expanding the scope of consumption taxes; (3) levying fuel taxes; and (4) conducting research on the feasibility of imposing carbon taxes. “Cross-subsidizing” policies are intended to raise money from conventional fossil-fuel-based energy production and consumption (primarily raw coal, crude oil and natural gas) through a specifi c method, and to earmark these proceeds for energy conservation and renewable energy development.

D. Designing Policies for Implementing the Law on Renewable Energy The rules designed in the Law on Renewable Energy are meant to be overarching principles adaptable to the different situations in all of China’s regions. Efﬁ cient implementation of this law depends on the development of corresponding administrative rules and codes, and of technology standards. Considering the urgency and signiﬁ cance of formulating regulations on enforcement of the Law on Renewable Energy, important regulations should be taken into consideration including national renewable energy targets and development plans, feed-in tariffs, a cost-sharing mechanism, and a renewable energy development special fund. Other supplementary recommendations include taxation incentive policies, research on renewable energy technology standards, promotion and training. There are many government and private stakeholders involved in the implementation of the Law on Renewable Energy. Reforming the overall energy system and pricing mechanism is underway. However, public involvement in participation and supervision of reform efforts remains very weak. The National People’s Congress should establish a supervision mechanism to track and evaluate the enforcement of the Law on Renewable Energy. The NPC should also push to form a sound government management system along with a market system, and to 214 hu min and yang fuqiang create an environment of social supervision. This will ensure the effective enforcement of the Law on Renewable Energy.

E. Building a Resource Effi cient Urban Development Model A sustainable city relies on the development of public transportation and the improvement of building effi ciency to meet energy targets. With limited urban transportation resources, we should give priority to public transit, especially Big Bus Transit, which costs only 10% of rail transit. Buses provide fast, comfortable, effi cient and economical transportation. The government’s fi nancing support could improve Big Bus Transit development by setting a special budget in the government fi nance system to lessen urban traffi c confl ict. Besides this, social and private sector investment should be encouraged to develop public transportation construction. Urban expansion also results in tremendous real estate growth. Buildings account for an increasingly large part of total urban energy consumption. Standards for energy effi ciency in building construction will affect their consumption for many years. Therefore the government should set a high energy effi ciency standard on public and residential buildings. This standard will require careful monitoring and supervision to make sure that standards are being met. Furthermore, pilot building projects and technological advancement will improve the implementation and upgrading of energy effi ciency standards. Promoting the use of renewable energy equipment will also contribute to impairments in energy effi ciency.

F. Strengthening Enforcement Capacities China has already issued various laws and regulations on energy conservation and environmental protection. Although more and more research and policy recommendations are being carried out, China’s energy crises and environmental degradation have not been curbed. The main problem lies in the lack of enforcement capacity. Though the Ministry of Construction has issued the mandatory Energy Efﬁ ciency Building Standard on Public and Residential Buildings, 95% of newly built buildings in China are unable to reach the standard.19 To change

19 The Exhibition of Building an Energy Effi cient Society in December 2005. policy options for china’s sustainable energy development 215 this condition, government offi cials need to judged, at least in part, on the measurable improvement in energy effi ciency of buildings which they oversee. Also, enforcement capacities need to be further strengthened. Finally, it is absolutely necessary to make efforts to support the capacities of government offi cials by introducing best practices regarding technological advancements and the most potent ideas on achieving sustainable energy development.

G. Increasing the Awareness of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) In China, the government has dominated all economic and social development, therefore, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has largely ignored. With the transition from a planned economy to market economy, CSR will play a more and more important role in social development. In the energy sector, one of the best practices in western countries is the Energy Efﬁ ciency Voluntary Agreement, one of the many responses to the 1970s oil crisis and mounting pressures to reduce carbon emissions. The agreement was signed by the private sector and the government; it stipulates that corporations will cut energy consumption with the government’s encouragement. Many western countries have reached the energy conservation targets speciﬁ ed within the agreement, including the UK, the US, Australia, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Norway and Holland. In China, this mechanism is being promoted in steel and iron factories in the pilot cities of Beijing, Liaoning and Shandong. These practices will help China to reach the energy intensity reduction targets, especially as these efforts are rolled out in other provinces.

H. Encouraging Public Involvement and Extending Civil Society’s Participation Public involvement gives weight to policymaking and implementation. Civil society’s participation in political processes helps the public air opinions, and gives social relevance to legal constructs. Moreover, the public plays a curial role in support energy conservation efforts. Encour- aging public involvement and extending civil society’s participation will strengthen public supervision on law enforcement, increase the public’s awareness of energy conservation concepts and practices, and shape energy effi cient consumption behavior. Two key purchases made by the general public will have a huge impact on energy consumption: energy effi cient buildings and effi cient transportation choices, including autos with small engine displacement. 216 hu min and yang fuqiang

IV. Conclusion

In many ways, because of the economic development model it has pursued, it is working through problems that western nations faced one hundred years ago or more. As a result of these choices, China is facing binding constraints on natural resources. Its environmental carrying capacity is already strained, and its huge population adds to the pressure. Therefore, China has to do better in developing clean energy and improving energy efﬁ ciency. Two hundred years ago, Great Britain achieved great industrial development with the help of coal’s exploration and utilization. Sixty years ago, the United States achieved a modern lifestyle with the help of oil. In the 21st century, China, through prudent use of clean energy and improvements in energy efﬁ ciency, will pursue its own sustainable energy development path.

ECOLOGICAL RECOVERY: BELIEVING IN NATURE

Jiang Gaoming

I. Ecosystem and Ecological Deterioration in China

There are altogether ten major land ecosystems on the Earth, and China contains of nine of them. The ecosystems are: tropical rain forest, evergreen broad-leaved forest, temperate broad-leaved deciduous forest, frigid needle-leaved forest, mangrove forest, grassland, arctic-alpine meadow, desert, and tundra. The only ecosystem missing in China is the African Savanna communities (grassland ecosystem interspersed with forest and trees). However, the structures and functions of China’s four major sandlands (Otindag, Kerqin, Maowusu, Hulun Buir) are virtually identical with the Savanna ecosystem type when they are in good condition.1 China is not the only country in the world which has such a variety of ecosystems, but it does contain the largest number of different land ecosystems. Unfortunately, these ecosystems are all in the process of deteriorating to varying degrees.2 Apart from infamous and widespread cases of deforestation and expanding desertiﬁ cation, serious deterioration has also found its way to arctic-alpine meadows and temperate grasslands, where destruction used to be rare, or at least, not acute. Given the widespread nature of ecological damage, China now faces with a critical situation. The sustainable development of the economy and the nation’s political security will be affected if ecological deterioration gets out of control. The following cases will help to demonstrate the seriousness of the deterioration. The Qinghai-Tibet Plateau is a unique ecosystem that attains the world’s highest altitudes. However, because of long-time overgrazing, ecological deterioration on the arctic-alpine meadow is grave. Major manifestations are as follows: productivity of the grassland has dropped by a large margin with grass production falling from 15 kg per hectare in

1 Liu Maosheng, “Savanna Communities in Temperate Zones—China’s Biggest Wildlife Paradise,” in Scientifi c Times, July 11, 2003. 2 Liu Guohua, Fu Bojie and Chen Lishun, “Major Types, Characteristics and Dis- tributions of Ecological Deterioration in China,” in Ecology Journal, Volume 1, 2000. 218 jiang gaoming the 1960s to currently less than 6.7 kg/hectare; damage by underground rats is serious with the pests increasing from 0.5–0.7 per ha to more than 2 per ha; and the ratio of weeds to grasses is increasing. As well, barren land is more common: barren land used to account for less than 10% of the highlands; these areas now cover 30% of the plateau. As the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau eastern arctic-alpine meadow is the headwater of the Yellow River, the Yangtze River, the Lancang River3—and many others—the environmental health of the region has a direct bearing on the survival and development of the Chinese people now and into the future. Eventually this ecological deterioration is bound to arouse the attention of departments monitoring such changes. China’s natural grasslands take up 41% of its territory and are the nation’s largest land ecosystem and green belt.4 Since the 1950s, 193,000 square kilometers of high-quality grasslands have been cultivated, amounting to 15% of the nation’s total farmland. From 1986 to 2000, in fi ve leagues (equal to a prefecture) in eastern Inner Mongolia plus Xinjiang, Gansu, Ningxia and Qinghai Provinces, 22,700 km2 of high-quality grasslands were cultivated. Each year, in the 1980s and the 1990s, nearly 1,000,000 migrant people entered the grasslands to dig up herbal plants such as licorice, caladium (also known as “elephant ear”) and Chongcao (a highly prized mushroom);5 harvest Chinese ephedra; open mines and extract gold; collect sod; and cut shrubs for fi rewood. These activities have damaged large areas of the grasslands. By 2002, the population in the pasture area, or grasslands, increased three to four times over that of 1947. The population increase has exceeded the carrying capacity of the grassland ecosystem by two to three times over that of the international standard for similar ecosystems. The high growth rates of the human population and livestock result in overexploitation of the grasslands, which leads to deterioration and thinning of vegetation and an increase in sandy and/or saline/alkaline soil which causes the land to become barren. It is commonly recognized that the mangrove forest is one of the world’s ecosystems with high productivity and ecological diversity. China’s mangrove forests are mainly distributed along the southern

3 The Lancang River is better known as the Mekong River to most Westerners. 4 Chen Zuozhong, Wang Shiping, China’s Typical Grassland Ecosystem (Science Press House, 2000). 5 Chongcao is also known as Chinese caterpillar fungus and Cordycep Mushroom. Problems resulting from its collection are detailed elsewhere in this volume. ecological recovery: believing in nature 219 coast of Fujian Province. Historically, the area of mangrove forest reached 2,500 km2, but was reduced to only 500 km2 in the 1950s and further decreased to merely 150 km2 at present, accounting for 6% of the historical record high. Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, and especially in the last 20 years, predatory exploitation, deforestation and low-effi ciency utilization in violation of scientifi c principles—as well as reclaiming land from the sea—have all caused unprecedented damage to coastal mangrove resources. All the four major sandlands are situated in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region with a total area of 150,000 km2, which is about 60% of Great Britain’s size and four times the size of Taiwan Prov- ince. For a long time, people have held these sandlands in low regard, mistaking them for deserts. Actually, there is an obvious difference between sandy land and deserts. Annual rainfall in the sandy land is between 350–550 millimeters, and the land is covered by a sparse forest with the sand elm as the main plant. Its landscape is identical with the savanna-type ecosystem, and its bio-productivity and biodiversity are both apparently higher than the surrounding grasslands. In contrast, annual rainfall in deserts is below 150 millimeters, which cannot support forests. Only drought-enduring shrubs such as sacsaoul can thrive there. Frequent sandstorms in recent years have a direct connection with ecological deterioration of the four major sandlands. Take Otindag for example; the area of moving and shifting dunes accounted for only 2% of the total sand area in the 1950s and the 1960s, 8.2% in the mid-1970s, 13% by the end of the 1980s, and as high as 50% in the 1990s. Currently, this area of shifting sand dunes exceeds 70% of the total sand area in some places. Land and weather conditions make this area particularly vulnerable since wind, sand, drought and the sparseness of vegetation can seemingly work together to aggravate the problem of desertifi cation. Once vegetation is destroyed, the loose, sandy surface below it will be exposed; the exposed sand and dust will be blown around by strong, dry winds. When the winds blow hard enough over such lands, sandstorms result. The scale and pervasive- ness of sandstorms are widely known to Chinese people. What is not so well known is that sandlands are diffi cult to restore once this cycle of deterioration has taken hold. 220 jiang gaoming

II. Lessons Learned from Domestic and International Experience

After World War I, a high rate of immigration to the southern prairie started in America. Serious disturbance of the prairie brought about massive sandstorms. During the 40 years from 1935 to 1975, sandstorms destroyed 4000–6000 square kilometers of prairie annually. To bring desertifi cation and sandstorms under control, the United States carried out a long-term ecological conservation campaign. The main measures included promoting the “Ranch Act” which encouraged farmers to stop farming. The government implemented a compensatory system to suspend grazing, grow grass, and build nature reserves on these lands. We can see that America’s primary solution for checking the decades-long “dust bowl” problem was to encourage the “withdrawal of human activity.” From 1954 to 1963, the former Soviet Union reclaimed about 600,000 km2 of grassland in Kazakstan, Siberia, along the Volga and Ural Rivers, and in parts of the Caucuses. Because protective measures were not implemented, and because of the arid climate, newly reclaimed land was seriously eroded by wind, and “dust bowl” conditions took hold. Yet, the more harmful and lasting damage arose from the “white storm,” which started at the same time and continues to this day. The white storm—that is, a storm carrying salt dust—developed out of several interlocking factors: the Amudarjia River was cut off to serve a water diversion project in the deserts; this reduced the Aral Sea’s water level sharply, exposing salt and alkali deposits, which then became airborne in driving winds. Such moves stand in stark contrast to steps initiated under the “Stalin Plan of Reforming Nature.” This effort worked at a scale even larger than the US Roosevelt Project. The Plan included reforestation of grasslands and development of agricultural irrigation in concert. From 1949 to 1953, about 30,000 km2 of shelter forest were constructed under this project. However, by the end of the 1960s, only 2% of these shelter forests survived. To curb the continuing northwardly expansion of the Sahara Desert, Algeria has planted pine trees since 1975 on a large scale along the desert’s northern edge, calling it the “green dam.” This project stretches across 1500 km, reaching Morocco and Tunis, Algeria’s two neighbors on the Mediterranean Coast. This goal was to expand Algeria’s forests at an annual rate of 10%. However, out of an inadequate understanding of local water resources and the area’s environmental carrying capacity, and due to misguided and massive use of foreign species in the plant- ecological recovery: believing in nature 221 ings, the project has turned into an eco-catastrophe. Most important, the desert is still expanding northward. Last December, I went on an inspection tour in northern Tunis. We drove along the coast for a whole day, but did not see even a shadow of the so-called green dam. When asked about the progress of the “green dam” project in the fi ve countries in North Africa, the head of the State Aridity Research Institution of Tunis answered wryly: “It is a shelter forest only on paper.” The Three-north Shelter Forest is a reforestation project which covers most of Northwest China, the northern part of North China and the western part of Northeast China. This shelter forest was once regarded as China’s “Green Great Wall.” Over the past 25 years, China has invested large amounts of money to build the “Wall,” but the effort has not been worth the expense. Most of the trees there are now more dead than alive. Poplars made up the preponderance of the trees planted. However, large-scale, single-species planting tend to be vulnerable to disease and pest infestations. True to form, a single pest, longicorn beetles, almost destroyed the shelter forest single-handedly, ultimately ruining several billion poplars. These painful lessons prove that reforestation in large areas, if implemented against natural laws, will fail. Even if reforestation is to be successful, the ratio of input and output must be cost-effi cient. Let’s make a simple calculation. In 2002, the reforestation project to prevent and control blowing sand sources around Beijing-Tianjin planted trees on 676,400 hectares. This effort cost as much as 60 billion RMB, with the state investing 1.232 billion RMB or 121.4 RMB per mu, (15 mu = 1 hectare). Let’s then take a look at the Three-north Shelter Forest. In the same year, 453,800 hectares were reforested, with an investment of 1.393 billion RMB,6 or 204.6 RMB per mu. Adding the two items together, they cost 326 RMB per mu. In this way, each household of herdsmen living in southern Inner Mongolia where the project is should receive a net benefi t of 489,000 RMB from the state reforestation project. But this is not the case because many herdsmen do not even know that their land has been included in the Three-north Shelter Forest area.7 There is no doubt that the money has been spent, but where is the forest? How has the money

6 State Forestry Administration, “Six Major Forestry Projects,” http://www.forestry. gov.cn/SHTGC/index.asp, 2002. 7 Flonchy, Edward, “Why China’s Extensive Forestation Has Shown Little Achieve- ment,” in The Reference News, April 13, 2004. 222 jiang gaoming been spent? This money was not used evenly on each unit of land, but concentrated on a few projects which will easily pass inspections. This area accounts for only less than 10% of the total area designated for reforestation. While reforestation achieves an effect in small areas, deterioration is taking place in large areas. That is the basic cause for the claims that “plantation and deterioration go hand in hand” and “plantation cannot catch up with deterioration.”8 Contrary to the above negative examples, Holland and Great Britain have achieved greater success in their efforts. The world-renown project of reclaiming land from the sea has greatly boosted Dutch agricultural development, urban construction and natural conservation. In the past 20 years, by complying with natural laws and adopting few artiﬁ cial measures, the barren reclaimed areas are thriving. This successful case has often been cited as an important case of ecological construction. Great Britain is the earliest industrialized country in the world and is also the ﬁ rst to taste the bitter fruit of ecological destruction, because massive coal mining terribly damaged its ecological environment. How- ever, by the end of the 1990s, they had already restored the natural ecological system. What’s more, they developed some of these areas as world-known countryside scenic spots. From this experience, the British learned how to achieve ecological balance with the help of natural forces. Recently, researchers from Holland and Britain found out through a four-year program conducted in India, Puerto Rico, South Africa and Tanzania that reforestation in arid areas is unable to improve water conditions or prevent soil erosion. In fact, the far-reaching roots of trees will aggravate water shortage in arid areas and the leaves and roots of trees will increase evaporation.9 In fact, this point of view was already raised on different occasions by Chinese scientists long ago, without being given due attention at the time. For example, the late academician Huang Bingwei once vividly compared reforestation in arid areas to a “water pump,” by drawing water out of the soil and into the air.

8 Ge Jianxiong, “The Three-north Shelter Forest: How Much Do We Still Have to Pay for the Lessons?” in East Morning News, July 27, 2005. 9 Ma Libian, “Returning Farmland to Forest Caused Damage to Water Resources; the Effect of Reforestation Came into Question,” in Science and Technology Guide, August 4, 2005. ecological recovery: believing in nature 223

III. Mistaken Concepts in Ecological Construction

Clearly, ecological deterioration is a serious problem, and we must face it now. We also know that China has an extraordinarily varied ecosystem endowment. Taken within the context of this knowledge, it is especially troubling that the condition of these ecosystems has generally deteriorated so severely. Problems with water loss, soil erosion, declining biodiversity, decreasing ecosystem productivity, and increasingly frequent and severe sandstorms, mudslides, fl oods, and insect infestations plague the land. Fortunately, state investment to control ecological deterioration is increasing every year. But this money must be spent prudently, and that will require environmental protection administrators to overcome some long-held misguided notions on how to deal with these problems.10 The fi rst erroneous idea: attaching more importance to construction than protection. One especially irrational aspect of currently applied policies is that regions facing the most severe deterioration receive more fee money to control damage, while regions where protection work is effectively performed get little or no support. In essence, the incompetent are rewarded—or at least, well paid—and the successful programs have to struggle. Funding allocation has other problems as well. Fees to control deterioration are divided up among different governmental departments, without any thought given to the effectiveness, effi ciency, or sustainability of the programs being funded. So if fees are allot- ted in the name of “controlling sand storms and planting forests” or “returning farmland to forest,” then the local government just plants trees without considering its practical effects. This is not a complaint based on hypothetical conjecture: current policy stresses “returning farmland to forest”; only projects for planting trees on cultivated land get funding while projects to return farmland to grasslands (or some other type of ecosystem) get no funding at all. Thus, the local residents are enthusiastic about planting trees, without caring whether the trees will survive or not. The second mistaken approach—which has already been touched upon above—is the idea of building large-scale forests, such as the

10 Jiang Gaoming, “Why Is Desertiﬁ cation Becoming More and More Serious in China?” in Scientiﬁ c Times, June 17, 2005. 224 jiang gaoming

Three-north Shelter Forest11 in arid and grassland zones in order to block sandstorms. Sandstorms cannot be blocked by trees alone. The best measure for controlling sandstorms is growing grass, which tackles the root causes of sand and dust displacement. Under natural conditions, grass grows on sandy grassland soil. However, overgrazing has prevented grass from growing and establishing a solid ground cover. Once such areas are covered with thriving grass, the powerful roots of these plants will ﬁ rmly hold the sand and dust on the ground. As well, the ground cover will improve the efﬁ cient utilization of rainwater and snow runoff. By containing water, the earth will be able to better withstand the effect of droughts, insects, and rats. The third notion undermining activities aimed at ecosystem reclamation is the belief that human efforts to reform nature should take precedence over implementing systems and programs that allow natural systems to heal themselves. For hard-to-control problems, the best course of action is often reducing human intervention. By reducing manmade pressures and disruptions, nature can rehabilitate itself.12 Even ancient deserts can thrive as long as the thin layer of plants and microorganism covering their surfaces remains relatively undisturbed. This layer will stabilize the soil, allowing plants to thrive and moisture to persist in the ground. Both of these effects prevent sandstorm frequency and severity. Human beings must treat deserts with great care and curtail their incursions into the deserts. Given that this can work in deserts—one of the most fragile ecosystems—it seems likely to work at least as well in grasslands and sandlands.

IV. Methods Used by the Chinese Academy of Sciences

From 2000 to 2005 the Botanical Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences carried out eco-rehabilitation experiments in Bayinhushu Village in Zhenglan Banner, Inner Mongolia in order to aid in the recovery of the sandlands in Otindag. Its population is 310 people spread out among 72 households and a land area of 126,000 mu. It is

11 French H. W., “Billions of Trees Planted, and Nary a Dent in the Desert,” New York Times, April 11, 2004. 12 Jiang Gaoming, “Desert Will Move Back Only When People Back Away,” in People’s Daily, February 21, 2003. ecological recovery: believing in nature 225 a typical Otindag sandland environment.13 It is also the primary source of sand and dust blowing into Beijing. These experiments, and the pilot programs stemming from them, have been a resounding success in ecological, social and economic terms. Scientists took the following steps within their experiments: First, they reduced the ecological pressure from livestock. This allowed natural forces to begin the reclamation process. Researchers then enclosed 40,000 mu of severely degraded grassland with fences, and then assigned riders on horseback to patrol the fence perimeter to prevent livestock from reentering the area. In 2001, the grass inside the enclosed area grew to a height of 80 to 140 centimeters, and reached 5,300 jin per mu (1 jin = 0.5 kg) in density. In 2002, the vegetation coverage reached 60%. The number of ﬁ xed dunes increased by nearly 4 times, and biomass in lowland sandy dunes increased by a factor of nine. The number of thriving plants also increased by nine times. By 2003, wetland grass grew as tall as 1.85 meters, and fresh grass surpassed the density of 6,500 jin per mu. Before this project took hold, herders would buy 10,000 kilos of dry grass per household annually. Now each household receives a portion of the 35,000 kg of dry grass produced every year. This meets household demands. This productivity can be contrasted to lands not included in the reclamation project. Here we observe the output falling as low as 50 jin per mu. In addition to improved conditions for people, wild animals are now thriving as well. Hares, foxes, wide geese, grey cranes, and even wolves have returned to this once-deserted land. Remarkable results have also been achieved for the sparse elm communities which have been enclosed in protected areas.14 Two years after being enclosed, a survey of elms was conducted on protected trees and those left unprotected in the Zhenglan Banner area. Researchers counted two key variables: numbers of trees and their ages. Obvious differences emerged. Experimental sandlands had many seedling elms, with an average of 1.8 trees per square meter. Seedlings planted to hold sand dunes on the bases of north-facing hillsides averaged a density of

13 Liu Meizhen, Jiang Gaoming, et al., “Dynamic Changes of Flora Communities in Restoring Deteriorated Otindag Sandy Land in 18 Years,” in Ecology Journal, 2004, 24 (8): 1731–1737. 14 Li Yongkang, Jiang Gaoming, et al., “The Inﬂ uence of Human Intervention on the Otindag Sparse Elm Forest,” in Botanical Ecology Journal, 2003, 27(6): 829 –834. 226 jiang gaoming

1.58 per meter. With protection, seedlings can grow into sparse forests that resemble the natural pattern of growth. The reader should compare these results to attempts using forestation to prevent sandstorms. Although these efforts cost vast amounts of money, the trees died; their only value is as fi rewood for herders. Mass planting attempted by sewing seeds from planes failed as well; the seedlings could not compete with indigenous plants. Not only did these successful efforts stabilize the ecosystem, they provided suffi cient fodder for livestock. If grasslands were only closed off as part of protection and restoration efforts, feed would be in short supply. To tackle the feeding problem, researchers grew more than 1,000 mu of high-yield Yinghong corn. The planting area accounted for only 1% of the village’s total area, but with a productivity rate of 3,000–5,000 kg per mu this area provided more than enough feed for the spring. However, villagers still faced the problem of meeting interim feed demands, since the amount of corn straw harvested could not feed all 7,000 animals in the villagers’ possession. Rather than squeezing land beyond its capacities, the villagers linked ecological rehabilitation efforts to their practical experience as nomads, to formulate a new approach: placing a moratorium on farming and grazing until the land could rehabilitate itself. In the meantime, fodder would be produced on a small-scale using highly-effi cient land. This would allow large areas of grassland to lie fallow. This approach has been dubbed the “supporting land with land” model,15 or “decreasing usage by one-percent” model. In other words, 50 to 100 mu of degraded sandy grassland can be rehabilitated by focusing feed production on only one mu of land, while taking the rest out of production. Researchers also changed herders’ mode of production, encouraging them to develop a more corporate approach to organizing their operations. With the help and participation of scientists, the “Zhenglan Banner Otindag Ecological Science and Technology Development Cor- poration Ltd.” was established.16 Two years after this corporation came into operation, the per capita income of the village rose from 2,400 RMB to 3,500 RMB. The village became the majority shareholder with 75% of shares. This share allocation was based on the villagers’

15 Jiang Gaoming, “The Restoration Policy for the Degraded Ecosystem in Otindag,” in China Science Tribune, Vol. 3, 2002. 16 Ma Jing, Jin Hai, A Survey Carried Out in Bayinhushu Village, Zhenglan Banner, Inner Mongolia (Yunnan University Press, 2004) 96. ecological recovery: believing in nature 227 contribution of the most crucial assets: the land, their animals, various buildings and equipment, as well as their labor and knowledge of agriculture and herding. Three experts from the Botanical Institution of the Chinese Academy of Sciences who had worked alongside farmers became shareholders as well. Their intangible assets—technology, management, and scientifi c know-how—were translated into 20% of the total shares. The Zhenglan Banner Science and Technology Agency was granted a 5% stake in the business, refl ecting their contribution of intangible assets such as technology and management. The company makes many agricultural products: dairy, meat, grass for fodder, vegetables, and poultry. The company also provides services in ecotourism and transportation. Each year it produces a surplus of 3.5 million kilos of forage from the ecological rehabilitation projects. This output continues to benefi t herders, gradually helping them to specialize their production. This system of production and research brings the ecosystem and economy to attain a healthier, sustainable balance. Note as well, with productivity up, and the assets of the company increasing in value, land values have increased. Sustainability has taken on a clear rhythm: protecting grassland in the summer, harvesting grass in autumn, which in turn, prevents and controls sandstorms in spring and winter. Thus, in accordance with related policies applied in Inner Mongolia, a productive base was formed making use of environmentally friendly technology. Intervention in the area has focused on educational development as well, by improving the quality of education offered to herders’ children. This process had to start by making schools more accessible. Primary schools are few and far between in the area because the population is scattered. This required children to travel long distances, and then to pay for boarding, to attend school. Some herders spent up to half of their income to cover these costs. In spite of this investment, returns may never be realized: many children dropped out in their early secondary years. Children returning home would inevitably take up traditional farming, working alongside parents and grandparents. This produced many farmers, and therefore, more pressure on the land. In order to break this cycle, scientists encouraged middle school students to go to college. The persons offering the encouragement have succeeded in education: many have graduate degrees and come from some of the best schools in the country, including Peking University and Beijing Number 4 Middle School, one of the best middle schools in Beijing. In recent years the number of college students from Bayinhushu Village 228 jiang gaoming has increased. In 2005, fi ve students gained admission to colleges. No other village in the area has produced such a large group of college students in a year. These students will most likely work in cities after graduation. Through this intervention, educational, material, and social levels undergo fundamental changes. By improving the quality of life and broadening the work options of the herders’ children, the pressure on the land can be eased as well. This way the state can relieve itself the burden of ecological management, allowing education to solve the problem indirectly. Many efforts made by the Chinese Academy of Sciences are worth learning about more deeply and propagating in suitable situations. One very important ecological lesson to be drawn from the experience detailed above is that ecological reclamation can be made more effective, with less effort, if human pressure is lessened and natural forces are set free.

V. Other Related Practices

There are many successful cases of natural ecological recovery. For instance, from 1991 to 1999, 4,356 households in the Yanqing mountainous area of Beijing resettled outside of the area, reducing the original population of 60,000 to 30,000, and thus greatly relieving pressure on mountain forests. As a result forest coverage has increased from the original 30% of the mountains’ 1,300 km2 to the current 70%. Some areas exceed this density of forest cover. In fact, two townships reach over 80% forest coverage. In the core area of the Foping Nature Reserve in Shaanxi Province, there is a place named Steamer’s Field. From 1875 to 1908, bamboo steamers were produced here. It is situated in the center of the Qinling Mountain Range, and more than 10,000 people once lived in the area.17 Over time people gradually moved out and the place became uninhab- ited because of the area’s inaccessibility to transportation. Particularly noteworthy is the health of forests now: big trees grow to over 50 cm in diameter and only native species live in the forest. Arrow bamboo,

17 The Administrative Bureau for the National Natural Reserve in Foping, Shaanxi Province, The Administrative Program for the National Natural Reserve in Foping Shaanxi Province (for staff only), 1998. ecological recovery: believing in nature 229 the favorite food of giant pandas, thrives there and as a result, this has become a favorite haunt of this rare and precious animal. Established in 1981, the Chebaling Nature Reserve in Guangdong Province has a total area of 70,000 hectares. As a reserve, it enjoys a number of protections, but the main impediment in realizing the goals of ecological recovery comes from poverty in the area. The area contains eight villages with a total population of 1,200. 80% of these people are of the Yao ethnicity. Early attempts to restore the area’s environment focused exclusively on protecting natural resources at the expense of community development. In particular, protection plans banned hunting and timber collection. As a result, the locals’ incomes fell from 600 RMB per capita in 1981 to 330 RMB in 1985. This produced tense conﬂ icts; at one point the reserve’s signage was smashed.18 Later, reserve managers realized that they must solve the problems of the community alongside those of nature if they wanted to achieve ecological recovery and conservation in the reserve. As a ﬁ rst step, they invited technicians from the Agricultural Bureau to promote intensive cultivation in the area. These technicians taught villages how to grow vegetables and orchards which were out of season. This provided the Yao a livelihood in farming. Incomes increased rapidly, reaching 3,000 RMB per capita in 2002. In response, locals stopped cutting timber. Community development went farther: now households have access to electricity and running water, and schools have been built. These efforts also addressed a key ecological and economic headache—family planning. The number of children per household has fallen from eight to one. With only one child, each family can invest more in their next generation. In this case, a win-win situation is realized between inhabiting a nature reserve and community development. Jiuzhaigou in Sichuan Province is an even more outstanding example of a program that achieves environmental protection concurrent with economic development. Tibetans in the area used to survive by working the land of mountainside. This often harmed the pristine natural environment. Since establishing Jiuzhaigou Nature Reserve in 1984 and related ecotourism efforts, the Tibetans living there have become stewards of the ecosystem. Large areas of forest have been completely

18 Xu Yanqian, Lan Shengfang, “Discussion on Economically Sustainable Develop- ment for Forests and Wildlife Nature Reserves in Guangdong Province,” in Science of Ecology, sec.2, 1994. 230 jiang gaoming rehabilitated by allowing natural systems to take hold. Currently, admission fees to the reserve plus income from sightseers has climbed to 300 million RMB annually. In fact, economic development in Jiuzhaigou has infl uenced other areas like Chengdu in Sichuan Province and Xin- ing in Qinghai Province to adopt similar efforts. Social, economic and ecological benefi ts are much higher than the fi nancial profi t generated by the reserve. If the above cases are still not suffi ciently convincing because they touch on small physical areas, then the moves of Linqu County in Shangdong Province will provide a powerful argument for programs covering a larger land area. Linqu is a mid-sized county, with a population of 852,000 covering an area of 1,834 km2. Hills cover 87.3% of the total area. Like many other places in China, its ecological condition deteriorated daily as its economy boomed in recent years. Green mountains turned barren, and big and small rivers dried up. To deal with this situation, the newly-elected leaders of the county government put ecological protection on their agenda. After years of effort, substantial changes have taken hold. Changes have been systemic, covering ecological, social, and economic aspects of problems. Natural rehabilitation has been fully realized here.19 Their main efforts have been as follows: First, they restructured industrial activity, allowing natural forces to run their course in restoring the environment. The plan called for the labor force to be diverted from the land in order to relieve productive pressures on natural systems and begin restoring the environment. Taking such a step shows a huge leap forward in the city leaders’ understanding of ecological rehabilitation. Second, they transformed farmers into workers within two highly competitive industries. At the end of 2002, the government of Linqu County drew up a strategic plan to “develop market-based industry to develop the economy through such efforts.” In particular, they built a productive base for aluminum and stainless steel fabrication. Pres- ently, 23 fi rms produce aluminum goods, and nine produce stainless steel products. Including suppliers and subcontractors, 220 businesses are involved in manufacturing aluminum materials, and 150 in the

19 Kao Jijia, “Setting Loose the Potential for Natural Recovery through Industrial Transformation,” in Works of the First Beijing International Eco-construction Forum, People’s Government of Mentougou District, Beijing & Beijing Science and Technology Com- mission, 2005. ecological recovery: believing in nature 231 manufacture of stainless steel goods. The aluminum and steel industries now employ nearly 20,000 persons, mostly former farmers. Third, they built “three bases” to increase the value of agricultural products and farm labor. In general, this project directed farm production away from traditional agriculture and toward producing crops with high market value. Each of the “three bases” all serves this end: a greenhouse fruit production center, a dairy farm system, and a structure for creating high quality labor which can be exported. All have succeeded impressively. Fruit production covers 30,000 mu, making it the biggest greenhouse fruit base north of the Yangtze River. The base also provides many jobs: if two laborers look after one mu of greenhouse fruit, then roughly 60,000 farmers work in greenhouse fruit production. The area now boasts 150 cattle farms, making Linqu County the biggest cattle farming base in Shandong Province.20 Cattle have consumed vast amounts of corn straw left in local ﬁ elds, which cuts down on waste disposal. The county has built more than 3,000 silage ponds, storing 300,000 tons of corn straw annually. The third base is for exporting skilled workers. The four technical vocational schools in the county have strengthened contacts with universities and other technical vocational schools in and out of Shandong Province and well-known enterprises. They have also strengthened skills training. In this way the labor market has expanded, and the pace of transforming a rural labor force into a modern, industrial urban labor force has quickened. At present, the county exports 130,000 industrial laborers in slack farming seasons, and 100,000 persons in busy farming seasons. Workers serve Chinese port cities like Shanghai, Ningbo, Qingdao, and Yantai, as well as neighboring countries like Japan and South Korea. The county also sends high-quality workers to big domestic companies such as Haier, a well known conglomerate in China. With the further development of agricultural restructuring and the implementation of projects returning farmland to forest, restricting access to mountains and banning hunting, many mountain farmers have moved to towns, cities, and other locales. The former farmers are gradually turning into modern industrial workers and city residents. As a result trees and grass have begun growing again on once-barren mountains. With the slow recovery of the environment, the county has taken on a completely new look: green mountains, clear rivers, and blue

20 These farms also raise 35,000 pigs. 232 jiang gaoming skies are returning. The economy is prosperous, and people are well-off. Linqu County is proud of its achievements in ecological recovery. Foreign and domestic experience has proven that the most direct, economical and effective way to achieve ecological recovery is achieved by unleashing natural forces. The focal point of China’s ecological recovery is to propagate such efforts, while unnatural methods should be avoided. For instance, reforestation in arid areas and on grasslands should be discouraged. At the same time, the focus of ecological construction should be shifted to ecology conservation. The main channel of state investment should be geared to human resources. Ecological recovery involves many departments, such as the bureaus of forestry, agriculture, water resources, environmental protection, mineral resources, land, and nature reserves. All these departments must proceed from the fundamental interests of the nation, and make concerted efforts to realize meaningful progress in ecological recovery within a broader policy context. A fundamental piece of this puzzle is to ensure the effectiveness of funding. Grand projects which go against natural, economic, and social laws should be readjusted or even suspended.

LAND RESOURCE PROTECTION AND MANAGEMENT IN CHINA

Bao Xiaobin

Soil degradation refers to the reduction or even total loss of soil quality and sustainability due to natural and/or human-induced factors. By harming the environment, natural resources, agriculture, and even the whole economy, soil degradation has become one of the major factors hindering China’s economic and social development as well as the improvement of its people’s living standard. To implement its strategy of developing the western regions and promoting harmonious development, China is in urgent need of an integrated eco-economy management model to prevent and manage soil degradation.

I. Soil Degradation in China

A. Soil Degradation Analysis

1. Soil Erosion Trend Analysis The Second National Soil Erosion Survey found the soil loss in China dropped by 3% from the late 1980s to 3,560,000 sq km; 1,650,000 sq km of this loss was due to water erosion, and 1,910,000 sq km due to wind erosion. The land loss caused by a combination of water and wind erosion was 260,000 sq km. The loss to water erosion decreased from 1,790,000 sq km at the end of the 1980s to 1,650,000 sq km, down by 140,000 sq km. In terms of intensity, mid-level water erosion was reduced from 880,000 sq km in the 1980s to 820,000 sq km, and high-level water erosion declined from 380,000 sq km in the 1980s to 270,000 sq km. However, wind erosion grew from 1,880,000 sq km in the late 1980s to 1,910,000 sq km, up by 30,000 sq km. Mid-level wind erosion increased from 940,000 sq km to 1,120,000 sq km, and high level wind erosion from 660,000 sq km to 870,000 sq km. 234 bao xiaobin

2. Desertifi cation Trend Analysis According to the Third National Desertifi cation Survey done in 2004, 27.46% of the land in the country was claimed by desertifi cation; this comes to a total of 2.636,200 sq km. Wind erosion accounted for 69.77% of this area, or 1,839,400 sq km; water erosion 9.84%, or an area of 259,300 sq km; salinization consumed 6.59%, or an area of 173,800 sq km; and 13.80%, or an area of 363,700 sq km, was lost through vegetation being killed by rapid cycles of freezing and thawing. Before the end of the 1990s, desertifi cation in China had been growing faster than the country’s capacity to management it. The average annual increase of land claimed by the desert amounted to 1,500 sq km in the 1950s, 2,100 km2 by the end of the 1980s, and in the 1990s, the fi gure was as high as 2,460 sq km. The annual loss of cropland, grassland, and forest to desertifi cation was equivalent to a mid-sized county. The years since the 1990s have witnessed 23 extreme sandstorms, a leap from the sandstorm frequency in the 60s, the 70s, and the 80s, when there were only 8, 13 and 14 sandstorms, respectively. The last fi ve decades saw over 7,720,000 hectares of farmland degraded; another 670,000 hectares of cropland and 2,350,000 hectares of grassland became desert. Desertifi cation is causing China a direct economic loss of 54 billion RMB every year, and the indirect loss is 2 to 10 times higher. In 2004, desertifi cation across the country was reduced by 37,924 sq km from 1990, an annual reduction of 2,585 sq km. Land lost to wind erosion was down by 33,673 sq km, and losses from water erosion by 5,535 sq km. However, salinization took an additional 930 sq km. Slight desertifi cation was up by 90,700 sq km, moderate desertifi cation up by 117,300 sq km, severe desertifi cation down by 131,700 sq km, and very severe desertifi cation down by 114,200 sq km.

B. Soil Degradation—A Regional Comparison

1. Regional Comparison of Erosion Most soil erosion in China occurs in the country’s central and western regions. Erosion in western China is as much as 2,937,400 sq km, accounting for 82.6% of the country’s total. Water erosion is 1,068,400 sq km, and wind erosion is 1,868,900 sq km, accounting for 64.8%, and 98.0% of the country’s total respectively. Provinces with over 100,000 land resource protection and management in china 235

Table 1. Erosion and Its Structure by Region (1,000 sq km) regions water erosion wind erosion total erosion east 196.5 14.6 211.1 middle 383.9 23.2 407.1 west 1,068.4 1,868.9 2,937.4 Total PRC 1,648.8 1,906.7 3,555.6 sq km of eroded land include Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan, Yunnan, Shaanxi and Tibet.

2. Regional Comparison of Desertifi cation Desertifi cation occurs in 498 counties of 18 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions where natural and economic environments are relatively poor and the ecology is fragile. Provinces experiencing signifi - cant desertifi cation include Hebei, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Liaoning, Jilin, Shandong, Henan, Hainan, Sichuan, Yunnan, Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Beijing and Tianjin. However, desertifi cation is most acute in only eight of them; these account for 98.45% of the country’s total area lost to the desertifi cation. The other 10 places account for the remaining 1.55%. The eight hardest hit provinces include Xinjiang with 1,071,600 sq km lost to desertifi cation; Inner Mongolia, which lost 622,400; Tibet, with 433,500; Gansu, which lost 193,500 sq km; Qinghai, which suffered a loss of 191,700 sq km; Shaanxi, with a total loss of 299,000 sq km; Ningxia, with losses of 297,000 sq km; and Hebei with 232,000 sq km of land lost to desertifi - cation. 16 provinces (municipalities/autonomous regions) such as Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang saw a decline of desertifi ed land in 2004 over 1999. The reduction in Inner Mongolia is 16,059 sq km and 14,226 sq km in Xinjiang. Other provinces showed declines in desertifi cation as well: 4,029 sq km in Hebei, 2,329 sq km in Ningxia, 1,900 sq km in Gansu, 1,257 sq km in Shaanxi, 772 sq km in Liaoning, 231 sq km in Jilin, and 149 sq km in Shanxi. Lands changed through desertifi cation fall in to four categories. These categories were established through studies of desertifi cation dynamics conducted since 1999. First are areas where the situation has been improving, with reductions in land becoming sandy, increases in vegetation coverage and better ecology. Kerqin sandland, Ningxia plantation, and the south edge of the Maowusu Desert are in this 236 bao xiaobin category. Second are areas claimed by the latest desert expansion, but which have begun recovering. The Hunshandake Desert and Bashang Grassland in Hebei Province belong to this group. Desert expansion in these two areas has been curbed, vegetation restored, and ecology remarkably improved due to a Beijing-Tianjin sand control project. Third are areas where desertifi cation used to be severe, but where the process is slowing. Areas such as the lower reaches of the Tarim River and the Heihe River fall into in this category. Emergency water transmission and management has brought increased vegetation recovery and slowed down degradation, but full restoration of the land has a long way to go. Fourth are areas where desertifi cation continues to expand. Under this category are the Minqin Oasis in Gansu, the source region of the Yangtze, Yellow, and Langcang rivers, and the Shouqu region of Yellow river. The improper use of resources and drought have caused the continuous expansion of desertifi cation and expanded degradation of the local ecology in these places.

C. Causes of Soil Degradation Both natural factors, like dry climates, and human-induced factors, like unsuitable economic practices, contribute to land degradation. The main reasons are as follows:

1. An Impractical Crop Planting Structure and Farming System In some farming areas, an ill-conceived crop planting structure and farming system upset the balance between the land’s ecosystem and other environmental elements. This led to reductions in productivity, land degradation, erosion and even desertiﬁ cation.

2. Massive Forest and Grassland Clearance for Farmland Expansion In arid, semi-arid, and sub-humid zones that are naturally unsuitable for farming, large areas of unprotected forest and grassland are cleared for farmland, leading to ecological deterioration. In the areas suffering from land degradation, and especially desertiﬁ ed areas, coal is hard to get due to an economic underdevelopment and poor transportation, forcing farmers and herdsmen to rely largely on plants, and livestock or poultry manure for fuels. Their ﬁ rewood collection techniques usually include uprooting trees. This causes serious damage to the soil and groundcover, which allows wind to turn large areas of stabilized and semi-stabilized sand into shifting or blowing sand. land resource protection and management in china 237

3. Serious Overgrazing Utilization of unprotected grassland has reduced its productivity. Driven by population growth and market interests, herdsmen blindly increase their livestock holdings, exceeding the grasslands’ carrying capacity. Overgrazing damages the surface of these lands, making them vulnerable to wind erosion and desertiﬁ cation. Since 1949, the livestock population in China has increased from 29 million to over 90 million animals, while grassland has decreased by 6.67 million hectares due to human damage and natural desertiﬁ cation. In spite of this, overgrazing continues to intensify.

4. Unsuitable Exploitation of Water Resources Large scale development of ground water in some areas has dramatically reduced the ground water level. As a result, large areas of sand plants die. In dry inland regions, rivers and lakes are being drained, and deserts expanding, due to over consumption of water in areas which supply these areas with river water. Over exploitation has also caused the death of plants. In some midsize and large irrigation areas where unsuitable irrigation practices are practiced, rising groundwater is causing secondary soil salinization.

II. Progress in the Protection and Management of Land Resources in China

A. The Process of Protecting and Managing Land Resources Over the past fi ve decades land management has evolved in China. Measures countering the degradation of land now work within a framework that respects both the laws of nature and economics. Manage- ment systems have moved beyond narrow, case-specifi c tactics to tactics and strategies that address an entire ecological segment. Traditional approaches have given way to methods applying advanced technologies and cutting-edge management models. Solely depending on government management has relaxed to allow for a wider and more fl exible array of administrative, economic, and legal instruments to come to bear on various problems. Simple, one-dimensional approaches have been replaced by approaches that stress prevention, and make use of ongoing management efforts. Even prevention efforts have gone the extra step of integrating development needs; the demands of ecological constraints, social benefi t, and economic goals are more effectively coordinated. 238 bao xiaobin

Management of soil and water erosion in China has undergone the following four phases: testing an area, emphasizing a target for treatment, promotion of treatment efforts, and realizing improvements. Currently twenty-fi ve key erosion management areas cover seven nationwide watersheds, for a total managed area of 520,000 square kilometers. Within non-key areas under management, rehabilitation is being set up for more than 11,000 rivers and their basins, covering an area of 400,000 sq km. More than 3,000 of these rivers have been rehabilitated and tested according to various criteria. Over the past fi ve decades, erosion management has played a crucial role in improving the farming conditions in mountain areas, alleviating silt runoff, while boosting rural economic development. In general, robust soil and water erosion programs have led to great progress in poverty reduction across the country. Statistics show that China is scaling up erosion control efforts. Between 1950 and 1985, the accumulated area under management grew to 338,400 sq km. On average, 9,400 sq km were rehabilitated each year. During the period 1986–2000, an additional 535,700 sq km came under management efforts. In this fi fteen year period, the annual average rehabilitated area reached 35,700 sq km, more than 3.7 times the rate achieved in the previous 35 year period. Over the most last 15 years the total area successfully rehabilitated has reached 175,400 sq km. During the Eighth Five-Year Plan on the National Economy and Social Development (aka, “the Eighth Five-Year Plan”), the total rehabilitated area is 30.6% greater than that achieved in the period covered by the Seventh Five-Year Plan. Note that the total of 226,000 sq km achieved in the Ninth Five-Year Plan represents an increase of 28.86% over the total achieved in the Eighth Five-Year Plan. These trends are summarized in Table 2:

Table 2. Rehabilitated Soil and Water Erosion Areas Time Period Total Rehabilitated Growth Rate % Percentage of Area (1,000 sq km) Accumulated Rehabilitated Area 7th 5-Yr Plan 134.3 15.4 – 8th 5-Yr Plan 175.4 30.6 20.1 9th 5-Yr Plan 226.0 28.8 25.8 Source: Department of Water and Soil Conservation, Ministry of Water Resources, 2000. land resource protection and management in china 239

In the 21st century, China has further intensiﬁ ed its efforts in integrated management of soil degradation. Areas under management have grown more extensive, as evidenced by the breadth and number of newly launched projects: the Soil-retaining Dam Project in the Loess Plateau; the Pilot Project on Integrated Management of Soil-Water Erosion in the Chernozem Areas of Northeast China; the Pilot Project on Integrated Management of Soil and Water Conservation in the Karst Regions of the South and North Forks of the Panjiang River in the Upper Reaches of the Pearl River; and the Key Construction Project on National Water and Soil Conservation based on the previous Key National Prevention and Control Project in the eight regions.1 Mean- while, more efforts have been made to strengthen the Key Prevention and Control Projects on Water and Soil Conservation in the middle and upper reaches of the Yangtze River and the Yellow River; the Rehabilitation Project in the Beijing-Tianjin Dust and Sandstorms (DSS) Source Region; the Water and Soil Conservation Project for the Program for Sustainable Use of Water Resources in the Capital; the Ecological Project Using Seabuckthorn in the Soft Rock Regions in Shanxi, Shaanxi, and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region; the Local Key Prevention and Control Projects on Water and Soil Conservation ﬁ nanced by national treasury bonds; and the National Water and Soil Conservation Program of the Agricultural Development, to name just a few. A historic breakthrough was scored in ecological rehabilitation in 2002. Rehabilitation was completed in an area of 5.1212 million hectares covering 128 pilot counties spread across 29 provinces, including autonomous regions and municipalities. The people’s government in the provinces of Beijing, Hebei, Shaanxi, Qinghai, and Ningxia announced resolutions prohibiting access to hillside and mountain pastures for grazing. This directive covers 25 prefectures and 197 counties. In subsequent years this policy has been adopted by 697 counties and 136 prefectures in 20 provinces and autonomous regions, including Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Liaoning, Jiangxi, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Sichuan, and Gansu. The total area affected by the grazing prohibition covers 520,000 sq km.

1 The eight regions of China are Western Northwest, Eastern Northwest, North, Northeast, Tibet, Southwest, East, and South. 240 bao xiaobin

B. Measures Protecting and Managing Land Resources Obeying the laws of nature and employing a more systemic view of the various factors at work in desertifi cation allows managers to be more comprehensive in dealing with this phenomenon. These efforts combine managed rehabilitation with human-facilitated natural rehabilitation. Methods vary widely. Some intervention focuses on biological measures such as planting trees and growing grass. Other methods use administrative steps to encourage natural rehabilitation, like barring the use of hillsides to facilitate natural reforestation. Engineering measures such as soil-retaining dams and diversionary dams have been used. Even farming has been integrated into rehabilitation efforts. An inclusive planning and rehabilitation system covering hills, watersheds, forests, farmland, and roads has been established based around the new perspective of seeing sloped farmland and small river basins as linked. A system has been set up to involve farming households, larger business enterprises, and communities, as well as government in undertaking land resource protection and management. Through contracting, auctioning, and leasing degraded land, and setting up shareholding cooperative bodies to manage degraded land, the system emphasizes the optimal allocation of land resources to address the mismatch of resources. Through this process degraded land is turned into a competitive productive resource that brings benefi ts to the aforementioned parties. With land producing value, and with a clearer set of ownership rights and responsibilities falling to those reaping the benefi ts, land quality is protected. With the market economy forging ahead, the management of degraded land is conducted in a manner characterized by regionalized production, economies of scale in what is produced, and, therefore, intensive and highly productive use of land put into such operations. Moreover, the practice known as “Integrating and Extending the Three Dimen- sions” is an effective means for achieving land resource protection and management because it improves the eco-environment alongside industrial development. As well, resources are developed and brought up to a higher level, which contributes to regional economies. These efforts help to alleviate poverty. This approach should be more widely applied in agriculture, non-agricultural sectors, and even the national the broader market. During the period 1950–2000, an accumulated soil and water erosion area of 85.9 million hectares has been rehabilitated, including 13.333 million hectares of basic farmland, 43.333 million hectares of water and soil conservation forest, 4.667 million hectares of export agriculture land resource protection and management in china 241

5.0% 50.5% 5.4%

15.5%

23.5% Basic Farmland Export Ag/Fruit Orchard Grassland Water & Soil Conservation Forest Miscellaneous

Pie Chart 1: Category and Proportion of Completed Rehabilitative Measures and fruit orchards, 4.333 million hectares of grassland, and 1,403 key projects for gully erosion control, as well as a large number of modest water conservation projects. The proportion of each rehabilitative measure is as shown above in Pie Chart 1.

C. The Effects of Protecting and Managing Land Resources By the end of 2003, the accumulated rehabilitated soil and water erosion area in China amounted to 897,000 sq km, more than twice the area rehabilitated as of 1982. Note that rehabilitation of small river basins reached 356,000 sq km, or about 40% of the total. As shown below in Graph 3, the rate of rehabilitation has not slowed over the long term. For instance, the rehabilitation rate climbed from 39.0% in 1990 to 54.4% in 2003, an increase of 15.4 percentage points. Water and soil conservation facilities currently in place have an annual silt blocking and storage capacity of 1.5 billion tons, with an extra water storage capacity of 25 billion cubic meters; taken together these measures reduce the fl ow of silt into the Yellow River by 300 million tons. Through comprehensive control measures applied to small river basins, promotion of cost-effective agriculture and animal husbandry, more than 25 million mu (4.12 million acres) of steeply sloped farmland was turned into forests in targeted areas. Another 100,000 sq km of land has been sealed off in order to support the reestablishment of forests and grasslands. These steps produced defi nite market benefi ts: more than 40 million people gained access to food and clothing. The solid foundation laid by these steps has helped to achieve sustainable social and economic development in areas affected by soil and water erosion. 242 bao xiaobin

20000 18000 16000 14000 12000 10000 8000 6000 4000

Per Ten Thousand Hectares Ten Per 2000 0 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Soil-Water Erosion Area Rehabilitated Area

Graph 1. Soil-Water Erosion Area VS Rehabilitated Area in China

Since launching its economic reform program and opening-up the country in the late 1970s, China has achieved remarkable gains in combating desertifi cation, thanks to the development strategy that aggressively addresses ecological restoration and development with a comprehensive, multi-pronged strategy. Through these efforts, various types of desertifi cation have been brought under control; in essence, gains through ecological management and destruction from abusive practices and natural effects are locked in a dead heat. In some regions where pilot or key projects were conducted, a new trend can be observed where “people advance and the sand retreats,” which has effectively ended the era when “people retreat as the sand advances.” Increasingly saline and alkaline concentrations pose an especially diffi cult reclamation problem. But even here, the overall trend has improved. In 1990 4.995 million hectares had been reclaimed; by 2003 the total reclaimed amount had climbed to 5.90 million hectares, an increase of 18.1%. The rate of reclamation in the same period rose from 66.3% to 76.4%. In 2003, the dynamic monitoring system for soil erosion and water depletion in the key watersheds, regions, national eco-construction projects, ecological rehabilitation projects, and other construction projects demonstrated that the affected erosion area in the Three Gorges Res- ervoir areas shrank from 38,800 sq km in the mid-1980s to 29,600 sq km in 2000, down by 23.9%. Notably, soil and water erosion intensity land resource protection and management in china 243 dropped as well. The overall eco-environments improved. From the mid-1980s to 2000, in the Beijing-Tianjin Dust and Sandstorm Source region, the area affected by water depletion and drainage decreased by 14.2%. However, the wind erosion area increased by 4.4%. To treat this problem, an emergency water-transfer project was launched to feed the Tarim River’s lower reaches, which helped water and soil conservation efforts and ecological rehabilitation. Natural vegetation in the area increased by 18,000 hectares, the area of sandland decreased by 33,700 hectares, and strong rebounds in groundwater level, water content in the soil, and vegetation coverage could be observed as well. China’s mid-west regions suffered the most soil-water erosion. The eastern regions, however, enjoyed the fastest rehabilitation rate. The soil and water erosion area in the eastern regions stood at 281,700 sq km, or 7.7% of the country’s total. This is largely offset by rehabilitation in the region: 191,200 sq km, or 21.9%, of the country’s total rehabilitated areas lie in the east. The rehabilitation rate is 67.87%. Soil and water erosion in the central regions amounted to 1.3217 million sq km, or 36.1% of the country’s total. 322,700 sq km had been rehabilitated, or 36.9% of the country’s total. The rehabilitation rate in the region stood at 24.42%. The most active region for erosion is the west, with 2.0579 million sq km, or 56.2% of the country’s total, being affected. 360,200 sq km have been rehabilitated; this comprises 41.2% of the total rehabilitated area. The rehabilitation rate is 17.50%. These details are restated in Table 3 for easy comparison:

Table 3. Comparison of Soil and Water Erosion Areas with Rehabilitated Areas in Three Regions Regions Soil-Water Erosion Rehabilitated Rehabilitation Area Area Area % of Area % of Rate (%) (1,000 PRC (1,000 PRC sq km) sq km) Eastern 281.7 7.7 191.2 21.9 67.9 Central 1321.7 36.1 322.7 36.9 24.4 Western 2,057.9 56.2 360.2 41.2 17.5 Total 3,661.3 100.0* 874.1 100.0* 23.9

Source: Department of Water and Soil Conservation, Ministry of Water Resources, 2001. * Note that some rounding error exists. 244 bao xiaobin

III. Analysis of Factors Affecting the Protection and Treatment of Land Resources

A. Institutions and Policies Since initiating economic reform and opening China, the leadership has enacted and promulgated a wide range of measures aimed at improving land and water resource management. These edicts include: the Water and Soil Conservation Law, the Regulations for the Implementation of Water and Soil Conservation Law, the Desertifi cation Prevention and Control Law, the Environmental Assessment Law, and the Regulations for the Implementation of Forestry Management Law. Administrators have also revised the Grassland Law; issued a State Council Notice on Banning the Collection and Selling of “Hairy Grass”;2 proscribed Arbitrarily Digging Up Licorice Root and Herba Ephedrae; and adopted a series of measures to improve the environment and benefi t farmers. Taking these steps has formed a solid framework for legislation and policy focused on environmental improvement and economic development. These laws and regulations set clear land resource protection goals, which include protecting the quantity of land resources, maintaining their production potential, and protecting the land’s capability to improve productivity. These legislative and administrative efforts ensure the effective implementation of land degradation control in China. The control of water loss and soil erosion in China has been co- fi nanced by the central government, local governments, and the public. Using prices in 2000 as a base, the accumulated investment in water and soil conservation and restoration was 196.88 billion RMB for the period 1950–2000. The central government invested 13.669 billion RMB of this total, local governments contributed 18.345 billion RMB, and the public supplied 164.866 billion RMB, mostly in the form of labor. The public contribution makes up a whopping 83.74% of the total; local government contributed a relatively modest 9.32%, with the central government covered the remaining 6.94%. China has also increased its outlays to deal with water loss and soil erosion. In 1983, 30 million RMB went to such efforts; by 2003 the sum had reached 1.32 billion

2 “Hair-like Grass” or “Hairy Grass” grows in semi-deserts. It is a highly valued ingredient in Cantonese cuisine. Unfortunately, cutting and digging up this kind of grass speeds up desertiﬁ cation. land resource protection and management in china 245

RMB. The government has identiﬁ ed water and soil conservation as key economic and social development projects in the 21st century. Both points are included it in the 10th Five-year Plan (2001–2005). As an important component of western development strategy, strategic goals and concrete actions have been identiﬁ ed.

B. Development of Science and Technology China has launched many key projects aimed at curbing soil loss and water depletion. These including building a massive shelter forest system to protect natural forests, returning farmlands to forests and grasslands, protecting and developing grasslands, combating desertifi cation, comprehensively treating water and land loss, and comprehensively applying remedial measures for inland rivers and lakes.3 Many demonstration areas in different biological climate belts have been set up, adopting ecological protection and restoration techniques to combat land degradation, including soil transformation, restoration and reconstruction of vegetation, land degradation control, small watershed management, and land reclamation. Meanwhile, many technologies have been applied to the treatment of regional desertifi cation, including high sand dikes alongside other types of sand barriers, chemical sand fi xation, biological sand fi xation, straw-laced sand-barriers, high-yield agriculture in sandy areas, planting fruit trees in sandy areas, and improvement of grasslands threatened by desertifi cation. With the application of these technologies, the model of land degradation control that suits the local natural and social conditions can be established. In each case, these techniques yield economic returns, benefi cial social effects, and environmental benefi ts.

C. Management of the Market Economy China has adopted a new tax policy that reduces taxes and the collection of money through fees. It has also established land use rights and a more market-oriented system by which those who invest in a project or improvement reap the beneﬁ ts of their investment. These changes further imply that those who pollute the environment should

3 Some of these efforts are detailed in this volume. 246 bao xiaobin be responsible its rehabilitation. The point has been to adopt preferential economic policies, which establish the incentive mechanism to mobilize the public to participate in the protection and treatment of land resources. Uncultivated lands are not only the target of land resource control efforts, but they are also sought after by parties wishing to employ these lands profi tably. To optimize the utilization of these resources, their property rights should be identifi ed through market-based institutions and mechanisms. Given the differences of production conditions and industrialization in rural areas, there could be different models for transferring property rights of land resources among different regions. Along these lines, property rights could be transferred through fl exible measures in order to achieve the desired results for controlling and correcting land and water degradation, while fulfi lling the aims of industrial restructuring. Such approaches could include land subcontracting, transferring land use rights, stock purchasing, leasing, and other types of contracting to ensure effective utilization of these resources.

D. Diversifi cation of Investment Land degradation control should be co-fi nanced by the central government, local governments, communities, and individuals. While increasing the input from the central government, fi scal departments at various levels should allocate money when necessary, and local fundraising should be encouraged. Efforts should be made to encourage the public’s participation in providing various forms of labor and volunteer work. Private fi nancial investment has a role to play as well. Creating long- term, zero-interest and/or low-interest loans to support ecological work and investment should be made available to encourage enterprises and the public to sign contracts for large areas of uncultivated land and to encourage enterprises to establish production bases through such fi nancing. China has established a partnership with the Global Environment Facility (GEF) to deal with land degradation in arid areas. Coopera- tive projects have been established in Xinjiang, Gansu, Qinghai, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, and Shaanxi. Leadership groups to manage project coordination have been established through the central government to serve the aforementioned six provinces and the regions affected by the projects implemented in these provinces. In addition, expert groups in executing strategic plans in controlling land degradation and drafting land resource protection and management in china 247 legal frameworks and regulations addressing these issues have been established in these provinces and regions.

IV. Improvement in the Protection and Treatment of Land Resources

A. Problems in the Protection and Treatment of Land Resources Land degradation has become one of the most severe ecological problems in China. Although it has been contained in some areas, it is worsening in the most serious degradation areas and less developed areas. Currently the most pressing problems are: 1. Large areas—some 2 million sq km—of degraded land that have not be addressed through reclamation and rehabilitation efforts, which means that achieving a signiﬁ cant impact on this land will require nearly a half-century given current levels of progress; 2. The continuing high intensity of water loss and soil erosion in the hardest hit locations. The most seriously degraded areas have not been given priority for concentrated treatment; more troubling is that degradation has not been halted in these cases; 3. The blind and single-minded pursuit of regional economic development has led to the destruction of land and water resources, which totally undermines control and rehabilitation efforts. Economic pressures exert sustained pressure on water and land resources, and the entire ecological environment; 4. The model of land degradation control has yet to effectively address the incursion of monopoly control of uncultivated land and mountains by those who just happen to have the deepest pockets, and not the most extensive knowledge of resource use. Poor farmers, many of whom have rich experience in land degradation treatment, are marginalized in such cases, and their skill, knowledge, and insight do not come to bear on resolving land and water resource problems. Control and rehabilitation systems need to be strengthened so that they can effectively address these major problems. 248 bao xiaobin

B. Measures for Sustainable Use of Land Resources Land degradation control is an engineering system focusing on the restoration and improvement of the ecological environment, which combines resource and industrial development. It requires systemic innovation mechanisms in the ﬁ elds of investment, management, and motivation to effectively control land degradation and utilize land sustainability.

1. Optimizing the Structure of Agriculture, Forestry and Animal Husbandry Agricultural restructuring not only includes returning farmland to grassland and forests—along with efforts to restructure systems of planting, harvest, and animal husbandry—it also embraces many large-scale infrastructural investments. These include the construction of reservoirs, drainage systems, and even a massive shelter forest system to improve agricultural conditions in a broader ecological sense. Natural grassland should be improved and manmade grassland and forage bases should be developed. Forestation and forest structure can be improved by increasing farmland-protection forests, forests for water and soil conservation, commercial forests, and fuel-wood forests. The planting of trees, shrubs, and grass should be combined, and conifer and broadleaved mixed forests should be expanded to promote the resilience of these forests. To improve the quality and productivity of farmland, planting technology, based on the complex and varied patterns seen in natural grasslands and forests, should be applied. Planting of multiple species in the same plots, and avoidance of mono-cropping, should be advocated and widely implemented.

2. Promoting the Development of Key Projects to Treat Land Degradation Focus should be put on key projects aimed at water and soil conservation, and sand control. These projects should be developed in a stable way by formulating an accountability system, creating a process for continual improvement of the techniques being applied, giving priority to high quality and effective projects, strictly managing capital and costs, and achieving measurable, substantive outcomes in resource protection. Demonstration areas for water and soil conservation and sand control should be established to kick-start the diffusion of innovations that work well. This will help to form a new pattern of development with extensive coverage in land degradation treatment. land resource protection and management in china 249

3. Strengthening Management by Legal Means in Land Degradation Treatment Enforcement is vital in the control of land degradation. Bans on farming, grazing, and woodcutting should be strictly implemented. Exploiting land resources in a destructive fashion should be stopped. Furthermore, the public must be better informed about laws and regulations. In order to standardize production and construction activities in degraded land areas so that they meet legal standards, articles about the control of land degradation should be included in villages’ rules and regulations.

4. Exploring Institutional Innovation in Land Degradation Treatment Governments in various areas should establish standardized resource utilization compensation and ecological benefi ts compensation mechanisms. That is, they should reward those who have made remarkable contributions to the improvement of the ecological environment. This could be done by letting those who have contributed to improvement and reclamation efforts take over the production of uncultivated land and waiving use taxes on that land for a limited time, perhaps years. On the other hand, those who destroy the environment should face heavy fi nes for such acts. Fine amounts should at least equal the sum needed to compensate injured parties and/or the costs of clean up. In order to adjust the relationship amongst interests which operate and manage ecological resources and those who benefi t from them, a more rational compensation mechanism should be established in areas affl icted by land degradation.

5. Establishing Technology Systems for Land Degradation Treatment Modern technologies for water and soil conservation and sand control should be applied to areas damaged by these processes. Technological dissemination should be strengthened. Cutting edge farming techniques, such as multi-crop plantings and other ecologically sensitive approaches, should be established in areas suffering the effects of degradation. Meanwhile, monitoring and early warning systems for land degradation should be improved, and the development of key projects should be closely monitored to scientiﬁ cally evaluate and assess the execution of projects.

6. Supporting Capacity Building of the Main Players in Land Degradation Treatment Capacity building is a crucial factor in the sustainable utilization of land. The treatment of land degradation requires the participation of 250 bao xiaobin government agencies in the ﬁ elds of agriculture, forestry, environmental protection, water conservancy and land resources; enterprises of all sorts that either make their wealth from land use or use land and water resources to handle the byproducts of production; and farmers, since they not only work the land but also feel the effects of environmental damage most directly. Along with improving their capacities, government agencies should provide training and educational programs for the main players in land degradation control. The aim here should be to encourage the participation and cooperation of all stakeholders in ensuring the development and implementation of effective control of land degradation measures.

References

Fan Shengyue et al., The Eco-economic model and Institutional Choice in China’s Sand Control Projects, Science Press, 2005. Liu Xiangnan et al., “Analysis of Mechanisms for Regional Ecological-Environmental Degradation through Changes in Land Use” Journal of Northeast Normal University, no. 2 (2002). Liu Yuzhen et al., “My Opinions on Desertifi cation and Regional Economic Develop- ment” Journal of Henan University, no. 4 (2001): 75–81. The Ministry of Water Resources, Report on China’s water and soil conservation monitoring, 2004. The State Environment Protection Administration, Warnings on China’s Ecological Environ- ment, China Environmental Sciences Press, 2003. The State Forestry Administration, Report on China’s Desertifi cation, 2005. Wang Qiubing, Study on Land Resource, China Agriculture Press, 2005. Zhang Dinglong, “China’s Desertifi cation and its Treatment,” Macroeconomic Manage- ment, no. 3 (2000): 20–24. Zhou Huanshui, et al., “Areas of Desertifi cation in China and the Characteristics of Their Expansion” Discovery of Nature, no. 4 (1998): 60–61.

“GREAT LEAP FORWARD”-STYLE RUSH TO URBANIZE PUTS ENVIRONMENT IN THE SPOTLIGHT

Zhou Weifeng

Rapid urbanization has emerged as one of the driving forces of China’s economic and social development since the 1980s. This has translated into graver and graver environmental problems: in only twenty years, Chinese cities have racked up environmental problems on a scale that industrialized countries took a century to reach. In the wake of this crisis, China needs a new urbanization model that enables cities to develop in harmony with the environment.

I. Current State of the Urbanization Process: an Overview

China’s urban population has jumped from 170 million to 540 million between 1978 and 2004 (Ministry of Construction ﬁ gures), an urbanization rate of 41.8%, with the total number of cities rising from 193 to 661.1 Cities are expanding in physical size too. Taking the total 2003 populations of all districts under each city’s jurisdiction, 11 Chinese cities boast populations of over 4 million, and another 22 of between 2 and 4 million.2 Urbanization has become a driver of Chinese economic growth. International experience tells us that cities gather factors of production together, with the resulting vast demand for infrastructure investment giving strong economic growth incentives. The same has held true in China, where large-scale government infrastructure projects and consumer housing credit have made real estate a major growth engine since 1998. Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz sees the two decisive drivers of

1 “Urban Development Results: 49 Mega-cities with Population of over 1 million,” http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2005–11/09/content_3754779.htm (accessed November 9, 2005). 2 National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook 2004, (Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House, 2004). 252 zhou weifeng the world economy in the 21st century as none other than American high-tech industry and urbanization in China. Some of the features of the Chinese urbanization process, compared to its international peers, are as follows:

A. Government-driven Urbanization Since urbanization took off nationwide in the late 1990s, heavy government investment in urban infrastructure, particularly in amenities, has directly fuelled urban and industrial development. In recent years public opinion has rallied around the idea of bigger and more prosperous cities. Many of these have set sky-high ambitions: over 100 of China’s 600-odd conurbations are planning to become “international- ized” cities.

B. Expanding Urban Areas Few cities have been principally relying on building up the area of the city proper, with most cities instead preferring new satellite towns or development zones outside it, especially given that this latter mode allows local governments to cash in:

Local government revenue from granting land leases (nationwide total, RMB billion)3

1998 50.7 1999 52.1 2000 62.5 2001 131.8 2002 245.2 2003 570.5

A “City-Building Movement” has quickly come into being, with a wave of major development projects and city developers. The story has been the same throughout eastern, central and western China, a case in point being Wuhan New Area, launched in 2005, which covers nearly the same total area, 368 km2, as the whole of the three towns making up

3 Xie Fuzhan, deputy director, Development Research Center of the State Council, “The 11th Five-Year Plan and Mid- and Long-term Development Strategy for Cities,” September 16, 2005. “great leap forward” 253 the original city of Wuhan. Some government ofﬁ cials view large-scale urban projects as vital for proving their achievements, with feasibility in environmental and resource terms simply not ranking as a priority.

C. High-speed Urbanization Developed countries took a long time to become urbanized on a large scale. The UK took nearly ninety years to bring its urbanization rate up from 26% to 70%, while France (25.5% to 71.7%) and the US (25.7% to 75.2%) needed over a hundred. China has been a different story. Urbanization rates have increased by 0.92% annually from 1978 to 1997, and 1.4% thereafter. The rate varies regionally: well-off eastern China has moved faster than central and western China, with city clusters emerging in the Pearl and Yangtze River deltas and the Bohai Rim. Urbanization in these regions looks set to accelerate even further.

II. Environmental Consequences of City Development

As population, economic and social centers, cities exert the highest pressure on the environment. The 2005 World Environment Day had “Green Cities” as its theme, emphasizing the growing importance of environmental protection to global development. Pollution in Chinese cities is currently worsening, however. Black spots have spread from a minority of cities to even far-ﬂ ung conurbations, and the range of pollutants is widening too. While China’s urbanization process began relatively late, in just two decades a panoply of environmental problems have reared their heads—problems ranging across whole swathes of history that developed countries have undergone. China’s environmental challenges are unique in their complexity and gravity, and unparalleled in any industrialization and urbanization experience anywhere else. The most pressing environmental problems are currently the following:

A. Increasingly Dire Air Pollution The State Environmental Protection Administration’s Report on Envi- ronmental Protection in Chinese Cities ( June 2005) rates China’s cities as having generally poor air quality. On the national scale of Grade I (least polluted) to Grade V (most severely polluted), only 38.6% of the 500 cities assessed in 2004 managed at least a Grade II rating, 254 zhou weifeng while over one-ﬁ fth of urban residents are breathing severely polluted air every single day. Pollutants include soot, acid rain, photochemical smog and dust particles; physical, chemical and biological processes turn these into compound pollution. Air pollution is directly proportional to area; large cities are much more heavily affected than medium and small ones. One prominent result is haze, which has covered large areas along the Yellow Sea and Yangtze and Pearl River deltas in recent years. The problem is especially in urban cluster regions: the Pearl River delta, for example, is plagued by haze all year long, and haze from the region now even affects Hong Kong. The impact of worsening indoor air pollution cannot be overlooked either, as urban residents spend most of their time indoors. Urban air pollution has taken a huge toll in health terms. Wang Jin- nan, Chief Engineer at the Environment Planning Institute, cites 2003 research saying that 300,000 people die every year from outdoor air pollution, and 111,000 people from the indoor variant.4 Despite some evidence still being incomplete, it is certain that air pollution harms urban residents more than rural ones, as the phenomenon is generally worse in cities.

B. Rapidly Deteriorating Water Quality Another challenge that burgeoning cities have posed for sustainable development is their pressure on water resources. Some cities discharge untreated or poorly treated wastewater directly into natural rivers, resulting in 90% of the rivers around them being polluted and the eutrophication of 75% of lakes. This puts yet heavier pressure on water resources. The quality of groundwater is also dropping. Wang Jinnan cites test results from 118 large and medium-sized cities showing that most groundwater is now polluted. Groundwater pollutants in some cities far exceed acceptable standards and the trend remains negative;5 northern cities all exceed acceptable levels, despite some variations between them. Over 70,000 km2 of water in the Haihe River alone

4 “400,000 People Dying from Air Pollution in China,” www.bbcchinese.com (accessed October 25, 2005). 5 “Environmental Experts: Problems in Water Use in Cities,” http://www.people. com.cn/GB/huanbao/8220/30473/36260/36283/2690878.html (accessed August 6, 2004). “great leap forward” 255 fails to meet Level III standards. Beijing’s groundwater is extensively polluted, with large areas severely afﬂ icted. This all severely endangers urban drinking water supplies. Mao Rubai, head of the National People’s Congress Committee on Envi- ronmental and Resources Protection, states that only 28.3% of potable water sources are “good” in 46 major cities, with 26.1% “fairly good” and 45.6% “poor.”6 Sampling by SEPA and the Yellow River Basin Water Resources Protection Bureau has shown that nearly 70% of cities along the Yellow River fail minimum benchmarks for their potable water sources. The cities of Shizui, Baotou and Sanmenxia in the upper-middle reaches of the Yellow River fell foul of these standards every single day in 2004.7 Poor water quality increases treatment costs, and toxic pollutants directly harm human health—WHO research links 80% of human diseases to water pollution. Liu Hongliang from the Chinese Academy of Sciences points out that 2000–odd kinds of organic pollutants have been discovered in water, of which 114 are suspected of links with cancer, birth defects and mutation. Over 100 organic pollutants have been discovered in water sources nationwide.8 Deteriorating water quality also puts pressure on clean water supplies. Southern China is a case in point, with few cities short of water by volume but facing crises in many areas in terms of quality. Even some formerly water-rich regions are suffering from usable water shortages due to pollution. While water quality is a crisis that all rapidly-urbanizing countries face, China’s immense urban population and unsatisfactory environmental protection herald a bigger problem than elsewhere in terms of deteriorating water quality.

C. Surface Subsidence Subsidence has been a major problem as larger cities develop, especially in eastern China. Research on groundwater resources has identiﬁ ed various levels of surface subsidence and ground ﬁ ssuring in over 50 cities. An area of 94,000 km2 suffers from ground subsidence, and over

6 “Water! Another Warning for China,” http://news.xinhuanet.com/report/2005– 08/03/content_3303464.htm (accessed August 3, 2005). 7 China Youth Daily, “Red Light Warning on the Safety of Drinking Water in Several Cities along the Yellow River,” September 6, 2005. 8 “Survey of Current Situation of Water Pollution in China: 360 million People have Difﬁ culty in Seeking Safe Drinking Water,” http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/ 1026/3299359.html (accessed April 6, 2005). 256 zhou weifeng

180 cones of depression now exist over a total of more than 190,000 km2. More than 1400 rock masses have been deformed, and constantly increasing areas are affected by seawater intrusion.9 In Shanghai, for example, mushrooming numbers of high buildings and over-extraction of groundwater since the 1990s has overloaded the ground surface, resulting in an acute subsidence problem. The level sinks by 1 cm annually, threatening the safety of high-rise buildings and the subway system. Similar things have happened in the Bohai Sea Rim and the Yangtze River delta, where close to 10,000 sq. km2 of land has witnessed subsidence of over 200 mm. Subsidence has taken a major economic toll. The Nanjing Institute of Geology and Mineral Resources has identiﬁ ed losses of 315 billion RMB in the Yangtze River delta alone.10

D. Severe Hazards Left Unchecked, Leading to Environmental Disasters Recent years have seen a spate of environmental catastrophes resulting from industrial accidents. These pose a major challenge for the sustainability of urban development and as such deserve to be reﬂ ected on closely. It was only when the Tuojiang River was contaminated in February 2004 that the media started paying attention to China’s widespread and long-standing environmental hazards. Sichuan Chemical Second Fertilizer Company had installed new equipment incorrectly, with failures during the trial run resulting in wastewater discharges containing ten times the acceptable level of nitrogen and high concentrations of ammonia. Unenforced environmental regulations also led to severe pollution in the Tuojiang River basin. The ﬁ nal result was the interruption of water supplies to about one million urban residents, the longest and largest-scale interruption since the 1976 Tangshan earthquake. Shortly thereafter in April 2004, a chlorine leak occurred at Tianyuan Chemical Plant in Chongqing, resulting in 20 direct fatalities, over 300 people poisoned and about 150,000 having to be evacuated. In Novem- ber 2005, an explosion at PetroChina’s benzene plant in Jilin released

9 “Brieﬁ ng on the Survey of the Ground Water Resources and Environment by China Geological Survey,” http://www.cgs.gov.cn/NEWS/Geology%20News/2005/ 20040422/20050422001.htm (accessed April 22, 2005). 10 Wenhui Daily, “RMB 315 billion Losses Caused by Land Subsidence in Yangtze River Delta,” March 24, 2005. “great leap forward” 257 huge quantities of contaminants into the Songhua River, cutting off usable water supplies in cities downstream on a scale surpassing even the Tuojiang River disaster above. This disaster was widely covered at home and abroad and cost Xie Zhenhua, director of SEPA, his job. SEPA revealed on 5 December that year that in the ten days running up to the disaster, several dozen other environmental accidents had occurred across the country. Even more worryingly, the national craze for building heavy chemical facilities is creating new hazards by virtue of the latter’s locations. Petrochemicals is a clear example, with large production bases slated for Liaoning and Guangxi Provinces as well as various coastal cities. All these claim to be “world-class” and the “largest in China,” but most have overlooked environmental factors, and some are even located in nature reserves! With their modern technology, these new large facilities should be capable of meeting emission standards, but should accidents occur in the environmentally sensitive areas where they are located, a calamitous price will be borne in the shape of the resulting pollution. Environmental disasters affect urban residents in two ways: normal activities are rendered impossible, and their health is jeopardized. There are generally long-term effects too, with experts predicting that water quality in the Songhua River, for example, will continue to be affected by its contamination with nitro-benzene and benzene for a long period.

E. Noise Pollution Noise pollution has become a regular feature of the urban environment, in the form of trafﬁ c noise, industrial noise, construction noise and human noise. In many cities, trafﬁ c is the most serious of these. SEPA monitoring shows 108 of 312 cities and counties to be suffering light pollution (34.6%), 9 as having medium pollution (2.9%), and one as having heavy pollution.11 In response, central and some local authorities have issued regulations to prevent and control noise. The city of Tianjin has a Regulation on Environmental Noise Control, and that of Shenyang has included noise control on its legislative agenda for the forthcoming year.

11 “Report on the Quality of the Acoustic Environment in Urban Areas of China in 2004,” State Environmental Protection Administration of China, June 2, 2005. 258 zhou weifeng

As a major disturbance to normal activity and health, noise is a frequent source of complaint in urban areas. In 2004 noise pollution topped the list of environmental complaints by Beijing residents. Heavy noise is proven to lead to nervous symptoms, distraction, and irritability as well as neural, cardiovascular and stomach ailments and peptic ulcers. It also makes it hard to concentrate and can even lead to aggressiveness.

F. Weak Environmental Rights for Urban Residents Framed primarily in engineering terms, the above arguments all essentially go back to the issue of urban citizens’ environmental rights. A groundswell of environmental awareness is now forming, in response to breakneck urbanization that has wreaked immense changes while offering few guarantees for environmental rights. For example, plans for a high-voltage power line near the Baiwang Jiayuan estate in Beijing attracted widespread media and Internet debate in 2004. Disputes started in 2003 over plans for a 3km tunnel in Shekou as part of the Hong Kong-Shenzhen Western Corridor, and the controversy has not yet died down. These and similar incidents can result in a range of social frictions and even threaten public conﬁ dence in the government. The emergence of civil society has increased awareness of citizens’ legitimate rights. Environmental rights are certainly no exception to the trend, with perceived violations resulting not only in legal and other action by individual citizens, but also in the intervention of NGOs. Misguided responses to citizens who assert their environmental rights are liable to aggravate social frictions and even impede the course of progress towards a harmonious society. These are not the only effects of urbanization, of course: the generation of large amounts of waste, serious ecological damage and deteriorating living environments are not to be overlooked.

III. Root Causes of Urban Environmental Problems

Several root factors lie behind the various problems that have accompanied the urbanization process: “great leap forward” 259

A. Conceptual Fallacies Urbanization normally follows in tandem with industrialization. In China, however, the government has had a dominant role in economic development as well as urbanization. The growth of cities was consciously held back for a long period prior to post-1978 economic reforms. Urbanization was then gradually set in motion, but policies were in a state of ﬂ ux: prior to the late 1990s, many voices advocated a primary focus on small cities and towns, and so a policy was adopted of “leaving the ﬁ elds but not one’s hometown,” encouraging township and village enterprises (TVEs). The small cities and towns that emerged were thus a conscious decision, rather than the natural product of economic growth; their gestation was rushed, and quality was uneven. Since the late 1990s, meanwhile, local governments have engaged in an all-out scramble to urbanize, with some large and medium-sized cities suffering the same problem: developing faster than they naturally should, they have compromised on the quality of the process. The last two decades have thus seen intensive government-driven urbanization without all the necessary preconditions in place—economic, social, resources, and environmental. This drive to catch up in 20 years with what developed economies have done in over a hundred years was bound to cause environmental problems.

B. Urban and Industrial Planning Neglected Planning is important; it guarantees that governments can function, permits rational allocation of public resources, ensures a key role for the market in resource allocation, and keeps a balance between economic and social development. Urban environmental issues are intertwined with the urban and industrial planning process that governs the city’s layout, scale and structure. Many local governments, though, are bent on the headlong pursuit of high economic and urban growth, heedless of the need for rigorous or rational planning. Any response to environmental problems needs to correct this tendency by integrating environmental factors at the planning stage. Otherwise, if planning is neglected, irrationalities in the city’s layout, scale and structure will ensure that environmental problems remain all too familiar news. It was thanks to the inherent problems with its geographical layout, for example, that PetroChina’s Jilin Petrochemical plant saw an explosion end up causing an unprecedented environmental disaster. The heavy chemical sector 260 zhou weifeng has been ﬂ ourishing nationwide since 2003, and many more plants have been built close to main rivers and downtown areas, which promises disastrous consequences in the event of any accidents.

C. Regulatory Reform Left by the Wayside Some moves have been made to reform urban environmental regulation in recent years, but with no signifi cant progress. In particular, civil organizations such as NGOs still have no channels for getting involved in regulating the environment, which leaves civil society excluded from these matters of fundamental public interest. Environmental impact assessments for major projects are kept secret, for example, despite the clear possibility of large-scale pollution or other serious effects. Furthermore, government agencies with environmental remits are not functioning properly. The environmental protection authorities have overall charge of regulation, but the construction and water authorities also have major roles, with specifi c responsibilities differing from place to place. With several agencies involved, in many cases they all try to pass the buck for what they should be responsible for. Noise pollution, for example, is a continual source of complaint in big cities, but the various government agencies continue to defl ect their responsibility. Clearly, this threatens to leave long-standing problems unsolved.

D. Severely Inadequate Environmental Infrastructure The lack of environmental infrastructure means only a small proportion of municipal garbage and sewage can be treated, despite their major capacity for generating pollution. 155 of 500 cities surveyed by SEPA lack any hazardous waste treatment facilities, 193 have no domestic sewage plant, and 160 are without any household garbage disposal facilities.12 Meanwhile, the Ministry of Construction singles out 297 cities (as of end June, 2005) that still have no sewage treatment plant; at the same time, many of those that are in place fail to function normally, with one-third running sporadically, and another third not functioning at all, owing to the absence of a policy on charges for waste disposal or sewage facility fees.13

12 “Environmental Protection of Cities in China,” State Environmental Protection Administration of China, October 10, 2005. 13 “News Analysis: Why are Sewage Treatment Plants in Cities Not Functioning “great leap forward” 261

E. Increasing Automobile Pollution With private demand for automobiles rising exponentially on the back of fast economic growth, China is now the world’s fourth biggest automobile producer and third biggest consumer. Urban car ownership has seen striking growth, from only 0.34 cars per hundred households in 1999, to 2.2 in 2004, and then 3.2 as of June 2005. Two factors have aggravated the effects: ﬁ rst, relatively backward technology has left vehicles with high emission levels and minimal exhaust control. Sec- ondly, the rapid increase in ownership has caused pollutant emissions to mushroom. The latter is more critical, as automobile pollution is cumulative within geographical areas; all automobiles sold in Beijing, for example, meet green label environmental standards, but air pollution is still pervasive, and threatens the city with photochemical pollution as vehicle numbers increase. Air pollution from automobiles has already become a grave problem for cities, especially larger ones, in some of which automobile pollution is overtaking soot-related pollution in scale. In major cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, automobile emissions make up over 80% of the carbon monoxide and hydroxide toxins in the air. For urban centers nationwide, it is estimated that automobile emissions in 2005 made up 79% of total air pollution. As soot control improves, the effect of automobile emissions on air quality will be coming even more into the spotlight. Automobiles are also a major factor behind increasingly severe noise pollution levels. To a large extent, however, the automobile pollution problem stems from planning deﬁ ciencies. Transport infrastructure has been ignored in the planning stages in many major cities, leaving their residents excessively reliant on the car.

F. Weak Environmental Resource Markets For a long time environmental resources were seen as public commodities, to be used at extremely low cost. Despite economic development having brought their scarcity to light more recently, this has not garnered sufﬁ cient attention from authorities, and environmental resources are yet to be commercialized. No established pricing systems exist. For example, while the State Council issued guidelines in early 2004 for sewage,

Normally?” http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2005–10/10/content_3602232.htm (accessed October 10, 2005). 262 zhou weifeng setting a four-part water charging system comprising water resource fees, water conservation project supply charges, city water supply charges and sewage treatment charges, many cities have failed to implement this in practice, while a few defeat its purpose by charging prices too low to fund the operation of sewage plants. Sewage and garbage, furthermore, are treated as waste, rather than resources to be recycled and reused. This makes it difﬁ cult for an environmental infrastructure industry to function. With its public service character, environmental infrastructure is subject to total government control from investment to construction, operation and management. Institutional constraints have greatly impeded environmental protection efforts in cities.

IV. Suggested Solutions to Environmental Problems in Chinese Cities

China’s urbanization rate in 2004 was 41.8%, according to the World Bank, placing it somewhat lower than the world average of 51%. That year high-income countries had an average urbanization level of 77%, medium-income economies 65%, and low-income states 32%. Interna- tional experience tells us that the urbanization process reaches critical mass somewhere between 30% and 70%, which suggests the phenomenon will continue apace in China for some years to come. One-third of Chinese villages are destined to disappear over the next 20 years, predicts Xiao Jincheng, a researcher with the National Development and Reform Commission; 300 million people will be disgorged into cities or towns.14 Clearly, urbanization will not be stopping any time soon. In environmental terms, this is a double-edged sword. While aggravating pollution, urbanization reinforces the constituency for environmental protection. Modern cities also bring more advanced technology and management capacities, paving the way for cheaper pollution control and an emerging environmental protection industry. If cities are to live better with the environment, the following things need to be done:

14 “China Should Drive on the Urbanization Highway with Care,” http://www.nan- fangdaily.com.cn/jj/20051110/dc/200511090066.asp (accessed November 9, 2005). “great leap forward” 263

A. Set the Right Direction The vision set out by the Party’s recent Fifth Plenary Session should be followed up and made a reality. Large and medium-sized cities should be balanced out with small cities and towns, and living costs in all made more affordable; a path should be charted that combines land conservation with intensive development, rational layouts and orderly growth. At the same time, where the need arises, new satellite clusters can be formed around large cities as a result of comprehensive planning, allowing for reduced land use, greater employment, and a rational population distribution.

B. Ensure Cities “Put People First” Urbanization is certainly not an end in itself. Cities should be centered on the needs of the people: comfortable working and living environments. Central government ofﬁ cials recognize the primordial importance of these goals to the planning process: a clear requirement is laid down that urbanization be harnessed to “improve living conditions” as part of China’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan for Economic Growth and Social Development, adopted by the Party’s Fifth Plenary Session (above). What the majority of cities should be aiming for, then, is not the pipedream of being “large international cities” or “large modern cities” but the concrete goal of building a comfortable city for their residents. And given that environmental conditions have a direct bearing on people’s lives, environmental protection is a major step on that road. The concept of “putting people ﬁ rst” should be in the foreground of city planning and must guide the whole urbanization process.

C. A More Moderate Urbanization Model Faster urbanization does not necessarily mean better. Urbanization should instead be coupled with environmental considerations and a realistic approach to resources. Speed should be replaced as a priority by the quality of practical results. Environment, energy, land and water constraints all mean that the current rate of urbanization is unsustainable in the long term. Some local governments rely on administrative measures to accelerate urbanization, ﬂ ying in the face of the way development really works. Without effective controls against rushed urbanization, China stands to face many of the same problems that 264 zhou weifeng have bedeviled parts of Latin America, in energy, resources, environmental and social terms.

D. Rational Evaluation as Part of the Planning Process Urban and industrial planning can have immense environmental consequences. Environmental problems should be taken into account as early as possible in overall and project planning processes. This can make the difference between effective environmental protection and a vicious cycle of inevitable and unstoppable damage. This is a lesson that developed countries have learned in the light of their own experiences with cities. Speciﬁ cally, this calls for environmental impact assessments to be carried out for construction projects, and potential environmental pollution to be assessed at the planning stage. Special attention should be paid to possible environmental impacts in sensitive zones such as where schools, hospitals and housing are located. At the same time environmental infrastructure should be rationalized at the regional level so as to avoid unnecessary duplication and achieve sharing and full utilization of facilities.

E. Preventative Mechanisms Relating to Environmental Hazards Responsible government bodies should fulﬁ ll their duties in terms of preventive measures, early warning, transparent reporting, emergency response, and information disclosure. In particular, where serious environmental incidents occur they should make relevant information public in a timely fashion so as to maintain social stability. Further cover-ups such as in the cases of the SARS epidemic and the Songhua River disaster should be avoided. In this information age, any attempt to conceal important information about environmental hazards is bound to result in rumors and panic, which is precisely the opposite of the “social stability” that government ofﬁ cials aim to maintain.

F. Reform the City Environment Management System In light of current national conditions, reforms should aim in the medium term to make the market and the general public play their full roles, with guidance from the government. Experience in developed economies shows that the market economy greatly increases business efﬁ ciency and reduces environmental management costs, while allow- “great leap forward” 265 ing civil organizations such as NGOs to play a positive environmental role. Market mechanisms should thus be given a key role in Chinese environmental management, with competition introduced in sectors including sewage treatment and garbage recycling. Environmental NGOs and public participation should also be encouraged, so that people can fully enjoy their rights to information and to having their voices heard on environmental issues that affect them. In the same spirit, a system should be set up for public interest litigation to give people broader protection of their environmental rights.

A FRAGILE BALANCE: OBSERVATIONS ON PROTECTING BIODIVERSITY

Xue Dayuan and Xie Yan

I. Biodiversity in China: Assessing Current Conditions

China’s biodiversity is exceptionally rich compared to that found in other countries. However, China’s biodiversity is currently under serious threat. China’s rapid economic growth produces tension between the goals of economic development and environmental protection. One aspect of the problem is the increasing risks to the country’s biodiversity. These threats manifest themselves on the three key dimensions of biodiversity: ecosystem diversity, species diversity, and genetic diversity. The China Species Red List (Volume I)1 followed the IUCN Red List Category and Criteria (2001); both offer listings and assessments of the peril faced by 4,408 plants and 5,809 animals in China, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. This comprehensive examination of ﬂ ora and fauna at risk of endangerment and/or extinction provides a new understanding of the current biodiversity situation in China. This assessment shows that the percentage of species under threat in China is much higher than previously reported, particularly the percentage of endangered plants. In previous assessments, threatened species accounted for 2–30% of total species. For instance, the percentages of threatened species in the China National Report of Biodiversity2 published in 1998 are 22.06% of mammals, 14.63% of birds, 4.52% of reptiles, 2.46% of amphibians, 2.41% of ﬁ sh, 28% of gymnosperms, and about 13% of angiosperms, respectively. But the new assessment reveals that the percentages of threatened (i.e. critically endangered, endangered and vulnerable) inver- tebrate species is 34.74%; near-threatened species make up 12.44% of the total. Among vertebrates the percentages are 35.92% and 8.47%;

1 Wang Song, Xie Yan et al., China Species Red List (Volume I: Red List) (Beijing: Higher Education Press, 2004). 2 The State Environmental Protection Administration, China National Report on Bio- diversity, (Beijing: China Environmental Science Press, 1998). 268 xue dayuan and xie yan for gymnosperms 69.91% and 21.23%; and 86.63% and 7.22% for angiosperms. Most of these threats arise as a result of human exploitation of natural resources: felling wild forests, uprooting and damaging natural vegetation, reclaiming grasslands, overgrazing pastures, infi lling wetlands, and over-fi shing in rivers, lakes, and seas. Additionally, pollution caused by improper disposal of industrial waste and usage of agricultural chemicals has further damaged both natural and farmland ecosystems. Mining and extraction activities often cause devastating habitat destruction effecting numerous plant and animal species. Still other species are endangered and on the verge of extinction due to hunting, poaching, and use of questionable and illegal fi shing technologies. The State Forestry Administration of China (SFA) organized a nationwide National Survey on Key Protected Wild Plants between 1996 and 2000. This fi ve-year survey conducted a national census of 191 wild plant species. The survey showed that 71% were in no danger. The report offered encouraging fi ndings on at least two fronts. First is the rediscovery of Thuja sutchecenensis in the Daba Mountain Area in Chongqing Municipality after a century of not being found in the wild. This discovery landed the plant on the World Conservation Union’s critically endangered list. Second is the discovery of new habitat for the White-berry Yew, Pseudotaxus chienii, and Tsoongiodendron odorum Chun (Tsoong’s Tree). The report also paints a stark picture of endangerment for many species: twelve species of woody plants including, Carpinus putoensis Cheng, were found to each have only 1–10 individual plants surviving in their original wild habitats. Among another nine species, including Parakmeria omeiensis Cheng, researchers found only 11–100 individual plants surviving in their original habitats. Eighty-fi ve key protected wild plants species had fewer than 50,000 surviving individuals; note that this comprises 44.5%—or close to half—of the 191 species under study. Perhaps most troubling is that researchers failed to fi nd any specimens of Betula halophila Ching and two other plant species on the list. In short, the situation for these plants is extremely grave. In 1995, the State Forestry Administration (formerly the Ministry of Forestry) initiated one of the largest surveys since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) of the country’s wild fl ora and fauna. It lasted fi ve years, cost tens of million yuan and focused on 252 highly endangered species (including 153 nationally protected species) that humans consume. The results showed that 34 species—all on the a fragile balance: observations on protecting biodiversity 269 list of nationally protected species—enjoyed modest increases in their population; that nine non-protected species dropped signifi cantly in their population (eight of them snakes); and that 104 species continued to be endangered, with some of these requiring immediate protection because their numbers had dipped below the threshold of sustainability. The survey also revealed that China’s protection of wild animals, especially regarding key protected species, was very effective, with nature reserves guarding the primary habitats of over 300 nationally protected wild animals and plant species. The population of some rare and endangered wild animals such as the Chinese alligator, the red ibis, and Hainan Eld’s deer (Cervus eldi hainanus), among others, had increased. The population of China’s best known endangered mammal, the giant panda grew by 40%. Furthermore, the ranges of certain target species have gradually increased. For example, researchers found new breeding spots and winter-habitats of the black-beaked gull, black-faced spoonbill, and brown-eared pheasant. The number of counties providing habitat for the giant panda increased by 11, to a total of 45, representing a whopping 65.6% increase in the panda’s range. Conversely, the population of some lesser known wild plant and animal species diminished, especially among species with signifi cant economic value. Due to damage and over-exploitation of their habitats, some species are critically endangered. Some species such as the red ibis, Guizhou golden monkey, Mangshan viper, crocodile lizard, Hainan gibbon, Przewalski’s gazelle (Procapra przewalskii), and beaver, are at risk of extinction.33

II. China’s Major Efforts in Biodiversity Protection

A. Biodiversity Research and Planning In recent years China has put increasing emphasis on biodiversity protection. In 2003, in order to better protect biodiversity and to facilitate cooperation among the relevant ministries involved with policies affecting biodiversity, the State Council established an inter-ministry council

3 See this link for details: http://www.sepa.gov.cn/eic/650773448984887296/200 51013/11965.shtml. 270 xue dayuan and xie yan consisting of the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) and eighteen ministries, with SEPA leading this council. In early 2005, SEPA gathered expert opinion from eight authorities and compiled the National plan for biological conservation and use (2006 –2020), for the purpose of ensuring the safety and sustainability of biological resources. In the Development of a Seven-Point Agricultural Plan4 completed by the Ministry of Agriculture of China, a description of an agricultural system that considers ecological preservation is described as follows: 1. To protect and develop about 6.7 million hectares of grassland by 2010 to restore the most severely degraded grasslands, including ecologically fragile areas in and around grasslands, and grassland vegetation at the sources of key rivers; 2. To create a group of grassland and ﬁ shery preserves to provide effective protection of wild plant habitats, including the rare and endangered aquatic wild plants and animals that inhabit them; 3. To tackle agricultural pollution, especially hazards produced by runoff, within an area of 800 thousand hectares and to implement sustainable farming techniques in an area of 1.2 million hectares. Six projects developed and implemented by the SFA are closely related to biodiversity protection. These are: the Wildwood Protection Pro ject; the “3-North”5 and the Middle and Lower Yangtze River Shelterbelt Project; the Grain-for-Green Project; the Beijing Region Sand-Control Project; the Forestry Support and Fast Growth/High- Yield Timber Project; and the Wild Plants, Animal, and Habitat Con- servation Project. The ﬁ nal project is the one most sharply focused on biodiversity protection. In 2005, the SFA collaborated with nine other relevant authorities to compile the National Plan for Implementing Wetlands Conservation (2005–2010), which encompasses a plan for protecting 50% of China’s natural wetlands.

4 The seven elements include the system for developing and amassing seed; the system for creating and implementing agricultural technology; the system for fauna and ﬂ ora conservation; the system for ensuring the quality of farm produce; the system for market information about farm produce; the system for the protection of agricultural resources and the ecosystem; and the system for bringing market reforms to rural services and their management. 5 North refers to the Three-north Shelter Forest covering most of Northwest China, the northern part of Northern China and the western part of Northeast China. a fragile balance: observations on protecting biodiversity 271

In 2003, the State Council of China approved the National Plan for Marine Economic Development, which proposes (1) to broaden protections for unique natural and manmade coastal features; (2) to protect coastal vegetation such as mangrove swamps; (3) to require a thorough investigation of plans for reclaiming land from the sea or using tidelands for cultivation; and (4) to ban the use of the marshes, reed wetlands and coastal mangrove swamps for cultivation. The plan projects that with full implementation, the amount of pollution entering the sea will level off by 2010. This, in turn, will greatly improve environmental quality in coastal cities and major gulfs.6

B. Preserving Genetic Diversity By 2005 China had established modern mid-term and long-term seed banks for protecting and preserving agricultural genetic resources. This pool included nearly 400,000 types of crop germplasm accumulated over many years from local and foreign sources. Additionally, China has built a total of 30 germplasm resource plots (including 17 for fruit trees, 4 for food crops, 8 for export crops and 1 for pastureland species) and two test tube seedling banks. Meanwhile, different crop research institutes of the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences have established ten gene banks for middle-term storage. Provincial academies of agricultural sciences or forestry sciences have built seventeen gene banks for middle-term storage. China has also set up cattle and sheep sperm and embryo banks. At present, China is building its fi rst national gene bank for wildlife species at the Kunming Institute of Botany, Chinese Academy of Sci- ences. This bank will cost 148 million RMB. The bank will collect and preserve the genetic material from Yunnan province and its neighboring areas, such as Qinghai on the Tibetan Plateau. Priority will be given to fl ora seed, with substantial, but smaller, collections of fauna and microorganism genetic material. The completed bank will include a seed bank, an in-vitro plant gene bank, a DNA bank, a microorganism gene bank, a fauna gene bank, an information center, and a fl ora genetic resource plot. This comprehensive collection of functions and operations

6 State Environmental Protection Administration, The Third National Report from China’s Implementing Biodiversity Convention (Beijing: China Environmental Science Press, 2005). 272 xue dayuan and xie yan assures that a collection of 190,000 individual genetic samples representing 19,000 species will be available.

C. Political Reform and International Cooperation Due to the progress in China’s economic, political, and legal reforms, the country has become more open, leading it to be increasingly involved in international efforts focused on environmental protection. By 2005, China had acceded to a series of environmental protection agreements, including those concerning biodiversity, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity; the Cartageña Protocol on Biosafety; the Interna- tional Convention on Trade of Endangered Wild Flora and Fauna; the International Convention on Wetlands, Especially Waterfowl Habitat; the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, the United Nations (UN) Convention to Combat Desertifi cation, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, and so on. China has cooperated on many multilateral projects with related UN organizations such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Educational, Scientifi c and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the World Bank (WB), the Global Environment Facility (GEF), and others. China has also cooperated on long-term projects with many non-governmental organizations such as the World Conser- vation Union (also known as the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources or IUCN), the WWF, Conservation International (CI), the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), and Fauna and Flora International (FFI). China has also entered into bilateral cooperation for biodiversity protection with dozens of countries from the Americas, Europe, Asia, Africa, and Oceania. The international community has provided considerable investment and technical assistance for China to protect its environment and biodiversity, and has made signifi cant contributions to improving China’s ability to protect and manage biodiversity. a fragile balance: observations on protecting biodiversity 273

III. Key Issues and Suggested Measures

A. Management of Protected Areas By the end of 2004, more than 5,000 protected areas with various designations had been established in China. These lands cover 18% of the country’s total area. Most are nature reserves: 2,194 in all, covering 148,225,800 hectares. The preponderance of this area is on land; only about 6 million hectares cover aquatic zones. The land area in nature reserves accounts for almost 15% of China’s total area.7 These reserves include 85% of the ecosystem types found in China, 85% of its wild fauna population, 65% of its higher fl ora communities, and 20% of China’s wild woodlands. Most of these nature reserves protect the natural resources and ecosystems in China that possess the richest biodiversity, that display the best ecological function, and need protection most. The recently completed surveys on national wild fauna and fl ora—including research on the giant panda and its habitat—show that more than 85% of the rare and endangered species of wild fauna and fl ora are being effectively protected within nature reserves. China’s star species have thrived in reserves: 61% of the wild panda populations, and 100% of the remaining red ibises, live in reserves. China has more than 800 scenic areas, 1,400 forest parks, 50 geological parks and 50 water conservation scenic areas to help protect its natural resources. There are also more than 1,000 small nature reserves and farmland protection areas serving this function. These various types of reserves conform to the defi nition of “protected areas” as defi ned by the IUCN; therefore we refer to them as “protected areas” below. Although the areas put under protection have increased in total size, biodiversity continues to decline due to improper resource management and insuffi cient funding. China still has many problems in planning, establishing, and managing protected areas, as demonstrated by the pres- ence of problems such as poaching, uncontrolled logging, overgrazing, invasion by alien species, illegal farming or land expropriation within protected areas, confl icts with local communities, pollution, violation of ecological laws including illegal sales of bird specimens collected in protected areas by employees paid to protect them, and overdevelopment

7 See this link for details: http://www.sepa.gov.cn/eic/650772366653128704/200 51130/13318.shtml. 274 xue dayuan and xie yan of tourism. Such problems have many causes. For instance, unsound legislation; weak law enforcement; under-skilled staff, especially at the managerial level; underdeveloped social and political institutions; inadequate participation among local communities; low public awareness of conservation issues; poverty; lack of funding; improper allocation of profi ts; and so forth. But two more fundamental causes undermine resource protection and management efforts: the lack of a reasonable, clear and fl exible legal framework concerning protected areas, and the lack of a mechanism for coordinating management and supervision of protected areas. Each of these problems touches upon the failure of policymakers, resources managers and staffers, as well as the general public to fully understand how to plan and implement a multiple-use system in protected areas. The existing system of nature reserves puts too much emphasis on protection at the expense of a broader set of uses that could help to ameliorate the confl ict between resource protection and development. Failing to engage this confl ict misses one of the fundamental driving forces of biodiversity degradation. The current categorization of protected areas fails to distinguish between management objectives, supervision criteria, management styles, and funding sources. At present, legislation does not accommodate diversifi ed management needs or goals. In the existing protected area system, there are too many nature reserves (in the strict sense) covering too large an area; total protected areas exceed the total land devoted to agriculture. Single-mindedly focusing on protection at the expense of achieving a balance between development and protection may not be a sustainable policy. First, the direct and opportunity costs of managing and setting aside such vast tracts of land can hardly be justifi ed. Second, given these high costs, fi scal support becomes crucial, but by exclusively relying on government funding, ongoing preservation efforts become more precarious given fl uctuations in annual budgets. Such fl uctuations, and the threat of sudden declines in support could undermine resource conservation. Therefore, an important improvement would be to develop new legislation to accommodate diversifi ed and fl exible resource uses and management frameworks for protected areas. Legislation should include tools for helping to develop harmonized national standards and planning for managing protected areas and implementing biodiversity policy generally. By noting these and other needs in reforming biodiversity policies, the government can begin seeking solutions. a fragile balance: observations on protecting biodiversity 275

B. Wetlands Protection According to the recently completed survey on national wetland resources, China has 38,485,500 hectares of wetlands (paddy fi elds excluded) at present, which places the country fi rst in Asia and fourth in the world in total wetland acreage. Moreover, China’s wetlands are very diverse; each type of wetland found in the world exists in China. Most are natural wetlands: a whopping 36,200,500 hectares, accounting for 94% of the total. The remaining 6%, or 2,285,000 hectares, is divided between reservoirs and ponds. Among the natural wetlands, 13,700,300 hectares are marsh swamps; 5,941,700 hectares are coastal wetlands; 8,207,000 hectares are river wetlands; and 8,351,600 hectares are lake and pond wetlands. These wetlands are the habitat of 2,276 species of higher fl ora, and 724 species of wild fauna, including 271 waterfowl species, 300 amphibian species, 122 types of reptiles and 31 kinds of mammals. The total number of key wetlands comes to 376, which cover an area of 15,029,300 hectares. Survey results also showed that 16 million hectares of natural wetlands (about 40% of the total) across China had already been incorporated into 353 protected areas and were under sound protection. According to the National Wetland Conservation Program (2002–2030), China plans to establish 30–50 wetland nature reserves and 32 national wetland area demonstration projects. These demonstration projects will help managers implement rational utilization of wetland resources over a fi ve-year period, which will improve management as well as research and monitoring efforts devoted to wetlands protection. In 2004, the General Offi ce of the State Council issued the Notice on Strengthening the Management of Wetland Protection and convened the National Meeting on Wetland Protection and Management. Subse- quently national wetland protection at the basic level has improved; local governments have started to attach importance to wetland protection. Some provinces such as Heilongjiang, Gansu and Jiangxi have developed local wetland protection laws. On December 7, 2004, Wetlands International granted the SFA the Wetlands International Global Recognition for Wetlands Conservation and Wise Use Award. Ms. Jane Madgwick, CEO of Wetlands Interna- tional, awarded the certifi cate of merit to Zhou Shengxian, Director of the State Forestry Administration at a ceremony in Beijing. This award is Wetlands International’s most prestigious and The State Forestry Administration of China is the world’s fi rst winner of the honor. 276 xue dayuan and xie yan

On the same day, the Convention on Wetlands ratifi ed the Chinese government’s specifi cation of nine key wetlands (including the Shuang- taihe area of Liaoning and the Labuhai Dashanbao area of Yunnan) as “important international wetlands.” This increased the number of important international wetlands in China to 30, covering an area of 3.46 million hectares.8 However, the biggest problem in wetlands protection is how to implement the area plans; i.e. how all the relevant authorities in each wetland area coordinate with each other to achieve common objectives in wetlands protection. This is no mean feat since any wetland area involves authorities managing agricultural, fi shery, water, and forestry resources, alongside those overseeing environmental protection. None of these authorities can effectively protect the wetlands working alone. Therefore, they have to cooperate with each other and exchange information. Those responsible for developing resource usage plans need to include biodiversity protection in such documents. However, the current situation shows that the wetlands protection authorities have little power and work in isolation. In particular, these authorities rarely communicate or cooperate with development authorities.

C. Ex situ Species Conservation

1. Botanical Gardens By 2005, China had established more than 140 botanical gardens, which grow about 18,000 Chinese species, or about 65% of the total number of plant species found in China. The Beijing Botanical Garden’s North Garden grows about 5,000 species, including 95 protected species, and the older South Garden grows another 6,000. Other major gardens cultivate at least as many species: the Kunming Botanical Garden about 5,000; the South China Botanical Garden about 8,000; the Xishuangbanna Botanical Garden about 10,000. Other key gardens include the Wuhan Botanical Garden, which grows about 4,000 species; the Nanjing Sun Yat-sen Botanical Garden, with about 3,000; and the Shenzhen Botanical Garden raises about 4,000. These botanical gardens have also set up 135 special gardens for their widely known

8 See this link for details: http://www.forestry.gov.cn/lydsj/content.asp?nd=2004. a fragile balance: observations on protecting biodiversity 277 and emblematic species while adopting ex situ conservation for 300 rare and endangered species. Unfortunately many Chinese botanical gardens have underperformed in providing protection and proper exhibition of Chinese fl ora. First of all, botanical gardens still focus on introducing and domesticating alien plant species. Thus their contributions in collecting, conserving, and researching Chinese fl ora have been insignifi cant. Further, they have done little work in restoring local vegetation and or effectively using indigenous plant species. China does not have any botanical gardens comparable to the major gardens in South Africa, such as the Cape Town National Botanical Gar- den and the Pretoria National Botanical Garden. Both have collected more than 5,000 fl ora species each; more importantly, their collections represent 99.9% of the total number of extant plant species in South Africa. To better represent plant biodiversity, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, in collaboration with over 140 botanical gardens in the country, plan to put more than 300 million RMB into the protection of over 30,000 Chinese higher fl ora species. It also plans to increase the number of protected species in its twelve botanical gardens from 13,000 to 21,000 within 15 years. Another effort aimed at broadening the scope of botanical garden holdings in China is the planned Qinling Botanical Garden, which will be built under the supervision of the Xi’an Branch of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. When completed, it will cover an area of 458 square kilometers, or about four times the size of the largest botanical garden in the world as of 2006.

2. Zoos and Wildlife Parks By 2005, China had established almost 200 city zoos and wildlife parks. Beijing Zoo is the largest of these city zoos. It now raises a total of over 100,000 individual animals representing 600 different species. The zoo manages over 30 breeding populations of rare wild animals, such as the giant panda, red ibis, golden monkey, antelope, black-necked crane, giraffe and zebra. These particular species have enjoyed an increase in population. However, these successes coexist with ongoing challenges. Zoos must maintain a manageable number of animals and species and at the same time must preserve suffi cient genetic variability in these populations to assure viability. In addition, zoos must take care to prevent their breeding populations from becoming overly domesticated or unfi t for 278 xue dayuan and xie yan producing offspring that can function in the wild. Addressing these and other problems remains diffi cult because of the rigid barriers separat- ing the various authorities overseeing animal populations in zoos. As a result, the structure of these populations leaves much to be desired and yet changes little. For instance, facilitating exchanges between different populations and complementing a limited population with non-related animals remains a problematic issue. These factors raise the probability of inbreeding and unnatural selection. The loss of genetic variability is so severe in some cases that both the quantity and quality of zoo animals barely meets the requirements for species protection. Thus these zoo animals cannot contribute to the re-establishment of wild populations in natural habitat; in some cases they cannot even survive in captivity for long periods. Only 10% of populations in captivity are self-sustaining and viable. Therefore, zoos have to capture wild animals from their natural habitats from time to time to replenish captive populations. The main objectives of zoos should be to expand wild populations, to carry out reintroduction projects, and to save rare and endangered animals from extinction. However, due to the small size of base populations, the confl icts and barriers between the different authorities involved, exchanging breeding animals from different zoos is quite diffi cult. This results in inbreeding, which in turn degrades the gene pool of captive populations. Therefore, these penned animals contribute little to efforts aimed at reintroducing populations to natural habitats. Problems exist in exhibition of animals as well. Most Chinese zoos still exhibit their animals in small cages. Too many use simple education methods and have not played an active part in educating the public regarding biodiversity conservation. This stands in contrast to the world’s leading zoos. For instance, the National Zoo in the capital of the United States, Washington, DC, provides its wild animals with living conditions similar to their natural habitats. Doing so helps to showcase animals and at the same time inform the public about the ecology in which animals live in the wild. In short, the most essential purpose to exhibiting animals is to show the relationship between each species, the social structure within that animal population, and the relationship between the species and the ecosystem it lives within. Such displays need to include species other than “charismatic megafauna” which often dominate the attention of those visiting zoos. The recent popularity of wildlife parks in China is perturbing as well. The serious goals of species preservation and public education have been completely obscured by the actions of those in charge of a fragile balance: observations on protecting biodiversity 279 these parks. A number of parks have built their populations around African species, and in fact, seem to imitate the look of African wildlife parks. However, even though the look is similar, the intent is completely different. Establishing and operating wildlife parks in Africa not only attracts many visitors but aids wildlife conservation efforts because these wildlife parks increase visitors’ awareness of Africa’s rich animal life and the ecosystem that supports them. By imitating African parks, China introduced many alien species, especially the most popular. Therefore, all wildlife parks in China look alike. Worse yet, they rarely show local species to visitors. And by focusing on imported species, they mislead the public into believing that the relationship between wild animals and the ecosystem should be altered according to human whims.

3. Breeding and Raising Animals at Nature Reserves A related issue is breeding and raising alien, as well as native, species in nature reserves. It is a common misconception that animals held in nature reserves, but given human assistance, actively contribute to species preservation by increasing the population of said species. Visi- tors to nature reserves in China typically see wild animals raised in enclosures. The only difference between nature reserves and zoos is the size of the cages. These animals are fed by humans, at least in part. This produces two problems: (1) Many nature reserves become feeding farms for wild animals, and with so much additional food, populations of these species grow beyond the carrying capacity of the ecosystem, harming or even destroying it; and (2) The animals receiving support are more susceptible to diseases since they live too close to human beings and each other. If they do become diseased, they can easily infect wild populations. China has established breeding bases for the giant panda, Francois’ leaf-monkey (Trachypithecus francoisi ), crane, Golden Monkey, South China Tiger, and takin (a large relative of both the mountain goat and musk ox) in Chengdu, Wuzhou, Shenyang, Wuhan, Chongqing and Shanghai respectively. These bases are dedicated to breeding and researching rare and endangered species. The PRC has also established more than 230 breeding farms of wild animals and 14 rescue and breeding centers for endangered wild species like the Northeast Tiger, elk, Przewalski’s Horse (Equus przewalskii Poliakov), Saiga antelope, red ibis, Chinese alligator, and white-ﬁ nned dolphin. The country continues to build such centers. For example, the SFA invested 27.6 million RMB to build the Chinese research center of giant panda conservation, located in the 280 xue dayuan and xie yan scenic Bifengxia Gorge Wildlife Sanctuary in Ya’an. In order to protect the endangered species of the Tibetan antelope, China will invest 29 million RMB to build a Tibetan antelope breeding research center at Dangxiong of Lhasa. The project will include a breeding lab; a diag- nosis, prevention and treatment lab for Tibetan antelope diseases at Gecuo of Shuanghu; and a facility dedicated to rearing the antelope at Naqu in the Tibetan Autonomous Region.9 Some of these breeding centers have enjoyed success by playing important roles in protecting wild populations of some of endangered animals, especially the red ibis, elk and Equus przewalskii Poliakov. But most were ineffective in protecting wild animals and failed to function as institutions for endangered species conservation. They engage in excessive reproduction; in some cases their activities become commercialized by selling wild animal meat and related animal products. This increases the demand for wild animal products, which can increase the probability that wild animals are poached. Rather than breeding or raising animals in these sorts of conditions, money spent on such efforts could be redirected toward meaningful protection of truly wild populations. For example, there is little use in spending so much money establishing Tibetan antelope breeding centers, changing their migration patterns, and rearing them in controlled environments because the survival and conservation of the species has not been broadly supported. The Chinese government should be more circumspect in selecting and supporting projects aimed at supposedly protecting endangered species; too many such parks and centers do not contribute signiﬁ cantly to animal protection efforts. Moreover, these efforts have an air of deception abut them; if these centers end up taming wild animals and raising them for commercial purposes, then they should be required to function as commercial enterprises without government support. The government should spend limited protection funds on projects that can honestly play a role in protecting wild populations, especially among endangered, vulnerable, and threatened species.

9 See this link for details: http://www.forestry.gov.cn/lydsj/content.asp?nd=2004. a fragile balance: observations on protecting biodiversity 281

D. Safe Administration of Genetically Modifi ed Organisms Modern biotechnology, especially Genetically Modifi ed (GM) technology, progresses at an unprecedented speed. Production of GM soybean, cotton, corn, rape and tomato varieties have been commercialized over large areas worldwide, and the total planting area soared from 1.7 million hectares in 1996 to 81 million hectares in 2004, a nearly fi fty-fold increase in less than a decade. However, research, development and implementation of modern biotechnology may have potentially adverse effects on biodiversity, the ecological environment, and human health. For example, Geneti- cally Modifi ed Organisms (GMOs) produce various unintended side effects: increasing numbers and varieties of pesticide-resistant insects and plants, increasing aggressiveness and proliferation of such species, changes in the natural ecological balance by altering the competitive relationship among species, and producing toxic and allergic reactions in human beings. Many developing countries, unequipped in handling GMO environmental and health risks, hope to regulate the transfer of GMOs and related products between countries through international treaties. Since 1996, the UNEP and the Convention on Biodiversity have been organizing and formulating the Biosafety Protocol. After ten rounds of working group meetings and heated negotiations, the Cartageña Protocol on Biosafety (see “Protocol” below) was adopted in January 2000. Taking a precautionary approach, the objective of the Protocol is to ensure the safe international transfer, handling, and use of living modifi ed organisms (LMOs) developed and propagated through modern biotechnology that may have adverse effects on biodiversity. The Protocol also takes into account the risk to human health, especially during the transfers of LMOs. Its main subject matter includes the objectives, scope of application, procedures for approval-upon-prior- notice, risk assessment and management, labeling, identifi cation of national authorities and liaisons, locations of bio-safety information exchange, capacity-building, liability for damages and an indemnity and fi nancial liability mechanism. The Protocol came into force on September 11, 2003. Given the great importance that the Chinese government attaches to biosafety, it signed the Protocol on August 8, 2000 following active participation in all the rounds of negotiations. The State Council of China ratifi ed the 282 xue dayuan and xie yan

Protocol on April 27, 2005. China then became one of the signatories of the Protocol on September 6, 2005. China’s guiding principles for developing biotechnology include: encouraging innovation, stressing an integrated approach in applying these technologies, promoting the biotechnology industry, ensuring biosafety, developing high technology, industrializing biotechnology, and setting a primary goal of obtaining great intellectual property holdings to boost the bio-economy within the PRC. By 2005, there were about 500 enterprises with more than 50,000 employees involved in modern biotechnology; 300 of these specialize in biotechnology for medical purposes and over 200 focus on agriculture. On average, about 100 new biotech fi rms are established annually. In Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen, more than 20 biotechnological parks have been set up. These cities have adopted preferential economic policies to support the establishment of such companies through tax, fi nance, human resource, import, and export policies. So far, these new enterprises are playing a leading role in developing China’s biotechnology. The Chinese government fi rst accepted applications from GMO producers to pass safety standards in 1997. By the end of 2004 1,009 applications had been handled, with 807 gaining approval. Of these 176 were for commercialized production, 141 for manufacturing pro- totypes, 157 for environmental release permits, and 333 for mid-term tests. These applications come from over 200 research institutions. These companies worked on over 60 GM crop species in their research and development (R&D) programs; more than 150 genes were represented in these R&D projects. From 1998 to 2004, China examined and approved of over 100 domestically developed pest-resistant cotton varieties. The planting area of these varieties reached 5 million hectares nationwide in 2004, accounting for 80% of the total planting area devoted to cotton production. Signifi cant progress has also been made in developing disease-resistant and pest-resistant rice, pest-resistant and high-lysine corn, pest-resistant potatoes, disease-resistant cotton and high-oil rapeseed. To more effectively regulate agricultural GMOs, the State Council developed and implemented the Regulations on Safe Administration of Agricultural Genetically Modifi ed Organisms in 2001 to regulate the research, testing, production, processing, management, import, and export of agricultural GMOs. According to these regulations, the Ministry of Agriculture published the Measures in the Safe Administra- a fragile balance: observations on protecting biodiversity 283 tion of Imported Agricultural Genetically Modifi ed Organisms, the Measures in the Administration of Biosafety Assessment of Agricultural Genetically Modifi ed Organisms, and the Measures in the Administration of Labeling Agricultural Genetically Modifi ed Organisms in 2002, all of which further established administrative procedures in assuring safe handling of GMOs while strengthening administrative oversight of agricultural GMOs. Although labeling of GM foods in major Chinese cities has become standardized, most members of the public remain unaware of the practice. In 2004, an onsite survey given by Renmin University of China to 1,000 consumers at 12 supermarkets showed that 64.9% of the informants knew little or nothing about GMOs and the products made from them; only 2.3% of respondents had good or very good knowledge of GMOs. As for labeling, 45.3% did not realize that GM products were labeled in China; 42.6% failed to recognize the labels even though they knew that labeling was practiced. However, 96.9% of the informants demanded that GMOs and their derivatives be labeled, and 48.1% of these persons demanded that labels be clearly discern- able. 69% of the informants showed confi dence in traditional foods; only 5.20% trusted GM foods and 25.8% were indifferent. Moreover, 80.5% believed China should moderate the development of commercial GM technology; 10.9% held that China should promote the development of GM technology; while 8.6% said China should not develop GM technology.10 In order to meet these public demands, China has a long way to go in developing its capacities in conducting research and monitoring of the impact of commercialized GM products on the environment, especially on biodiversity. Work undertaken thus far has generally cited fi ndings published in other countries. Domestically executed studies have been limited both in terms of duration and depth of investigation. Conse- quently, little high quality, empirically-based conclusions can be drawn from such research. Because a relatively greater number of GMOs have been planted in China, covering a relatively larger planting area than found in other countries, potential negative impacts could be greater in China. In particular, preservation of domestic genetic resources and

10 Wang Yuqing and Xue Dayuan, “An Investigation and Analysis on Consumers’ Knowledge of and Attitudes towards Genetically Modiﬁ ed Foods,” Environmental Protec- tion, No. 3 (2005). 284 xue dayuan and xie yan the broader ecological condition in China may experience a variety of unknown impacts.

E. Measures Used To Control Alien Species Statistically, there are more than 400 Alien Invasive Species (AIS) in China, and 100 of these have been deemed “harmful.” More than half of the world’s most threatening AIS, as determined by The International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), have been found in China. The latest fi gures are from a joint research project carried out by the Ministry of Science and Technology and the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) of China from 2001 to 2003 entitled Research on Key Technologies for Implementing the Convention on Biodiversity. Details about the origin, path of introduction, and the ecological and economic impact of 283 AIS are presented. Nineteen alien invasive microorganisms, 18 aquatic plants, 170 terrestrial plants, 25 aquatic invertebrates, 33 terrestrial invertebrates, 3 amphibi- ous reptiles, 10 fi shes, and 5 mammals are profi led in the study. The estimated annual loss caused by AIS in China was around $14.5 billion US dollars, which is approximately 1.36% of the PRC’s GDP.11 Over the last few years, more alien organisms have invaded China and have invaded more often, spread to larger areas, caused greater damage, and produced heavier economic losses. For example, a group of 11 major AIS—including Bemisia tabaci, Eupatorium adenophorum, and Bursaphelenchus xylophilus—have produced 57.4 billion RMB in economic losses to the farming, forestry, and fi shery industries in China.12 The SEPA and the Chinese Academy of Sciences jointly published the fi rst authoritative list of Alien Invasive Species in China on January 10, 2003. The list included 16 AIS that have caused severe damage to China’s biodiversity and ecology including Spartina alternifl ora, Eichhornia crassipes, Eupatorium adenophorum, Mikania micrantha, and Oracella acuta. This volume includes information on the biological features of the various

11 Xu Haigen, Wang Jianmin, Qiang Sheng and Wang Jiuyong, Research on Hot Issues Regarding the Convention on Biological Diversity: Alien Invasive Species, Biosafety, Genetic Resources (Science Press, 2004). 12 See this link for details: http://www.sepa.gov.cn/eic/650777842736431104/20 051121/13093.shtml. a fragile balance: observations on protecting biodiversity 285

AIS, their identifying features, origin, current distribution in China, degree of damage caused, and methods for controlling them.13 In 2003, the Ministry of Agriculture published the Pilot Program to Eradicate Alien Invasive Species as well as The Pilot Action Plan for Eradicat- ing Alien Invasive Species (2003). Actions focusing on the eradication of Ambrosia artemisiifolia and Eupatorium adenophorum were carried out in one province and ﬁ ve counties: speciﬁ cally Liaoning Province; Kaiyuan County and Tengchong County of Yunan Province; and Xichang City, Ningnan County and Renhe District in Panzhihua City of Sichuan Province. The public was widely mobilized to assist in this program. Eight million persons from all walks of life joined in the effort. About 19.2 billion individual Ambrosia artemisiifolia plants covering an area of over 860,000 hectares were eradicated. Over the course of the program, as much as 80% of the Ambrosia artemisiifolia plants were uprooted. Eupa- torium adenophorum was uprooted in an area of over 4,000 hectares. In 2004, the Ministry of Agriculture formulated the National Devel- opment Strategy and Framework for Preventing, Managing and Control- ling Alien Invasive Species. This plan prioritizes eradication and alien species control efforts, emphasizing capacity building efforts needed to sustain such programs. The plan also spells out the details for eleven eradication and control programs ready for immediate launch. The plan summarizes China’s general objective for the next 10 years: to establish and improve the national technological platform for sharing database information about AIS, to establish key systems needed for invasion prevention, to develop early warning and instant reaction procedures when dealing with major and aggressive AIS, to develop techniques and methods of quantitative risk assessment, to set up techniques and systems of outdoor monitoring, to develop techniques and methods of sustained administration, and to keep the damage and spread of key AIS under effective control. These controls now affect China’s authorizing system for importing aquatic and terrestrial wild animals and agricultural products. The Sino-US Agricultural Cooperation Agreement stipulates that imported wheat and other grains are to be quarantined, and that over 200 quarantine institutes are to be set up at various ports to form a supervision network.

13 See this link for details: http://www.sepa.gov.cn/eic/649086798147878912/20 030611/1038855.shtml. 286 xue dayuan and xie yan

On July 29, 2004, the SFA published the list of harmful organisms to be quarantined in their Announcement IV (2004). The list includes Bursaphelenchus xylophilus, Dendroctonus valens, Brontispa longissina, Hemiberlesia pitysophila, Cryptorhynchus lapathi, Mikania micrantha, Laspeyresi pomonella, Hyphantria cunea, Heterobostrychus aequalis, Pseudomonas syringae pv. Actinidiae Takikawa et al., Cronartium ribicola JC Fischer ex Rabenhorst, Opogona sacchari, Eulecanium gigantea, Botryosphaeria laricina (Sawada Shang), Poplar mosaic virus (PopMV), Rhynchophorus ferruginneus Fabricius, Xylotrechus rusticus Linnaeus, and Agrobacterium tumefaciens, Rhizoctonia solani Kuhn.14 While the AIS already in China strain resources to their breaking point, more of them continue to stream into the country. For instance, in Taiwan roughly 200 million animals ranging from insects to monkeys are brought into the country. The impacts of these fl ows are long-lasting and widespread; at least 75 alien bird species have been identifi ed in the Taiwanese environment. A similar condition exists in Hong Kong where research conducted in 2004 found 19 alien bird species that humans had released. Although precise statistics for Mainland China do not exist, AIS have become a hot topic. Recently, hundreds of freed snakes harassed Beijing residents, which Buddhists from Tibet and their followers throughout the nation, released. Smaller species have had a big impact as well. For instance, spiral shells introduced to Liangzi Lake in Ezhou City, Hubei Province have caused economic losses to the local aquaculture business. Chinese waters have also been adversely impacted by one of the most common and dangerous alien species, the red-eared slider (Trachemys scripta elegans). In Taiwan, the number of red-eared sliders is increasing so rapidly that in some areas they outnumber native turtles. Pet fi sh such as suckermouth catfi sh (Plecostomus punctatus) run rampant in Yilan, Taiwan and have to be fi shed out of local waters. “Weird fi shes” have been frequently reported in the Hanjiang River near Dujiangyan in Sichuan Province, the Funan River in Chengdu City, and Liangzi Lake in Ezhou City in Hubei Province. In June 2005, the Beijing Administrative Bureau for Industry and Commerce, the Beijing Forestry Administration, and the Beijing Consumers’ Association jointly published “Ten Tips for Cooperative Forestation,” which states that only fi ve tree species are suitable for the Beijing environment: poplar “107,” poplar “108,” the Zhonglin

14 See link for details: http://www.forestry.gov.cn/lydsj/content.asp?nd=2004. a fragile balance: observations on protecting biodiversity 287

46 Poplar (developed by Chinese Forestry Science and Technology), Sacrau-79 (Populus × canadenisi ), and Italia-214 (Populus × canadensis Moench). Unfortunately, most large tree plantings run by the government ignore these rules by using single or two-species plantings of mostly alien species. To control these alien species, more natural enemies are used, but this introduces even more alien species. Managing these secondary and “benefi cial” AIS requires careful oversight in order to avoid proliferation. Authorities have not property administered such programs and processes. The continuing infl ux of AIS will almost assuredly negatively impact China’s ecology and biodiversity. Although we often focus on the adverse effects of many AIS on the human health, we have not paid enough attention to their impacts on the ecology and biodiversity. For instance, we are on the alert against imported red fi re ants (Solenopsis invicta Buren) simply because they are detrimental to human health and economic activities, but little attention has been paid to the fact that other imported ants have invaded Chinese wilderness areas. Animal diseases that used to be harmless to humans constantly evolve and are beginning to infect human beings, causing greater problems. This is exemplifi ed by SARS and bird fl u. Although we are aware of such threats, we should also bear in mind that wild animals face these and other threats as well. Unfortunately these trends heighten our fear of animals, especially those in the wild, which have been implicated in the origination and spread of such diseases. Our fear can be addressed by instituting more widespread disease testing of animals, including those in the wild. Taking such measures can benefi t both human health and ecological balance by allowing us to better manage the health of animals and the environments in which they live. Since the heated discussion of AIS in China from 2000 to 2002, there have been reports about further proliferation of AIS and the discovery of new alien species in the country. The AIS problem continues to become more severe, contrary to expectations that came out of discussions from 2001 and 2002 when it seemed that the problem would be brought under control in a few years. In spite of this overall ineffectiveness, there are bright spots. A handful of alien species, most of them having already caused severe economic losses, have received primary attention. A few more quarantined species have received serious attention as well, and special measures have been adopted to control sudden alien species outbreaks. For instance, 288 xue dayuan and xie yan special notifi cations concerning red piranhas (Colossoma brackypomum) and red imported fi re ants have been circulated. While this indicates that China responds more quickly to alien species invasions, overall quarantine measures and policies remain the same, resulting in limited and ineffective control of AIS, especially those that pose signifi cant natural threats. Importation of quarantined alien species is banned, but the list is quite limited. Because of globalization, species importation is on the rise. Some species that have not been imported may suddenly become popular; in the past such fads have brought red-eared sliders, various fi sh species for aquaculture, and particular garden fl owers to China. In these cases the quarantine list will not adequately manage the importation of alien species. Therefore, it is vital to immediately set up a risk assessment system which gathers input from experts in the fi eld to develop a list identifying currently and potentially dangerous species so that they can be kept out of the country. Banning AIS imports remains the main method of treating the problem, and bans remain tied to quarantine lists. On the other side of the table, economic benefi t is the primary driving force driving importation of these species. However, when importation of alien species causes economic losses, importers are not required to compensate adversely affected parties. By ignoring these economic costs and allowing those who produced these costs to pass them on to the government and general public, problems are allowed to linger and policy remains ineffective in curtailing a key source of the AIS problem. For example, Spartina alternifl ora cost aquaculture producers in Fujian Province hundreds of million yuan, but importers and sellers of the grass did not pay anything to those harmed or to government agencies charged with cleaning up the problem. Even after a foreign species adapts to its new environment and produces negative effects on biodiversity and ecological function, economic policy to treat the problem and curtail further importation may remain diffi cult to implement. The typical prescriptive of imposing an import ban will prevent some alien species from entering our country; however, this step fails to produce changes in the incentives that drive the importation and sales of AIS. Banned species and those which are not yet banned but are in fact dangerous and harmful can be more effectively controlled through economic deterrents: having those who import and sell AIS be held responsible for costs. This includes covering costs involved in risk assessment, environmental monitoring, control and a fragile balance: observations on protecting biodiversity 289 eradication if such measures become necessary, and compensation for damages. By introducing the economic factor into the control of alien species, imports of AIS, especially those that are not considered important or dangerous before their introduction, will be effectively reduced.

DEVELOPMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL NGOS IN CHINA

Fu Tao

The number of Environmental NGOs (Non-Governmental Organiza- tions) in China has grown for years and they have become a major source of environmental knowledge as well as champions of public participation in environmental protection. In recent years especially, they have played an indispensable role in a series of environmental events by arousing public interest and seeking to impact policymaking. These actions have captured wide attention from the whole society. At the same time, NGOs are changing, swept up in the drastic transformation of Chinese society. The hand-in-glove nature of these changes can be seen in the phenomenon known as “NGOization,” which is characterized by an increasingly independent, Internet-based alliance of reporters and scholars. As NGOs are delving deeper into an unprecedented number of environmental issues, they are also confronted with various constraints and challenges.

I. The Rise of Environmental NGOs

The 20th century witnessed the emergence and development of environmental NGOs (ENGOs) in China when institutional reforms swept through this traditionally socialist society in the 1970s and 80s. Civil activities were made possible by the decision to run the government by the rule of law and to yield more public resources to social organizations. NGOs working for public and special interests mushroomed, adding to the variety of stakeholders in the society. Many voluntary charitable nonproﬁ ts, ENGOs included, are now essential parties in responding to environmental crises, helping the disadvantaged, safeguarding social justice, accumulating social capital and promoting sustainable development. In this process, NGOs have become the major non-government players in the allocation of domestic and international public resources. 292 fu tao

A. Types of NGOs In the ﬁ eld of environmental protection, top-down NGOs and bottom- up or grassroots NGOs exist side by side in China. The former refers to top-down Government Organized NGOs (GONGOs), whereas the latter denotes “values-driven” public organizations launched by social elites and ordinary people with a keen awareness of environmental conditions and of their obligations as citizens to mobilize civic responses to environmental crises. The founding of Friends of Nature (FON) in 1994 foreshadowed the ﬂ ourishing of grassroots environmental NGOs in the ensuing decade. University student societies were also blossoming, taking on new features by forming regional networks in recent years. According to the estimate of Wen Bo, Coordinator of the China Advisory Board of the Global Greengrants Fund (GGF), there are over 1,000 organized and indigenous NGOs in China: over 100 are grassroots, 500 are student societies, and the rest are GONGOs. Many expect a forthcoming report based on an international survey conducted by the Social Survey Center of China Youth Daily and commissioned by the All-China Environment Federation to show substantial increases in Chinese ENGO activity. In Chinese society, environmental NGOs are active and robust, taking the lead in environmental public education and policy advocacy.

B. Environmental Education and Policy Advocacy Since 2003–4, indigenous environmental NGOs, with their distinctive characteristics and vigorous nature, participated in major public events to usher in a new phase in their development. This new thrust put a premium on NGOs mobilizing active public participation. Through media coverage, they have succeeded in exerting extensive pressure and social infl uence. By doing so, NGOs have signifi cantly reinforced their participation in drawing attention to environmental issues. At the same time, they have also drawn more public attention to environ - mental events. Taken together, these forces have helped to inspire insights into and encourage efforts in addressing underlying problems in areas of social justice, cultural preservation, and decision-making mechanisms. For instance, questions have been raised about the plans for the Yangliu Lake Dam at the Dujiangyan Water Irrigation System, the Mugecuo Dam, the Hydropower Stations on the Nujiang River, and development of environmental ngos in china 293 the development at the Tiger Leaping Gorge on the Jinsha River.1 Various ENGOs toured a number of cities with photo exhibits calling for protection of the Nujiang River, and set up a website to follow the developments of the plan. Later, a dozen ENGOs formed a loose coalition of organizations on the Internet called China Rivers, to encourage public discussion of the proposed hydropower station at the Tiger Leaping Gorge. As stakeholders directly affected by these projects, local residents voiced, for the fi rst time ever, their determination to protect their legitimate rights. Equally conspicuous was the Lakebed Anti-seepage Project in Beijing’s Yuanmingyuan Park in 2005. On April 13, the State Envi- ronmental Protection Administration (SEPA) held a public hearing on the project. A number of ENGOs took an active part in the inquiry, with about ten representatives attending the hearing and jointly putting forward fi ve proposals on handling the project’s aftermath. In terms of regional environmental events, Green Earth Volunteers (GEV) and other NGOs started campaigns against a possible relocation of the Beijing Zoo. Pressures from various sources fi nally led to the abandonment of that idea, a result that won praise from the magazine Nanfengchuang: “Green Politics Is Emerging in China.” Years of hard work by ENGOs have awakened the public to environmental protection. A great number of urban elites have become staunch supporters of sustainable development and have high expectations about what ENGOs can do to promote social participation in environmental protection campaigns. Meanwhile, inequity brought about by social transformation exacerbates environmental problems, spurring some ENGOs to shift their focus to the public sector. By incorporating the principles of equal development and environmental justice into their projects and activities, they assume the role of spokespersons and guardians of the public interest. During this process, they have developed a deeper understanding of the social impacts of ecological and environmental issues, as exemplifi ed by their emphasis on both resettlement and ecology when they questioned dam building plans. In a context of increasing diversity of stakeholders, NGOs’ efforts have necessitated the establishment of dialogue mechanisms among

1 The Tiger Leaping Gorge project is described elsewhere in this volume. 294 fu tao diverse stakeholders, a second practical beneﬁ t of ENGO advocacy. A typical advocacy group is Green Watershed of Yunnan Province, which calls for public involvement in the comprehensive development of river valleys. Yu Xiaogang, founder of the group, argues that unless NGOs integrate their philosophies with working projects in an effort to change policies and decision-making mechanisms, they will become merely commonplace service units without independent channels of communication and mobilization. All these lines, Chongqing Green Volunteers Union (CQGVU) has reshaped 15 government policies concerning environmental protection since its founding in 1999. Nine policy moves targeted pollution caused by industrial production and the misconduct of local authorities, and another changed the local farmers’ traditional farming methods that involved excessive use of chemicals detrimental to the environment.

II. Changes in Environmental NGOs

Over the last decade, ENGOs’ activities have undergone two profound changes.

A. NGOization of Media and Academia Due to the lack of political and market resources, NGOs have always valued the media as powerful amplifi ers of their voices. In a series of advocacy events, participants have come from such diverse backgrounds as scholars of various disciplines, journalists, and government offi cials. Pulling together such varied interests testifi es to ENGOs’ strong capacity to integrate different social resources. In recent years, ENGOs have strengthened their advocacy role by mobilizing against the most fl agrant confl icts of interests. This amplifi es their work on environmental issues by actively considering the social and legal dimension of the work. At the same time, echoing NGOs voices satisfi es the demand of some media to be more socially responsible by providing ENGOs with frequent coverage. Take for example the media coverage of the potentially dire ecological consequences that could come about if a proposed dam is built on the Nujiang River. According to incomplete statistics, from August 2003 to September 2004, this controversial issue became the focus of well over a hundred articles and programs by nearly a hundred national-level development of environmental ngos in china 295 newspapers, magazines, radio and television outlets.2 The message in these reports grew increasingly critical, as they changed from positive comments to dissenting opinions, as revelations about the negative impacts of the dam surfaced. Parallel to this, the media began calls for new policymaking mechanisms and more public participation to shape further debates. Diverse reporting perspectives stirred heated argument between reporters offering differing stances. Some professional reporters renounced their role as independent and objective observers and became sympathizers for disadvantaged people and marginalized NGOs. Advocacy trumped “objectivity,” thus emphasizing the importance of assuming more social responsibilities in a period of transition. Friends of Nature (FON) organized two seminars, one before the SEPA held a public hearing on the environment impact assessment (EIA) of Yuanmingyuan Lakebed Anti-seepage Project in April 2005, and the other after the SEPA released the EIA report by Tsinghua University. Both were broadcast live on www.bokee.com. At the same time, the joining of like-minded scholars in NGOs increased their ability and willingness to analyze social problems from the perspectives of the relevant publics. Expertise contributed by scholars from a wide range of disciplines helps NGOs to become more professional in articulating their positions, which helped compensate for their inadequate internal technical capacity. In the literature on environmental issues compiled by some experts, such as Comments on China’s Environment and Development Series and A Scientifi c Outlook on Develop- ment and River Exploitation, special topics were added to discuss ENGOs and public participation in government policymaking. With increased independence, NGOized scholars and journalists have become activists in civil society. This is attributable to ENGOs’ hard work over the years. Take the example of Friends of Nature. Since its founding in 1994, FON has, for six consecutive years, conducted a detailed analysis of data to rank newspapers according to their awareness of the environment, and recognized the most environmentally sensitive journalists by giving them awards. Global Village of Beijing (GVB) educated the public on protecting the environment by producing television programs. In late 2000, Hebei Green Alliances launched a journalist advocacy and capacity-building campaign on environmental

2 Wang Yongchen, “The Controversy over Dam Building on the Nujiang River and the Balance of Media Information,” in A Scientiﬁ c Outlook on Development and River Exploitation, (Huanxia Press, 2005). 296 fu tao protection. Biennial prizes from Daughters of Mother Earth are awarded to female reporters who have made outstanding contributions to the coverage of environmental issues. Green Earth volunteers and China Youth’s Green Island co-host environment forums regularly to offer independent, objective, scientiﬁ c, and forward-looking perspectives to reporters covering environmental issues. The forum itself has now begun to take the shape of an NGO. GVB also holds a regular journalists’ forum on energy to discuss current energy-related issues and hotly debated policies. Both forums bring NGOs, the media, and scholars closer. Moreover, almost all environmental NGOs are running their own publications, directly expressing their voices to society and their peers, as well as exchanging information with each other.

B. ENGOs Going Online and Developing a Network As a means of communication, the Internet serves as a cohering force among organizations and individuals with common values and goals. It provides the means to share information and knowledge, integrate resources, and augment social leverage. Thus, individual organizations are empowered to expand their capability and engage in dialogues with other interest groups, while the Internet also amplifi es all NGOs’ voices to increase their infl uence on policymaking. Coordination made possible by the Internet sets the stage for more intensive inter-organizational association and cooperation. Presently, information exchanges between NGOs through e-forums and e-newsletters are becoming increasingly frequent, and joint advocacy targeting focal issues demonstrates the intensive interaction among NGOs. For instance, on August 25, 2005, after knowing that new plans to develop hydropower plants on the Nujiang River had passed reviews by planning and environmental authorities, ENGOs demanded disclosure of the Hydropower Develop- ment EIA Report, as required by law. By soliciting signatures, ENGOs pressured the approving agencies to make the report public before making the fi nal decision to implement the project so that peoples’ right to information would be safeguarded. Advocacy by indigenous organizations is also bolstered by international NGOs, such as the World Wildlife Fund’s participation in the “26 Degrees Campaign”.3 However, constrained by their relative immaturity

3 This campaign is detailed in this volume. development of environmental ngos in china 297 and some popular skepticism regarding their motives and credibility, China’s ENGOs do not yet compare with their full-ﬂ edged international counterparts. There are hopeful signs however; the diversity of voices and communications synergies made possible by the Internet may already be remedying this situation, as seen in the following two examples of action taken by ENGOs.

Example 1: Reassessing the Impact of the South-to-North Water Diversion Project In August 2003, the environmental group Green Hanjiang in Xiangfan, Hubei Province collaborated with 12 ENGOs in Beijing and Tianjin to launch an advocacy effort. Since the middle route of the South- to-North Water Diversion Project would transfer a colossal amount of water from Xiangfan to the country’s capital and the municipality, these organizations appealed to the authorities to take into serious consideration some ecological compensation to the Xiangfan people. In essence, that campaign was a joint action taken by NGOs to defend the environmental rights of local residents.

Example 2: Cutting Power Demand by Turning up the Heat Given the power crunch in the summer of 2004, GVB and another 5 domestic and international ENGOs introduced a joint initiative in Beijing, calling on the air-conditioned temperature in venues like hotels and restaurants to be kept at 26 degrees Celsius. In 2005, another organization joined the campaign, which spurred Beijing’s municipal government to adjust public policy.

C. The Concentration and Comprehensiveness of Commonly Held Issues The environmental NGOs began to pay close attention to speciﬁ c environmental issues. For instance, Hanhaisha, Alxa SEE Association (SEE), and the Chifeng Desert Green Engineering Institute focused their attention on desertiﬁ cation. They have already carried out programs of desert control and ecosystem recovery. The Yunnan Pesticide Eco- Alternatives Center gave priority to pollution produced by pesticides, and coordinated the action of producers, consumers and the government to address the problem. In practice, some organizations began to take into consideration environmental pursuits alongside the development of community. For instance, GVB established model ecological villages in the suburbs of 298 fu tao

Beijing to explore a sustainable rural development pattern.4 Green Earth Volunteers and the Beijing Brooks Educational Center raised funds to establish village libraries and organized volunteers to mentor students from villages. Beijing Green Cross promoted the construction of rural ecological culture in Wushan Township in Hubei Province, and coordinated the development of the rural community economy and the environment by classifying garbage, building biogas pools, purifying water, cleaning toilets, improving the sanitation of pens and kitchens, and popularizing environmental education. The Global Environmental Institute (GEI) applied its technical background to an effort to make use of market mechanisms to realize greater environmental effi ciencies, which introduced some foreign concepts and practices in the fi eld of environmental technology and economics. On August 8, GEI launched a poverty alleviation program in Shui Village in Lijiang of Yunnan Province, solving the problem of cow dung pollution by using biogas and vegetable greenhouses, which helped reduce the damage to forests by limiting the consumption of fi rewood. The community development program of the China Association for NGO Cooperation (CANGO) also combined ecosystem recovery and environmental protection. All these practices are an application of renewable resource, or “cradle- to-cradle,” economic theory.5 During this period, with the support of some international organizations, the indigenous resources of traditional religions and cultures in areas rich with minority populations were tapped and promoted. There- fore, the protection of the ecology and cultural diversity was further strengthened. For instance, grassroots organizations such as Snowland Great Rivers Environmental Protection Association in Qinghai Province and Green Kham in Ganzi participated in the international program for protecting “sacred mountains and lakes.” To realize this goal they launched a program harnessing indigenous knowledge that promoted a sustainable system for managing natural and land resources in both Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Sichuan Province and Yushu ( Jyekundo) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Qinghai Province. Around the same time, Friends of Nature (FON) also began to refl ect on the value of indigenous culture.

4 This and related efforts are detailed elsewhere in this volume. 5 An entire chapter in this volume is devoted to the application of zero-waste, cradle-to-cradle economics. development of environmental ngos in china 299

The overall development of China’s NGOs coincided with that of international NGOs. During the past three decades, among NGOs in every ﬁ eld, the concepts of environmental NGOs, humanitarian NGOs engaging in ﬁ rst aid and development, religious organizations and charity funds were converging. NGOs, doing research on some environmental problems, increasingly regarded human development as an indispensable requirement of environmental protection. Meanwhile, most of the humanitarian NGOs, and NGOs caring about long-term development in particular, began to emphasize that environmental protection is an indispensable prerequisite for human development.6

D. The Emergence of Pollution-driven Organizations In this period, there emerged several pollution-driven organizations, for example Fujian Pingnan Green Association, which was formed by the people in pollution-stricken communities. The aim of these organizations was mainly to strive for pollution compensations and to safeguard peoples’ right to health. Some organizations transformed their strategy into seeking rights and promoting ecological construction rather than seeking rights directly. For example, farmers in Dazu County of Sich- uan Province established an ecological agriculture planting cooperative in October 2005. Members of the association began to monitor local polluting enterprises and engage in defending environmental justice.

E. The Emergence of Environmental GONGOs The Environmental GONGO and its activities, to some extent, are a sig- nal indicator of the government’s environmental control efforts. There are a huge number of national and local GONGOs. Due to administrative control and emphasis on maintaining an academic atmosphere, however, these GONGOs lack innovation and ﬂ exibility, and are separated from the needs of people and communities. In spite of this, highly professional GONGOs and environmental organizations including the China Society of Environmental Sciences, the China Association of the Environmental Protection Industry, the China Energy Conservation Association, and the Chinese Society for Sustainable Development boast competitiveness

6 Nick Young, “International NGOs: Different Origins, Changing Features and the Tendency toward Globalization,” 200 NGOs in China, ( January 2005). 300 fu tao in environmental planning, technical decision-making consulting, environmental protection, energy development and application, as well as academic information dissemination and exchange. These organizations, approved by the government for their strong area expertise, offer effective inter-institutional communication channels. During this period, two national environmental GONGOs with strong government backgrounds became very active. These are the China Environmental Culture Promotion Association (CECPA) and the All-China Environmental Federation. After he took the offi ce as Vice Minister of the State Environmen- tal Protection Administration (SEPA), Pan Yue acted as the leader of CECPA, and began to restructure this association. He led this GONGO to engage in semi-civil activities, which produced signifi cant social impacts. The main activities of this association include training universities’ environmental protection associations to enhance capacity building, holding forums on environmental protection, and promoting communications and interactions with grassroots organizations. In April 2005, CECPA developed a training program in association with Global Village of Beijing (GVB), and the SEPA. Offi cials from the SEPA served as instructors, providing training on public hearings related to environmental issues. Environmental NGOs from all parts of China took part in this training process. The aim was to help them grasp a better picture of the purpose, procedure, content and methods of the public hearing system, thus increasing their ability to participate effectively in public hearings. The All-China Environment Federation, established in April 2005, features a leadership that also works within state departments and agencies relating to environmental protection, as well as other enterprises and associations engaged in such efforts. In June 2005, the Federation commissioned the social research center of China Youth Daily to conduct an investigation on the status of environmental NGOs nationwide so as to establish an information bank on environmental protection. Mean- while, the Federation completed an environmental protection white paper based on a survey and in-depth interviews. Another important activity of the Federation is to provide legal consulting assistance to help safeguard environmental rights. development of environmental ngos in china 301

III. A Review of Environmental NGOs’ History

Before 2003–2004, environmental NGOs underwent the period of environmental enlightenment education. During this period, environmental NGOs, through operating programs, publicity, and education, increased public awareness of the environment. In particular, ENGOs advocated for the public to cultivate an environmental-friendly way of life. This change in attitude may be seen as a prelude to becoming more involved in direct actions on the elements behind environmental problems. Environmental NGOs showed diversity in all respects, such as developing background, activities, and management, as well as mobilizing social resources and program content. Compared with NGOs in other regions, environmental NGOs in Beijing were set up earlier. Being in the capital gave them advantages in acquiring human resources, information and ﬁ nancial resources. Moreover, they paid extensive attention to environmental issues. The establishment and activities of local NGOs mainly evolved around local environmental issues and the strengthening of public awareness. The following is a description of activities of some environmental NGOs.

A. Environmental Education Friends of Nature (FON) was the ﬁ rst ENGO to introduce the mobile van for environmental education in China. Their van, named Ante- lope, traveled across urban and rural areas to popularize participatory environmental education in primary and middle schools. In 2000, FON began to send volunteers to Project Hope7 primary schools throughout the country to spread environmental education. At the same time, it compiled books on environmental education that were suitable for

7 A Project Hope school is a school set up with funds provided by Project Hope. This program, sponsored by the Communist Youth League (CYL) Central Commit- tee and the China Youth Development Foundation, is to support young dropouts in poverty-stricken areas. China, a developing country, faces a shortage of education funds, especially in poverty-stricken areas. More than 30 million children between the ages of 6–14 are unable to attend school or are forced to drop out. 84 percent of these youngsters come from the countryside. Each year one million children are deprived of education due to poverty. 302 fu tao children. It also trained rural teachers to improve their skills in environmental education. The “Better Environment” scheme launched by Friends of Nature collected feasible environmental protection plans generated by students in primary and middle schools, and provided ﬁ nancial support for the implementation of the best plans. Green Earth Volunteers mobilized a large number of volunteers to participate in tree planting and bird watching. Global Village of Beijing made a number of movies and TV programs, wrote columns for newspapers, and organized a children’s art ensemble, Green Art Association. Some activities on environmental protection organized by the China Environmental Protection Founda- tion were well received among the public. CANGO, in cooperation with other organizations, held various activities to advocate environment conservation. As the Chinese partner of Leadership for Environment and Devel- opment (LEAD International), the Beijing Institute of Environment & Development enrolled students and provided them with training on the art of leadership related to the environment and development. The Beijing Earthview Environmental Education and Research Center introduced videos from abroad and set up resource centers in different parts of China, where readers can borrow books free of charge. Hanhaisha, an NGO focused on reversing desertiﬁ cation, provided free movies on environmental education at weekends. Little Swan Artistic Troupe of Shanxi Province introduced the concept of environmental protection into children’s art education. Chengdu Green Rivers established environmental protection stations in Hoh Xil to monitor the environment and provide educational services. Other organizations, including Green-web, Hebei Green Friends Association, Jiangsu Green Friends, The Yunnan Yueyang Environmental Conser- vation Volunteers Association, Tianjin Green Friends, and Yunnan EcoNet, in accordance with their local situations, held a host of educational activities in schools and communities.

B. Environmental Protection and the Development of Communities

1. Green Community Development In 1999, Global Village of Beijing implemented a garbage classiﬁ cation and sorting initiative as a key element in developing the concept of a green community. In order to support the bid for the 2008 Olympic development of environmental ngos in china 303 games, Global Village of Beijing established model green community models in several places. Meanwhile, it established rural green communities that enabled locals to participate in environmental protection, most notably in Duishi Village in Yanqing County. In addition, it also published a Green Community Guide Book, which serves as a handbook on establishing green communities. In this way, GVB encouraged communities to participate in environmental protection.8

2. Controls on Pollution To control the source of pollution spreading through the Hanjiang River basin, the Environment Protection Association in Xiangfan (a.k.a., Green Hanjiang River) advocated for the protection of the Mother River, and effectively pushed the government to conduct pollution control and prevention. Green Beijing launched the “Saving the Grasslands” program in 2002 by persuading herdsmen to protect land resources, investigating local polluting enterprises, and helping herdsmen safeguard their legitimate rights. In the late 1990s, the Huaihe River Guards focused on the pollution of the Huaihe River basin by holding photo exhibitions to expose pollution, educating the public on environmental protection, and working to establish a supervision and participatory mechanism on environmental policy and decision-making.

3. Comprehensive Development of Communities From 2000 to 2004, programs such as Lashihai Participatory Integrated River Basin Management and integrated control over small watersheds in Lijiang of Yunnan Province conducted by Green Watershed, greatly improved the capability of the local people in participation and management. Thus it laid a solid foundation for a sustainable development of the Lashihai watershed. The South-North Institute for Sustainable Development carried out a commercialized demonstration project in the White Horse Snow Mountain Nature Reserve in Yunnan showing how to produce and use biogas. Through the participation of farmers and the strengthening of capacity building, the project demonstrated an ecologically friendly rural energy system that mainly relied on using biogas collected from pig farming, vegetable greenhouses, and liquid biogas. By popularizing the use of biogas in two towns in Yubei, the Green Volunteer League

8 These efforts are detailed elsewhere in this volume. 304 fu tao of Chongqing solved two problems in a single stroke: the pollution of rivers and their courses by cow dung and the pollution of scenic spots by emissions from domestic coal ﬁ res. Beyond these more focused efforts, Yunnan EcoNet has a long history of developing and implementing renewable energy projects in rural communities. In the second half of 1999, Shanxi Volunteer Mothers for Envi- ronment Association Protection provided environmental protection training and eco-agricultural technology education in 13 counties and 45 townships in order to encourage women’s participation in environmental protection.

4. Protection of Species Green Xinjiang, funded by the Global Green Fund (GGF), organized a series of forums on Xinjiang’s environment and organized many activities such as snow leopard protection, Xinjiang Salamander protection and investigations into illegal trade of the snow lotus. It has been over 10 years since the Black Beak Gull Protection Association of Panjin in Liaoning Province began to protect the local endangered black-beak gulls and educate the local people about their value, which played a key role in restricting commercial development of black-beak gull breeding sites. Locals have also worked to improve government administration over environmental issues. The Volunteers Association for Black-Necked Crane Protection in Zhaotong Prefecture conducted many activities including fundraising to support cranes’ winter habitats as a way to ensure harmony between these animals and the rural communities where they live.

5. Protection of Biodiversity and Cultural Diversity The Yunnan Center for Biodiversity and Indigenous Knowledge (CBIK) has long been devoted to recording and disseminating indigenous knowledge, and facilitating dialog between citizens and local policymaking departments. The CBIK seeks to improve the political organizing and engagement skills of indigenous people living in areas with high concentrations of minorities in southeastern China and impoverished mountainous areas.9 In August 2004, the Qinghai Snowland Great Rivers Environmental Protection Association launched the Green Com- munity Network to carry on ecologically focused cultural education and

9 The work of the CBIK is detailed elsewhere in this volume. development of environmental ngos in china 305 sustainability education for communities at monasteries, schools, and whole communities in the source area of the three rivers.

6. Legal Assistance Since its founding, the Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims at China University of Political Science and Law, has accepted about 80 typical and inﬂ uential cases related to environmental pollution and ecological damage. Considering the expenses involved in prosecuting these cases exceeded the ﬁ nancial capability of the litigants, the center provided them with legal assistance for free. In this way, the center encouraged the public to safeguard their rights to environmental protection, to impose pressure on polluters and destroyers of the environment, and to promote the process of environmental legislation.

C. Exchanges and Cooperation among NGOs The Beijing-based Institute of Environment and Development (IED) is devoted to developing public-oriented information systems and websites, and providing technical and Internet services to other environmental groups. Green-Web has become an Internet service provider and technical group for grassroots organizations since 2003. The Dandelion Project, initiated by Friends of Nature, is offering moderate grants to other environmental NGOs and their projects. Environmental NGOs have initiated several high-proﬁ le activities to disclose environmental damage. For instance, during 1998 and 1999, Green Plateau, Friends of Nature and some other groups launched a joint program to protect the Tibetan antelope and Yunnan snub-nosed monkey. In 1998, the Green Volunteer League of Chongqing reported through Economic 30 Minutes, a CCTV program, the excessive logging of natural forests in west Sichuan Province. In March 2001, three environmental groups in Beijing issued a joint invitation to the municipal government to attend a meeting on the Beijing-Miyun canal project, expressing concerns about ecological damage along the canal and the environmental feasibility of the project. With the support of international organizations, Chinese environmental NGOs have conducted many exchanges and cooperative efforts with their foreign colleagues. The World Summit on Sustainable Devel- opment (WSSD) and the annual meeting of the Global Environment Facility (GEF), for instance, have presented excellent examples in terms of public participation and environmentally friendly policymaking. 306 fu tao

The World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) was convened in Johannesburg, the capital of South Africa, from August 26 to September 4, 2002. Participating NGOs from all over the world engaged each other through a multilateral dialogue mechanism. The UN supported this approach. Participants promoted their cause through parades, demonstrations, exhibitions and speeches aimed at the public; among their peers and colleagues they delivered professional proposals for policymaking. Several dozen Chinese NGOs attended the events. The Chinese grassroots delegation, composed of 12 green groups which enjoyed the fi nancial backing of international agencies, made a group debut on the international stage and made their voices heard through forum speeches, performances, and presentations. The coordination, training leading up to the event and publication of the delegates’ work were undertaken by the Global Village of Beijing (GVB). In October 2002 the Second Assembly of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) was held in Beijing. During the event, over 40 domestic NGOs and their foreign colleagues attended the NGO Forum organized by Friends of Nature. They undertook building partnerships with GEF member states and the GEF’s executive agencies in handling global environmental issues. The Forum called for greater civic participation in GEF programs to ensure their transparent implementation. On November 6, the 2005 International Renewable Energy Confer- ence and NGO symposium opened in Beijing. Chinese NGOs in this fi eld presented their projects at the meeting. Groups such as the China Association for NGO Cooperation (CANGO) and the Yunnan Eco-Net worked with their foreign colleagues and raised constructive proposals in drafting the Statement on Renewable Energy. Their proposals were accepted and the fi nal draft of the Statement was submitted to the conference organizers. The above-mentioned events have broadened the horizons of Chinese environment NGOs, helped them in understanding international common practices of public participation, and paved their way for getting involved in multilateral dialogues.

IV. Problems and Challenges Facing Mainland Chinese Environmental NGOs

Indeed, after over a decade of development, NGOs in China have made remarkable progress on many fronts. However, with enhanced public awareness of environmental protection and working within a changed development of environmental ngos in china 307 social context, the once low-key environmental NGOs are facing challenges in institutional structure and professional capacity, which affects how they respond to external pressures.

A. Internal Management Mechanisms and Capacity Building First, many Chinese grassroots NGOs are “spontaneous in management and function, and loose in institutional design and discipline.”10 As a result, the ﬁ rst generation of grassroots environmental NGOs mainly relied on their founder-leader. Leaders’ personal ambitions and charisma shaped these organizations and mobilized followers. Management was not institutionalized and decision-making remained concentrated among a small group of individuals. However, if these environmental groups are to broaden their scope of development, they have to institutional- ize their management system, and enhance transparency. This will help them build public support as well. They have to set up objective evaluation standards for approving and executing projects; deepen their capability in risk management; and establish a response system to address possible emergencies. To improve internal management, environmental NGOs have to—while ensuring humane and democratic management—establish consistent and binding rules and regulations, and establish boards of directors for policymaking, decision-making, and oversight. NGOs “are faced with challenges in terms of internal management. The more they get involved in solving social problems, the greater the pressure for them to improve their organizational structure and operation.”11 This challenge has propelled many NGOs to step up capacity building and internal reform. Friends of Nature, for instance, has achieved remarkable progress in this regard. Another challenge lies in the limitation of professional capability. The change of social conditions requires environmental NGOs to take a professional rather than a general perspective. This will require them to achieve sharper identiﬁ cation of environmental problems, deeper involvement in addressing these problems, and more effective

10 Wang Ming, Defi nition, Development and Policy Advocacy of NGOs, (Beijing: NGO Research Institute of Tsinghua University). 11 Lester, M. Salamon, Civil Society: A New Era for Global Associational Revolution and Resolution of Public Problems in the Nonprofi t Sector in China’s Development, ed. Zhao Liqing, 58 (Hong Kong: Social Science Press, 2001). 308 fu tao advocacy in organizing public interest. For example, public hearings on environmental impact need to be better understood. Furthermore, they need to present evidence more effectively and work with administrative and bureaucratic systems more successfully. The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) report on the Nujiang River is a case in point. The report, containing more than 700 pages, touched on various branches of science. It is an urgent task for NGO experts to translate the content of the report into scientifi cally sound and convincing proposals that would lead to professional environmental decision making.

B. The External Environment and Expansion of Inﬂ uence Environmental NGOs have enjoyed relatively favorable conditions and external support in their development. However, external constraints still exist. Under the current policy framework, NGOs still face many restrictions in legal terms, especially regarding domestic fundraising. Another issue affecting them is competition for resources because of the increasing numbers of NGOs. Particularly scarce resources are technology, information, and funding. Furthermore, public conﬁ dence in NGOs has yet to be strengthened. In general, whether the NGOs can play a more prominent role in the future depends on the progress they make in conducting institutional reforms.

C. The Gap between Chinese and International NGOs Generally speaking, mature international NGOs have sound management structures and high professional standards. Resources can be fl exibly applied and redeployed, especially media and promotional resources. They have diversifi ed operations, connecting with research institutes, advocacy groups, cooperatives, organizations that straddle these categories, as well as on-line groups.12 Many of them enjoy transnational and cross-regional infl uence, ensuring their participation in decision-making processes. A mature organizational culture nurtures these strengths.

12 Gan Lin, Promotion of Sustainable Energy Development and Consumption: the Social Func- tions of Environmental NGOs, a speech in the Subfroum on Environmental Protection of the Forum on Millennium Development Goals. development of environmental ngos in china 309

In comparison, Mainland Chinese NGOs often lack such organizational strengths. Furthermore, Chinese NGOs tend to be very homo- geneous, which erodes their collective capacities. They rarely have experience in the international arena and therefore their perspectives are relatively limited and their actions rarely take on a global outlook. Because of capacity and managerial limitations, they have not developed organizational agility; generally, they do not react quickly and suitably to environmental challenges as they present themselves. To better understand how NGOs and their roles evolve, we can examine how ENGOs in Hong Kong have collectively developed. NGOs there used to be the watchdog, whistleblower or group exerting pressure on the government. Now they have become problem solvers, often serving as consultants for the government and the general public. After many years, HK NGOs have become well-situated strategists, network builders and partners of the government. However, this new relationship does not prevent them from exerting pressure on the authorities. When they do, they mainly nudge policymakers through legal leverage. These changes have occurred partly as a result of the political reform carried out by the Hong Kong administration in the 1980s. This reform broadened the political arena in which NGOs could function. Major environmental NGOs were given a seat at the table with other parties offering insight and consulting. Their policy proposals were often heeded. As a result, the relationship between NGOs and the authorities has transformed from confrontational to cooperative. The organizational style and structure of HK NGOs has changed as well, moving from the charismatic-leader model to more of a teamwork-based system. Their public image has changed from being lumped in with “marginalized groups” to being included in the group of “mainstream policy participants.”13 By comparing mainland environmental NGOs with their counterparts in Hong Kong, and even the other nations, we can see that the PRC’s ENGOs still have a long way to go before gaining the range of expertise and capacities seen among more established NGOs. By no means, though, does this mean that Mainland Chinese ENGOs can

13 Ye Guangtao, “The New Operational Models of Environmental NGOs in Hong Kong,” in Anthology of Papers Presented at the Journalists’ Forum: A Meeting of Environmental- ists in Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, 11–12 (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2001). 310 fu tao merely imitate their counterparts in Hong Kong and abroad. Rather they will have to integrate the best practices of these organizations, but mold them to the speciﬁ cs of their local conditions.

DIVERSE APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION BY CHINESE NGOs

Wang Peng

In the 1990s, China experienced an environmental awakening. This social change can be attributed to the expansion of environmental education efforts made by the public schools, and to a lesser extent, initiatives undertaken by Chinese non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Chinese NGOs continue to play a lesser role in environmental education in spite of the great energy, original ideas, and fresh insights offered through their programs. Recently, Chinese environmental education entered a new phase of development, when in 2005 the Chinese government added its voice to the chorus calling for heightened environmental awareness. At the same time, international NGOs have entered China more aggressively; their actions both challenge and inspire the native NGOs. NGO leaders realize that deepening the impact of environmental education programs will require an exacting analysis of how to reach the public with useful and compelling information. Given these competing pressures and widespread changes, Chinese NGOs are in a state of crisis and confusion.

I. Background on Environmental Education

A. The Deﬁ nition of Environmental Education What we now call environmental education was actually inspired by several international conferences on the environment and environmental development. Two of the earliest international environmental education conferences, held in 1975 and 1977, reached a consensus on environmental education, which helped form a foundation for later efforts. The 1992 United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development reached an international agreement on sustainable development for human beings and considered environmental education to be a vital measure to achieve sustainable development. The instructive International Implementation Scheme for the United Nations Decade of Education 312 wang peng for Sustainable Development (2005–2014) originally put forward by the UN in 1993 exerted a great inﬂ uence on the promotion of environmental education in countries all over the world. Environmental education is a process through which people acquire environmental awareness, knowledge, techniques and experience that encourages them to act on resolving present and future environmental problems. Its objectives include public participation, internalization of environmental values and knowledge, understanding techniques for improving environmental education techniques, and broadening the public’s awareness of environmental issues. Not only does environmental education cover various social outcomes, it also involves a set of methods which construct the society as a united whole, and any one-dimensional practice is discouraged. Environmental education is basically a part of a complete education, while environmental research is interdisciplinary. Empirical experience of nature formed the basic conceptual framework of environmental education, which places equal importance on educational approaches and objectives.

B. Current Environmental Education in China In the past, Chinese public education had no specifi c courses on environmental education, so most courses concerning environmental protection were carried out in biology lessons and fi eld trials. Recently this situation changed signifi cantly. In 1993, the Ministry of Education in China offi cially released The Syllabus for Environmental Education in Primary and Secondary Schools and the fi rst national instructional document on environmental education, Guide for Implementing Environmental Education in Primary and Secondary Schools (draft version), which includes regulations on environmental education and tends to cultivate a culture of environmental awareness within educational institutions. Such efforts demonstrate the expanded role of environmental education in Chinese public education. Environmental education was formally brought into national core courses in 1994. Some government sectors or organizations with government support also undertook environmental education, such as the “Green School” established by the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) and the Ministry of Education, as well as those schools set up by the Environment, Population, and Sustainable Devel- opment program of UNESCO. Although teachers in environmental education are not required to do so, many keep in close touch with diverse approaches to environmental education 313

NGOs, which keeps materials and discussions more up-to-date. Some of these efforts have great potential, but are currently too disorganized. Teaching universities1 and research institutes lay comparatively greater stress on theoretical research while other educational organizations, such as science and educational centers, mainly engage students in scientifi c experiments and research competitions. Each type of organization pursues environmental education in its own way. The human strength in environmental education comes from overseas and domestic NGOs promoting environmental protection, student organizations at colleges, and environmentalists. Overseas and domestic environmental protection NGOs are the main force of popular environmental education. Infl uenced by powerful overseas and domestic environmental protection NGOs and funds, the local environmental education NGOs and the educational events they produce are important local factors in environmental education in China. Collegiate organizations and their networks in many places are a vital force in environmental education, and were greatly infl uenced by earlier environmental protection NGOs. National College Student Green Camps, which have been successfully held for ten years, have cultivated a great number of college volunteers. The Green and Wild Union in Xiamen University promoted the Chinese Mangrove Protection Program (CMPP) on the basis of their established activities and previous concerns. Eventually the group went on to publish locally distributed textbooks on mangroves. The environmental education policies carried out by international environmental NGOs differ a great deal from those of domestic NGOs. Foreign NGOs, with abundant capital and worldwide fame, can more easily exert top-down infl uence on the Chinese government. They not only support the Chinese NGOs and environmental protection programs, but also introduce and localize some Western concepts of environmental education. Recently, international NGOs sped up their localization efforts by successfully improving these policies and approaches.

1 The typical translation for “teaching university” is “normal university.” However, this term is unfamiliar to most Western readers. Therefore the more widely understood “teaching university” description will be used here. “Normal University” will be used in proper names of universities. 314 wang peng

II. The Status of Environmental Education by NGOs in 2005

A. Public Environmental Education Activities Almost all environmental NGOs carry out educational events to raise public awareness of environmental protection through street propaganda (giving printed information to passers-by), promotions, lectures, various contests (the Environmental Protection Case Contest and the Contest of Drama on Environmental Protection, etc.), exhibitions, ﬁ lms, and activities associated with special theme days. Besides these, environmental education gained great support from various awards, publications, and public environmental resources (like websites). In 2005, the Wild China Workshop and The Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) held a series of public lectures, inviting international leaders on biological research and protection to interact with the public, and these lectures quickly became popular. Between February and June 2005, “Roots & Shoots,”2 in cooperation with Hewlett Packard (HP), launched a printing supplies recycling program named “Dragon Recycling.” Dragon Recycling explored a new approach for “Root & Shoots” activities through this recycling program. They established cooperation with many schools and companies in Beijing and Shanghai in order to provide citizens a convenient, efﬁ cient and environmentally-friendly channel for recycling printing supplies. At the same time, they conducted all sorts of promotions about recycling different sorts of waste from electronic devices. Starting in November 2004, Friends of Nature carried out a pictorial road show throughout China called “The Last Virgin Land—Seeing China’s Reserves.” The display, jointly organized by many non-government forces, contained photos of different reserves and was an important part in the assessment of reserves. In 2005 these pictures were displayed in public areas (like universities) in Nanjing, Shanxi and Beijing. The exhibition successfully raised public awareness of reserve conservation. Public lectures accompanied the photographic exhibits, which helped to better inform the public about reserves.

2 Roots and Shoots is an environmental NGO based in Shanghai and Beijing. This organization serves as Hewlett Packard’s primary partner for recycling programs in China. Global Village of Beijing and the Jane Goodall Institute also work with HP on these programs. diverse approaches to environmental education 315

The largest-scale international event for animal welfare is Animal Action Week (AAW) held each year around the fi rst week of October by the International Animal Protection Fund. The 2005 event was the event’s thirteenth consecutive year. In January 2005, the program called “Green Train—the Public Education of Animal Diversity in the Southwest” was launched. The exhibition took the creative and remarkable approach of using, together with public lectures, a train as a classroom for environmental education. Relying on Kunming Railway Bureau’s T61/62, the “Green Train” attempted to combine protection, information, and sustainable travel together in a celebration of animal life diversity in the southwest. Con- ductors were trained regarding environmental information and outreach; the videos of the program were shown on trains; and pamphlets on this issue were handed out to passengers. Cooperating with local NGOs in the southwest, the program made full use of local forces while exerting a favorable infl uence on public environmental education. In 2005, The Sixth Ford Motor Environmental Conservation Award program, built around the theme of “Water,” granted awards to the following winning projects: for general educational efforts undertaken by the Green Hanjiang River Environmental Protection Association of Xiangfan City in Hubei Province; the project for environmental research and protection called “Protect the Mother River” by the Environmental Protection Volunteer Association of Xinxiang in Henan Province; the program dubbed “Green Path: On Water Resources of the Yangtze River” by student organizations at Tongji University; the program entitled “Daughter of the Earth” on wetlands protection by the Environmental Protection Volunteer Association of Hengshui; and the water conservation program initiated by Xiamen Green Cross Association. Friends of the Earth (Hong Kong) set up a delegation of outstanding environmental lecturers with the purpose of promoting the Earth Award. The “Green-Green-Grass” delegation of environmental educators continued its green lecture tours to the far corners of China, covering fi fteen provinces in 2004 and 2005. It is worth noticing that two new environmental protection awards emerged in 2005: namely the SEE Environment Award and the Case Competition on Sustainable Development in China. The former is an environmental protection award fi rst granted in April 2005 by the fi rst entrepreneurs’ NGO, Alxa Society, Entrepreneurs, and Ecology (SEE) Association. SEE seeks to safeguard great Chinese cultural and physical 316 wang peng treasures, while producing public benefi t around conservation. The latter is jointly organized by the Beijing-based Economic Observer news agency and Shell Oil, with additional support from many NGOs. The Earthview Environmental Education and Research Center introduced international environmental protection movies to China, and established a publicly accessible database of such movies. These fi lms are distributed through branches throughout the country. In June 2004, a digital library on the Internet was opened to the public, catering to the need for environmental education support materials. Teachers in more than 100 colleges and universities registered as users of this digital library within one year of its opening, downloading a total of more than 7,300 fi lms. The Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims (CLAPV) at the China University of Political Science and Law provided educational materials on environmental laws. The World Wild Fund for Nature offered environmental education to children ranging from 8 to 13 years of age through their website Children of the Earth. Some public environmental education sites have been, for a long time, engaged in exhibitions and shows relating to environmental education. For instance, Milu Yuan (a park for Pere David’s deer) in Beijing is a famous national museum for environmental education; and the Global Village of Beijing set up an environmental education base for rural areas in Yanqing County and promoted the campaign of “Green Communities” in cities.

B. Mass Media and Public Environmental Education Media, including newspapers, radio, TV and the Internet, produce a large and unique influence on public environmental education. Elevating the stature of environmental awareness in the media will certainly result in greater public environmental awareness. In 2005, voices and ideas from environmental protection NGOs were broadcast through the media. Spokespersons from the Nujiang River Project, the Yuanmingyuan Lakebed Anti-seepage Project, and the Environmental Impact Assessment “Storm”3 all enjoyed visibility through the mass media. Chinese NGOs also participated in various environmental events, producing huge impacts on environmental awareness.

3 EIA Storm; see Chapter 1 of this book: “Environmental Impact Assessment: A Storm Stirs in 2005”. diverse approaches to environmental education 317

NGOs have a deep understanding of the media’s role in environmental education and have effectively employed special media-oriented strategies for environmental education. The Green Earth Volunteers held a “Reporters’ Salon” throughout the year to advance environmental broadcasts. The Global Village ran two forums called Sustainable Energy Reporter Forums in both 2004 and 2005, aimed at enhancing reporters’ awareness of sustainable energy policies. These forums stressed to reporters that the media could encourage the government to introduce legislation supporting sustainability and that public support could also be rallied by raising the proﬁ le of sustainability issues through the media. This forum was run eight times a year; on the eighth event, held in 2005, an awards ceremony honoring the Reporter of the Year on Sustainable Energy was presented. The Global Village hoped that by honoring excellent reporters on these issues, more reporters would be encouraged to present environmental coverage. In 2005 the ﬁ rst Star Reporter on Sustainable Energy of the Year was awarded.

C. Various Tactics Regarding Curriculum and Public Activities

1. A Formal Educational System Proposed by the WWF The WWF adopted top-down tactics for environmental education in China, actively cooperating with the Chinese government and educational sectors, in order to push environmental education policies through both. The Environmental Educators Initiative (EEI) was jointly initiated by the Chinese Ministry of Education, the WWF and BP (formerly British Petroleum) in July 1997 for the purpose of embedding environmental education into primary and secondary school curricula. The program made a great contribution to the institutionalization of environmental education. As the highlight of its development, the Ministry of Education ofﬁ cially issued in November 2003 the National Environmental Education Guidelines (trial implementation), a document that guides environmental education in primary and middle schools. The program took into consideration the obstacles of a shortage of teachers for Chinese environmental education and established 21 educational centers on sustainable development within Beijing Normal University, East China Normal University, and Southwestern Normal University, among others. EEI Phase III (2005–2007) will focus on the nationwide implementation of the Guidelines. 318 wang peng

2. Environmental education through extracurricular activities The Better Environment Scheme, supported by Shell Oil, launched an annual competition to encourage students to design and implement environmental protection projects in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Tianjin. Its partner in Beijing is Friends of Nature and its partner in Tianjin is Friends of Green. The Roots & Shoots Group, composed of members ranging from preschool children to college students, was constructed under the Roots & Shoots Program to carry out activities in local communities and schools. There are currently more than 300 Roots & Shoots Groups in China. In September 2005 the Roots & Shoots Beijing Ofﬁ ce put forward Eco-Action Beijing, a national project which will popularize environmental education among youth through the slogan “Greener Beijing” until the end of the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008.

3. Environmental Education Carried out by Friends of Nature in Cities and Rural Areas Some environmental education projects are based on classroom instruction, such as the “Environmental Education Van” (EEV), the “Green Hope Initiative” and the “Village Teachers Training” programs. Friends of Nature oversees all of these programs. The Environmental Education Van Program grew out of the Friends of Nature’s Antelope Van outreach project in 2000. The basic idea, brought from Germany, was that a van could be reﬁ tted to be a classroom, complete with educational equipment. By employing the participative teaching approach, including games, students in primary and secondary schools (including schools for migrant workers’ children), as well as city dwellers, could get environmental education. The curriculum created by the Institute for the Environment and Development was designed to educate people regarding energy issues. The EEV program developed into a program on sustainable development education for youth by bringing some new educational concepts and approaches into schools. The training session “Education on Development” was jointly organized by the Antelope Van Program and Oxfam in Hong Kong during 2004. In August and October 2005, the Antelope Van Program and the Tianxiaxi website (a forum for environmental protection), along with the Green Web, launched the program “Training the Trainer.” This gave rise to two successive training sessions focused on developing teaching strategies and case studies aimed at establishing a network of environmentally informed teachers. diverse approaches to environmental education 319

During June and July of 2005, the program cooperated with the Anima- tion Workshop in Denmark to offer courses on cartoon production for environmental protection. This was the fi rst attempt of such a project in China. The EEV program has achieved a name in China. Many similar projects have been started across the country. The Green Hope Initiative and the Village Teachers Training offer environmental education courses in vast rural areas and focus on using volunteer resources. A great number of volunteers have gained deeper practical understanding of developmental and environmental issues confronting Chinese villages. To help disseminate this knowledge, many rural schools have been urged to include environmental education in their curricula. The Green Hope Initiative, cooperating with the China Youth Development Foundation, focuses on providing environmental education in Hope Schools. The Village Teachers Training program focuses on teachers in poverty-stricken areas by increasing fi nancial support in small amounts to solidify local training development and to exert a lasting infl uence on local environmental education practices. From 2004 to 2005, the Village Teachers Training program successively carried out environmental education in the Errguna region of Inner Mongolia and in Guizhou province, among other remote sites.

4. Environmental Education Programs for Farmers and Herders in Tibetan Areas The Upper Yangtze Organization (UYO) and Sanjiangyuan Environ- mental Protection Association for the Source of the Three Rivers are environmental NGOs working with Tibetans. They have launched localized environmental education programs for people living in and around Tibet that combine advanced theories of environmental education with local practice. For instance, in April 2003, UYO established the Suonadajie Environmental Education Center, which focuses on delivering environmental education to youths in the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau. Their activities include implementing an “Environmental Education Van Program” and developing locally focused environmental education textbooks. In order to reach widely scattered farmers and herders in this region, the Sanjiangyuan Environmental Protection Association started the “Wild Yak Eco-Education Van” program in December 2004. In this program, environmental and biological development educational materials were presented to pastoralists through multimedia equipment installed in vehicles. From the 2nd to the 6th of October 2005, the Sanjiangyuan Environmental Protection Association and the Education 320 wang peng

Bureau of Yushu Prefecture cooperated on the “Green Cradle” environmental education program. Local teachers and government ofﬁ cials also took part in this training program in order to prepare for environmental courses in primary and middle schools in the ecologically fragile region of the Source of the Three Rivers. In addition, the Sanjiangyuan Envi- ronmental Protection Association is now cooperating with Conservation International in the long-term “Green Community Network” project. One of its goals is to provide assistance to communities in establishing an educational support for eco-culture and sustainable development.

5. Specialized Training Courses on Environmental Education and the China Wildlife Photography Training Camp3 By 2005, the LEAD-China Project4 had successfully held 11 sessions produced by the Institute for the Environment and Development aimed at nurturing environmental awareness among upper-level managers. The program has provided students with a platform to communicate and cooperate with experts in this fi eld. From December 2004 to August 2005, Wild China launched the 1st China Wildlife Photography Training Camp. The camp helped to promote wildlife photography, while using photography to enhance protection of wildlife. This is the fi rst such program in China. It provides training in wildlife photography and equipment support to interested photographers. Additionally, photographers can learn from each other and improve their skills. In September, 2005, the fi rst exhibition of photos from camp participants opened to the public.

D. Environmental Education in Community Development Environmental education at the community level cannot be separated from more direct environmental activities and is closely associated with themes such as community development, cultural preservation, and protection of biodiversity. As a key support for these environmental actions, environmental education can provide regular courses and training in the relevant skills, thereby optimizing the effects of these environmental actions. For instance, the Center for Biodiversity and Indigenous Knowledge in Yunnan Province has made great efforts to integrate traditional knowledge into community development pro-

4 LEAD stands for “Leadership for Environment and Development.” diverse approaches to environmental education 321 grams; the Green Watershed group has launched a program aimed at improving environmental conscious in watershed management; and the International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW) integrated the protection of Asian elephants into its environmental education and community development projects. The US-based Nature Conservancy (TNC) carried out a “Project on Education for Sustainable Education” from 2003 to the end of 2005, cooperating with Rare,5 a US environmental organization, in environmental education programs titled “I Am Proud of My Hometown” in order to consolidate the environmental protection achievements in northwest Yunnan.

1. “I am proud of my Hometown”—Environmental Education Projects by Roots & Shoots Roots & Shoots, cooperating with Conservation International and Rare, has developed a dynamic environmental education program titled “I am proud of my hometown” in Baishui Nature Reserve. This program seeks to instill pride of place among the residents of a given community. It also gives priority to promoting a sense of team spirit, thereby encouraging local environmental education. Residents, owners of inns in rural homes, and students all participated in the project. In 2005 the ﬁ rst phase of the project was completed after two-and-a-half years of work.

2. The Sunﬂ ower Action Program In 2005, the Shanxi Volunteer Mothers Association and Friends of the Earth carried out the “Sunﬂ ower Action” project, in which women took the lead in community environmental education. Giving full consideration to the important position of women in local households and community development, this project made great efforts to establish the eco-household model, and through this, promote ecologically sensitive energy usage in rural areas. Hopefully the utilization of marsh gas generated by recycled pig manure will give impetus to developing eco-agriculture and eco-energy while improving rural hygiene and the ecological environment. By August 2005, 170 pilot households had been set up to capture energy from these sources.

5 For more on Rare, see their website at http://www.rareconservation.org. 322 wang peng

3. Funding NGO Natural Protection Stations through Book Sales —a Program Executed by the Green-River Environmental Project From 1997–2004, Green River, which is committed to the protection of the Yangtze River, set up the ﬁ rst non-governmental natural protection station—the Suonandajie Protection Station—funded by the sales of books such as Soul of the Yangtze River and Resource of the Yangtze River. Green River was the ﬁ rst local Chinese NGO to establish a volunteer mechanism in China to carry out comprehensive environmental education. In 2005, in order to collect funds for a second protection station on the Mingjiang River, it held charity sales of the book Ten years in Kekexili, with volunteers serving as the sales force. The sustainability of the volunteer mechanism, extensiveness of public environmental involvement, and the creative methods used in its programs will all give momentum to further protection of the local culture and the land around the source of the Yangtze River.

E. Subject-specifi c Environmental Education It seems that environmental education as a subject is not systematically conducted at present, although there are some comprehensive projects. However, “Roots and Shoots” has already fi nished editing a series of teaching materials on animal welfare as well as environmental protection by using translated materials and also referring to practical conditions in China. The Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) has achieved great success in the protection of wild animals. Its programs in environmental education have been conducted systematically, reaching out to the general public and those whose interests are directly concerned. These programs also cover a wide range of issues from green consumption to trade protection. Take, for example, its efforts to protect tigers: WCS has conducted extensive educational campaigns in Northwest China, educating people to reject products made from tigers. The program is designed not only for those engaged in Chinese medicine, but also for students in primary and middle schools. By reaching the younger generation early, they can be infl uenced, and in turn, infl uence the ideas and behaviors of others. Since 2000, WCS has been establishing social coordination and cooperation systems for primary and middle school students in Shanghai. By 2005, 75 schools had founded programs focused on wildlife conservation, making it the largest cooperative organization of science education in Shanghai. diverse approaches to environmental education 323

F. Compiling Textbooks for Environmental Education There are three basic kinds of textbooks in environmental education: comprehensive environment textbooks, localized textbooks and reference books. Since the localized textbooks include a wide range of subjects, their compilation and publication require active support and participation from local people. Such textbooks go beyond providing information; they initiate bottom-up trials in environmental education, leading the general populace to think more deeply about the kinds of hometowns we should build. The project “Developing a Local Environmental Education Textbook on Wetland Preservation,” started in Tianxiaxi during 2003, addresses such questions. Five textbooks were compiled for environmental education in the wetland region. Through summer and winter camps the project presented environmental education to youths in the wetland region, while training teachers and staff as well. In October 2005, Tianxiaxi hosted a symposium in Beijing about localization of textbooks with the intention of pulling together more social resources to develop textbooks addressing local conditions. Doing so should increase the impact of these textbooks. From March to October 2005, the WWF, Friends of Nature and local wetland protection and education departments worked together to compile and publish a textbook for local environmental education titled I Love Mother Lake, in the Honghu area of Hubei province. The “Renewable Energy Project” carried out by the Institute for the Environment and Development produced a textbook entitled Energy in the Future: Renewable Energy along with accompanying teaching aids. The project was not limited to compiling the textbooks; it featured a sustainable and practical approach in popularizing the textbook. This effort was strategically based on local NGOs and its target topics were not only designed for in-school teaching, but also for study by public, community and special interest groups. After several trials and revisions, this set of textbooks was at last in print in June 2005. They were regarded as the ﬁ rst textbooks on sustainable development for young readers in China. The third generation of teaching aids has also become public. High demand for these materials has helped to foster cooperation for distributing the books. Although a shortage of textbooks on environmental education persists, the Ministry of Education, through its 2001 education reform pronouncements, has encouraged basic environmental education to be 324 wang peng conducted through curriculum administration ofﬁ ces at the state, local government, and school levels. Local governments can develop courses according to their own conditions. Therefore, textbooks of environmental education can be used as both school textbooks and teaching material. Under this model, NGOs have easy access to participation in the compilation of textbooks. Furthermore, NGO participation contributes greatly to localizing these textbooks.

III. A Review of NGO Environmental Education in 2005

Generally speaking, assessing NGO environmental education in 2005 is relatively straightforward. There are three key features to consider: ﬁ rst, these efforts basically continued programs carried out in past years, generally lacking novel and creative programs; second, achievements in public environmental education were prominent, yet there are few sustainable, participation-based projects in this area; third, some attempts have been made to utilize organizational networks in this area, but the scope and conceptualization of their activities still remained relatively undeveloped, with no overall strategy or action framework emerging. For example, Friends of Nature has carried out two symposiums on the promotion of the Mobile Classrooms Project focused on pushing forward environmental protection; strengthening cooperation between related organizations, government and experts; and more formally fostering exchange between those working in the ﬁ eld. In 2005, a new environmental NGO—The “Green Voyage Envi- ronmental and Cultural Center” was founded. Committed to environmental education for youth, it has established a network of teachers from China, Japan, and Korea. It has actively engaged in compiling textbooks, writing training materials on environmental education and research, and organizing summer camps for students.

A. Environmental Education Can Be Evaluated according to Three Steps To evaluate environmental education programs, we must fi rst assess the conditions faced by NGOs undertaking such efforts; then we can examine the contributions NGOs have made to the overall effort in developing environmental education in China; and fi nally, we must evaluate NGOs’ effectiveness in reaching and infl uencing public consciousness through their efforts. diverse approaches to environmental education 325

1. Since NGOs are one of the Factors that can Inﬂ uence the Public’s Environmental Consciousness, their Media Strategies should be Strengthened The image of NGOs and the coverage they receive in the mass media are among the most important factors inﬂ uencing public environmental consciousness. In 2005, the scope of NGOs’ debate on environmental issues was widened. NGO activities and attitudes reported in the mass media can help stimulate public interest in environmental issues, promote public participation in the course of environmental events, and thereby function as a basic form of environmental education. Public discussion will also help to increase environmental consciousness and provide solutions for practical problems. The present problem is that there has not yet been a general, sustained mass media strategy. A better mass media strategy should be developed in order to provide an atmosphere that is more conducive to environmental education.

2. NGOs have Enjoyed Advantages in Environmental Education, but these Advantages have not been Fully Exploited Environmental education carried out by NGOs is associated with the general development of Chinese civil society. Given this trend, and the widespread support for environmental reform, much progress can be made in environmental education programs undertaken by NGOs. In this sense, popularization of environmental consciousness will promote environmental education. In China, environmental NGOs are regarded as the basic promoters of environmental education. The values and goals of NGOs distinguish them from other organizations. The methods, attitudes, and resources of NGOs are much more ﬂ exible and dynamic, which provides a good complement to governmental environmental education. So far, the widespread and severe nature of environmental problems in China has aroused great concern, but a comprehensive mechanism for environmental education has not yet been established. Therefore, the role that NGOs choose to play could be crucial. Judging by general conditions, the implementation of national environmental education guidelines is still far from complete, even though such provisions have been on the books for more than a year. Moreover, given the huge need for environmental knowledge in Chinese society, educational efforts have a very long way to go. In particular, we need more detailed plans and strategies in order to make a breakthrough in outreach. But with national guidelines in place, NGOs involved in these efforts face a promising future. 326 wang peng

3. Appraising NGO Environmental Education Projects Based on Impact The ability to appraise environmental education projects in China is quite limited at present. Little information has been collected on program effectiveness. Although many local NGOs have expressed their hopes to infl uence the public, and have certainly made attempts in this regard, even going so far as having invited experts from abroad to conduct project appraisals, few convincing appraisals and reports exist as this point. Remedying this condition and demonstrating effectiveness through these projects could provide crucial evidence for building public and organizational support for environmental education. However, NGOs in China fi rst need a fuller understanding of the issues involved in measuring effectiveness before they can improve their educational programs. Deepening organizational and systemic capacities to carry out environmental education programs depend on improving assessments of effectiveness. Unfortunately, this connection has not been made by many NGOs in the fi eld, which seem more interested in project creation than program outcomes. They pay much more attention to project planning and methodology than to environmental education itself. Still project promotion and creative environmental education offer golden opportunities for local NGOs to expand and become involved in effective outreach. In doing so, they should go beyond just conveying relevant concepts. Environmental education should not be confi ned to organizations trumpeting their views; it must achieve deeper and more lasting impacts on public consciousness.

B. NGOs Are Now Making Breakthroughs in Environmental Education and Are Seeking Opportunities for Self-development From 2004–2005, environmental NGOs in China have learned to ﬂ ex their muscles. This newfound conﬁ dence can help them develop and promote environmental education in China by making full use of each NGO’s core strengths and competencies. The following strategies would aid in this effort:

1. Establish Extensive Cooperative Mechanisms and Develop Strategic Plans with Clear Objectives NGOs need support and cooperation from the government, independent and scholarly experts in the ﬁ eld, as well as from the general public to promote their work. By establishing a sound communication mechanism, diverse approaches to environmental education 327

NGOs can immediately transmit their research and practical achievements to local governments and other organizations to enhance mutual understanding of issues and how they can be presented. They should seek to improve their negotiating position and take full advantage of their organizational strengths. In this way, they will become service institutions for the society as a whole, directly meeting and developing social demands, rather than simply providing ancillary support to the educational system. Cooperation and communication should also be consolidated between NGOs. The agreement on a framework of environmental education and a strategic plan will help give birth to a clear overall picture of concepts, perspectives, approaches and appraisal guidelines in this area. Taken together, such efforts produce positive effects by encouraging interaction among NGOs while helping them conduct project appraisals of their activities, which in turn, further reﬁ nes program effectiveness.

2. Enhance Performance in Environmental Education and Promote Creativity among Professionals Measures for enhancing environmental education capacity include: strengthening organizational capacity, researching local environmental education, providing training courses to teachers and volunteers, accumulating teaching experiences, and implementing the goals of environmental education in teaching practices. There are many opportunities in environmental education to help fulﬁ ll these aims. NGOs can take the initiative in making new demands according to their own local conditions and insights. Some NGOs have already developed distinctive features in their environmental education programs. For individual NGOs, however, sharpening the distinctiveness of their projects is a good choice. Emphasizing the creativity of each project can help make projects more long-term, locally meaningful, and indi- vidually appealing.

3. Finally, it is Advisable to Improve NGOs’ Central Educational Capability Developing professional qualities refers not only to deepening the pedagogical expertise of those involved in environmental education, but also developing in-depth comprehension of the goals and content of environmental education. Environmental education should help people understand the relationship between development and environmental protection by integrating these ideas within widely used educational content and approaches. At present, people lack such knowledge and 328 wang peng environmental education professionals have ignored this. To ameliorate this condition requires strenuous effort from environmental education professionals, who need to introduce new and broader perspectives regarding economic and social development. If environmental education by NGOs remains at the level of simple environmental awareness, it will be impossible for NGOs to exert sufﬁ cient inﬂ uence to promote China’s environmental education.

PART THREE

CASE STUDIES

THE 26 DEGREES CAMPAIGN: SAVING ENERGY

Qiao Liming and Wang Peng

Background

In recent years economic growth in China has outstripped its electrical power generating capacity, leading to shortages from 2003 to 2005 in cities throughout the country. Widespread use of air-conditioning has created acute shortages in recent summers. In 2004 six NGOs met the crisis head-on by initiating the “26°C (78.8°F ) Air-Conditioning Energy- Saving Campaign,” also known as “The 26 Degrees Campaign.” Over 50 NGOs around the country joined the effort to help rollout the campaign. The main goal of this campaign was to encourage government policymakers to create legislation requiring enterprises to set thermostats to 26 degrees. In June 2005 this goal was achieved when the government laid down a statute that air-conditioning should be set at or above 26 degrees Celsius in public buildings during summer days.

I. The Concept behind the 26 Degrees Campaign

The campaign was built around the idea of keeping air-conditioned buildings at or above 26 degrees Celsius. In recent years the Chinese have developed a growing appetite for air-conditioning. In developed cities, air conditioners consume about 40% of the peak electrical load in summer. This large share of demand is driven by many factors. First, most buildings in China are poorly insulated, and are generally energy ineffi cient, thus causing air-conditioners to work especially hard. Second, most air-conditioners are low-effi ciency units. Third, most Chinese have not adopted energy saving practices and waste energy by leaving air conditioners on to cool empty rooms or leave doors and windows open in air-conditioned rooms. Changing the way that air-conditioners are used in public buildings such as hotels and shopping malls can yield huge benefi ts. By adopting the 26 degree standard in public buildings, China will save 90 million kilowatts by 2020, when the country achieves moderate levels 332 qiao liming and wang peng of prosperity and development nationwide. This represents enormous savings: fi ve times the output of the Three Gorges Dam and two to three times the output of nuclear power plants planned to be online in 2020. Energy savings will reduce the need to invest in electrical power infrastructure by 400 billion RMB. Energy conservation will also take pressure off input prices connected to power development. As well, energy savings reduce all manner of environmental costs. An analysis of the impact of raising thermostat settings conducted by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) makes these general claims concrete. Using Beijing as the basis of its analysis, the NRDC estimates if the temperature of air-conditioning increased from 22–24 degrees to 26–28 degrees, 400 million to over 600 million kilowatt-hours would be saved; peak demand would decline by 500 to 750 thousand kilowatts. Consumers would enjoy savings of 180 to 270 million RMB. The report also noted some of the environmental benefi ts: sulfur dioxide emissions would be reduced by 2400 –4500 tons; a staggering reduction of 400,000 to 600,000 tons of carbon dioxide would also be realized. Thus the price pressure of demand would be lessened, reducing out-of-pocket energy costs. Further, global warming pressures would be reduced.1

II. A Brief Account of the 26 Degrees Campaign

A. What is an Environmental Campaign? The 26 Degrees Campaign is an environmental campaign using informational tools to infl uence government policies. Such campaigns use approaches applied in traditional environmental publicity and education, but with particular differences. Environmental education may operate without a defi nite time frame, making program evaluation diffi cult. Contrary to environmental education, an environmental campaign works toward clear, measurable goals within a defi nite time frame. A typical campaign can advocate a certain policy during a certain period

1 Dr. Kang Yanbing from the NDRC, Air-conditioning and Energy Conservation: An Inevitable Choice, an address given at the launch ceremony of the 26 Degrees Campaign on June 26, 2004. the 26 degrees campaign: saving energy 333 of time. For instance, a campaign may aim to replace plastic shopping bags with cloth bags in a city’s supermarkets by a certain date. An effective campaign proceeds from a plan that includes three key elements: a defi nite goal, strategies to achieve this goal, and tactics/actions to carry out these strategies. The goal of a campaign is almost always long-term and macrosocial; strategies provide the general approach to achieve this goal. Tactics/actions refer to the concrete activities designed to carry out campaign strategies, such as hosting press conferences, writing and publishing relevant reports and so on. Every specifi c tactic/action needs to evolve within the strategic framework. The media are a very important partner in such campaigns. Those who launch a campaign create news events to attract media attention and through the media’s ability to amplify messages, spread the word on the importance and credibility of the message contained within the campaign. Scientifi c institutions serve as another important partner. Writing, publishing, and circulating scientifi c reports are one of the campaign strategies/tactics. Policy lobbying plays a central role in the tactics and actions available to campaigners.

B. Analysis of the 26 Degrees Campaign

1. The United Action of NGOs The 26 Degree Campaign was jointly initiated in 2004 by several well- known Chinese and international NGOs: the Global Village Beijing, the WWF, the China Association for NGO Cooperation (CANGO), Friends of Nature, the Institute for the Environment and Develop- ment and Green Earth Volunteers. The international composition of this group stands out as one of the most remarkable characteristics of the campaign. Several other organizations joined this group in 2005 including the China Environmental Culture Promotion Association (CECPA), Friends of the Earth (HK), and Conservation International (CI). CECPA and CI took part in the campaign by contributing ﬁ nancial support while Friends of the Earth mainly developed the campaign in Hong Kong. Though these organizations have different backgrounds, they worked cooperatively by sending their staff members to form an energy conservation action group. 334 qiao liming and wang peng

2. Designing and Implementing the Framework of the 26 Degrees Campaign The 26 Degrees Campaign had a defi nite goal and time frame. The group heading the campaign committed to realizing a clear target: the objective of creating a government sanctioned standard of 26 degrees would be fulfi lled at the end of three years. a. The Campaign’s Goal was Basically Achieved in the First Year From June 26 to September 26, 2004, the fi rst stage of the 26 Degrees Campaign was carried out in Beijing. It appealed to air-conditioning consumers, including governmental departments at all levels, state-owned and private enterprises, embassies in Beijing, the offi ces of transnational companies, hotels and restaurants, various other businesses, and urban residents, to participate in this campaign. Each type of community participant had to be targeted specifi cally; roles for each were specifi ed as well. To generate media exposure, organizers created news events touting the campaign. These events required many types of participation, from environmental envoys who attended the launch ceremony, to volunteer cyclists riding bicycles through streets of Beijing for publicity purposes, delivering a letter of appeal to the 2008 Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad (BOCOG), and giving awards to enterprises which set air-conditioning at 26 degrees so that other enterprises would follow their example. Lectures were given to spread the concept of 26 degree air-conditioning, especially regarding the health benefi ts of this change. Following lectures, the fi lm The Day after Tomorrow was shown, which described one possible scenario of global climate change. The 26 degree concept was also introduced to communities through awards given to model energy saving-communities. To attract the participation of young people, lively activities like concerts were presented. The campaign focused especially on hotels, which used powerful air-conditioners that consumed a lot of electricity. The objective was to push hotel associations and the 2008 BOCOG to include the 26 degree air-conditioning standard as part of a “green hotels” label. The action group successfully persuaded 10 fi ve-star hotels and numerous offi ce buildings to take part in the campaign by setting the air-conditioning in public areas at or above 26 degrees in the summer. the 26 degrees campaign: saving energy 335 b. The Campaign’s Goal was Readjusted in Response to the Improvement of the Policy Environment in the Second Year The 26 Degrees Campaign entered its second stage from June 26 to September 26, 2005 in Beijing. The focus of the campaign at this stage was to distribute “26 degrees commitment cards” to public indoor spaces such as offi ce buildings, restaurants and shopping malls. These cards would be completed by the participants who were willing to be supervised by the participating NGOs during the summer months. The goal was to consolidate and advance the achievement of the fi rst year by getting 50 more hotels and restaurants to use the 26 degree standard, and to continue lobbying the hotel associations and tourism bureaus to adopt the standard as industry- wide practice. Progress came quickly, partly because the national policy environment was more open to resource-conservation issues. The larger goal of creating a regulated standard of setting air conditioning to 26 degrees in the public spaces of commercial buildings was realized in 2005, a full year ahead of schedule. On June the 30, 2005, Premier Wen Jiabao pointed out in his speech titled “Spurring the Development of a Conservation-minded Society” that in the summer air-conditioning in government offi ces and meeting rooms should not be set below 26°C. He added that except for special occasions regarding important state or foreign affairs, suits and ties were not required, allowing employees to stay cooler in summer months, further reducing air-conditioning demands. His remarks aroused an enormous social response. On July 5, the Departmental Affairs Management Bureaus of the State Council and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) issued a notice designed to bolster conservation efforts throughout State and Party departments. This notice specifi cally required every department to set the air-conditioning at or above 26°C in offi ces and meeting rooms, stating that air-conditioners should be turned off in empty buildings or rooms. Windows would remain closed while air-conditioning remained on. In responding to the call from the central government and the Central Committee of the CPC aimed at coping with the summertime electricity peak, Beijing’s municipal government declared that from July the 1st to August 31, 2005, the temperature in offi ce buildings of Party and governmental departments at all levels would remain at or above 26°C. On July 27, the Beijing municipal government sent an open letter to all corporations in Beijing, urging them “to save every kilowatt-hour of electricity by committing to energy conservation” and 336 qiao liming and wang peng requesting that they adopt the 26 degree standard in all buildings of restaurants, hotels, offi ces and public areas. Then the action group began to actually measure the temperatures in public buildings and relayed to the media of buildings which did not meet the standard. At the same time, the action group encouraged NGOs outside of Beijing to implement the 26 Degrees Campaign in other localities. Fifty-one environmental NGOs around the country responded positively to this request. On June 26, 2005, the embassies of Germany and Burundi agreed to join this campaign and promised to set their air-conditioning at 26°C in their offi ce and residential spaces. Soon, the China Environmental News Publication, the Sino-Japanese Environmental Protection and Communication Center, and the Chinese Research Academy of Envi- ronmental Sciences made the same commitment. On July 30, 2005, the China Association for NGO Cooperation, Environmental Defense and several environmental NGOs in the Yangtze River Delta jointly signed-on to participate in the “26 Degrees Campaign—Our Commitment to a Green Yangtze River Delta,” in Shanghai to help alleviate the shortage of electric power supply in summer. In the summer of 2005, Haier Co. Ltd became the fi rst air-condi- tioner manufacturer to commit to the 26 Degrees Campaign by promoting research of products and customer guidance. More than 2000 employees signed their names on the commitment cards.

C. An Assessment of the 26 Degrees Campaign

1. NGOs Played a Positive Role in Promoting the 26 Degrees Campaign The 26 Degrees Campaign achieved its goal of changing public policy in advance in 2005 for several reasons. First, even before 2005, the government had created energy-saving policies and guidelines supporting conservation efforts. Second, power shortages have made energy conservation a pressing need. These conditions helped to set the stage for the campaign. Building on this foundation, the action committee and participating NGOs could drive the process forward to its successful resolution. Before taking these actions, the campaign organizers introduced the “26 degrees” concept in the summer of 2004. In response to power shortages, the 26 Degree Campaign was offered as an energy saving response. Within three months the “26 degrees” concept appeared in the 26 degrees campaign: saving energy 337 about 100 media reports. At the end of the 2004 part of the campaign, a questionnaire delivered to 252 randomly selected respondents, showed that about 40% had heard of the 26 Degrees Campaign, and respondents knew that NGOs had initiated this effort. Clearly media exposure had had a positive effect. Campaign directors, taking full advantage of NGOs’ fl exibility and responsiveness, frequently organized activities, about one every two weeks. Each activity targeted a different group in order to generate media attention. This approach carried the risk of moving from target to target before a deep impression had been made. But generally speaking, the campaign’s strategy of getting more widespread media coverage, rather than deeper coverage, worked successfully. Throughout these parts of the campaign, organizers stayed in touch with the government and continued working toward the ultimate goal of introducing legislative changes regarding air-conditioning use. Before the launch ceremony on June 26, 2004, Liao Xiaoyi, president of Global Village Beijing (GVB), used her position as an environmental consultant for the 2008 BOCOG’s Department of Environmental Affairs to lobby for the inclusion of the “26 degree” standard to be applied to all hotels contracted with the BOCOG. Organizers further strengthened their efforts by having representatives of the National Development and Reform Commission and chief offi cials of China Tourist Hotels Asso- ciation (CTHA) in charge of formulating standards for hotel industry in China in attendance at the campaign launch. After the ceremony, the action group organized a volunteer biking activity; cyclists delivered the letter of appeal for the “26 Degrees Campaign” to the BOCOG’s Department of Environmental Affairs. This particular move was the fi rst lobbying effort targeting the government. Even after concluding its 2004 activities, campaign organizers continued lobbying efforts. For instance, Liao Xiaoyi used her BOCOG platform to repeatedly call for the government to formulate legislation regulating air-conditioning temperatures. Concurrently, Global Village Beijing continued working on the Campaign by introducing a new slogan—“set air-conditioners a degree lower” in winter, which won praise from BOCOG and CTHA. Clearly, progress was being made on several fronts.

2. The 26 Degrees Campaign as a Model for Inter-Organizational Cooperation Among NGOs The 26 Degrees Campaign stands out as a successful experiment in inter-organizational cooperation among NGOs. Earlier attempts at forming coalitions among NGOs had met with difﬁ culty due to differences 338 qiao liming and wang peng in principles, styles, and missions. In previous attempts to coordinate activities, usually one or two NGOs took the lead on initiatives and shouldered much of the work; their confederates usually offered moral support without much actual involvement. But in the 26 Degrees Cam- paign true inter-organizational cooperation among NGOs was realized as all parties got equally involved and took coordinated actions, compe- tently reacting to changing conditions. The action group deserves credit for this coordinating effort; however, they could not have achieved so much without the authorization of the participating NGOs who com- municated with great effectiveness and gave the action committee their backing. The foundation for this part of the effort was laid down by the leaders of the founding six NGOs who reached an agreement on forming a cooperative alliance and an action group. Each organization took charge of some part of the coalition’s routine work, and in turn, members in the action group enjoyed great freedom to make decisions and take action on behalf of the coalition’s members. The group held regular meetings every other week, set up email contact lists, and held ad hoc meetings to deal with urgent matters in order to coordinate information and make democratic decisions. Clearly, every participating NGO stayed engaged and the action group worked diligently and met challenges decisively.

III. The 26 Degrees Campaign Calls for Wider Public Participation

“The 26 Degrees Campaign” was mainly proposed by environmental NGOs in Beijing. Introduced at a time of more liberalized policymaking, the campaign won warm responses from all types of citizens and organizations, particularly NGOs. The Campaign was initiated at the right time, at the right place and for the right reasons; the organizers then harnessed these conditions successfully. Their efforts have provided many useful lessons for developing environmental protection campaigns in China. Even so questions and debate remain. Some observers are divided on the effects of the 26 Degrees Campaign. For instance, some people doubt the effectiveness of media campaigns for changing public and business behaviors. Further, many think that a more focused campaign would yield deeper and longer-lasting results. Broader questions remain as well: the 26 degrees campaign: saving energy 339

• Is 26 degrees the proper target temperature? • How should energy conservation efforts, including this one, be measured? • How has the campaign infl uenced the country as a whole? In spite of everything, the 26 Degrees Campaign is a remarkable example of NGOs’ cooperation and serves as a model for collectively organized environmental action. Even though the 26 Degrees Campaign has been a resounding success in cultivating advocates and adherents among the Central and local governments, numerous private enterprises, and dozens of NGOs, much remains to be done to encourage participation in such efforts by the whole of society. In the summer of 2005 a survey showed that air-conditioners in most public places throughout China still ran below 26°C, with many air-conditioners in Beijing’s public spaces running at 23°C to 24°C.2 Controlling the temperature of air-conditioning is not an isolated issue. To fi nally achieve a society-wide impact, wider and greater efforts must heighten awareness of the whole complex of issues related to air- conditioning use, such as energy conservation, the need for more energy effi cient air-conditioning units, and the crucial role for government regulation and enforcement in assuring that clear, universally applicable standards exist and that means to enforcement such measures can be fairly but forcefully applied.

2 Gu Kefei, “Difﬁ culties in Carrying out the 26 Degree Campaign,” Consumption Daily, September 6, 2005.

ELECTRIC VEHICLES AND AUTOS WITH SMALL ENGINES: SHOULD WE BAN OR PROMOTE THEM?

Wang Peng

A strange phenomenon has recently developed in our trafﬁ c administration policies: despite skyrocketing oil prices and the central government’s call to build a conservation-minded and environmentally-conscious society, electric vehicles and autos with small engine displacement (ASEDs), which have great conservation and environmental potential, are being restricted in many cities. At present, 84 cities in China enforce such bans and more seemed poised to follow suit. In 2005, this problem aroused great concern, causing more voices to speak up against these bans. The tension between cities adopting such bans, the public desire to have greater choices, and government polices promoting conservation point out some deep-rooted conﬂ icts regarding urban development in China.

I. The Dilemma Regarding Electric Vehicles and ASEDs

A. Analysis of the Ban on Electric Vehicles Electric vehicles are a special kind of bicycle powered by a battery. Riders can choose to switch between pedaling and the electrical drive system. As motor powered vehicles, they are subject to various national regulations regarding maximum speed, weight and size. Since they are battery-driven, they do not produce emissions or consume petroleum- based fuels; thus they are environmentally friendly. Because they are small and easy to operate, they are more convenient to use than many other vehicles; because they are powered, they can save time and trouble compared to riding a standard bicycle or walking. Their rapid acceleration and modest size (similar to that of a bicycle) allows them to avoid trafﬁ c and parking congestion in densely populated areas. Moreover, operating these vehicles in China does not require a license.1

1 Many countries require operators of such vehicles to earn a special license. 342 wang peng

For the above reasons, electric vehicles are considered very desirable and practical. Many metropolitan centers like Paris and Tokyo have made large investments constructing special lanes designated for bicycles and electric vehicles. The Chinese central government supports the development and use of these electric vehicles. The government’s primary partner in this effort is Extra Energy, a European non-governmental organization (NGO) dedicated to the popularization of electric vehicles. This NGO is conducting research in China on the design and manufacture of electric vehicles with the cooperation of the China Bicycle Association. Despite this working relationship and the benefi ts that could come from it, many local governments have banned electric vehicles. Such policies impose a formidable obstacle to developing fast-growing industry. These policies have also inconvenienced consumers. Within a short time—only about ten years—the electric vehicles industry has witnessed rapid development in the China. In 2004, 7.5 million electric vehicles were sold nationwide, almost doubling the fi gure from the previous year, and sales were predicted to reach 10 million in 2005. China now has the world’s largest electric vehicle output, accounting for 75% of the world total. In sharp contrast to these positive steps, regulations prohibiting the use of electric vehicles were enacted in Beijing, Nanning, Fuzhou, Wen- zhou, Haikou and other cities. On August 1, 2002, Beijing handed down the “Announcement on Strengthening the Administration of Electric Vehicles,” stipulating that “from January 1, 2006, the use of electric vehicles is prohibited in this city.” Electric vehicles are categorized as non-motor vehicles within the Law of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on Road Traffi c Safety, which came formally into force on May 1, 2004. This is the law that granted legal status to electric vehicles. In spite of this, local and provincial bans were not lifted. In May 2005, Zhuhai became the fi rst city to issue a legislative prohibition of electric vehicles, elevating the ban from the administrative to the legal plane. These restrictions have thrust the industry into a crisis. Two issues have been used to promote the ban on electric vehicles: that of safety and of environmental protection. In day-to-day use electric

Included in this list are the United States, Britain, Japan, Germany, and the Nether- lands, among others. electric vehicles and autos with small engines 343 vehicles often exceed the speed limit designated by the State and are likely to use motor vehicle lanes or pedestrian lanes. The battery used in electric vehicles needs to be renewed every six to twelve months, and improper practices in producing and recycling batteries may lead to serious pollution. Additionally, many electric vehicles fail to conform to technical and safety standards as required by the State. Although these problems exist, they cannot be justiﬁ ed as reasons for a ban.

1. Technical Standards for Electric Vehicles Need to be Updated as soon as Possible In 1999, a maximum speed of 20 km/h and a maximum weight of 40 kilograms were stipulated in “Electric Bicycles—General Technical Requirements” (GB17761—1999) as instituted by the State Bureau of Quality and Technical Supervision. Due to the small scale of this industry in China at the time, an outside standard was used as a guide: in particular, the German standard from World War II. It is now necessary to set new standards that better suit the technical development of the industry in China.

2. The Issue of Batteries Should be Considered in a Wider Context Currently, more than 95 percent of electric vehicles use lead-acid batteries and only top grade models use nickel metal hydride (Ni-Mh) batteries or Lithium batteries. The use of lead-acid batteries is the main reason for electric vehicles to be labeled as “polluting.” Compared with the wide use of lead-acid batteries in automobiles, computers and other products, the total impact arising from use in electric vehicles is quite limited. Thus, forbidding the use of electric vehicles contributes little to the reduction of environmental pollution caused by lead-acid batteries. A more proper measure would be to strengthen recycling programs so as to prevent secondary pollution from improper handling of battery wastes. Policymakers should also develop new technology and policies that would promote the diffusion of Ni-Mh and Lithium batteries.

3. A Comprehensive View on the Problem of Safety should be Developed In recent years, with electric vehicle technology maturing, the industry is undergoing rapid development. Many small or medium-sized enterprises have begun to enter this industry. Some of them, however, manufacture poor quality products in an effort to increase short-term profi ts. Doing so disrupts the market. This suggests the need to establish industry regulations to prevent poor quality products from entering the market. Safety problems caused by violations of traffi c regulations can 344 wang peng be steeply reduced by strengthening safety awareness and rationalizing the traffi c system. Based on the foregoing analysis, we may conclude that problems attributed to electric vehicles do not lie in the vehicles themselves. Regulations forbidding the use of electric vehicles are just over-simpli- fi ed treatments of superfi cial problems that fail to seriously address the more serious and fundamental problems at work in the development and use of electric vehicles.

B. Analysis of the Ban on Autos with Small Engine Displacement (ASEDs) ASEDs have also drawn the public’s attention this year. These vehicles face many of the same issues as electric vehicles. From 1998, after Beijing and Shanghai put forward policies to “restrict ASEDs,” many other cities began to follow suit. Restrictions on ASEDs mainly put constraints on when and where ASEDs can operate on municipal roads. Rush hours and major thoroughfares are generally off-limits. Cars with engine displacement below one liter are generally called ASEDs. Generally speaking, ASEDs consume four to six liters of gaso- line2 in a hundred kilometers while cars with engine displacement above 1.6 liters3 consume 8 to 11 liters of gasoline over a similar distance. ASEDs are usually small and light and are therefore more convenient to park. The central government has long advocated the use of ASEDs due to their fuel economy. A brief summary of this history follows. In 1996, the General Ofﬁ ce of the State Council announced a notice to lift various restrictions on mini-autos. In 2001, the State Economic and Trade Commission, in its “The Tenth Five-year Program for the Auto Industry,” took economy autos as the focus of the auto industry. In 2003, nine departments, including the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Public Security, and the State Development and Reform Commission, jointly issued the “Notice on the Campaign to Improve the Auto Market.” Among other things the Notice opened markets to ASEDs. In 2004, “The Outlook on the Auto Industry in China” and the “Medium-to-long-term Special Program on Energy Conservation” were put forward by the State Development and Reform Commission

2 Gasoline is also known as “petrol” in some countries. 3 Engine displacement of about 1.6 liters is generally the lower limit on engine size used in small economy cars produced by major manufacturers. electric vehicles and autos with small engines 345 in order to encourage the development of ASEDs. In 2005, the “Fuel Consumption Limits for Passenger Vehicles” regulation was enacted, further encouraging the use of ASEDs. That same year, Premier Wen Jiabao reiterated that “Regulations restricting autos with low gasoline consumption, small engine displacement and low-emissions should be abolished” as part of the broader plan to promote a conservation- oriented society. Despite these clear directives, there are still more than 80 cities restricting ASEDs. The possible reasons are as follows: (1) Their low top speed and slow acceleration may reduce the effi ciency of traffi c fl ows; (2) Many ASEDs fall short of emission standards, thus exacerbating pollution; (3) ASEDs are mostly low-price domestic brands whereas autos with large engine displacement are mostly luxurious brands, and thus the ASEDs are generally considered as low-end cars and thought to degrade the image of users or the overall image of the cities in which they operate. In stark contrast, ASEDs have always been popular among consumers in European countries, Japan, and South Korea, among other countries. In these places, preferential policies, such as subsidies and tax reductions and exemptions, have been adopted to encourage the purchase of conservation-minded and environmentally-friendly ASEDs. Traffi c jams are a common problem in cities and simply limiting the use of ASEDs cannot eradicate this problem. Many measures, including banning and taxing ASEDs, have been adopted by countries in order to solve traffi c jams, but these restrictions work against the popularity of ASEDs. On the other hand, some countries have taken a different tack: Italy, one of the countries with the highest ratio of ASEDs, considers them useful in mitigating traffi c pressures since they can easily be driven on narrow roads. There are still some misunderstandings concerning ASEDs. To begin with, they pollute, but produce less of an impact on the environment because they conserve fuel. Secondly, they are not cars of inferior quality. For instance, many ASED brands demonstrate excellent braking performance. Many autos with standard or large engine displacement do not offer substantively better performance across various measures. In short, engine displacement should not be used to judge the quality of an automobile, its level of technology, or its safety. This is not to say that some ASED makers do not cut corners. However, market pressures will make it hard for these models to compete over time. As well, manufactures of standard and large-displacement autos have 346 wang peng begun investing in the development of high quality ASEDs. All of these factors are slowly improving the image of ASEDs. Consumers’ social values have constrained ASED sales as well. As a result of the economic boom in China, many persons have a strong desire to own luxury consumer items, including automobiles. As a result the demand for autos has surged. And with the economic boom continuing for many years, many individuals have done quite well. They go beyond looking at cars as luxury items; they now have an eye for luxury cars. In short, some Chinese consumers have moved from consumption, to conspicuous consumption. So even though ASEDs may be better suited for many Chinese consumers, their tastes prod them to purchase a more “up-market” auto.

C. Prohibiting Electric Vehicles and Restricting ASEDs Refl ects a Confl ict over Values in Chinese Urban Development Prohibiting electric vehicles and restricting ASEDs are both responses to the array of related challenges arising in Chinese urban development. Here we offer a reassessment of the typical responses. Rapid economic growth in recent decades has triggered dramatic changes in society’s cultural and conceptual structures. Market-oriented thinking precedes and frames urban administration. Regulation follows on economic principles. In particular, urban layout, design, and zon- ing almost exclusively serve the purpose of automobile development plans, which neglect those who choose to build their lives around other transportation modes, including walking, cycling, and mass transit. Such policymaking overlooks the needs and desires of disadvantaged groups. Developers and builders dictate the structure of the urban environment. These interests do not apply systemic or comprehensive approaches to urban layout, including traffi c systems. As traffi c congestion worsens, city offi cials respond by building even more standard automobile and bus systems, while limiting alternatives, such as electric vehicles, ASEDs, bicycling, and walking. Economics, as practiced in contemporary China, and environmental protection confl ict with each other in these cases. Oil consumption in China continues to climb even as the global price of crude rises. From 2000 to 2004, China accounted for one third of the increase in global oil consumption.4 China is now the

4 Andy Roth, CLSA, “Bulk Commodity Consumption behind the Economic Growth electric vehicles and autos with small engines 347 world’s second-largest consumer of oil, after the US. With the expansion of economic modernization into more parts of China, the need for energy will be even greater. Conservation is essential to maintain an economically viable society. Encouraging the use of ASEDs and electric vehicles can serve this aim.

II. Developing the Use of ASEDs to Solve Related Problems

A. Enact Relevant Industry Policies There are still problems to resolve regarding what roads will be accessible to ASEDs. However, by the end of 2005, some research and institutional work had already been undertaken to clarify these matters. In October 2005, administrations in Beijing and Shanghai indicated that they were doing research in order to encourage the development of cars with high performance, small engine displacement, and low emissions. Their actions will be a model to other cities. In November 2005 the offi cials in charge of this project in the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) indicated that policies to encourage the development of super-economy cars are under way. The goal seems to be the development of a car with a small displacement engine that makes use of advanced technologies, and still offers solid consumer appeal at as reasonable price. Many countries use taxes to infl uence consumer behavior. Noting this, the Ministry of Finance began to formulate a tax reform project to encourage purchasing fuel-effi cient cars. This policy is codifi ed in the “Limitation of Fuel Consumption for Passenger Cars” directive, which taxes large-engine cars at higher rates. On December 30, 2005, the Public Security Bureau in Beijing issued a pronouncement stating that after January 4, 2006 electric vehicles which meet the performance standards laid down in the “General Technical Requirements for Electric Bicycles,” and which are produced in Beijing, can apply for registration and receive licenses from the transportation management bureau. Two points should be emphasized regarding policymaking. First, the expected effectiveness of the policy should be taken into consideration

in China,” http://www.cmgsl.com.cn/images/ll6/hg577.htm. CLSA is a Hong Kong- based brokerage, investment banking, and private equity group. 348 wang peng when crafting said policy. Once in place, policies should be refi ned in order to enhance their effectiveness. Second, the policy system should be made more coherent. Relevant policies should address the whole industry. Policies should consider the entire transportation system, thus making solutions more systematic, comprehensive, objective, and scientifi c. The electric vehicle and ASED industries can contribute to the national economy through the effi ciency of transportation services they provide and the jobs they create. As a global leader in the electric vehicle industry, China has developed advanced technology and achieved high production in this area. Regarding the ASED industry, China dominates the industry; the Chinese make most of the world’s ASEDs. These conditions offer the opportunity for the Chinese to enjoy substantial benefi ts by supporting these industries. The government should play an active role through economic incentives and regulatory control to ensure the healthy development of these industries. It is imperative for China to institute effective technological and industrial criteria for electric vehicles and to reform and improve enterprises in this area. Only those enterprises that meet high standards should be able to put their products into the marketplace. To foster this development, the government needs to improve the regulation of relevant services, reinforce supervision of services in the after-market, consider consumers’ interests, and effectively regulate those parts of the industry where problems exist, such as battery recycling and disposal.

B. Enhance Public Participation in Government Decision-making When urban streets become a scarce public resource, the government’s usage and distribution of street resources will affect the entire street system. In the process of decision-making on these issues, local governments sometimes lack democratic mechanisms and the means to encourage public participation. Worse still, if policymakers are self- serving, seeking to manage their problems or actively rent-seeking rather than addressing the broader public beneﬁ t involved, they will forestall progress in addressing these issues. Such actions encourage conﬂ ict between interested parties. Policymakers have not supported the development of electric vehicle and ASED usage. This rough handling has prompted some industry representatives, transit and planning experts, and consumers to actively promote policies that would support the use of these vehicles. In June electric vehicles and autos with small engines 349

2003, Ni Jie, Chairman of the Board of Lu Yuan Electric Vehicle Cor- poration in Jinhua, Zhejiang, wrote a public position paper criticizing the limitation of electric vehicles in Fuzhou. In July 2005, the Second Session of the Electric Vehicles Industry Forum opened. The Session participants eventually released the Beijing Announcement which stated the industry’s aim to help “construct a thrifty, harmonious society and to develop an electric vehicle industry in accord with such values.” In general, electric vehicle enterprises are active advocates for the industry. ASED manufacturers have also made bold pronouncements. In August 2005, Yin Jiaxu of Chang’an Automobile Co. Ltd. published a ten-thousand-word paper calling for the elimination of the restrictions on ASEDs. The choice to use electric vehicles and ASEDs or not must be left consumers. For consumers to have real freedom of choice, the regulatory playing ﬁ eld must be leveled. Therefore, government, private enterprises and the public must address the root problems of trafﬁ c and urban design, and thoughtfully tackle what role small vehicles should play in addressing these challenges.

THE OBSESSION WITH HARVESTING CORDYCEP MUSHROOMS IN THE THREE RIVERS SOURCE AREA

Zhu Huiying and Mu Jingliang

Background

Dongchong Xiacao (Chongcao for short) is a medicinal herb used for centuries in Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM). Its Latin name is Cordyceps sinensis, or in English, the Cordycep Mushroom. It is an Asco- mycetes fungus closely related to the mushroom. The literary meaning of Dongchong Xiacao is “winter worm, summer grass,” an allusion to its remarkable lifecycle described below. This rare and exotic species is found at high altitudes on the Himalayan Plateau. It has long been one of the most expensive medicines in the world. In the summer of 2005, many media reported on the obsession for collecting Cordycep Mushrooms in Yushu and Guoluo prefectures in an area known as the Source of the Three Rivers Nature Reserve in Qinghai Province. (The three rivers in question are the Yangtze River, the Lancang River and the Yellow River.) Every year, in hopes of making money, large numbers of people swarm here to dig up Cordycep Mushrooms, thereby causing serious damage to the fragile ecology of the Plateau. This article analyzes various factors that have contributed to this annual inﬂ ux of mushroom hunters. It also offers explanations for and evaluations of the relevant laws and regulations.

I. Cordycep Mushroom Digging at the Source Area of the Three Rivers

A. Cordycep Mushrooms and the Source of the Three Rivers Dongchong Xiacao, commonly called Chongcao in Chinese, is an important medicinal herb in Traditional Chinese Medicine. Chinese traditional doctors consider it good for both the lung and the kidney. It is also used to stop bleeding. Dongchong, the worm, feeds on a fungus, Xiacao. Once the worm has completed its life circle and dies, its body hardens into a combination of worm and fungus. In Qinghai 352 zhu huiying and mu jingliang

Province, wild Chongcao is most often found on high grasslands and under bushes on the Qingnan Plateau between 3400 and 4000 meters above sea level. Situated in the Source Area of the Three Rivers, Yushu and Guolu Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures claim the most and the best Chongcao growing areas.1 Reaching these grasslands would be daunting for most persons: the high elevation makes for cold, thin air and transportation is at a premium. However, these difﬁ culties do not discourage those who come to dig up Chongcao. Although the exact number of such persons is unknown, we can roughly estimate the ﬁ g- ure from various facts. Long distance buses typically run from Xi’ning (capital city of Qinghai Province) to Yushu six times a day. During the mushroom hunting season of 2005, the number of buses making the journey increased to 90 buses a day and most of the passengers were Chongcao diggers. This suggests that 100,000 and 200,000 Chongcao diggers traveled to Yushu in 2005.

B. The Impact of Chongcao Digging on the Environment The area around the Source of the Three Rivers Nature Reserve in Yushu Prefecture produces a large output of Chongcao even though the ecology is quite fragile. The weather is cold weather and the soil here is rather barren and inhospitable. If the vegetation is ruined, it may never revive. And because the three major Chinese rivers originate in the area, ecological damage can affect a vast area in multiple ways. The massive collection of Chongcao seriously threatens the health of the environment here and beyond. The prime collecting season is from the middle of May to the end of June. During this period the body of the worm can be found 100 mm below the surface. The epiphyte, commonly called Caotou in Chinese, grows out of the worm’s head into an area above ground. To get the complete body of the worm, the collector has to dig 100 mm deeper than where the worm is, which means a 200 mm hole is made in the ground. 3500 holes of this depth are made for every kilogram of Chongcao collected. According to the information provided by the government of Yushu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, the total output

1 The Compiling Committee of Information on Opening up in the West of China, Informational Encyclopedia on Opening up the West of China, Volume on Qinghai, (Qinghai People’s Press, Shanghai Science and Technology Press, 2003), p. 61. the obsession with harvesting cordycep mushrooms 353 of Chongcao every year is between 12,000 and 22,000 kg, which means 42 million to 77 million holes are made in the grasslands.2 These fi gures exclude holes dug without fi nding the worms. Most of the collectors travel great distances. Their movements cause as much damage to the local environment as does the collecting itself. Local Tibetan people use cow dung as fuel for cooking and heating while outsiders choose to chop bushes instead. It is estimated that 100,000 people could consume 100 hectares of bushes as fuel every day. An investigating group representing the Standing Committee of the People’s Congress of Yushu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture points out that because too many people have crowded into fragile areas without making efforts to protect the environment, damage has been done to the area. Increased vehicular traffi c, uncontrolled digging, and wasteful fuel collection practices have combined to seriously damage the vegetation covering the grasslands. Many Chongcao diggers fail to refi ll the holes with earth. Pastures have been destroyed. Soil has eroded. Water loss has resulted in increased desertifi cation. Refuse has been left in digging areas. The environment has become more threatened and fragile.3

C. Resistance from Local Herdsmen Herdsmen lease most of the pastures in Yushu Prefecture for periods of 50 years. Large numbers of local herdsmen do not want outsiders to collect Chongcao in their pastures. “People in Zaduo Prefecture insist that measures be taken to forbid any one from other prefectures to collect Chongcao on their pastures.”4 This is not only about the protection of the local environment, but also about preserving a unique religious culture. Those with Tibetan ancestry make up 95% of the total population in Yushu Prefecture. These people had been living in harmony with nature in their own way for thousands of years before being reached by industrialized civilization. They value life, are respectful of nature, and refrain from over-exploiting nature. They have what can be called a simple notion

2 Yushu People’s Government, “Opinions on the Collection and Management of Chongcao Resources,” 2005. 3 The Investigating Group of the Standing Committee of the People’s Congress of Yushu Prefecture, “An Investigative Report on the Collection and Management of Chongcao Resources,” 2005. 4 Ibid. 354 zhu huiying and mu jingliang of environmental protection. Their religion also advocates love for all plants, whether trees or blades of grass. A local fable tells the story of a dragon that is punished by having a tree planted on its head because the dragon has damaged trees. Every time the wind blows, the dragon’s head bleeds.5 So local herdsmen do not collect Chongcao, and some of them organize patrolling teams to stop outsiders from collecting the mushroom.6

II. The Chongcao Economy

A. The Economic Lure of Chongcao In the 1970s, the government-set purchase price of Chongcao was only 20 RMB per kilogram. There was no proﬁ t at all for outside collectors since this price could not cover their transportation, living, and other expenses incurred while harvesting Chongcao. However, increases in market demand and prices in the 1990s produced a massive upsurge in Chongcao collecting. The price of Chongcao has continued rising because of growth in the health products market. At present, the wholesale price of middle-grade Chongcao is approximately 35,000 RMB per kilo. The retail price is much higher. The price for top-grade Chongcao in big city drugstores is as high as 150,000 RMB per kilogram.

B. The Commercial Supply Chain of Chongcao The commercial supply chain of Chongcao enables collectors to make a healthy proﬁ t. After simple processing by collectors, Chongcao is easily sold to merchants doing business near the collection sites. These merchants either sell Chongcao to medicine wholesalers in Xi’ning or they themselves act as wholesalers and sell Chongcao for 1,000 RMB per kilogram more than they paid for it. When Chongcao is ﬁ nally placed on the shelves of drugstores in big cities, it is sold by the gram at a price several times the price found in the producing area.

5 Liu Junzhe, Tibetan Morality, (Nationality Press, 2003), p. 73. 6 Liu Jianqiang and Cao Xiaofan, “The Living Buddha and His Environmental Protection Activities,” Southern Weekend, Sept. 8, 2005. the obsession with harvesting cordycep mushrooms 355

Statistics from the Administration of Medicine show that China exported 4,795 kilograms of Chongcao in 1994, earning total revenues of 15.74 million USD. These fi gures represent an astonishing 1421.61% growth rate when compared to the same time the pervious year, making Chongcao one of Chinese Traditional Medicines’ high growth export products. Its total export value among traditional Chinese medicines is second only to ginseng, but Chongcao fetches the highest per unit price among CTMs: 3,283 USD per kilogram. This is vastly higher than pilose antler at 98 USD per kilogram and ginseng, which costs 13 USD per kilogram. Some wholesalers who know the inside story of the trade have said that smuggling of Chongcao is rampant, with most of it going to Hong Kong and Southeast Asia. Individuals and organizations at all points in the supply chain of the “Chongcao Economy” benefi t, whether they are diggers, purchasers, wholesalers, exporters, health product producers, sellers and drugstore owners. All levels of the provincial government also benefi t from this trade. Governmental departments above the county level issue licenses granting people a 50-day period for collecting Chongcao. These government departments also collect related fees that go toward restoring grass and other services. Every collector has to pay a fee ranging from 500 to 2,000 RMB depending on the area.7

III. Related Laws and Regulations

A. National Legislation to Restrict Chongcao Collecting State departments have clear regulations governing the collection of Chongcao. The law protecting herdsmen’s rights to possess, use, and harvest crops in leased pastures also presents a legal obstacle to outsiders wishing to collect Chongcao in this area.

1. National Law on Prohibiting Chongcao Collecting The List of Key Wild Plants under State Protection deﬁ nes Chongcao as a second-class state protected plant. According to Regulations on the Protection of Wild Plants of the People’s Republic of China, the collection,

7 Yushu Political Consultative Committee, “An Investigation of Chongcao Collection in Our Prefecture,” 2005. 356 zhu huiying and mu jingliang selling and purchasing of plants under second-class state protection must be authorized by the administration of the Wild Plants Protec- tion Bureaus of provincial, municipal and autonomous prefectures or by other authorized institutions. The State Council of the PRC issued the Regulations on Prohibiting the Collection and Sale of Hairy Grass, Unregulated Collection of Licorice Roots, and Chinese Ephedra in 2000, which said that the collection of Licorice Roots and Chinese Ephedra on pastures contracted to herdsmen is forbidden.8 These regulations apply to the collection of Chongcao as well. In accordance with the Regulations, the management of wild plants such as Licorice Roots, Chinese Ephedra and the Cordycep Mushroom by the State Council are to be carried out in the following manner: a. Local governments overseeing wild plant resources should clearly defi ne regulations concerning the above-mentioned wild plants. These governments should specify the amounts to be collected, establish a clearly defi ned collecting area, and state a clear plan for enforcing the regulations. As well, areas where wild plant collecting is forbidden should be specifi ed. These points should be presented to all those wishing to collect such plants. b. Only licensed digging will be allowed. The license will specify a limit on the total harvest of each plant, and the specifi c area open to harvesting. c. Those selling and distributing the above-mentioned wild plants must also be licensed. The appropriate agencies will develop a licensing management system to oversee wholesaling and retailing activities. d. Local governments will create a wild plant conservation system. A key function of this system will be to ensure that leaseholders can enjoy the profi ts from their land and that management of these and neighboring plots will be ecologically sustainable. In order to fulfi ll this mission, administrators must develop a contractual system that clearly spells out how economic benefi ts will be divided. Those wishing to cultivate wild plants for commercial purposes should do so in specifi c plots and pastures. Since many individuals participate in harvesting plants from these plots, a secondary contract between them, leaseholders, and resource management

8 Hairy grass looks like hair and is a popular ingredient in Cantonese cuisine. Dig- ging it up damages grasslands. the obsession with harvesting cordycep mushrooms 357

authorities should be developed and signed as well. Doing so should improve the overall management of resources and produce better information sharing between the parties engaged in land management and wild crop cultivation. The Ministry of Agriculture wrote and circulated The Administrative Regulations on Collecting Licorice and Chinese Ephedra in year 2001. These regulations clearly forbid digging up Chongcao in pastures that have been leased to local herdsmen. In the same year, the State Economy and Trade Commission issued The Administrative Regulations on the Exclusive Management and Licensing of Licorice and Chinese Ephedra, which stipulates a variety of controls on the collection of Licorice, Chinese Ephedra, and Chongcao. The Regulations also lay down the details of the licensing system for managing plant harvests and sales. The Ministry of Agriculture published the Regulations on Wild Plant Protection, stipulating that the sale and purchase of wildlife under second-class state protection is not allowed unless it is approved by the provincial administrative departments in charge of wildlife protection and a license is issued.

2. State Legislation Protecting the Rights of Pasture Leaseholders and Restricting the Abusive Collection of Chongcao According to The Law on Contracts Affecting Rural Land, the contracts for pasture lands last between 30 to 50 years. From the date the contract is signed, the contractor is entitled to manage, use, and benefi t from the pasture. Furthermore, the contractor has the right to independently manage, harvest, and sell the products of that pasture. This bundle of rights allows local herdsmen to independently manage the pasture. As a plant growing on the pasture, Chongcao falls within the purview of these contracts; therefore, herdsmen have the legal right to benefi t from Chongcao harvesting. Additionally, they can place restrictions on the activities of those seeking to dig up Chong- cao and other plants; at the extreme they can completely forbid such harvesting. They can also restrict access of those who wish to feed animals or gather supplies, such as fi rewood, from land for which they hold a contract. Leaseholders also face particular restrictions as well. Since Chong- cao is a wild plant under state protection, there are special regulations concerning its collection. Even the contractors have to obtain permission to dig it up, even within pastures under their control. 358 zhu huiying and mu jingliang

Enjoying the beneﬁ ts from Chongcao harvesting places many legal restrictions on all parties concerned. The Law on Contracts Affecting Rural Land, together with the above- mentioned regulations issued by the State Council and the Ministry of Agriculture, restrict the abusive digging of Chongcao.

B. Inadequate Local Legislation Restricting Chongcao Harvesting The Qinghai Provincial People’s Government issued The Administrative Regulations on Chongcao Collection in Qinghai Province (called Regulations below) in November 2004. Following this, the Yushu Tibetan Autono- mous Prefecture in Qinghai published The Detailed Rules on Implement- ing ‘the Administrative Regulations on Chongcao Collection in Qinghai Province’ (called Detailed Rules below). However, these two regulations fail to protect Chongcao resources and the ecological environment because they contradict portions of the State legislation. Furthermore, they do not adequately restrict digging for Chongcao.

1. The Regulations and the Detailed Rules Fail to Protect the Herdsmen’s Rights to Manage Leased Pastures The Regulations and the Detailed Rules allow those digging in pasture- lands to collect Chongcao without the leaseholder’s permission. The following are stipulated in the Regulations: “The pasture contractors have the fi rst option to collect Chongcao in the pastures they contract.” The Regulations go on to state that, “The pasture contractors and those who legally dig on these lands have the right to stop those who violate collection regulations or who collect Chongcao without a license.” Although these statements place restrictions on Chongcao collection and make some attempt to manage plant and land resources while protecting property rights, the wording, “The pasture contractors have the fi rst option to collect Chongcao . . .” implies that others can collect the plant if the contractors do not. Compared with the obscure stipulations of the Regulations, the Detailed Rules are clearer in this respect. Counties applying for Chong- cao collection and: Persons wanting to collect Chongcao shall sign contracts with the county governments in the digging area, fi x the number of diggers, limit digging areas, and go through procedures like paying fees and applying for licenses . . . Any fee collection by the local governments at county, township, or village levels is forbidden. the obsession with harvesting cordycep mushrooms 359

Yet, from provisos within the Detailed Rules, we can see that the procedures are to be completed by county governments, and the pasture contractors’ opinions are not considered at all in the approval procedure. In addition, the contractors have no choice but agree to let the licensees dig Chongcao on their contracted pastures. The above stipulations of the local legislation indicate that the local government of Qinghai Province and Yushu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture can issue harvesting licenses without considering the pasture contractors’ opinions. This contradicts the stipulations of the state legislation, which forbid entering and digging on pastures leased by herdsmen.

2. Defi ciencies in Local Legislation Regarding Restrictions on Collection Activities According to the stipulations of the State Council and the Ministry of Agriculture, the amount of digging allowed must be specifi ed in the license. However, the Regulations and the Detailed Rules only require that the number of diggers, digging areas, and periods open to offi cially sanction digging be specifi ed in the license. The absence of a restriction on the amount of digging comes up short in protecting the local ecological environment.

3. Structural Defi ciencies in Local Legislation Related State Council and Ministry of Agriculture regulations have made it very clear that the purchase of Chongcao must be based on a license and on the adoption of a management system limiting access to this resource. According to the stipulations from these agencies, the provincial government should be in charge of the purchase and sale of Chongcao, the issuing of licenses for harvesting and selling it, and the implementation of a management system limiting access to this resource. Thus, a comprehensive system for managing Chongcao collection should be undertaken at this governmental level with an eye toward managing resources effi ciently. However, regulations focus almost exclusively on Chongcao collection; there are no specifi c stipulations regarding the purchase and sale of the mushroom in Qinghai Province and Yushu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture. This omission leads to an incomplete management system of the Chongcao supply chain and is unfavorable for supporting the effective supervision and restriction of abusive Chongcao collection, sale, and distribution. 360 zhu huiying and mu jingliang

C. The Reason for the Discrepancy Between Local and State Regulations The apparent reason for the discrepancy between local and state regulations is that the Chinese legal system is not fully developed. The Law on Legislation of the People’s Republic of China (or Law below) defi nes local and state legislative responsibilities. Since it has been in existence for only a short time, this law is still in a testing period. Resolving confl icting interpretations of the legislation is still in question. Furthermore, according to this Law, the regulations of local governments and the departments of the State Council are of equal importance; therefore, when enacting regulations, local governments can ignore the regulations of the State Council’s departments. The legislative discrepancy is to some extent built-in to the national legislative framework. The key lies in how such discrepancies are resolved. In this regard the Law stipulates in Article 86 that: Where any discrepancy occurs between a local regulation and an administrative rule concerning the same matter and it cannot be decided as to which provision shall apply, the State Council shall give its opinion. When the State Council decides that the local regulation should apply, then the local regulation will apply. When the State Council decides that the administrative rule should apply, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress will be asked to make a ruling.” However, some details are lacking. For instance it is not clear who is entitled to initiate this appeals process. The chief reason for the legislative discrepancy with regard to digging for Chongcao is attributed to the differing areas of focus between local governments and the central government. The former only pays attention to practical and local interests while the latter has to consider the long-term interests of the whole country. Environmental protection is a long-term and broad task. Workers charged with protecting the environment face the duel challenge of fulfi lling environmental aims and staying within the complicated framework of the Chinese political system.

IV. Invalidating Local Governments’ Oversight Function

Because the Yushu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture is remote, the Chi- nese government allows the local government to regulate the Chongcao harvesting. According to the two local Regulations and Detailed Rules, the Yushu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture’s work centers mainly on the obsession with harvesting cordycep mushrooms 361 the issuing of digging licenses. How to manage the purchase and sale of Chongcao is an issue not addressed by the Prefecture. Additionally, in order to increase the poor local residents’ income and boost the local economy, the local government is not strict in managing digging activities. As long as one has submitted the relevant paperwork and paid the necessary fees to local governmental departments, he/she can enter and dig Chongcao on pastures contracted by herdsmen. Even if contractors attempt to restrict access to lands under their control, their efforts have no infl uence on license approval or the management of the digging activity. During the 2004 digging season, even the government of the Yushu Prefecture carried out an organized dig. In 2005, from the middle of May to around the 10th of July, the prefecture’s government organized a group to dig Chongcao on the pastures near river sources in Zaduo County. However, pasture contractors and local herdsmen blocked the group’s access to these lands. Consequently, a confrontation involving tens of thousands of people occurred, which dragged on for 20 days.9 It should be mentioned that the Yushu Prefecture’s Government has made efforts to manage digging activities. For instance, they set up stations to check licenses and send workers to supervise digging on pastures. However, because Chongcao is widely scattered, and therefore diffi cult to monitor, controlling and supervising the digging activities when large crowds swarm to the area is diffi cult. Due to limitations of management resources available to local government, many persons without licenses managed to enter the river source areas by avoiding the checkpoints. In 2005 the situation was utterly out of control. Because of a defect in the local legislation, government attempts to remedy the situation were ineffective. By law, the contractors’ have a right to benefi t from pastures under their management. This right is clearly defi ned and supported by local citizens. But in practice, the local legislatures fail to pay due attention to these rights, going so far as to bar leaseholders from restricting access to their lands for harvesting Chongcao and other plants. In essence, managing digging activity is under the sole control of the local government, while the contractors

9 The Yushu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, “Report on the Work of the Chongcao Digging Administration,” 2005. 362 zhu huiying and mu jingliang have no say on this matter. Thus digging for Chongcao is regulated by administrative measures rather than civil rights. To help resolve over exploitation of Chongcao and the resultant environmental degradation, the rights of leaseholders should be confi rmed. They should have the option of applying for exclusive licenses to harvest the plant on lands under contract. Supporting contractors’ rights should also be supported by local government as a means to promote environmental protection. Supporting contractors’ rights will not only be helpful in defi ning administrative power, emphasizing local government’s authority, and restricting the abusive digging of Chongcao, but will also mediate the confl ict between the local herdsmen and those coming in from outside the Yushu area to dig for the mushroom.

THE GREEN HANJIANG RIVER NGO HELPS RESOLVE A TRANS-BOUNDARY RIVER POLLUTION PROBLEM

Jin Fen

With the economy soaring, the pollution of rivers, especially pollution affecting multiple provinces, is becoming a major issue. Apart from the severe consequences of the pollution itself, trans-boundary pollution has become a contentious issue for Chinese water resource managers because it causes disputes between interested parties in a river’s upper and lower reaches. For example, the Tangbai River, the largest tributary of the Hanjiang River, suffered severe pollution in recent years, posing serious threats to both the environment and those living near the river. This matter is especially complicated because pollution of the Tangbai River involves both Henan and Hubei provinces. Finding a resolution acceptable to interests in both provinces has proven diffi cult. However, the Green Hanjiang River, an environmental protection non-governmental organization (NGO) based in Xiangfan, a city in Hubei province, has played a signifi cant role in working toward a mutually satisfactory settlement for both parties. This NGO’s effort has established a paradigm for public participation in the resolution of trans-boundary pollution confl icts.

Pollution of the Tangbai River

The Tangbai River is the biggest tributary of the Hanjiang River. Covering a drainage area of 24,500 square kilometers, it fl ows through Henan and Hubei provinces. The Bai River, which fl ows from Nanzhao County, and the Tang River, which fl ows from Mount Funiu in Henan Province, join at the city of Xiangfan in Hubei Province; from this point downstream this waterway is called the Tangbai River. Since the early 1990s, many polluting enterprises were set up along the river, and water quality of the once-clear Tanghe and Baihe Rivers deteriorated. The Hanjiang River Water Quality Index taken from the Hubei Environmental Protection Net in July 2005 revealed that the Tangbai River experienced Level V pollution—the worst ranking—in 364 jin fen three sections (including the Xiangyang Tangbai River in Zhangwan).1 An offi cial in charge of the Xiangfan Environmental Protection Bureau said that the main pollution sources on the Tangbai River are in Nan- yang City in Xinye County, in the river’s upper reaches, where quite a few small-scale paper mills discharge their waste water into the river without any treatment.2 In recent years pollution has rendered the Baihe River useless as a food or water source. Its best known fi sh species, the White Fish, is basically extinct. Biological diversity has been damaged and residents along the river face health threats from the pollution. The Tangbai River joins the Hanjiang River at Zhangwan, 90 kilometers downriver from the Danjiangkou Reservoir dam in Hubei Province. Therefore, water quality of the Tangbai River directly affects that of the middle-lower reaches of the Hanjiang River. In addition, since the Hanjiang River (the major tributary of the Yangtze River) rather than the Yangtze River is the source of the middle route of the South-to-North Water Diversion Project, the negative impact of the Tangbai River pollution could reach a vast area. After the completion of the Water Diversion Project, it is expected that the total runoff of the Hanjiang River would drop by 1/3, which would reduce the river’s environmental carrying capacity, its self-purifi cation capacity, and its pollutant-carrying capacity, thus complicating efforts aimed at water treatment, pollution prevention, and environmental protection in the Hanjiang River region.

Failure of the Trans-Boundary Process

Both the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution and the Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China provide that water pollution disputes involving more than one administrative division should be resolved by consultation between the disputants or settled by a common higher authority. For instance, for conﬂ icts between provinces, the Central Committee would serve as arbitrator. However, these laws and regulations are weak in practice.

1 The Hanjiang River Water Quality Bulletin (58th issue), http://www.hbepb.gov. cn/admin/htmup/200507hjgb.htm. 2 Guangming Daily, “Tangbai River Pollution: Who Deserves the Biggest Blame? Nanyang and Xiangyang, Join Hands Rather Than Shirk Responsibility,” Feng Yongfeng, July 26, 2005. a trans-boundary river pollution problem 365

Trans-boundary pollution problems can only be resolved through regional cooperation between administrative bodies in both the upper and lower reaches of a river system. Note that administrative bodies in the lower reaches of a river have little incentive to combat water pollution on their own; without active cooperation from administrators in a given river’s upper-reach their efforts will be in vain. By the same token, administrative bodies in the river’s upper reaches have little incentive to reduce downstream pollution since ‘the Environment Responsibility System’ only requires local or provincial governments to take responsibility for their local environment. Given this, it would be highly impractical to count on those in the river’s upper reaches to restrain themselves from dumping untreated or under-treated waste water out of self-discipline. Without the means to coordinate their actions, efforts to prevent pollution deadlock; in effect, neither side takes the initiative to improve conditions. In recent years, the environmental protection bureaus of Hubei Prov- ince and the city of Xiangfan held several consultations with Henan Province and Nanyan district about the pollution of the Tangbai River, but to no avail. The State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) also suggested that the two provinces jointly monitor the trans- boundary section of the River, but the two sides have yet to reach an agreement that would allow for implementation of this plan. In practice, identifying responsibility for causing pollution and its consequences remains diffi cult. Especially diffi cult are those cases where both sides are at fault; in these instances the cities or counties at the center of such claims often prevaricate or engage in mutual fi nger- pointing. A typical response goes like this: after a local river has been polluted in a nearby city or county, the environmental protection bureau in the affected area invites their peers from the neighboring administrative district to join in testing the water to determine the severity of the pollution. One (or both sides) will typically choose to suspend operations of the polluting projects or businesses. After a period of time, the polluted water will purify itself, making the collection of information about the type of pollution and its severity virtually impossible. Note that in cases where testing is conducted by only one side, results may lack credibility and the acquisition of credible data may be impossible. Note also that because such efforts obscure the information needed to establish responsibility for pollution, ‘the Environmental Responsibility System’ can be undermined even while the relevant parties attempt to 366 jin fen strictly implement it. Working across borders pushes ‘the Environmental Responsibility System’ beyond its breaking point.

Enter the Green Hanjiang River: Breaking the Deadlock

The Xiangfan Environmental Protection Association, also known as the “Green Hanjiang River,” realizing the seriousness of the situation facing the Tangbai River, attaches great importance to addressing the river’s problems expeditiously. Therefore they have made raising awareness of the river’s problems a central focus in their work. By working outside of government, the Green Hanjiang River serves important functions that government cannot. At the same time, the NGO can infl uence and prod the government on relevant policy issues and actions. The Green Hanjiang River is the fi rst non-governmental environmental protection organization in Hubei Province. It is also the only non- governmental environmental protection organization in the Hanjiang River Valley. The organization’s goal of protecting the Tangbai River is made manifest through specifi c actions: raising public awareness of pollution and its impact on the river and using this as a springboard to encourage public participation in working toward solutions to existing pollution problems; taking preventative measures to ameliorate pollution in the future; gathering information on the condition of the river and those living and working near it through monitoring, investigations, and surveys; and marshaling awareness, public participation, and information in the service of identifying and implementing workable policy actions to improve conditions in and along the river. These general aims will be examined in turn.

Raising the Public’s Awareness of the Tangbai River’s Condition and Encouraging Participation in Discussions and Actions Affecting the River’s Condition

In late April of 2003 a series of activities called “Hiking along the Han- jiang River in Xiangfan to Promote Environmental Protection” were planned to attract public attention to the problem of environmental pollution. The Green Hanjiang River and the Xiangfan Environmental Protection Bureau jointly organized these activities. Twenty-six team members formed two expedition teams. Within ten days, the two teams a trans-boundary river pollution problem 367

fi nished the investigation of the Hanjiang River’s ecological condition within Xiangfan. This original hiking expedition, along with the follow-up large-scale photo exhibition entitled “Protecting our Mother River,” made ‘concern for the protection of our mother river’ a hot topic in the region. In April 2004, the Green Hanjiang River once again successfully organized similar hiking expedition activities called “Hik- ing along the Tangbai River to Promote Environmental Protection.” These activities attracted the public’s attention to the severe pollution of Tangbai River, noting that the pollution in the Xiangfan section of the river originated upstream. With the support of local media, the Green Hanjiang River enjoys great success in attracting attention to the pollution problem, encouraging extensive public participation in working toward a solution. For instance, Duan Zekun, an eleven-year-old student in Xiangfan, learned through these programs that paper mills and chemical plants in the city of Nanyang, Henan Province caused local pollution of the Baihe River. In response, he wrote a letter to Li Keqiang, Secretary of Henan’s provincial Party committee, in April, 2004. In the letter, he said that he “wanted to swim with the fi sh in the Tangbai River.” Publication of this letter in the Yangtze Daily produced two effects: the government began to feel pressure to act on the issue and the general public began to express greater support for action. The Yangtze Daily’s follow-up report said that, “After the Secretary of Henan’s provincial Party committee, Li Keqiang, read the letter and the report in our paper, he immediately made comments in response and began developing instructions to solve the problem.” The article continued: “The Henan Environmental Pro- tection Bureau immediately began to tackle the problem at the source of pollution in Nanyang by ordering some polluting enterprises to close down, suspending operations, merging with other enterprises, changing their product offerings or relocating. The bureau also moved to expand the Nanyang Sewage Disposal Plant.” These actions provided clear evidence that the two neighboring provinces had broken the deadlock and had begun cooperating. However, the work had only started. In the middle of July, 2005, the government of Henan Province received a report from a Wuhan University student claiming that the handling of the Tangbai River’s pollution problem was not completely satisfying. This prompted leaders of the government in Henan Province to demand that the Henan Environmental Protection Bureau re-investigate the pollution problem. Once again the Henan Environmental Protection Bureau went to 368 jin fen check on the problem, and based on new fi ndings, took more drastic measures. The Bureau punished the polluting enterprises and at the same time accelerated the pace of constructing the sewage disposal facilities. In late August 2005, they reported to the Henan provincial Party Committee on their investigation. Secretary Li Keqiang read and commented on the report. Because of the public’s enthusiastic support for its efforts, the Green Hanjiang River founded its environmental protection team in August 2004. The team investigated Longmang, Jingyuan and Shangdayan industrial parks, which are located in Nanzhang and Yicheng Counties, and also investigated the pollution of the Manhe River, which they traced back to several factories. By November 31, 2005, the teams conducted eight investigations into the Baihe River’s condition, including the identifi cation and measurement of discharge at various drainage pipes, and the pollution situation along the river’s lower reaches downriver from Nanyang City, Henan Province.

Information Gathering: Monitoring, Investigations, and Surveys

According to the records offered by the Green Hanjiang River, members of this organization have done more than 100 on-the-spot investigations and tests around the Hanjiang River Valley in the last few years. Investigators have traveled over 18,280 kilometers in the process of gathering information. The data collected, problems identiﬁ ed, and thoughts accumulated constitute the basis of a series of investigative research reports entitled Addressing Water Pollution Requires Immediate Atten- tion: Those Negatively Affected by Implementation of the South-to-North Water Diversion Project Should Receive Timely Compensation. Through these travels the Green Hanjiang River uncovered the case of Zhaiwan Village. Zhaiwan Village is the ﬁ rst village that the Baihe River passes after entering Hubei Province. The villagers there used to fetch water from the Baihe River for drinking, but later shifted to well water when the Baihe River was polluted in the 1980s. Since 1993, as pollution in and around the river increased dramatically, the well water had become contaminated as well; levels of some pollutants exceeded legal standards. Since 2000, more than 130 persons died of digestive and urinary tract cancers in a village of only 3,000 persons. In April, 2005, the environmental bureau of Xiangfan discovered that all three wells in Zhaiwan Village contained the carcinogenic substances chro- a trans-boundary river pollution problem 369 mium, benzene and toluene.3 The head of Hubei’s Cancer Hospital, Chen Huanzhao, told reporters that the high incidence of cancers in Zhaiwan Village was directly related to the polluted water the villagers had been drinking for a long time. In response, during April 2005 the Green Hanjiang River founded three water quality-monitoring teams and trained 24 persons to staff the teams. By May 2005, all the teams conducted two water quality tests every month in the area.

Policy Suggestions

The Green Hanjiang River submitted the aforementioned investigative and research reports to relevant leaders and departments in 2005. Reports included detailed information on the NGO’s long-term monitoring and information gathering, as well as its efforts in engaging public participation in environmental campaigns. The report also included many policy suggestions, which helped to foster links with government departments concerned with environmental policy. On June 20, 2005, the NGO submitted a report on the pollution of the Tangbai River along with relevant suggestions for addressing these problems to the secretary of Hubei Province, Yu Zhengsheng. In July and early Septem- ber the Green Hanjiang River submitted reports to the Vice-Director General of the State Environmental Protection Administration, Pan Yue. In the latter part of September 2005 the Supervisory Bureau of the State Environmental Protection Administration went to Henan and Hubei provinces, directing the provincial and local environmental bureaus in Henan Province’s Nanyang City and Xiangfan City, Hubei Province in an on-the-spot investigation. The delegation also made a special trip to Neixiang, Dengzhou, and Xinye in Henan Province to round out their investigations. At this time and since, paper mills that did not meet or exceed environmental performance standards were shuttered. Subsequently, the Henan Environmental Bureau and Nanyang City People’s Government printed and distributed documents demanding severe punishment for those found to have violated environmental standards. These documents

3 Yang Huayun, “A Hundred People Died of Cancer in One Village: the Losses to Pollution,” http://env.people.com.cn/GB/1073/3790120.html. 370 jin fen stated that ofﬁ cials in Henan and Nanyang would inform the departments concerned in Hubei Province of the need to establish comprehensive treatment of pollution in the Baihe River in Henan Province. By strengthening communication and interagency cooperation—and shouldering their respective responsibilities—the two provinces united to contain water pollution. The suggestions for policy from the Green Hanjiang River are as follows:

The Green Hanjiang River’s suggestions for Containing Water Pollution in and Around the Tangbai River

For quite some time, the prevention and remediation of trans-boundary pollution has been a major focus in pollution control efforts. It has also been an elusive goal; many departments involved in the effort follow vague and competing directives. Jurisdiction has been a key sticking point. Ideally, treating trans-boundary pollution should be about containing and preventing environmental pollution affecting different administrative regions and defending the rights of individuals and communities to live in a healthy environment. Practically speaking, though, policy development and implementation comes down to matters of competing interests and the constituencies representing various interests. The variety and distinctiveness of these interests—from the interests of the public who are or could be victims of environmental pollution, to the interests of individuals and industrial concerns causing environmental problems, to the interests of environmental regulators and policymakers—often undermine attempts to resolve differences between these interests, especially when pollution exists across administrative boundaries. Given this, the rights of citizens in the affected areas could not be guaranteed. In order to contain pollution in and around the Tangbai River and to give the residents in the river’s lower reaches a satisfactory explanation of the degree and sources of pollution, the Green Hanjiang River put forward several suggestions: 1. The Xiangfan Environmental Protection Association asks authorities at all levels of government to cooperate on efforts aimed at treating and preventing trans-boundary river pollution. 2. The Green Hanjiang River appeals to the deputies to the National People’s Congress and members of the Chinese People’s Political Consulta- tive Conference in the Jingjin Area [including Beijing and Tianjin -tr.] to inspect the Baihe River Valley in person and to report problems identiﬁ ed there to the central government. Doing so would prompt authorities to attach great importance to these problems and urge decision makers in Henan Province to take effective measures to contain and reduce trans- boundary water pollution of the Baihe River. a trans-boundary river pollution problem 371

3. We ask that the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) arrange an inspection of the Baihe River Valley in Henan Prov- ince. The inspection, organized by the State Environmental Supervisory Bureau, would invite participation from the Environmental Protection Bureaus of Henan and Hubei provinces. Inspections would focus on shutting down small polluting enterprises that violate standards in fi fteen major categories; developing and distributing a list of major industrial polluters in the region; and constructing and operating municipal sewage treatment plants in both provinces. We expect the offi cials to supervise and urge Nanyang City in Henan Province to more effectively contain sources of water pollution and to maintain a schedule of tests aimed at staying up-to-date on water conditions. Moreover, water quality standards should meet or exceed the fourth grade of China’s Surface Water Envi- ronmental Quality Standard. 4. We propose that the SEPA strengthen the supervision and monitoring of water quality in the trans-boundary section of the Baihe River, and call on the National Environmental Monitoring Centre to manage the process of organizing and coordinating testing and supervision of monitoring and enforcement efforts. We earnestly request the SEPA to fi nancially aid the establishment of an automatic monitoring station of water quality in the trans-boundary section of the Baihe River so that the central government and the relevant departments in Henan and Hubei Provinces can track water quality and pollution. 5. We propose that the relevant government departments should supervise the management of trans-boundary water pollution, and meanwhile, they should establish guidelines for handling fi nancial compensation and indemnity to those harmed by pollution. Pollution of the Baihe River produced huge losses to the farming and fi shing industries in the Xiangyang District in Nanyang City. Those producing pollution that harmed operators in these industries should provide compensation to those adversely affected until water quality of the Baihe River meets acceptable standards.

Containing Pollution in the Tangbai River Fosters Beneﬁ ts through Cooperation

Efforts to prevent and control pollution of the Hanjiang River Valley took a favorable turn late in 2005. On December 5th, the Xiangfan Environmental Monitoring Station published November’s water quality test results for the Hanjiang River’s major tributary running through Xiangfan. 59% of the 22 monitored cross-sections reached or exceeded national water quality standards. The 59% of stations meeting or exceeding national standards is a 25% increase over December 2004 results. The Henan Environmental Protection Bureau announced that 372 jin fen they would periodically update the Hubei Environmental Protection Bureau on the impact of coordinated efforts aimed at controlling pollution levels and rehabilitating the Baihe River. This indicates the intentions of both parties to control water quality in and around the Baihe River. This benefi cial outcome is a direct result of the interaction and cooperation between various interested parties in both provinces, the relevant parties in the central government, local governments, the local media, and the general public. The Green Hanjiang River played a positive role in this process by motivating communication between the various stakeholders. Coopera- tion has broken through organizational and regional gridlock, providing a valuable example of how to tackle the exceedingly diffi cult trans- boundary pollution problem. Public involvement, through an organized body like the Green Hanjiang River, played a major role in bringing the relevant parties together, and encouraging dialog and action, as a means to fi nd a solution that respects environmental protection goals in cases of trans-boundary pollution.

(Yun Jianjun, Ma Jun, Wang Yongchen and Tang Yin contributed to this article.)

SAFEGUARDING ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS: ACTIVIST EFFORTS BY RESIDENTS OF BEIJING’S BAIWANG JIAYUAN NEIGHBORHOOD

Zhang Jingjing and Liang Xiaoyan

Breaches of environmental rights and interests drew widespread public attention in 2005, especially when such breaches threatened the fundamental rights of access to clean water, clean air and safe food. Typically those who violate these rights have greater resources and organizational muscle relative to those victimized by such lapses. This makes it diffi cult for victims to fi nd relief through the courts. Many victims’ claims fail despite their investing considerable time, effort, and capital in such efforts. In this regard, the case described here involving residents of the Baiwang Jiayuan neighborhood in Beijing is unexceptional; because of this it provides a good case study that demonstrates the various and common diffi culties faced by those seeking to establish and safeguard their environmental rights in China. Located by the Northern Summer Palace and facing the Baiwang Shan Forest Park in the west, the neighborhood of Baiwang Jiayuan enjoys wonderful scenery. The efforts of the Baiwang Jiayuan residents to safeguard this special setting led to one of China’s fi rst signifi cant environmental lawsuits. By seeking legal redress, the residents from Baiwang Jiayuan demonstrated their determination to participate in decision-making on environmental issues. Various problems arose during this marathon prosecution. Defendants challenged the plaintiffs’ qualifi cations, confl icts between state and public interests were aired, the legitimacy of the public’s environmental rights was questioned, and procedures used to evaluate Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) were revealed to be inadequate. Because of the case’s scope and the variety of confl icts contained within it, the case is considered a milestone in the of practice public efforts aimed at safeguarding environmental rights in China. 374 zhang jingjing and liang xiaoyan

I. Case Review

The Baiwang Jiayuan case was triggered by the construction of a “220KV/110 KV electricity transmission line from Xisha Tun to Shang Zhuang and Liulang Zhuang.” Without giving any notice to residents near the path of the power lines, the project went directly into operation in February 2004. Two of the towers were set up on public green space in the neighborhood, which proved to be especially provocative. The high voltage construction not only upset the ecological environment of the Summer Palace but also prevented people from gaining access to outdoor spaces. More importantly, residents learned that the electromagnetic radiation generated by high voltage could threaten human health. The World Health Organization (WHO) regarded this type of radiation as a possible carcinogen. Research has shown that children living within 200 meters of high voltage lines had a 30 percent higher chance of contracting leukemia. As fate would have it, the neighborhood kindergarten was the closest building to the towers; it was only 30 meters away. As a result, parents refused to let their children go to the kindergarten once they learned of this threat. Outside experts joined residents in a chorus of voices opposing the project. The residents learned from The Regulation of the Municipal Electricity Program that no newly built overhead high voltage line (66kw and above) should run across downtown areas or renowned tourist attractions. Armed with this information, residents appealed to the Beijing Envi- ronmental Protection Administration (BEPA). The company defended itself by claiming that the closest residential area was 45 meters away, which far exceeded the 15 meter minimum set by the relevant national regulation. The company’s brief used this claim to conclude the power lines posed no threat to residents’ health. After receiving the complaints, the Beijing Environmental Protection Administration launched an investigation. On June 8, the representatives of Baiwang Jiayuan residents received notice of the BEPA’s conclusion by phone: the project was invalid because it had not gone through the examination and approval process related to environmental protection. In order to move forward the BEPA mandate required the electricity company to apply for the relevant environmental protection assurances in a timely fashion. On June 22, the Beijing Environmental Protection Administration ordered the suspension of the project. However, the electricity company safeguarding environmental rights 375 did not abide by the order, and proceeded with construction in direct confl ict of resident’s demands and the regulator’s stipulations. On the afternoon of July 17, a team of workers suddenly broke into the neighborhood to install facilities onto one of the towers while residents were busy gathering signatures and donations to support their anti- electromagnetic pollution campaign. Upon learning of the company’s ploy, residents gathered around the crew and asked them to leave because the crew lacked proper certifi cation. The work crew complied. However, four days later, a crew of over 40 forced their way into the neighborhood and continued the work. Despite heavy rains, dozens of residents rushed to the construction site to confront the work crew. After failing to persuade the work crew to leave, the residents had no choice but to turn to the police who eventually managed to make the team leave at 6 PM. However, the Strategic Planning Department of Beijing’s Electricity Company publicized a letter the next day, claiming that the construction route had been approved by the government. At 7 AM on July 23, over 100 construction crew workers returned to the neighborhood to continue construction. Shocked by the news, many residents hurried to the construction site determined to use the force of numbers to protect their rights. After a fi ve-hour confrontation, the work crew withdrew. The residents then welded iron sheets onto the northwest gate of the site and appointed a volunteer to guard the gate each day. The construction team also sent staff to check the situation over the next fi fteen days. On July 23, the same day that the 100 electrical workers attempted to continue construction for the third time, Baiwang Jiayuan residents received a notice from the Beijing Environmental Protection Adminis- tration announcing the date for the beginning of evidentiary hearings to determine whether or not to issue the environmental protection administrative permit to the electrical company. On August 13, 2004 the BEPA held the fi rst hearing. Attendees included twelve business units, representatives of the residents and other stakeholders. Within the proceedings, the residents from the Baiwang Jiayuan neighborhood noted various problems in the corrective application, including problems with procedures, standards, calculations and conclusions. Therefore, the residents’ argued, it was advisable that the BEPA nullify the electricity company’s request to continue the project. Other business groups and stakeholders expressed the same opinion. Despite these objections the BEPA still ratifi ed the environmental impact evaluation report in a statement issued on September 6, 2004. 376 zhang jingjing and liang xiaoyan

The residents said afterwards that the evidentiary hearing marked only the beginning of their fi ght and that the result was not unexpected because they had low expectations of such proceedings and of the BEPA’s willingness to stand against an industrial concern. On the other hand, releasing the offi cial sanction triggered a series of related actions: residents from Baiwang Jiayuan and the neighboring communities organized three administrative discussions and four administrative cases from late 2004 through 2005, revisiting the claims and counterclaims made in the fi rst hearing. The cases not only involved discussions of high voltage electromagnetic radiation, but also refl ected the Chinese people’s commitment to the broader environmental protection campaign. These discussions and cases clearly exposed fl aws in China’s environmental impact evaluation system, problems regarding the determination of jurisdiction in disputes between public and industrial interests in environmental confl icts, and shortcomings in determining the appropriate legal standards to use in adjudicating environmental administrative cases.

II. Public Participation

The Baiwang Jiayuan residents’ participation in the process of environmental evaluation of the “Xi Shangliu Power Transmission Project” and the resultant administrative and legal ﬁ lings clearly conﬁ rms the strength of public concern about environmental rights. As well, their efforts indicate a strong desire on behalf of the public to participate in the policymaking process on environmental issues. The working record of these proceedings, taken from meetings held from August 2004 through April of 2005, further underscore these points. The Rights Protection Committee of the Baiwang Jiayuan District edited these excerpts:

The Year 2004 August 13: Quite a few residents attended the hearing on the environmental evaluation report of the “Electricity to the West Project” organized by the Beijing Environmental Protection Administration. September 6: The panel of lawyers for Baiwang Jiayuan was established, and their fi rst meeting was held at the same time. The panel identifi ed the main tasks. First, the panel was to supervise activities safeguarding environmental rights 377 designed to safeguard rights, and any decision made by the Rights Protection Committee should be ratifi ed by the lawyers before being put into practice. Further, lawyers will be present for group activities, and all participants should follow their direction. Second, all legal business—particularly regarding litigation and administrative recon- siderations—should be carried out under the specifi c instructions of the lawyers’ panel. September 9: The website of the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) published its September 6 approval for the Environmental Impact Assessments ( EIA) of the Beijing Electric Power Cooperation project. On the same day the Rights Protection Committee of the Baiwang Jiayuan district wrote an essay to refute it. September 17: After being revised by a number of lawyers on the panel with assistance from administrative law experts, the application letter written by six residents’ representatives from Baiwang Jiayuan asking for reconsideration was fi nalized. The fi nal version of the application letter was sent to the SEPA by the lawyers and the residents’ representatives. September 23: The SEPA informed residents that the Notifi cation of Administrative Reconsideration had been accepted. On the same day, the SEPA sent the notifi cation of Administrative Reconsideration to the Beijing Environmental Protection Administration. November 3: Six representatives of the Baiwang Jiayuan residents sent a supplemental package to the SEPA to be included in their application letter seeking administrative reconsideration. November 8: The six representatives of the Baiwang Jiayuan residents sent a second supplemental package to the SEPA. They argued that the administrative approval from the BEPA was in violation of related municipal laws and regulations and demanded that it be rescinded. November 8: The Beijing Electric Power Corporation sent staff to the Medical Plant Bureau and the Baicao Garden in the Baiwang Jia- yuan neighborhood to measure electrical towers 15 through 17. They concluded that the distance between the newly installed 220KV electric line and an edifi ce designated as Building Number 1 did not reach the standard of 15.5 meters as described in the Environmental Evaluation Report. Furthermore, it did not meet the 15-meter safety distance as noted in the corporation’s communiqués to the National People’s Con- gress (NPC) representatives. Two days later, the Beijing Electric Power Corporation sent staff to dismantle the offending iron towers. And on November 18, they sent workers to move the tower base four meters 378 zhang jingjing and liang xiaoyan towards the highway. Before completing this task, however, the workers were stopped by the residents in Baicao Garden. On November 20, the residents of Baicao Garden appealed to the State Environmental Protection Administration asking for revocation of the Beijing Envi- ronmental Protection Administration’s sanction permitting this change. Residents claimed that the Environmental Evaluation Report made by Beijing Electric Power Corporation was inaccurate. Furthermore they noted that the BEPA had granted the corporation permission without any verifi cation process. November 16: The SEPA invites experts from Baiwang Jiayuan to a Symposium. Subsequently, the SEPA hears opinions from these and other experts. December 27: Five plaintiffs from Baiwang Jiayuan and their litigation agents received the Administrative Decision handed down by the Haidian District Court stating that the Beijing Electric Power Corpora- tion should cease construction during the litigation.

The Year 2005 January 30: Residents received word that the Beijing Electric Power Corporation work crews would force their way onto the construction site the next day. That afternoon, security guards found a notice of construction outside the yard. That night, the core resident’s group discussed what measures to take. January 31: At 7:00 AM electric workers began forcibly tearing down the iron bars of the south wall. At 8:00 AM, about 150 policemen and security guards gathered to secure a perimeter, thus allowing the workers to begin forcible construction. January 31: The residents received word that the Municipal Legisla- tive Affairs Offi ce had already given an explanation on the regulation about two reservoirs and a diversion canal (Miyun Reservoir, Huairou Reservoir, and Beijing-Miyun Diversion Canal) and sent it to the SEPA and the Beijing Electric Power Cooperation. In the face of the company’s forcible continuation of construction, lawyers suggested that the residents should appeal to the SEPA under a provision of the Administrative Reconsideration Law. February 1: A third letter from 465 residents was sent to Vice-Bureau Chief Pan of the State Environmental Protection Administration. Mean- while, the Supplementary Materials on Administrative Review Applications was also sent to the Administrative Reconsideration Offi ce. On the same safeguarding environmental rights 379 day, six representatives of Baiwang Jiayuan wrote to the SEPA asking that body to postpone implementation of this latest resolution, suggest- ing that doing so would help to maintain social stability while allowing residents to enjoy a peaceful and traditional New Year’s Festival. February 1: The residents received the original version of the explana- tory document called “Beijing Political Letter {2005} NO.6 Document” from the Beijing Municipality. February 2: Residents wrote letters to the municipality and Congress, calling for a legal retraction of the NO.6 Document. From the fi rst ten days of February to the fi rst ten days of March, the residents in Baiwang Jiayuan and Baicao Garden sent letters protesting the company’s forcible construction of the project to the State Environmental Protection Administration and Beijing Municipality. March 5: The Baiwang Rights Protection Committee issued a document called “The One Year Anniversary of Tearing Down the Tower Near the Summer Palace, One of China’s World Cultural Heritage Sites.” Looking back over the past year, the document provided an earnest summary of the efforts and the great sacrifi ces on behalf of environmental protection made by residents in the Western parts of Beijing, including Baiwang Jiayuan. March 15: The Beijing Municipal Government held a meeting chaired by Zhang Mao, Vice Mayor of Beijing. Others in attendance included Mayor Wang Qishan, Party Secretary Liu Qi, as well as directors, managers, bureau chiefs, and other offi cials related to the proposed construction of a road near the northern border of China Agricultural University. This project prompted the government to propose that electrical service would be available by June 30, 2005. Concrete work would be under the regulation of the Haidian Regional Government. Construction would begin in April, with measurable progress being required by April 10. March 17: Only two days after the meeting, the SEPA decided to turn down Baiwang Jiayuan’s appeal for Administrative Reconsideration, which reaffi rmed the resolution of the Beijing Environmental Protec- tion Administration. April 6: The offi cial resolution on the case of Baiwang Jiayuan was released on the SEPA’s website. The SEPA subsequently produced the offi cial paper Resolution on the Administrative Reconsideration and presented this to the Baiwang community. April 26: The briefs of Baiwang Jiayuan against the BEPA were sent to Haidian Court and the case was put on fi le. 380 zhang jingjing and liang xiaoyan

April 27: The plaintiffs in the case of Baiwang Jiayuan against the Beijing Environmental Protection Bureau refused to accept the decision made by the fi rst hearing of the Haidian Court and appealed to the Beijing Intermediate People’s Court Number 1. It is worth mentioning that Internet played an integral role in the residents’ efforts to their protect rights. They used their website to communicate with each other, exchange information, analyze problems and show mutual encouragement and support. In these ways the Internet served as an effective means for public dialogue. The legal use of the Internet provides an entirely new means for average people to participate in the administration of public affairs. Though their efforts turned out to be in vain, this was still one of the fi rst times the public participated in administrative decision making regarding signifi cant environmental issues.

III. Public Interests or State Interests?

The Xishangliu Power Transmission Project is a major nationwide program as part of the People’s Republic of China’s preparations for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. This gives the project public interest priority, a point emphasized by both the Beijing Municipal Commis- sion of Urban Planning (BMCUP), and by the Beijing Electric Power Corporation. Regulators gave precedence to the broader public interest, even at the expense of a group of local citizens. This begs the following questions: How do we differentiate between individual, public, and state interests? Who represents each of these interests? How is representation supervised in order to prevent abuse?

IV. Environmental Impact Assessments Reports

Does an environmental impact assessment produce a substantive impact when completed after construction of the project under consideration has already started? During the processing of this case, the Beijing Elec- tric Power Corporation started construction without ﬁ rst completing all the legally required paperwork. They did not submit an Environmental Impact Assessment until their construction crews were challenged by the plaintiffs. A full month passed before the Beijing Environmental Protection Administration issued its administrative decision, allowing safeguarding environmental rights 381 the completion of the EIA after construction had been started and interrupted. Residents argued that this process could not guarantee the quality of the report, and therefore, did not safeguard the local environment. By allowing the report to come in after starting construction it could not possibly be complete in its analysis and conclusions. This process left residents and other stakeholders unaware or misinformed about potential harmful effects of the electrical project, including the effect on upriver water quality. By resorting to “tight” scheduling of the assessment, or intentionally bypassing parts of the required administrative procedures, environmental protection and health concerns are typically overlooked in favor of industrial and other “public interest” goals.

V. Are Environmental Rights Subject to Legal Protection?

At the fi rst and second hearings in this case, the plaintiffs stated that their rights would be violated. In particular, they expressed concern that their property would be damaged or rendered unsafe, and that their health would be affected by electromagnetic radiation. In addition, The Beijing Electric Power Corporation had harmed local water resources. And by attempting to sidestep administrative procedures, and then attempting to force through the construction project, the corporation infringed on the plaintiffs’ rights to live in a commodious social environment. The Court ruled that the plaintiffs were not able to prove a legally relevant relationship between the defendant’s administrative behaviors and the alleged harms; therefore, the plaintiffs had no legal standing for suing the corporation. Moreover, claims regarding the violation of environmental rights were dismissed due to a lack of support by specifi c laws. The third party, Beijing Electric Power Corporation, clamed that although established environmental laws and practices exist in China, there is not a legally recognized civil right to live in a safe environment. The court affi rmed this claim. This claim that citizens have a right to live in a safe environment with clean water and clear air should be revisited. Even though the court did not recognize such a right in this case, such rights should be considered fundamental and constitutionally grounded. According to Article 26 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, the state protects and improves the living environment along with the 382 zhang jingjing and liang xiaoyan ecological environment, and prevents and controls pollution and other public hazards. The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China is the legal cornerstone of the Republic; all other laws are based upon and subservient to it. However, the court ruled that the claim to rights made by residents of the Baiwang Jiayuan community lacked the support of specifi c laws and thus failed to protect the claimants from the potential harms of pollution. The two courts took no action on the plaintiff ’s claim of rights, which suggests that they view the Constitution as a political statement, rather than as a legally binding document. Clearly, there is still a long and tough journey ahead for citizens in order to develop the tools to protect their health and environmental rights. To meet these lofty goals, more citizens needed to take up this cause and become involved in this process. DONGWU BANNER COUNTY PAPER MILL: POLLUTING AND VIOLATING LEGAL RIGHTS

Chen Jiqun and Li Junhui

In the recent years some corporations that had been pressured by environmental organizations to suspend production because it produced so much pollution have moved their production lines to western China. Often they make such moves under the cover of enhancing development in the region, but these actions result in serious industrial pollution in the region. The case of Dianhua Pulp and Paper Mill—more commonly called Dongwu Banner Paper Mill—in Xilinguole League,1 Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, is a case in point. The mill relocated production from Hebei Province to Dongwu Banner2 and within ﬁ ve years after had caused severe pollution in the area. This disrupted the lives and livelihood of the Mongolian herdsmen who lived in the area. These herdsmen have lived on the Wuzhumuqin Grassland for generations, and harbor deep love for the land. In order to defend the grassland and their way of life, they used all manner of legal means. The article below details the pollution produced by the mill and how herdsmen have responded to Dianhua’s actions. The paper also addresses the causes and consequences of industrial pollution on the grassland.

I. The Paper Mill on the Grassland

A. The Wuzhumuqin Grassland The Wuzhumuqin Grassland is situated to the west of Daxinganling and south of Baogeda Mountain, or about 800 kilometers (497.2 miles) north of Beijing. It covers more than 70,000 square kilometers (27,038.7

1 “League” refers an administrative division of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region that would correspond to a Prefecture elsewhere in China. 2 “Banner” designates an administrative division on the county level in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. 384 chen jiqun and li junhui square miles). Two banners are situated on the grassland: Dongwu Banner in the northern part, and Xiwu Banner in the southern part. It is meadow grassland with relatively high precipitation compared to typical grasslands in the Temperate Zone. Beneﬁ ting from the harmonious coexistence of natural conditions—including plentiful water, fertile earth, and strong vegetation—and cultural tradition, Wuzhumuqin Grassland is one of the few high quality grasslands in China. While most parts of Inner Mongolia have experienced grass degradation in the past twenty years, the Wuzhumuqin Grassland is relatively free of these troubles.

B. The Coming of Factories Water plays an essential role in the biological system of grasslands. Water determines and controls virtually everything; and it was water that caused the confrontation over environmental conditions. The paper mill settled seven kilometers (4.35 miles) to the southwest of Wuliyasitai Town, where the Dongwu Banner government is located, and appropriated the grassland contracted to herdsmen from Wuliyasitai Town and Jirigelanggecha Village. In the early 1990s, a trend of attracting business and investment swept Inner Mongolia, with industry as the focus of these programs. Encouraged by this policy, the government of Xillinguole League introduced the paper mill program. Dianhua had previously operated a paper mill in Anxin County, Hebei Province, but local government forced the mill to stop production at the end of 1999 because its pollution emissions exceeded total discharge limits. On January 15, 2000, the owner came to Dongwu Banner, signed the contract, leased the land, and soon after opened the paper mill. The content of the contract signed between Mr. Gao, the representative of the Economic Bureau of Xilinguole League (Party A) and the factory owner (Party B) is as follows: Party B leases the former Dongwu Banner Horse Meat Processing Fac- tory, now bankrupted, with 500,000 RMB per year from Party A for ﬁ fteen years. Lands covered by this contract include 185 mu (29.6 acres) on which the facility is located. The Dongwu Banner government, on behalf of Party A, promises to provide Party B with a place for the wastewater discharge.3

3 Cited from the original contract. dongwu banner county paper mill 385

The Letter of Commitment from the Dongwu Banner Government reads: Except the fee for water in the amount of 50,000 RMB per year, wastewater discharge in the amount of 20,000 RMB, and land use from the sixth year, the government will not charge the factory any other fee… and the government also promises to return all income tax revenues paid by the factory as soon as it is collected during the ﬁ rst seven years of operations. During the same period of time, the government will return 50% of value-added tax revenues . . . The Remarks to the Commitment Letter from the Dongwu Banner Government states, “If the local government fails to keep its promise, the lessee has the right to terminate the contract unilaterally, and the lessor has to return the investment monies and compensate the lessee for losses.”4 In March 2000, the paper mill started production without any environmental impact evaluation. It dug out a pool of 4000 mu (640 acres) to contain wastewater. This pool was constructed on the land that had been acquired from the aforementioned herdsmen in Wuliyasitai Town and Jirigelanggecha Village. Note that this was simple a trench; the company took no measures to prevent seepage from the pool into the surrounding ground. The mill discharged 2,500,000 tons of unapproved industrial wastewater into the grassland every year. This amount far exceeds the Discharge Standard of Water Pollutants for the Paper Industry, which allows factories to discharge 60 cubic meters of wastewater per ton of paper. Also, the level of pollutants in the wastewater far exceeded standards.5 The statistics from the Dongwu Banner Environmental Protection Department shows that the COD6 of discharge is above 13,000 mil- ligrams per liter. Note that national standards classify a body of water with COD above 40 mg/l as “seriously polluted.” Such water is not potable for humans or animals; it is not usable for industry, farming, or stockbreeding. Given that the COD of wastewater discharge in papermaking industry is typically 450 mg/l, it should be no surprise that the Prevention and Management Law of Water Pollution requires the

4 Jiang Fei, “A Placid Lake on the Grassland,” China Youth Daily, August 20, 2003. 5 Yin Chenglong, “Research on the Wastewater Discharge and the Water Quality in the Peripheral Environment of the Dongwu Banner Paper Mill,” Research Center on the Environment and Chemistry, (Beijing Jiaotong University, 2002). 6 COD refers to the oxygen volume that chemical oxidizers need to oxidize, decom- pose, and eliminate organic contamination in water. The higher the COD, the higher the contamination density in the water. 386 chen jiqun and li junhui inclusion of fi xed sites and effective treatment processes for handling wastewater discharge from papermaking operations. The paper mill also heavily taxed limited groundwater supplies. Paper mills usually consume a large amount of water; however, their precise water requirements remain unknown. According to the estimate of the Water Conservancy Bureau of Dongwu Banner, the paper mill used 2 to 3 million tons7 of groundwater every year. Clean water plays a signifi cant role in maintaining the biological health of the grassland. Even in the meadow grassland with its relatively high precipitation, clean water is valuable. Fearing the nonrenewable groundwater would disappear, the Dongwu Banner Environmental Protection Department reported their concerns to government offi cials. Without inspection reports to measure the amount of available groundwater, though, offi - cials consistently replied that there was “enough.” Given its demands and the relatively scarce water supply, it seems clear that the paper mill underpaid for the water it used. The severe pollution produced by the mill, and its irresponsible behavior in dealing with the consequences of its actions, aroused indignation among local herdsmen.

II. Herdsmen Strive to Assert their Rights

Herdsmen in the Mongolian Wuzhumuqin Tribe have been living on the Wuzhumuqin Grassland for countless generations. Relying on the grassland for a living, the Mongolian herdsmen harbor a deep and enduring respect for the lands.

A. Appealing to Higher Authorities for Help When the paper mill began damaging the grassland ecosystem, groups from Jirigalanggazha Village, together with herdsmen who had been adversely affected, wrote the ﬁ rst protest statement. They requested ownership of the occupied grassland, recovery of the environment, and compensation for the herdsmen’s losses. Molinzhabu, the Party Secretary of Gazha Village, led the protesting herdsmen to the ofﬁ ce of the Banner Head. Thus began one-and-a-half years of appeals to the authorities,

7 One ton of water equals 1 cubic meter of water or 1000 liters. dongwu banner county paper mill 387 including all levels of the Banner government, League government, and government of the autonomous region; various organizations such as the Correspondence and Complaints Offi ce of the People’s Congress of the Autonomous Region, the Agriculture and Animal Husbandry Bureau, the Grassland Supervision and Administration Station, and the Environmental Protection Administration of the Autonomous Region. Appeals continued until December 14, 2001, when the expansion of frozen sewage caused the dike in Wuzhumuqin to burst. The broken dike caused fl ooding; not just of water, but of black and brown sewage and sludge. This led to the loss of 2,000 livestock owned by 18 herdsmen, the contamination of 4,293 mu (686.88 acres) of grassland, and the creation of another sewage pool.8 The chemically burned lands turned gray; not even a blade of grass survived in the fl ooded area. The original sewage pool, even prior to its collapse, had a severe negative impact on the health of the residents and the local economy. The stench of the pool spread with the wind year-round, causing symptoms such as dizziness, vomiting, and lack of appetite. More important, the pool polluted the drinking water. After the mill opened, livestock did not fatten up as readily; fewer lambs were born in spring.9 Not only did sheep reproduction fall off, they also lost much of their coats. Similarly, the production of goat cashmere dropped.10 On December 15, 2001, the day after the dike burst, the herdsmen prepared another appeal. Subsequently, a government working group spent a month at herdsmen’s homes, trying to persuade them to reconsider the overall situation and seek arbitration rather than litigation. The Working Group claimed that the latter option would waste time and money and would possibly leave the problem unsettled. Most important, they told the herdsmen that the paper mill, which had contributed substantially the Banner economy, and would not have its operations suspended.

B. Bringing the Matter to Court When appeals to the authorities achieved nothing, the herdsmen took up the weapons of the legal system. In August 2002, seven herdsmen,

8 Jiang Fei, op. cit. 9 This is a standard used to evaluate livestock strength. 10 Liu Yi, “Grassland, How to Preserve the Greenness?” China Daily, 14th edition, April 4, 2003; Jiang Fei, op. cit. 388 chen jiqun and li junhui represented by lawyers from the DeHeng Law Offi ce in Beijing, sued the paper mill for damages caused by pollution, demanding 15 million RMB as compensation. The Intermediate People’s Court of Xilinguole League accepted the case. Since the Dongwu Banner government had agreed to provide lands for sewage dumping and containment, and because it had illegally transferred herdsmen’s grassland for use in sewage dumping and containment, the court enjoined the Dongwu Banner government to appear in court as the third party in the case. Under these circumstances, the Banner government adopted a series of “remedial measures.” In January 2003, the Dongwu Banner government divided the grassland area into parts, which included the Dianhua Paper Mill workshop and 10,730 mu (1,716.8 acres) of surrounding pasture, based on a purportedly incorrect division of the grassland made in January 1997. The government also signed and issued fi ve copies of the State-owned Land-use Rights Certifi cate, which offi cially transferred the land to state ownership, and then leased it to the Dianhua Pulp and Paper Mill.11 With these maneuvers, the herdsmen appeared no longer to be the legal users of the land, and consequently lost their litigation qualifi cation. However, according to Item 45 of the Law of Land Administration (Amendment) passed in 1999, if 35 hectares (86.4 acres) of arable lands, or 70 hectares (172.8 acres) of other lands are taken for national construction, the land expropriation must be approved by the State Council. Note that this approval was not sought. Meanwhile, some offi cials of the Banner government and League government went to herdsmen’s homes, trying to persuade them to abandon litigation. Suyalatu, then Secretary of Gazha Village, did not submit to his superior offi cers’ pressure to transfer the pastureland, which had been used as the sewage-draining ground, to state-owned assets. In December 2002, he was dismissed from his position. Under long-term pressure, four of the seven herdsmen dropped their lawsuit. In February 2003, the three remaining herdsmen, headed by Damolinzhabu, continued as plaintiffs in the Intermediate People’s Court of Xilinguole League, demanding over 1 million RMB as compensation for damages from pollution. In March 2004, the Court ruled in favor of the herdsmen, directing the Dianhua Paper Mill to compensate the herdsmen in the amount of 170,000 RMB, and the Dongwu Banner government to pay an additional 50,000 RMB to the

11 Jiang Fei, ibid. dongwu banner county paper mill 389 herdsmen for damages and legal fees. Not satisfi ed with the judgment, the plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme People’s Court, demanding increased compensation and the return of 11,000 mu (1,760 acres) of land collectively-owned by the herdsmen, but which they claimed was illegally occupied by the defendant. In August 2004, the Supreme People’s Court of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region issued a second judgment in favor of the herdsmen, which included the following decisions: The Dongwu Banner Paper Mill and the government of Dongwu Banner should pay herdsmen a sum of 360,000 RMB as compensation for damages caused by pollution. The plaintiff did not provide a valid land-use rights certifi cate, so the court did not support the petition for “returning the occupied lands”. In December 2004, this second decision was implemented in full. The court rejected the herdsmen’s appeal to reclaim the occupied lands because the herdsmen possessed no certifi cate to prove valid land use. Many herdsmen had never heard of the Collective Land Ownership Certifi cate, which could have effectively proven their land-use rights. Note that the country has issued these certifi cates for more than six years.

C. Remaining Problems The fi ve-year battle put up by the herdsmen was a long and arduous process. In the court, the three herdsmen stood on one side of the court, while the paper mill enterprise and the government of Dongwu Ban- ner stood on the other. The scene poignantly displayed that industrial and governmental interests were united, and that the herdsmen stood apart from their power. Although the herdsmen put up a gallant fi ght, they obtained insubstantial compensation. Moreover, serious problems remain. A brief recap of events since the ending of the court case will clarify some of the unaddressed issues. In May 2005, the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) was entrusted with the supervision and administration of the nine key polluting enterprises nationwide, including the paper mill in Dongwu Banner. The SEPA closely examined the smoke discharge of these operations, but not wastewater emissions. August 2005 marked the one-year anniversary of the Supreme People’s Court’s ruling. During this period, the paper mill continued to operate and to occupy the lands of the herdsmen. The second judgment 390 chen jiqun and li junhui ruled that compensation should be paid to cover the herdsmen’s losses, especially of livestock. There was no compensation for the pollution of the grassland. In October 2005, faced with pressure from various levels of society, the Dongwu Banner Paper Mill suspended its production and moved to the Xilinguole League Lanqi Banner Grassland. It is not clear, though, who should take care of the wastewater pool or the damage it caused to the soil and groundwater of Dongwu Banner. Let us reconsider the case from an economic perspective. In 2000, Dongwu Banner Paper Mill rented 185 mu (29.6 acres) of state-owned land as its factory site. The annual rent was 500,000 RMB, making the annual rent for one mu (0.16 acres) 2,700 RMB. The government of Dongwu Banner also promised that the dumping site would be transferred to the factory without charge, which led 4,300 mu (688 acres) of collectively owned grassland to be seized, polluted, and irreversibly damaged by the Dianhua Paper Mill. The three plaintiffs’ grassland holdings—1,362 mu (217.92 acres)—were among the area seized. The fi nal ruling of the Supreme Court of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region ordered the defendant to pay 360,000 RMB to the three plaintiffs; this breaks down to only 264 RMB per mu (0.16 acres). Compared to the herdsmen’s economic losses, the severe damage of the fragile grassland ecosystem, and the harm done to a valuable collective ecological and strategic barrier, the compensation hardly seems adequate.

III. Review of Polluting Activities and Treatment of the Grassland

A. The Transfer of Pollution under the Rubric of “Developing the Western Regions” The case of the Dongwu Banner Paper Mill is of vital signifi cance. Similar pollution cases can be found on various grasslands. Taking advantage of the need to develop the West, polluting enterprises driven out of the urban periphery go west, where population density is much lower and the probability of protest against their activities is less likely. In Dongwu Banner, apart from the paper mill, there are various metal mines and smelters. These produce iron, zinc, gold, silver, and copper. Collectively they have done serious damage to the grasslands. Similar situations occur not only in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, but also in other western regions. In the suburbs and exurbs, pollution dongwu banner county paper mill 391 guidelines are becoming stricter, but some western regions merely wink at these polluters. These enterprises take advantage of offi cials in the western regions eager to develop industry and pursue rapid economic growth. However, the wealth produced by the polluting enterprises is far less than the cost of pollution treatment and remediation. In the case of the Dongwu Banner Paper Mill, the preferential conditions the local government promised were many, as detailed above. It is hard to understand how, given these conditions, the enterprise contributed to local economic development. The majority of profi t went into individuals’ pockets, while a much smaller portion went to national and local fi nancial organs in the form of tax revenue. The resultant pollution, however, remains in the locality and poses a serious and continuing threat to the local environment and people. Through this process, pollution is transferred from economically developed areas to economically underdeveloped areas, with the residents in the underdeveloped areas becoming the ultimate victims of pollution. Economic development alone would give little cause for criticism, but the sacrifi ce of both the environment and the long-term interest of the people is too high a price. The grassland ecosystem in northern China is fragile, and plays a signifi cant role in the security of the nation’s ecology. In choosing a development model, the environmental factor should be considered as a priority. Often it is entirely neglected.

B. Protection of the Grassland Cannot Be Separated from Protection of the Legal Rights and Interests of Local Residents As demonstrated in the pollution case of the Dongwu Banner Paper Mill, the incidents in which economic development lead to environmental damage mainly involve three interest groups: local herdsmen, local government, and outside developers. The fate of the local herdsmen is closely linked to that of the grassland, from which they make their living. This link has been and continues to be passed down from generation to generation, forming part of the herdsmen’s’ culture and spiritual support system. The damage to the grassland has undermined the rights and interests of the herdsmen. This harms not only the present generation, but also future generations. The interests of government offi cials, however, are not directly related to the health of the grassland environment. Therefore, under existing 392 chen jiqun and li junhui policies, the government only considers the degree to which they can convert grassland resources into tangible economic “benefi ts” and increased economic growth in the short term. Outside developers also have no physical or spiritual connection to the grassland. When government laws and policies are not effective to prevent damage to the grassland, the developers, driven to gain maximum profi t, sacrifi ce the environment and the herdsmen’s rights and interests. In a confrontation of these three parties, the developers and the government undoubtedly possess the balance of power, but do not possess a common interest in protecting the grassland. Under these circumstances, the protection of the grassland and the legal interests of herdsmen are closely associated. In the case of the Dongwu Banner Paper Mill, the herdsmen’s ownership of the lands remained unconfi rmed because they did not possess the Collective Land Ownership Certifi cate. Therefore, although the court ruled that the paper mill had infl icted harm on the herdsmen, it was unable to rule that the seized pastureland be returned to the herdsmen. It is necessary for the local herdsmen to overcome language barriers and become conversant in the policies, laws, regulations, knowledge, and skills required to safeguard their lawful rights and interests. The government and all people who care about the healthy development of the grassland should make persistent efforts towards this goal.

(Hasi contributed to this article.) JISHA IN YUNNAN: ENVIRONMENTAL AND CULTURAL PROTECTION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF TOURISM

Li Bo1

Jisha Village, a small Tibetan village at the foot of Qianhu Mountain, supports several hundred families in southeastern Xiaozhongdian, a town located where Shangri-la County borders Lijiang Prefecture and the Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, in northwestern Yun- nan. Over two thousand Tibetans from twelve production teams of Tuanjie Administrative Village, Xiaozhongdian Town, including those from Jisha Village live on the alpine grasslands and lakes of Qianhu Mountain, meaning mountain of a thousand lakes in Chinese. Since the Three Parallel Rivers of the Yunnan Protected Areas were added to UNESCO’s World Heritage List in 2003, the Qianhu Mountain Scenic Area has been one of its eight core protected areas. However, confl icts occurred when a real estate development company tried to develop tourism there, pushing the Qianhu Mountain Scenic Area to the frontline of a war between environmental protection and tourism development. The aggressive developers, who see themselves as promoters of the idea that “development is the fundamental principle,” are ignoring people’s basic rights to public resources, intend to violate the country’s laws and policies to pursue development at the cost of the environment. It is truly diffi cult to harmonize protection with development, but if we fail to conduct with vision a coordinated exploration of the possibilities, we are bound to pay a high price for environmental deterioration. The story of Jisha shows the confl icts taking place now in the western region of China over this basic question.

1 The author has followed the exploration of the Qianhu Mountain Scenic Area since 1999. However, an individual person or institution has limited capacity. So researchers on rural development, rural sociology, cultural anthropology, resource management, eco-tourism and protection of plateau wetlands are welcome to pay attention to the development and protection of the Qianhu Mountain Scenic Area. Those interested may email [email protected] to ask the CBIK for relevant materials. 394 li bo

1. Conﬂ icts over Resources Lead to Environmental Crises

Qianhu Mountain boasts a central expanse of virgin vegetation, plateau lakes and plateau wetlands in the Jinsha River Basin. In places above an altitude of 3800 meters there are many glacial lakes left by glacial erosion processes, showing a unique landscape of plateau forests and lakes. It supports the rich yet specifi c diversity of a mountain ecosystem and the richest diversity of plateau creatures among the Three Parallel Rivers of the Yunnan Protected Areas, characterized by alpine meadows, rhododendron forests and spruce-fi r forests. However, only Professor Peng Hongshou, the fi rst primate ecologist to record and report Yunnan snub-nosed monkeys, has ever, in a comprehensive way, researched animals in the Qianhu Mountain, where he led a team from the Institute of Zoology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences in the early 1980s. Unfortunately, he died of mountain sickness during his scientifi c research, and since then, no systematic ecological or biological investigation has been conducted there. So it is safe to say when scientists are discussing protecting biodiversity in northwest Yunnan and researching its ecology that no on-the-spot scientifi c investigations have taken place in Qianhu Mountain, and no comprehensive protection plan focusing on plateau wetlands and the freshwater ecosystem has ever been worked out.

A. The Traditional Relationship between Man and Land Has Effectively Protected the Environment Traditionally, river valleys marked the division lines between forests and grasslands in Jisha Village. Before the founding of the new republic, the village would choose a person every year, called “zha ben,” to take care of the holy mountains and other village affairs. Religion also played an important role in managing forests and mountains and in solving conﬂ icts over them. After the founding of the republic, the ownership of forests was shifted to the state and the responsibility of protection to a new village leadership. In 1982, according to three newly declared principles on forestry,2 the Chinese government redeﬁ ned the borders

2 The three principles are to stabilize the rights of mountains and forests, identify the parts of mountains used for personal needs and establish a forestry production responsibility system. See Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council on Some Issues Concerning Protecting Forests and Developing Forestry (1981). jisha in yunnan 395 and property rights of state-owned forests, designated the watershed forests, distributed some of the forest remnants to Jisha Village as collective forests and issued ownership certifi cates for mountainous regions and forests. Great changes have taken place in ownership but not in the relationship between local livelihood and natural resources. Tibetan ancestors long ago realized that in high mountains and deep valleys the temperature is low and little fl at land exists for agriculture, and alpine meadows are only suitable for herding animals during the summer months, so they have developed and handed down knowledge of living with their environment, which has actually evolved as the basis of the local culture, namely that agriculture and animal husbandry should complement each other. In March and April, they plant highland barley, potatoes, and creeping wood. When it turns warmer in May, herdsmen become busy. Yaks can’t stand the increasingly warm weather, and the grass on the summer alpine meadow above an altitude of 3800 meters is the best feed for them, so every Tibetan family sends members to raise yaks there, making butter, cheese and yogurt from the milk. Other family members who remain below need to work constantly sending provisions up and carrying the milk products down the mountain until October. After September, it is harvest time; yaks are herded back to the lowland meadows about 3400 meters away from the village, and the families work preparing fodder and fi rewood for the winter. Farmers are also busy from June to September harvesting large amounts of wild mushrooms and other wild plants for consumption by urban residents. So, in the normal course of living, they have to work on farms, in mountain meadows and in the forests. The peaks and plateau lakes of Qianhu Mountain are regarded as holy by Tibetans in Jisha and other areas around Zhongdian County. Qianhu Mountain or “Lamu duocuo” in Tibetan, which means the thousand lakes of the Goddess of Mercy, is a holy land admired by generations in Jisha. They hold signifi cant ceremonies to worship gods and pray for blessings on New Year’s Day and on other festivals. Monks and farmers from Zhongdian County also gather for religious activities, offering sacrifi ces to gods and ancestors so as to pray for favorable weather and success in agriculture and animal husbandry. So Qianhu Mountain features as an important place in local customs and religion.3

3 It is also an important outdoor scene for Chen Kaige’s ﬁ lm The Promise. 396 li bo

B. Confl icts over Resources Destroy Cultural Property and the Natural Environment From 1976 to 1998, the timber industry was a pillar of the economy in Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture. Loggers from northeast China came south to a station in the center of Jisha. Since then, the relationship between people and land has changed. Due to clear cutting, all the trees except for those on a holy hill named “Zhongzhai” located in the center of the village were cut down. Today, it is only on that holy hill that one can enjoy views of the virgin environment which existed on Qianhu Mountain before loggers came in. One can truly feel the drastic environmental changes that have taken place. After the felling of trees was stopped the local timber economy slowed gradually. Grain production also suffered from severe insect infestations for several consecutive years. However, it is the Jisha villagers rather than the loggers that have had to endure all of the adverse impacts of environmental deterioration and have had to struggle to survive. Unfortunately, Zhongdian County was offi cially renamed Shangri-La Town soon after the felling came to an end. From 1998 to 2005, a stream of tourists swarmed into the Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, signifying a shift from a timber-based economy to a tourism-based economy. More and more businessmen came to make investments in tourism in the area, making the confl ict between environmental protection and economic development more complicated. The National Road 214 linking Lijiang and Zhongdian runs through Jisha Village, not only cutting in half the Jisha Meadow (which is under the protection of the Diqing government) but also destroying the original celestial burial site. In 1999, Kunming-based Ziyuan Real Estate Development Company came to the Qianhu Mountain area to invest in projects such as cable ways, race tracks and high-altitude fl ights. In 2002, a subsidiary of Ziyuan Company submitted a major project for development in Zhongdian which failed to be admitted at a provincial conference on projects deliberation because the project did not pass the environment impact assessment.4 The story was covered by

4 China Tourism News reprinted journalist Liang Xin’s report in 2002 as follows: The Yunnan provincial government focuses much on environmental protection in evaluating and examining tourism programs, so the Tourism Program on Shangri-la Gorge, Yunnan, submitted by Shanghai Yunjia Investment Consultant Co. Ltd., controlled by Ziyuan Group failed to be passed because of its not-up-to standard environmental jisha in yunnan 397

Yunnan’s newspapers and CCTV. In 2003, in order to build the Jisha hydropower station, a road was built into the forest. However, in 2005, the State Environmental Protection Administration announced on the Internet that this hydropower station project had violated environmental protection regulations. Jisha Village has received individual travelers since 1999. Farmers voluntarily spend some time in numbering each house, so that they can entertain the travelers in turn. To prevent travelers from shouting near the holy mountains and sacred lakes and washing or throwing rubbish in the sacred lakes, each group of tourists is accompanied by one farmer during their visit. These farmer guides are not conscious or capable of introducing their scenic spots. However, they keep a close watch over the travelers’ behavior.5 Since 1999, the news that Ziyuan Company would cooperate with the local government of Xiaozhongdian Township (later renamed Xiao- zhongdian Town) to explore 40 square kilometers of Qianhu Mountain has kept villagers guessing and worrying. They fear that they will ﬁ nally face the adverse results of excessive resource exploration. And projects including the construction of asphalt roads and cable ways on top of the mountain make them feel that their rights to access and use the mountain’s resources are threatened.

protection. And the expert group turned their topic from evaluation and examination to consultancy. The planning department listened to various comments and suggestions conscientiously so as to re-draft the program to high and strict requirements. Source: http://www.ctnews.com.cn/gb/2002/01/14/zglyb/zhxw/2.htm. 5 Projects such as the Gangqu River ﬁ rst- and second-order power station and the Jisha power station, in violation of the environment impact assessment report, widen roads into forests without authorization and dump waste sand and rock into the river, exerting adverse inﬂ uence on the eco-environment, and on the life and production activities of people living in surrounding areas or further down the river. They have been ordered to rectify and reform the projects within a certain time and have been given administrative punishment. Another nearby project, the Concentration Plant of the Weixi Zinc Oxide Company, which has a great threat of landslide, was ordered to take protective measures and was also given administrative punishment. From: State Environmental Protection Administration, “The Yunnan Provincial Government Attaches Great Importance on Tangible Results in the Special Action of Tackling Enterprises Illegally Emitting Pollution to Protect the Health of General Public,” State Environmental Protection Administration, http://www.zhb.gov.cn (accessed October 10, 2005). 398 li bo

About one hundred families in Jisha Village signed two agreements6 on development which violated grass-roots democratic procedures, mis- led the public and undermined the morale of the local farmers. Actu- ally, the contracts between Ziyuan Company and villagers were worked out by Ziyuan Company only, neither showing plans and blueprints of the development to the farmers nor soliciting their advice. We can imagine how diffi cult it would be for the village representatives, many of whom were illiterate, to overcome obstacles in signing the contract, to conduct democratic discussions and to make collective decisions. In July 2005, they ultimately surrendered to the powerful coalition of Ziyuan Company and the local government. The author was told on the phone by a villager that for the development project of Qianhu Mountain, a senior leader of Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture visited Jisha without precedent. The village head conveyed his message as follows: if villagers could not reach agreement with the developer immediately, the government would consider sealing the mountain passes, and “no one will be allowed to enter that area.” Though there was no record of these words for textual research and some villagers had no knowledge of the threat to “seal the mountain,” 99% of the villagers reluctantly stamped their fi nger prints on the third development agreement, drafted by the developer and notarized by the county notary organ itself. According to the development management regulations and rules, the exploration of the Three Parallel Rivers in the Yunnan Protected Areas should be subject to three-tier planning and management. On February 27, 2004, the Offi ce of the Yunnan World Heritage Management Com- mission formally responded to the Yunnan Tourism Bureau by issuing its suggestions on the Master Plan of the Development of Qianhu Mountain, which said the Master Plan on Development of the Three Parallel Rivers in the Yunnan Protected Areas had been submitted to the State Council, and the development of the Qianhu Mountain, as a

6 The fi rst agreement, namely the Agreement on the Villagers’ Interests after the Development of Qianhu Mountain (August 31, 2002) was not signed by all of the villagers, but by seven un-elected villagers through stamping their fi ngerprints, most of the agreeing villagers were illiterate. Besides, the company drafted the agreement unilaterally without publicly soliciting rural residents’ opinions. Under pressure from the farmers, the fi rst agreement was discarded. Unfortunately, the second agreement was formulated unilaterally by the company again and signed in the same non-democratic way. Essentially the assenting farmers were lured into signing a document that did not consider their own interests. jisha in yunnan 399 part of the Three Parallel Rivers in Yunnan Protected Areas, should be in line with the latter plan, if it had been given an offi cial and written reply by the State Council, especially when it comes to environmental protection. Nevertheless, on April 19, 2005, before the master plans were passed and the very day when the Yunnan Environmental Protection Administration called on a panel to assess the environmental impact of the cable ways, Jisha Villagers were informed that the Zhongdian County government had approved the development plan and Ziyuan Company had already cut into the mountains. A large portion of the plan for the development of Qianhu Mountain was examined and approved by prefecture and county governments, since it was broken into parts, namely a series of minor plans for approval, in a bid to evade the examination and approval of provincial authorities. These minor plans had no offi cial, written documents concerning environment impact assessment by the State Environmental Protection Administration and evidently evaded the Law on State Envi- ronment Impact Assessment in terms of investment quota.7 According to the environmental impact assessment, investment in cableways was a little less than RMB 30 million; however some materials showed a different version of the project’s costs which was far higher than that fi gure. There were also some problems in its fi nancing strategy. A report by the company read, “collecting development funds through many channels” and “the government and relevant companies will jointly establish a guarantee fund to provide a certain proportion of guarantee for the loans and bonds held by tourist enterprises.”8 However, all of these provisions contravened the Guaranty Law of the People’s Republic of China, Article 8 of which states clearly, “No State organ may act as a surety, except in the case of securing loans, for on-lending, from a foreign government or an international economic organization as is approved by the State Council.”

7 State Environmental Protection Administration and The State Council released a document concerning investment system reform, i.e. Notice on Improving Examination and Approval of Environment Impact Assessment at Different Levels for Construction Projects (SEPA Document No. 164 in 2004) provided that tourism development projects or environmental protection facilities involving 50 million yuan or more within the area of national key tourist attractions, national nature reserves and national key cultural properties protection units, as well as all projects involving 30 million yuan or more in world natural and cultural heritage sites should be submitted to SEPA for examination and approval in terms of their environment impact assessments. 8 Ziyuan Company, Clause 16.3, Directions for The Master Plan on the Develop- ment of Thousand Lake Mountain, Shangri-la County (49). 400 li bo

The environmental impact assessment report on the cable ways of Qianhu Mountain does not respect the participation rights and interests of the Jisha villagers, because only one farmer took part in the survey anonymously and no cultural protection plan was adopted. In the report, the Qianhu Mountain Development Plan says that building cable ways can protect the plateau wetlands better than using this area as grazing land or riding track; and to provide “vegetation protection,” villagers’ herding animals on the pasture within Qianhu Mountain will be controlled, with pasture merely for show. The report even goes against the law of nature in advising that the summer grazing land for yaks be moved to low-altitude land. Ironically, in the Master Plan for the Development of Qianhu Mountain in Shangri-la, they propose some Good for Health Leisure Travel Projects such as horse racing within the tourist area. Implementing such self-contradictory development plans will cause conﬂ icts between the development of tourism and people’s life there. These plans, under the disguise of “protective development” deprive the local minorities including the Tibetan villagers of their rights to lead a traditional life, severely damage the relationship between man and the land, and pose a threat to the local environment.

C. The Confl icts Highlight the Defects of China’s Environmental and Resource Management System Though affecting a small area and population, the case of Jisha is very typical. If the whole western region is damaged in the same way as Jisha, we will pay a price, in a broad sense, of much more than mere money. Currently, when approving plans to explore resources, governments at all levels usually fail to take environmental protection into consideration. To remedy this we should immediately introduce innovation into the system and improve the management. Not all local governments or all government agencies are able to bear in mind the national interest while examining the benefi ts of community development and environmental protection and strike a balance between them. Many offi cials and professionals, let alone ordinary farmers, do not know what specifi c procedures are needed to supervise a certain scale of development. Besides, public participation is an important step to assess the environmental impact of the development projects. The democratic decision-making procedures based on administrative villages cannot solve problems concerning resource management based on natural villages. jisha in yunnan 401

The Organic Law of Villagers and the “four rights”9 of rural residents, the rights to know, to make decisions, to participate, and to supervise, provided by the central government give strong legal and policy support to exercise democracy in rural areas. However, due to the fact that people live scattered over wide areas, as well as differences in culture and customs, and insufﬁ ciencies in the mainstream education service, these laws and policies are not well understood by the ethnic minorities living in the western mountainous areas.

II. Social Participation in Ecological Protection

Since 2000, CBIK (Center for Biodiversity and Indigenous Knowl- edge), an NGO in Yunnan, has launched a cultural and ecological tourism project in Jisha Village and combined the project with poverty eradication efforts. The aim is to improve the living standards of the local people and at the same time, protect the bio-diversity of Qianhu Mountain. The organization hopes to introduce the concept of ecotourism, integrate protection of bio-diversity with eco-tourism in which local communities participate, and thus to explore a new model which balances protection and development and is based on the participation of local communities. The project includes the following activities: investigating the natural and cultural resources of Qianhu Mountain, setting up protection groups within different communities, organizing activities in which villagers go out and learn about experiences with eco-protection in other places in China, constructing environmental hotels in a Tibetan style (which are collectively owned by the villagers), and establishing community management groups to develop small-scale eco-tourist activities. So far CBIK has helped 15 villagers to travel in other areas and learn about some successful and unsuccessful experiences. Through these visits, the villagers have realized that they should unite, that the development of tourism should fairly beneﬁ t all villagers, that agriculture, animal husbandry and the cultural traditions of the Tibetan ethnic

9 General Offi ce of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the General Offi ce of the State Council, “Opinion on Making the Running of Vil- lages More Transparent and Management System More Effi cient ( June 22, 2004),” People’s Daily, July 12, 2004. 402 li bo group are the foundation for their subsistence and for the sustainable development of the community, and therefore must be protected. However, from the very beginning, CBIK has been haunted by dis- ruption from commercial interests. The commission did not get any strong support from the township government, and the investing company, claiming that it has a monopoly on exploration rights, attempted many times to prevent the project by exerting pressure on the township government. In addition, CBIK, as a non-governmental organization, has only limited fi nancial resources, thus the local government takes a more favorable attitude toward the company. On the other hand, CBIK, since it is a non-commercial organization, does not aim at earning a profi t from the project and organizing activities to encourage the villagers’ participation has cost it a great deal of money. What is worse is that the villagers, faced with the combined power of the government and the investing company, have no organizations or leaders that can truly represent their interests and protect their rights through legal procedures. For example, the villagers seem to be quite powerless when confronted with the unscrupulous exploration plan of the company, its misinformation, and the lack of democratic decision-making mechanisms. Gradually, disputes among the villagers, and their concerns about the future and overall suspicion have grown and have fi nally affected the development of the project. As a result, the commission has had to spend more and more time and energy to assist the villagers to fi ght for their rights to be informed, to participate in decision-making, and to monitor the commercial activities. The project has lasted for about three years. It has provided the villagers with abundant information and organized activities in which the villagers could discuss issues with regard to their own interests. However, CBIK recognized that the low capacity of the villagers to understand and apply laws and policies could not meet the requirements of western development and the construction of a harmonious society. CBIK also found that this situation was diffi cult to change only through their own efforts. When the commission was in the most diffi cult time, the media played an important role. China Youth Daily published two special reports in 200410

10 Zhang Wenling, “Jisha Villagers Query a Tourism Development Project in Shangri-la County and File a Suit against the Developers,” China Youth Daily, October 30, 2004. Source: http://zqb.cyol.com/gb/zqb/2004–08/30/content-938949.htm. jisha in yunnan 403 and 2005,11 which focused the attention of the public and the government at all levels on the protection and the appropriate exploration of Qianhu Mountain and the Three Parallel Rivers. In 2004, the Jisha Village employed legal counselors to demand openness of information and rights to participate in decision-making, which revealed that many aspects of the exploration of the company may not comply with the relevant administrative regulations. Following these events, the CBIK took the occasion to direct public attention to the administrative approval and registration procedure for the exploration of the Three Parallel Rivers. Practical developments then proved that this shift was correct, as the commission was no longer trapped in the local problem of Jisha Village and was able to exert wider inﬂ uence on environmental protection and poverty eradication in the local communities.

III. The Fundamental Interests of Western Regional Development Lie in a Harmonious and Well-off Western Region and in National Ecological Security

The conﬂ icts between villagers and the company may continue, though most people in Jisha Village have stamped their ﬁ ngerprints on the contract of development. The state has to pay for two possible adverse results, namely the irreversible destruction of alpine wetlands and the growth of local hatred of the nonnative. So companies should be accountable to citizens, society, governments and laws, bear relevant economic costs and take social responsibility. Successful addition of the Three Parallel Rivers to the World Heritage List means that the People’s Republic of China has made a solemn commitment to the international community to protect human civilization. The development of tourism in the Three Parallel Rivers of Yunnan Protected Areas remains the core contentious issue in protecting this world heritage. Conniving in the development of Qianhu Mountain by tourist companies may lead to catastrophic consequences: undermining the solemnity of heritage management, setting a bad example for other core nature reserves, and escalating the irrational exploration of the whole heritage site.

11 Zhang Wenling and Li Songtao, a special report in China Youth Daily, June 8, 2003. Source: http://zqb.cyol.com/gb/zqb/2005–06/08/node-7.htm. 404 li bo

The ancient classic Rectifi ed Interpretation of the Book of Rites King System says, Temperature and moisture must be taken into consideration when assign- ing people to different work. Vast valleys and broad rivers have various characteristics. Likewise people living around enjoy different customs. For example, they may be strong or weak, frivolous or steady, slow or quick in nature. They have different tastes, use different tools and wear different clothes. So their education must be improved but their customs not changed. Policies should be in line with local conditions. The Han ethnic group and the minority ethnic groups, or, in other words, people from across the country have different characteristics which must not be forcefully changed.12 Such principles of respect by our ancestors for the ethnic groups living in the border regions are still of signifi cance for us in considering how to deal with the current issues. They believed that each land nurtured people with its own characteristics and advocated protection of different cultures and harmonious coexistence of different ethnic groups. These traditional principles were also refl ected in talks between Fei Xiaotong and Deng Xiaoping in the 1950s.13 Development policies for the western region concerning resource exploration should pay special attention to respecting the traditional livelihood of different ethnic groups and should by no means neglect the characteristic of diversity in unity of the Chinese nation. We should take into account the harmony and stability necessary for a pluralistic society and national ecological security when thinking about the nature of issues concerning farmers, agriculture and rural areas in the western region. The western region, a treasure land for China’s sustainable development, though only having 29% of the whole population and 17.1% of the total GDP, covers 71.4% of China’s territory and is home to 72.23% of all ethnic groups.14 Striking a balance between the government and the market, ecological protection and economic growth, long-term development and short-term development, overall interests and partial and local

12 The Thirteen Classics with Annotations, Vol. 12, (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1979) p. 1338. 13 Wu Yuenong, “Talks Between Deng Xiaoping and Fei Xiaotong on Issues Concern- ing Ethnic Groups”, http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/40557/47435/47438/3350088. html, Fei Xiaotong was the best-known anthropologist in China. 14 Ofﬁ ce of the Leading Group for Western Region Development of the State Council, Basic Information on Western Region Development. Nov. 12, 2002. http://chanye. cashq.ac.cn/html/25/40099.htm 2002. jisha in yunnan 405 interests, man and nature guarantees the building of a harmonious and well-off western region and will help us realize the ideal of national ecological security, both of which are in the fundamental interests of Western Regional Development and China’s sustainable development. To conclude, governments and the general public are confronted with unprecedented tests posed by the conﬂ icts between resource exploration and harmonious development.

ALXA SEE ASSOCIATION: A NEW INITIATIVE BY ENTREPRENEURS

Yang Peng

In 2004, a new face appeared among China’s non-governmental environmental forces—the Alxa Society, Entrepreneur, and Ecology (SEE) Association. It is the ﬁ rst private environmental organization run by entrepreneurs in Mainland China. Many well-known entrepreneurs are counted among its founders. The Alxa SEE Association began operating in 2005 and soon exerted a broad inﬂ uence. Apart from carrying out environmental protection and community development projects at designated places in Alxa, it also launched a “SEE Award for Ecological Protection” to honor and support environmental NGOs throughout the country, and a “SEE Forum” to encourage deliberation about entrepreneurs’ social responsibilities.

I. SEE—China’s First Environmental Organization Run by Entrepreneurs

On October 1, 2003, the China Entrepreneurs Forum was held in the Moon Lake Ecological Holiday Village in Inner Mongolia’s Alxa desert area. A group of entrepreneurs at the forum were concerned about desertifi cation in Northwest China. Desertifi cation claims 1,000 square kilometers annually, amounting to a serious threat not only to North China but also to coastal areas in Southeast China and even to certain parts of Japan and South Korea since expansion of the desert also expands the severity and range of dust storms. The Alxa desert in particular has become the origin of sandstorms threatening Beijing’s environment in recent years. These concerned entrepreneurs decided to consider possible remedies for the problem. On February 14, 2004, eleven entrepreneurs gathered together for the fi rst time to discuss how to improve and recover the environment around the Alxa region of Inner Mongolia, how to slow or deter the sandstorm formation, and how to call on Chinese entrepreneurs to shoulder more social responsibility for environmental conditions. 408 yang peng

The Alxa SEE Association (also known as SEE) was founded in Alxa, Inner Mongolia, by 80 corporations from both Mainland China and Taiwan. On December 30, 2005, members of the SEE council totaled 100, including 83 council members and 17 exchange members. Each member made a commitment to donate 100,000 RMB annually for ten successive years to support the environmental protection efforts of SEE in the Alxa region. As the name denotes, SEE seeks to bring Chinese society together with the country’s entrepreneurs to protect the ecological environment and to show leadership in social responsibilities related to environmental policies. After its founding, SEE set itself two major tasks. First, the group would move to protect the ecological environment in the area affected by desertifi cation in and around Alxa, Inner Mongolia. The centerpiece of this effort would be to set up an ecological protection trial zone in the area affected by desertifi cation within three years. Sec- ond, SEE would promote environmental protection efforts within each member corporation, thus putting member companies at the vanguard of efforts to propagate environment-friendly practices in Chinese corporations. Through example and direct urging they would encourage their peers to take on more ecological and social responsibilities. (See Appendix: Alxa Declaration) As the fi rst environmental organization run by entrepreneurs in Mainland China, SEE symbolizes the awakening sense of ecological and social responsibility taken on by Chinese entrepreneurs. Its members are responsible for funding SEE, as well as overseeing its policies and management. SEE’s Executive Council supervises this work. The Council consists of a regulatory commission and six special committees in charge of resource integration and decision management. All entrepreneurs-members serve voluntarily. Non-state corporations and private as well as publicly-traded corporations account for 80% of SEE’s membership. This shows that Chinese managers of private corporations are willing to assume more ecological and social responsibility. It should also be noted that 20 corporations from Taiwan are included in SEE, making it the fi rst major effort fostering cooperation on environmental protection between corporations from both sides of the Taiwan Strait. alxa see association: a new initiative by entrepreneurs 409

I. Developing SEE through Exploration

In its ﬁ rst year SEE conducted several major projects.

A. Implementation of Environmental Projects as SEE’s Primary Task

1. Implementation of Environmental Projects The purpose of SEE is the implementation of environmental projects. Since its establishment, SEE has arranged fi ve visits of experts to Alxa to carry out fi eld research on the local ecosystem, economy, society, culture, and history. Research results led to a clarifi cation of both subjective and objective reasons for the ecological deterioration in the Alxa region, a specifi cation of the vulnerable key links in the local environment, and a formulation of SEE’s project goals, as well as a Three-Year Strategic Plan for Environmental Protection. As of 2006 SEE has launched 16 environmental projects in the Alxa region, backed by a total investment of 12 million RMB. These projects fall into three categories: Projects implemented by SEE: the “Zhaosutaolegai ecological protection and community development” in Jilantai town, and the Platform for Volunteers” projects. Projects funded by SEE: On April 22, 2005, SEE launched the SEE Foundation. The Foundation spends 2.5 million RMB annually to encourage other environmental organizations to carry out programs in the Alxa region. International cooperative projects: “The Story behind the Photos”— in cooperation with the Ford Foundation; a research project on sand- dust sources in cooperation with the Italian government and the Institute of Desert Research of the Chinese Academy of Science; and the Wind Power for Irrigation in Haloxylon’s Ammodendron Nurseries Project, also in cooperation with the Italian government.

2. Formulating a Community Building Model SEE has been seeking and formulating a distinctive work model while carrying out community activities. Its current work model can be described as follows: 410 yang peng a. Empowering Local People, Particularly Farmers and Herdsmen, to Promote Sustainable Development Alxa’s local government and people are used as key practitioners in implementing programs. SEE only provides guidelines and support on data, capacity building, technology and marketing. Local initiative is taken as the major force in promoting sustainable development in the region. Support from SEE comes to an end when local communities are able to manage their own development. b. Coordinating Improvement the Eco-Environment and Economic Growth, with an Emphasis on Improved Living Standards The most important issue regarding environmental protection is the relationship between man and the land, that is, the relationship between man and nature. Man’s overexploitation will surely bring severe damage to nature. However, environmental protection excluding any consideration of human demands is undoubtedly unsustainable. Therefore, SEE must take into consideration the improvement of people’s living standards, and make sure that environmental protection in vulnerable areas should work alongside poverty alleviation efforts. Environmental protection will not be effective unless a harmonious relationship between human development and protection of natural resources is achieved. c. Emphasizing a Cost-benefi t Analysis in the use of Public Funds, while Encouraging Local Government and Herdsmen to Share the Cost of Programs The effi cient use of public funds has always been a public concern. Obvious problems like embezzlement and illegal and improper appropriation, lavish and extravagant use of funds, and a “free ride” attitude all conspire to reduce the effi ciency and impact of public spending. Beyond this, ineptitude and ineffi ciency can undermine effectiveness. Therefore, SEE puts great emphasis on using cost-benefi t analysis to connect spending to impact. Where possible, local government and herdsmen share a portion of program costs so as to prevent the tendency to “free ride” on the efforts and spending of other parties. Meanwhile, each funding body is encouraged to generate revenues needed to support program investments through commercial activities or through producing outputs in other activities or markets. This helps to achieve an effective balance of input and output. SEE will not allocate funds until it sees that inputs lead to signifi cant, measurable, and meaningful outputs that meet the organization’s standards. alxa see association: a new initiative by entrepreneurs 411 d. Taking Community Autonomy as the Main Organizational Precondition for Environmental Protection Farmers are enthusiastic about the household contract responsibility system1 adopted under the reform and opening-up (better word) policy. However, the responsibility system also gives rise to problems like organizational laxity and loss of organizational resources, which leaves rural communities incapable of providing public goods including the protection of the environment and natural resources. When introducing projects in local communities, SEE puts great emphasis on collaborative community building. A group of representatives, elected by local residents through a democratic procedure, work hand-in-hand with the village council in project deliberation, which ultimately results in a locally designed fi nancial management system. Formulation of such a community organization with guaranteed equity, transparency and effi ciency is indispensable in promoting sustainable efforts in environmental protection.

B. Launching the “SEE Award for Ecological Protection” Shortly after its founding, SEE allocated 3 million RMB to launch the “SEE Homeland Watch,” with RMB 2.5 million going to the SEE Foundation and the remaining RMB 500,000 going toward the SEE Award for Ecological Protection. This aware is intended to honor and encourage individuals and organizations that have made remarkable contributions to environmental protection throughout the country. And will be granted every other year. On April 22, 2005, the ﬁ rst SEE Award for Ecological Protection ceremony was held at the China Century Monument. Of the thirty-eight awards, nine were selected as best-in- class awards and three as special awards. SEE created four levels for the awards. At the highest level is the SEE Homeland Award, which includes an 80,000 RMB prize, won by the program of “Herdsmen’s Seed Sowing for Sand Control and Community Development.” Three secondary-level awards called the “SEE Field Awards,” each attached to a 50,000 RMB prize, went to programs for “Greening the Ke Erqin

1 In 1978, China introduced the household contract responsibility system, linking remuneration to output, and started to dismantle the people’s commune system, eliminating the links between organizations of state power and economic organizations. Contracting land to peasants altered the distribution system for land and mobilized the peasants’ enthusiasm for production. 412 yang peng

Desert to Prevent Blowing Sand,” the “Kangjiahui High School Friends of Nature,” and the “Gusheng Nature Protection and Community Development Project in Guizhou Province.” Six “SEE Diversiform- leaved Poplar Awards”,2 each linked to a 20,000 RMB prize rounded out the more lucrative awards. Finally, thirty SEE Zi Gen (meaning nourishing the roots) Awards were presented, with each recipient receiving 5,000 RMB.3 The nomination process starts with online voting, which ensures public participation. Online voting by the general public is also taken as a way to demonstrate the public value of efforts made by China’s grassroots NGOs working on environmental protection issues. By encouraging public participation in the nomination process a large number of people come to know the individuals and organizations devoted to China’s environmental protection. After the nominations have been received, experts vote to further reduce the group of potential awardees. Soliciting expert analysis adds to the award’s authority. The third step is ﬁ eld evaluation, which reﬂ ects an emphasis on project implementation. Finally, the donors nominate award winners. Representatives of each nominated program are required to make a presentation describing the program and to participate in a question-and-answer session run by the entrepreneurs who then vote to determine the winners. This voting committee decides on the top ten awards for the SEE Award. Through this process the entrepreneurs are introduced to many environmental protection organizations and individuals previously unknown to them. In this way they learn a great deal about environmental protection, thus building up substantial contacts with those most deeply involved in environmental protection. Further, the process and awards system provides an opportunity for communication and exchange between China’s grassroots NGOs working towards environmental protection.

2 The diversiform-leaved polar is an ancient and long-lived tree growing in the desert, symbolizing endurance and perseverance. 3 Zi Gen is a Chinese term meaning “nourishing the plants at the roots.” alxa see association: a new initiative by entrepreneurs 413

C. Launch of the SEE Forum SEE has held a wide variety of forums in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Shenzhen and Beijing to promote regional, national and international activities around environmental protection. The forums help promote SEE’s philosophy while helping to make entrepreneurs more aware of their environmental and social responsibilities. On October 17, 2005, SEE hosted a forum on corporate social responsibility, called Common Destiny, with the assistance of the four major commerce associations in Hong Kong. Entrepreneurs from SEE had an in-depth exchange of opinions with environmentalists and entrepreneurs from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and overseas. They also reviewed the history of Chinese entrepreneurs’ contributions to social welfare and environmental protection. The forum focused on two themes. One was “The maturation of Chinese corporations and the need to provide public goods”; the other was “Opportunities and challenges—Chinese corporations and environmental protection.” Discussions on these two themes aimed to encourage participants to further exchange opinions on the challenges they will confront and the responsibilities they should shoulder in their pursuit of sustainable development. Inspired by these discussions and guided by the forum speeches, SEE decided to launch a distinctive project to facilitate the establishment of an accountability system for environmental protection in each of its member corporations.

III. An Important Landmark in the Development of China’s Civil Society

As the fi rst non-governmental nonprofi t organization run by entrepreneurs in China, SEE not only symbolizes entrepreneurs’ awakening sense of social responsibility, it also stands as a signifi cant landmark in the development of civil society in China. Civil society refers to the balance of power between government, the market and the public. It is characterized by democratic processes and institutions, deliberation and participation. Within civil society, the public will have suffi - cient incentives to contribute to sustaining civil institutions, largely through participation and cooperation, which may ultimately lead to a successful balancing of independence and collaboration, prosperity and solidarity, individuality and social responsibility. As major players in the market, corporations should seek maximum profi t on the one 414 yang peng hand while shouldering responsibilities as practical and responsible corporate citizens on the other. The corporation should be judged by the market, but monitored and evaluated by the public. They should avoid expanding market power excessively and single-mindedly, and at the same time, should accept social responsibility willingly and respond to the demands of the society. The United States and many European countries have developed a set of mature civil society mechanisms and social charity and donation mechanisms. Both rest on a larger institutional and philosophical foundation. Donations from government, corporations, and entrepreneurs offer solid support to the civil society. The U.S. spends 30 percent of its GDP on social welfare; Europe spends even more, about 45 percent.4 Private contributions, especially in the U.S., continue to grow more rapidly than government contributions. Corporate donation activities organized by SEE will serve as a reminder to us about the demand for perfection of these systems in China, thus contributing to the healthy and positive development of our civil society. SEE does not simply contribute to charity, but also associates corporate responsibility with more comprehensive social responsibilities through project implementation. Several community-based environmental projects aimed at sandstorm control have been launched based on these comprehensive and systemic efforts. The establishment of SEE establishes a solid foundation at enabling Chinese entrepreneurs to make an unprecedented contribution to public goods provision, and to take on the responsibilities of more engaged corporate citizenship. As SEE travels this road of exploration, corporations in China are also exploring new practices in shouldering the responsibilities assigned to corporation citizens.

Appendix: Alxa Declaration

Why did we entrepreneurs come to the Alxa desert from all parts of China? Why did we plan to establish the Alxa SEE Association as a way to take part in the cause of sandstorm control in China? The answer is that we have hopes and dreams in our hearts. We hope China can

4 “Another Sky for Entrepreneurs,” speech delivered at a charity activity organized by SEE by Long Yingtai, former Cultural Minister of Taipei. alxa see association: a new initiative by entrepreneurs 415 be more and more prosperous, and Chinese people can get richer and richer; we hope people can be more and more friendly to each other; and the land of China can see green hills and clear waters, full of vitality; we hope people all over the world can live together in a beautiful global village; we dream for a harmonious world in which every person has the opportunity to fulfi ll their dreams. The modernization process enables China to step onto the road of peaceful development. China has witnessed continuous economic growth, a steady rise of people’s living standards and widespread social progress, thus entering a brand new stage of development. Looking back into the one hundred years of tribulation in our history, we feel proud of the achievements in our time. We cherish the opportunity of freely innovating and peacefully developing ourselves in this moment in history. We are willing to face all the problems and diffi culties with a constructive attitude and to solve them as this development proceeds. We have realized that despite our economy’s steady and rapid growth, some environmentally-unfriendly ways of thinking, manufacturing and living are gradually destroying the natural environment on which we rely. Many of the economic achievements in the past were achieved at great expense to our environment. Air and water pollution, dry rivers and lakes, frequent fl oods and droughts, shrinking forests, degradation of grasslands, desertifi cation, emergence of sandstorms—all are threats to people’s safety and property, to the operating environment of corporations, to the stability of our society and to the very existence of our nation. We rely on the natural environment. If it is ruined, all our dreams and pursuits will die. Today, with the ecological environment continually deteriorating, we have to ask ourselves this question: what can I do to improve our environment? Due to our large population, scarcity of natural resources, limited capacity of our environment, and the lack of technological skills among our corporations, the modernization process in China will continue to be confronted by the pressure of limited environmental resources. The dual pressure of economic and ecological needs requires entrepreneurs to put environmental protection and corporation development onto our agenda, to actively seek the integration of economic growth and environmental protection, and to dedicate ourselves to searching for a new path of modernization for China. The new problems and responsibility of this epoch require us to overcome our own defi ciencies and limitations, to cultivate new value systems, new ideals, new personalities and new codes of behavior. 416 yang peng

Based on such consciousness and consensus, we entrepreneurs coming from different regions, different industries and different systems of ownership, gather here in the Alxa desert to sign this joint declaration. Each of us will do our best to make the Alxa SEE Association more widely recognized by both China and the world, and to develop it into the most important non-government nonproﬁ t environmental organization in controlling sandstorms in China. We will make every effort to realize the wishes and dreams advocated by this declaration.

All initiators of “Alxa SEE Association” at Moon Lake in Tenggelidalai Desert June 5, 2004 COUNTERING THE INCURSION OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD INTO CHINA

Lin Zhiguang and Wang Peng

In 2004, a consumer in Shanghai sued Nestlé Corporation for withhold- ing information about the genetically modiﬁ ed ingredients in one of its products. In the same year, the importation of genetically engineered soybeans caused an intense public debate in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The debate resulting from these two incidents foreshadowed two new problems involving GM foods: the sale of genetically modiﬁ ed food ingredients on the Chinese mainland by Kraft Food Inc., and the illegal planting of GM rice. These and other incidents have accompanied an increased public awareness about GM foods. As well, public attitudes have grown increasingly negative. Furthermore, Chi- nese consumers seek better access to information on GM foods while expressing their demands for more transparency in processes related to food safety. As a result, the Chinese Government has adopted a more cautious attitude towards GM foods.

I. Genetically Engineered Food and Chinese Consumers

According to Greenpeace, genetically modifi ed food refers to an edible organism created using biotechnology that allows the transfer of genes from one species to another to change the latter’s inherited characteristics. This is usually done to enhance certain “desirable traits” like nutritional quality, size, shelf-life, insect-resistance, pesticide-resistance, and so forth.1 GM plants and animals are foreign to the earth’s natural ecological system. To date, there is inadequate scientifi c understanding of their impact on the environment and human health. Due to the controversies over the long-term safety of genetically modifi ed foods, voices defending consumers’ rights to information and freedom of choice

1 See Greenpeace, http://www.greenpeace.org/china/ch/campaigns/food-and- agriculture. 418 lin zhiguang and wang peng regarding GM products have been growing in strength throughout the international community. As early as August 2000, the Chinese Government signed the Bio- safety Protocol, also known as the Cartageña Protocol on Biosafety. This protocol is a complementary agreement to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity. It is the fi rst international legal document to control and regulate trans-boundary movements of GM foods, including the handling and use of any genetically engineered organism that may have adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. These points take into account risks to human health. After long interdepartmental negotiations, China formally ratifi ed the protocol in June 2005. Since 2001, Greenpeace and others have been researching GM food consumption in China by conducting regular consumer surveys. At the end of 2004, a survey was done by Ipsos, a famous international market research company. The survey results were compared to another survey commissioned by Reputation Institute (RI) China in 2003. Results showed that consumers in the three cities of Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou are more cautious about, more aware of, and less willing to buy GE foods. These basic fi ndings were echoed in research conducted in 2005. 62% of the respondents said that they are aware of “GE food,” up 10% over 2003. In addition, the survey shows that residents in Beijing are more aware of GE food than those in Shanghai and Guangzhou. The rejection rate of GE food is also highest in Beijing; 64% said they would take GE food off their shopping list, while the fi gures in Shanghai and Guangzhou are 58% and 50% respectively. This shows that the rejection rate of GE food rises as consumer awareness increases. Rejection is not a matter of ignorance, but rather, it coincides with greater knowledge of GE foods.

II. Genetically Modiﬁ ed Food Produces an Alarm over Food Safety

2005 was a particularly difﬁ cult year in trying to control the rampant infestation of Genetically Modiﬁ ed (GM) foods into China. As the Chinese market boomed, more and more multinational food corporations launched businesses in China; however, they adopted GM food policies that differed from those used in Europe and developed countries. This “double-standard” clearly infringes on Chinese consumers’ right to information and choice. Therefore, Greenpeace has made it a high countering the incursion of gm food into china 419 priority to expose the corporations’ “double-standard” and to deliver equal rights to Chinese consumers.

A. Kraft Foods’ Response to the Non-GM Appeal from Chinese Consumers Over the years, Greenpeace has been supervising food safety and publicizing the results. As part of these efforts it compiles the Guide to Non-GM Food. The guide chooses well-known food corporations with businesses in China, and mails them questionnaires querying them as to their use of genetically modiﬁ ed raw materials; whether they promise not to use genetically modiﬁ ed raw materials; the time limit on their promises, and so forth. In 2003 and early 2005, Greenpeace carried out two inspections on 30 kinds of foods that were most commonly found in Chinese markets. Greenpeace contacted the corporations whose products contained GM components as soon as it got the results of the inspections. The Ritz Sandwich Biscuit made by the world’s second largest food corporation, Kraft Foods, was on the list. Since Kraft and the other corporations targeted by Greenpeace gave vague responses to their inquiries, Greenpeace decided to announce the results.

1. Chinese Consumers can say “No” to the “Double-Standard” On February 24, 2005, Kraft Foods sent a letter to Greenpeace, reading “Our company’s decision on whether to use GM components is based on careful consideration of integrated factors such as the choices of consumers in different markets, rules and regulations of a given nation, requirements for labeling, difﬁ culties in obtaining raw materials, and production and sales.” It did not mention whether it would promise not to use GM raw materials in the Chinese market. On March 14, the eve before the “Day for Protecting the Rights and Interests of Chinese Consumers,” Greenpeace announced that there was evidence that the Ritz Sandwich Biscuit made by Kraft Foods in China contained GM components, whereas the corporation had promised not to use GM raw materials in the European market. This revelation aroused a strong reaction in the market. Stores and supermarkets like Beijing New World Department Store, Beijing Huapu Supermarket, and Chongqing Department Store immediately removed all Kraft products from their shelves. Such drastic market reaction was very rare in the past. The main reason for such an extreme reaction was that Kraft’s “double-standard” provoked dissatisfaction among Chinese consumers. The double standard 420 lin zhiguang and wang peng damaged the corporation’s business credibility by disregarding Chinese consumers’ rights and interests. At present, some of the multinational food corporations in China still apply a double standard on using GM raw materials. For example, the world’s largest food manufacturer, Nestlé, employs a non-GM policy in Europe while using GM raw materials in China. As a result, in 2004 it was faced with a series of public relations crises and worse, charges for violating consumers’ rights. The lawsuit has not yet ended, but already the brand image of Nestlé has been badly damaged. At a time when more and more corporations are committed to producing non- GM food, products using GM raw materials will diminish consumers’ conﬁ dence and market share.

2. The Triumph of Chinese Consumers —Kraft’s non-GM Commitment After the results of the inspection came out, Greenpeace contacted Kraft Foods. The two parties exchanged views on using GM raw materials. Greenpeace also provided Kraft with materials: the report of the investigation of Chinese consumers’ attitude towards GM food and information on the policies of related manufacturers. Greenpeace provided these materials to help Kraft Foods make a well-considered decision on GM Food policy in China. On December 13th, 2005, Kraft Foods stated clearly in its letter to Greenpeace, that from January 1st, 2007, all its products (including its additives and sauces) sold on China’s mainland would not use GM raw materials. This commitment is in accordance with the commitment Kraft Foods made in the EU market. Following the example of Coca-Cola, Danone, and other corporations, Kraft will become another world-renowned food maker which promised not to use GM raw materials in China. This reﬂ ects Chinese consumers’ collective success in ﬁ ghting against GM food made by multinational corporations. This outcome has a desirable effect on the multinational food corporations’ GM food policy. At the same time such a result wins Chinese consumer rights on-par with those of the most developed nations. In November, 2005, Greenpeace issued the 2005 Guide for Non-GM Food in Beijing and Guangzhou. To date, 107 food brands made by 63 food corporations will exclude GM raw materials. Companies involved range from international food giants such as Coca-Cola and Danone, to well-known domestic food corporations like MasterKong and Want-Want. Adopting policies to exclude GM raw materials from countering the incursion of gm food into china 421 their products shows that more and more food corporations have begun listening to consumers’ demands.

B. The Uproar over Genetically Modifi ed Rice (GM Rice) in China 2005 was a particularly important year as China’s ‘Commercialized Promotion of Genetically Modifi ed Rice’. Efforts to promote and contain GM rise captured worldwide attention. If China chooses to grow GM rice, China will be the world’s fi rst country that grows a genetically modifi ed staple food. GM rice is produced by using new and cutting-edge biotechnology to transfer foreign genes into rice plants. This introduces characteristics such as insect resistance, herbicide resistance and disease resistance. However, this technology is still rather crude as the spliced genes are inserted into the original gene clusters of the crop at random. This changes the crop’s original genes which may bring about many unexpected consequences, and thus pose a potential risk to peoples’ health and that of the environment. Genetically modifi ed organisms have exotic genes. They are new breeds in the natural ecological system. If released into the environment, they will change the interactions among species, tip the original natural ecological balance and may ultimately lead to the loss of biodiversity. Genetically modifi ed crops may hybridize with their sister species in nature, which may result in the uncontrollable spread of exotic genes and lead to irreversible genetic pollution. China is one of the fi rst places where cultivated rice was planted. It is also the center of a diverse range of rice and boasts rich resources including both wild and locally hybridized breeds. If and when genetic pollution occurs, China’s natural treasure-trove of rice resources may sustain serious damage, and scientists’ capacity to solve the problem of food safety through genetic diversity may also be affected. Additionally, China is a big rice producing and consuming country. Rice is the most important crop for Chinese farmers and consumers. China is considered a market leader in this fi eld. World opinion anticipates that if China takes the fi rst step in commercializing production of GM rice, it will be tantamount to approving the production of GM rice thereafter. This act could prompt other big rice-producing countries in Asia to follow suit, which may trigger a crisis in rice, the world’s number one staple food. 422 lin zhiguang and wang peng

1. A Record of Food Chain Contamination by GM Rice Illegally Introduced in Hubei An article in Newsweek (International Edition) issued on December 20, 2004 quoted Zhang Qifa, academician with the Chinese Academy of Sciences, who said that, “In Wuhan, where the largest GM rice fi eld trial is in operation, a seed company has obtained the seeds of GM rice, and has started selling them to local farmers.” Zhang said that more than 100 hectares of GM rice have been cultivated up to now. By consulting Internet information and research papers, Greenpeace has confi rmed that Zhang Qifa and others from Huazhong Agricul- tural University are conducting related research. The research papers published in Nature by Zhang Qifa, Tu Jumin and others also confi rmed such reports. In April 2005, based on four in-depth fi eld investigations in Hubei Province, Greenpeace announced that unapproved GM rice has already been cultivated and sold. The aforementioned seed companies are involved. As well, agricultural technology stations, seed stations and the company affi liated with Huazhong Agriculture University have been implicated in spreading GM rice. These companies and institutions knew that the species in question was GM rice, the commercialization of which had not been approved by the state. However, they apparently could not resist the temptation to make money from these illegal sales. The price of GM rice seeds was twice as high as ordinary hybrid rice, and these corporations and institutions deliberately sought profi ts in violation of the law. The GM rice found its way into the local wholesale rice market in Hubei; some was used for local consumption, and the rest transported to some provinces and cities in the south. According to the statistics of seed companies and farmers, it is estimated that at least 950 –1,200 tons of GM rice were fl own into the Hubei market last year. In 2005, the planting area was at least 20,000 –25,000 mu2, which could produce 10,000 –12,500 tons of GM rice. GM rice could also be mixed with ordinary rice, so the amount of contaminated rice might far exceed this estimated fi gure. In addition, on the outskirts of Wuhan and in the city of Songzi, the seeds of “GM insect resistant Bt rice” are being sold and planted illegally, a practice that has been ongoing for two years in some areas.

2 1 mu approximately equals 1/15 of a hectare; therefore 20,000 –25,000 mu equals about 1,300 –1675 hectares. countering the incursion of gm food into china 423

In June 2005, unapproved GM rice from Hubei Province was discovered in the markets of Guangzhou. Wholesalers said that about 60 tons of rice from Hubei Province was sold daily to buyers from Guangzhou, Zhongshan, Shunde and Zhuhai, among others, mainly for factories and restaurants. Supposing that one person consumes half a kilo of rice a day, 60 tons of rice would be suffi cient for 120,000 people a day. It follows that the effects of the illegal distribution of GM rice were far-reaching. In August 2005, Greenpeace released test results showing that a type of rice sold at Carrefour Shisheng branch in Wuhan was genetically modifi ed. It was the fi rst time illegally distributed genetically modifi ed rice had been discovered in domestic supermarkets. Worse, it was discovered in a famous supermarket. Illegally planted genetically modifi ed rice has not passed the Ministry of Agriculture’s safety tests. Presently, there is no evidence to support that it is safe to eat this kind of rice in the long term. Since genetically modifi ed rice appears to be the same as natural rice, and there is no label to differentiate it from natural rice, consumers are unaware that they are eating illegally distributed genetically modifi ed rice and related products. More worryingly, a poisonous protein gene named Bt has been found in samples of pest-resistant rice. Scientists are worried because this anti- pest protein may cause allergic reactions and other health risks. Even though farmers growing this kind of rice do not know it is genetically modifi ed, they generally do not eat it, saying that, “If pests don’t eat it, how can human beings consume it?” According to the report in Hubei Daily on August 10, 2005, after completing its investigation, the Agricultural Department of Hubei Province censured the three companies which were involved in the spread of illegal distributed genetically modifi ed rice. As well, the Department sanctioned the companies for extending the planting area without approval during the experimental research on GM food. The Department also removed all the illegally planted genetically modifi ed rice. After this incident, Greenpeace proposed several suggestions to the government and the Commission on Biological Safety. These measures included: addressing the existing problem of illegal distribution of genetically modifi ed rice, putting a temporary hold approval for commercial production of genetically modifi ed rice, and discussing how to improve the management of genetically modifi ed food. Greenpeace 424 lin zhiguang and wang peng also wrote to the headquarters of Carrefour in China, calling for it to take decisive measures to control the proliferation of GM rice by immediately recalling and destroying polluted rice, and testing and controlling the rice it sells more strictly so that genetically modifi ed rice cannot enter the supply chain. Greenpeace defended this plan by noting that it would better protect consumer health. The rice pollution incident drew people’s attention to the possible loopholes in the management of genetically modifi ed food in China. Controversies still exist over the impact of genetically modifi ed food on the environment and health. Presently, no country wants to apply transgenic technology to the production of a staple food. If there are problems during even the small-scale experimental period, how can we ensure that there will be no problems in the management of large- scale commercial production? Once problems emerge in producing staple food in China, who will assume responsibility for correcting such problems?

2. China Remains Cautious about the Commercialization of GM Rice In 2005, China’s Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) held several meetings to put the issue of commercially produced genetically modifi ed rice on the agenda. Other than the commercialization of GM cotton in 1999, The Chinese Government has not endorsed the commercialization of any other GM crop. In June, the State Agricultural GM Crop Bio- safety Committee discussed the issues of genetically modifi ed products and the commercialization of GM rice for only the second time; the fi rst meetings had been held at the end of 2004. In the same month, in order to promote GM plant safety evaluation, the State Agricul- tural GM Crop Bio-safety Committee was reshuffl ed, recruiting more agricultural biotechnology, bio-safety, food safety and environmental experts. Through this action, the committee expanded from about 50 to 74 people. It was the fi rst time that the new committee discussed and evaluated the commercialization of GM rice. The result of the discussion would considerably infl uence the fi nal decision of the MOA. On December 1, 2005, a meeting of the MOA was held without the results being publicized. According to Reuters, the meeting failed to reach a consensus on the commercialization of GM rice. If the news is true, China will not commercialize the production of GM rice for now. Heated debates on the issue of GM rice continue. Opponents, including Greenpeace, appealed to the Chinese government to be cautious in approving the commercialization of GM rice. According to research- countering the incursion of gm food into china 425 ers, the commercialization of GM crops would benefi t scientists and biotechnological companies much more than farmers. On November 16, 2005, the Journal of Agricultural and Food Chemistry published an article in which scientists found that GM peas caused lung damage in mice. As a result Australia’s national research organization, CSIRO’s3 decade-long project to develop genetically modifi ed peas with built-in pest-resistance, was abandoned. Such fi ndings have affected domestic GM programs as well. In 2005, four GM rice strains were sent to the MOA for approval as commercial products, including three insect-resistant rice strains and one that resists bacterial blight and other plant diseases. However, the Cowpea trypsin inhibitor, CpTI transferred into the CpTI insect-resistant rice in order to produce the trypsin inhibitor to resist insects, was quite similar to the gene transferred into the Australian GM peas mentioned above. Therefore, the safety of such an undertaking was questioned. These kinds of fi ndings sound an alarm, warning us against the approval of GM crops for commercial use in China. Rice is the staple food of Chinese people, so the implications regarding ecological balance, safety, and human health are crucial to the country. As long as uncertainties still exist, the Chinese government should set strict standards to ensure the safety of genetically modifi ed products.

3 CSIRO stands for Commonwealth Scientiﬁ c and Industrial Research Organisation.

COMMUNITY-BASED SUSTAINABLE LIVING: CASES IN BEIJING

Liao Xiaoyi

In August 2000, the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games Bidding Commit- tee promised for the ﬁ rst time to support model green communities, or communities with sustainable living, within the Action Plan for a Green Olympics.1 Five years later, the government expressed its support for green communities when the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) evaluated green communities and commended the most outstanding ones. Since 2000 green communities have appeared throughout the country. The theme for the World Environment Day of 2005 in China was “Everyone participates in building a green planet.” Over the years, “green community” has become a catchword among both decision- makers and the general public. In building green communities, non- governmental organizations (NGOs), such as Global Village of Beijing (GVB), have played an active role through their creative and practical programs. They have repeated shown a genuine knack for promoting environmental protection and public participation. Practice has shown that NGOs can cooperate with the government in implementing green communities in China’s transitional society. The term “green community” is now well known in China, and the government plays a key role in promoting the concept. In 2000, the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games Bidding Committee issued the Action Plan for a Green Olympics, ofﬁ cially listing the effort to create green communities as part of the Green Olympics.2 The guidelines on National Environmental Promotion and Education for the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001–2005) calls for gradually establishing green communities in forty- seven key cities, raising public awareness of environmental protection, and promoting social ethics. In addition, the guidelines call for the

1 See the offi cial website of the 29th Olympic Organization Committee (OOC): http://www.beijing-2008.org/84/82/article211618284.shtml. 2 Beijing Olympic Bid Committee, Action Plan for a Green Olympics 2001. See http:// www.beijing-2008.org/84/82/article211618284.shtml. 428 liao xiaoyi building of green communities as a step towards the ultimate goal of building civil society, while promoting cultural and ideological progress.”3 In July 2004, the SEPA issued the Circular on Further Promoting the Building of Community-based Sustainable Living to encourage building more green communities all over the country. Moreover, the appendix to the document, A Guide to Building Green Communities, provides a framework and standard for building green communities.4 By June 2005, there were 2,300 provincial and municipal-level communities that were recast as green communities; the SEPA gave awards to 112 of these.5 Government agencies and non-governmental organizations have reached a consensus on what a green community should be. It is, by defi nition, a community with environmental protection facilities, which is managed through the mechanism of public participation. It is the benefi cial interaction between the public and the government that results in this consensus.

I. Setting up a Green Community —Jiangongnanli: a Pilot Community

Based on earlier achievements in promoting a green lifestyle and recycling, the Global Village of Beijing came up with the idea of remodeling a green community, where residents practice water and energy conservation, as well as garbage classiﬁ cation for recycling and other uses. In 1997, supported by the Environment and Sanitation Admin- istration as well as the Ofﬁ ce of Civil Society of Xuanwu District, Beijing, the GVB experimented with remodeling green communities. In the Jiangongnanli community of Xuanwu District, the GVB, the district government, and the residents launched a publicity campaign and “greening” training programs. As part of the promotions for the “green community” concept, this slogan was permanent carved on a stone wall in the neighborhood. On April 23, 1999, a day after World Earth Day, the Jiangongnanli pilot green community came into being, co-sponsored by the Global

3 The China Central Government Publicity Ministry, the State Environmental Protection Administration, the Ministry of Education: Program of National Education and Promotion for Environmental Protection, 2001–2005. 2001. 4 See the ofﬁ cial website of the State Environmental Protection Administration, http://www.zhb.gov.cn/eic/649086798147878912/20051118/13039.shtml. 5 Liu Xiaoxing and Xu Qi, Xie Zhenhua Chuxi Quanguo Lüse Chuanjian Huodong Biao- Zhang Dahui, (Xie Zhenghua Attends the National Green Campaign Award Ceremony), Chinese Environment News, June 6, 2005. community-based sustainable living: cases in beijing 429

Village of Beijing, the district government and the community’s residents. They discussed and explored their experiences in organizing around the green community model, as well as the facilities needed, and the details of the management mechanism to be employed. They made it clear that a green community would need to be a community having environmental protection facilities and a participatory decision making mechanism. The facilities would support energy and water conservation, garbage classiﬁ cation for recycling and composting, environmental “greening,” and protection of biological diversity. The processes for achieving these ends were also considered. The organizational and decision-making mechanism would encourage wide participation of stakeholders. A key activity would be the production of a conference bringing together the related government agencies, property management companies, NGOs, neighborhood committees, representatives of the residents, leading volunteers, and members of “green families.” The community would also support a series of environmental protection activities. These activities can be distilled into four major functions: protecting the environment, supervising the enforcement of environmental laws, giving advice on policymaking, and leading a green life. Taken together these elements form the basic model of the green community. Since 2000, the Global Village of Beijing has been working on encouraging resident participation, institutionalizing the participatory mechanism, and reﬁ ning GVB’s role in community building. In the Jiangongnanli community, the Global Village of Beijing organized community forums, encouraging residents to express their opinions at these gatherings. In the past, it was the members of the Global Village and college students who spoke on the issues of green communities and environmental protection; now, it is the residents who speak up. Since 2003, the residents’ forum has become a platform that raises residents’ awareness and enhances the quality of their participation. A breakthrough is thus achieved through the community forum: this is a new model for residents to manage their affairs.

II. Building Inner Strength—the Chunshuyuan Community

While working at the community level, the Global Village of Beijing realizes that when building green communities, the role of the NGO is not to help the community solve specifi c problems but to help them set up problem-solving mechanisms. Only the residents and their 430 liao xiaoyi associations can solve the problems of a community. GVB only applies some external force that helps to facilitate the development of these processes. On July 12, 2003, the eve of the second anniversary of Beijing’s successful bid for the 2008 Summer Olympic Games, the Chunshuyuan Residents’ Assembly was founded. With help from neighborhood committees and the Global Village of Beijing, the Assembly held a party to celebrate its successful launch. Made up of eleven residents elected at the community forum, it has its own charter, structure, agenda and division of responsibilities. As part of its self-management and self-education mission, it has held many community forums on environmental protection. At these meetings the Assembly has worked to solve such thorny and longstanding problems as spitting in public places and throwing rubbish from upper level domiciles. In addition, the Assembly has organized quite a few community activities on environmental protection, including drives to promote the use of energy-saving light bulbs, calling for refuse classifi cation, advocating the use of environmentally- friendly bags, and teaching songs about environmental protection. It has established good partnerships with neighborhood committees and property management companies, as well as building communication and cooperation with local government and environmental NGOs. The capability of the residents’ assembly develops through various means, including training and participating in activities sponsored by NGOs. The development of the green community model has helped increase public participation. Before the establishment of the residents’ assemblies on environmental protection, the development of green communities was, to some degree, driven by external forces. The establishment of the assemblies, however, indicates that a participatory mechanism with local residents playing a major role is fi rmly in place, and that the driving force for the development of green communities has shifted from external forces to internal forces. Since 2003, the relevant local authorities have recognized the community environmental assemblies, and the Global Village of Beijing has also applied the model in the Dongsi Olympic Community in Beijing and the Kangjian Street community in Shanghai. community-based sustainable living: cases in beijing 431

III. Developing Rural Green Communities—Duijiushi Village

Apart from developing green communities in cities, the Global Village is also building green villages in outlying areas. Since 1999, with the fi nancial support from Director Mr. Yang Rentai, the Global Village of Beijing rented 2,800 mu (around 461 acres) of mountainous fi elds in Duijiushi Village, Jingzhuang Town, Yanqing County, and used it as a training base for environmental education, in particular, for building green villages. The Global Village, along with local governments and villagers, has developed a model featuring the combination of “ecological protection, environmental education, rural development, and folk- culture tourism.” They created a mechanism featuring a partnership among local governments, villagers, and NGOs; set up joint offi ces; and started a training base for cultivating environmentally-friendly lifestyles. The group organized various activities, including demonstrations of rural refuse classifi cation and renewable energy, displays of green products, presentations on organizing environmental education and training, and forums describing ways to combine folk-culture tourism with family-based rural conservation. Note that environmental education stimulates family-based rural conservation, which promotes folk- culture tourism, which in turn encourages economic growth. This chain represents an endeavor to develop green villages through conservation and cultural progress. The development of green communities in rural areas, like that in urban areas, has experienced growing resident participation. In the fi rst few years, the development of the green community in Duijiushi Village relied primarily on the GVB staff. There was no independent self-management system. At the end of 2002, the Global Village held many discussions with the villagers about the self-management model and development programs for the green community. In these conversations, the GVB listened to the villagers’ opinions, household by household, and invited them to participate in the program. All these activities were aimed at encouraging the villagers to plan their own future. In the green community projects in rural areas, the GVB tried to set up the villagers’ environmental assemblies. These suited local conditions quite well in such places as Chenjiagou Village in Henan Province and Hexi Village north of Gubeikou in Miyun County of Beijing. In 2005, the Hexi Village Environmental Assembly was set up after training programs on participation were conducted by the Global Village. As Mr. Zhang, head of the Hexi Village described it, the Village Environmental 432 liao xiaoyi

Assembly and the Village Committee should stand side by side, like sisters. Their close cooperation gradually aroused the initiative and enthusiasm of the villagers. As a result, a number of programs have been launched and some of them have already achieved noticeable progress. Energy-saving light bulbs are being popularized, refuse classiﬁ cation is being taught and learned, support has been sought out for projects to produce renewable energy such as methane, handicraft education attracts more and more women, and folk-culture tourism is well underway.

IV. The Interaction between Non-Governmental Idealism and Government Implementation

One of the NGOs’ primary missions is to exert infl uence on government’s policies. How can an NGO’s experience with pilot green communities gain the support of the government and get promoted through governmental channels? According to the Global Village, NGOs must establish solid partnerships with locally based government departments. Participatory programs promoted by the Global Village are completed through communication and cooperation with related government agencies. At the beginning of the Jiangongnanli pilot project, the fi rst green community the Global Village of Beijing helped set up, a joint committee was established involving three parties: the GVB, related government departments, and property management companies. Cooperation between the local government, the local community and the Global Village is featured in all the green community projects sponsored by the GVB, urban and rural alike. In August 2000, when I was invited to discuss environmental issues with Mr. Liu Qi, mayor of Beijing, I proposed building green communities and establishing a refuse classifi cation system. In September 2000, the Beijing Municipal Government held a meeting on building green communities for leaders from 18 districts in Beijing. At that meeting, representatives from the Global Village and Xuanwu District shared their experience of building the Jiangongnanli Community. There- after, GVB’s ideas on the physical and ideological material needed to build a green community were approved by the government and were incorporated into the basic elements of the government’s documents on green community building. community-based sustainable living: cases in beijing 433

In 2000, when China was bidding for the 2008 Olympics, I—together with several colleagues—served as advisers on environmental issues in the drafting of the Action Plan for a Green Olympics. The Beijing Orga- nizing Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad (BOCOG) accepted our advice and listed Green Community building as one of the most important elements in the Action Plan for a Green Olympics. Thus Beijing’s bid for 2008 Olympics became our golden opportunity to promote the Green Community concept. When the Olympic Evaluation Committee of the International Olympic Committee visited Beijing in February 2001, the BOCOG appointed the Chunshuyuan Green Community in Xuanwu District, which was jointly built by the Global Village of Beijing and Chunshu Street committee, as the sole community to receive a site visit. The passion and enthusiasm of community residents deeply impressed the committee members. In order to sum up and promote the ideas and practices of Green Community building, the Global Village of Beijing compiled a “Hand- book on Green Communities,” which was published by the SEPA in 2001. This is yet another cooperative effort between environmental NGOs and governmental agencies. As early as 1998, two handbooks, “A Guide to Environmental Protection (for Adults)” and “A Guide to Environmental Protection (for Children)” were compiled by the Global Village, jointly authorized by GVB and the SEPA, and published and distributed through the government’s environmental protection system. Similarly, the ideas of a green lifestyle and green communities were initiated by the Global Village and were recognized through cooperation with the environmental protection departments and promoted through government channels. Soon after, the Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee, the SEPA, and the Ministry of Education jointly issued “The Guidelines on National Environmental Education and Promotion 2001–2005,” which emphasized the importance of building green communities. This effort marked the beginning of GVB’s close cooperation with local government agencies and other NGOs. The Global Village has been invited to provide training in many districts of Beijing on how to build a Green Community. The program has been extended to many other cities across the nation, such as Xi’an, Shanghai, Nanjing, Nanning, Chongqing, Wuhan, Huangshi, Ningbo, Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Zhuhai. “A Handbook on Green Communi- ties” has also become a popular manual and teaching guide. 434 liao xiaoyi

By working with relevant government departments, we ﬁ nd that government ofﬁ cials often identify with the GVB when talking about green communities. Linking NGO’s sense of mission and with governmental goals and implementation capacities can create great momentum in developing and implementing projects. The more NGOs and government departments cooperate and communicate, the better they understand each other. Green community building encourages public participation and promotes the development of civil society, as well as helping lay a solid foundation for building a more commodious conservation-minded and resource-conserving culture. Though we have made achievements in Green Community building across the nation in 2005, it is only a beginning. When building a Green Community, it is much easier to build its hardware than to build its software. It is a matter of urgent import that all parties, including the government, NGOs, community residents and enterprises, devote more time and energy to such projects. We must learn to communicate and cooperate more often now than in the past.

(Li Junhui and Yao Yao contributed to this article.) POSTSCRIPT

The China Environment Yearbook (2005), published offi cially in Chinese as the Green Book of Environment 2005, has fi nally come out for our readers. Compiled by the Institute of Green Culture (known as Friends of Nature) affi liated with the International Academy of Chinese Culture, the yearbook is an annual report of Chinese environmental protection. Following the perspective of an NGO, we hope to provide observations of the China’s environment from a social and a non-governmental stance, different from a governmental perspective so that we will be able to help people concerned to gain a more complete picture of the changes, problems, challenges and lessons of China’s environment in 2005. Our intention is to faithfully record China’s historical shift toward sustainable development. This fi rst attempt of Friends of Nature is in process. We still need to strive for improvement in the compilation of future green books. Our effort will not be wasted if the book is of any help to our readers in understanding the crises and breakthroughs in the realm of China’s environment. In future yearbooks, we will improve upon this beginning with persistent effort. As an indigenous non-governmental organization for environmental protection with a history of eleven years, Friends of Nature devotes itself to environmental education and natural protection with the hope of becoming an organization that can translate lofty ideas into concrete actions. Guided by this principle, we wish to advocate concepts, systems and channels for public participation in environmental protection, disseminate an environmentally friendly culture and push forward sustainable development in China. We believe that a proactive outlook is effective. Only when more and more citizens sincerely commit themselves to environmental protection will the dream of harmony between humans and nature be realized. Only with active citizen participation can the damage of environmental hazards that exist throughout the world be reduced. Only with genuine concern can we give serious refl ections to the question of “equity between our generation and the generations to come.” 436 postscript

On the occasion of the publication of this yearbook, we would like to express our gratitude to friends of various circles to whom we are indebted for the completion of the book. They are: Zhu Jinshan, Yang Xin, Shen Xiaohui, Feng Yongfeng, Lu Xiaohong, Sun Danping, Jin Hui, Wang Lili, Wang Xiaoping, Zhu Chengzhang, Xu Songling, Liang Bin, Xi Zhinong, Tan Jing, Gan Lin, Qian Yingqian, Wang Daitong, Xia Guang, Luo Yong, Kang Xue, Zhang Yinying, Lv Bin, Wang Shuangling, Feng Yangjing, Li Yucheng, Li Dajun, Liu Jianqiang, Wang Yungang, Lu Dandan, Tao Xinyuan, Su Dan, Wu Yan, Chen Kelin, Cao Jun, You Xiu, Tang Yonglin, Yang Min, Han Yanli, Liu Hui, Ji Suyuan, Wen Ting, Xiong Lisong, Yu Kongjian, Su Li, Cui Xiaoxian, Zhou Yinghua, Liu Bing, Zhong Yu, Hao Bing, Han Jing, Lv Zhi, Yan Baohua, Chen Ying, Zhang Huilian, Li Xiaoxi, Zhang Xiao, Zhang Zheng, Zhang Li, Zhou Li and many others. Driven by a common dream and goal as well as a shared trust for Friends of Nature, they volunteered to work for this project with enthusiasm and selfl essness. Meanwhile, we would extend our thanks to the Social Sciences Academic Press for publishing the original Chinese version of this yearbook and to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences for its full- fl edged support. We are also indebted to our colleagues working in the offi ce of Friends of Nature whose selfl ess efforts make the publication of the book possible. Finally, we would like to give our thanks to our friends and readers who have been following our efforts with interest. We hope to entertain criticism and suggestions from you and expect you to become more involved in environmental protection, a common cause for all citizens who cherish Nature and have a strong sense of social responsibility.

A Brief Introduction to Friends of Nature

Established on March 31, 1994, Friends of Nature (FON) is the ﬁ rst ofﬁ cially registered environmental non-governmental organization in China. The four founding members are Liang Congjie, Yang Dongping, Liang Xiaoyan and Wang Lixiong. FON is headed by President Liang Congjie, a member of the CPPCC and a professor from the Green Culture College of the International Academy of Chinese Culture and Vice-President Yang Dong, a scholar specializing in social culture and education. Its mission is to spread a green culture to promote sustainable development. As a NGO, Friends of Nature complies with postscript 437

Chinese laws and plays a role of supervising the implementation of governmental policies. Over the past decade more than 8000 people have joined FON, of whom 3000 are active members and 30 group members (university student bodies). FON has won 15 national and international awards including the Asian Environment Award, the Earth Award, the Giant Panda Award and the Ramon Magsaysay Award granted by the Philippines. Chapters of FON have been established in Nanjing, Guangdong, Shenzhen and other major cities. More than ten new environmental NGOs have been set up by FON members. Friends of Nature has made great contributions to environmental conservation and has become an inﬂ uential NGO in China. For more information, please visit the website: www.fon.org.cn

Be a volunteer for Friends of Nature: Criticism and complaints cannot solve problems if no action is taken. If you want to be a volunteer to be involved in activities organized by Friends of Nature, please write to [email protected]

Become a member of Friends of Nature: Friends of Nature needs your help and participation. Please become one of us. The more members we have the more success will achieve in environmental protection. Please contact [email protected]

Donate to Friends of Nature: Our various programs for environmental protection need ﬁ nancial support. Your donations to Friends of Nature will be highly appreciated. If you would like to make a donation, please contact ofﬁ [email protected]

Contact Friends of Nature: Address: No. 79 Drum Tower Street West West District Beijing, China 100009 Tel: 0086–10 –64030402/64030405/64033224/64030696 Fax: 0086–10 –64032230 Email: ofﬁ [email protected] Website: www.fon.org.cn

Friends of Nature January 4, 2006