CONTENTS Editorial #3 (13), 2008 Saakashvili: “War At Last!” 2 PUBLISHER Centre for Analysis of International Relations Strategies and Conflict in South Ossetia: Political Context 4 Technologies Implications of the Georgia-Russia War for Global Politics 7 CAST Director & Publisher Ruslan Pukhov Editor-in-Chief War And People Mikhail Barabanov The August War between Russia and Georgia 9 Advisory Editors Konstantin Makienko Force Development and the Armed Forces of Georgia under Alexey Pokolyavin Saakashvili 13 Researchers Georgia’s Air Defense in the War with South Ossetia 20 Ruslan Aliev Sergey Denisentsev Polina Temerina Dmitry Vasiliev Military Procurement Editorial Office Russian National Defense Procurement 2000–2007 23 3 Tverskaya-Yamskaya, 24, office 5, Moscow, Russia 125047 phone: +7 495 251 9069 Defense Industry fax: +7 495 775 0418 Profile of Tactical Missiles Corporation 26 http://www.mdb.cast.ru/ To subscribe, contact phone: +7 495 251 9069 Facts & Figures or e-mail: [email protected] Known Deliveries of Military Equipment 28 Moscow Defense Brief is published by the Centre for Analysis of Strategies to Georgia 2000–2008 and Technologies All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical or photocopying, recording Our Authors or otherwise, without reference to Moscow Defense Brief. Please note that, while the Publisher has taken all reasonable care in the compilation of this publication, the Publisher cannot accept responsibility for any errors or omissions in this publication or for any loss arising therefrom. Authors’ opinions do not necessary reflect those of the Publisher or Editor Computer design & pre-press: ZEBRA-GROUP www.zebra-group.ru Cover Photo: A Russian tank column in South Ossetia, August 2008. Photo by: REUTERS/Denis Sinyakov © Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, 2008 Printed in Russia # 3, 2008 Moscow Defense Brief 1 Editorial Saakashvili: “War At Last!” Mikhail Barabanov he August War in Georgia began with the fateful decision Having declared the return of Abkhazia and South Tof President Mikhail Saakashvili to launch a campaign Ossetia as his main goal, Saakashvili’s regime faced the against South Ossetia on August 7. This step could be seen political task of constantly galvanizing nationalist sentiment as an impulsive and sudden decision of a Caucasus leader. to maintain popular support. Short of the unattainable “total However, the attack on Tskhinvali was in fact the logical victory,” he had to show at least partial victories. Hence, his outcome of the policies of the leader of “Free Georgia.” political need to “unfreeze” the positions in Abkhazia and The Georgian “Rose Revolution” of late 2003 was neither South Ossetia that had formed in the wake of the conflicts democratic in form nor motivated by democratic ideals. The of the early 1990s. Hence, Tbilisi’s constant, conscious driving force of this mass movement against the then President maneuvers from 2004 onward to instigate spiraling tensions Eduard Shevardnadze was radical Georgian nationalism, and in both regions, to destabilize the situation and raise these the main accusation leveled against Shevardnadze was the fact conflicts as an “issue” of Georgian domestic and foreign that he did not use force against Abkhazia and South Ossetia policy. The strategy of fomenting conflict was essential to when those regions declared their independence in the early Saakashvili, whose political machine worked like a bicycle, 1990s. Having seized power in Tbilisi in late 2003, Saakashvili constantly pedaling so as not to fall down. And, insofar as distinguished himself from the other oppositional leaders by Russia was the main guarantor of the status quo in Abkhazia his especially radical rhetoric, not shying away from racist and South Ossetia, Saakashvili’s policy was destined to bring attacks against the Abkhazians and Ossetians and openly Georgia and Russia into conflict. calling for violence against the former autonomous regions. Saakashvili was able to find support in the West, first It was this, not democratic slogans, that made Saakashvili of all from the United States, which has always based its attractive to the crowds in Tbilisi; it was precisely his promise policy in the post-Soviet space on the primitive principle to “solve” the Abkhazian and South Ossetian “issues” that that “whatever is bad for Russia is good for us.” That said, the brought Saakashvili to power. Americans at first followed a contradictory policy. On the The forcible return of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to the one hand, they wanted stability in Georgia and the Caucasus Georgian fold was the main plank of Saakashvili’s platform as a whole, to serve among other things as an energy when he was in opposition and when he came to power. He transit corridor from the Caspian that bypassed Russian could not reject this program even if he wanted to, insofar as territory. On the other hand, the United States also wanted he would simply have fallen prey to competing nationalist to use Georgia to inflict the maximum possible harm on demagogues. Having seized power on promises to “return” Russia and to undermine Russian political influence in the Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Saakashvili simply had to fulfill region. The second aim inevitably led to American support those promises, so as to avoid the fate of Shevardnadze. for all anti-Russian rhetoric and action, including openly It is therefore no accident that everything that Saakashvili destabilizing steps, like the unfreezing by Saakashvili of did as President was directly related to preparations for war the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Thus, it is not with the former autonomous regions. All other policies were surprising that the United States sent Saakashvili confused subordinated to this goal. The development of the Georgian and self-contradictory signals, ones that he could interpret army was the main task, accompanied by world-record- according to his whim. In practice, American policy veered breaking increases of the defense budget, which grew from toward automatic support of Saakashvili against Russia 2003 to 2008 in dollar terms by 33 times. In 2007, Georgia on every issue, without serious analysis of his actions in spent 8% of its GDP on defense, and would have spent 10% the broader context of American interests. The logic of “he in 2008 even without the August War, surpassing the defense may be a bastard, but he’s our bastard” began to take hold, spending levels of the Stalinist North Korean regime. It is allowing Saakashvili to manipulate Western support for his clear that Georgia, with its fragile economy and huge balance- own interests. The tail wags the dog. of-payments deficit, could not sustain this level of defense For its part, Saakashvili’s faith in the total and spending for very long. Saakashvili gambled everything unconditional support of the United States and the West on the wager that a victory over the “separatists” would had a corrosive effect on the internal politics of the Georgian recoup all losses. This made war inevitable, for without a regime. Saakashvili’s policy from 2005 onward was built war Saakashvili would have soon become bankrupt in an exclusively on the notion that the West would sooner or later economic and political sense. force Russia to make concessions to Georgia and would force 2 # 3, 2008 Moscow Defense Brief Saakashvili: “War At Last!” Editorial Russia to give up its de-facto protectorate over Abkhazia and more sensible and flexible policy, he stood a good chance to South Ossetia and allow Tbilisi to regain control over them. secure Russian support with respect to Abkhazia and South According to this logic, Georgia needed only to demonstrate Ossetia as well. All that was required of Saakashvili was to maximum loyalty to America, while Russia’s interests could respect Russia’s obvious interests in those regions and its in principle be ignored, since the United States would in any desire to avoid violence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the case dictate its terms to Russia. waves of which could penetrate into the Russian territories of To Saakashvili’s great sorrow, this logic proved to be the North Caucasus. completely unsound. In the Putin era, Russia was not about Instead, Saakashvili launched an aggressive anti- to give in to Western pressure in an area of vital Russian Russian policy in the hope that this would secure US support interests. Moreover, Western states themselves were not and ultimately force Russia to withdraw from Abkhazia and prepared to provide unconditional support to Georgia. In South Ossetia. Simultaneously, Saakashvili initiated the essence, Georgia turned out to be no more than a political “unfreezing” of the conflicts in both zones, organizing the coin of the West in its relations with Russia. In this manner, first military campaign in South Ossetia in 2004, which very Saakashvili made his country hostage to relations between quickly fell apart. Blaming Moscow for the failure, and at the great powers. the same time declaring the return of Adjaria as a “victory Saakashvili’s drive to NATO membership would over Moscow,” Saakashvili unleashed an hysterical anti- prove to have even more catastrophic consequences for Russian campaign, declaring Russia to be the chief enemy Georgia’s foreign policy. Assuming that NATO membership of Georgia. At that point, Georgia-Russian relations came to would secure the West’s close involvement in Georgia’s the brink. Russia’s reaction was at first purely reactive, but problems, Saakashvili lost not only the chance to take back as Georgia continued to sow tensions, Moscow’s position the territories, but also any chance of joining NATO. The hardened. When it became clear in 2006 that Saakashvili’s policy was unrealistic from the start. Even if Russia could main goal was preparation for military action to return be persuaded to hand over Abkhazia and South Ossetia to a Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and that Georgia was becoming friendly Georgia, it could never transfer these territories to a militaristic state, the inevitability of military intervention NATO.