Astrid Forland

NORWAY’S NUCLEAR ODYSSEY: FROM OPTIMISTIC PROPONENT TO NONPROLIFERATOR

by Astrid Forland1

Astrid Forland is a doctoral student in History at the University of Bergen, Norway. Her dissertation examines the development of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards regime from 1954 until 1974; her master’s thesis analyzed the establishment of the Norwegian Institute for Atomic Energy and the construction of Norway’s first reactor. She recently published an article in Norway on the IAEA’s early years, as well as a book on the history of the University of Bergen.

lthough Norway is not time, speculation persists that the ra- which did develop nuclear weapons. widely remembered today tionale behind the Norwegian reac- Meanwhile, Norway’s own nuclear A as having been among the tor program might have been to lay ambitions eventually faded. world’s early nuclear powers, it was the basis for nuclear weapons pro- Norway’s nuclear history, there- in fact the sixth country to build a duction. This article contends that fore, is an important case to exam- nuclear reactor. Indeed, after although nuclear weapons were con- ine in considering the Norway’s experimental research re- sidered at the outset of the Norwe- processes—both forward and back- actor went critical in 1951, Norway gian program (and did have their ward—of proliferation. One of the stood poised to play a major role in supporters), there is no indication intriguing aspects of the Norwegian international nuclear relations, and that a bomb program was ever put at case is the extent to which it exem- indeed did so for more than a decade. the forefront of Norway’s nuclear plifies the euphoria created by the Although they eventually encoun- agenda. As a member of the North discovery of nuclear energy, which tered financial problems, Norwegian Atlantic Treaty Organization was taken to even greater heights researchers had by 1955 already de- (NATO) from 1949 onwards, Nor- under the rubric of the U.S. “Atoms veloped a technique for the separa- way eventually came under the for Peace” initiative. For Norway, tion of plutonium. Separation of American nuclear umbrella (al- a military nuclear program was con- plutonium on a small scale contin- though Norway never accepted the sidered too expensive and too tech- ued at the Kjeller reactor site, east stationing of nuclear weapons on its nically demanding for a small, of Oslo, until the early 1970s. Given territory in peacetime). More inter- relatively poor country in the imme- that Norway’s energy resources—in esting from a proliferation stand- diate post-war environment. But the form of hydroelectricity—were point, however, is the nuclear skillful nuclear advocates still devel- more than adequate for the needs of assistance Norway provided in these oped other avenues for Norway to the Norwegian population at the early years to other states, two of

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pursue. nuclear venture to falter in the mid- terpreted as an expression of this The Norwegian case sheds new 1960s. The nadir was reached when general goal. light on international relations in the the rise of the environmental move- The war had illustrated the impor- nuclear field in the 1940s and 1950s. ment in the 1970s halted all plans tance of science and technology for The basis for Norway’s role as a for the construction of nuclear power a country’s general development and player in the international market plants in Norway. Thus, the Norwe- standing in the world. The signifi- was its indigenous production of gian case illustrates how an early cance of radar for the Allied victory heavy water and its early acquisition enthusiasm for nuclear technology in submarine warfare in the North of basic nuclear technology and among a small group of technocrats Atlantic was but one powerful dem- know-how. Its venture into nuclear was gradually replaced by the gen- onstration of the importance of sci- reactor construction led to Norway’s eral public’s concerns about the risks ence and technology. establishment of close relations with involved in the utilization of this technology. The Norwegian venture into ap- several foreign countries embarking plied nuclear research was directly on applied nuclear research in the This article explores the themes linked to the war experience. The same period. For example, Norway outlined above in the context of initiator of the first reactor project set up a major joint venture with the Norway’s nuclear history. First, it was a young astrophysicist Gunnar Dutch in 1950. focuses on Norway’s strong belief Randers, who in 1946 had been ap- Norwegian nuclear history is par- in the virtues of nuclear power and pointed Director of the Physics di- ticularly interesting because it illu- its organization of a reactor program vision of the newly established minates France’s position in the first in the immediate post-war period. Norwegian Defense Research Estab- decade after World War II. Arguably, Second, it outlines the discussions lishment (Forsvarets forsknings- Norway’s refusal to enter into a for- about military use of nuclear energy institutt or “FFI”). Randers belonged malized cooperative agreement with during the same period. Third, it to a contingent of around 30 Nor- France was one of several disap- covers Norway’s cooperation with wegian scientists who participated in pointments (albeit a minor one com- foreign countries in the 1940s and defense-related research in Britain pared, for instance, to Canada’s 1950s and gives an overview of the during the war. Before returning to refusal to sell unsafeguarded ura- assistance provided to foreign pro- Norway in 1945, this group of highly nium to the French) that caused grams in that period. Finally, it dis- qualified researchers had gained the France to develop a strong resent- cusses the causes for the decline of support of the Supreme Commander ment towards its allies. Ultimately, the Norwegian program and shows of the Norwegian military forces for this resentment would become a how Norway in the 1960s became a the idea of establishing a defense re- major influence on the shaping of strong supporter of the Treaty on the search institute at home. The use of President de Gaulle’s nuclear policy. Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weap- science to solve practical problems ons (NPT), as well as of Interna- Yet, Norway’s export of heavy had been a revelation to many of tional Atomic Energy Agency these university educated scientists, water to the French program helped (IAEA) safeguards. France develop nuclear weapons and they were eager to preserve and build upon the expertise and experi- sooner than would otherwise have THE POST-WORLD WAR II been possible.2 Norwegian heavy ence gained from their war efforts. PERIOD: NUCLEAR The FFI was set up in January 1946 water was also used in the Israeli OPTIMISM IN NORWAY program. Norwegian exports in the at Kjeller, east of Oslo. Although the nuclear field exemplify the extent to In the immediate post-war period, mandate of the institute was to do which commercial considerations in- naturally enough, Norwegian poli- research for defense purposes, it was fluenced nuclear relations and tics focused to a large extent on the recognized that the outcome of the nuclear control in the early nuclear reconstruction of the country; invest- various research activities might be age. However, Norway’s inability to ment in research and development just as useful in the civilian field. make its nuclear industry profitable was seen as one means to build a For instance, one major field of re- and competitive in the international better society. Norway’s venture into search was the development and use market caused the Norwegian applied nuclear physics can be in- of asdic (sonar), a technology that

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was as potentially useful to the large Energy Act, more commonly known One of the aims of this book is to give the reader the feel- Norwegian merchant and fishing as the McMahon Act, had not yet ing that we are standing at fleets as to military vessels. This been put into effect, and they were the beginning of a long and double function of the research ef- able to visit several laboratories, al- unknown road full of possi- bilities, and not on the final forts was recognized from the out- though not the bomb sites or the plu- road leading towards set.3 tonium and enrichment plants. Their oblivion (...). There are still American colleagues gave clear-cut pioneers among us; people In 1947, Norway decided to con- who can see new possibili- struct an experimental nuclear reac- advice: Norway’s resources were ties which will determine tor because it already possessed adequate for the construction of a our future course (...).8 small reactor, but inadequate for the indigenous heavy water production, Such optimism about the possible construction of nuclear bombs.6 The a particularly important prerequisite. uses of nuclear energy fueled the de- reassurance given by the American At the start of the war, Norway had velopment of this form of energy. It experts was probably a decisive fac- been the only producer of heavy was believed that nuclear energy tor in obtaining the Ministry of water in the world. Its production would be a valuable commodity for Defense’s support for the reactor was a by-product of the substantial any nation, both militarily and indus- project. The young Defense Minis- fertilizer production of Norsk Hydro. trially. Its military use had already ter Jens Christian Hauge not only The possession of heavy water been demonstrated. Finding civilian gave his assent to the project, but meant that a reactor could be built purposes for nuclear energy was all suggested that the reactor could be using natural uranium for fuel. It that was left. Randers predicted ev- financed out of money set aside for seems reasonable to believe that the erything in his book, from the use of the reconstruction of Norway’s de- mere existence of the indigenous nuclear energy in farming the desert fense capability. He suggested heavy water production was a ma- wastelands to creating living condi- spending money that was intended jor factor behind Norway’s decision tions on our neighboring planets. for the purchase of long-range artil- to go into reactor development. These were, however, visions of the lery on the reactor instead. The grant future. The immediate task was to Although Norway was in a fortu- amounted to five million kroner, a lay the groundwork for the future de- nate position with regard to heavy vast sum of money for research pur- velopment of nuclear energy, which water, the country was lacking in poses at the time. The decision to meant, for example, acquiring exper- other respects. Uranium prospecting spend this much money on a research tise in the field. Thus, in the first in 1946 to 1947 confirmed that in- project directed by a military insti- round, Randers thought that it would digenous uranium deposits were in- tution was strongly criticized by cer- be wise to concentrate Norway’s ef- adequate for reactor purposes, even tain representatives of the physics forts on developing a “super fuel.”9 though a small deposit in the south- departments at the universities in east of Norway was considered Oslo and Trondheim. However, the After his return from the United promising.4 There was also a short- grant was approved by the Storting States, Randers posed the following age of qualified scientists in the (Norway’s national assembly) in question to the other FFI directors field. Consequently, young research- July 1947 after the introduction of of research: ers were sent abroad for training to White Paper No. 118, which dealt If we decide that Norway Frédéric Joliot-Curie’s laboratory in should use its military bud- with the rebuilding of Norway’s de- get for nuclear research, Paris and to various laboratories in fense in general.7 should it be specifically Britain.5 geared towards developing What were the reasons for launch- a nuclear bomb or towards In August 1946, Randers and Odd ing the project? The initiators of the possibly producing rocket Dahl (who would be in charge of the fuel or towards peaceful project clearly had high ambitions. 10 construction of the reactor) travelled purposes only? In early 1946, Randers published a There is as yet no information avail- to the United States in order to learn book entitled Atomic Energy—The able about the internal discussions as much as possible about the Man- World’s Hope or its Demise? In the at the FFI. But, based on public hattan Project and to discuss their preface he voiced his strong faith in documents from 1946 to 1947, it is plans for a Norwegian experimental the future use and value of nuclear possible to get an impression of the nuclear reactor. The U.S. Atomic energy. In this vein, he wrote:

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defense community’s thinking on of nuclear energy in future military the prerequisites to do so. The jointly this issue. conflicts. The first chapter was writ- written report expressed a fear that ten by the directors of research at the the existence of nuclear bombs on Military Plans FFI along with miliary representa- Norwegian soil would actually in- tives and several other outside ex- crease the risk of attack in a war be- A synopsis of the work carried out perts.14 The second chapter was cause of their mere presence. It was in the Physics Division of the FFI in written by Egil Ronæss, the director suggested that an alliance with one 1946 to 1947, suggests that in the of the Chemical Division. His chap- of the nuclear powers could be an winter of 1946 Randers wrote two ter dealt with, among other things, alternative to having a domestic reports to the Minister of Defense, the use of radioactive gases.15 The nuclear bomb production program. both bearing the heading: “Atomic third chapter was an appendix to the This solution was mentioned in the Bomb.”11 The contents of these re- report that specifically outlined the form of a question, with the under- ports are unknown. Thus, the prin- consequences of nuclear weapons standing that this was a political ciple available sources containing for future warfare. This chapter was question. information about the thinking of the penned by Gunnar Randers, but it defense community about the origins In the chapter written by Randers, represented the view of a special of the reactor project are a number the attitude towards having a na- committee established by the Su- of technical reports from the FFI to tional nuclear bomb production pro- preme Command Technical Advi- the Defense Commission.12 gram was far more positive. He sory Committee to discuss this argued that the possible production The Defense Commission was set 16 particular topic. Altogether, the of nuclear bombs should not be con- up in 1946 to plan the organization technical reports discussed three dif- sidered solely from the point of view of Norway’s future defense. One ferent ways of using nuclear energy of financial costs, but also accord- major lesson learned from the Ger- in the military field: for a nuclear ing to the “effectiveness” of the in- man invasion of Norway in 1940 was bomb; for a fuel for ships, airplanes, vestment measured in military that Norway must strengthen its de- tanks, or rockets; or for the produc- strength. Randers noted that: fense. However, no general consen- tion of radioactive gases. Nuclear weapons are expen- sus existed as to how this lesson The attitude towards the uses of sive to produce. However, it should be put into practice. The mili- is also true that if one looks nuclear energy, as they were por- tary leadership’s first priority was to at the cost of securing a trayed in these three chapters, var- positive result in warfare, reconstruct the national defense as ied somewhat. The chapter written instead of the cost of a rapidly as possible. But Hauge, the single weapon, then it ap- jointly by the directors of research defense minister, who had also been pears that nuclear weapons and Randers’s chapter gave the im- are the cheapest weapons one of the leaders of Norway’s main 17 pression that the nuclear bomb was one can have. resistance movement during the oc- a revolutionary defense tool; that This chapter concluded that so cupation, thought otherwise. His nations possessing this instrument long as there were no established first objective was to raise the over- would be in a singular position; and international controls over nuclear all quality of Norway’s defense, and that this held true even for small na- energy, a country should not for- he was willing to proceed with the tions. And yet, a Norwegian nuclear swear the possibility of using nuclear reconstruction through a gradual weapons production program was weapons for defense purposes. The process in order to achieve this aim. not deemed likely, for two reasons. same difference of opinion was evi- In December 1946, the Storting ac- Norway’s scientific, technical, and dent in the two chapters’ respective cepted a plan for reconstruction economic resources were considered discussions of the possible use of along these lines. The Defense Com- too limited for nuclear weapons pro- nuclear energy as a source of power mission had been established to duction, even though the country had for ships, airplanes, tanks, or rock- make the preliminary analysis upon all the necessary raw materials. ets. The collaborative chapter took which the plan was to be based.13 Moreover, there was some doubt as a categorical stand against such In the reports from the FFI to the to whether it would be wise for Nor- ideas. By contrast, the special com- Defense Commission, there were way to produce nuclear bombs, even mittee plead its case for making the three chapters that dealt with the use if it turned out that Norway did have air force more effective by using a

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“super fuel” based on nuclear energy research should be directed towards for a small nation to produce nuclear for the propulsion of airplanes. constructing nuclear bombs, produc- weapons. Nevertheless, the Minis- Randers’s chapter ended with the ing rocket fuel, or developing an try of Defense noted that, in the long- following characterization: energy source for peaceful purposes. run, technical advancements in this For the time being, one has This work plan stated that the FFI, area conceivably could “make (...) no choice. Either one must give up the hope of with the support of the Ministry of nuclear energy a part of even a small having an effective defense, Defense, had decided to pursue nation’s defense program.”20 All the or one must aim at a future nuclear energy research, and that it same, it was emphasized that the with the possibility of using nuclear weapons without ef- must be based upon what would be planned reactor would not be able fective cautionary rules and possible to build by using only one’s to produce enough plutonium to regulations. Nuclear weap- own resources in the beginning. manufacture a nuclear bomb. ons in this context do not necessarily mean the bomb, With regard to the question of pur- References to civilian uses of the but also nuclear fuel for pose, the work plan took a wait-and- reactor were vague. Apart from the planes and rockets.18 see attitude; the reactor represented fact that the reactor would produce The question of using radioactive the first step towards the industrial radioactive isotopes that could be material, especially plutonium, for utilization of nuclear energy. It char- used in medicine and biology, the defense purposes was discussed in acterized additional developments as general point of view was that the detail in Ronæss’s chapter on bio- being interesting for both defense reactor was valuable as a source of chemical warfare. He explained how and civilian uses, but it emphasized neutron production and as a tool for radioactive gases could be used in that the reactor itself had no mili- studying chain reactions. The White 19 warfare and on how defense against tary value. All in all, the work plan Paper stressed that chain reactions this type of gas warfare could be or- represented a toning down of were the basic elements for the de- ganized. He concluded that Norway Randers’s earlier view concerning velopment of nuclear energy, but al- must conduct its own research in this the use of nuclear energy (as put for- most nothing concrete was field in order to build up an effec- ward in his chapter on nuclear mentioned about planned uses of tive defense. The authors of the col- bombs in the technical report to the nuclear energy. laborative chapter agreed to a large Defense Commission). His new It is highly likely that the word- extent with Ronæss’s judgment. The level-headed tone regarding the mili- ing in the White Paper reflected the other directors of research at the FFI tary aspect of nuclear energy re- planners’ uncertainty as to what and the Supreme Command Techni- search seemed quite in line with the would be the upshot of nuclear en- cal Advisory Committee’s military views expressed in the joint chapter ergy research at Kjeller and what representatives also considered it of the same report. would be achieved by starting along possible that radioactive material The White Paper introduced by this path. At the same time, the could be used in future warfare. the Ministry of Defense to the White Paper itself represented a The technical reports from the FFI Storting seemed to confirm this wait- manifestation of the extent to which to the Defense Commission were and-see attitude. The part of the pa- the Ministry of Defense was behind written before Randers and Dahl’s per that dealt with nuclear energy nuclear research. It was also an ex- visit to the United States. This visit research was formulated in quite pression of the Ministry’s confi- seemed to confirm that Norway general wording. It stated that the dence in Randers’s positive would have the resources needed for reactor could be used in all general assessment of the future role of the construction of a nuclear reac- research in the country, both mili- nuclear energy in society, however tor, but not enough resources to build tary and industrial. With regard to vaguely defined that role was at this a nuclear bomb. At the end of 1946, the military aspect, the White Paper time. Randers prepared a work plan for the stated generally that the country In retrospect, a clear line appears Physics Division of the FFI. The needed to obtain knowledge about from Randers’s ideas about a “super work plan did not give any clear an- nuclear energy in order for it to or- fuel” in 1946, to a project for devel- swer to Randers’s own question as ganize its defense, including civil oping nuclear reactors for ship pro- to whether or not Norwegian nuclear defense, on a scientific basis. It was pointed out that it was not feasible pulsion, which eventually was

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started up in the early 1950s. Thus, the very outset of the Kjeller reactor need to import heavy water from the ambiguity of White Paper No. project, the Norwegians hoped for a Norway. Norwegian export of heavy 118 also could have been to some modification of the American policy water to France had started in 1940 extent deliberate. Certain sections of that would make it possible to coop- when Norsk Hydro’s general direc- the White Paper were clearly formu- erate more closely with British and tor agreed to hand over to France the lated with a view to placating the American research institutions and totality of Hydro’s stockpile, 185.5 displeasure of the university sector. to buy material and technology from kilos in all. The deal took the form Hauge himself has acknowledged those two countries. Both Randers of a gentleman’s agreement,25 and that the supporters of the project and Dahl had close contacts with the heavy water was brought to feared until the end that there would British and American researchers. France less than a month before the be trouble when the White Paper was Dahl had spent 10 years at the German invasion of Norway in April put before the Storting.21 This did Carnegie Institute in Washington, 1940.26 France paid for the delivery not happen, yet the resistance from D.C., constructing nuclear particle after the end of the war. the university sector proved to be so accelerators. Randers had been a re- When the Germans invaded strong that the reactor project was search fellow in astrophysics at the France in June 1940, French re- separated from the FFI, and a sepa- University of Chicago before mov- searchers fled with the heavy water rate, civilian nuclear research insti- ing to Britain to join the defense re- to England, where they continued 23 tute, the Institute for Atomic Energy search efforts there. In Britain, he their research at the Cavendish (IFA), was created next to FFI at had worked under Sir John Laboratory in Cambridge. In Decem- 22 Kjeller. Cockcroft, until Cockcroft was ber 1940, they demonstrated for the transferred to Canada to take over first time that it was possible to pro- INTERNATIONAL responsibility for constructing the duce nuclear energy with natural COOPERATION AND Chalk River reactor. After the war, uranium.27 This demonstration was ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN Cockcroft was, by all accounts, per- also an important link in the chain PROGRAMS sonally very encouraging to leading to the production of the Randers, but Britain’s “special rela- When the Kjeller reactor went atomic bomb. tionship” with the United States pre- critical in 1951, Norway became the vented any closer cooperation for a In April 1945, the French govern- sixth country in the world to con- long time. In 1947 to 1948, Norway ment again contacted the Norwegian struct a nuclear reactor. The success- repeatedly made formal requests to government in exile in London, ful outcome of the project had the British authorities asking for as- about securing new supplies of depended to a considerable degree sistance with the construction of the heavy water. New negotiations fol- on assistance from foreign countries. Kjeller reactor. All requests were lowed in the autumn, after the return One of Randers’s major assets had turned down by the British Ministry of the Norwegian government to been his ability to establish and of Supply.24 Oslo. Soon, deliveries of heavy wa- maintain a wide network of contacts. ter to the French nuclear program Nevertheless, international coop- Cooperation with France became a routine matter. During the eration in the nuclear field was re- whole post-war period, Norway has stricted due to the monopolistic Thus, France and Sweden became provided the French program with policy pursued by the United States the countries with which the Norwe- about 100 tons of heavy water.28 until the introduction of the Atoms gians maintained the closest rela- tions in the early post-war period. Second, the French wanted to for Peace initiative. The McMahon build up European cooperation in the Act prohibited American coopera- France became the foreign country that contributed the most, by a wide nuclear field as a counterweight to tion with other countries, with the American domination. The monopo- exception of Britain and Canada. margin, to the Norwegian venture in the late 1940s. listic American policy was strongly The wartime agreement between the resented by the French, who had British and the Americans also pro- There were two important reasons contributed to the war efforts in this hibited the British from giving as- for France’s willingness to give as- field. The French had been decisive sistance to foreign countries. From sistance. First, there was France’s in persuading the British that the

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atomic bomb could be built, and the in the international market. Intensive as a French-Norwegian pile. The British had been equally decisive in prospecting had started up in several Norwegians were very reluctant to persuading the Americans to launch countries, including Sweden, a coun- accommodate Joliot-Curie. This re- the Manhattan Project. Furthermore, try rich in uranium reserves, but the luctance resulted partly from the fear several scientists based in France utilization of such sources was years of a small power being dominated before the war had played a key role away. Norway’s indigenous uranium by a larger power. Randers, in par- in the construction of the British- reserves were scarce. The most ticular, resented the thought of hav- Canadian reactor at Chalk River. promising deposit was a small one ing to put up “a French flag” at Joliot-Curie’s assistant Hans Halban in the southeastern part of the coun- Kjeller. But Norway’s reluctance directed the project in the beginning, try. But even if Norway could even- was also due to fear of a hostile and other participants included Lew tually extract sufficient uranium American reaction to an eventual Kowarski and Bertrand from this deposit, the Norwegians agreement. The Americans’ negative Goldschmidt.29 In the post-war era, would still lack the necessary tech- attitude towards the French nuclear Bertrand Goldschmidt would play an nology to refine the indigenous ura- development program in general and important role in French nuclear re- nium. In 1948, the French Joliot-Curie’s leadership in particu- lations with other countries. The volunteered to assist the Norwegians lar was well-known, and the Ameri- French particularly resented the in refining their uranium. At this can scientific attache in Paris had “special relationship” between the stage, however, the Norwegians had told Randers that the Americans did United Kingdom and the United become reluctant to accept more not trust Joliot-Curie.34 Joliot- States in the nuclear field, which French assistance for fear that overly Curie’s membership in the French meant that the British were given close relations with the French might Communist Party was increasingly preferential treatment by the Ameri- be harmful to Norwegian interests. held against him, and his anti-NATO cans, while the French were left to During a visit to Paris in the win- stand did not improve his position. cope on their own. They therefore ter of 1948, Randers and Dahl told Eventually, he was forced to resign encouraged other European coun- Joliot-Curie that they feared a hos- in 1951. The Norwegians were un- tries to go into nuclear research and tile American reaction to eventual doubtedly sensitive to the American development. Norwegian-French cooperation.31 In position. For Randers, collaboration Norway no doubt benefited late 1948, the administrative direc- with the Americans and the British hugely from cooperating with the tor of the CEA, Raoul Dautry, sug- in the nuclear field remained the ul- French Commissariat à l’Energie gested to the Norwegian ambassador timate goal. He was convinced that Atomique (CEA). The CEA re- in Paris that Norway and France the United States would eventually ceived and trained Norwegian re- should continue working together in be forced to relinquish its monopo- searchers in their laboratories. Odd order to establish a European nuclear listic and secretive policy in the ci- Dahl was permitted to spend weeks industry independent of the two su- vilian nuclear field. This belief was at the French reactor site of perpowers,32 but the Norwegians did one of the reasons he advocated a Châtillon, studying the design of the not follow up on this suggestion ei- total openness regarding nuclear re- 35 first French heavy water reactor Zoé. ther. search and development. He also had the opportunity to dis- As the Norwegians made progress Randers’s advocacy of openness cuss the design of the Norwegian with the design of the reactor tank, was a further impediment to a closer reactor with Kowarski. Furthermore, the lack of uranium was felt more French-Norwegian cooperation. the French supplied the Kjeller re- and more acutely. In October 1949, When Joliot-Curie started pushing 30 actor with reflector graphite. Joliot-Curie told Randers that the for a formal agreement of coopera- Norway’s main problem in con- CEA would be willing to provide the tion, one of the inducements he of- structing the reactor was lack of ura- Kjeller reactor with uranium, pro- fered to the Norwegians was an nium, the actual energy source. Due vided that the French-Norwegian invitation to learn the French meth- to the Anglo-American monopoly of cooperation was formalized in an ods for the extraction of plutonium all Western controlled uranium agreement.33 He also wanted the from spent fuel. This offer was made sources, no uranium was available Kjeller reactor to be acknowledged on the condition that the Norwegians would keep what they learned to

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 7 Astrid Forland themselves.36 Such a condition con- One problem remained to be an important shipping nation. The tradicted Randers’s policy of treat- solved, however. The Dutch uranium Institute for Atomic Energy, there- ing reactor construction the same was in the form of raw material, and fore, started to plan for the construc- way as the results of basic research. neither the Dutch nor the Norwe- tion of a prototype reactor for ship The aim was to publish, and the ul- gians possessed the necessary refine- propulsion. In 1953, the Dutch and timate aim of publishing was to con- ment technology. Once more the Norwegians agreed to build jointly vince the Americans that their policy French were eager to do the job, but a prototype that would serve as a of secrecy would not prevent other the Dutch in particular did not like training ground for both the possible countries from pursuing nuclear re- the idea. At this stage, the United construction of power stations and search. For all of these various rea- Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority ship propulsion mechanisms.41 The sons, formal cooperation along the suddenly agreed to barter the Dutch Dutch and Norwegians discussed lines suggested by the French did not uranium oxide for British uranium several different reactor types and suit Norwegian interests. When the metal, produced specifically for use locations for construction during issue of cooperating with France was in nuclear reactors. The decision 1954, without making a decision.42 finally settled at the cabinet level in came as a total surprise to the Nor- In the midst of these discussions, the March 1950, the Ministry of De- wegians, who had asked the British end of the American policy of se- fense stated that it feared possible for uranium in 1948 but had never crecy led to a review of the Dutch harmful consequences of eventual received an answer. The British had plans. French-Norwegian cooperation and, not been able to give a positive re- In July 1955, the Dutch set up a for this reason, considered it impos- sponse due to American opposition. new research establishment, the sible to enter into a formal coopera- Now, they were willing to go ahead Foundation Reactor Centre Nether- 37 39 tion agreement with the French. with or without American consent. lands (RCN). This new creation was The change of policy might have linked to a decision to buy a whole Norwegian-Dutch Cooperation been aimed at preventing the French reactor equipped with enriched ura- from acquiring a leadership position In February 1950, the Norwegians nium from the United States instead within a budding European nuclear found an unexpected solution to of building a second reactor jointly cooperation. At least, this was how their uranium problem, when they with the Norwegians. The Dutch dis- the French interpreted it.40 learned that the Netherlands pos- tanced themselves from the Norwe- sessed a small stockpile of uranium Initially, the Norwegian-Dutch co- gians because they were afraid that oxide that had hitherto been kept se- operation was a highly successful the connection with Kjeller might cret. The Dutch were planning to one. However, from the mid-1950s, complicate the nuclear cooperation launch themselves into applied the venture ran less smoothly. The agreement they were negotiating nuclear research, and Hans Kramers, construction of the Kjeller reactor with the United States.43 In Novem- a leading Dutch physicist, travelled had served both countries’ interests. ber, the Dutch and the Norwegians to the Scandinavian countries look- But once the discussions on a fol- agreed that the new Dutch reactor ing for potential partners in the field. low-up reactor got under way, it soon center and the Institute for Atomic The Dutch and the Norwegians im- became evident that Norway and the Energy at Kjeller would pursue their mediately agreed to unite their two Netherlands had different points of reactor development independent of projects, although it was agreed that departure for the application of each other. This agreement signalled the Kjeller reactor would remain a nuclear energy. While the Nether- the beginning of the end of Dutch- Norwegian reactor. The Dutch lands saw nuclear energy as the pri- Norwegian cooperation. A new co- would supply the uranium for the mary solution to its power problem, operative agreement was signed in reactor, and they would take part in Norway’s energy needs were pro- 1955, effective until 1958, when it the final stages of its construction. vided for through hydropower. In was extended for one more year. This arrangement solved the acute the early 1950s, Norway’s interest In the mid-1950s, there had been Norwegian uranium problem, and in nuclear energy was focused on its plans for building a full-scale repro- the Dutch got a flying start in the potential use for ship propulsion. cessing plant at Kjeller. A few mil- 38 field of reactor development. This orientation was obviously a ligrams of plutonium had in fact consequence of Norway’s status as

8 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 Astrid Forland

already been extracted in the labo- initiated by one of the Norwegian re- ready been produced by 1960, or if ratory in 1954.44 But when the Dutch searchers Torbjorn Sikkeland (now the 400 grams represented an esti- chose to buy a reactor from the a professor at the University in mate of the total amount that would United States, instead of building Trondheim), who extracted the first be extracted. The two countries one jointly with the Norwegians, the few milligrams of plutonium at agreed to share the plutonium be- Institute for Atomic Energy decided Kjeller in 1954. He had left Kjeller tween them, each taking 200 to spend the money originally in- by 1956 because he had not been grams.51 tended for the reprocessing plant on satisfied with the storage facilities Thus, the 200 grams reported to 45 the construction of a new reactor. at the site. In 1993, he suggested that have been produced by Norway at Plans were made for the construc- some of the plutonium produced in Kjeller seem to be in accord with the tion of a prototype reactor for ship Norway might have been meant for Dutch-Norwegian agreement, pro- propulsion. The Norwegians had the then-secret Swedish bomb pro- vided that the 400 grams referred to 47 problems realizing this project, how- gram. A Swedish researcher also had not already been produced by ever. In the end, the Organization for has maintained that the plutonium 1960. If that were the case, the fig- Economic Cooperation and Devel- extracted was meant for a joint ures given by Norwegian authorities opment (OECD) decided to finance Swedish-Norwegian bomb program. would not make sense, given that the it, and it eventually materialized in The plutonium allegedly had been extraction continued into the early the form of the Halden reactor. This shipped to Sweden for the purpose 1970s. Moreover, it would seem that 48 reactor was acknowledged as a Nor- of making such bombs. These al- the figures provided by the Institute wegian reactor, but it was adminis- legations have been categorically and confirmed by the Norwegian tered by the OECD. rejected by the Norwegian Institute government do not include the total The decision to abandon the plans for Atomic Energy, as well as the production at Kjeller, but merely the for a full-scale reprocessing plant government. The Institute maintains Norwegian part of it. Furthermore, also turned on the fact that the that only 200 grams of plutonium it is a fact that the plutonium ex- OECD was building a reprocessing were produced at Kjeller. Out of tracted by the Eurochemic reprocess- plant, the Eurochemic, at Mol in these, 10 grams were lost in the pro- ing plant in Belgium has never been Belgium. The Norwegians and the cess, 29 grams were exported to mentioned in official reports. Re- Dutch were both investors in this Sweden, 88 grams to the Nether- cently, it became known that this 49 project, which would permit them to lands, and 71 grams to Belgium. plutonium amounted to three kilos.52 reprocess their spent fuel abroad. These data have been confirmed by Such an amount had been sold to a Nonetheless, an experimental repro- the government. Moreover, they German company in the late 1960s, cessing facility was built at Kjeller. seem to be corroborated by an agree- apparently without being subjected This facility made it possible for the ment entered into by the Dutch and to safeguards.53 Thus, there are in- Dutch and the Norwegians to learn the Norwegians in 1960. dications that the government has the extraction technique without When formal Dutch-Norwegian been less than forthcoming about the having to make a major investment. cooperation came to a halt in 1959, extent to which Norway has been in- The limited extraction of plutonium the question of dividing the spoils volved in plutonium production. at Kjeller continued until the early was raised. In particular, the Dutch Yet, the government’s reticence does 1970s. In addition to the Norwegians wanted compensation for the five not necessarily imply it is trying to and the Dutch, Swedish researchers tons of uranium raw material that cover up the existence of a previ- made use of the facility from the they had supplied to the Kjeller re- ously secret bomb program, as some early 1960s onwards.46 actor. The countries also needed to critics seem to be suggesting. Nev- In recent years, a debate has con- agree on the ownership of the pluto- ertheless, the amount of plutonium tinued in Norway about the amount nium produced in the reactor. Ac- produced might indicate a wish to of plutonium extracted from spent cording to J. M. van Splunter, the establish a nuclear capability. Still, fuel in Norway; the purpose of the plutonium in question amounted to the evidence suggests that during the 50 plutonium extraction; and the end 400 grams. It is not entirely clear period of plutonium production, the use of the plutonium. The debate was from van Splunter’s writings, how- Norwegians were more keen on ever, whether the 400 grams had al- making money than bombs.

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 9 Astrid Forland

Norway’s Export of Heavy small.58 The IAEA’s negotiation of like the idea of imposing control via Water to Israel the first safeguards document was bilateral agreements because this The most controversial Norwe- pending, and this raised concerns meant that the control measures im- gian nuclear export was the sale of about possible implications of posed on recipient countries were 20 tons of heavy water to Israel in nuclear trade deals for the develop- bound to vary from case to case. 1959. The Israelis contacted the Nor- ment of international nuclear safe- Neither did he like the idea of hav- wegians in 1956, making an infor- guards. The Norwegian Ministry of ing to exercise control on foreign mal request through the chairman of Foreign Affairs, as well as Randers territory. With the exception of the the Labour Party and a Labour mem- (a personal advisor on nuclear en- United States, no country had devel- ber of the Storting.54 A similar re- ergy matters to U.N. Secretary-Gen- oped methods for controlling nuclear quest was made simultaneously to eral Dag Hammerschöld), surely activities in recipient countries, and the American government. The Is- must have been well acquainted with none liked the idea of having to do raelis obviously hoped to be treated the on-going discussions. This so. This reluctance was one reason in the same way as the Indians, knowledge may explain the Foreign why small supplier countries tended whom the Americans had supplied Ministry’s insistence that the sale to support efforts establish a control with heavy water a year before with- would only take place if the Israelis regime that would be administered 63 out insisting on controlling its use. agreed to subject the heavy water to by the IAEA. In the Israeli case, however, the international control. The Noratom Finally, there was the unresolved Americans insisted on safeguards.55 board was also worried about this issue of whether to define heavy 59 When Gunnar Randers and the board aspect of the sale. water as a “trigger” item or not. The of Noratom, the exporting firm, Randers was probably inclined to IAEA statute made it clear that learned about the Israeli desire to sell “without strings,” as long as the nuclear materials and whole reactors buy a large quantity of heavy water, Americans did not object. Without would be subject to control, but the they were eager to sell. To Randers, mentioning a possible Norwegian provision regarding equipment and such a deal represented a potential supply to Israel, he had in fact asked non-nuclear materials was less clear. breakthrough to the international Philip Farley, the special assistant to On one hand, several countries, such market.56 The early negotiations the secretary in atomic energy mat- as France and South Africa, were took place in the winter and spring ters, whether the United States found strongly against defining heavy wa- of 1958. Thus, they coincided with the prospect of the Israelis building ter as a trigger item. On the other the negotiations of the U.S.-Euratom a 40 megawatt (MW) reactor “omi- hand, the United States strongly sup- nuclear agreement in which the con- nous.” Farley had not replied di- ported the inclusion of heavy water, trol aspect of the deal was a core is- rectly, but had suggested that supply in accordance with the American sue, hotly debated within the to Israel might present an opportu- Atomic Energy Act, which clearly IAEA.57 The Euratom countries in- nity for imposing IAEA safe- subjected heavy water to control. It sisted on the establishment of a spe- guards.60 was thus reasonable to expect that cial safeguards system within the The Israelis were adamant that the American position in the forth- Euratom area and administered by they would not accept control on coming negotiations on the develop- Euratom. From the perspective of their territory by a big power.61 This ment of the IAEA safeguards Vienna, such a system represented a attitude was not unusual at the time. document would be to regard heavy breach of the principle of interna- Control measures imposed by the water as a trigger item. Furthermore, tional control. industrialized Western world on re- the technical importance of heavy It was generally acknowledged cipient Third World countries were water for the production of pluto- that if the Americans were to accept perceived as being “discrimina- nium was indisputable. what was perceived to be Euratom tory.”62 Randers may well have sym- The Norwegian Ministry of For- self governance, the chance of se- pathized to a certain extent with this eign Affairs insisted on attaching curing a wider safeguards system attitude, given his past efforts to pro- safeguards to the supply to Israel.64 through the IAEA (in accordance mote openness and cooperation on The producer, Norsk Hydro, had with the IAEA statute) would be an equal basis. He certainly did not misgivings about the entire sale.

10 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 Astrid Forland

Norsk Hydro feared that the inter- as it was—went further than re- such an industry on its own for want ests of the fertilizer firm in Egypt quired by the IAEA statute, the only of money as well as uranium.73 might be jeopardized if the agree- international instrument regulating Randers apparently had hopes that ment became known in the Arab nuclear trade at the time of the agree- the new American policy would per- world.65 This fear was the reason ment. Heavy water would not be mit the British a wider scope of ac- why ultimately the heavy water was defined as a trigger item until its in- tion in the field. If this were the case, not exported directly from Norway. clusion in the Zangger Committee’s it must soon have dawned on him Instead of shipping it directly, Nor- list.71 that Britain was not prepared to put way bought back 20 tons of heavy its relationship with the United water from the United Kingdom and CAUSES OF THE DECLINE States at risk. Britain’s military pro- had it shipped from the British Isles OF THE NORWEGIAN gram was dependent upon enriched to Israel.66 The British knew about NUCLEAR PROGRAM uranium provided by the Americans. its destination and accepted the re- The Norwegian belief in nuclear The Norwegians were soon to dis- export without insisting on safe- technology received new impetus cover that, contrary to expectations, guards.67 following Eisenhower’s introduction the new American policy had quite When faced with the Foreign of the Atoms for Peace initiative, detrimental effects on the Norwegian Ministry’s insistence on safeguards which created hopes of new oppor- plans. As shown above, its first vic- and a Norwegian draft agreement tunities for international nuclear co- tim was the Dutch-Norwegian co- they did not like, the Israelis invited operation and nuclear trade. In operative venture. More were soon Randers and his wife to Israel. They November 1954, the American sci- to follow. The foundation of the Nor- were wined and dined and taken entific attaché at the American em- wegian position in the nuclear re- sight-seeing, without a word being bassy in Paris reported home that search field had been indigenous said about the heavy water agree- “there [seems] to have been a rather heavy water production. In the early ment.68 In the end Randers brought radical increase in Norwegian hori- 1950s, the rate of production was the topic up himself, and new talks zons concerning atomic energy.”72 increased because of a growing de- about the control issue followed.69 This evaluation was based upon talks mand. When the Americans changed At the end of the talks, which con- with Randers. It seems reasonable to their policy, U.S. heavy water was tinued after Randers’s return to Nor- link Randers’s heightened ambi- suddenly available on the interna- way, the Israelis agreed to give a tions—he was never a modest per- tional market. The asking price was guarantee that the heavy water son in the first place—with the less than one-third of the Norwegian would only be used for peaceful pur- change introduced in the American price ($28 per pound compared to poses and that Norway would have nuclear policy. The revision of the $95). The decision to release Ameri- the right to verify this. Israel also McMahon Act clearly made him can heavy water on the market was agreed that the control function hope that in the future it would be probably made early in 1955. It was might in due course be transferred possible to cooperate with the partly connected with an Indian re- to the IAEA. But, Israel was ada- Anglo-American powers in the quest for 10 tons of heavy water for mantly against permitting the Nor- spread of nuclear technology all over use in CIRUS, the heavy water re- wegians to control the heavy water the world, starting in Europe. actor provided to India by the Cana- inside the plant, and the Norwegians Randers was eager to partake in the dians as a kind of development aid.74 accepted that they would merely feast. He apparently envisaged em- The annual American production have the right to ascertain the exist- barking on a program of providing amounted to hundreds of tons of ence of the heavy water outside the Europe with heavy water and en- heavy water, while the Norwegian reactor.70 Of course, this compro- riched uranium. In other words, he production was around 30 tons.75 mise was a serious loophole that planned to create a nuclear materi- The Americans argued that the low foreshadowed the position reluctant als and non-nuclear materials indus- price reflected a desire to help coun- countries would take in connection try based on the exploitation of tries on the nuclear energy path. The with the negotiations of the NPT in Norway’s hydropower resources. At Atomic Energy Commission was the 1960s. Yet, there can be no doubt the same time, it was obvious that conscious that the costs of nuclear that the control arrangement—such Norway would not be able to build materials and non-nuclear materials

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 11 Astrid Forland

would affect the length of time dur- may have been a further way of soft- ket.83 Several negotiations of sales ing which nuclear power would re- ening the Norwegian reaction to the to Third World countries were main noncompetitive with power new situation. stopped for political reasons. Nor- 76 from conventional sources. On the whole, the major develop- wegian technology very soon be- This consideration was perhaps ments in 1955 clearly indicated the came outdated. And new not the only or even the main reason extent to which Norway’s relatively developments in Norway did not for the low price, however. The Brit- strong position in the early 1950s in appear. In 1965, the ship propulsion ish scientist J.V. Dunworth reported the nuclear research field had been project was cancelled because to Sir John Cockcroft that lowering a consequence of America’s absence nuclear power could not compete in 84 the price of the heavy water was one from the nuclear market. Once price with petroleum. When the way of “[fixing] Randers in Nor- American industry appeared in the government introduced plans for the way.”77 The Americans were un- international market, it was difficult construction of nuclear power plants doubtedly very upset by his behavior for any other country to compete. in the early 1970s, these plans were in connection with the 1955 Geneva stopped by the mobilization of a However, it seems doubtful strong anti-nuclear movement.85 Conference on the Peaceful Uses of whether Randers acknowledged the Atomic Energy. At the time of the Eventually, the Institute for Atomic extent to which the Norwegian po- Energy was to change its name and conference preparation, Hammer- sition had become weaker due to the schöld appointed Randers his per- adapt its research and production to changed international situation. Oth- meet the demands of the budding pe- sonal adviser in nuclear matters. ers may have grasped it. The amount Randers immediately intervened in troleum industry exploiting the of money spent on nuclear energy North Sea gas and petroleum re- the preparations in a way that did not development in Norway was again suit American interests. The Ameri- serves. These reserves made the de- questioned in the mid-1950s, and velopment of a Norwegian nuclear can preparatory commission and its again the severest critics were uni- chairman Isadore Rabi undoubtedly power industry seem even more un- versity-based scientists.81 However, necessary. resented his unwelcome initiatives, the political support continued un- and they may have feared his ambi- abated. Until the mid-1960s, the In- Norway’s nuclear energy industry tions. However, the U.S. State De- stitute for Atomic Energy still fizzled out due to a lack of domestic partment was worried about the received two-thirds of the annual need and its inability to be competi- effect the sale of heavy water might grants distributed by the Research tive on the international market. have on U.S. relations with Norway. Council for Science and Technology. Moreover, the downward trend was It considered the new situation re- Randers’s and the government’s con- also indicative of the direction that garding heavy water as “a severe tinuous optimism led to new invest- Norway’s defense policy took from 78 blow” to the Norwegians, and ments, and, in particular, to the the mid-1950s onwards. Philip Farley felt that the Americans creation of Noratom, a company spe- were presented with “a fairly seri- cializing in the export of nuclear THE ISSUE OF NUCLEAR 79 ous problem in regard to Norway.” technology, nuclear materials (plu- DEFENSE OR The diplomats furthermore thought tonium), and heavy water.82 It was NONPROLIFERATION it unfortunate that this “blow” would Noratom that handled the export of During the planning of the first follow so closely on the U.S.-Neth- 20 tons of heavy water to Israel in Kjeller reactor, the possibility of a erlands nuclear cooperation agree- 1959. Norwegian bomb was clearly ment, which they also considered to touched upon by the planners. At the be detrimental to Norwegian inter- Noratom did realize its founders’ time, the production of nuclear ests.80 It was therefore decided to dreams of creating a new, important bombs was considered too expen- prepare the Norwegians for the export industry, however. After a sive, as well as too demanding, to forthcoming “blow,” so that they while, Norway had problems pen- be a realistic aim in the foreseeable would not be taken by surprise. A etrating the European market. The future. If some of the principal ac- later decision in 1956 to furnish the fact that Norway remained outside tors had harbored hopes about bomb reactor under construction at Halden Euratom became an impediment to production being made possible by with cheap American heavy water gaining access to this important mar-

12 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 Astrid Forland changed circumstances, they must factors probably played a role. ing nationally controlled nuclear surely have been disappointed. If Gerhardsen’s action may well have weapons. This policy decision may anything, political developments been an indication that he had not have been linked to the big issue would later serve to take Norway quite relinquished early post-war plaguing NATO during this period, further away from any plans of an ambitions of Norway acting as a namely: the question of establishing indigenous nuclear arsenal. “bridge-builder” between the East a multilateral nuclear force, which The first important step in this and the West. Another likely factor would give the Germans access to process was Norway’s membership influencing his decision was inter- nuclear weapons within a suprana- in NATO, which meant that Norwe- nal party strategies. tional setting. This particular issue gian defense became an integral part It is important to bear in mind that became a stumbling block in the ne- of the alliance’s defense plans from the Labour Party was the dominant gotiations of the NPT and effectively 1954 onwards. Its membership im- force in Norwegian political life prevented any progress in the nego- plied that Norway was protected by throughout the post-war period, and tiations for years. The Norwegian the American nuclear umbrella, and Gerhardsen was its leading light for attitude on this issue was clear. Nor- that there were no legitimate mili- the first 20 years of this period. Since way had no desire to see a multilat- tary reasons to have indigenous the 1940s, the Labour Party had a eral nuclear force being set up and nuclear bombs. This view was strong left wing to contend with. The wholeheartedly supported the efforts voiced by then-Chief of the Defense left wing opposed the security policy to arrive at a nonproliferation treaty. Staff Ole Berg in 1954 when it be- of the party. The first big issue was Once the negotiations were brought came known through a report issued the question of NATO membership, to a successful conclusion, Norway by the Swedish Ministry of Defense which created a huge split within the ratified the treaty in 1969. that Sweden’s defense plans had party. The arming of NATO with Norway’s efforts to promote been enlarged to include nuclear nuclear weapons and the implemen- nuclear nonproliferation in the 1960s weapons. Commenting upon this tation of this policy in Norway was were above all connected with de- piece of news, Berg stated that the second issue that threatened to velopments within the IAEA and Norway’s military situation was split the party. Gerhardsen’s decla- Gunnar Randers’s personal involve- quite different from Sweden’s. ration at the NATO summit con- ment in the development of the While Sweden was a neutral coun- formed with a resolution made at the IAEA safeguards system. The try, Norway was protected through Labour Party convention earlier in IAEA’s efforts to develop a safe- NATO. He furthermore emphasized the year. Based on grass roots inter- guards system did indeed provide that Norway had not developed the vention, the convention decided as Randers with a new outlet for his capability of producing nuclear part of its next four-year program ambitions and energy. In 1960, he weapons.86 that nuclear weapons should not be was appointed Norway’s represen- The second step was contained in stationed on Norwegian territory. tative to the IAEA Board. At the first a statement made by Prime Minister That spring, Gerhardsen also had meeting he attended in January Einar Gerhardsen in 1957. Speaking assured the Soviet Union that Nor- 1960, he was, in his personal capac- at a NATO summit meeting in Paris way would not allow American spe- ity, appointed chairman of a safe- in December 1957, he declared that cial troops to supervise nuclear guards “working group.” The Board 88 Norway had decided to refuse the charges in Norway. Gerhardsen’s failed to reach consensus on a draft deployment of nuclear arms and the summit declaration may therefore be for a safeguards document, so the storage of nuclear ammunition on its interpreted both as a concession to working group was set up to produce territory in peacetime.87 His “No internal opposition, and as a reassur- a new draft taking into consideration Nukes in Peacetime Declaration” ance to the Russians. comments given by member coun- came as a total surprise, especially A third major step in the develop- tries on the Secretariat’s draft. The to his foreign minister, who had ment of Norway’s nuclear policy Randers’s working group produced wanted more careful wording. No was an assurance given by the gov- a new draft within a month, and, af- one knows exactly what prompted ernment in 1962 to the effect that ter further deliberations, the final Gerhardsen’s decision, but several Norway had no intention of acquir- Safeguards Document was agreed

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 13 Astrid Forland upon by a majority decision of the directed at preventing heavy water and Randers personally found a new Board in January 1961. Randers’s from reaching the Soviet bloc. To a role as a promoter of IAEA safe- involvement in the development of large extent, Norway shared the guards, which meant that Norway the IAEA safeguards regime contin- French resentment regarding Ameri- very early on accepted IAEA con- ued throughout the 1960s. For ev- can efforts to prevent other countries trol of its activities. However, the ery extension and revision of the first from developing a nuclear industry. Euratom countries’ refusal to accept safeguards document, the Randers’s Randers always felt certain that the IAEA control of the Eurochemic working group would come together Americans would sooner or later be plant hampered full IAEA control of and prepare a draft. Randers’s in- forced to relinquish their monopo- Norwegian activities for years. This volvement meant that efforts to listic policy, and the Atoms for Peace was part of a general problem that strengthen the IAEA’s role as the initiative seemed to fulfill his was not solved until the IAEA and main safeguarding body were ac- dreams. His somewhat megaloma- Euratom reached agreement for the tively supported by the Norwegian niac plans for a Norwegian nuclear application of IAEA, as well as government. Thus, Norway volun- materials and heavy water industry Euratom, safeguards on all nuclear teered to transfer its bilateral nuclear bear witness to the euphoria created materials in the non-weapon states cooperation agreement with the by the change in the American of the European Community. United States to IAEA safeguards policy. However, it soon became The history of Norway’s nuclear and to put all its nuclear activities evident that it was based on a gross odyssey shows how research on the under IAEA safeguards at an early miscalculation not only of Norway’s early nuclear age helps illuminate stage. However, the full implemen- potential in the field, but of the pros- current proliferation problems. tation of this policy was delayed for pects for nuclear developments in Events taking place during this early years due to Euratom’s refusal to let the world at large. Still, the Norwe- period shaped perceptions and influ- the IAEA inspect the Eurochemic gian investment in the building up enced the politics of later periods. 89 plant in Belgium. of a nuclear industry was consider- Indeed, several aspects of the nuclear able. It had its background in the period deserve to be researched more CONCLUSIONS early successes of the Institute for thoroughly. Atomic Energy and was based upon Norway’s nuclear history is im- the Labour government’s consistent For instance, there is probably a portant because of the lessons it support until the mid-1960s. The great deal more to be learned about holds for international nonprolifera- sale to Israel, at least in part, must patterns in international nuclear re- tion policy. The fact that one of the be seen in light of past ambitions for lations during the 1940s and 1950s, early leaders in the nuclear field creating a nuclear exports industry. when—in the absence of taboos or eventually did not develop a bomb The negotiations with Israel showed effective controls—numerous coun- or, indeed, develop a nuclear power Norway’s willingness to go far in the tries actively took part in nuclear industry, provides important evi- direction of treating nuclear trade research and development. One in- dence that proliferation is not inevi- like any other trade. This case also teresting question is how the two table. At the same time, however, seems to indicate a growing aware- European powers, France and the the Norwegian case highlights the ness of the political implications of United Kingdom, compensated for importance of safeguards and export such trade in the Foreign Ministry. the American refusal to provide their controls on stemming proliferation. However, it is striking to what ex- nuclear programs with assistance. To Norway contributed in a signifi- tent the handling of trade in the take but one example, we know that cant way to the development of the nuclear field seems to have been left the United Kingdom only reluctantly French and Israeli nuclear programs. to the technocrats for a long time. accepted President Eisenhower’s In the 1940s and 1950s, Norway had Atoms for Peace initiative.90 At the The Norwegian attitude towards no scruples about exporting heavy time of the launching of this pro- the handling of nuclear trade gradu- water to friendly countries. Interna- gram, the British felt that they had ally changed during the 1960s. In the tional nuclear trade was not officially finally managed to put their nuclear early 1960s, the Norwegian efforts regulated at that time, and what con- house in order: they had gotten the in the nuclear field went into decline, trol measures did exist were solely bomb and established close relations

14 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 Astrid Forland with Australia and South Africa, two Secretariat and the research directors, dated Oc- Curie...”); Gunnar Randers, Lysaar (Oslo: tober 10, 1946. Gyldendal, 1975), pp. 148-149; Bertrand of the major uranium-producing 11 Randers’s private papers, file entitled “IFA, Goldschmidt, Les Rivalités Atomiques 1939-1966 countries in the world. But do we 1946-1951,” “Kort oversikt over fysikkavdelingen (Paris: Fayard, 1967), p. 196. know all there is to know about the 1946/47” (“A short overview of the Physics divi- 34 Forland, “På leiting,” p. 15. sion 1946/47”). 35 Ibid., pp. 12-17, pp. 20-24. contents of this cooperation? 12 National Archives (Oslo), “Tekniske 36 The Ministry of Defense’s archives, secret file utredninger til Forsvarskommisjonen av 1946” (187/1), report by Randers from meeting with Another potentially interesting (“Technical Reports to the Defense Commission Joliot-Curie, October 20, 1949. field of research suggested by the of 1946”). 37 Forland, “På leiting,” pp. 22-23. Norwegian case is the plutonium 13 Jakob Sverdrup, Inn i storpolitikken 1940-1949 38 Forland, “Norsk atomenergipolitikk”; Forland, (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1996), pp. 223-234. “På leiting,” p. 20 ff.; J.M. van Splunter, “Love production which took place in the 14 This was the concluding chapter, entitled at first sight. Co-operation between the Nether- 1950s and 1960s, and especially the “Sammenfatning og konklusjon” (“Summary and lands and Norway on the peaceful uses of atomic Conclusion”). energy, 1950-1960,” IFS Info (Norwegian Insti- role that Eurochemic played in the 15 Technical report no. 9. tute for Defense Research, Oslo), No. 2 (1994). distribution of plutonium. More in- 16 Technical report no. 7. 39 Gowing, Independence, Vol. I, p. 342. formation on the way Eurochemic 17 Quoted from Technical report no. 7 (from dis- 40 Bertrand Goldschmidt, Les Rivalités Atomiques, cussion of air warfare). 1939-1966, p. 197. influenced the spread of IAEA safe- 18 Ibid, quote from closing remarks. 41 van Splunter, “Love...,” p. 27. guards in the pre-NPT period would 19 Randers’s private papers, “Opplysninger 42 Among the locations mentioned were a site in be especially valuable to the nonpro- angående fysikkavdelingens arbeidsprogram” the Netherlands; an unused merchant ship; and (“Information regarding the work program of the the reactor site at Kjeller. See ibid. liferation field. Physics Division”), dated January 22, 1947. 43 National Archives (Maryland), Department of 20 White Paper No. 118 (1947). State, General records, Special Assistant to the 21 Jens Chr. Hauge, interview with author, Oslo, Secretary for Energy and Outer Space, Records August 26, 1982. relating to atomic energy matters 1944-63, Lot- 22 Forland, “Norsk atomenergipolitikk.” files, 21.69. Country file: Norway, b. Atomic de- 23 Randers, Lysaar, pp. 30-45. velopment program, 1955, letter of March 29, 24 Margaret Gowing, Independence and Deter- 1955, from Howard A. Robinson to Gerard C. rence. Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952, Smith. Vol. 1 (London: Macmillan, 1974), p. 341, p. 347; 44 National Archives, Department of State, Gen- Astrid Forland, “På leiting etter uran. Institutt for eral records, Special Assistant to the Secretary for atomenergi og internasjonalt samarbeid, 1945- Energy and Outer Space, Records relating to 51,” Forsvarsstudier, No. 3 (1987), pp. 11-12. atomic energy matters 1944-63, Lot-files, 21.69. 25 1 Copy of “Gentlemen’s Agreement,” dated Country file: Norway, d. General, 1956. An earlier version of this paper was presented at March 9, 1940, in Bertrand Goldschmidt’s pri- 45 National Archives, Department of State, Gen- a workshop on “Nonproliferation Decisions: Les- vate papers; copy of letter of March 9, 1940 from eral records, Special Assistant to the Secretary for sons from Lesser Known Cases” held at the Axel Aubert to Jacques Allier, in Bertrand Energy and Outer Space, Records relating to Monterey Institute of International Studies, Au- Goldschmidt’s private papers. atomic energy matters 1944-63, Lot-files, 21.69. gust, 19-29, 1996. I would like to thank David 26 Copy of report by Jacques Allier entitled “Rap- Country file: Norway, d. General, 1956, letter of Fischer and Lars van Dassen for comments on port sur la mise à disposition du Gouvernement December 5, 1955 from Howard A. Robinson to that first version of the paper. 2 francais du stock l’eau lourde de la Société Gerhard C. Smith. Bertrand Goldschmidt, “The supplies of Nor- Norvégienne de l’Azote (mars 1940),” dated De- 46 “Intet å skjule om atomhistorien,” Aftenposten wegian heavy water to France and the early de- cember 1944, in Bertrand Goldschmidt’s private (Oslo), December, 10, 1993, p. 3. velopment of atomic energy,” IFS Info, No. 4 papers. 47 Interview with Torjorn Sikkeland in Aftenposten (1995), pp. 24-26. 27 3 Bertrand Goldschmidt, “The supplies of heavy (Oslo), December 9, 1993, p.3. Astrid Forland, “Norsk atomenergipolitikk, water to France and the early development of 48 Statement by Professor Jan Olav Liljenzin 1945-1951” (Master’s thesis in history, Univer- nuclear energy,” IFS Info (Norwegian Institute for quoted in Aftenposten, September 8, 1993, p. 3. sity of Bergen, 1985), pp. 54-55; Tor Arne Defense Studies, Oslo), No. 4 (1995), p. 25. 49 “Intet å skjule om atomhistorien,” Aftenposten, Eilertsen, “Fra FOTU til FFI. Grunnleggingen av 28 Ibid. December 10, 1993, p. 3. norsk forsvarsteknologisk forskning, 1942-1946” 29 For an account on the development of French 50 van Splunter, “Love...,” pp. 39-41. (Master’s thesis, University of Bergen, 1987). 51 4 nuclear research and its contribution to the war Ibid. Astrid Forland, “Atomer for krig eller fred? effort, see for instance, Spencer R. Weart, Scien- 52 “Sveitsisk atombombegranskning: Norsk plu- Etableringa av Institutt for atomenergi, 1945-48,” tists in Power (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer- tonium til salgs,” Aftenposten, June 29, 1996, p. Forsvarsstudier, No. 2 (1988), p. 13. 5 sity Press, 1979). 3. Gunnar Randers, Lysaar (Oslo: Gyldendal, 30 Forland, “På leiting,” p. 12 ff. 53 Ibid. 1975), pp. 88 and 106. 31 54 6 The Institute for Atomic Energy’s archives, Odd Karsten Tveit, Alt for Israel. Oslo-Jerusa- Forland, “Norsk atomenergipolitikk,” pp. 52-53; folder entitled “Oslo arkiv, avd. Kjeller. (L12-9),” lem, 1948-78 (Oslo: J.W. Cappelens Forlag, Forland, “Atomer,” pp. 11-12. 7 report by Odd Dahl from a visit by Dahl and 1996), p. 256. The White Paper is printed in the Records of the Randers to England, France, and Belgium in Janu- 55 National Archives, Department of State, Gen- Storting, published on an annual basis. 8 ary and February 1948. eral records, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Gunnar Randers, Atomkraften. Verdens håp eller 32 Forland, “På leiting,” p. 14. Energy and Outer Space, Records relating to undergang (Oslo: J.W. Cappelens forlag, 1946), 33 Norwegian Ministry of Defense archives, se- atomic energy matters 1944-63, Lot no. 57D688, p. 5. cret files, H-187/1, report by Gunnar Randers 21.50 Country file: Israel, f. Reactor, 1961, part 1 9 Ibid., pp. 217-218. 10 entitled “Samtale med professor Joliot-Curie, of 2, secret report entitled “Implication of the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment’s 20.10.49” (“Conversation with Professor Joliot- Acquisition by Israel of Nuclear Weapons Capa- archives, file 70, 1946, letter from Randers to the

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 15 Astrid Forland bility,” dated January 31, 1961. 73 Ibid. 28 (The Debates of the Riksdag. Second Cham- 56 Tveit, Alt, p. 263. 74 National Archives, Department of State, Gen- ber. No. 28). 57 See for instance, letter of July 26, 1958, with eral Records, Special Assistant to the Secretary 90 Astrid Forland, “Hope over Fear. The Estab- enclosure from Robert W. Mckinney (U.S. Am- for Energy and Outer Space, Records relating to lishment of the International Atomic Energy bassador to the IAEA) to Foster Dulles, in Na- atomic energy matters 1944-63, 21.69. Country Agency,” Forsvarsstudier, No. 3 (1995). tional Archives (Maryland), State Department, file: Norway, d. General, 1956, letter of June 29, Central files, 398.1901-IAEA/7-2658. 1954 from Gerard C. Smith to Elbert G. Mathews, 58 See for instance, letter of May 15, 1958 from counselor of U.S. Embassy, Oslo. the Director General of the IAEA Sterling Cole to 75 National Archives, Department of State, Gen- President Eisenhower, in Foreign Relations of the eral Records, Special Assistant to the Secretary United States, 1958-60, Vol. VII, part 1, no. 20. for Energy and Outer Space, Records relating to 59 Tveit, Alt, p. 262. atomic energy matters 1944-63, Lot-files, 21.69. 60 Ibid., pp. 261-262. Country file: Norway, b. Atomic development pro- 61 Ibid., p.263. gram, 1955, memorandum for the files entitled 62 See for instance Allan McKnight, Atomic Safe- “Heavy water,” dated February 14, 1955. guards. A study in international verification (New 76 Ibid. York: UNITAR, 1971). 77 PRO, FO 371/125198, letter of February 2, 63 See for instance, records from the first nuclear 1955, from J.V. Dunworth to Sir John Cockcroft. suppliers discussions in London in February- 78 National Archives, Department of State, Gen- March 1959 regarding safeguards on nuclear is- eral Records, Special Assistant to the Secretary sues, in Public Records Office (Kew), FO 371/ of Energy and Outer Space, Records relating to 140594. atomic energy matters 1944-63, Lot-files, 21.69. 64 Tveit, Alt, p. 262 ff. Country file: Norway, b. Atomic development pro- 65 Ibid., p. 265. gram, 1955, memorandum of March 11, 1955. 66 Ibid., pp. 264-266. 79 National Archives, Department of State, Gen- 67 PRO, FO 371/135517, letter of September 22, eral Records, Special Assistant to the Secretary 1958 from Atomic Energy Authority to Atomic of Energy and Outer Space, Records relating to Energy Office (FO); letter of September 25, 1958 atomic energy matters 1944-63, Lot-files, 21.69. from Foreign Office to Atomic Energy Authority. Country file: Norway, b. Atomic development pro- 68 Tveit, Alt, p. 271. gram, 1955, letter of February 18, 1955 from 69 Ibid., pp. 269-274. Philip Farley to Howard A. Robinson. 70 Ibid., pp. 273-275. 80 National Archives, Department of State, Gen- 71 Norway’s inspection rights were used. The in- eral Records, Special Assistant to the Secretary spection took place in connection with a visit by of Energy and Outer Space, Records relating to Jens Christian Hauge to Israel in 1962. Hauge atomic energy matters 1944-63, Lot-files, 21.69. discovered nothing suspicious, and no more in- Country file: Norway, b. Atomic development pro- spections were carried out in Israel by the Nor- gram, 1955, letter of February 24, 1955 from wegians. In the wake of Mordechai Vanunu’s Howard A. Robinson to Philip Farley (Deputy to revelations of the Israeli nuclear weapons program the Special Assistant to the Secretary). to the Sunday Times in 1986, Gary Milhollin of 81 Odd Viggo Nilsen, “Noratom og drommen om the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control en norsk atomindustri,” TMV Working Paper was influential in persuading the Norwegian gov- (published by the Center for Technology and ernment to try to exercise its inspection rights in Human Values, University of Oslo), No. 54 (April Israel. Having refused an inspection by the IAEA, 1992), p. 19; Randers, Lysaar, pp. 244-249. Israel in 1988 said it would allow Norwegian rep- 82 Nilsen, “Noratom,” p. 18. resentatives to inspect about nine tons of heavy 83 Ibid., p. 29. water away from the reactor site. Israel claimed 84 Ibid., pp. 30-31. that the remaining 12 tons had been lost during 85 See for instance, Bjarne Åsgard, Strilekrigen operations. Influenced by critical media coverage, mot atomkraft. Ei soge om sivil ulydnad (Knarvik: the Norwegian government did not accept the Is- private edition, 1994). raeli offer. In the end, Norway bought back 10.5 86 National Archives, Department of State, Gen- tons of heavy water from the Israeli government eral records, Special Assistant to the Secretary for in order to avoid further embarrassment. For fur- Energy and Outer Space, Records relating to ther details, see Milhollin’s numerous publica- atomic energy matters, Lot-files, 21.69 Country tions, including Gary Milhollin, “Who Controls file: Norway, letter of November 5, 1954 from the Israeli Bomb?” Arbeiderbladet (Oslo), Janu- Howard A. Robinson to Gerard C. Smith. ary 21, 1987; and Gary Milhollin, “Heavy Water 87 Rolf Tamnes, The United States and the Cold Cheaters,” Foreign Policy (Winter 1987-1988). War in the High North (Oslo: Ad notam forlag, 72 Quoted from the letter of November 5, 1954 1991), p. 164; Berge Furre, Vårt Hundreår. Norsk from Howard A. Robinson (Special Assistant to historie 1905-1990 (Oslo: Det Norske Samlaget, the Ambassador in Paris) to Gerard C. Smith, Spe- 1991), p. 287. cial Assistant to the Secretary, in National Ar- 88 Rolf Tamnes, The United States and the Cold chives, State Department, General Records, War in the High North (Oslo: Ad notam forlag, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Energy and 1991), p. 162. Outer Space, Records relating to atomic energy 89 See for instance, minutes from a debate about matters 1944-63, Lot-files, 21.69. Country file: this issue in Sweden’s National Assembly: Norway, d. General, 1956. Riksdagsdebatterna 1967. Andra kammaren. Nr.

16 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997