BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS IN FOREIGN POLICY MAKING A CASE STUDY OF PAKISTAN’S POLICY TOWARDS AFGHAN TALIBAN 1996-2016
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment for the award of the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
by
BASHARAT ALI
SCHOOL OF POLITICS AND INTERNTIONAL RELATIONS QUAID-I-AZAM UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD APRIL 2020
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DEDICATION To All those who Guided and Helped
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CONTENTS
ABSTRACT vii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS viii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ix
LIST OF MAPS xi
LIST OF TABLES xii
LIST OF DIAGRAMS xiii
GLOSSARY xiv
INTRODUCTION 1
CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 37 1.1 Theorization of Foreign Policy and Decision Making 1.2 Decision-making in Foreign Policy 1.3 Illustration of Bureaucratic Politics Model 1.4 Critique on Allison‟s Governmental Politics Model 1.5 Theoretical Construct
CHAPTER 2: PAKISTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING PRISM-1996-2016 58 2.1 Historical Context 2.2 Benazir Bhutto Era 1993-1996 2.3 Nawaz Sharif Era 1997 to 1999 2.4 Pervez Musharraf Era 2000-2008 2.5 Zardari Era 2008-2013 2.6 Nawaz Sharif Era 2013-2016
CHAPTER 3: PAKISTAN’S POLICY DECISION MAKING TOWARDS TALIBAN 1996-2016 92 3.1 General Zia Era (1977-1988): The Foundation 3.2 Benazir Bhutto Era (1988-1991): The Legacy 3.3 Nawaz Sharif Era (1991-1993): The Continuity 3.4 Benazir Bhutto Era (1993-1996): Emergence of Taliban 3.5 Nawaz Sharif Era (1996-1998): Recognition of Taliban Regime 3.6 Pervez Musharraf Era (1999-2008): Parting Ways with Taliban 3.7 Zardari Era (2008-2013): Pakistan under Attack 3.8 Nawaz Sharif Era (2013-2016): Negotiating with Taliban and QCG
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CHAPTER 4: IMPACT OF BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS ON PAKISTAN’S TALIBAN POLICY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 148 4.1 Recognition of Taliban Regime 4.2 Policy Shift and Parting Ways with Taliban 4.3 QCG Initiative and Pakistan‟s Policy 4.4 Important Findings and Core Reflections
CONCLUSION 177
BIBLOGRAPHY 182
ANNEXURES 190 1. Questionnaire 2. Political, Bureaucratic and Military Establishment 1988-2016 3. The National Assembly of Pakistan, Approval for Formulation of Committees, 1993 4. National Assembly Secretariat, Final Recommendations of the Sub-committee on Pak-Afghan Relations-2016 5. Guidelines for Revised Terms of Engagement with USA/NATO/ISAF and General Foreign Policy by Parliamentary Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2012 6. Afghan Jihadi Groups 7. Peshawar Peace Accord, April 1992 8. Islamabad Afghan Peace Accord, December 1992 9. Unanimous Resolution passed by the National Assembly, May 1997, to Congratulate Prime Minister and foreign Minister 10. Views by former Director General, Inter-Service Intelligence, on Pakistan‟s Policy towards Afghan Taliban;1996-2017 11. The USA Embassy (Pakistan) cable about Pakistan‟s efforts to convince Taliban to Cooperate, September 2001 12. Wikileaks about Pakistan‟s Inter-Services Intelligence working Style 13. US Department of State, as per Former President Musharraf: US-Pakistan Relationship at New Low, October 2011
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ABSTRACT
This research seeks to explain Pakistan‟s foreign policy decisions towards Afghan Taliban from 1996-2016. The study analyses the decision making process, involving the bureaucrats of foreign office and security establishment while dealing with three major policy decisions. 1) Extending recognition to Afghan Taliban Regime in May 1997; 2) Parting ways with Afghan Taliban in October 2001, after 9/11 incident in USA; and 3) Joining Quadrilateral Coordination Group for Afghan peace process in December 2015. The central hypothesis of the thesis is that Pakistan foreign policy outcomes to deal with Afghan Taliban from 1996 to 2016 were mainly impacted by the bureaucratic politics among civil and military bureaucrats. The first part of the thesis pertains to reviewing the literature on bureaucratic politics in decision making; with special reference to Pakistan‟s foreign policy projections towards Afghanistan. Then the theoretical and conceptual framework is explained to develop an understanding of Pakistan‟s foreign policy making structure and policy formulation process. The prism of Pakistan foreign policy from 1996 to 2016 has been analyzed with special reference to the leadership roles of the political elite, civil bureaucracy and military bureaucracy, operating within the prevailing internal and external environment relevant to the given case studies. In this background, the study evaluates various policy alternatives with the dominant consideration of policy decisional pursuits. It seeks to reconstruct the decision making process while deciphering the construction of alternatives in a competitive environment under the tenant of bureaucratic politics through pulling and hauling. The pertinent evidence to relevant case studies is sought through interviews (primary source) from the specific senior political, civil and security hierarchy, responsible for major policy decisions towards Afghan Taliban. The study determines the preferential considerations (security, economic and political) towards rational decisions in developing consensus about the ultimate aggregated decision to serve the national interests. It does so by capturing the perceptions and developing preferences by decision players though their presented stances or positions while entering in a decision game; which were different to what they got adjusted for the final aggregated decision outcome. The nature of squeezing others decision space by the “influence potential” retained by respective player in any given decision making arena confirms the significant usefulness of Bureaucratic Politics Model in a developing country like Pakistan.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS From the core of my heart, thanks to respectable Prof. Nazir Hussain for his persistent guidance and scholarly supervision. I am indebted to him for his valuable input which enabled this thesis to see the light at the end of the tunnel. Special gratitude to relevant senior civil and military officers for sharing their valuable insight on the study.
Special thanks to my family; wife, daughters and son who cooperated and supported me at each stage. Last but not the least, lot of thanks to School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, staff (office/library) in finalizing this thesis.
Basharat Ali September 25, 2019
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ABBREVIATIONS AIG Afghan Interim Government ANA Afghan National Army Annex Annexure ANP Awami National Party APTTA Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement AUG Afghan Unity Government CARs Central Asian Republics CIA Central Intelligence Agency COAS Chief of Army Staff CSF Coalition Support Fund DDG Deputy Director General Dir Director DG Director General DG ISI Director General Inter Services Intelligence ETIM East Turkmenistan Islamic Movement FO Foreign Office FATA Federally Administered Tribal Area Gen General HPC High Peace Council IHK Indian Held Kashmir GWOT Global War on Terrorism IMU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan ISAF International Security Assistance Force ISI Inter Services Intelligence ISPR Inter Services Public Relations KPK Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Lt Gen Lieutenant General LJ Loya Jirga MMA Mutahidda Majlis-e-Amal MQM Mohajir Qaumi Movement
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MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs NDS National Directorate of Security NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NA Northern Alliance /National Assembly No Number OEF Operation Enduring Freedom PML-N Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz PML-Q Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid-e-Azam PDPA Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan PM Prime Minister QCG Quadrilateral Coordination Group RAW Research and Analysis Wing Sect Secretariat TNSM Tehrike Nifaz-e-Shariat-Muhammadi TTP Tahrike Taliban Pakistan UN United Nations US United States VOL Volume
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LIST OF DIAGRAMS 2.1 Structure of Pakistan‟s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 59 2.2 Broad outline of Pakistan Armed Forces 61 2.3 Outline Structure of Inter Services Intelligence 62 2.4 Pakistan Foreign Policy Decision Channel 64 2.5 Pakistan Foreign Policy Decision Making Process 66 2.6 Afghan Taliban Organization 75
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LIST OF TABLES 1.1 Panoramic View of Major Foreign Policy Decision Making Models 40 1.2 Summary of Alison and Zelikow‟s Bureaucratic Politics Model 46 3.1 Timeline of Main Events, Towards Recognition of Taliban Regime-1997: Case Study-1 104 3.2 Foreign Office and Security Establishment Stance/Position for Taliban Regime Recognition,1996-97 112 3.3 Interview List of Relevant Decision Players, Case Study-1 113 3.4 Timeline of Pakistan‟s Parting Ways with Afghan Taliban-2001: Case Study-2 116 3.5 Foreign Office and Security Establishment Stance/Position on Policy Decision of Parting Ways with Taliban in 2001 129 3.6 Interview List of Relevant Decision Players, Case Study-2 129 3.7 Summed up Activities related to Quadrilateral Coordination Group in 2015: Case Study-3 135 3.8 Foreign Office and Security Establishment Officials‟ Stance/Position about Decision to Join Quadrilateral Coordination Group 142 3.9 Interview List of Relevant Decision Players, Case Study-3 143 3.10 Interview List of some Officials, Indirectly linked to Decision Making 144 4.1 Process about Reaching to an Aggregated Policy Decision in Case Study-1 151 4.2 Process about Reaching to an Aggregated Policy Decision in Case Study-2 161 4.3 Process about reaching to an Aggregated Policy Decision in Case Study-3 167
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LIST OF MAPS 2.1 Taliban Held Areas in Afghanistan-1996 78 3.1 Bordering Areas Along Pak-Afghan Border 91 3.2 Eastern and Western Borders of Pakistan 94 3.3 Area Controlled by Taliban and Northern Alliance 105 3.4 Shamsi and Jaccobabad Air Bases 128 3.5 Pak-Afghan Border Area, Slala Post 133 3.6 NATO Forces Logistic Routs through Pakistan 133
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GLOSSARY
Afghan Unity Government: A collation Government formed on the behest of US as a result of no clear majority to any party in Afghanistan general elections 2014. New government could choose to understate the current vulnerability of Afghanistan‟s foreign relationships with its allies, including the U.S., or simply ignore it.
Afghan Interim Government: This is the provisional list of the 30-member interim administration for Afghanistan which was approved on December 5, 2001 by four Afghan delegations meeting near Bonn, Germany.
Al-Qaeda: Translation: "The Base" "The Foundation" or "The Fundamental" is a militant Sunni Islamist multi-national organization founded in 1988 by Osama bin Laden, Abdullah Azzam, and several other Arab volunteers who fought against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s.
Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement: The Afghanistan–Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (also known as APTTA) is a bilateral trade agreement signed in 2010 by Pakistan and Afghanistan that calls for greater facilitation in the movement of goods amongst the two countries.
Bureaucratic Politics Model: Bureaucratic politics theories or explanations of why particular public policy decisions got made the way they did stress the motivation by the relevant officials in the government bureaucracy to protect or promote their own agency's special interests (in competition with other agencies) as a major motivating factor in shaping the timing and the content of government decisions.
Bureaucracy: It refers to both a body of non-elective government officials and an administrative policy-making group.
Chief Executive: It is the position of the most senior corporate officer, executive, leader or administrator in charge of managing an organization, especially an independent legal entity such as a company or non-profit institution. In 1999 as a result of military coup General Pervez Musharraf took over the government and adopted for himself the title of “Chief Executive” instead of being called Chief Marital Law Administrator.
Civil Establishment: Civil Structure and various organizations in a government setup having legitimacy to perform their role for the betterment of the state affairs and community wellbeing.
Coalition Support Fund: Pakistan receives foreign aid from several countries and international organizations for its extended facilities and cooperation towards global war on terrorism being fought in Afghanistan since 2001. Since the start of the War in Afghanistan, the majority of the aid comes from the United States via the Coalition Support Fund which is reimbursed to Pakistan for counter-terrorism operations.
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Decision Equilibrium: A state reached at by the competing decision players for achieving best policy option through accommodating the competing preferences.
Decision Game: it is an exercise in which one presents other with a scenario, asks them to take on the role of a character in that scenario, and then asks them to solve problems as if they were that character.
Durand Line: The 2,450 km border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Durand Line was established in 1893 and is named after Sir Mortimer Durand, The foreign secretary of the British-India Government.
Decision Process: It is the process of making choices by identifying a decision, gathering information, and assessing alternative resolutions.
Doha Afghan Peace Process: Qatar played a major role in facilitating peace talks between Afghan officials and the Taliban by opening an office for the group in Doha in 2013. Participants included Americans, Afghans and Taliban.
Economic Concerns: The fundamental economic problem faced by human society and business operators is how to allocate scarce resources to the provision of various goods and services within the economy. Pakistan economic concern with reference to Afghanistan revolves around attaining trade access to Central Asian States and un- interrupted gas supply from Turkmenistan via gas pipe line through Afghanistan.
Establishment: It generally denotes a dominant group or elite that holds power or authority in a nation or organization.
Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA): It is a semi-autonomous tribal region in northwestern Pakistan, consisting of seven tribal agencies (districts) and six frontier regions, and are directly governed by Pakistan's federal government through a special set of laws called the Frontier Crimes Regulations. Since May 31, 2018, FATA has been officially merged with Khyber Pukhtunkhwa (KPK).
Geneva Accords: The Geneva Accords, known formally as the agreements on the settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan with regard to withdrawal to soviet troops who invaded Afghanistan in 1979, were signed on 14 April 1988 at the Geneva Headquarters of the United Nations, between Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the United States and the Soviet Union serving as guarantors.
Haqqani Network: The Haqqani network is an Afghan guerilla insurgent group using asymmetric warfare to fight against US-led NATO forces and the government of Afghanistan.
High Peace Council: The Afghanistan High Peace Council (HPC) is a body of the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program, established by Hamid Karzai to negotiate with elements of the Taliban.
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Inter Services Intelligence (ISI): The premier intelligence agency of Pakistan, operationally responsible for gathering, processing, and analyzing national security information from around the world.
Interference: The term interference means to intrude, to force, to impede and to encumber others in their personal matters, and progress.
Jihad: The Arabic word "jihad" is often translated as "holy war," but in a purely linguistic sense, the word "jihad" means struggling or striving.
Jihadi or Jihadist: It refers to a person who believes that an Islamic state governing the entire community of Muslims must be created and that this necessity justifies violent conflict with those who stand in its way.
Localitus: It implies to a state where a country‟s diplomats in other countries start talking on some issue, the same as per the local stance of the host government. Such diplomats are termed or labeled as localitus in diplomatic community.
Loya Jirga: In the Pashtunwali, a code of laws of the Pashtun peoples living in areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan and neighboring countries.
Military Establishment: Armed Forces organizational Structure and potential to perform security role against the internal as well as external threat. They have a role also towards the internal stability of a country particularly in third world countries. In foreign policy decisions major representation comes from the lead intelligence agency.
Mullah: It is the name given to teachers or scholars of Islamic learning or the leaders of mosques.
Northern Alliance: Also known as the United Islamic Front for Salvation of Afghanistan (UIFSA) was a coalition of militias seeking to topple the rule of the Taliban throughout Afghanistan.
Organizational Behavior Model: A discipline is an accepted science that is based upon theoretical foundation, whereas OB is an inter-disciplinary approach where knowledge from different disciplines like psychology, sociology, anthropology, etc. are included. It is used to solve organizational problems, especially those related to human beings.
Operation Enduring Freedom: It began on 7 October 2001 in Afghanistan by the US, four weeks after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on America.
Pakistan’s Interest in Afghanistan: Explaining six particular factors which are vital to Pakistan's policy calculations in Afghanistan those are mitigation of Indian
xviii influence, economic interests, the Durand Line dispute, Balochistan secessionist movement, the issue of „Pashtunistan‟ and trade route to CARs.
Pakistan National Alliance: It constituted of nine religious and political parties. It was formed in 1977 in which the alliances agreed to run as a single bloc to overthrow the rule of Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.
Foreign Policy Prism: An approach to build foreign relationship to secure national interests of a country. This serves as a lens to calibrate policy response and determining other inter-state relationship activities.
Quadrilateral Coordination Group: On February 6, 2016, the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) was formed. It consists of the US, Pakistan, Afghanistan and China to pursue peace with Afghan Taliban. It held six round table talks to discuss the Afghan-led peace and reconciliation efforts by the stake holders, less Taliban.
Quetta Shura: The Quetta Shura is a militant organization which is composed of the leaders of the Afghan Taliban, and believed to be based, since 2001, within the city of Quetta in the Balochistan province of Pakistan.
Rational Actor Model: The rational actor model is a linchpin of Foreign Policy Decision Making (FPDM). Paul MacDonald (2003, 551) contends that many see it “as the most plausible candidate for a universal theory of political and social behavior, whose simple and intuitively plausible assumptions hold the promise of unifying the diverse subfields of political science.
Security Concerns: Someone or something that is a risk to safety.
Shura: The process of decision-making by consultation and deliberation.
Taliban: The Taliban in Afghanistan are the activists who were accused of providing a sanctuary to Osama Bin Laden and the al-Qaeda movement who were blamed for the 9/11attacks in the US.
Tora Bora Mahaz: It is a militant group operating in Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan.
Tahrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: It is an Islamic extremist organization seeking to overthrow Pakistan's government and expel US forces from Afghanistan.
Yellow Force: Reportedly it is the code name of American special group which is expert and equipped for taking out nuclear weapons or neutralizing these weapons or disposing it off after taking out from the storage. In 2002, the US was reported to have stationed this component of force in Afghanistan with its futuristic employment either towards Pakistan or Iran.
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INTRODUCTION The foreign policy performance of a country is an outcome of a state's endeavors to optimize its objectives at the system level. The policy projections of any state revolve around a state‟s plans to ward off external dangers and deriving benefits from the world comity, which are essential for the realization of its national interests. The nation-state system in the world is composed of subsystem of nations which interact among themselves for securing respective national interests. To comprehend complexities and perplexities of inter-state behavior it is essential to have a critical study of the foreign policy dynamics of a state. In addition, since the world has become more interdependent hence foreign policy analysis is emerging as a complex and challenging study.
Intellectual reasoning for possible policy options, by officials engaged in decision- making process, leads to proposed policy choices, which in turn become focus for further discussions. Ultimate decisions are the outcome of these discussions and the final approval of country's executive is sought for final policy intervention prior to its implementation. The participation in such discussions by the government officials is based on the scope and conditions of the issue concerned and its relevance to their organization. These discussions are also impacted by the perceptions of the existing opportunities and limitations as per given 'context' and 'construct' of a particular foreign policy issue. These policy decision-making processes at primary level have been a key area of interest for the foreign policy analysts. In general, the realpolitik analyses of foreign policy are presumed to be based on securing power and national interests. Also it is argued that human decision-making is central to the interpretation of foreign policy actions. These decisions and procedures, dominated by rationality, remain the backbone of any ultimate foreign policy decision outcome. The 'procedure rationality' occurs when an actor engages in a systematic process, including reasoning, to enable him/her to achieve the goals, which are already in mind. Pakistan's foreign policy decision-making processes have also been subjected to these rational procedures.
Pakistan came into being in 1947 as a result of the division of the Indian Subcontinent, which was then the British colony. Geographically, Pakistan‟s location in South Asia has a strategic importance. It has China, a friendly country, in the
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North. India lies in the East, with whom Pakistan has troubled relationship owing to various contentious issues. In the South, Pakistan has 750 kilometer long coastline along Arabian Sea, and Iran lies in South West, with which Pakistan has generally good relations. On the Western side, it is Afghanistan, a landlocked country. Due to poverty and conflict in Afghanistan, Pakistan has been suffering on account of illicit trade, drug trafficking, terrorism, gun running and millions of Afghan refugees on the Pakistani soil.
Since its inception, Pakistan has been experiencing a mixture of democratic and military rules in the country. There have been serious challenges for Pakistan to manage foreign relations with its neighbors, especially India and Afghanistan. Diplomatic relations with Afghanistan generally have remained tense due to number of reasons, even before the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion in 1979 engendered such instability in Afghanistan, which had serious spillover effects on Pakistan. Since mid-1990s, another irritating issue for Pakistan has been the growing influence of its arch-enemy India in Afghan decision-making mechanism to target Pakistan. The shelter provided by Afghanistan to Pakistani insurgents in Afghanistan and their use by National Directorate of Security (NDS) and Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), Afghanistan & India‟s intelligence agencies respectively, to create instability in Khyber Pakhtunkha (KPK) and Balochistan is a big worry at the government level in Islamabad. Pakistan shares around 2400 kilometers border with Afghanistan. About 700 kilometers of this border, known as Durand Line, is considered by Afghanistan as disputed one; whereas, Pakistan considers it a recognized border under all the established international rules and conventions. Durand Line lies in the north-east of Pakistan and it is being fenced by Pakistan. The Pashtun ethnicity lives on both sides of the Durand Line. The Pashtuns on Afghanistan side have been the major fighting machine to evict the Soviet occupation in 1989. In this fighting effort, they did have the support of Muslim States, including Pakistan. The US and Saudi Arabia were main sponsors to fund, and CIA was there to coordinate through Pakistan lead agency, Inter-Services Intelligence, (ISI), the entire effort of Jihad against the Soviet Union from 1979 to 1989. Subsequently, the withdrawal of the Soviet Union in 1989 left a power vacuum in Afghanistan as the ex- Jihadi groups started fighting among themselves. The vacuum was ultimately filled in by the emergence of Taliban in 1994. Taliban emerged in Pashtun belt of eastern
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Afghanistan and ruled the war-torn country from 1996 to 2001. Taliban regime fell in 2001 as a result of the US invasion to destroy Al-Qaeda, the purported sponsor of 9/11 attacks, present in Afghanistan. Taliban fighting strength melted down and they took refuge in the countryside and some came to Pakistan for hiding. Since 2001, the Taliban are fighting the US and lately have gained more strength in the battlefield. As a result, the Taliban continue to be an important factor in the strategic calculus of Pakistan‟s national security environment.
Statement of the Problem The policy of Pakistan towards Afghan Taliban from 1996 to 2016 has been witnessing periodic highs and lows. In this regard, various alternatives of foreign policy options and choices have been tried as a result of the joint efforts of civil and military establishments. In the lead up to any final policy approval for such decisions, the role played by various decisional players (civil and military bureaucracy) has been a major contributor for constructing various policy options. But the role played and amount of influence on the final decision outcome by these players have not been known. Such outcomes have been shrouded by an aura of secrecy as state secrets. However, at the same time, these foreign policy decisions are of paramount academic interest in the field of International Relations.
The relevant bureaucrats play a key role in decision-making mechanism owing to the authority vested in them due to their placement in ministerial and organizational hierarchies. Pakistan‟s Afghan policy choices and options have been the result of rigorous decision-making processes among these bureaucrats. These processes generally follow an unstructured approach as such decisions are seldom documented nor are these made public. In the analytical pursuit to find out possible answers to various queries pertaining to the decision-making processes, it is highly pertinent to study as to how these bureaucrats use their respective turf to compete for their influence on final decision outcomes.
The outcomes of foreign policy decisions in Pakistan are considerably influenced by the relative power positions enjoyed by various bureaucrats as per their respective roles; either in civil or military establishment. The bureaucrats while representing their ministries and departments engage in 'bureaucratic politics' among themselves to
3 reach various decision outcomes for different foreign policy pursuits. The other political entities, like the Cabinet, the Prime Minister's office or Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs in the National Assembly and Senate also have their share towards policy making. Pakistan‟s foreign policy projection towards Afghan Taliban has been primarily the outcome of such bureaucratic politics among civil and military bureaucrats.
The foreign policy decisions towards Taliban from 1996 to 2016 emerged after having passed through the process of bureaucratic politics amongst various decisional actors in a 'realist paradigm.' Yet, there is very little known about the magnitude of respective role played by various bureaucrats towards the final foreign policy decisions. In addition, it is important as well as pertinent to dissect those aspects which contributed towards the perception building and allocation of this perception to final policy outcomes of various players. In broad policy decision spectrum, various policy alternatives were crafted at various time periods within the Pakistani bureaucrats (establishment) which were dealing with the Afghan Taliban. But the key details about the decision-making processes and ways of reaching an aggregated final policy outcomes, which this study aims to provide, have remain hidden from the academic scrutiny, creating a grey area in the foreign policy analysis in Pakistan. Three case studies while dealing Afghan Taliban i.e. recognition of Taliban Regime in 1997, parting ways with Taliban in 2001 and reestablishing contact with Taliban under QCG program for Afghanistan peace in 2015 have been focused to analyze the role of bureaucracies in foreign policy decision-making of Pakistan towards Taliban during 1996-2016.
Significance of the Study This study attempts to explore the interplay of bureaucratic politics for arriving at an aggregated foreign policy decision outcome among the government officials. The scope of the study is to evaluate Pakistan‟s Afghan Taliban policy decision-making from 1996 to 2016 with the help of Bureaucratic Politics Model of Graham T. Allison. A holistic review of the decision-making process and an analysis of the role played by various government officials or bureaucrats (to be termed as decision-making players) is an uphill task. The aim of this study is to analyze the process through which various decisions related to Afghan Taliban were made i.e. squeezing each other‟s place and
4 reaching an aggregated decision by having pulling and hauling among decision- making players. In the processes, as the study proceeds, focus is to identify the role played by bureaucrats to come up with the decision outcomes which can be termed as “resultants.” This study attempts to explore the pulling and hauling indulged in by the decision-making players to get their viewpoint impact the final decision and how, eventually, the divergent views are accommodated or otherwise towards an “aggregated” final policy decision.
Generally, there are many studies discussing the decision-making processes and contributions made by the bureaucrats about foreign policy decision-making practices in the developed countries. The foreign policy analyses of developing countries are rather infrequent, which could shed a critical light on bureaucratic politics perspective in foreign policy decision-making. Hence, such foreign policy analysis remains equally important for developing countries. Within the foreign policy process analysis, the system and state level analyses are considered more important and are undertaken selectively more frequently. However, it is contended that the importance and efficacy of the third level i.e. individual or actor specific level is even more desirable to be done, especially when it remains a less frequented by foreign policy analysts. This study proffers the analysis about the individual level attributes of bureaucrats (civil and military) and their impact on Pakistan‟s foreign policy prescriptions towards Afghan Taliban from 1996 to 2016. This study aims at bridging the understanding gap as far as decision-making processes and bureaucratic politics in Pakistan vis-à-vis its policy towards Afghan Taliban is concerned.
Objectives of the Study The study aims at establishing a link between the role played by bureaucratic politics and various policy outcomes for the pursuance of Pakistan‟s foreign policy towards Afghan Taliban from 1996 to 2016. The main objectives of the study are; 1. To better comprehend the foreign policy decision-making processes in Pakistan 2. To enquire about the prism of Pakistan‟s foreign policy channels towards Afghanistan from 1996-2016
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3. To determine how much “pulling and hauling” of main decision players have a role in arriving at aggregated decisions among bureaucrats which impacted the specific policy outcomes regarding the Afghan Taliban 4. To determine as to which arm of bureaucracy i.e. civil or military, prevails for the final foreign policy outcomes and why.
Literature Review The process of foreign policy making has attracted a lot of academic interest and production of literature, both in the domain of theory and practice, to critically understand the entire spectrum of International Relations and Politics. Interplay between Foreign Policy for conducting international relations has been focus of academia. Some scholars have exclusively focused on policy formulation processes and decisional mechanisms for the foreign policy. The succeeding paragraphs illustrate the relevant work undertaken by various authors on foreign policy formulation and decision-making.
Kenneth R Hammond, et al in Human Judgment and Decision-making (1980)1 present theories, methods and procedures of decision making. Their decisional theory however restricts its theoretical interest to the single-system case, which involves one person making decisions without full knowledge of the task situation. As compared to this theory, where single individual exercises its rational powers, „Behavioral Decision Theory‟ (BDT) examines the relation between external and internal unconditional probabilities to explain the difference between them and the causes of such differences. BDT is an approach to judgment and decision making focusing on subjective expected utility and on departures from normative theories such as Bayes' theorem and utility theory. It was first put forward by the US psychologist Ward Dennis Edwards (1927-2005) in an influential article in 1954, and many authorities interpret it to include psychological decision theory.2
1 Kenneth R Hammond, ed., Human Judgment and Decision-making: Theories, Methods and Procedure, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980). 2 Jie W. Weiss and David J. Weiss, A Science of Decision Making: The Legacy of Ward Edwards, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
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The development of a more holistic foreign policy decision-making framework is attributed to Charles F. Herman, Charles W. Kegly Jr., and James Roseau in their work New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy (1987)3 and Richard Snyder, H.W Bruck and Burton Sapin, ed., Decision Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics (1956).4 They have centered their work around decision-making processes and its interpretation towards foreign policy actions. They maintained that decision makers are constrained by internal and external environment. They treated foreign policy as a variable which can be affected by various factors influencing the decision makers‟ orientations for policy issues and policy prescriptions. Snyder in his analytic framework underscores the importance of Case Studies as a scientific approach for studying foreign policy. For Snyder, the behavior of the decision makers is impacted by organizational behavior, psychological perceptions and societal values and norms.
Gautam Sen, National Interest and National Security Policy Making: Prism for India, (2017)5 asserts that a national security strategy is an integral part of a nation-state's quest to safeguard its national interest. Today, nation-states are the unit of analysis of international relations amongst them, bilaterally and multilaterally, at regional and global levels. The individuals do play an important role in decision making and an examination of the factors impacting the individual behavior does yield important insights. However, the institutions of a country, which develop over a long period of time, remain very important. The efficient role and effective participation of institutions in state affairs heavily rely on the kind of relationship which exists between the key institutions of bureaucracy (civil and military) and the political elite. Charles H. Kennedy discussed this relationship in the case of Pakistan in his book Bureaucracy in Pakistan (1987).6 He says that “it can be maintained that during the greater part of Pakistan history, higher bureaucracy has ruled the country; in fact Pakistan can be described as bureaucratic polity. Thus the symbiotic relationship which should exist between political institutions and bureaucracy failed to develop in
3 Charles F. Herman, Charles W. Kegly Jr., and James N. Rosenau, New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy, (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987). 4 Richard Snyder, H.W Bruck and Burton Sapin, ed., Decision Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1956. 5 Gautam Sen, National Interest and National Security Policy Making: Prism for India, (New Delhi: KW Publishers, 2017). 6 Charles H. Kennedy, Bureaucracy in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1987).
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Pakistan.” This failure, which created an adversarial relationship between different institutions of the state can be attributed to numerous factors such as bureaucratic attitude of civil servants, comparative incapability of political leaders, relatively free hand to the agencies, without much control from the top hierarchy of politicians etc.
The Civil Service in Pakistan is an old, strong, stable institution. The civil servants do enjoy prestige in Pakistan accompanied by certain perks and privileges. Syed Abdul Quddus discusses the role of bureaucracy in his book, Bureaucracy and Management in Pakistan (1991).7 As per the author, “public servant is held in high esteem because of his ability, education and competence to render highly useful and beneficial service.” To perform their respective job all the services of Pakistan have laid down procedures and regulations. Syed explains that, “the public servant carries his work in accordance with set rules designed to enforce certain standards for the service of the people and the protection of their rights.” These rules, procedures and processes put a check on public servants in interpreting a situation and initiating an action based on individual‟s perception and understanding. Pakistan inherited a small Foreign Service from the departing British in 1947. As Pakistan was beset by serious security challenges, its foreign services and missions abroad grew quickly and Pakistan has a fully functional Foreign Office manned by experienced officer, taking forward the national traditions.
Robert E. Goodin and Hans-Dieter Kingemann in New Handbook of Political Science (1996)8 have grouped articles of various authors on political science and institutions. Goldman asserts that the focus should shift from the structure to ideas to better understand the causes of an actor‟s behavior to arrive at a decision. Goldman underscores the importance to know the reasons of preferences and perceptions of actors which affect the decision outcome. The bureaucracies of the third world countries remain less developed as compared to the developed countries. In any case, regardless of their competence, bureaucracies have pivotal role in the state affairs. Malcolm Wallis in his book Bureaucracy: The Role in Third World Development
7 Syed Abdul Quddus, Bureaucracy and Management in Pakistan, (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1991). 8 Robert E. Goodin and Hans-Dieter Kingemann, New Handbook of Political Science, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
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(1989)9 explains the gap between political institutions of Pakistan and its bureaucracy. For him, “Pakistan has been subjected to extensive periods of military rule and periods of dominance by civilianized military leaders. Even when the military is in the barracks, they have exerted a veto power on the political system. Such military dominance has exacerbated the inherited gap between the capabilities of the civil bureaucracy and orthodox political institutions.” Wallis, however, acknowledges that the civil bureaucrats remain instrumental in the determination of any state policy. “Indeed successive governments of Pakistan (military and non-military) have remained exceedingly dependent on the civil bureaucracy for all phases of the policy process. Conversely, civil bureaucrats have viewed the growth of political institutions as an inherent challenge to their authority.” The triangle that Wallis helps us see evolving overtime places the bureaucracy arbitrating between the military establishment and the political leadership.
The academic focus shifts from the structure and actors to the 'foreign policy decision' itself with the publication of monumentally influential work of Graham T. Alison in his first book Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, (1971).10 It gives the general argument that occurrences in foreign affairs lead to a particular foreign policy outcome. The analyst seeks to discover why one specific state of the world came with specific response to a particular happening. As per Alison, these explanations assume governmental behavior with the purposive act of certain individuals; the “makers” of government policy. The three propositions used to develop this argument include; 1) Professional analysts of foreign affairs (as well as ordinary laymen) think about problems of foreign and military policy in terms of largely implicit conceptual models that have significant consequences for the content of their thoughts. 2) Most analysts explain (and predict) the behavior of national governments in terms of one basic conceptual model, here entitled Rational Actor or “Classical” Model (Model I). Two alternative conceptual models, here labeled on Organizational Process Model (Model-II) and a Governmental (Bureaucratic) Politics Model (Model-III), provide a base for improved explanations and predictions. Essence of Decision (1999) by Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelokow is the
9 Malcolm Wallis, Bureaucracy: The Role in Third World Development, (New York: MacMillan, 1989). 10 Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, (New York: Little Brown, 1971).
9 analytical synthesis of all the evidence about foreign policy decision of the US.11 The authors have examined the central puzzles of the Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962); the view of American leaders‟ and others; like risks of a likely nuclear war, crisis confrontation and foreign policy. Decision-making has been developed by the authors around three models. Most analysts explain (and predict) behavior of national governments in terms of one basic conceptual model, titled as “Rational Actor Model” (RAM or Model 1). The essence of this conceptual model is the outlined behavior of governments where analogy to the behavior of individuals making calculated and rational choices is made. Second conceptual model labeled as “Organization Behavior Model” (Model II) provides an improved bases for explanation of decision makers and prediction. Paradigm of Model II is built on the argument that government is composed of various organizations and these organizations when interact for decision-making processes, their actions are largely guided by their “Standard Operating Procedures” (SOPs). Under “Bureaucratic Politics Model” (Model III), foreign policy decisions are made by many setups with divergent strategic orientations of international issues. In this model, the foreign policy decisions are neither made by as per Mode l nor as per Model II, rather aggregated on decisions are reached by pulling and hauling, that is politics among the decision makers.
Stephen Krasner in his work Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland) (1972) discusses who and what shapes foreign policy.12 He contests Allison‟s assertion that instead of rational calculations of the national interests or the political goals of national leaders, foreign policy outcomes are greatly impacted by bureaucratic procedures and bureaucratic politics. Krasner maintains that this understanding of foreign policy decision-making, apparently compelling, is actually misleading and dangerous. This is misleading as it obscures the power of US president and dangerous as it undermines the assumption of democratic politics by relieving high officials of responsibility because it offers leaders an excuse for their failures. Whereas democratic political philosophy assumes that responsibility of the acts of governments can be attributed to elected officials. The author is of the view
11 Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Second Edition, (New York: Pearson, 1999). 12 Stephen D. Krasner “Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland)” Foreign Policy, 7, (Summer 1972).
10 that president of US remains the “king” of decision-making as he influences the action channels of bureaucracy through his speeches, through budget allocations, selecting the White House bureaucracy etc.
The principal challenge for an analyst is to view foreign policy decision-making processes in a transparent way. Christopher Hill in his book, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (2003)13 explains how foreign policy choices are formulated and the feasibility of a choice is evaluated. Personal influences on any foreign policy outcomes are manifestations of decision makers‟ perceptions of the issue and their expectations about a policy i.e. how a policy ought to be? Government officials involved in foreign policy decision-making arrive at a decision through a process known as bureaucratic politics, coined by Graham T. Allison. Hill qualifies this approach by adding that the bureaucrats manage the foreign policy issue because of, “where you sit and how you see.” This implies that bureaucrats‟ “seeing” will be affected by their perception of an issue and by “sitting” means the relative position of an official authority in a hierarchical setting.
Inevitably, the foreign policy projections of any country are developed on the direction and vision of political elite. To transform political elite‟s vision, the Foreign Service officials of respective country formulate the policy options. Out of these options, the most viable and practicable option is approved by the elite before operationalizing the selected policy option. J.N. Dixit discusses the Indian foreign policy formulation in his book, Makers of India’s Foreign Policy (2004).14 Dixit asserts that the foreign policy formulation is a joint work of any country‟s elite and bureaucracy. “It is not the political elite which shape foreign policy rather policy prescriptions also afford a space for civil and military bureaucrats to impact final policy outcomes.” The main focus of this work is to establish a chain of policy formulation i.e. directed by political elite, constructing various policy alternatives while keeping ground realities in mind and ensuring purposiveness of policy to secure the national interests at any given point and time in the arena of international relations. J.N. Dixit explains the contribution of bureaucrats towards foreign policy
13 Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, (New York: Macmillan, 2003). 14 J.N. Dixit, Makers of India’s Foreign Policy, Raja Ram Mohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha, (New Delhi: Harper Collins Publishers, 2004).
11 formulation but does not shed any light on how the decisions are processed and contested among the various stakeholders i.e. civil and military bureaucracy.
J. Bandyopadhyaya tackles the foreign policy making in India in his book Making of India’s Foreign Policy, Determinants, Institutions, Processes and Personalities (1984)15 elaborating various aspects of foreign policy formulation of India. With nineteen divisions as territorial and administrative units, where each division is headed by a joint secretary, the process of policy formulation starts with the evaluation of information, working out alternatives, analysis of policy alternatives and rendering advice to the foreign minister. In this process, it is ensured that foreign policy final outcomes must help in the actualization of national interests. These national interests generally pertain to national security, national development and the role of India in world order. Bandyopadhyaya asserts that the Indian foreign policy was deeply impacted by different Prime Ministers, reaffirming the role of political elites in the foreign policy making. However, he has not visited the thorny field of foreign policy analysis i.e. decisional processes while working different policy alternatives by competing bureaucracies (civil and military).
Valerie M. Hudson in his article „Foreign Policy Analysis, Actor Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations‟ (2005)16 examines the history, conceptual breadth and recent trends in the study of foreign policy analysis. This analysis is characterized by an actor-specific focus, based upon the argument that what all occurs between nations and across nations is grounded in human decision makers, acting singly or in groups. The point of intersection is foreign policy analysis, not the state, it is human decision makers. In this way the engine of theoretical integration in international relations is the definition of the situation created by the human decision makers.
Major happenings in international relations always generate uncertainty but response to these is always calibrated as per options considered by policymakers. The policy outcomes are always in direct relation to the position of authority enjoyed by
15 J. Bandyopadhyaya, The Making of India’s Foreign Policy: Determinants, Institutions, Processes and Personalities, (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1984). 16 Valerie M. Hudson, “Foreign Policy Analysis, Actor Specific Theory and The ground of International Relations‟ Foreign Policy Analysis, 1:1, (March 2005).
12 respective decision players. In Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy Morton Halperin et al (2006)17 explain the interplay of bureaucratic attributes to the foreign policy outcomes. Coping with uncertainties and constructing alternative course of action are affected by the background knowledge held on an issue, intellectual capabilities and organizational dispositions in a bureaucratic setup. All participants in a decision-making process carry somewhat different image of an issue as their perception is heavily linked to their particular concerns. Every participant focuses on a different aspect of an issue, contrives different dangers and peculiar foreign policy likely interventions in any given decision game. The rules of game determine how the participants should relate to others in bureaucracy. These rules specify as to who has the action authority in an organization or individual responsible to move an issue. These rules define the level of authorization, competent authority, channels through which the issues would be moved and how high would it go up.
Joshua S. Goldstein‟s work on International Relations (2008)18 underscores importance of the foreign policy process, which is one way of decision-making, which in itself is a way where adjustments are made as a result of feedback from the whole world. The steering process is based on the goals of decision makers, set as discrete steps to be reached. Given the importance of Allison‟s foundational work, many subsequent authors have tried to build upon those foundations. Klaus Brummer in his work, The Bureaucratic Politics Model and Poliheuristic Theory (2009)19 attempts to enhance the explanatory power of Bureaucratic Politics Model. The author explains three core propositions of the model. The first one is “Bureaucratic Position” which underscores the importance of „position‟ in impacting the policy preferences; “where you stand depends on where you sit.” The second core proposition argues that the competing preference of bureaucratic actors clash in the political bargaining processes; “the pulling and the hauling that is politics.” The third is a proposition about the decision outcomes or resultants which are „unintended compromise solutions‟ for the problem under scrutiny. Brummer attempts to integrate “poliheuristic theory” in decision-making process, highlighting the interaction of
17 Morton H. Halperin, Priscilla A. Clapp and Arnold Kanter, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, (Washington DC: Brookings, 2006). 18 Joshua S. Goldstein, International Relations, (New York: Longman, 2004). 19 Klaus Brummer, „The Bureaucratic Politics Model and Poliheuristic Theory‟ Foreign Policy Analysis, July 2009.
13 cognitive and rational factors in shaping the actor‟s preference through a two-stage process. “In the first stage, actors rely on a non-compensatory strategy as a cognitive shortcut to eliminate unacceptable alternatives and to reduce the decision-matrix. In the second stage, actors switch to a compensatory mode of information processing and select the remaining alternative which maximizes expected utility.”
In the study of foreign policy, a focus on the „behavior‟ brings in intellectual challenges which are complex. Davis Bobrow et al in their book, Understanding Foreign Policy Decisions: The Chinese Case (2010)20 explain that in foreign policy decision-making process participants cannot be assumed simple minded, homogenous across political and bureaucratic culture and un-opinionated on an issue of seeking some decision. To know these processes, one needs a chain of contingent analysis to unpack the policy outcomes. The entire maneuvering of decision-making process reflects the presence of those structures, and the knowledge of these structures, which helps us better understand the decision makers‟ cognitive level, impacts their handling of an issue in a real context. Decision processes therefore become „attempts‟ to cope up and affect an international scheme of settings i.e. an international environment. All participants take part in decision process as per the cognitive beliefs to view and adjust with the elements at system level. This brings into play the role of the „particular nature of the cognitive understanding of the distant and recent past history‟ of the principle actors. The pre-eminence of certain narrative regarding the history of the state becomes important factor, which forms the initial assessment and its future policy implications. In the case of Pakistan, the „narratives‟ about the historical developments leading to the creation of Pakistan and their consequent impact on the apperception of the national security risks have a divisive role in foreign policy formulation.
Analysis of foreign policy has to be focused on a wide range of phenomena, from individual to actors, groups, institutions, economic and political elites. Steve Smith et al, in Theories, Actors and Cases (2012)21 explain that foreign policy analysis has a vast scope where one has to be familiar with the dynamics whereby states interact
20 Davis B. Bobrow, Steve Chan and John A. Kringen, Understanding Foreign Policy Decisions- the Chinese Case, (New York: Free Press, 1979). 21 Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Tim Dunne, ed., Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors and Cases, Third Edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
14 with each other but the internal processes whereby foreign policies are framed also need to be probed. Smith reminds that the foreign policy analysis tools were developed in 1950s with three main paradigmatic themes to study foreign policy. The first paradigm was inspired by Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (1950) and substantial literature was developed on bureaucratic and organizational politics in 1970s by Allison and Halperin. The second paradigm focused on psychological dimension of foreign policy making, promoted by Kenneth Boulding, Harold, Margaret Sprout (1950), Alexander George and Michael Brecher (1960) and Irving Janis (1970). The third paradigm was the attempt by James Rosenau to develop a theory of comparative foreign policy (1960).
Valerie Hudson, however, points out that foreign policy analysis needs to be carried out at multiple levels. She gives four levels of foreign policy analysis i.e., international, state, group and individual. The actors dominate at both the lower levels of analysis.22 William C. Wohlforth23 considers Realist School of thought more relevant owing to its core assumptions (groupism, egoism and power-centrism) more important to analyze individual actors‟ role in decision-making processes. Walter Carlsnaes24 laid down four stages of decision-making through which decision makers traverse to reach some policy outcome. These stages include problem recognition, problem framing and goal prioritization, contingency planning and option assessment. Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikov explained the rationale of conceptualizing the actors‟ role in decision-making processes. Their “bureaucratic politics (or governmental) approach” explains why decisions often take the form of „resultants‟ i.e. the power and performance of proponents and opponents of decision players taking part in decision processes at that time.
At system level states predominantly affect the international politics; through their respective foreign policy undertaking. Alexander Wendt in A Social Theory of International Politics (1999)25 dilates upon the role of states in international politics. “Primary actors in international politics, states, are much more autonomous from the
22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 Kantzenstein, Peter J., “International and Domestic Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States” International Organization, 30:1, Winter 1976.
15 social system in which they are embedded.” Wendt believes that States‟ foreign policy behavior is often determined primarily by domestic politics, the analogs to individual personality, rather than by the international system (society). In all cases whatever happens at the system level is caused by some issue and thus one issue causes the other happenings and foreign policy scholars undertake analytical discourse of such causal happening. “In this inquiry how we answer „what causes what‟ will depend on how we first answer „what is there‟ and how should we study (methods)?” States appear to be agents to manifest the decisions of policy makers, Wendt says “States really are agents, decision makers timely speak in terms of national „interest‟ „needs‟, „responsibilities‟, „rationality‟ and so on, and it is through such thoughts that states constitute themselves and each other as agents.” It is a fact that international politics is the indirect display of decision makers‟ perceptions of the outside world. “The character of international life is determined by the beliefs and expectations the states have about each other and these are constituted largely by social rather than material structures.”
Foreign Policy of a state is reflection of domestic sources to propel national interests and project national ideology. Arshin Adib-Moghaddam in Iran in World Politics (2010)26 offers methodological and theoretical insights in explaining the foreign relations and domestic politics of post-revolutionary Iran. The author points out the importance of domestic source of foreign policy while highlighting the effect of extra territorial entities and important domestic leadership on Iran‟s internal projections on policy formulations. Arshin highlights that the ideational and material dialects shape the politics. The author discusses the role of Iranian leadership to make Islamic Republic of Iran a home of Sh‟i‟ crescent and a regime ruled by messianic fanatics who are aspiring to become nuclear power.
World politics is a scene where manifestation of foreign policy of any state is well embedded in national interests. Projection of national identity remains one of the sources to carve foreign policy of a nation. David Ryan in US Foreign Policy in World History (2000)27 dilates upon acquisition and display of identity in US foreign policy. Author traces the history and form of identity, “identity relies on various
26 Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, Iran in World Politics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 27 David Ryan, US Foreign Policy in World History, (London: Routledge, 2000).
16 forms of communication, description and representation between „US and them.‟ Collective identity was important to cement the new unity against hostility. The traditions of US diplomacy were crafted through the combination of beliefs, visions and interaction with the world outside.” Identity and nationalism are intertwined and give defining cut to any state‟s foreign policy projections. As per author, “US foreign relations have been flexible and adaptable, evolving always to suit the needs of US.” David Ryan explains the demonstrated aspirations of US universal virtue in its public discourses. As per author “US foreign policy is embedded in a type of nationalism not defined by territorial limits. US nationalism encompassed the formal ideologies associated with the beliefs in liberty and democracy and a belief that free trade is symbiotic with these.”
International politics is also impacted by structures which do have a role to shape the environment and policy outcomes, at domestic level. Peter J. Kantzenstein dilates upon the role of structures in his article, “International Relations and Domestic Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States” (2009).28 The author says, “Government Policy is also shaped by domestic structures. Governments respond to changes in vulnerability, relatively unencumbered by societal pressure, and that they don‟t have serious problems in controlling their bureaucracies.” To review foreign economic policies of advanced industrial states the author has employed three paradigms of International Relations in the context of under discussion policy perspective. Peter J. Kantzenstein uses „National Paradigm‟ for „national and supranational integration‟ while having its core concepts „identity‟, level of analysis is „international level‟ unit of analysis is „society‟ and political focus remains „primacy of domestic policy.‟ „Realist Paradigm‟ is employed for „mercantilism, balance of power and strategy‟. Under this paradigm core concept remains „security‟ level of analysis is „international‟ unit of analysis is states and political focus remains „Primacy of foreign policy.‟ Last Paradigm proffered by the author is „Neo-liberal‟ to review „Neo- Classical Economics and International Trade.‟ Here core concept is „prosperity‟ level of analysis is „international and domestic‟ unit of analysis is „society and state‟ and political focus remains „interrelation of domestic and foreign policy.‟
28 Peter J. Kantzenstein, “International and Domestic Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States” International Organization, 30:1, (Winter 1976).
17
It is in the backdrop of theoretical literature on the dynamics of the foreign policy analysis and decision making forms and structures that this study tries to tackle the widespread belief in the academia and other scholarly circles that Pakistan controlled and controls Taliban, which were once ruling Afghanistan and now are fighting the US-led Allied forces to regain the control of Afghanistan. The foreign policy decisions regarding Taliban from 1996 to 2016 provide a unique window to understand the dynamics of foreign policy making in Pakistan and better understand its successes and failures, impacting Pakistan‟s economy and security. The Taliban of 1996 were a group of Islamists, can be called pure and simple, controlled by central authority. After staying briefly in power, the Taliban in the post 9/11 era are new Taliban with their leadership in hiding as their activities are controlled by local operational commanders. Gretchen Peters in his book, Seeds of Terror: The Taliban, The ISI and the New Opium War (2009)29 maintains that given the challenge of fighting in a large swath spreading over south and eastern Afghanistan, the fighting soldiers are more loyal to the local commanders, though still operating under the umbrella of Taliban and in some cases, the local commanders do not hesitate to indulge in the practices such as opium business, extortion, kidnapping to muster the resources for perpetuating their fighting and ensure their survival. This is the reason that many Afghan officials maintain that even the disappearance of Taliban Shura from Quetta (Pakistan), they cannot be sure that Afghanistan was closer to ending the Afghan insurgency. The US invasion in 2001 caused Taliban to scatter and Americans failed to put down Taliban strength once forever. The US opted for a light footprint on ground and relied more on the local proxies to fight on their behalf. This light handling of Taliban is amplified by the fact that throughout 2002, the US had just 4500 troops dedicated to punish Afghan Taliban that too all stationed at Kabul, the capital. All along, the US has been pressurizing Pakistan to tackle Taliban and bring them to mainstream of domestic politics in Afghanistan, due to the supposed „control‟ of Pakistan over Taliban. This accusation and presumption of the „control‟ of Pakistan over Taliban have produced the greatest pressure on Pakistan‟s foreign policy making and choices. Pakistan was one of the first amongst a total of only three countries, which recognized the Taliban regime in 1997 against an international pressure of not doing so. After 9/11, it did a volte face in joining the coalition against the Taliban. A
29 Gretchen Peters, Seeds of Terror- The Taliban, The ISI and the New Opium War, (New Delhi: Hachette Book Publishing India, 2009).
18 few years later, Pakistan was again wooing Taliban on behalf of US and China to join the dialogue as a means to peace. Pakistan‟s joining the QCG was an indirect admission that Pakistan had some influence on Taliban despite the volte face it did in 9/11. In a span of 20 years, the calibration of national interest when it came to Taliban has undergone such radical shifts. To better understand the way this challenge has been handled by Pakistan, we need to critically understand the dynamics of foreign policy making in Pakistan in the recent past.
Pakistan‟s political history has witnessed frequent takeovers of government by the army. This practice has been happening invariably due to a gap of understanding between political elite and military establishment regarding vital national security issues. Sartaj Aziz has been Foreign Minister with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (1998-1999) and foreign affairs advisor to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (2013-2018). He attributes the pitfalls of Pakistan political instability and a chasm of understanding between civil rulers and military to the absence of any formal institution to discuss and develop consensus about critical foreign policy perspectives, specially pertaining to US, India and Afghanistan. His book Between Dreams and Realities, Some Milestones in Pakistan History (2011)30 covers the political history and major foreign policy issues from 1988 to 2011. Aziz describes the foreign policy formulation process starting with evolving policy briefs, position papers and policy guidelines at the Foreign Office while taking input from army. The Foreign Office then puts up the proposed policy guidelines to the Prime Minister for approval. Aware of the fact that the current institutional arrangements were not functioning very well, he proposes to establish a new organ in the federal government with the name of Cabinet Committee of Defense and National Security to replace the existing Defense Cabinet Committee of Defense, entrusted with the responsibility of narrowing down the gap between perceptions of the army establishment and civil leadership on security issues gradually leading to a national consensus on different aspects of national security.” With regards to Pakistan‟s foreign policy towards Afghanistan, Sartaj Aziz is of the view that “The Afghan policy Pakistan pursued between 1980 and 2000 has not been, it now seems in retrospect, a great success. For him, its negative fallout far exceeds any positive economic gains Pakistan may have achieved in 1980s.” The work of the
30 Sartaj Aziz, Between Dreams and Realities: Some Milestones in Pakistan History, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009).
19 author does hint on overbearing influence of military establishment towards Pak- Afghan foreign policy prescriptions but he does not spell out as to how the civil and military bureaucrats compete among themselves to finalize any policy alternative.
Javid Hussain in his work, The Process of Foreign Policy Formulation in Pakistan (2004)31 explains the process of foreign policy formulation in the country, examining the role and input from the Parliament and its Standing Committees on the process of foreign policy formulation. The author underscores an important facet of the foreign policy making in Pakistan, while asserting that the public representatives in Pakistan do not play a proactive role in foreign policy decision inputs as provided for in the Constitution of Pakistan. Khawar Hussain in his work, Pakistan’s Afghanistan Policy (2005)32 mentions that Pakistan‟s prime foreign policy driver remains securing security interests through a friendly government in Kabul. Mostly, Pakistan has experienced a deep seated hostility from Afghanistan. Skepticism and fear are always there as both countries move cautiously to revitalize bilateral ties. The work suggests an effective engagement of Pakistan with Afghanistan and pursuit of its legitimate security interests should be based on the principle of refraining from actively interfering in Afghanistan‟s political future. Abdul Sattar in Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2012 (2013)33 maintains that though Pakistan recognized Taliban in 1997 but had little control over them. In the post 9/11 environment in 2001, Pakistan decided to withdraw its support to Taliban and joined the global war on terrorism. After having calls from the US, General Pervez Musharraf started interactive sessions with political parties, intelligentsia, media, Ulema (religious leaders) on the issue of withdrawing Taliban support. Some 90 percent opinion of these people was in step with Gen Musharraf. In terms of formal processes “yes-but” approach was recommended by the Foreign Office in a view to safeguard Pakistan‟s geostrategic interests. In the following years, Pakistan has been supporting all peace initiatives in Afghanistan while maintaining its stance that these initiatives should be Afghan-led and Afghan- owned.
31 Javid Hussain, „The Process of Foreign Policy Formulation in Pakistan‟ PILDAT Briefing Paper, April 1, 2004. 32 Khawar Hussain, „Pakistan‟s Afghanistan Policy‟ MA Thesis, California: Naval Post Graduate School, June 2005. 33 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2012, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013).
20
The Americans make an ineluctable part of this triangle i.e., Taliban-Pakistan-US or the quadrangle if we include the Afghan Government in it. The American foreign policy establishment in itself has been struggling to pursue its foreign policy aims in Afghanistan. Obama Administration (in particular Hillary Clinton and Hallbroke) had to fight to have their voices heard. Vali Nasr in his book, The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat (2013)34 mentions that there has been an imbalance between military intelligence complex and foreign policy establishment in Washington. While reviewing critical foreign policy critical issues, Obama spent many months considering all relevant information with all concerned before the „surge‟ i.e., sending additional 33,000 troops to Afghanistan. During these discussions, little attempt was made to restore diplomatic primacy for having foreign policy decisions.
Pakistan side has been trying hard to decipher and then influence the US policy towards post 9/11 Afghanistan. Pakistan Army Chief, General Kayani gave Obama a thirteen page paper, addressing the outstanding strategic issues between Pakistan and US. The paper was codenamed “3.0” as two similar papers were given earlier also by General Kayani. “Kayani asserted that the US was not going to win the war as it could not transform Afghanistan and like many other empires, which failed earlier, this time also, the Afghan land will also brutally take the US to the brink of failure. He advised the Americans to stop developing great plans and get practical, sit down and sit with Pakistan to discuss as how they would leave and what will be the desirable end state, with which both Pakistan and US live with.”35 General Kayani was suggesting to the Americans to take strategic decisions which could result in a favorable action for them in Afghanistan. Obama however refrained from making the strategic decision, including the decision to work with Pakistan and now is accused of merely making announcements for the public opinion satisfaction. Such has been the difficulty of the Afghan imbroglio, when the US wanted to influence Afghanistan against the Soviets in 1980s, the only option available was to work with General Zia of Pakistan. Hussain Haqqani in his book, Magnificent Delusions (2013)36 discusses the dynamics of US
34 Vali Nasr, The Dispensable Nation- American Foreign Policy in Retreat, (New York: Scribe Publications, 2013). 35 Ibid., 11. 36 Hussain Haqqani, Magnificent Delusions, (INDIA HC ED): Pakistan, the United States, an Epic History of Misunderstanding, (New York: Public Affairs, 2013).
21 tackling Pakistan leadership from Gen Zia to President Zardari. General Zia was offered $400 million aid package to act as frontline state after the Soviet invasion but this offer was turned down by General Zia considering it as a “peanut.” In June 1981, $3.2 billion military and economic aid was given and General Zia negotiated an agreement with the US that Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) will have the operational control of Jihadis (fighters) in Afghanistan. Eventually, the Soviets were forced to leave Afghanistan in 1989.
Taliban, under Mullah Umar, emerged in August 1994 from Kandahar which was one of the Pashtun dominant provinces in Afghanistan. Iftikhar Murshad in his book Afghanistan: The Taliban Years (2006)37 has covered the Taliban emergence, recognition by Pakistan and Afghan situation till 1998. Taliban were able to take control of Kabul by September 1996. Taliban had been asking Pakistan to extend diplomatic recognition of the Taliban regime. Invariably the reply from Pakistan had been that the recognition would be there the day peace is restored and Taliban had got other factions and ethnic groups on board. By the end of May 1997, Mazar-e-Sharif fell to Taliban. Major reasons for success of Taliban were the war-weariness of Afghan population. They longed for the restoration of peace and the semblance of an honest administration, no matter how harsh its system of justice was.
Meanwhile, ex-jihadi foreign elements had regrouped in Afghanistan under Osama Bin Laden to fight the excesses against Muslims in the world. Al-Qaeda resorted to bombings in different cities including the major cities of Europe, culminating in the 9/11 attacks. Thus came the major shift in Pakistan‟s foreign policy as Pakistan decided to join the US to fight the war against terrorism and withdrew its support to Taliban regime. Taliban regime in the face of US attacks withered away by the end of 2001. The movement of Taliban in 1994 grew at its own but it melted down in the wake of US attack on Afghanistan in post 9/11 scenario consequent upon the refusal by the Taliban to handover Osama bin Laden who was suspected to be man behind 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US. General Pervez Musharraf in his book, In the Line of Fire (2006)38 admits that Pakistan could not persuade Taliban to handover Osama bin Laden and they (Taliban) were unable to very well imagine the aftermath of the US
37 Iftikhar Murshad, Afghanistan- The Taliban Years, (London: Newton, 2006). 38 General Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, (London: Simon & Schuster, 2006).
22 attack on Afghanistan. On September 12, 2011, the US Secretary of State Colin Powel called Gen Musharraf to ask whether Pakistan was with US or against it and reply was that Pakistan was with US against terrorism. The demands put by the US to Pakistan were deliberated with the technocratic cabinet, officials of foreign office and army Corps Commanders and the decision to withdraw support to Taliban and joining war against terrorism was apparently based on these consultations.
Foreign policy remains the first line of defense for every country and makers of this policy always seek to secure national strategic interests in the world through policies based on principle of a realist paradigm, leaving behind all kinds of illusions and emotions i.e. “realpolitik.” Shahid Amin in his book, Pakistan Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal (2010)39 points out that Pakistan policy makers at times have allowed illusions and ad-hocism to ride the policy tides. The reasons for this are mainly due to the absence of relatively autonomous policy planning and poor involvement of think tanks, scholars and academia. Contrary to the impression conveyed by Musharaff in his book, Amin asserts that, most of the time, the foreign policy directives were given by the head of the government to the foreign office without any prior consultation. For Amin, this has been a general practice that the foreign policy decisions were made first and foreign office was asked to come up with the rationale for such decisions. In Afghanistan the Taliban (ex-Jihadis), emerged in 1994 and were able to establish their regime by September 1996. Recognition of their regime by Pakistan in 1997 was followed by Saudi Arabia and UAE. No other country of the world recognized them. For Amin, Pakistan‟s decision to recognize Taliban regime was pushed by the military intelligence.
There has been however a general and continuous realization that the peace and stability in Afghanistan is good for Pakistan‟s economy. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989, the various Afghan Jihadi groups have been fighting against each other. Pakistan policy makers were keen to open the trade route to Central Asian Republics after their release from the Soviet Union. Ahmed Rashid in his book Taliban: The Power of Militant Islam in Afghanistan and Beyond (2017)40
39 Shahid M. Amin, Pakistan Foreign Policy, A Reappraisal, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010). 40 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban-The Power of Militant Islam in Afghanistan and Beyond, (London: I.B. Torus, 2013).
23 says that “Pakistan‟s Afghan policy was in doldrums. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, successive Pakistani governments were desperately keen to open direct land route for trade with the Central Asian States. The major hindrance was the continuing civil war in Afghanistan. Pakistan policy makers were thus faced with strategic dilemma i.e. “either continue supporting Hikmatyar (Pashtun) ex-jihadi leader or urge for a power sharing between all Afghan factions for a stable government.” Rashid thinks that the military establishment of Pakistan considered Northern Alliance (NA) as anti Pakistan as the latter used to get support from Russia, India and Iran. Under this assumption they considered that Hikmatyar (South Pashtun Commander) may remain better option. “The Pakistani military was convinced that other ethnic groups would not do their bidding and continued to back Hikmatyar. The lobby within the ISI and military remained determined to achieve a Pashtun victory in Afghanistan. Pakistan was getting tired of backing a loser and was looking around for other potential Pashtun proxies.”
Ahmed Rashid maintains that Pakistan‟s military has strategic assumption that Taliban after getting recognition of their government will recognize the Durand Line, the disputed boundary between the two countries. Contrary to this, Taliban did not listen to Pakistani government and neutralized ISI efforts to keep Taliban under its influence. Pakistan became victim not only if its strategic vision but of its own, intelligence agencies. “The ISI‟s micromanagement of the Afghan Jihad was only possible because it was under a military regime and had a lavish funding from abroad. The ISI was able to subdue political opposition at home. Zia and ISI had power to formulate Afghan policy and implement it, something which no other agency, not even the CIA, had the power to do this as ISI had enormous unity of purpose and scope for operations. The ISI then faced no independent powerful lobbies or political rivals, as in the Taliban era, when they had to compete with an array of Pakistani lobbies which independently supported the Taliban and had their own agendas.”41
Foreign policy analysis is comprised of mainly two aspects. First one deals with the policy formulation process and second with implementation mechanism. To analyze the first part, knowledge of national interests with their implications and decision-
41 Ibid.
24 making processes remain the basis of analysis. For second aspect, the performance of foreign policy has to be evaluated while examining historical record of the implementation of important policy decisions. Javid Hussain has evaluated Pakistan‟s Foreign Policy since 1947 in his book, Pakistan and a World in Disorder (2016).42 Pakistan‟s national interests include country‟s independence and territorial integrity, maintenance of a high rate of economic growth, development and the strengthening of internal political stability and harmony. Hussain reiterates the narrative which has lately become pretty popular that the resources for economic growth in Pakistan in the past were diverted to meet the defense sector demands, undermining the desirable economic growth-rate and development remained below expectations. Soundness of foreign policy has to be evaluated in the perspective of fulfillment of the national interests. Some of the characteristics of this test include synchronization of foreign policy with national security and economic development, reflection of relative importance of nation‟s internal and external objectives, balance between short-term and long-term objectives and variability of foreign policy ought to be based on popular support of public. The two last characteristics require that the foreign policy should be based on a realistic assessment of the regional and international environment and country must concentrate on building up economic strength and technical prowess before developing its military power in the pursuit of ambitious foreign policy goals.
Foreign Policy formulators have a great responsibility on them to produce foreign policy options which are holistic and reflect a nation‟s intent in their foreign relationships. Gohar Ayub Khan (Foreign Minister of Pakistan, 1997-1998) in his book Testing Times as Foreign Minister (2009)43 dilates upon the principle features of Pakistan‟s Foreign Policy and dealing with Afghan Taliban during his tenure. About the main features of Pakistan‟s Foreign Policy, he says, “Foreign Policy managers take initiatives to have incisive assessment of global events and future trends and plan our moves well ahead of time. Foreign policy must exhibit maturity, independence, self-confidence and resilience. Conduct of foreign policy is holistic, consistent and should have integrated approach i.e., external trade, external economic relations and
42 Javid Hussain, Pakistan and a World in Disorder: A Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century, (New York: Macmillan, 2016). 43 Gohar Ayub Khan, Testing Times as Foreign Minister, (Islamabad: Dost Publications, 2009).
25 external publicity be brought under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.” National interest of a country is reflected through the conceptualization of a country‟s Foreign Policy. In this regard, the author maintains, „A clear formulation process must be evolved to gain maximum benefit and eventual success. Council for Defense and National Security (CDNS) is an appropriate forum for conceptual delineation/evaluation and, if a re-orientation of the foreign policy at the highest decision-making level is required, this exercise should be done by CDNS on a regular basis to keep foreign policy under a constant review. Formulation of proposals for consideration lies with Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the consultative process with all concerned Ministries. Input from think tanks/NGOS/Universities should be utilized for updating and refurbishing of foreign policy.”
About the emergence and recognition of the Afghan Taliban government, Gohar Ayub says that “The Taliban were not a product of General Nasserullah Babar (Pakistani Interior Minister in mid-1990s) or the ISI, as is commonly claimed. The Taliban were really like a frog in a well, living quite happily in it but unaware of the outside world. Taliban takeover of Mazar-i-Sharif in May 1997 put them in control of 85 percent of the country. To recognize any government, a few factors need to be taken into considerationi.e.do they control the capital? How much land mass do they have under control? Have they restored Law and Order? In the evening of 25th May, 1997, Pakistan officially recognized the Taliban government in Kabul.” About the future of Afghanistan issue he asserts that “Afghan cauldron and its regional fall-out will continue to strengthen Russia, Iran and India axis in South Asia. Peace and stability in Afghanistan are of vital importance to Pakistan. Government in Kabul, friendly to Pakistan is of paramount interest to us. Pakistan must support any effort which brings peace and central control in Afghanistan. Establishment of economic links, development of road-rail network, telecom links will help in revival of economy and bring back stability.”
The happenings in the power corridors are not usually known to the general public owing to the secrecy of the government business at top level. But in certain cases, a few people give their respective tenure accounts as federal ministers after their retirement which does carry certain insights about decision making at top level, such as Gohar Ayub Khan‟s autobiography; Glimpses into The Corridors of Power
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(2007).44 Whenever a foreign policy measure has to be taken, it must have the public support. Gohar Ayub underscores this, “One of the Kashmiri leaders said to me, Minister Sahib, there is a difference between India and Pakistan about undertaking foreign policy pursuits. In India, if the government sets out to take some foreign measures, it gets its peoples support and all political parties and the armed forces back it wholeheartedly. They did this for the attack on East Pakistan, and they won the war. But on the other hand, Pakistan takes half-hearted measures and has not brought any issue to fruition.” About the emergence of Afghan Taliban, the author says, “After the Soviets withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Mujahedeen factions fought amongst themselves, which led to a state of anarchy and lawlessness in the country and as a result Taliban emerged. They brought relative peace to war-torn Afghanistan.” Taliban‟s impression about Pakistan remained ambiguous according to Khan as he writes in his Memoirs, “The Taliban complained through a private source that Pakistanis were neither good friends nor good foes and that we were trying to straddle both positions simultaneously.” Taliban held a rigid approach in case of accepting the Northern Alliance in a broad-based government. “Their assertion was that they would not accept those leaders who were responsible for the Soviet invasion or had links with them.”
Since the invasion of Soviets in 1979, Afghanistan has remained unstable to date. The Afghanistan issue became more complex when the US, after 9/11 attacks, came to Afghanistan for destroying Al-Qaeda. Riaz Mohammad Khan in Afghanistan and Pakistan: Conflict, Extremism, and Resistance to Modernity (2011)45 explains the complexities of unstable Afghanistan and its impact on Pakistan. The author says that “Afghanistan conflict has a deep impact on Pakistan. The Pakistani Taliban and other desperate militant groups wreaking violence in Pakistan have drawn succor from Afghan Taliban. Return to normalcy in the region will be a long haul even if the professedly well-intentioned efforts of all major players in the region succeed. Much will depend on the ability of the Afghan leaders to promote reconciliation and improve governance.” The author contends that the perceptions of decision makers play an important role in their contribution towards the final decision outcomes. “The
44 Gohar Ayub Khan, Glimpses Into the Corridors of Power, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007). 45 Riaz Muhammad Khan, Afghanistan and Pakistan: Conflict, Extremism, and Resistance to Modernity, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011).
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Pakistanis saw Taliban as a friendly dispensation in neighboring Afghanistan. The Pakistani Military and Intelligence had developed a deep antipathy towards the Northern Alliance, in particular Ahmed Shah Masood. They accused him of double dealing during the days of Afghan jihad against the soviets and later playing the game of Iran and India in Afghanistan at the expense of Pakistan‟s interests. Quite often, these views were formed on the basis of reports from mid-level operatives in the field who empathized with the Taliban. Their reports put a simplistic Manichean construct on a complex situation; but, tragically, these inputs colored perceptions at the senior most levels of decision making in Pakistan. Dealing with Mujahedeen and then with the Taliban, the Pakistanis‟ empathy with their client‟s point of view than the other way round. Intellectually weak, the mid-level officials, especially those from the ISI, were often impressed and overawed by the certitude of conviction and faith the Taliban demonstrated.” The Taliban are expected by some analysts to emerge more forcefully after US withdrawal. Contrary to this belief, the author says that “A Taliban resurrection in Afghanistan is an improbable prospect because opposition to Taliban is now strong. Afghanistan is no longer the neglected, war-torn country of the mid 1990s.” The author, at the end, concludes, “Pakistan is a case of intellectual crisis and weak governance. At the intellectual level, over the years, ground was ceded to conservative Islamic thinking essentially resistant to adapting to the imperatives of 20th Century socio-economic and political progress. One facet of the Institutional breakdown in Pakistan has been the politicization of the bureaucracy i.e. lack of participatory politics impacted the working of the federation and aggravated systemic problems of governance.”
The Foreign Policy of any country takes care of economic, political and security concerns. Khurshid Mahmood Kasuri (Pakistan‟s Foreign Minister 2002-2007) in his book Neither a Hawk nor a Dove (2016)46 narrates his experiences as Foreign Minister of Pakistan. On the pronounced role of ISI in foreign policy he says that “The conduct of the Afghan Jihad and the details of the support by the CIA to covert operations generally were kept secret in Pakistan. The ISI received and distributed the funds, weapons and materials to the Mujahedeen. Naturally, they acquired a more significant role in the policy on Afghanistan.” As per the author, during his tenure
46 Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, Neither A Hawk Nor A Dove: An Insider’s Account of Pakistan Foreign Relations including details of the Kashmir Framework, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2016).
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“Pakistan Foreign Policy remained focused on promotion of regional and global peace and security, as well as on the country‟s economic and social development and the welfare of its citizens.” Any foreign policy to deliver the ultimate objectives must have people‟s support. Kasuri, while dwelling on this aspect of foreign policy says, „The purpose of the foreign policy is not to provide an outlet for sentiments of hope or indignation, but to shape real events in a real world. Moreover, the strength or weakness of foreign policy of any country is directly related to its domestic political and economic situation. Therefore, it is the prime duty of a government to truthfully convey the reality to the people and galvanize national consensus around it.” About Pak-Afghan situation, Kasuri says that “The regional situation is undergoing a dynamic change in the emerging endgame scenario in Afghanistan. Pakistan Army‟s worst-case scenario is encirclement by a hostile Afghanistan allied to India on one side and by the Indian Army on its eastern borders.” Pakistan, being a stake holder in bringing peace and stability in Afghanistan, has to play its role also. Kasuri explains, “There is a recognition by all sides that Pakistan has the ability to help ensure a final settlement or to sabotage one. This imposes a greater responsibility on Pakistan to do all that it can bring about conditions of peace and stability in Afghanistan. Who rules Afghanistan should be their internal matter.”
Most of the literature published on Pakistan‟s dealing with the Afghanistan problem gives a pre-eminent role to ISI in shaping the policy. This should not in principle come as a surprise as the intelligence agency of any country acts as ears and eyes for respective foreign office to formulate policy options. Hein G. Kiessling in his book, The ISI of Pakistan (2016)47 says that “all main decisions regarding foreign policy emanate from the ISI.” ISI reports to the Prime Minister and interacts with foreign office on need basis. “The degree to which the prime ministers were informed differs from case to case. Generally, they were relatively well briefed by their military and security advisors, little being concealed from them. While the foreign office was more often than not on the sidelines, spectators in the decision-making of 1990s, as becomes clear in seeing the developments from Afghanistan and Kashmir.”
47 Hein G. Kiessling, The ISI of Pakistan: Faith, Unity, Discipline, (Uttar Pradesh-India: C. Hurst & C., 2016).
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Indian intelligence agency RAW (Research Analysis Wing) and Pakistan Intelligence Agency ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) have been competing with each other to enhance their influence in Afghanistan. A book jointly authored by two former spy masters of India and Pakistan under the name of The Spy Chronicles: RAW-ISI and the Illusion of Peace (2018)48 sheds light as to how these agencies operate and influence state decisions with regard to the foreign policy domain. According to former ISI Chief Gen. Asad Durani, one of the co-authors of the book, the first step is that the ISI hypothesizes the things and put them in a particular context, as the ground realties and the popular perceptions hardly match each other. Naturally, their view point, presented with confidence, as an agency, organization and persons having true knowledge of ground realities will be heard invariably always. The impression built here leads the readers to conclude that ISI, knowing the ground realties about Afghan Taliban, can help the US exit from Afghanistan, as earlier desired but now anxiously waited. Ex RAW Chief A.S. Dault, the other co-author of the Spy Chronicles, while explaining as to why the ISI has more say in the foreign policy formulation, thinks that “it is interesting and makes sense that because of peculiar defense challenges and geostrategic location, Pakistan policy makers, particularly the military establishment, have kept security as top parameter for policy pursuits to its neighbors, with overwhelming influence towards the final policy outcomes.” “Americans play the carrot and stick policy. I see no change in American policy. I sense Americans have been desperate to talk to the Taliban but do not know how to get there. In a sense, the Pakistanis have the Americans by the balls.” Durani continues, “In Afghanistan, Taliban wanted to reconcile with America, and in 2002 made the first move. Each effort by the Taliban to reach out and each effort made by Pakistan to facilitate was spurned as Rumsfeld refused. Obama wanted an exit policy and negotiated settlement, but the deep state (CIA) subverted it.”
Tariq Khosa in his book, The Faltering State; Pakistan’s Internal Security Landscape (2017)49 presents his views as to why the military dominates the policy formulations. “The security establishment is firmly in the driving seat. It is calling the shots with respect to the multiple internal security challenges facing the nation. Since the 1980s,
48 A.S. Daulat and Asad Durani et al., The Spy Chronicles: RAW-ISI and the Illusion of Peace, (Uttar Pradesh-India: C. Hurst & C., 2018). 49 Tariq Khosa, The Faltering State: Pakistan’s Internal Security Landscape, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2017).
30 the military establishment has primacy over nuclear doctrine, foreign policy, especially where it relates to the US, India and Afghanistan and the use of militant proxies to further regional political objectives.” The foreign policy and defense policy in Pakistan is taken as one package; especially the undertakings of foreign policy with neighbors and major allies like the US, China, Saudi Arabia etc. For Khosa, “Pakistan‟s foreign policy has been intertwined with its defense policy. The decision in the early 1950s to align with the US during the Cold War, followed by close cooperation with CIA in ousting of Soviets from Afghanistan in the 1980s, and the war against terror, following 9/11 in the post 2001 period, were guided by Pakistan‟s desire to keep its defense forces strong and equipped with modern arms.”
Khosa points to the heart of Pakistan‟s dilemmas. Pakistan is situated in a geo- strategically sensitive area and Pakistan‟s defense forces have managed to develop themselves in a challenging environment. Should it be a willing partner when it is called upon to be a regional player for peace? The peace in Afghanistan is possible only through dialogue. Such a dialogue has to be all inclusive (Taliban, Afghan and Pakistan governments) and that too in the presence of some guarantor i.e. the US and /or China. Jinnah Institute of Pakistan in 2018 held an in-depth study about the peace prospects in Afghanistan published as “The Afghanistan Essays: From Trenches to Table.”50 One of the essays gives rundown of Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) meetings. Under QCG (a peace process for Afghanistan) there were five meetings of all parties (the US, China, Afghanistan and Pakistan) without any breakthrough. The salient features of QCG process can be summed up as “military solution is no path to settle conflict, the US strategy remains unpredictable, military assistance to the Afghan government has failed to bring peace; Taliban have grown stronger (expanding their territories and surge in violence); new loose rules for US Commanders to engage the Taliban have resulted in vain aerial bombings; spillover effects on Pakistan manifest in the form of influx of Afghan refugees, impediments for bilateral trade, drug trafficking, safe havens for anti-Pakistan terrors, holding back regional connectivity etc. The opportunity of peace process provided under QCG was lost by the regional players to step in by trying and bolstering the push for regional
50 “The Afghanistan Essay: From Trenches to Table: Waging Peace in Afghanistan” Jinnah Institute Islamabad, January 23, 2018.
31 consensus on the need of stability, the major reason for QCG process failure being the adhoc strategy by the US.”
Research Gap The literature presented in the preceding paragraphs shows foreign policy concepts and different analysis paradigms. Various approaches towards the formulation processes of foreign policy are adequately covered and explained. But no Pakistan specific work has surfaced substantially which points out how bureaucratic politics has been impacting the foreign policy decision-making. This deficiency necessitates the undertaking of an in-depth study with regard to the interplay of bureaucratic politics in Pakistan‟s tackling of Afghan Taliban from 1996 to 2016.
Foreign policy analysis is done at four levels i.e. individual, group, state and system. At the individual level, the decision-making is reviewed at four stages. Stage one covers the recognition of the problems, second stage looks into problem structuring with setting goal priorities, third stage covers the working of contingencies and last stage dwells on the options assessment. These four stages of analysis with regard to Pakistan‟s foreign policy towards Afghan Taliban is less traversed and hence needs an elaborate work to know as to how the major foreign policy decisions towards Afghan Taliban (1996-2016) were taken by the individual civil and military bureaucrats. In this regard, Allison‟s Model-III is a suitable theoretical framework to start with. As this study proceeds further, the relevance and robustness of the Model is tested in the context of a Muslim majority, developing country, situated in a globally sensitive geo- strategic zone with hostile neighborhood.
In any foreign policy decisional process, preferences and perceptions of decisional actors remain the major tools to exert pressure or stay neutral on an issue. Interpretation of a reality by actors fosters the development of their preferences on an issue. The situation further gets complicated when a group of bureaucrats with their initial preferences get involved into a decisional game where they have to finally develop some consensus or to agree to an aggregated decision for the final policy outcome. To know this, one has to intermittently look into the perceptions, stances and preferences of the participants about major policy decisions towards Afghan Taliban. While tackling Afghan Taliban, the relevant bureaucrats have been engaging
32 among themselves to develop the final policy decision outcomes under the bureaucratic politics pursuit. Relatively less work has been done on this aspect of policy analysis as very few official documents have surfaced throwing light on this particular dimension i.e. foreign policy decision process.
Whenever a group activity takes place, it must have binding rules of the game, mandatory to follow for the participants of any decision game e.g. who to take out the agenda, who all to participate, who sits where on the table, how much one gets the time at the floor, to whom they have to listen to, in case of dissenting views etc. There is always some sort of steering mechanism to control the group‟s activity. An analysis of the kind and manifestation of such steering system needs an impassionate and realistic study with regard to participants‟ role in developing final policy alternatives and its implementation. The quality knowledge about the real play of such steering system in Pakistan foreign policy decision-making process is conspicuous by its absence as most of the actors remain inaccessible. This study seeks to create such a knowledge comprised primarily of the first person narration of the key actors themselves. So many authors have informed about the important role played by the individuals, particularly, from the military establishment and ISI in shaping Pakistan‟s foreign policies but hardly ever, before the present study, a systematic effort has been done to reach to all the major actors of a complex foreign policy challenge that is dealing with Taliban, spanned over twenty years, involving the decisions which apparently involve radical shifts.
According to Allison, “the decisional players join decision process with varying individual perceptive complexities but ultimately, with all these complexities of perceptions and preferences, they settle with an aggregated decision.”51 The academic work on Pakistan‟s foreign policy and Afghan Taliban is generally devoid of such analysis. It would be academically rewarding to see as to how various decisional players allow or deny space of their respective turfs to others to arrive at an aggregated foreign policy decision.
Hypothesis
51 Graham. T. Allison and Zelikow, Philip, Essence of Decision Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, (Boston: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 1999):256.
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This study uses Allison‟s framework of „bureaucratic politics‟ as the theoretical tool to uncover the foreign policy decision making dynamics in Pakistan, where policy decision is a dependent variable and various factors affecting decisional players‟ perceptions, stand on issues, pulling and hauling to push own perspective and granting space to have some compromise remain independent variables. The study set to demonstrate the causal relationship between the dependent and independent variables while contending that Pakistan‟s Foreign Policy outcomes to deal with Afghan Taliban from 1996 to 2016 were significantly impacted by the bureaucratic politics among civil and military bureaucrats.
Research Questions After having formulated hypothesis, the next critical aspect of study is to determine the questions around which data gathering and empirical analysis is built. Following are the research questions, which this study attempts to answer in order to test the hypothesis; 1. How are the decision outcomes directed by bureaucratic politics among civil and military bureaucrats? 2. What has been the Prism of Pakistan foreign policy towards Afghanistan from 1996 to 2016? 3. How were each of the three case study decisions arrived at as a result of “pulling and hauling” and how a compromise among the bureaucrats impacted the Afghan Taliban‟s specific policy outcomes? 4. Which arm of the bureaucracy (civil or military) prevailed and why in taking the crucial decisions regarding recognition, parting ways and reconnect with the Taliban?
Research Design and Methodology
To breakdown the complexity of decision-making process in foreign policy domain (with reference to the selected case studies) the techniques of qualitative as well as quantitative research are employed. To focus on major foreign policy decisions, the case study approach is employed to carry forward the research process. The three case studies to analyze decision-making process about Pakistan foreign policy to deal with Afghan Taliban have been used. These case studies include (i) Recognition of Afghan
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Taliban Regime in 1997, (ii) parting ways with Taliban in 2001 and (iii) persuading Taliban to join the peace process under Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) in 2015.
In an overall scheme of research design, a mixed method approach is employed to analyze decision process and role played by various decisional actors (bureaucrats), mainly collecting primary data/information via personal interviews with the relevant decisional players (higher and middle level government officials) active at the point and time of each of the Case Study Decisions. The data from these decisional actors is also collected through a questionnaire attached as Annexure-1. This method has helped to build a general picture to plug the gaps in the qualitative research. This method has also helped to prove the causal relationship of dependent and independent variables. The data collected thus helps to know behavioral aspects of participants in a decision-making process. Secondary sources are also accessed like books/articles and press coverage on the three case studies to analyze, scrutinize, compare and contrast the recorded details.
The case study approach has certain limitations, if the sample is small and a possible bias. To address the first problem (small sample), a comprehensive list of relevant participants for a policy decision was made after going through the posting & transfer records and then the relevant officers were listed. Using the specific criterion of having a direct decision makers‟ role in a process and closeness to the investigative tool (Alison‟s bureaucratic politics model) helped to identify the decision makers for each of the three case studies. To overcome the second problem (bias), nature of analysis has been open ended. The three selected case studies are explanatory and present causal data of various decision outcomes while factoring in the role of various decisional players. Each explanatory case study presents data learning on cause-effect relationships explaining which cause produced which effects. This research develops explanatory arguments to view respective case studies objectively to illustrate and test the model‟s assumptions and the foreign policy decision outcomes to test the developed hypothesis. The decision outcomes are also used for analysis as per the research topic and to proffer new insights to generalize the study findings for futuristic application.
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Limits of the Study The study confronted certain limitations like non-availability of decisional meetings‟ proceedings at foreign office due to the secret nature of the undertakings. The other limitation pertains to non-availability of few key players for the interview i.e. former President General Pervez Musharraf (Case Study-Parting Ways with Afghan Taliban- 2001) was out of the country, former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (Recognition of Taliban Regime 1997) was inaccessible and his Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub due to his old age and ailment declined the meeting. Another problem faced was the assertion of some of senior bureaucrats that their names should not be quoted.
Division of the Study After introducing the proposed research, the treatment of the subject is organized in four Chapters. The Chapter-1 deals with the theoretical framework. After a brief explanation of the theoretical perspectives, the conceptual framework of policy formulation of Pakistan is dilated upon, followed by an application of the Bureaucratic Politics Model to the selected case studies. Chapter-2 deals with Pakistan‟s foreign policy decision-making „prism‟ from 1996 to 2016. It describes and defines the nature of political and military leadership as well as the civil and military bureaucracy, which influenced the decisional outcomes in case of each of the case Studies. Chapter-3 deals with the evolution of Pakistan‟s foreign policy towards Afghanistan in general and towards Taliban in particular. The policy evolution is traced through an analysis of successive civil and military regimes in Pakistan from 1979 to 2016. Military regimes of Gen. Zia-ul-Haq and Gen. Pervez Musharraf are discussed for their respective policy evolutionary practices. Civil regimes of Pakistan People Party and Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) are focused for their policy evolution to deal with Afghanistan and Taliban as per their respective tenure and relevant issues. Chapter-4 analyses in detail the three Case Studies while dealing Afghan Taliban i.e. recognition of Taliban Regime in 1997, parting ways with Taliban in 2001 and reestablishing contact with Taliban under QCG program for Afghanistan peace in 2015.
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CHAPTER 1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK Passing through the long corridor of diplomatic history and law, a new discipline called International Relations, emerged between the two World Wars. By the end of the World War II, the first coherent approach of the discipline of International Relations and the field of foreign policy analysis came into existence with the realization that “all that occurs between nations and across nations is grounded in human decision makers acting singly or in groups.”52 The efforts to understand as to how the human beings perceive and react to the world around them and how do they shape the world around them are central to the inquiry of decision-making in foreign policy. K.J Holsti defined the concept of foreign policy as “decision that determines the country‟s objectives externally from act and actions taken to implement the decisions.”53 By all definitions, a foreign policy is based on the decision-making process to reach at a particular policy option. The individuals who form part of various decision-making actors are politicians, bureaucrats and interest groups. “Decision process is the selection of a particular alternative from a range of alternatives in order to achieve certain purpose by those in power in the institutions of society.”54
The decision-making process allows the participants to dilate upon the foreign policy issues before arriving at the best alternative for the adoption of a specific decision. “The decision-making process is the set of rules and methods used by the participants in decision-making structure for a particular choice or preference choices to solve a particular problem. Decision-making is generally understood as a process reached at a reasonable working version between several competing alternatives and all decisions are aimed at achieving specific goals, or avoid undesirable results.”55 As per David Eston, in the context of foreign policy, “these decisions are the outputs of the political system which are made through the distribution of authoritarian values in society, whether these values are internal or external.”56
52 Valerie M. Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory, (Plymouth, UK: Rowman and Littlefield 2007). 53 K.J. Holsti, International Policies: A Framework for Analysis, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1977):21. 54 Jamal Mujahid, Opinion and Measures, (Cairo: Cairo University Press, 2008):125. 55 D. Ismail Sabri Moukled, Theories of International Politics, Comparative Analytical Study, (Kuwait: Kuwait University, 1985):148. 56 David Eston, A Framework for Political Analysis, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1969):50.
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1.1 Theorization of Foreign Policy and Decision-making Richard Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin‟s pioneering work was followed by James Rosenau‟s development of the “pre-theory” to guide research on foreign-policy decision-making. Rosenau was one of the first International Relations‟ scholars to emphasize the significance of role factors in foreign policy decision-making. The subsequent research on the role of socialization has attempted to explain not only the process, by which specific role-related beliefs are acquired, but also the ways in which individuals manage dual identities-as ex-officio spokespersons for a particular agency, and as individuals who are responsible for giving the leader the best quality advice under the circumstances. He argued that in the absence of widely accepted theories of foreign-policy causation, scholars should at least be explicit about their initial assumptions when they undertake the study of a decisional situation. This meant not only listing the variables that one believes to be determinative but also ranking these variables in terms of their assumed “relative potency” for the particular decisional situation. He also provided some preliminary guidance about the circumstances under which one variable was likely to have greater relative potency than another, depending upon the “issue area” (type of decisional situation) and the degree to which the nation under study was influenced by external influences.57
Rosenau‟s pre-theoretical arguments served as a cornerstone for the development of a new approach to the study of foreign-policy decision-making, called Comparative Foreign-Policy (CFP). CFP assumed that the impact of variables could (and should) be testable and replicable. These variables were employed to test the development of a general theory of foreign-policy causation by explicitly incorporating individual, societal and systemic variables in respective studies. CFP conceived international relations not in terms of three distinct and competing levels of analysis but rather in terms of the interaction among these levels of analysis. “In so doing, the contributors to the CFP approach set the precedent for a number of newer approaches to the study of international relations (constructivism, poliheuristic theory), which seek to engage
57 James Rosenau and J.D. Singer, Private Preferences and Political Responsibilities: The Relative Potency of Individuals and Role Variables in the Behavior of US Senators, (New York: Free Press, 1968).
38 all three levels of analysis while maintaining the focus on foreign-policy decision- making.”58
It is generally assumed that the relative potency of various factors involved in a foreign-policy decision (the independent variables) and the process by which the decision is arrived at (dependent variable) will differ according to the type of decisional situation. David Braybrooke and Charles Lindblom “differentiated between decision-making situations according to the degree of importance (defined as change) accorded to the decision and the degree of uncertainty associated with the decision.” They also introduced the concept of “disjointed instrumentalism” to illustrate the characteristic adjustive behavior associated with „small change‟ situations.”59 Charles Hermann (1996) provided a useful typology of “decisional situations, ranging from crises to administrative situations-based on high or low threat to national values, and the degree to which the decision-makers were surprised by the event.”60
Harold Hance Sprout and Margret Tuttle Sprout provide important insight about the concept of the frequently used expression of „Objective Reality.‟ They believe that “the agents involved in a particular decision and the process that ultimately leads to the policy decision is determined by the psychological milieu and the way the situation is defined by the key decision-makers. On the other hand, the outcome of the decisional process, the success or failure of a foreign policy, will be determined by objective reality, which the Sprouts refer to as the operational milieu.”61
Most of the scholarly input on decisional situations has been divided according to these two tracks i.e., the psychological milieu and the operational milieu. Several important studies have focused on the operational milieu. “One approach that bears special mention is the use of the data of various events systematically to categorize bilateral and multilateral interactions, which laid the foundation for follow-on research in the international contexts of foreign-policy decision-making. Events data
58 Ibid. 59 David Braybrooke and Charles Lindblom, A strategy of Decision: Policy Evaluation as a Social Process, (New York: Free Press, 1963). 60 Chales Herman, International Crisis as a situational Variable in international Politics and Foreign Policy, (New York: Free Press, 1969):409-21. 61 Harold Hance Sprout and Margret Tuttle Sprout, The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs: With Special Reference to International Politics, New Edition, (New York: Praeger, 1979).
39 has been used by various government agencies, including the department of Defense and the National Security Council, to help prepare policy-makers for international crises.”62
A much larger community of scholars has pursued the alternative path envisioned by Sprout‟s study of psychological milieu. As per Robert Jervis, “the researchers have dilated upon various circumstances under which a policy-maker or group is predisposed to interpret an international event in a particular way. This literature, which focuses on the definition of the situation as a determinant of subsequent decision-making behavior is borrowed from cognitive psychology. His research on the effects of a leader‟s cognitive predispositions (evoked set, perceptual readiness, and so on) on his or her interpretative and decisional behaviors carries special emphasis to seek the impact of cognitive psychology.”63
Arguably, the most famous example of the impact that a leader‟s cognitive bias can have on his or her definition of the situation is Ole Holsti‟s demonstration of the “inherent bad faith” model. “Holsti‟s ambitious study (1962) of the belief system of John Foster Dulles illustrated that the Secretary of State was so fundamentally suspicious of Soviet intentions that he could not accept non-threatening Soviet behaviors at face value. Rather, he explained such behaviors as indicators of Moscow‟s weakness. This logic led Dulles to recommend that the United States respond to apparently non-threatening Soviet actions by increasing the pressure on the Kremlin.”64
Foreign Policy decisions are often the product of deliberations among a small group of political insiders, many of whom are ex-officio representatives of government agencies. Morton Halperin‟s various writings (1974) on bureaucratic politics provide interesting illustrations of the tensions inherent in this situation. Haplerin argues that “bureaucracies, and the individuals who represent them, accord a high priority to the
62 CA McClelland and G.D Hoggard, „Conflict Patterns in the Interactions Among Nations‟ in James N. Rosenau ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory, (New York: Free Press, 1969):711-24. 63 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979). 64 Ole R. Holsti, “The Belief System and National Images” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 6:3, (September 1962):224-52.
40 protection and advancement of four institutional interests i.e., missions, capabilities, influence, and essence.”65
The scholars further deliberated on individual decision-makers and the ways in which the important concept of „agency‟ has been made more complex by incorporating the variables of group and organization. Various authors, over a period of time, used different concepts and assumptions to come up with a decision models for their probable usage in foreign policy decision-making process. Some of the major models with their concepts/basic tenants/assumptions, process, application domains and their probable appropriateness for different environment and cases are summarized in the Table below.
65 M. Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy” Washington, DC, Brooking Institute, 1974.
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Table 1.1 Major Foreign Policy Decision Making Models
Probable Basic Appropriateness of Sr. Tenants/Key Model By Process Application model for various No Concepts Foreign Policy /Assumptions Decisions People are cognitively competent to match means to ends. Rosenberg Nations are led Referred to an Stein & Sino-Indian Rational by rational – Thin Weighed and individual, 1. Walch, War choice rationality reviewed for to explain & predict Graham T. Seven Weeks theory (strategic pursuit prose & cons outcomes of FP & Allison War of stable & international conflict 1971 ordered preference). Thick-rationality (authors specific preferences) Individuals face constraints which President to use limit decisional Incrementalim major functional making & satisfying‟ responsibilities: computational by controlling Herbert Commander in It helps to judge the capabilities, inherent Simon, chief cognitive and 2. memory, re-call uncertainty by Cybernetic Steinbruner (international communication abilities focused Ostrom & dimension), abilities of a leader Use their own attention & Job, 1955 Chief Executive to affect decision. cognitive highly (domestic) and capabilities & programmed Political leader demands imposed response (Political) by decision environment Individuals evaluate outcomes React to Two phases:- Kahneman probabilities in a - Carter‟s Identifying Discusses / evaluates 3. Prospect & non linear fashion decision for options and outcomes not the Theory Tversky- gains; Refers freeing Tehran Evaluation process. 1979 Profit- Loss hostages options Form a reference point that is predetermined by situation Concentrate s on It is Iraq‟s no „why and how‟ of progressive withdrawal policy makers in nature and form Kuwait” Poliheuristic Non-compensatory employ two loss aversion. Bush decision Theory principle 4. Mintz and decision process Takes over to attack Iraq. Poly-(many) “eliminating by Red 2000 I) Screen all other Clinton in Heuristic- aspects (EBA),” alternates; II) consideratios/ Kosovo. (Shortcuts) Leaders specific analyze minimum 42 dimension Carter-“Iran risks & maximum based Hostages.” rewards. approach Pakistan Measured in nuclear terms of political explosion ramifications. Chosen alternative may not be optimal (the best one)
Conformity of decision because Bay of pigs of (1) direct invasion Janis – Long sessions pressure from Korean & Relevant to 5. 1982 compel all Group Think group on Vietnam war identical/ single McQueen members to dissenter member JFK – Cuban group decision – 2005 agree (2) conformity Missile crisis from stress Iraq invasion induced cohesion Group is failing to carry out any significant Mintz, collective *Camp David Mishal thinking. 2000, Israeli Morag Decision base Applicable to a 6. Group does not delegation Poly Think (2005) or input is professional group; speak in one *9/11 US Mintz & broadened not bureaucrats voice. invasion of De-Roun Afghanistan (2010) Broader vision due to polarity of opinions of group members SOPs determine *Forecasting how actors of stances as “Organizatio Applicable to see T. Allison behave per knowledge nal Behavior Cuban missile organizational 7 &Holper(1 Grounded notion of SOPs process crisis behavior stemming 969) that policy *Violation of Model” from their SOPs makers are SOPs is ruled rational out Government Bargaining actors drive at are included Applicable to decision through by changing current study as it a “bargaining composition T. Allison deals with “Bureaucratic game” as per of group. Carter – Iranian 8 & Halper - bureaucratic Politics” their policy goals. Similar hostages 1972 assertions of Actors promote evaluation of government their positions as information officials per organizational increases stands. bargains Transferring Two stages knowledge from 1. Establish an past problem analogy in two Sage – Used to forecast a solving. events, & *Persian gulf “Analogical 1990 decision, basing on 9 Information is causes war Reasoning” Vertzberger past identical collected through 2. Inferring; *Vietnam War 1990 situations. feedback similar causes mechanism of lead to similar two stages outcomes
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Decision matrix “Applied Developing alternatives Saddam Decision Mintz - descriptive and dimensional Applied to non- 10 Invasion of Analysis 2005 predictive phases of democratic leaders Kuwait (ADA)” decision profiles implication Analysis of each decision Strategy for improving decision making, eliminating biases:- 1. Input Biases Jarris-1976 i.e. selective data Revisiting the 2nd War in Kahneman for inference likely Lebanon 2007 Whether decisions , Lavallo, 11 “Biases” 2. Output Biases outcomes to Yom Kippur are biased or Sibony preferences in remove any War 1973 otherwise 2011, answers as ones‟ bias Sage-1990 Invasion of Iraq acquiescence 3. Operational Biases i.e. blaming others not having foreseen events
Source: Compiled by the Researcher Note: Converting into a table and viewing its appropriateness is done to have a panoramic view of major foreign policy making models.
1.2 Decision-making in Foreign Policy Graham T. Allison introduced the cluster of Rational Actor Model, Organizational Behaviour Model & Bureaucratic Politics Model of variables in his pioneering work. He enriched all these models while linking the respective models with the various facets of US Policy to handle the Cuban Missile Crises. Under this linkage Alison terms the “Three Cuts” as an explanatory tool to describe the US policy options for the subject crises. It is also a source of pre-theoretical guidance, which determines “when the analyst finds puzzling, how he formulates his question, where he looks for evidence, and what he produces as an answer.”66 Allison comes up with three models to elaborate the decision-making process in foreign policy. As Allison, Halperin, and others have observed that “organizations influence decision-making by their standard operating procedures, their habits of information processing, their institutionalized world-views, and their distinct and competing priorities. There is still a great deal of
66 Graham T. Allison and Philip Zalikow, Essence of Decisions: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd Edition, (Boston: Wesley Educational Publishers, 1999).
44 work to be done, both empirically and theoretically, on the processes by which institutions develop distinctive identities and characteristic modes of behaving.”67
Although the articulation of this research agenda can be found in works such as Huntington (1960), Hulsman (1967), Neustadat (1970), Shilhing, Hammand and Snyder (1962), probably the most cited work is of Allison (1971) and Halperin (1972). Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow in their work Essence of Decision (1999) offer three perspectives at explaining one episode in the US foreign policy i.e. the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962; investigating both the US and Soviet sides of the case. Their 1st model Rational Actor Model (RAM) describes that decisions taken in foreign policy by a unitary actor are based on the rationale exercised by that person to reach at the best alternative. The 2nd model, Organizational Behavior Model (OBM) underscores the importance of the standing operating procedures of an organization which become the bases of decision makers to reach any decision outcome. The 3rd model is Bureaucratic Politics Model (BPM), where foreign policy decisions are impacted by bureaucratic politics among decision makers who influence the final outcome about a policy issue. This study applies the third model to advance research arguments on Pakistan‟s Foreign Policy to deal with Taliban from 1996 to 2016.
1.3 Illustration of Bureaucratic Politics Model The propositions of Model III, mentioned above, were supported by Richard Neustadt‟s work.68 Neustadt clarifies the “distinction between power on paper and power in practice, explaining the fact that authoritative power is mostly shared among the power holders.”69 In Model III, the subjects are „government officials‟ who take decisions while representing various organizations. This Model focuses on the decisional actors‟ behaviors who are involved in decision-making process. All decision actors represent some department, agency, organization, and have their biases because of their organizational culture and respective stand on an issue. Decision-making environment demands that government decisions must pass through a process where various government officials reach to decision outcomes for a given
67 Ibid. 68 Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan, Revised Edition, (New York: Macmillan, 1990). 69 Ibid.
45 policy issue. Main features and characteristics of the Model are explained in the paragraphs below.
1.3.1 High Quality or Better Decisions: “Multi person process gives better decision due to detailed analysis of information, values, interests, imaginatively identifying options, accurate estimates of cost/benefits, alertness to indicators of failures and readiness to learn from mistakes. But too much analysis also has to be avoided as it can produce decision paralysis.”70
1.3.2 Participants and their Role: “Who participates and in what role? Different personalities with varying preferences alter policy outcomes. The organizational participants are affected by the notion of organizational tasks, mission, programs, and associated culture. The lower level bureaucrats display, “grooved thinking.” (sticking to organizational dispositions and preferences). The political leadership is transient and depends on particular individuals for the decisions, whereas bureaucratic power is there to stay and the former keep making use of it to operate the government machinery.”71
1.3.3 Decision Rules: These rules, binding on decisional actors, lay down the proceedings in a channel through some procedures. “Its impact is more clear where group decisions are made by vote and is more applicable at the stage of legislation or approval of policy at various Houses of Representatives eg the rules of the game in various congressional committees to decide about the ratification of a decision or policy.”72
1.3.4 Framing Issues and Setting Agendas: The initial response of bureaucrats to frame an issue and taking out agenda lays the foundation for further decision-making process. “How a group or a decision actor responds to an issue depends on how an issue is framed and comes on discussion agenda. Decision actors recognize problems in the “problem – stream” (inter-linkages of problems) and contribute to a policy in the “policy-stream” (available alternatives). A proper problem identification is crucial
70 Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, (New York: Little Brown, 1999):263-265. 71 Ibid., 275. 72 Ibid., 278.
46 which can be ensured through proper explanation of the problem, to avoid the self- explanation by respective agents, for uniform understanding of a challenge and intricacies of a specific problem.”73
1.3.5 Group Think: “Key policy issues are discussed and divided in small groups (6- 12). Due to less number of participants, there is certainly a degree of cohesion which leads to a consensus. Resultantly, this helps bringing in a shared rationalization to reach to the least objectionable decision. Outcome of a group think can be altered if personalities, power structures and business rules of an agenda discussion are changed. The important thing is to reach at a consensus in spite of having divided views.”74
1.3.6 Complex of Joint Action: “Complexity grows when the decision has to come from and be ratified from various executive and legislative levels. If the numbers of actors are increased, it becomes a complex situation to reach a process outcome. A solution to this is laying down the condition of accepting or rejecting a decision by approval authority instead of accepting and rejecting by part i.e. “accept-it-or leave it.” Another way to break the “decision jam” is to expand the decision group so that the new entrants either justify or modify the upcoming policy decision.”75
1.3.7 Organizing Concepts: This is about the effect of a decision-making actor on government decisions. These decision agents enter in decisional games as per their respective positions and their organizational sensitivities on certain issues. The organizational parochialism puts pressure on players to remain mindful of their organizational orientation and sensitivities about an issue thus hinting at what has to be done. Though national interests are well accepted, still other interests like personal, political and organizational interests come into play to affect the decision choices. The overleaping interests of decision-making agents constitute the stakes and stands of respective decisional players.
73 Ibid., 280. 74 Ibid., 283. 75 Ibid., 287.
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1.3.8 General Propositions: For making propositions the analysts need information about the rules of the game, importance of skill that players bring to their positions, the distribution of power among players and the judgment of the individual players about the pay offs of each alternative. “There are many factors which constitute a governmental game. These factors come into play between issues and resultants. The individuals whose positions and moves matter are hooked in action-channels. An action-channel remains a regularized mean through which governmental decisions on any specific issue are taken. Rules of the Game come from the constitution, statues and executive orders. Rules establish the position of players in a hierarchy; establish the range of governmental decisions and actions and revision moves of some kinds i.e. bargaining, threat, coalitions etc.”76
The major aspects of Bureaucratic Politics Model are summed up in Table below; Table 1.2 Alison and Zelikow’s Bureaucratic Politics Model (Model III) Sr. No The Paradigm Model III 1 Decision players Civil Establishment Security Establishment Others (Different Ministries etc.) 2 Unit of analysis Foreign Policy decision as political resultant among bureaucrats 3 Major Organizing Concepts Players and their position in structure Factors shaping perceptions, preferences and stands of the players Decision game An aggregated decision 4 Dominant Inference Pattern Decision outcome as resultant of mutual bargaining 5 General Propositions Final decision different than the initial intention Different perception about the problems Stand to issue depends where one sits on the table Sensitivity of contextualizing the issue (prism and issue under discussion) Style and maneuverability of the players Bureaucratic politics and decision resultants Source: Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, New York: Little Brown, 1999.
1.4 Critique on Allison’s Bureaucratic Politics Model Many scholars have proffered their critical views on this model, helping to get a nuanced understanding of the Model to apply on the selected case studies of this research. Some of the prominent reviews are summarized below.
76 Ibid., 305-309.
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J. Bendor and T.H Hammond have analyzed all the three models of Allison about the governmental decision-making. They are of the view that these models are not rigorously formulated, conclusions are incorrectly drawn and empirical tests are ambiguous. Bendor and Hammond have four criticisms on Bureaucratic Politics Model (Model-III). “It misconstrues nature of executive branch policy making. Second, it says little that policy making takes place in some hierarchy. Third, model is not very precisely formulated. Finally, it is too complex to determine the role and impact of each variable, relationship and assumption.”77 Daniel Dezner maintains that “this paradigm suggests that any new insertion of ideas into institutions is not that simple. In contrast to Allison‟s Model III, where decision agents carry high influence because of their positions, decision actors have less influence because they belong to a thin interest group. These foreign policy interest groups are smaller, less organized, less wealthy and by extension less influential. The bureaucratic politics approach has focused exclusively on crisis decision-making in security bureaucracies at the expense of longitudinal analysis of routine foreign policy, which is the policy category that bureaucratic politics should matter most.”78
Jerel Rosati states that “the decision-making structure placed in this model is not generally as prevalent within executive branch as is commonly assumed. Even where this structure is present, the decision-making process is not always one of bargaining, compromise and consensus. The decision context and decision participants are ignored in the model.”79 Whereas, Stephen D. Krasner offers that “though the bureaucratic interpretation of foreign policy has become the conventional wisdom but this vision is misleading, dangerous and compelling because it obscures the power of the president and undermines the assumptions of democratic politics by relieving high officials of responsibility. Then it offers leaders and theorists an excuse for their failures and reinterpretations.”80
77 J. Bendor and T.H Hammond, “Rethinking Allison‟s Model” American Political Science Review, 86:2, (June 1992):30-32. 78 Daniel W. Dezner, “Ideas, Bureaucratic Politics and the Crafting of Foreign Policy” American Journal of Political Science, 44:4, (October 2000):733-749. 79 Jerel A Rosati, “Developing a Systematic Decision- Making Framework: Bureaucratic Politics in Perspective” World Politics, 33:2, (January 1981). 80 Stephan D. Karsner, “Are Bureaucracies Important? (or Allison Wonderland)” Foreign Policy 7, (Summer 1972):159-179.
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Edward Rhodes applied the Bureaucratic Politics Model with respect to the outcomes relating to the US Navy budgets, procurement and force mix versus the career background of the most senior naval leaders coming from three communities of aviation, surface warfare and submarine warfare. His analysis of empirical data reveals no statistically significant support for Allison‟s proposition of “where a player stands depends on where he sits.” Edward Rodes suggests, “an alternative model, where government behavior be taken as shared ideas rather than competing interest where a player stands depends not on where he sits, but what he thinks; secondly, governmental officials not arrive at a “compromise outcome”, instead, through shared images on the issue, they arrive at a “shared outcome.”81
Douglas T. Stuart believes that “With respect to „Agency‟ as an independent variable in decision-making, Allison‟s Bureaucratic Politics Model III as a pioneering study “Essence of Decision” is not only an excellent example of a theoretically informed case study, it is also a source of pre-theoretical guidance which explains that the conceptual model that a researcher implicitly or explicitly applies to a particular decisional situation, will determine how to formulate such a question, where he has to seek the evidence and finally what sort of answer he would produce. Other independent variables which impact the decision outcomes include indispensable leaders, institutional interests (missions, capabilities influence and essence), individual‟s behavior and attitudes, other actors (academia, international leaders of other countries), world organizations and media.”82
Klans Brummer aims at enhancing the explanatory powers of the Bureaucratic Politics Model by clarifying its core propositions. “Where you stand depends where you sit.” An actor draws influences from seat which he occupies. In addition to this, other human factors also affect the actors‟ influence i.e. personal experiences, preferences etc. “The pulling and hauling politics for bargaining; the decisions are not only made because of varying power enjoyed by various decisions actors. At times outstanding representatives from less powerful organizations may also succeed in bargaining process.” “Decision Outcome” “The Resultants” are unintended
81 Edward Rodes “Do Bureaucratic Politics Matter: Some Disconfirming Findings from the Case of US Navy” World Politics 47:1, (October 1994):1-47. 82 Douglas T. Stuart, The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).
50 compromised solutions that no actor originally pursued. These also appear to be logical outcome since the actors involved in bargaining process not only advance their competing policy preferences but usually are not that powerful who can impose their will on the other actors.”83
This is a constructive criticism and this has enriched the debate on Allison‟s model and this has helped a kind of „augmented Allison‟s model‟; augmented by the critics who have pointed out the missing elements or identified the limitations on its applicability in certain situations etc. The critique of the Alison‟s Model notwithstanding, this Model is one of the best available models which explain the tension between the civilian and military bureaucracies in Pakistan, in the domain of foreign policy.
1.5 Bureaucratic Politics Model and Foreign Policy Making As a whole, the Bureaucratic Politics Model of decision-making is an elaborate scheme through which some of the foreign policy decisions can be de-constructed. The above discussion shows the intricacies, which exist in the hierarchy of the decision-making. It further shows that in any decision-making and agenda setting scheme there is usually a set of pattern which is followed. In this particular model, the theme happens to be „governmental officials‟ who do not belong to a single department. The most interesting facet of the model happens to be that even if there is one particular decision maker who is the face of a particular department e.g. the Foreign Office, the decision-making actually does not reside with only his/her authority but the entire team has to participate in the analyses and agenda setting. Decision-making is a highly complicated process in the light of the proposed model. A leader has the power but often not the authority to form a policy because there is always a group of people (bureaucrats) knowing the details of how and what policies are to be formed. Thus the importance of bureaucrats cannot be denied as they form the team players, actors and even stakeholders who come to set agendas and later policies.
83 Dr. Klans Brumer, “The Bureaucratic Politics Model and Poliheuristic Theory” British International Studies Association (BISA) Annual Conference, Leicester-UK, December 14-16, 2009.
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Another important aspect of decision process by a group involves a vast amount of discussions among the group members, which can often lead to the making of sound policies or even the sound setting of agendas. Such vigorous discussions also lead to another aspect, the checks and balances, which one actor can place on the other actor through exhaustive counter arguments. It does serve as a hard hitting check and balance, which works in pin-pointing certain crucial aspects which could be unhelpful and possibly harmful in state interests. Perhaps one of the most interesting factors here happens to be the organizational preferences which come to play and how one of them might supersede the other. Even though there is a certain amount of checking of biases but in most cases the organization which holds the highest amount of power and authority often succeeds in getting an unrestricted leeway to exercise a free hand in putting forth such analyses and notions, which serve their own organization. This is a negative aspect because often in group discussions, there are always one or more organizations with their self-serving agendas having more authority and quite probably these get better consideration than the others. In this case, the question is how much power or authority does any organization actually has and how much is it willing to exercise towards a policy decision. But apart from this weakness, the Bureaucratic Politics model for foreign policy decisions works well because of the exhaustive and elaborate planning and careful assortment of discussions.
In general, there are many scholars who believe that the Bureaucratic Politics Model serves as a mean to the formation of policy making. Due to the presence of multiple actors from various organizations this whole process of decision-making becomes complicated because every actor is playing a peculiar role as per respective preferences. In areas like Foreign Policy, the idea is that usually the security forces and their bureaucracies take the high road while the civilian bureaucracies are rendered as sidelined actors, especially for the security oriented policy issues. In such cases, the executive being in charge, most often, is also just a mere actor who does not employ the power which they have. Under such like situations, there is too much emphasis on bargaining and compromise than consensus because there are too many actors and organizations involved. However, as a whole there is a clutter of authority, power and leadership in the organizations who compete for their organizational preferences but then at the end of the day, reach to a shared one or an aggregated decision with the competing counterparts of decision-making process, which serves
52 the national interests. This may be actually the biggest strength and a core value of any national level decision making system.
Graham T Allison and Philip Zelikow‟s paradigm of “Bureaucratic Politics” in foreign policy formulation will serve as a template to analyze Pakistan‟s foreign policy decisions making process towards Afghan Taliban from 1996 to 2016 (In the realm of dealing with Afghan Taliban). This model‟s main argument is that decisions are product of gaining and negotiating for an aggregated decision among concerned civil and military bureaucrats. Decision and political game remains an approach to determine the likely influence of bureaucratic politics to impact the policy outcomes in an action channel.
Core proposition of “Bureaucratic Politics Model” is that an actor‟s bureaucratic position strongly impacts its policy preferences. Competing preferences of bureaucratic actors settle in a bargaining process and resultants are unintended aggregated solutions, about which no actors initially started with. The unit of analysis in this case, remains the decisional outcomes, where differing priorities and perceptions of decisional actors matter in decision-making process. Single individual or an organization‟s dominance for pursuance of his/her department or agency‟s stance on an issue remains an overriding factor for agreeing to the final outcome. Like any developing country, bureaucrats of Pakistan, under a democratic government or under the military rule, play a vital role in foreign policy decision-making process. This study is going to track back such impacts on the final decision outcomes by employing the Bureaucratic Politics Model.
1.6 Theoretical Construct The context, which is the basis of our analytical pursuits, remains the circumstantial and compulsive options presented by different scenarios at any given time and point. The constructs of this analytical context encompasses the policy response formulated towards Afghan Taliban at three junctures i.e., Recognition of Taliban Regime (1997), parting ways with Taliban (2001), and joining Afghanistan Peace Process under QCG (2015). In this scheme, the contribution made by various decisional agents (bureaucrats – civil and military establishment) is analyzed through the prism
53 of Graham Allison‟s Model of “Bureaucratic Politics” by gauging pattern of influence and power politics exhibited by various decisional actors.
The propositions of Bureaucratic Politics Model like, “you stand where you sit” “pulling and hauling exerted by bureaucrats” “focusing on problems as own perception” “domination of certain decision players” and “final resultants emerging as an aggregated decision among players” are employed to identify the preferences exercised, influence exerted and other conditioning factors (independent variables) of decisional actors to reach at the policy outcomes or resultants (dependent variable) in a decision-making mechanism. The period under review of Pakistan‟s Afghan foreign policy is from 1996 to 2016. Recognition of Taliban regime in Afghanistan (1997) was a tough decision. Pakistan decided to recognize the Taliban Regime for normalization of war torn Afghanistan. This foreign policy decision passed through the rigors of decision processes at various levels to have the respective decision inputs for policy outcomes. From 1996 to 2001 Afghan Taliban governed Afghanistan except Panjsher Province, a Northern Alliance area. The 9/11 attacks were traced by the Americans to Al-Qaeda under Osama bin Laden who happened to be the close ally and guest of Taliban.
Pakistan tried to convince Taliban for the right cause but their refusal compelled Pakistan to withdraw its support and to join the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), which was a major shift in Pakistan‟s foreign policy to deal with Taliban. The US attacked Afghanistan in October 2001, for not complying with the UN resolutions and not cooperating with the world community to fight against terrorism. However, the war in Afghanistan became protracted and other regional players like India, Iran also starting having their stakes in the Afghan conflict. The US despite having declared Pakistan as a strategic ally, neither shared the exit strategy nor entertained Pakistan‟s legitimate security concerns about the RAW and NDS machinations in FATA and Baluchistan and nor forced the two Agencies to sever their relations with the Pakistani Taliban who fled to Afghanistan as a result of operation against insurgents in FATA and Swat (North Eastern part of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province). The prolonged war in Afghanistan became a challenge for the US to end this on a positive note and have a safe exit. Afghan peace process was considered only possible if Taliban can be brought on the negotiation table. A QCG composed of US, China, Afghanistan and
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Pakistan embarked upon to coordinate among all stake holders the modalities and mechanism to convince Taliban for joining the peace process. This initiative was roled out in December 2015.
Model III of “Bureaucratic Politics” given by Graham T. Allison in foreign policy formulation process is our principle research tool for this study. It is used for seeking out evidence about foreign policy resultants with regards to Pakistan‟s foreign policy decisions towards Afghan Taliban i.e. 1996 to 2016. After understanding the structure and process of Pakistan‟s foreign policy, this model can contribute in developing an understanding of decision processes involved, role/influence of various players, and how the final resultants are reached at, to deal with the above mentioned, specific Pakistan foreign policy issues. The participants of decision-making process are the bureaucrats who come from different departments and institutions, mainly from MOFA and security establishment. The Bureaucratic Politics Model helps to determine how bureaucrats at different levels and from different departments enter and conclude the foreign policy decision-making processes while displaying their respective grooved thinking. These organizational participants cast their impact on the final decision outcomes as per their respective departmental mission and notion with regard to deal with Afghan Taliban as per above mentioned case studies. Political elite has the final say in approving the worked out foreign policy alternatives. These political elites are transient by nature in a democracy and hence rely upon particular bureaucrats for foreign policy decisions.
As per the Bureaucratic Politics Model, genuine problem identification is critical. This problem identification is only possible if problem explanation is proper in its context and totality. This facet of Bureaucratic Politics Model is employed to see how civil and military bureaucrats have been recognizing the criticalities of problems in case of the three case studies under review. Then, in turn, we study as to how did they played their role to construct specific policy options in the “policy-streamline” i.e. for implementation. All this happens in a sequence through a series of actions undertaken by various bureaucrats.
After structuring the issue and setting agenda, the decisional participants enter in a decision-making game. This has been termed under Bureaucratic Politics Model as a
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“Chapter of Joint Action.” This aspect has been a major dispositive to situate the complexity in the foreign policy decision-making process. The Bureaucratic Politics Model is employed to seek the evidence as to how the “Decision-jams”, as a result of the instilled complexity of different situations, has been overcome by the civil and military bureaucrats. One of the tenants of Bureaucratic Politics Model is Basic Unit of Analysis i.e., the government and action as a political resultant. These political resultants are the policy decisions arrived at as a result of pulling and hauling to initiate a government action to deal with a foreign policy issue. Dealing with Afghan Taliban from 1996-2016 has witnessed critical policy decisions (as per three case studies) which were political in nature. The Bureaucratic Politics Model is going to help in determining how the policy making decisions were reached at by civil and military bureaucrats as a result of compromise and bargaining among themselves for Pakistan‟s policy towards Afghan Taliban.
For any foreign policy decision, various actors enter into a decision-making process with specific perceptions and with their own departmental interests and accordingly adopt a stance/stand on a specific policy issue. Pakistan‟s government officials have been part of decision-making process towards the handling of Afghan Taliban. To have a pragmatic analysis of the foreign policy, it is crucial to isolate those factors which determine the various constituents of the perception with which civil and military bureaucrats enter into a decision process for a foreign political issue. Bureaucratic Politics Model under its “organizing concepts” explains these factors which shape the perceptions of decision players. These factors (preferences, stands, interests of organization, parochial priorities) are factored in to determine their impact on bureaucrats during decision-making processes for various foreign policy decisions of Pakistan towards Afghan Taliban. With regard to each player‟s impact on foreign policy decision-making, the Bureaucratic Politics Model proffers the relative “Power” enjoyed by different bureaucrats engaged in a decision process. While evolving foreign policy options towards Taliban, the bureaucrats have been enjoying varying power thresholds. Bureaucratic Politics Model is employed as a tool to determine the display of this “Power” (control and use of resources essential to carry out action information about ground situations, preferences to serve national interests etc.) by different bureaucrats at different levels and at different occasions for working out foreign policy alternatives towards the Afghan Taliban.
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Pakistan‟s policy towards Afghan Taliban was the outcome of bureaucratic politics in the form of specific resultants among bureaucrats engaged in various decision-making processes. These resultants (policy decisions) are the outcomes of “pulling and hauling” among the bureaucrats. By employing Bureaucratic Politics Model, we intended to determine the specific „decision game” i.e. to know the pulling and hauling exercised by bureaucrats, who contributed towards a specific foreign policy alternative for Afghan Taliban. Bureaucrats, civil and military alike, remain major role-players in Pakistan‟s Afghan foreign policy. A methodical research approach is necessary to establish the link in historical background and happenings of foreign policy at different occasions. The next Chapter deals with Pakistan‟s foreign policy decision-making prism for developing foreign policy options and lens used by Pakistan‟s policy formulators.
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CHAPTER 2
PAKISTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING PRISM 1996-2016 Since the inception of Pakistan in 1947, all successive governments in Pakistan have tried to engage with Afghanistan to maintain a friendly relationship. This approach was mainly based on three considerations. Firstly, Pakistan has ethnic and religious affinity with the Afghan people and some pushtuns have their own regional aims and resentments. Secondly, Pakistan has had a long desire to secure an access to the Central Asian Republics (CARs) to open a trade link. Thirdly, viewing the historical involvement of India in Afghanistan, Pakistan needs to guard against the overwhelming influence of India on Afghan Government so that Afghan soil was not used against Pakistan. The three objectives appear to be simple and legitimate foreign policy pursuits but their pursuance has proved always bumpy and difficult. On the Afghan side, the internal security turmoil is almost perpetual and for many Afghans, the Durand Line remains an unsettled border. The regional and international interference in Afghan affairs also infused an element of adhocism on Pakistani side, making its approach at times changing suddenly and whimsically.
Immediately after the creation of Pakistan, the Afghan government denounced the treaty which Amir Abdul Rehman had concluded in 1893, establishing the Durand Line as the boundary with British India and started supporting „Pushtoonistan‟ which it wanted to be carved out of Pakistan.”84 Afghanistan was the only country which opposed Pakistan‟s membership to the UN. “The relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan became tense but these were not allowed to go out of control. Situation became more tense and serious when Sardar Muhammad Daud threw out King Muhammad Zahir Shah who was his cousin, on 17 July 1973 as he was known pro Pakistan.”85
Sardar Daud relied on the Soviet support to consolidate his grip on power but he soon realized that Soviets were behind revolutionary People‟s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). “To block the intentions of the Soviets to occupy decisional place in Afghan affairs, Daud started an active diplomacy with Iran, Pakistan and other Muslim countries but the PDPA brought down Sardar Daud through “Saur
84 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2012: 171. 85 Interview with former Ambassador Ayaz Wazir held in Islamabad on January 24, 2018.
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Revolution” in April 1979.”86 Successive and short lived PDPA governments failed to manage the infighting among their ranks and files, and to bring normalcy to their government affairs. The Soviets sent the Red Army in Afghanistan in December 1979, which revived in Pakistan the fears of the long-dreaded Soviet (Russian) expansion towards the warm waters.”87 Military footprints of the Soviets marked the beginning of Afghan liberation war, which drew on to 1989 and end of the Soviet Union, as a main player of the Cold War against the US in 1991.
As per the scope of this study the period under review is from 1996 to 2016, and this chapter presents a prism of policy decisions to address the dealings and issues with the Afghan Taliban by various Pakistan governments in this specific time period. “A national security strategy is an integral part of a nation-state‟s quest to safeguard its national interest. Today, nation-states are the unit of analysis of international relations amongst them, bilaterally and multilaterally, at regional and global levels. National interests involves the securitization of a nation from external and internal threats, by synergizing with foreign policy-making to ensure that diplomacy plays a complementary as well as supporting role to meet the goals and objectives of national interest. This synergization leads to the evolution of a structured architecture of the national security policy-making prism which is institutionalized in a way to incorporate the ideas and role of all the stakeholders in a democratic form of governance.”88 The policy prism comprised of senior civil and military elite is attached as Annexure-2. This prism reconstructs the multiple and changing dynamics of the internal working of Pakistan‟s decision-making but also shows how the usefulness of our Model endeavors to make this study spatial in nature. It connects the aspects of the Bureaucratic Politics Model as presented in the previous chapter with the developments in Pakistan‟s policy towards Afghan Taliban and the decision- making scope. It also shows as to how the whole decision-making process got overpowered by one element (security) having too much ingress, underpinning almost everything else.
86 Interview with former Ambassador Syed Iftikhar Murshad, held in Islamabad on February 18, 2018. 87 Shahid M Amin, Pakistan Foreign Policy A Reappraisal: 84. 88 Gautam Sen, National Interest and National Security Policy Making: Prism for India, (New Delhi: KW Publishers, 2017).
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2.1 Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Decision-making At the governmental level, there is well defined structure to give input and undertake the processes of decision-making. Prime Minister, Cabinet and Parliament are the main political entities of foreign policy considerations and approval bodies in Pakistan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the focal point for initiation of all proposals relating to the formulation and conduct of foreign politics. As per the Constitution of Pakistan (1973), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), under the Prime Minister is responsible to formulate the foreign policy. Being a focal point, MOFA initiates the policy decision process as per envisioned by the executives or a foreign policy issue confronted at any time. “At times, the Prime Minister also points out some agenda to MOFA for formulating a response. Foreign ministry shares these agenda points with all concerned Ministries.”89 The important decisional actors in foreign policy formulation process are the Foreign, Defence, Finance, Interior, Commerce Ministries and the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR). As per the requirement, any other Ministry can be called upon for their input. Other entities like Joint-Services Headquarters and ISI also give their input.
After the Cabinet‟s approval of policy outcomes, Prime Minister endorses a decision and the same is implemented by the relevant officials. Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Army‟s feedback plays an important role before finalizing a policy alternative. “Top Army leadership controls the crucial issues of foreign policy when it comes to Nuclear weapons, US, India, Kashmir and Afghanistan. At times, the government feels that their power to take decisions on these issues is seriously curtailed.”90 In the modern era of international politics, well founded and intensely deliberated foreign policy decision-making paradigm proves a particularly viable diplomatic tool. To generate a precise response to foreign policy challenges an effective and efficient foreign policy decision-making process remains the hallmark for a befitting diplomacy. In Pakistan, the major inputs for foreign policy decisions come from MOFA and security establishment. Both the bureaucracies (civil and military) have a well-defined structure, cadre of earmarked officers, channel and decision making process. 2.1.1 Ministry of foreign Affairs (MOFA) Structure & Functions
89 The Constitution of The Islamic Republic of Pakistan, (Islamabad: Center For Civic Education Pakistan, 2010). 90 Tariq Rahman, „Who controls the foreign policy in Pakistan‟ Express Tribune, April 9, 2012.
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Pakistan‟s MOFA has a well laid down structure. It works under Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs. Its organization is based on territorial and other functional requirements. Federal Secretary of MOFA is responsible to manage various wings of the Ministry and Pakistani missions abroad. Pakistan has one hundred and twenty Missions in different parts of the world.”91
The ministry is organized on the basis of regional distribution of work (various desks dealing with different regions of the world) and support structure (administrative, policy planning, finance etc.). The organization of the MOFA is shown in diagram below; Diagram 2.1 Structure of Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Minister of Foreign Minister Director General State (NASA)
Foreign Secretary Director General Special Secretary (C&W)
Director Director General (AI) General (SP) Director Director General (FSA) General (ISS)
Director Director Director (A&I) (MB&SP) (HSB)
Additional Additional Additional Additional Additional Secretary Secretary Secretary Secretary Secretary (Administration) (Afg & ECO) (Americas) (Asia Pacific) (Europe)
Additional Additional Additional Chief Protocol Secretary Secretary Secretary (UN & EC) (Policy Planning) (Middle East & Africa) KEY:
91 Interview with former Ambassador Afrasiab Hashmi, held in Islamabad, on February 7, 2019.
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ME Middle East UN United Nation and Economic Coordination AFG&ECO Afghanistan & Economic Cooperation Organization AP Asia Pacific OIC Organization of Islamic Conference PP Policy Planning MB & SP Mission Building and Special Projects HSB High Security Block A & I Audit & Inspection C&W Cons and Welfare
Source: http://mofa.gov.pk/content.php?pageID=organo
MOFA remains the focal point to coordinate, construct and implement foreign policy. It works under the Foreign Minister and the Federal Secretary of MOFA, titled Foreign Secretary. The Foreign Secretary is usually the senior most diplomat and acts as a lynchpin to manage all the affairs in foreign policy domain. The Foreign Secretary is assisted by the regional desk officers (Additional Secretary, Director General, Director and Assistant Director) and other supportive divisions within the ministry. “The major functions of MOFA include; Formulation of policy alternatives after due consultation and coordination with all stakeholders (particularly with the Ministries of Defence, Interior, Finance, Economic Affairs Division, Commerce and the Military Establishment) Rendering advice to political elite for adoption of a policy alternative. Following policy decisions of the Cabinet and the Prime Minister. Ensuring implementation of policy decisions and feed back to high ups. Maintaining the Ministry and all the Missions abroad logistically. Interaction with foreign Embassies in the Capital. Maintaining liaison with the intelligentsia and relevant Think Tanks. Training and grooming of foreign office officers and capacity building of entire work force of MOFA.”92
2.1.2 Security Establishment Like all other countries Pakistan has a well laid down structure of its armed forces/services (Army, Navy & Air Force). To coordinate the efforts of all the Services, a four star general heads the Joint Services Headquarters. All the three
92 Ibid.
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Services are commanded by a four star general from the respective service. Every service apart from other wings (Logistic, Communication etc.) has its own Intelligence Wing to meet the intelligence requirements of the respective service. The broad outline of Pakistan armed forces is shown in diagram below.
Diagram 2.2 Broad Outline of Pakistan Armed Forces Structure
President
Prime Minister
Joint Services Headquarters
Army Navy Air Force Headquarters Headquarters Headquarters
Military Navy Intelligence Air Force
Intelligence Intelligence
Source: Constructed by the Author after having interview of various military officers.
Another imported part of the intelligence organizational structure is the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). ISI has two cadres of officers in its organization. One is civil cadre and the second one is the serving officers of all the armed forces deputed to the organization. These deputed officers (mainly from army) serve for varying periods of their tenure in ISI. The outline structure of ISI is shown in diagram below;
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Diagram 2.3 Outline Structure of ISI
Prime Minister
Director General ISI
SCP DG A DDG B DG PPA DDG S DDG I DDG CT DG T DG IM IW
SCP: Sector Commander Provinces DG A: Director General (Analysis) DDG: Deputy Director General DG PPA: (Pay, Pension and Allowances) DDG S: (Security) DDG I: (Intelligence) DDG CT: (Counter Terrorism ) DG T: (Technical) DG: (Information & Media) Source: Hein G. Kiessling, The ISI of Pakistan: Faith, Unity, Discipline, London: Hurst & Co., 2016.
ISI is the lead agency of Pakistan to render input for foreign policy considerations. DG ISI is assisted with other senior officers (normally two stars generals). “Like all other countries, ISI has a network of its own through Pakistan Missions abroad. ISI collects and shares information with all concerned. Its main listeners are Prime Minister Secretariat, MOFA, and three services of Pakistan armed forces.”93 As per the organizational structure, the role of various Directorates as per Hein G Kiessling is described below; “Analysis Wing is the heart and mind of ISI. Its area of responsibility is covering national security and ongoing international issues. Counter Terrorism (CT) wing coordinates for CT activities. Technical wing is for information gathering. Internal wing acts as the eyes and ears of the military. Personnel Directorate deals with the staff and administration. Directorate „S‟ deals with the security. Sector Commanders at each provincial headquarters act as liaison with police special branch.
93 Hein G. Kiessling, The ISI of Pakistan: Faith, unity, Discipline, (London: Hurst & Co., 2016):136- 137.
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Directorate „N‟ deals with media and information.”94
2.2 Decision-making Channel Decision-making structure in Pakistan foreign policy has its prime roots in the Constitution of Pakistan (Foreign policy formulation channel is shown at diagram 1.4). “As per Article 91 of Pakistan Constitution, Prime Minister along with its Cabinet is responsible to run the country‟s affairs.”95 For the foreign policy formulation, the responsibility rests with the Foreign Minister to take care of foreign policy through MOFA.
Processing of foreign policy options moves in a channel from the respective Director General of a region to the concerned Additional Secretary. With his input, the Additional Secretary moves the policy summary to the Foreign Secretary, who then moves the summary to the Prime Minister or the Cabinet after approval of the Foreign Minister. At the Cabinet level, thorough discussion takes place to evaluate the recommended policy options and, if need be, the changes or improvements are incorporated. After seeking final approval, from the Prime Minister, the summary moves down to the originator i.e., the Foreign Office in the channel as it moved upwards. The final policy decision is then shared with the concerned country or the Mission abroad for the implementation.” Channel is shown in diagram below;
94 Ibid., 167-172. 95 The Constitution of The Islamic Republic of Pakistan, (Islamabad: Center For Civic Education Pakistan, 2010):52.
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Diagram 2.4 Foreign Policy Decision Channel as per Civil Stream
PM
Cabinet
Foreign Minister
Foreign Secretary
Additional Secretary Regions
Respective Director General of a Regional Desk
Source: Constructed by the Author.
To tackle any issue in the realm of foreign affairs, the input is sought from all other concerned government quarters and foreign Missions officials.
2.3 Decision-making Process Any foreign affairs development which warrants policy response is identified by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). “Ministry officials structure/frame the issue with its background. The input is asked from all the stakeholders or likely response is shared with other stakeholders for any specific implication or adjustments. Likely response options are then finalized and formal decisional meetings take place in MOFA. Inter-ministerial level meetings are attended by the concerned Director General of a ministry. Foreign Minister gets involved at final stages before presenting the policy options to Prime Minister or Cabinet for the approval.”96
Foreign policy formulation of any country has to pass though certain phases, stages or steps. The foreign policy formulation process of Pakistan also passes through certain
96 Interview with Dr. Muhammad Faisal, DG South Asia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, held in Islamabad on September August 30, 2016.
66 stages of decision-making. As per former foreign secretary Shamshad Ahmed, these stages include:- “Stage 1: In house meeting on an issue to review and coordinate the information on the situation. Note of information about situation is shared with all concerned. Stage 2: Meeting at DG level held; participation by ISI (Brigadier or General level) and others to work out the alternatives Stage 3: Summary of policy options finalized under Foreign Secretary with compatible participation level from others. ISI represented either by a three Star or a two Star General, depending on the criticality of the situation. The Foreign Minister also joins in the process or is apprised separately Stage 4: Approval of PM is sought through the Cabinet Stage 5: Approved as such or changed policy shared with the implementers.”97
The four levels of decision-making meeting on any foreign policy issue are composed as follows;”98 Stage-1. Ministerial meeting to initiate the processes. Stage-2. Inter- ministerial committees/Ministry‟s meetings. Stage-3. Cabinet meeting. Stage-4. Prime Minister‟s approval.
The diagramtic process for policy formulation is sketched in diagram below;
97 Interview with former Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmed, held in Lahore, on February 22, 2019. 98 Ibid.
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Diagram 2.5 Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process
PRIME MINISTER
IB ISI CABINET FOREIGN AFFAIRS PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES LINE FOREIGN MINISTER MINISTERIES
NATIONAL SENATE ASSEMBLY
THINK TANKS
FOREIGN OFFICE MEDIA
POLICY INSTITUTES
ADDITIONAL SECRETARIES SPECIAL (OF REGIONS) SECRETARY
DIRECTOR GENERALS
DIRECTORS
Source: Developed by the author based on interviews of various foreign office officials.
2.4 Policy Making Role of other Actors Pakistan‟s Parliament is composed of the Senate (Upper House) and the National Assembly (NA) i.e., the Lower House. “In Pakistan the foreign policy issues are seldom discussed in the Parliament.”99 The Pakistan Constitution provides the Standing Committees in the Parliament for all the important Ministries e.g. Interior, Defense, Finance, Commerce, Law, Foreign Affairs etc. “These Committees have a
99 Interview with DG Afghan Desk (MOFA) held at Islamabad on September 30, 2018.
68 representation of all the political parties as per the seat position of each political party in the respective House. The Committee on the Foreign Affairs in the National Assembly was formed when the Motion for formation of the Committee was adopted on Monday, 27th December 1993 (Annexure-3). “As per the Business Rules, these Committees can get briefings from any concerned Government office, Organization or Department. As per any developing situation these Committees forward their recommendations to MOFA.”100 After Pakistani Salala Checkpost attack on November 25, 2011, by the USA, Parliamentary Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs proffered some policy guidelines to MOFA, details attached as Annexure-5. For example, the Standing Committee of National Assembly on Foreign Affairs prepared the Annual (2016) recommendations for „Pak-Afghan Relations.‟ This Report contains recommendations for the Government of Pakistan (MOFA) to improve Pak- Afghan relations; improved border management, enhanced cooperation on the repatriation of Afghan refugees and improving terrorism and security cooperation. “The point remains that the proceedings of these Standing Committees of Parliament mostly give very general recommendations. These recommendations are daintily viewed for any appropriate inclusion in the policy decisions. Lately, these Standing Committees have started asserting themselves now; off and on; they call MOFA officials for briefing on various foreign policy issues.”101
2.5 Historical Context It ought to be mentioned here that Pakistan has the advantage as well as the disadvantage of being stuck in a position wherein the security and geo-strategy of the region becomes, more often than not, rather cumbersome to deal with. In the particular instance, the relationships of Pakistan with Afghanistan were already bitter due to the past recriminations between the two sides. The almost continuous need to counter Indian influence became the overriding security and strategic purpose. This called for a holistic policy which could work for the benefit of Pakistan. The civil and military policy establishments therefore remained on forefront to construct policy alternatives to deal with the issues emerging from time to time.
100 Interview of Secretary of National Assembly Standing Committee on Forging Affairs, held at Islamabad on January 28, 2019. 101 Interview with DG Afghanistan Desk, MOFA, held at Islamabad on September 8, 2016.
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The Bureaucratic Politics Model is being applied to study various stances of the two bureaucracies towards the management of foreign policy i.e., civil and military bureaucrats. To better understand the role of bureaucracies in Pakistan‟s foreign policy formulation, we need to develop an understanding of some of the dynamics, which form the history of Pakistan‟s foreign policy. We start this trek from Z.A Bhutto who served as the Foreign Minister of Pakistan and later as the President from 1971-1973 and then the Prime Minister of Pakistan from 1974-1977. “During his time the decision-making prism was well grounded since it was under the civil bureaucracy and in particular headed and managed by Bhutto himself. Bhutto‟s keenness on the international, regional and diplomatic affairs was well known regionally as well as internationally. He had a hawk‟s eye to purview the emerging situation and had a highly pragmatic vision for the foreign policy of Pakistan as well as a strong diplomatic sensibility with which he maneuvered the foreign and security policies of Pakistan. It was during his time that the military bureaucracy did not find loose ends or gaps to fill. This did put the civil-military relations under some stress but by and large, the foreign and security policies of those days have been perceived as sagacious.”102
It was during the time of Bhutto‟s successor, i.e., General Zia-ul-Haq, when the civil- military relations started getting more visibly tense. General Zia had a religious leaning and the Pakistan Army was steeped in this leaning rather quickly. His Pan- Islamism desired to link Muslim countries with each other through an Islamic way of life. General Zia-ul-Haq had pushed Bhutto out of government in 1977. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, General Zia wanted to pursue an offensive policy towards the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. “President General Zia- ul-Haq appears to have followed a policy of activism in Afghanistan for his personal motives as he sought to consolidate his power by earning international approval for his military regime which was widely criticized for hanging the former Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in April 1979.”103 The entry of the Soviets in Afghanistan was so unexpected that neither Pakistan nor the world was ready to tackle the Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan.
102 Interview with Secretary NA Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Naseem Khalid, at Islamabad on January 28, 2019. 103 Interview with former Ambassador Syed Abrar Hussain, held in Islamabad on February 26, 2018.
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“President General Zia started observing development in Afghanistan keenly and echoing world about Soviets‟ long standing desire to reach Warm Waters, implying the perceivable threat to supply of oil from Gulf States to Europe. Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan created a small cell in January 1980 to provide modest and discreet support to the Afghan resistance. With experience on job and help from CIA, ISI organized probably the largest operation of its kind in history and became a “state within state” thus denying the foreign office its rightful place in formulating the country‟s foreign policy.”104
Initially, the US gave a lukewarm response to tackle the developing crisis in Afghanistan. At that time, the US had strained relationship with Iran. The only choice left was Pakistan, being the next door neighbor of Afghanistan. “Pakistan was under US sanctions since 1978 on the suspicion of developing nuclear capability. The US National Security Council advisor Brzezinski recommended President Carter to review policy towards Pakistan and without consulting Pakistan. The US President announced an offer of $400 million in economic and military assistance. President Zia rejected this offer labeling it as „peanuts‟ and Pakistan kept supporting Afghanistan resistance for more than one year without any US support.”105 It was in 1981 when the US joined Pakistan and other Arab countries to repulse and expel the Soviets from Afghanistan. The collective effort of the US, Arab countries and Pakistan, eventually enabled the Afghan Mujahedeen to compel the Soviets to pull out of Afghanistan.
In late 1980s, there were major changes in Soviet leadership at home. “Gorbachev became general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) on March 10, 1985. During 1987-88, he initiated deep reforms of the Soviet economic and political systems. He introduced his new policy of glasnost (openness); freedom of expression and information; the press and broadcasting were allowed unprecedented candor in their reportage and criticism. Under Gorbachev‟s policy of Perestroika (restructuring), the first modest attempts to democratize the Soviet political system were undertaken; multi-candidate contests and the secret ballot were introduced in some elections to party and government posts.”106 The hard liners were being replaced by moderates who were against the Soviet State‟s military involvement abroad as their economy was not supportive for such an adventurism.
104 Shahid M Amin, Pakistan Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal; 89. 105 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2012; 176. 106 “Makhail Gorbachev” available at www.britannica.com/biography/makhail-gorbachev accessed on March 24, 2019.
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“Talks had started since 1981 under the UN to workout arrangements for withdrawing Soviet troops and having Afghanistan‟s situation normalized. Gorbachev announced, at a press conference in Washington on 10 December 1987, that the Soviet forces would withdraw from Afghanistan within twelve months of the conclusion of Geneva Accord, and further, that during that period the forces would not engage in combat.”107
All the stakeholders in Afghanistan kept consulting each other to work out some accord for the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. “Finally US, Soviet Union and Pakistan signed Geneva Accord on 14 April 1988 and Soviet Military withdrawal was completed as scheduled in early 1989. The Soviet military for its one decade stay in Afghanistan suffered from 13,310 deaths and 35,478 wounded.”108 The Zia period signified a shift from a foreign policy pursued in a more wholesome fashion to a decision-making mode dominated by the military establishment. In the process, the civil bureaucracy was weakened, with the military establishment in the driving seat to steer the future foreign policy towards Afghanistan.
From then onwards, the foreign affairs of Pakistan became more complex as well as tumultuous in terms of decision-making. The cases in point are the civil-military relationships during the Benazir government from 1988-1990 and the succeeding Nawaz Sharif government from 1990-1992. Benazir Bhutto led Pakistan People‟s Party to win the1988 general elections but without a simple majority. This reduced her capacity to put pressure on the bureaucracy as she was heading a weak coalition government. The power enjoyed by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who was a former bureaucrat himself, actually overshadowed the Prime Ministership of Benazir Bhutto. The Foreign Minister during this period was Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, his being a known pacifist notwithstanding, was a former military general. To top it all, the COAS and the DG ISI; General Mirza Aslam Beg and Lieutenant General Hamid Gul respectively, were both hawkish personalities with a tendency to dominate the foreign policy decision-making process. Ms. Bhutto‟s government was pre-maturely disposed off, with a Presidential Order in August 1990.
107 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2012; 183. 108 Shahid M Amin, Pakistan Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal, 97.
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Similarly, during the Nawaz Sharif government, the military establishment asserted itself rather openly in foreign policy decision making. His government also was a coalition government which in a way automatically meant a dispersed decision- making in policies. This government also was disposed off by the same President on the charges of corruption. Under Nawaz government, the President, Foreign Minister and the Chief of Army Staff were the same as those during the previous regime. This shows that during a short span of time, the government structure changed but the bureaucratic structure and personalities remained intact. This continuity along with a domineering role of the military establishment of the Afghan issue established the de facto upper hand of the Army in the decision-making structure of the foreign affairs.
2.6 Second Benazir Bhutto Government 1993-1996 Early elections were held in 1993 when Nawaz Sharif‟s government was dismissed by Ishaq Khan, the President of Pakistan, on the charges of corruption and misuse of power. The fresh elections brought Benazir Bhutto to power again in November 1993. In Afghanistan, since 1994, the Taliban were expanding from Kandahar (the birth place of the Taliban in Southern Afghanistan) to central and eastern parts of the country. Ms. Bhutto desired peace in Afghanistan; “Bhutto administration attempted to influence Afghanistan because of its importance as an economic highway connecting Pakistan to Central Asia as well as a strategic support base in military conflict against India. Thus this new policy was a combination of Zia‟s pan-Islamism and Bhutto‟s economically driven foreign policy.”109
Benazir Bhutto led PPP to victory in the general elections by securing 89 seats in the National Assembly while PML N and PML Junejo groups had 73 and 6 seats each respectively. The President at that time was Farooq Leghari who had once been a part of the Civil Service of Pakistan and was also at one time a member of PPP and an important political leader in his own right. Aseff Ahmed Ali was the Foreign Minister and Shahryar Khan was the Foreign Secretary while General Abdul Waheed and Lt. General Javed Ashraf Qazi held the positions of COAS and DG ISI respectively. This gives a bird eye view as to who might have been the one entity or different personalities having a more say in the decision-making for various policies especially
109 Neamatollah Nojumi, The Rise of Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the Region, (New York: Macmillan, 2002):118.
73 in terms of the Foreign Policy. Foresee-ably, the civil-military relations during this period became visibly under stress.
During this period, though Benazir Bhutto, herself considering an expert in foreign policy like her father, had a practical sway on the decision-making, in terms of the Afghan issue, yet she was easily maneuvered by the military establishment. The decisional hierarchy might have remained intact but the military establishment did manage to swing past Benazir Bhutto‟s ideas regarding the issue. As a result, most of the Afghan foreign policy decisions parameters rested on security considerations, as per the military‟s preferences. “The Army retained the pivotal influence on the formulation of important domestic and foreign policy agendas and the political process remained beholden to the dictates and machinations of the generals.”110 Pakistan being confronted with internal and external security challenges provides a space to Army for giving input on all critical issues related to foreign policy with regard to neighbors and other major powers. “Theoretically speaking, the foreign and defense policies are for new states a matter for survival; they seriously affect domestic policy. By this chain of logic, the leader of the Pakistan Army is propelled into the center of decision making first as its arbiter and then as its monopolist.”111
Major General (Retired) Naseerullah Babar was the Interior Minister of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. “General Babar considered that Pakistan should make an attempt to open up, through Afghanistan to CARs for trade. He was of the view that Pakistan should distance from South Eastern Jihadi leader Gulbadin Hikmatyar as a vector of Pakistan‟s influence in Afghanistan. At the same time, foreign policy establishment under the Foreign Minister Sardar Assef Ali proposed to have a bigger focus in Pakistan‟s foreign policy on its North Frontier borders and open its trade with CARs and not an Islamic campaign.”112 Bhutto‟s regime perceived Taliban as pro- Pakistan and was eager to establish trade link with CARs. “Pakistan believed Taliban would prove a guarantor of peace; could establish a government friendly towards Pakistan and will emerge as a force which will recognize the disputed Pak-Afghan
110 Naseem Ahmed, „Pakistan Taliban Policy 1994-1999‟ The Dialogue, 7:1, (March 2012). 111 S.P. Verma and V. Narian ed., Pakistan Political System in Crisis: Emergence of Bangladesh, (Jaipur: University of Rajasthan Press, 1972):35. 112 Barnett R. Rubi, Search for Peace in Afghanistan; From Buffer State to Failed State, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995):138.
74 boundary line i.e. Durand Line as well as prevent Pushtoon nationalist trends in NWFP.”113 The subsequent developments however proved that the Taliban went against almost all of the expectations of Pakistan. Pakistani military establishment had been engaged in Jihad in Afghanistan for coordinating and guidance purposes with Jihadis for about ten years and over a period of time developed liking for certain Jihadi groups. “Pakistan Military wanted to see an important role of Hikmatyar (Pushtun Jihadi Leader) in any future political setup in Afghanistan. In practice, Pakistan has found its goals unattainable in the complex Afghan power struggle.”114 The US has been suggesting to Pakistan to exercise a restraint on extending support to Taliban. The Americans rather expected that Pakistan would convince Taliban to agree for a national and a unified government where all Afghan groups have voice and proportionate share in the power structure. “Domestically, Ms. Bhutto was in alignment with military establishment. Late COAS General Asif Nawaz Janjua was pro Ms. Bhutto.”115
The government of Benazir Bhutto worked to establish a broad-based Afghan Interim Government but she found it hard to make a serious headway. Benazir Bhutto used to feel the hard line adopted by Afghan leaders as main bottleneck for the establishment of a National Government in Afghanistan. It is evident that Ms. Bhutto was never hesitant to call Mujahedeen leadership and new brand of Taliban rigid and inflexible as perceived by the rest of the world. The foreign policy prism during that period was motley of variable positions. Benazir Bhutto felt that, in the long run, the Taliban would prove to be rather disadvantageous for Pakistan but the military establishment succeeded in swaying the decision-making towards the other side.
2.7 Nawaz Sharif Government 1997-1999 Nawaz Sharif became Prime Minister for a second time after the dismissal of Benazir Bhutto government by her own Party‟s President Farooq Laghari on the charges of corruption. Nawaz Sharif being conceived as socially conservative had a soft corner for the then leadership of Afghanistan. He used to appreciate the Islamic approach of
113 Tehseena Usman, „Trust Deficit in Pak-Afghan Relations and its Implications: A Historical Perspective‟ The Dialogue, 8:3, (July-September 2013). 114 Moonis Ahmar, “Pakistan and the Power struggle in Afghanistan” Eurasian Studies, 3:3, (1996):35. 115 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, Army and America’s War on Terror, (London: M.E. Sharp, 2005):152.
75 the Taliban and their dispensation of social justice. He did not subscribe to the worldly posture of western countries towards Taliban i.e. being rigid and being proponents of practicing a strict Shariah (Islamic Practices). Internationally, the Western leadership was averse to the extreme approach of Islamic practices being enforced by Taliban in Afghanistan. Regionally, the regional powers in general and particularly Afghanistan‟s neighbors, would disapprove Taliban like practices, fearing a similar spillover of Islamic extremism to their countries. But inside Afghanistan, Taliban were on their peak of domestic acceptance due to the war fatigued Afghanis; “Domestically Taliban who started from Kandahar in 1994 were expanding like fast wind to the rest of the country. Mullah Omer was the head of the Taliban who responded to the invitation of people from the provinces of Helmand, Nemroz, Uruzgm and Zabul to come and help the locals against the excesses of warlords of their respective areas.”116
The organization of Taliban was highly controlled from the top but operational commanders had requisite liberty of actions. Organogram of Taliban hierarchy is shown below;
116 Abdul Sattar Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2012, 199.
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Diagram 2.6 Afghan-Taliban Organization
Source: Thomas H. Johnson, “Taliban Adoptions and Innovations” Small Wars and Insurgencies, 24:1, 2013.
In order to establish the prism of foreign policy decision-making during Nawaz Sharif government, it is important to understand the respective positions held by various individuals. Nawaz Sharif led the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PMLN) in the general elections of 1997 and the party won by a heavy majority of 137 seats, wherein PPP had only 18 seats, Haq Parast Party had 12, Awami National Party (ANP) had 10 and other parties scored 21 in the National Assembly. The President, Muhammad Rafiq Tarar, a former Supreme Court judge, had at one time belonged to Pakistan Muslim League Functional. Nawaz Sharif had two Foreign Ministers after one another and both were from NWFP. Gohar Ayub was the Foreign Minister until August 1998; he was replaced by Sartaj Aziz. Shamshad Ahmad had the position of Foreign Secretary while the COAS was initially General Jehangir Karamat, who was later replaced with General Pervez Musharraf. The DG ISI, initially was Lt. Gen Naseem Rana and later, Lt. Gen Zia Uddin Butt. “The military team of the decision
77 makers who had quite a say in setting the policies, especially the Afghan foreign policy because of warlike situation in Afghanistan and Pakistani Military structure closely watching and dealing with the developments.”117
“The general perception about Nawaz Sharif is that he was a person with very little insight regarding the foreign and security aspects at the regional level.”118 This was because of his business background and relatively less exposure to foreign affairs. His personality was such that he had a good command at the domestic politics but he had little interest and experience in foreign and security matters. “The attention span of the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, while attending important meetings on foreign policy issues used to be not more than 3-5 minutes. After beginning of the proceedings, he would quickly lose interest in what was happening around him. At the end, generally he would conclude by saying, “you people do what is appropriate.”119 However, his second Foreign Minister, Sartaj Aziz not only knew the nitty-gritty of the foreign affairs but had quite a say in the foreign policy establishment. But if one applies this constellation to the decision-making approach and bureaucratic model approach, there were other organizational hierarchies, which did impact the decision- making authority regarding Afghanistan. The fact that on his own, Nawaz Sharif would not be able to pull the final levers on making any firm decisions about the Afghan situation and what policy framework Pakistan should adopt, it became fairly easy for the military establishment to sway the foreign policy decision-making process to their own preference.
After emerging in 1994, the Taliban had established themselves at Kabul by 1996, the sudden success of Taliban confused the observers and many analysts could not help conclude that the Taliban had some discreet support behind them. Mostly, the fingers were pointed towards Pakistan. “In actual fact, their rapid growth has been largely due to indigenous factors; Pakistan had neither the military capability, financial resources, nor even the political will to launch such a religiously oriented movement.”120 The situation in Afghanistan was quite different that what Pakistan had expected, after the collapse of the communist regime in Afghanistan in mid-1994. This triggered a
117 Interview with Syed Iftikhar Murshid former Ambassador held at Islamabad, on February 18, 2018. 118 Interview with Arif Ayub, former Ambassador held at Islamabad on February 26, 2019. 119 Ibid. 120 Shahid M.Amin, Pakistan Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal, 108.
78 turmoil and factional infighting among various jihadi leaders. Likewise, eruption of Taliban and their unexpected victories flabbergasted Pakistani policy makers. They were confronted with expanding Taliban‟s hold in Afghanistan, alienation coming from the world for Taliban and Pakistan finding itself in a quandary i.e. whether to support Taliban or maintain neutral view till the time the fog of uncertainty about the rulers of Afghanistan was cleared.
Taliban were knocking at Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif by the end of August 1996. “Due to their expanding influence, Taliban refused to negotiate with any one nor did they come forward with any power sharing proposal of their own. Kabul fell to Taliban on 27th September 1996 with only two hundred causalities.”121 The Northern Alliance was struggling hard to check the Taliban onslaught towards Panjsher valley and they were successful in that. “At the same time ISI and military were consistently backing Taliban. The new government continued to support the Taliban movement in Afghanistan; the essence of Pakistan‟s policy towards Afghanistan did not change.”122
In May 1997, Mazar-e-Sharif slipped out of Taliban control, after just three days, due to Uzbeks and Tajiks combined attack on Mazar-e-Sharif. “In May 1997, the situation took a dramatic turn in Mazar-e-Sharif as a result of dissension in Uzbek ranks when General Abdul Malik sided with Taliban and General Rashid Dostam fled to Turkey on 24th May and Taliban regained the control of Mazar-e-Sharif.”123 Pakistani government started considering extending recognition to Taliban regime as the same was being demanded by them. “Pakistani policy makers imagined several strategic, economic, and political advantages in taking this crucial decision as they viewed Taliban as friendly towards Pakistan, capable of bringing law and order and ensuring a stable Afghanistan where Taliban would protect Pakistan‟s strategic interests vis-à- vis other regional powers like India, Russia, Iran.”124
By the mid of 1997, Taliban had a control of about ninety percent of Afghanistan. The only exception was the Panjsher Valley, which was under the control of the Northern Alliance, led by Ahmed Shah Masood, see map below;
121 S. Iftikhar Murshed, Afghanistan The Taliban Years, 49. 122 Naseem Ahmed, “Pakistan Taliban Policy 1994-1999” The Dialogue, 7:1, (2012). 123 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2012, 200. 124 Naseem Ahmed, “Pakistan Taliban Policy 1994-1999” The Dialogue, 7:1, (2012):96.
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Map 2.1
Taliban Held Areas in Afghanistan
Source: Google Maps
While considering the recognition of Taliban regime, Pakistan was weighing the political, economic and security benefits attached to a stable Afghanistan. “Consensus was being developed to extend recognition to Taliban regime while dropping the previous conditions proposed by the Foreign Office i.e. ensuring all of Afghanistan factions on board, as part of government, to have a peaceful Afghanistan. In last week of May 1997 when Mazar-e-Sharif was captured by the joint forces of Taliban and General Malik, DG ISI informed the progress to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif who gave consent to announce Taliban recognition. Pakistan‟s Foreign Minister, Gohar Ayub announced Pakistan‟s recognition of Taliban government through a statement stating that the Taliban fulfilled the criteria for recognition being in effective control of most of territory of Afghanistan and were being supported by other ethnic groups
80 in the country.”125 Pakistan took about 9 months to extend recognition to Taliban since they entered Kabul in September 1996. Taliban regime‟s recognition was followed by Saudi Arabia and UAE, whereas the rest of the world held mixed feelings, generally not inclined towards Taliban for their rigid Islamist approach.
2.8 Pervez Musharraf Government 1999-2007 When General Pervez Musharraf took control of the government, he did so by imposing Martial Law. He became the Chief Executive of the state and in these circumstances, there was no concept of a Prime Minister. During the time period of 1999-2002, the Foreign Minister was Abdul Sattar, former Foreign Secretary, while the Foreign Secretary was Inam-ul-Haq. Interestingly the position of COAS was with Gen Pervez Musharraf himself while DG ISI was initially Lt. Gen Mahmood Ahmed and later Lt. Gen Ehsan-ul-Haq. This was a plain military rule until 2002, when the elections were held while a President in uniform was present in the highest office of the country.
The results of the 2002 election were not surprising as the Pakistan Muslim League Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q), the defection group of PML, came out as the majority party with 126 seats. This was the party which had shown loyalty to the military rule of Musharraf and the one which was utilized by Musharraf to show the world that he had a legitimate democratic system in Pakistan as well as a working bureaucracy. Pakistan People‟s Party emerged as the main opposition party with 81 seats, while the Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), the conservative rightist parties clubbed together with other conservative parties had 63 seats. PML-N had 19 seats while Mohajir Qumi Movement (MQM), another pro-Musharraf party, had 17 seats. Zafar Ullah Jamali was made the Prime Minister and served till 2004 after which he was replaced by Shaukat Aziz who was in office till 2007. During this period, the office of the PM was rather weak as the real power remained with the President Musharraf himself.
After Abdul Sattar, Khurshid Mahmoud Kasuri became the Foreign Minister in 2003 and though he was believed to have a keen eye for the security and foreign issues too, his authority and power appeared to be rather ceremonial. For a very long time,
125 S Iftikhar Murshed, Afghanistan The Taliban Years, 82.
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General Musharraf was the COAS himself and was in charge of the defence as well as security issues of Pakistan. He has been heading both the military as well as military establishments and was in control of everything. It was only after a lot of hue and cry over the fact that he could not be the President and COAS at the same time then he let go off the COAS position and Gen Ashfaq Pervez Kayani was made the COAS in November 2007.
While taking charge of the office of Chief Executive in October 1999, Gen Musharraf confronted with numerous challenges at home and abroad. Major challenges on domestic scene were depleting Pakistan‟s foreign reserves, corruption and unemployment. On the external front, two major outstanding core issues were waiting to test the Musharraf‟s leadership i.e., Kashmir and Afghanistan. General Pervez Musharraf evolved the strategy to improve the domestic scene through four objectives; “Achieving macroeconomic stability. Making structural reforms to remove micro economic distortions. Improving the quality of economic governance. Alleviating poverty.”126
He focused on these four objectives as part of an integrated strategy. On external front, towards Afghan Taliban, General Pervez Musharraf was disposed rather positively. He expected that Taliban would allow Pakistan a safe trade route to CARs, at the same time denying any space to India in Afghanistan for anti-Pakistan activities. “General Musharraf was eager to cooperate with Afghan Taliban in return to win their cooperation for trade with CARs. In middle of 2001 a five minister team from Afghanistan visited Pakistan. The team asked to remove certain items (TV, tires etc.) from the restricted items for trade, to be exported from abroad via Pakistan. Response to this was that General Musharraf said, I am a soldier and I will always stand by you. The next day a circular in that regard was issued, where the asked items were removed from the restricted goods list.”127
126 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, (London: Simon & Schuster, 2006):182. 127 Interview with Ayaz Wazir, Former Pakistan Ambassador, held in Islamabad on January 24, 2018.
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The catastrophic event of 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US brought Afghanistan once again onto the radar of the entire world as the attackers were suspected to be supported, sponsored and controlled by Osama Bin Laden, who was residing in Afghanistan at that time. The world community condemned the attack. “The president of Pakistan issued a strong statement of condemnation and sympathy. He also affirmed Pakistan‟s readiness to join the USA fight against the terrorism.”128 Pakistan being a neighbor of Afghanistan and perceived as friend of Taliban was approached by the US to cooperate for tackling the perpetrators, hiding in Afghanistan under protection of Taliban regime. The Americans wanted Taliban to expel Osama bin Laden out of Afghanistan or be ready for being punished for supporting Al-Qeada.
The US President was also in communication with the Pakistani counterpart. “President General Pervez Musharraf was asked by President Bush: are you with us or against us? General Pervez Musharraf was under tremendous pressure to extend support to US against Taliban regime. In making a choice Musharraf had to keep in view three ground realities. Firstly, Pakistan was the only feasible route, air as well as ground, to US forces to attack Afghanistan. Secondly, there was little that Pakistan could do to dissuade the US from invading Afghanistan. Thirdly, opposing the US could have resulted in dire consequences for Pakistan‟s own security and economic welfare. Realpolitik clearly demanded that Pakistan abandon its erstwhile support for the Taliban regime and join the US-led coalition in the war against terror.”129 This decision was in line with the idea as to how the military establishment took control of the decision-making process for all of the states‟ affairs. From the acceptance of being a US ally till the decisions which affected the state‟s relationship with Afghanistan and US till 2007, the military establishment had clearly dominated the entire scheme of decision-making in policy matters.
2.9 Zardari Era 2008-2013 After the tumultuous last few years of the Musharraf regime, the elections were held in 2008. After the assassination of Benazir Bhutto on December 27, 2007, there was a visible void in the party. Though there were senior leaders in Pakistan People‟s Party to fill the void but the husband of deceased party chairperson, successfully managed
128 Abdul Sattar Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2012, 255. 129 Shahid M Amin, Pakistan Foreign Policy A Reappraisal, 315-316.
83 his accession to power. Asif Ali Zardari took over the party leadership of PPP and led the party to victory in the 2008 general elections. PPP won 118 seats while PML-N had a total of 89 seats, PML-Q had 60 seats, MQM had 25 seats MMA and other smaller groups and independents had 8 and 30 seats respectively. Zardari became the President of Pakistan and he turned out to be a strong President and the Presidency became the real centre of power.
Yousuf Raza Gillani was the first Prime Minister with Zardari but he was removed from the office in June 2012, on the order of the Supreme Court of Pakistan for not complying with the Supreme Court orders for writing Swiss Bank to furnish details of undeclared money by his party chairman and the sitting President Zadari. Raja Pervez Ashraf replaced the Prime Minister Gillani and stayed in office till the next elections in 2013. The portfolio of Foreign Minister was allocated to Shah Mehmood Qureshi in 2008 but he resigned in February 2012, following the Salala episode where Pakistani military post along Pak-Afghan border was mistaken by NATO as Afghan Taliban concentration and attacked. Pakistan reacted strongly and the NATO supplies through Pakistan were blocked for about eight months until the US conveyed “sorry” on the losses. The portfolio of Foreign Minister was then handed over to Ms. Hina Rabbani Khar. The Foreign Secretaries during this period was Salman Bashir followed by Jalil Abbass Jillani. More importantly, the position of COAS was continued to be held by the Musharraf appointed Gen Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, while the DG ISI first was Lt. Gen Nadeem Taj, followed by Lt. Gen Shuja Pasha and Lt. Gen Zaheer-ul-Islam. This was the whole team of decision-making in terms of foreign policy.
During this period, though President Zardari held considerable power, yet the democratic system and the parliamentary system worked fairly well. Both Shah Mehmood Qureshi and Hina Rabbani Khar as Foreign Minister displayed a considerable understanding of the regional and international affairs. But it must also be made clear that the COAS Kayani, who stayed in office for six long years, was also a highly learned and skillful person in the security and foreign affairs. This period saw the civil-military relations came under stress due to different foreign policy challenges and preferences while dealing with CIA operations inside Pakistan and frequent US drone attacks in FATA without any serious resistance by the government. “Federal
84 government was extra generous in the issuance of visas to US nationals (probably the CIA contractors for operating human intelligence network inside Pakistan till early 2012. The visas to such individuals were issued from New York and even from Dubai, without the necessary security clearance of the Interior Ministry in Islamabad. US Embassy in Pakistan had many staff members without any clear designation, which every embassy needs to indicate. It appeared that the Interior Ministry run by Rehman Malik was under some obligation to entertain the visa requirements of the US.”130 During this period, there were too many actors comprising the foreign policy making system and the decision-making power was diffused over multiple locations. “The guidance on the decision-making for governmental affairs generally came from President Zardari but on the issues regarding the Afghanistan policy, General Kayani had a considerable influence.”131
The major events of this period relate to the conclusion of Pak-Afghan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA), Salala Check Post (Pakistan) attack on November 25, 2011, the US Naval Seals string operation to kill and take out Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad on May 2, 2011 and the contribution of Pakistan government for Afghan peace process. Given the importance of these issues, the major input had to come from the security establishment. The policy choices made as a result generally were in line with the previous policy preferences. Pakistan government did assert itself on the issue of Salala attack and the conclusion of APTTA. On the Salala issue, the US Secretary of State extended sorry. On APTTA, the return carriage of cargo from India to Afghanistan was not allowed to the Afghan trucks, carrying trade goods for India up to Wahga crossing point on border between India and Pakistan in Punjab province, on the recommendation of the military establishment. Both the foreign policy issues were debated by all the stakeholders in various government circles but eventually the military establishment prevailed over the civil establishment.
There is an extensive cross border movement between Afghanistan and Pakistan as the border is porous and rugged and it is hard to manage it well. On the Afghan side, there is a negligible deployment of border security forces, whereas on Pakistan side the deployment of security force is comparatively more dense. The skirmishes
130 Interview with former DG Intelligence, JS Headquarters held in Islamabad on September 9, 2018. 131 Interview with Abdul Sattar, former Foreign Minister held in Islamabad on February 9, 2019.
85 between forces of the two countries have been a regular feature. But the serious clash which ensued in the wake of the NATO attack on a Pakistani border post in 2011 was very deadly. “Pak-US relations plunged to a breaking point on 26 November 2011 when a US strike killed 24 Pakistani soldiers at the Salala security post near the Afghan border. In response to this Pakistan asked US to vacate the Shamsi Base in Baluchistan and suspended US and NATO transit facilities for their forces in Afghanistan along with downgrading intelligence cooperation between intelligence agencies.”132 Government quarters and civil segment of society condemned the US act aggressively at all major forums. Pakistani government did assert itself on the issue of Salala attack and conclusion of the APTTA. The civilian government did exhibit the national resolve without budging to regional or international pressure. But overall, the policy issues were apparently overshadowed by the military control as the issues at hand were more or less related to the security sphere. Parliament did assert to handle this foreign policy issue of Slala attack. “After debating at the issue for four months, Pakistan‟s parliament adopted a consensus resolution on 12th April 2012, recommending the following policy guidelines for future; Immediate cessation of the US drone attacks and formulation of new flying rules for areas contiguous to the border. Pakistan territory and airspace shall not be used for transport of arms and ammunition to Afghanistan. No covert or overt operations shall be permitted inside Pakistan territory. No private security contractors and/ or intelligence operatives shall be allowed to operate in Pakistan. Pakistan territory will not be provided for establishment of foreign bases. Demand for apology from the Obama administration for the 26th November airstrikes. All verbal agreements or understandings regarding national security shall cease to be valid forthwith. Pakistan position on the nuclear capability must not be compromised.
132 Abdul Sattar Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2012, 274.
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Pakistan should actively pursue the gas pipeline projects with Iran and Turkmenistan.”133 “The above consensus resolution was a milestone in the history of US-Pakistan relations. For the first time, the elected representatives formulated the terms signifying willingness to take the consequences of defying US pressure.”134
2.10 Nawaz Sharif Government 2013-2017 The Nawaz government from 2013 to 2017 is perhaps one of the most chaotic periods in terms of botched civil-military relations in the recent history of Pakistan. After the general elections of 2013, Nawaz Sharif became the Prime Minister of Pakistan for the third time. The general landscape on diplomatic front was almost the same as he faced in his second tenure (1997-1999) as Prime Minister. But as far as the foreign policy challenges from Afghanistan were concerned, the environment had become much more challenging and demanding. The US in Afghanistan was considering to pullout most of its forces by 2014 but was frustrated with the weak Afghan government and an emphatic comeback of the Taliban forces, particularly in the rural areas of Afghanistan. This period witnessed a change in the thinking of most of the concerned quarters, favoring to bring the Taliban on the negotiation table for peace in Afghanistan. Like so many previous peace initiatives, once again the effort was made jointly by the US, China, Afghanistan and Pakistan to coordinate talks with Taliban.
The prism of foreign policy decision-making underwent serious changes during this period. Pakistan Muslim League-N won with a good majority and held 166 seats in the National Assembly, while the opposition party PPP was the second largest party having 42 seats. For the very first time, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf came out as a third largest political party in the house with 35 seats while MQM had 24 seats and other parties held 15 seats. Nawaz Sharif became the Prime Minister while the presidency was held by his hand-picked party stalwart Mamnoon Hussain. The latter happened to have a rather unassuming, docile demeanor and under him the office of the Presidency became what it constitutionally is i.e., constitutional head in a parliamentary system, in which the real power is vested in the office of the Prime Minister.
133 Ibid., 275. 134 Ibid.
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One of the most intriguing facts about this tenure was that throughout the four year period, there was no Foreign Minister. The foreign policy was run by the two un- elected advisors to the Prime Minister i.e., Sartaj Aziz and Tariq Fatmi. “While the two men were reasonably experienced and possessed the knowledge of foreign affairs, there was no clear cut division of responsibilities between Sartaj Aziz and Tariq Fatmi. Any one of these ordering anything would ask the foreign secretary to talk to the 2nd Advisor. Sartaj Aziz had the economics background while Tariq Fatmi was an old diplomat. The latter was thought to be close to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, whereas he did not have the requisite experience of serving in critical diplomatic environment i.e. US, China, India etc. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif did not appoint a full-fledged Foreign Minister, supposedly to exercise personal control over foreign policy but he did not possess the requisite skills and exposure for the responsibility.”135 As there was no clear authority to head the foreign policy decision- making mechanism, the resultant vacuum was filled in by the military establishment. Jalil Abbas Jilani, Aizaz Ahmed Chaudhry and Tehmina Janjua held the position of the Foreign Secretary during this period in succession.
As for the COAS, there were two strong personalities during this tenure and both were committed to eliminate the vicious internal security challenge of terrorism in Pakistan, following the war of terror in 2007-8. First, there was General Raheel Sharif and later General Qamar Javed Bajwa. They initiated the string of operations against extremists and won the critical public acclaim for it. However, not only in terms of foreign but in terms of security and defence, the two men made a big impact especially General Raheel Sharif, as during his tenure, the military establishment categorically stated that they will not be interfering in any of the state affairs under the civilian government and administration and in a way transformed the tune of the whole military bureaucracy. When General Bajwa took office on November 29, 2016, he followed in the footsteps of his predecessor but made it more pro-active in his own way while standing for democracy and peace with neighbors. Together, the period of the two Chiefs of Army Staffs proved to be the points when the military establishment planted their roots in the moral, social and emotional fabric of the entire nation and state. Apart from these men, the DG ISI was first Lt. Gen Zaheer-ul-Islam, then Lt.
135 Interview with former Ambassador Afrasiab Hashmi, held in Islamabad on February 7, 2019.
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Gen Rizwan Akhtar and later Lt. Gen Naveed Mukhtar. It must also be mentioned that this was the period in which the utility of social media was fully exploited by both civil and military sides especially the Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), a media mouthpiece of armed forces, in creating a unified narrative on the security issues.
Nawaz Sharif being the PM was content with the foreign policy apparatus dealing with the Afghan issue, particularly regarding the Taliban. Foreign Office of Pakistan and military establishment were working in concert to manage and respond future projections towards Afghanistan. Absence of whole time foreign minister of Pakistan was compensated by having foreign policy security advisers as the portfolio of foreign minister was with the PM himself. Having so many other governance issues, it seemed very difficult that PM could get involved into serious deliberations and thinking processes to do justice with the foreign policy dictates. It was obvious that PM of Pakistan was not that keen to exercise grip on the foreign policy establishment and steer foreign policy issues in a certain direction when it came to the issue of peace in Afghanistan. This allowed the things to flow in a „natural‟ course of action under the auspices of MOFA and ISI, somewhat dominated by the later.
During this period, almost all the stakeholders in Afghanistan showed an apparent keenness to tie up the loose ends and find a negotiated solution for Afghanistan, shunning the previous preference for the military solution of the Afghan crisis. According to Vali Nasr, “Holbrooke wanted President Obama to consider the option of a political settlement in Afghanistan during the review that the latter ordered in 2009, but there was no discussion of diplomacy and political settlement at all. A commitment to finding a political settlement to the war would have put diplomatic front on center and organized military and intelligence operation in Afghanistan to support it. Holbrooke wanted the President to consider this option but the White House was not buying it. The military wanted to stay in charge, and going against the military would make the President look weak.”136
The same thinking about tackling Afghanistan issue prevailed in Pakistan and Pakistan wanted all the stakeholders of Afghan issue, particularly the US, to put the
136 Vali Nasr, The Dispensable Nation, (New York: Random House, 2013):25.
89 military options at the backburner. Pakistan wanted that instead of considering the options like the enhancement of the force level or advance employment of engagement, the confronting parties in Afghanistan should be won for joining back the mainstream political processes. The desire for a negotiated settlement brought the Taliban back in the game as their prolonged and complex resistance to US appears to bear the fruit as the Taliban come out as victorious. Pakistan‟s foreign policy planners were also convinced of the merits of the dialogue approach and exhibited their keenness to join any international or regional endeavors in this regard.
After the major pullout of NATO and US forces (20,000 troops) from Afghanistan in 2014, the grip of Afghan government over the entire country became more questionable than ever. The Taliban, opposed to the foreign occupation of Afghanistan, succeeded in fuelling instability in Afghanistan. After the Afghan presidential elections of 2014, the front runners Mr. Ashraf Ghani (as the President) and Mr. Abdullah Abdullah (as Chief Executive) entered into a National Unity Government brokered by the US. “To forge peace and stability in Afghanistan, a four country peace initiative was set in motion. The countries included in this initiative were Afghanistan, China, Pakistan and US. This peace initiative was named Quadrilateral Coordination Group (OCG) Process and its first dialogue for the peace process was held in Islamabad in January 2016.”137
Pakistan accepted to play its role in the QCG and the decision to join the group was based on playing positive role to bring peace in Afghanistan as Pakistan always considered that stable Afghanistan, being a next door neighbor, will be good for peace and stability in Pakistan. If there is instability in Afghanistan, its repercussions on Pakistan will be felt in social, law and order, economy and security domains. Till May 2016, the QCG held five meetings but without making any concrete contributions towards peace owing to Taliban‟s non-cooperative and non-committed approach. To make Pakistan‟s position clear on the stalemate of this initiative, Mr. Sartaj Aziz, Advisor to the Pakistan Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs said that “Pakistan has some influence on Taliban but it had no control over them, so Pakistan‟s job is only to
137 Wang Xu, “Cooperation Between China and Pakistan on Afghan Issue” in Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) Conference Proceedings on Evolving Situation in Afghanistan: Role of Major Powers in Regional Countries, held in Islamabad May 18-19, May 2016:108.
90 facilitate.”138 Afghan government also realized the importance of Pakistan‟s positive role in bringing peace in Afghanistan. “Afghan president Ashraf Ghani‟s visited Pakistan in November 2014, expressing the opinion that Pak Afghan relations were moving in right direction. In a statement issued on 20th February 2014 from Kabul, President Ashraf Ghani appreciated Pakistan‟s efforts in paving the ground for peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan.”139
Pakistan foreign policy projections towards Afghanistan have been based on three principles. The first principle was joining regional and international collaborations for the general peace of the world and particular peace efforts for Afghanistan. Second principle was based on ensuring Pakistan‟s vital interest with regard to economic and security linked to Afghanistan, directly or indirectly. Third principle was based on protecting the sovereignty and internal stability of Pakistan. Civil and military bureaucracy has been contributing towards Afghan Policy while remaining cognizant of the regional environment and developments in Afghanistan. Various portfolios of political elites, civil senior bureaucratic hierarchy of foreign office and military as well as intelligence chiefs contributed for shaping foreign policy towards Afghanistan with focus on security and national interests of Pakistan. These issues have been discussed and analyzed in details in the next chapter.
138 „Pakistan has some influence, but no control: Sartaj‟ Dawn, October 28, 2015. 139 “Pakistan‟s role in peace talks deserves credit: Ghani” Dawn, February 21, 2015.
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CHAPTER 3 PAKISTAN’S POLICY DECISION-MAKING TOWARDS AFGHAN TALIBAN 1996-2016 Foreign Policy making incorporates many considerations and processes. The foreign policy considerations are formed by national interests and their preferred projections correspond to the given environment at that point and time. In the prevailing security environment, every state endeavors to maximize its gains through an appropriate decision-making process. “As an aspect of state behavior, foreign policy represents the policy making and unit behavior involved in inter-state relations.”140
The foreign policy of Pakistan since its inception in 1947 was based on the manifestation of friendly relationship with neighbors and positive contribution towards peace at international level. These foundations are summarized by Abdul Sattar as envisioned by the founding father of Pakistani nation, Mohammad Ali Jinnah in the following words; “There lies in front of us a new chapter and it will be our endeavor to create and maintain goodwill and friendship with Britain and our neighborly dominion, Hindustan, along with other sisterly relations so that we all together may make our greatest contribution for the peace and prosperity of the world. Our foreign policy is one of friendliness and goodwill towards all the nations of the world. We do not cherish aggressive deigns against any country or nation. We believe in the principle of honesty and fair play in national and international dealings and prepared to make the utmost contribution to the promotion of peace and prosperity, among the nations of the world. Pakistan will never be found lacking in extending its material and moral support to the oppressed and suppressed people of the world and in upholding the principles of the United Nations Charter. There is nothing we desire more ardently than to live in peace and let others live in peace, and develop our country according to our own lights without outside interference, and improve the lot of the common man.”141
Pakistan foreign policy planners have been engaged in evolving policy options through policy processes at the various levels while having the above guidelines at the back of their mind. Government‟s executive level officials have been maturing policy alternatives by employing their organizational preferences through the foreign office for working out policy options. Foreign Office, in return, has been heavily relying on
140 Steve Smith and Amelia Hadfield, ed., Foreign Policy Theories, Actors, Cases, Second Edition, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008):4. 141Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2012, 12-13.
92 the input from Pakistan Military and Intelligence Agencies, giving due consideration to their order of preferences. This policy making mechanism affords an overriding role to the military establishment in Pakistan‟s foreign policy formulation, with particular reference to Afghanistan.
In the past history of seven decades, Pak-Afghan relationship has been marked by many conflicts such as Durand Line, spillover of refugees owing to poor law and order situation in Afghanistan, drug trafficking, gunrunning etc. “It is Afghanistan only who has been main source of the unchecked flux of refugees to overburden the existing amenities in Baluchistan and Khyber Pukhtunkhaw. On daily basis, thousands of laborers from Afghanistan travel to Pakistan for daily wages jobs in Pakistan border cities.”142 Afghanistan did all it could to sponsor the separatist sentiment of Pushtunistan. Pushtunistan was the name of separate future homeland for Pashtun Tribes living along Pak-Afghan border; hitting at Pakistan‟s territorial integrity by the slicing off the northern province of Pakistan. Map 3.1 Bordering Area along Pakistan-Afghanistan Border
Source: “The Afghan-Pakistan Militant Nexus” BBC News, October 6, 2011.
Another big challenge of Pakistan‟s foreign policy was produced when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979. “President of Pakistan General Zia-ul-Haq
142 Interview with former Ambassador Aziz Ahmed Khan, held in Islamabad on February 16, 2018.
93 perceived this invasion as a potential compromise of Pakistan‟s sovereignty in future as the Soviets had longstanding desire of reaching the warm waters of Arabian Sea through Pakistan.”143 Ultimately, the Soviets were forced to withdraw from Afghanistan in early 1989 as a result of the combined struggle of various Afghan Jihadi Groups, (List attached as Annexure-6) with the support of US, Gulf States and Pakistan.
When the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, Jihadi leaders failed to develop a consensus for making a national government in Afghanistan, in spite of concerted efforts of Benazir and Nawaz Sharif governments from 1992 to 1994. After the emergence of Taliban in 1994, Nawaz Sharif, in his second term of government, gave recognition to the Taliban regime of Afghanistan in 1997, once the Taliban gained the control of about ninety percent territory of the country.
Chief of Army Staff, General Pervez Musharraf, who took over as Chief Executive in 1999 after sacking the civil government of Nawaz Sharif in Pakistan, was confronted to make a tough policy choice in the post 9/11 scenario; whether Pakistan should remain aligned with Taliban or should join the international coalition and the US to fight Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). He rationalized his policy to stand with the rest of the world at the cost of parting ways with Afghan Taliban. After Pervez Musharraf, the successive civilian governments of President Zardari (Pakistan People‟s Party) and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (PML-N) also remained generally in line with the international overtures towards Afghanistan. Nawaz Sharif government in 2015, after developing consensus with the US, China and Afghanistan decided to contact Taliban to facilitate Afghan peace process under the auspices of QCG.
The brief history of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations given above reveals that the Pakistan foreign policy decisions towards Afghanistan (Taliban) have evolved through various stages. This evolution of the policy options has largely been informed by three dominating foreign policy decision considerations i.e., political, economic and security interests. The constellation of these interests has been fluctuating from
143 Interview with former Ambassador Syed Iftikahr Murshid, held in Islamabad, on February 18, 2018.
94 time to time resulting in a shifting order of the Pakistan foreign policy projections from time to time. Notwithstanding, the close inter-linkages of these foundational factors for policy outcomes, probably the security aspect in policy making considerations has been the most overwhelming. The remaining part of this chapter dwells upon the bases of evolving policy outcomes towards Afghan Taliban from 1996 to 2017. It appears that the policy outcomes have been resting on selected number of policy decisional factors. “Apparently the major factors that have been on play for reaching any decision outcome include prevailing environment, set of policy options in any given context, synchronization of national interests with likely policy interventions and processes through which these interventions were funneled.”144
3.1 Gen Zia Era (1977-1988): The Foundation Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was overthrown by Gen. Zia in a military coup in 1977. Gen Zia was soon confronted with the developing situation in Afghanistan, when the Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in 1979. “The communist coup in Afghanistan in April 1978 was the first step in that direction. This was followed by the induction of the Red Army in Afghanistan in December 1979.”145 Pakistan was alarmed at the Soviet presence next door and perceived this a serious future threat to the sovereignty and security of Pakistan. Another evolving situation was the Islamic revolution in Iran under Ayatollah Khomeini. Shah Raza Pehlavi‟s exit from Iran sent worrying signals to the US. The US had uneasiness over the successful Islamic revolution in Iran, to tackle the Soviets, Pakistan was the only country considered suitable by the US. India, the arch rival of Pakistan was also watching the developing situation closely. “Afghanistan invasion by the Soviets had a soothing feeling for India as they thought of Pakistan was being exposed on a dual front i.e. Soviets on western and Indians on eastern borders.”146
“After Symington Amendment to US Foreign Assistance Act 1961, the grants and loans from financial institutions were stopped for Pakistan. In April 1979, President Carter imposed unilateral economic and military sanctions on Pakistan on its suspected efforts to build nuclear capability for making an atom bomb. These
144 Interview with former Foreign Secretary Inam-ul-Haq held in Islamabad, on February 26, 2019. 145 Shahid M Amin, Pakistan Foreign Policy A Reappraisal, 84. 146 Interview with former Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmed, held in Lahore, on February 22, 2019.
95 sanctions were lifted by President Reagan in December 1979 to enable the US administration to provide assistance to Pakistan to coordinate the Afghan fighting effort against Soviets invasion of Afghanistan.”147 Map 3.2 The Eastern and Western Borders of Pakistan
Source: http://countrystudies.us/pakistan/23.htm accessed on April 4, 2019
On the domestic political scene, General Zia was struggling to establish himself in power. General Zia was keen to enhance his acceptance at home and build his profile abroad. In the beginning, the US was apparently not that alarmed by the Soviet entry in Afghanistan and the US was not that forthcoming to support Pakistan‟s concerns. “US president Jimmy Carter offered only a modest support to Pakistan. US offer of $400 million for 18 months to Pakistan was termed as “peanuts” by General Zia-ul- Haq.”148 “Pakistan was receiving huge influx of Afghan refugees as a result of the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. Pakistan had provided asylum to 386,916 Afghan
147 “Report to Congress: Update on Progress Toward Regional Nonproliferation in South Asia” The US Department of State, Bureau of South Asia Affairs, June 15, 1997. 148 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2012, 177.
96 displaced people by early 1980.”149 “Twenty two hundred kilometer long porous border with Afghanistan became vulnerable to communist expansion.”150 Since military coup in 1977 in Afghanistan, the Pak-Afghan border became very volatile because of the influx of Afghans in Pakistan. In addition, Pakistan was fighting against the US sanctions for economic and military support. Pakistan‟s leadership, like most of other world leaders, was of the view that the most likely purpose of the Soviet invasion was to have access to the warm waters of the Arabian Sea and had started reaching out to the rest of the world particularly the Muslim countries, for support.
3.1.1 Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Options All the relevant policy circles of Pakistan were deeply involved in analyzing the emerging situation and searching for appropriate policy interventions. The security considerations appeared the paramount concern at that time. President Zia saw the communist takeover in Kabul and the later entry of the Red Army into Afghanistan as a mortal threat to Pakistan itself and decided, as he put it; “To fight the battle for Pakistan inside Afghanistan.”151 “While listing the policy options for Pakistan, the civil and military officials weighed the emerging situation predominantly through Pakistan‟s peculiar security perspective, compulsions, challenges and possible befitting options. Pakistan considered three possible scenarios after the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. First, to take this invasion as a fait accompli; secondly, remain neutral or, adopt the policy of activism in Afghanistan by mustering international support to evict the Soviet troops from Afghanistan. There were many senior diplomats and military officials who were not in favor of a kinetic policy. They were of the view that there was nothing that could cause the Soviets to leave Afghanistan. There were some who warned that the Soviet Union was the super power located in the backyard of Pakistan, and that it made little sense to depend on other super power; the US, which was located 10,000 miles away, who despite being military ally had not come to Pakistan‟s rescue in previous two wars against India.”152
149 Mehrunnisa Ali, Readings in Pakistan Foreign Policy, 1971–1998, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000):332. 150 Shahid M Amin, Pakistan Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal, 86. 151 Ibid., 87. 152 Ibid., 88.
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While opting for a policy of activism against the Soviet invasion, Gen Zia rationalized his decision in view of the prevailing regional as well as international situation. His key hypothesis was that the Soviet Union would not stop in Afghanistan and in due time, they will drive to the warm waters to dominate the Gulf States, having the major reservoirs of oil in the world. While sensing this, the rest of the world in general and the US in particular will not let it happen and will do all that it takes to ensure an uninterrupted supply of oil from the Gulf States. “The core argument in favour of an active policy against the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan was the nature of Pakistan‟s own security dilemma. Pakistan already had India on its eastern border with which it had fought three wars. Indians happened to be close ally of the USSR (present in Afghanistan) and were sure to strategize a combined pressure approach to subdue Pakistan to Indian‟s dictates. Thus eventually Pakistan will land in a “nut-crack” position. So this “pincer” move was perceived as an attempt to threaten Pakistan‟s security, a violent act against Pakistan‟s integrity and sovereignty.”153
Another calculation made by General Zia was the factoring of US involvement in the conflict. Though initially, the US administration under President Carter did not show much concern to the Soviets‟ stepping in Afghanistan. But Gen Zia had surmised that ultimately the US will jump in for certain reasons. The anticipations and appreciations for the US involvement, as imagined by Pakistan were mainly three. One, US will not miss this chance of avenging the US defeat in Vietnam, in which the Soviets played a major role. Secondly, the US will not leave any stone unturned to defeat its arch rival of Cold war. Thirdly, the US would not risk its role being diminished in a region sensitive due to oil supplies as Iran stood against the US and India remained a close ally of the Soviet Union. If Soviets were not evicted from Afghanistan, eventually, they will be positioned strategically to disrupt the oil supply from Gulf States to European countries and the US. Another non-geostrategic reason for supporting the fight against the Soviets by Pakistan in Afghanistan was the resistance/fighting potential of the Afghans themselves. History stood in favor of this argument as many earlier invaders to Afghanistan were defeated. This resistance potential had been developed owing to the rugged mountainous terrain and the tribal fighting spirit of Afghans to protect their independence. “Another factor for Pakistan to gamble this
153 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2012, 172.
98 participation was that some Afghani resistance leaders like Engineer Gulbadin Hikmatyat and others who had taken refuge in Pakistan since „Saur Revolution‟ of PDPA and they had already started cracking their opponents.”154
3.1.4 Decision Outcomes 3.1.4.1 Jihadis and Soviets’ Eviction After contemplating the future scenarios, Pakistan started evolving possibilities to support the resistance movements of the Afghans. “Pakistan created a small Cell in ISI in January 1980 to provide modest and discrete support to the Afghan resistance.”155 This Cell was able to establish contacts with the Jihadi leaders. Afterwards, this Cell was expanded when the CIA came to the region to support the Afghan Jihad by 1981. Different Jihadi groups (Annexure-6) organized themselves on geographical and ethnic basis. Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries also joined and Soviets started signaling their weariness of war and ultimately withdrew from Afghanistan. “Geneva Accord was signed on 14th April 1988 and Russians left after suffering 15000 killed, 35000 wounded and financial losses of 100 billion Rubles.”156 While leaving, the Soviets left behind a PDPA government without having any arrangements for a broad-based Afghan government, comprised of all Afghan groups and ethnicities. Soon after the Soviet withdrawal, Afghan Jihadi leaders started fighting amongst themselves for enhancing their influence and grabbing more power in their respective areas.
3.1.4.2 Post Soviet Withdrawal and Jihadis The PDPA government left behind by the Soviets in Kabul lacked an effective control over Afghanistan. Very soon, they were virtually restricted to Kabul only. Ultimately, the feeble administration of PDPA collapsed in April 1992. But the Jihadi leaders themselves behaved rather stubbornly and failed to come up with as consensus to formulate a broad based national government, in spite of Pakistani, Saudi and Iranian efforts.
154 Ibid. 155 Moonis Ahmar, Foreign Policy Making Process: A Case Study of Pakistan, (Karachi: University of Karachi, 2009):89. 156 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2012, 185-188.
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The leading Jihadi leaders at that time included the heavy weights like Hikmatyar, Mujhahidi, Burhanuddin Rabani, Ahmad Shah Masood, Abdul Sayaf Rasool etc (See Annexure-6). These Jihadi leaders spurred a perpetual fight among themselves in the post-Soviets period for their respective ambitions to guard their economic interests in the respective areas. In the process, they developed mistrust towards each other and preferred to strengthen and enlarge their respective areas of influence. Some of the Jihadi leaders, especially non-pushtun, came to believe that Pakistan had a friendly bias towards pushtun ethnic groups. “Mistrust and rivalry among Jihadi leaders triggered bloodshed and civil war in Afghanistan. Pakistan is understood to have pursued them to adopt a more accommodating approach among themselves.”157 Pakistan at that time was actively working to convince Jihadi leaders to develop an understanding and consensus among themselves towards a unity government as a stable and peaceful Afghanistan was considered a must for the fulfillment of Pakistan‟s national interests. Pakistan policy at that time was aimed to ensure rehabilitation of Afghan refugees from Pakistan to their native places in Afghanistan. Other imperative to have peace in Afghanistan was opening of trade route to newly liberated Central Asian States. Another major consideration for Pakistan‟s efforts for peace in Afghanistan was to have a friendly environment in the country where Indians should not be able to use Afghan soil against Pakistan. This environment was only possible if all Jihadi leaders had agreed to form an all-inclusive Afghan national government in Kabul to manage the Afghan affairs without any foreign influence.
Just prior to the conclusion of Geneva Accord, Gen Zia had pleaded a condition of putting a national unity government in Kabul, even at the cost of delay in withdrawal. Gen Zia had his doubts on the ability of Afghan leaders to form a government of national unity, when the international stakeholders would have lost interest in the post withdrawal stability in Afghanistan. “Even Pakistan Prime Minister Mr. Muhammad Khan Juenjo could not read the future unfolding of events in Afghanistan and insisted to sign the Geneva Accord at the cost of annoying Gen Zia i.e. ignoring the critical need of a unity of government. Mr. Juenjo called the All Parties meeting and got the approval for signing the Geneva Accord.”158
157 Interview with former Ambassador Ayaz Wazir held in Islamabad, on January 24, 2018. 158 Ibid.
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3.2 Benazir Bhutto Era (1988-1990): The Legacy On August 17, 1988 President Zia-ul-Haq was killed in a plane crash along with other 29 people, including US ambassador in C-130 aircraft crash near Bahawalpur, a city in the South Punjab region, drawing a curtain on his 11 years rule as a military dictator.
After Zia‟s death, the general elections were held in 1988. Prior to the elections, Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan People‟s Party landed back in Pakistan from exile. She became the first woman Prime Minister of Pakistan and of the Muslim world on December 2, 1998. About Afghan foreign policy, she had two major challenges in post Soviets scenario i.e. working for Afghan Interim Government (AIG) and return of more than three million Afghan refugees. But both of the issues remained unresolved. “The Afghan Jihadi leaders and PDPA could not reach at any agreement for a unity government due to their rigid positions. Jihadi leaders were of the view that they had fought the Soviets along with the PDPA government and will never share power with the PDPA government after the Soviet departure. Whereas, the PDPA leaders were of the view that as their government still controlled the capital, they deserved a major share in any future setup.”159 To break the stalemate, the seven parties‟ Afghan Jihadi forces planned to attack Jalalabad in April 1989. “Benazir Bhutto gave the green signal when ISI Chief Lt Gen Hamid Gul responded in affirmation to a direct question on whether the Tanzeemaat (Jihadi factions) were militarily in a position to take on Jalalabad.”160 But PDPA succeeded in defending Jalalabad and the Mujahedeen abandoned the operation. Pakistani diplomatic and ISI efforts did not bare any fruit in making Afghan factions agree to develop consensus for the AIG. Due to the widened gulf of mistrust between President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Benazir Bhutto, the People‟s Party government was sacked by the President in August 1990 and fresh elections were announced.
3.1.1 Decisional Outcomes The decision-making prism during this period remained heavily dominated by the security establishment, as the civilian government under Benazir Bhutto was circumvented to deal the security issues. However, there was consensus both by the
159 Ibid. 160 Ibid.
101 military and civil bureaucracies that an Afghan Interim Government (AIG) must be formed to bring peace and stability in Afghanistan and subsequently in the region. The efforts could not move further due to the removal of Bhutto Government and the legacy of the Pakistan‟s Afghan policy continued without much change.
2.3 Nawaz Sharif Era (1991-1993): The Continuity As a result of fresh elections in 1990, Nawaz Sharif came to power. “His approach for regional foreign policy projections was based on peaceful coexistence, prosperity, economic cooperation and establishing an economic zone in the region.”161 Nawaz Sharif as a Prime Minister, having a business background, was keen to step up trade activities with the regional countries. He believed that the Islamists in Afghanistan have not been able to prevail upon the adversary nor are they willing to arrive at an understanding for a broad based national government. “On 25th January 1992, Pakistan officials reshaped Afghan Policy. The top brass, civil and military, centered their discussions on three factors; Mujahedeen failure at Gardez (Province of Afghanistan), which indicated that the military victory was beyond their reach; obstructionist attitude of Islamists, particularly Hikmatyar and their inability to offer any alternative path towards peace; and Pakistan‟s diminishing hopes of opening trade routes across Afghanistan for CARs.”162 With this background, foreign ministry officials proposed that Pakistan should offer its support to the UN Secretary General to convene Afghan Loya Jirga to develop a consensus for an interim unity government in Afghanistan.
3.3.1 Decisional Outcomes The decisional prism remained the same in the dynamics of security versus economics viz-a-viz Afghanistan. Though the legacy of the past continued to form a broad-based Interim Government in Afghanistan but now Pakistan was keen to involve the traditional pushtun method of consultation through Loya Jirga, and also to involve the other actors under the United Nations. These efforts continued but Nawaz Government abruptly ended in a tussle between President and Prime Minister.
161 Musa Khan Jalalzai, Pakistan Foreign Policy: Sectarian Impacts on Diplomacy, (Lahore: Printing Talent, 2002): 29. 162 Ibid., 63.
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3.4 Benazir Bhutto Era (1993-1996): Emergence of Taliban In July 1993 Nawaz Sharif government was sacked on the charges of corruption by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan. Benazir Bhutto took over the government in 1993 and showed eagerness to exploit the trade potential of Central Asian States. Especially her interior minister, Major Gen (Retd) Naseerullah Baber was a staunch advocate of opening trade route towards Central Asian States. “Foreign office was of the view that the opening of route through Afghanistan was still uncertain. The Intelligence Agencies, though not against the trade initiative as such, were of the view that the route through Afghanistan was still not safe. In Afghanistan, the war of influence among ex-Jihadi leaders was continuing at a high pitch. Inspite of the resistance from the foreign office and Agencies, Major Gen (Retd) Babar sent a trade convoy to Tajikistan. The convoy was ambushed en-route by Afghan warlords and experimental trade trip turned into a complete fiasco, though vehicles were recovered afterwards with half of the trade goods looted. Gen Babar‟s ambitions based on a long desire of Pakistan to have a trade route opened to Central Asians States met no success.”163
3.4.1 Regional and International Environment After the disintegration of USSR in 1991, Pakistan was desperately looking for opening trade routes to CARs. “Pakistan policy makers were facing major hindrance in the form of continuing civil war in Afghanistan. Pakistan could either continue with its support to Hikmatyar in a bid to bring a Pashtun group to power in Kabul, which would be Pakistan friendly, or it could change direction and urge for power sharing agreement between all the Afghan factions at whatever the price for Pashtuns, so that a central government could open the routes to Central Asia.”164 This was the general approach persisting in foreign office contrary to the military thinking. Military establishment centered their logic for continuous support to Pashtuns, being the majority ethnicity, to have maximum share in the foreseeable Afghan unity government.
Pakistan military had been interacting with the Pashtun ethnic Jihadi groups to whom they found favorable towards Pakistan. Basing on this analogy, it was perceived that their possible future government would be Pakistan friendly. “Other ethnic groups of
163 Interview with former Ambassador Syed Iftikahr Murshid, held in Islamabad, on February 18, 2018. 164 Ibid., 65.
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Afghanistan i.e. Uzbek, Tajik, Hazara etc, their power bases were far from Pakistan border making it difficult for Pakistan to have an influence over them. Pakistan military and ISI continued supporting Hikmatyar and remained determined to achieve a Pashtun victory in Afghanistan.”165 But as the years passed by, Hikmatyar was unable to manage his opponents, which forced Pakistan to look for the alternative options to support. “By 1994, Hikmatyar had clearly failed; losing ground militarily while his extremism divided the Pashtuns and Pakistan was getting tired of backing a loser and was looking around for another potential Pashtun proxy.”166 In this chaotic scene of persisting chaos in Afghanistan, Taliban emerged from Kandhar. Taliban leader Mullah Omar had been fighting Jihad as a foot soldier with Siaf group and after the Soviet withdrawal, settled in his native village near Kandhar, where he was engaged in the job of Imamit (job to lead five time prayers in a mosque). He was observing the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan due to excesses of local jihadi leaders against their own population. The people were exploited economically and socially. Extortion of money, kidnapping for ransom and other human rights violation were rampant, with a total collapse of the law and order and social justice systems. The vacuum thus created was crying for some local and central authority to furnish relief to the aggrieved segments of the society. This paved the way for emergence of Taliban in Kandahar province to get relief to a family at the hands of local jihadi commander. “In 1994, a local warlord of the area molested a boy and mistreated the people. These people came to Mullah Omar for help and he went to the crime site with his forty five followers/Talibs (boys getting religious education in the mosque).”167 The warlord retreated and fled away. This proved the beginning of Taliban movement and the same template spread fast without much resistance. “Within two years, this movement had the most of the area in Afghanistan under their control.”168 The world viewed the emergence of Taliban as a creation of Pakistan. “Taliban emergence was totally indigenous and an outcome of utter lawlessness in country where masses were desperately waiting for someone who could redress their grievances. This vacuum happened to be filled by those Taliban who were least
165 Ibid. 166 Ibid. 167 Ibid. 168 S. Iftikhar Murshed, Afghanistan The Taliban Years, 43,124.
104 exposed to the external world.”169 The emergence of Taliban came out of the blue. Neither the ISI, nor the foreign offices in Pakistan or other neighborly countries had foreseen their arrival. They surfaced without any foreign funding or support. “The Taliban were not a product of Gen Naseeruallh Babar or ISI, as is commonly claimed. The Taliban were sadly rigid in their outlook and leas exposed to the outside world.”170
3.4.2 Policy Options and Outcomes The accusation however stuck and the Benazir Bhutto government was made to work hard to dispel the world‟s view about Taliban being a Pakistan‟s creation and promote the idea that Pakistan was a neutral actor in Afghanistan. The environment was complex and Pakistan policy makers were in a dilemma to tackle the prevailing uncertain situation. Civil government of Pakistan was adamant to open a trade route to Central Asian States. “Whereas a senior ISI official Col Imam serving as Counsel General Herat coordinated with the warlords for the safe passage of convoy. Colonel Imam‟s assessment, which was rejected by Interior Minister, was that it would be difficult to use this trade route on a regular basis because of the warlords.”171 Afterward, the convoy was ambushed at Herat by Commander Ismael, a local commander loyal to the Afghan President Rabbani. Pakistani officials, instead of coordinating with the Central government in Kabul, contended to coordinate with Taliban in Kandhar and warlords along the route i.e. Quetta Chaman-Kandhar-Heart- Ashgabat. “After the ambush of the convoy, Gen. Babar was surprised by the emergence of Taliban but his reference to them as “our boys” fueled a vicious and unrelenting propaganda against Pakistan, which resulted in such regional tensions, which were to last for several years.”172
3.5 Nawaz Sharif Era (1996-1999): Recognition of Taliban Regime 3.5.1 Timeline of Major Events With the emergence of Taliban in October 1994, the situation evolved in Afghanistan rapidly changed the scenario, which demanded new adjustments towards Afghanistan
169 Interview with Ambassador Aziz Ahmed Khan, (Former Pakistani Ambassador to Afghanistan) held in Islamabad on February 16, 2018. 170 Interview with former Ambassador Syed Iftikhar Murshad, held in Islamabad on February 18, 2018. 171 S. Iftikhar Murshed, Afghanistan The Taliban Years, 44. 172 Ibid., 45.
105 by all the stakeholders i.e. internal as well as external. Out of these, for Pakistan, the major policy challenge was the pros and cons of recognizing the Taliban regime. The main events in this regard are summed up in table below; Table 3.1 Main Events Leading to Recognition of Taliban Regime in 1997
Date Event /Activity April 1992 After withdrawal of Soviets from Afghanistan, Kabul fell to Mujahidin and they start fighting among themselves. Central government exercises marginal control on provinces. Local warlordism at rampant October 1993 Elections in Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto (PPP) becomes prime minister October 1994 Taliban emerge in Kandahar, under Mullah Omer November A 30 truck Pakistani convoy to Central Asia States ambushed by 1994 warlords near Kandahar and released afterward November Taliban take control of Kandahar, Lashkargah and Helmand 1994 provinces of Afghanistan. End of 1995 Taliban take about half of Afghanistan and start bombing at Kabul. 4 April 1996 Mullah Omer made Ameerul Momineen 19 May 1996 Osama bin Laden comes to Afghanistan in a charted plane with his companions from Sudan 26 September Taliban take over Kabul and ask Pakistan to recognize their regime 1996 25 February General elections in Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif (PML-N) becomes PM 1997 25 May 1997 Taliban take control of Mazar-e-Sharif 26 May Pakistan recognizes Taliban regime 28 May Taliban driven out of Mazar-e-Sharif June Saudi Arabia and UAE extend recognition to Taliban regime. 1997 07 Aug 1998 In Kenya and Tanzania bomb blasts at US embassies. Osama bin Laden held responsibility. 08 August Taliban retake Mazar-e-Sharif 18 August Mullah Omer announces to protect Osama bin Laden 20 August US launches 75 cruise missiles on Jalalabad and Khost camps run by Osama bin Laden. He had a narrow escape. 06 September Taliban appeals to UN for recognition. 22 September Saudi Arabia expels Taliban envoy for Taliban refusal to handover 1998 Bin Laden following Prince Turki‟s visit to Kandahar, and withdrew their support to Taliban regime.
Source: Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: The Power of Militant Islam in Afghanistan and Beyond, London: I.B. Torus, 2013.
3.5.2 Situation on Regional Front and Afghanistan Taliban had entered Kabul in September 1996. At that point and time, they claimed to have an effective control of around 90% of the area in Afghanistan. Only the North-
106 eastern provinces and Panjsher valley dominated by Northern Alliance remained out of Taliban control. Map 3.4 Area Controlled by Taliban land Northern Alliance
Source: Google Maps
Northern Alliance‟s effective support from Iran, Russia, India and rest of the world coupled with Taliban‟s stringent interpretation of Sharia remained a hurdle for getting their recognition at the world level. Like the Afghanistan masses, who had been sick of the protracted conflict and instability, Pakistan‟s hopes to have friendly government in Afghanistan also remained unfulfilled.
At this critical moment, Pakistan‟s main foreign policy objective in Afghanistan was a stable and peaceful Afghanistan. “The establishment of a durable peace in Afghanistan and a friendly regime in Kabul, which was at peace at home and with its
107 neighbors, remained Pakistan‟s objective.”173 Pakistani policy makers were convinced that in order to achieve its strategic interests in South Asia, a friendly and stable government in Afghanistan was a must. To take care of its strategic interests in the region, Pakistan decided to be on the side of that Afghan group who controlled the majority of the area in Afghanistan including Kabul. “With the Taliban controlling majority of the Afghanistan area, Pakistan perceived Taliban the only Afghan faction which was well disposed towards Pakistan.”174 Because rest of the Afghans or ex- Jihadi groups either had lost grip on their respective areas or had built negative impressions about Pakistan regarding its suspected sponsorship of Taliban.
3.5.3 Situation in Pakistan Taliban‟s abrupt emergence in 1994 from Kandhar generated a welcoming response from the general public in Afghanistan though the warlords and other Jihadi leaders opposed them. Their appeal was simple, which as it provided relief to the local populace under their banner i.e. quick dispensation of justice at local level and least excesses and exploitation of the masses as compared to all other warlords. “Mullah Omer along with his supporters took over Kandhar without any fight from the local warlords. Taliban were receiving invitation from other provinces as well. Helmand, Nimroz, Uruzgan and Zabul provinces fell after one and other, without a fight.”175
At this time, the international view about Taliban was not very favorable. Iranians feared that the Taliban would discriminate against Hazara/Shia community. The opinion in the West turned against Taliban due to their extremist interpretations of Islamic laws. Russia viewed the emergence of Taliban in Afghanistan as a harbinger of possible future export of extremism to the Central Asian States. A parallel was being promoted between the aggressive designs of Taliban with the aggressive designs of the Soviets at the time of their invasion of Afghanistan. “UN Security Council adopted a Russian-sponsored resolution on 22nd October 1996, condemning discrimination against women and calling for immediate cessation of hostilities, an end to the supply of arms and ammunition from outside, and resumption of political
173 Shahid M Amin, Pakistan Foreign Policy A Reappraisal, 108. 174 Ibid.,107. 175 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2012, 199.
108 dialogue among all Afghan parties.”176 For Pakistan, the dilemma was to recognize Taliban or follow the international community, most of which was not favorable towards Taliban.
The Taliban, aware of the importance of the Northern Provinces, tried to subdue them but met fierce resistance. “In September 1996, the Taliban rapidly penetrated the eastern Pashtun provinces and the Shura that ruled Jalalabad melted away and the city fell to Taliban.”177 Taliban‟s eyes were focused at Kabul to declare their final victory. “The city was defended by Northern Alliance and Hikmatyar as earlier they were trenched against each other with control of their respective areas in Kabul. Without much bloodshed, the Taliban entered Kabul on 27th September 1996.”178
3.5.4 Pakistan Policy Options and Outcomes Pakistan had been advocating the establishment of a broad based unity government by all Afghan ethnic groups all those years in Afghanistan for achieving peace. Despite the repeated efforts of Pakistan through Peshawar Accord (Annexure-7) and Islamabad Accord (Annexure-8), the Afghan groups failed to develop an agreement for a unity government. After the fall of PDPA government in April 1992, Jihadi groups came up with an adhoc arrangement of government for the future political process. As per the mutual understanding, during the 1st two months, after the collapse of PDPA government in Kabul in 1992, Professor Mujadadi was to be the President and his successor, Professor Rabbani was to remain president for the next four months. Professor Rabbani; however refused to step down after completing his tenure as per the arrangement among the Jihadi leaders and clung to the Presidency till September 1996. Professor Mujaddadi, during a regional conference on Afghanistan organized by Iranian government on January 25-26, 1997, attended by Turkey and Pakistan, had the following to say regarding the „vows‟ of Afghanistan‟s political settlement; “All Afghan leaders should repent and ask God‟s forgiveness for them, and they alone, were responsible for Afghanistan‟s continuing tragedy. It was hypocritical to blame neighboring countries for the turmoil that had gripped the country during the past several years. Afghan
176 Ibid., 202. 177 Ibid., 200. 178 Ibid.
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leadership was selfish and only wanted to perpetuate themselves in power.”179
Pakistan was also sick of Jihadi leaders for their greed, and inflexible attitude. “Instead of addressing their internal differences, they were more interested in grabbing money and territory to strengthen themselves. Taliban dominance of Afghan political scene provided an opportunity to Pakistan to get rid of the thuggish clan of Afghan Jihadi leaders.”180
Meanwhile, after their emergence in 1994 in Kandhar province under Mullah Omar, the Taliban were dashing to the rest of the country. In just two years, they were able to take control of Kabul. Having experienced the selfishness of most of the Afghan Jihadi leaders and Taliban now well settled in Kabul, Pakistan was weighing the option of Taliban regime recognition more seriously. In this regard, the following options, with relevant rationale were under active consideration of Pakistan‟s foreign policy makers;181 “Not extending the recognition to Taliban regime, until they control hundred percent area of Afghanistan and the inclusion of all ethnicities is ensured in a Unity Government. This might produce some soothing effect for the anti- Taliban groups and the rest of the world. The down side of this option was this had the potential to alienate the Taliban, which was the most important and dominating group in Afghanistan. Extending recognition to Taliban regime was considered on the following grounds: Pashtuns, being the majority of the population, were headed by Taliban. Most of the Taliban had been educated in Pakistan madrassas (place to get religious education) thereby having an affinity and natural leanings towards Pakistan. Relative peace and stability expected under them, which was badly needed by Pakistan for strategic reasons i.e. opening trade route to CARs and denying space to anti Pakistan elements to use Afghan soil.
179 S. Iftikhar Murshed, Afghanistan The Taliban Years, 66. 180 Interview with former Ambassador Syed Iftikhar Murshad, held in Islamabad on February 18, 2018. 181 Interview with former Ambassador Ayaz Wazir, held in Islamabad on January 24, 2018.
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Act as a bridge between Taliban and rest of the world by establishing diplomatic relations with Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Go for the recognition only when the Taliban exercise control over Capital (Kabul) and most of the areas of Afghanistan.”
A brief account of the prevailing situation just before the recognition of the Taliban Regime and the calibration of Pakistan‟s responses were summed up by the Foreign Secretary of that time; “The troubled history between Pak-Afghan relations can be traced back to the division of India back in 1947. Pak-Afghan border has remained a sore issue at bilateral level between both the countries. This borders sensitivity has been hurting bilateral relations mainly in two ways. Its disputed status had been manipulated by Afghans and anti- Pakistan elements for extending claims over parts of Pakistan territory, while bringing up the Pushtunistan issue (separate homeland for the Pushtuns living along both sides of the Pak-Afghan border). Second area of serious concern has been the porous nature of the border and its poor management, resulting in unchecked frequent crossings and smuggling. The illegal crossings on Pak-Afghan border triggered serious problems especially after the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989. During this period, the anti Pakistan elements supported by the enemy intelligence agencies such as the Indian RAW and Afghan NDS started exploiting the least monitored crossings of the border. With the emergence of Afghan Taliban in 1994, their affiliates in Pakistan (Tehrek-e-Taliban Pakistan TTP) felt obliged to go to Afghanistan and support Afghan Taliban. After 1997, some TTP elements turned their guns against Pakistan to create space in Pakistan‟s bordering areas to replicate the Afghan Taliban like enforcement of stringent Sharia laws. But the TTP moves were countered well by Pakistan security forces, seriously undermining the strength of TPP at that time. Under the environment as it prevailed towards the end of 1990s, conducting diplomatic pursuits became an uphill task.”182
Though the national interests of Pakistan are not defined anywhere but these are invariably rooted in its history and respond to the prevailing environment. In 1997, the national interests to be pursued through the diplomatic means included; To see a friendly or at least neutral government in Afghanistan. Afghan soil is not used against Pakistan‟s integrity and sovereignty. Minimized control or influence of India over major decisions emanating from Kabul rulers.
182 Interview with former Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmed, held in Lahore on February 22, 2019.
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Opening of secure trade route though Afghanistan to Central Asian states. Effective management of Pak-Afghan border and quick rehabilitation of Afghan refugees from Pakistan to their own home land.
All the above interests are legitimate and the countries in the world put in their weight to pursue such interests through diplomatic means. At the same time, the environment at bilateral and regional levels has been evolving due to a series of events and policy decisions. The ultimate aim of a foreign secretary‟s policy decisions is to secure maximum advantages for the fulfillment of national interests. Foreign policy process and channel is well laid in Pakistan. The main stakeholders of foreign policy formulation remain foreign office and security forces, more precisely the ISI. While working out policy options towards the recognition of Taliban regime in 1997, a well- coordinated working relationship existed between the foreign office and ISI. The interaction between the two entities has never been an issue as for as the level of participation (compatible level to the counterparts) or the frequency of consultative meetings are concerned.
By September 1996, the Taliban gained control of Kabul and started demanding their regime recognition. Options considered for possible policy interventions were; Extend the recognition to Taliban regime after fall of Kabul in September 1996. Delay the recognition till fall of Mazar-e-Sharif, centre of power for Northern Alliance and inclusion of all ethnic groups in a broad based national government in Afghanistan. Wait till other countries recognize the Taliban regime.
As for as third option was concerned, it was ruled out because each country would have its own policy objectives and constraints. Pakistan was bound to react as to responding to diplomatic challenges was interpreted as a strategic bankruptcy on the part of policy makers and Pakistan would have been accused of being merely reactive. The first option, though favored by ISI was considered a knee jerk response to developing a volatile situation and Pakistan might have been perceived as party with Afghan Taliban. The option left with was the second one (as above) which was to be
112 deliberated for developing a consensus and wait for an opportune moment to implement the final policy outcomes.
There was no parliamentary input either to formulate or to review the policy recommendations as the Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs in both the Houses (Senate and National Assembly) were still in the process of settling down after coming into existence in December 1993. There was hardly any input from the Cabinet of the PML government. In the hindsight, one could say that most of them lacked capability to comprehend, forecast and analyze the foreign policy events, dictates and impacts. The Prime Minister, being head of the political elite, would show little zeal and urge to influence or steer foreign policy. More often than not, he was content with approving whatever was put up to him. Generally, the political elite had neither will nor courage to explore difficult paths.
The ISI was keen to push the second option (as above) i.e., extending the recognition to Taliban in 1996 after the fall of Kabul. Foreign office and ISI used to have marathon sessions of consultative meetings either at the Foreign Office, at the Joint Staff Headquarters or at the ISI headquarters. There is no doubt about Pakistan‟s foreign policy being overwhelmingly security oriented because of native realities of the threats emanating from Afghanistan to Pakistan‟s sovereignty and survival. Under these circumstances, maintaining high level of military preparedness is a must. By all means, the role of armed forces and ISI could not be divorced from the policy formulations under a threatening security environment.
Getting back to the Afghan Taliban, by the mid-1997, the Taliban were able to firm up their hold over the areas under them. “Taliban emerged as a reality and reality could not be ignored, particularly due to Pakistan‟s geographic location, history, environment and national interests. Pakistan did facilitate the Taliban representative to get in contact with the US administration at New York in April 1997. Finally, the recognition to Afghan Taliban regime was extended, the next day when Taliban entered Mazar-e-Sharif i.e., May 26, 1997.”183
183 Ibid.
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Like the civil bureaucracy, the military establishment was also deliberating upon the question of the appropriate time for Taliban Regime recognition. They were of the view that the Taliban Regime be given the recognition, when they have territorial control of all Afghanistan, minus the provinces under the Northern Alliance, which was the case when Kabul fell. Having considered the options, Pakistan‟s Civil and Military officials started working out the modalities for Taliban recognition. The Taliban had been asking for their recognition since their entry in Kabul in September 1996. Pakistan had been insisting upon the Taliban to ensure the participation of other Afghan ethnicities in a national government. This view was pressed by the foreign office as the participation of other Afghan factions in the government would convey a message to the world that the Taliban were not having a rigid and fundamentalist government in Afghanistan. There was a meeting between Mullah Ghous (Taliban representative) and senior foreign official (Iftikhar Murshad) to discuss the Taliban recognition. According to Iftikhar Murshad, Ghaus was pressing that once General Malik (who replaced General Dostum in Mazar-e-Sharif) has joined ranks with the Taliban, and Mullah Omer entering into negotiations with Ahmad Shah Masood, the condition of Pakistan i.e. the inclusion of all ethnic groups in the Government was being met. “For Ghaus, in these circumstances, Pakistan‟s reluctance to extend formal recognition to Taliban was incomprehensible. The official response from Pakistan side was that this was not enough. The time for the recognition would come when all the Groups would have actually joined the Taliban.”184 The civil and military bureaucracies had varying views about recognizing the Taliban regime. Their respective stances and positions are summed up in table below; Table 3.2
Foreign Office ISI Stance/Position for Taliban Regime Recognition in 1997
Civil Establishment Security Establishment Taliban to have control over the complete It is history that whosoever holds Kabul area is taken as Afghan ruler Taliban to have a broad Base government Northern Alliance under Ahmed Shah where other ethnic groups are also on Masood would never join Talban board Alliance Atleast Mazar e Sharif the capital of More than 80% area of Afghanistan Balkh province in Taliban‟s hands under Taliban Taliban to show flexibility /maturity and To behave maturely (diplomatically), improve extrovert exposure; practicing first let Taliban have exposure of that
184 S. Iftikhar Murshad, Afghanistan The Taliban Years, 81.
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diplomatic norms. Early recognition will enhance morale Let some other countries to recognize and enable Taliban for further Taliban regime also expansions and an improved rapport Pakistan to take some time, not to be with Pakistan. done in hurry Western countries, Iran and India will not recognize. Saudi Arabia & UAE will follow Pakistan. Source: Developed by the Author
To know the above stance/position the concerned appointment holders of MOFA and Security Establishment were interviewed as per the table below; Table 3.3 Interview of Relevant Decision Players Serial Interview Remarks Appointment YES /NO Civil Establishment 1 Foreign Minister No Owing to old age and ailment interview could not be arranged. 2 Foreign Secretary Yes 3 Additional Secretary Yes 4 Ambassador Yes 5 Director General Yes 6 Director Yes 7 Council General Yes Security Establishment 8 Director General Yes 9 Director General JS Headquarters Yes 10 Deputy Director General Yes 11 Defense Attaché Yes 12 Director Yes Total (Interviews conducted) 11
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The day (May 25, 1997) Taliban entered in Mazar-e-Sharif their recognition was in the offing. “The DG-ISI talked to the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and gave the update about fall of Mazar-e-Sharif and suggested that now Taliban should be given the necessary recognition. An ISI official, most probably Major General Aziz, talked to the Foreign Office and conveyed that the Prime Minister had been updated about the development i.e. fall of Mazar-e-Sharif. In response, the Prime Minister had asked that the Foreign Office be told to proceed to recognize the Taliban regime. There was neither any order nor any guidance from ISI to Foreign Office with regard to the recognition; the recognition being a political issue. It was just sharing the update and a suggestion to process or move forward i.e. as per their channels and procedures.”185
Pakistan foreign office was also aware of the development in Afghanistan and working on the excepted response to the evolving situation; “On 24th May 1997, in the evening, at around 8 pm, I received a phone call from General Rana, the Director General of Inter Services Intelligence, to inform me that Mazar-e-Sharif had been captured by the joint forces of Taliban and General Malik. Rana told me that he had already informed the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif who had given clearance for the Recognition of the Taliban regime, after consulting the Foreign Office. I replied that the decision would have to be held in abeyance for a few hours till the Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub had spoken to the Prime Minister himself.”186
After Taliban started coming out from their base in Kandahar to the Northern and Eastern provinces, the developing situation was pretty hazy. “The people sitting in the Foreign Office in Islamabad had little knowledge of what was happening on ground. The Taliban Operational Commanders used to express the hope that very soon the entire Afghanistan including Panjsher valley (held by Ahmed Shah Masood) would fall to Taliban, which actually did not happen, till the Taliban regime itself withered away in October 2001.”187 “The security establishment was of the view that the western countries, India and Iran, will not recognize the Taliban regime in the near future. These countries perceived Taliban as Islamists and not very mindful of the Human Rights. India and Iran were in no mood to take Taliban as the true
185 Interview with a senior security official in the hierarchy (on the condition of anonymity), held in Rawalpindi on February 1, 2018. 186 S. Iftikhar Murshad, Afghanistan The Taliban Years, 81. 187 Interview of third highest tier of security establishment (on condition of anonymity) held in Islamabad, on February 15, 2018.
116 representative of Afghanistan, with their obvious leaning and linage with Pakistani madaris.”188
In the meanwhile, the Foreign Office was talking to the relevant foreign ambassadors in Islamabad and preparing to declare Pakistan‟s recognition towards Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Pakistan‟s Foreign Minister held a Press Conference on 25th May 1997 in Islamabad and announced; “Pakistan recognizes the Taliban government. The government of the Islamic State of Afghanistan fulfilled the criteria for recognition as it was in effective control of most of the territory of Afghanistan and was being supported by other ethnic groups in that country.”189
Next day National Assembly passed unanimous resolution for approving the timely decision of Pakistan Government to recognize Taliban Regime in Afghanistan (Annexure-9). After the recognition by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates also extended their recognition to Taliban. For the next four years, Taliban could not expand the territory under their control and the Northern Alliance under Ahmad Shah Masood successfully defended Panjsher Valley in the North. The Taliban enforced their stringent system of Islamic Sharia. Former foreign Mujahedeen under Osama bin Laden fell back on Afghanistan after the US operation “Desert Storm” (Liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation) as Osama Bin Laden condemned the Saudi submission to the US and his Al-Qaeda started targeting US interests in the world like US Embassies etc. Ultimately, the tragic incident of 9/11 happened in 2001. The US claimed that 9/11 was sponsored by Al-Qaeda which was hiding in Afghanistan under the Taliban shelter.
3.6 Pervez Musharraf Era (1999-2008): Parting Ways with Taliban Events of 9/11 impacted the whole world as the fight against Terrorism emerged as a unified obligation of all countries at the global level. The summary of events /activities is given in table below;
188 Interview of a senior official of security establishment (on condition of anonymity) held in Islamabad, on February, 15, 2019. 189 S. Iftikhar Murshad, Afghanistan: The Taliban Years, 82.
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Table 3.4 Timeline of Pakistan’s Parting Ways with Afghan Talban-2001 Date Event /Happening 7 August 98 Bomb blasts at US embassies at Kenya and Tanzania. Osama bin Laden held responsible. 18 August 98 Mullah Omer says Taliban will protect Bin Laden 20 August The US launches 75 cruise missiles against Jalalabad and Khost camps run by Bin Laden. Bin Laden not hurt. 21 dead and 30 wounded 26 August Taliban condemn US attack and vow to protect Bin Laden 22 September Saudi Arabia expels the Taliban envoy and expresses anger at Mulla Omer at Taliban refusal to hand over Bin Laden following Prince Turki‟s visit to Kandhar on 18 June 1998 02 February 1999 US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot meets Taliban in Islamabad and hands over the letter to Taliban with the demand that they extradite Osama bin Laden. 9 February Taliban reject US letter and say Bin Laden will not be forced out of Afghanistan but they will impose restrictions on him. 14 May US issues first warning to Pakistan not to support the Taliban and says it favours the return of ex-king Zahir Shah to Afghanistan. 6 July The US imposes trade and economic sanctions on Taliban for refusing to hand over Bin Laden. 17 August Pakistan attempts mediation between Taliban and Northern Alliance but rejected by the later. 12 October General Pervez Musharraf dismissed Nawaz Sharif‟s Government and becomes Chief Executive of Pakistan 15 October US Security Council imposes limited sanctions on Taliban 10 July 2000 Taliban order all foreign relief organizations to sack their female staff. 19 Jan 2001 The UN Security Council passes resolution 1333 imposing sanctions and arms embargo against the Taliban 26 February Destruction of two ancient giant statues of Buddha in Bamiyan by Taliban. 5 September DG ISI arrives in US on the invitation of his US counterpart. 9 September Ahmad Shah Masud assassinated by two Arab suicide bombers. 11 September Terrorist bombings in New York and Washington 11 & 12 Pakistan Ambassador in US and DG ISI meet Deputy Secretary of September State Richard Armitage who spells out the support requirements 11 September Meeting in foreign office to assess the evolving situation and policy options for Pakistan. 12 September Pakistan‟s decision hierarchy under General Musharraf, holds the meeting to decide the fate of cooperation with the US 13 September DG ISI returns to Pakistan 14 September Pakistan receive formal requirement from US through its Ambassador 14 September Pakistan agrees to seven demands of US but use of restricted air space and take off / landing only on two air bases i.e. Jacobabad and Dalbandin.
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17 September DG ISI embarks upon his mission to convince Mullah Omer to expel bin Laden – Many times shuttles between Islamabad and Kandahar and Kabul. 1st Week of DG ISI resigned and Lt General Nadeem Taj appointed New DG October ISI. 7 October US bombing of Afghanistan starts and Northern Alliance troop with US support move against cities of Afghanistan 9 November Mazar e Sharif falls to Northern Alliance. 13 November Kabul falls to Northern Alliance. 26 November US troops arrive at Kandahar Airport. 7 December Mullah Omar flees Kandahar and city falls to US troops. 22 December Hamid Karzai becomes Chairman of Afghan Interim Government 2 January 2002 Troops of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) of 15 countries start reaching in Kabul with Britain in lead role. 1 May General Pervez Musharraf wins in a referendum to be president for next five years. October General elections in Pakistan and PML (Q) comes into power. 20 March 2003 US forces invade Iraq. 11 August NATO takes control of security of Kabul. Source: Developed by the Author from Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: The Power of Militant Islam in Afghanistan and Beyond, London: I.B. Torus, 2013 and on the basis of the interviews conducted.
The US knew that suspected sponsor (Al-Qaeda) of 9/11 tragedy was sheltered in Afghanistan under the umbrella of Taliban. Pakistan, happened to be one among three countries who had recognized Taliban regime and being the next door neighbor, was expected by the US to compel Taliban for expulsion of Osama bin Laden. Another reason for this pressure on Pakistan was due to the perceived myth in the world that Pakistan controlled Taliban.
Earlier to 9/11, because of terrorist activities of Al-Qaeda against the US interests, Osama bin Laden was perceived as a terrorist. The US, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan wanted the expulsion of Al-Qaeda and Bin Laden who was being protected by Taliban. “Before 9/11 incidence Pakistan was asked by US either to convince Taliban for handing over/expulsion of Bin Laden or stop supporting Taliban. Pakistan was in touch with Taliban, through the ISI for convincing Taliban to do the needful. But the Taliban would reply every time that they will protect Bin Laden. With Taliban‟s rigid stance, a consensus in Pakistan policy circles was emerging that we could not support Taliban on two accounts. Firstly, the Taliban were not in a mood to listen to Pakistan and secondly, Pakistan could ill-afford the mounting US pressure. If Pakistan
119 continued to stand with Taliban then this may jeopardize Pakistan‟s vital national interests i.e. nuclear program and the economic well-being of the country.”190
The US was adamant to punish Al-Qaeda and all those supporting it. President General Pervez Musharraf came under tremendous pressure to support the US war on terrorism. “President Bush put a blunt question to Pakistan; Are you with us or against us?”191 Pakistan had to factor in three realities before making any choice. First one was that being the neighbor to Afghanistan, it would be required to provide ground route to landlocked Afghanistan for any US operation in Afghanistan. Secondly, it was Pakistan‟s inability to convince US for not attacking Afghanistan. Thirdly, going against the US might have resulted in compromising Pakistan‟s national interests i.e. the US support on Kashmir cause, likelihood of compromised nuclear capability in future under the US maneuvered pressure and last but not the least, dire need of external support to feeble and precarious economic conditions of Pakistan. The prevailing environment and the dictates of the Realpolitik, predominantly hinted towards taking those decisions, which safeguard the vital interests of the country.
Pakistan was weighing the criticality of the situation very cautiously. The developing scenario was very clear that the US would not spare the perpetrators of 9/11 terrorist attacks i.e. Al-Qaeda. President Musharraf mentioned that while making decisions, leaders have to be very deliberate; “I made a dispassionate, military-style analysis of our options, weighing the pros and cons. Emotion is all very well in drawing rooms, newspaper editorials and movies but it cannot be relied on for decisions like this. Underlying any leader‟s analysis has to be a keen awareness that on his decision hangs the fate of millions of people and the future of his country. It is at times like these the leader is confronted by his acute loneliness. He may listen to any advice he chooses, but at the end of the day the decision has to be his alone. He realizes that the buck stops with him- this is no facile cliché.”192
The incidence of 9/11 was not only so surprising for the entire world but carried the potential to stir the shock waves to global politics. Many countries were impacted and had to take policy decisions to re-orientate their respective foreign policy projections.
190 Interview with former Foreign Secretary Inam-ul-Haq, held in Islamabad, on January 31, 2019. 191 Shahid M Amin, Pakistan Foreign Policy A Reappraisal, 315. 192 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 201.
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“Taliban knew nothing about the external world and at the same time they were ignoring all advices form their well-wishers, including Pakistan. Since their becoming ruler of Afghanistan, the rest of the world was critical for Taliban‟s serious human rights violations. Coming of Bin Laden to Afghanistan and his suspected sponsorship of terrorist activities in the world, took the worldly disliking graph for Taliban further up. The 9/11 incident brought the worldly support to the US for taking any punitive action against Taliban. In the Foreign Office, just after seeing the twin towers going down, the Foreign Secretary, immediately called a meeting for an „In House Discussion.‟ Various, upcoming scenarios were built to anticipate the US reaction. There was no doubt that Americans will come very heavy on Afghanistan if Taliban do not expel Bin Laden. As per the record of previous Taliban assertions to protect Bin Laden, the deduction was that expelling Bin Laden by Taliban will remain a distant reality in a future developing situation. At that level the consensus was that Pakistan had no other choice but to stand by the future worldly overtures against terrorism, led by US to safeguard Pakistan‟s national interests.”193
After 9/11 the situation was fast developing. Pakistan was cognizant of the past US attack against Afghanistan and got busy in working out the likely adjustments of Pakistan‟s policy towards Afghan Taliban. “Pakistan‟s foreign policy for Afghanistan used to have a heavy input from ISI. Rightly so because the ISI had an important rather very important role in foreign policy formulation being a defence line of the country. However, the problem with ISI was that they generally decided on a course of action, without prior consultations. The incidence of 9/11 did not leave many options to Pakistan except to be standing on the side of GWOT at the cost of withdrawing our support to Taliban. This dilemma of “No Choice” was to be handled with these decisional considerations, which afforded protection of our national interests. The major contours of these decisional considerations emerged as extending cooperation to the US and at the same time not allowing free for all operational support from Pakistan i.e. permission for restricted use of air space, nominated air base for logistic /coordination support.”194
193 Interview with former Ambassador and Additional Secretary Aziz Ahmed Khan, held in Islamabad, on February 16, 2018 194 Interview with former Foreign Minister and Foreign Secretary Abdul Sattar, held in Islamabad, on February 2, 2019.
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Since the arrival of Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan in May 1996 from Sudan, the CIA had been after him for his suspected role in many terrorist activities. Taliban did not only welcome Bin Laden but vowed to protect him. “US was hell-bent to sort out Bin Laden for his declared rants, assertions and threats against the US. The US wanted Pakistan to use its influence over Taliban to either hand over Bin Laden to US or expel him from Afghanistan. There was a serious effort on this issue and the Taliban were getting convinced and they gave indications to act against him but were still not ready to hand him over to the US. Only the mechanism to tackle or try him was to be evolved. But once the 9/11 happened, all the efforts went down the drain.”195
At the time of 9/11, the then DG ISI was in US on an official visit. The purpose of the trip was to advocate Pakistan‟s case with the concerned US officials to review the sanctions against Pakistan to help address the woes of dwindling economic conditions of Pakistan. With response to some questions and post 9/11 activities, the then DG ISI summed up in his own words is attached at Annexure-10. Some of the salient issues are narrated below.
“After returning from the US (September 15, 2001), the DG ISI had one on one meeting with President Pervez Musharraf. He told him that the Americans were really perturbed on this blatant act of terrorism. They can go to any limit to punish the sponsors of this attack and in this regard they are sure that al-Qaeda had done this. During his meeting with Armitage, the latter asked for the cooperation from Pakistan. President was suggested that there is a need that we should make a deliberate effort to convince Taliban to expel Osama-bin-Laden from Afghanistan. It is not only in their interest rather it is useful for Pakistan also as in case of the US attack on Afghanistan; there would be serious repercussions for Pakistan too. President Pervez Musharraf gave go ahead to try to win over Taliban for the needful. DG ISI went to Kandahar and discussed with Mullah Omer the entire situation and the complexities and challenges ahead. Mullah Omer stated that they had given commitment to Osama-bin- Laden for his safe stay in Afghanistan and they could not back out from the promise made to him. I arranged second trip to Kandahar along with leading Ulama from
195 Interview of former Deputy Director General Security Establishment held in Rawalpindi, on February 15, 2019.
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Pakistan. These included Molana Fazal-ul-Rehman, Molana Sami-ul-Haq, Qazi Hussain Ahmed and others. But just a day prior to our departure all these Ulamas made excuses not to go i.e. because of health, personal commitments, other important jobs etc. Prior to this DG ISI had told Mulla Omer that he would be bringing Ulemas to convince him. After the baking out of above mentioned Ulema, as an alternative, DG ISI contacted other Ulmas like Mulla Sham Zai, Molana Taqi etc. and took them to Kandahar. During the first twenty minutes, the DG ISI and this Uelma delegation were with Mulla Omer. After that, DG ISI went out of the room so that the Ulemas could convince Mulla Omer without any inhibition. But Mulla Omer did not agree to disown Osama bin Laden. I brought these Ulma back and reached my home at 2AM in the night after dropping them at their respective places. DG ISI visited Taliban even afterwards also to make them realize as to what kind of losses Afghanistan could suffer in post US attack scenario e.g. a lot of killings, eviction of Taliban from the Government, huge misplacement of people, overwhelming influence and maximum share of the Northern Alliance in future Afghanistan administration etc. DG ISI pleaded with the Taliban that the commitment made to Osama-bin-Laden by Mulla Omer be weighted with the potential losses to be incurred by the Afghan population in future. The DG ISI even presented to Mulla Omer the argument that in Islam there was a provision of Takhfif (relaxation under compulsive environment) with the example that if you are offering prayers and a snake appears, it is allowed to break the prayers and kill the snake. Mulla Omer showed some flexibility and asked DG ISI to convince his Shura at Kabul. DG ISI told him that this is your job to do why they should listen to me? In any case, Mulla Omer asked his Shura to meet General Mehmud in Kabul. When General Mehmud explained the whole futuristic scenario with its risks and challenges the Shura also realized the impending danger. They agreed to allow Osama-bin-Laden to leave Afghanistan for any country as per his choice. The next day same kind of statement was aired to that effect from Kabul by Shura at Kabul. DG ISI was updating Pervez Musharraf after every visit and insisting that Pakistan should buy some time from the US to convince Taliban as there was a mild indication that they might ask Osama-bin-Laden to leave Afghanistan. But America was not ready to give even a day more than the ultimatum on Afghanistan already given i.e. 7th October 2001.”196
196 Interview with Lt. Gen. Mehmud Ahmed, former DG ISI, held in Rawalpindi on February 20, 2018.
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The DG ISI‟s efforts to convince the Taliban to cooperate are acknowledged and reported back home by US embassy Pakistan, the cable of US embassy on the subject is attached as Annexure-11.The US also had the impression that ISI is in habit of going and working at times out of government control also. DG ISI‟s efforts to convince Taliban to cooperate may be an effort in the same direction, the US embassy (Islamabad) cable attached as Annexure-12.
3.6.1 Policy Options for Pakistan Pakistan was in a very tight situation with regard to Taliban‟s inflexible stance for not expelling Osama Bin Laden and the US being firm on not giving any extension in timeline to Taliban before initiating hostile action against Afghanistan. The Foreign Office approach was that Pakistan had no option but to support the US. “Foreign office was of the view that if Pakistan decides not to support US, Pakistan would suffer on many fronts i.e. diplomatic isolation, more economic sanctions, security threats, Indians overwhelming role in Afghanistan.”197 A number of meetings in this regard were held in the Presidency between the high ups of the Foreign Office and ISI officials. The obvious option which suited Pakistan was to join the war against terrorism. While making this choice, the national interests of Pakistan were to be kept supreme. General Pervez Musharraf‟s analysis of national interest was based on the following arguments; “First, India had already tried to step in by offering its bases to United States. If we did not join the US it would accept India‟s offer. What would happen then? India would gain a golden opportunity with regard to Kashmir. The Indians might be tempted to undertake a limited offensive there; or, more likely, they would work with the United States and the United Nations to turn the present situation into a permanent status quo. The United States would certainly have obliged. Secondly, the security of our strategic assets would be jeopardized. We did not want to lose or damage the military parity that we had achieved with India by becoming a nuclear weapon state. It is no secret that the United States has never been comfortable with a Muslim country acquiring nuclear weapons, and the Americans undoubtedly would have taken the opportunity of an invasion to destroy such weapons. And India, needless to say, would have loved to assist the United States to the hilt. Third, our economic infrastructure, built over half a century, would have been decimated. The ultimate question that confronted me was whether it was in our national interest to destroy
197 Interview with S Iftikhar Murshad, Former Ambassador and Additional Secretary Afghanistan, MOFA, held in Islamabad on February 18, 2018.
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ourselves for the Taliban. Were they worth committing suicide over? The answer was a resounding no. It is true that we had assisted the rise of the Taliban after the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, which was then callously abandoned by the United States. For a while, at the embryonic state, even the United States had approval of the Taliban. We had hoped that the Taliban, driven by religious zeal based on the true principles of Islam, would bring unity and peace to a devastated country. But they were fired by a misplaced messianic zeal inculcated in them by half-baked, obscurantist clerics, a zeal that was contrary to the moderate, tolerant, progressive spirit of Islam of the majority of Pakistani people.”198
While making the likely decision to support GWOT, Pakistan‟s policy makers were busy in serious deliberations to create a favorable environment to ensure advantages for securing Pakistan‟s national interests. The ultimate aim of all these considerations was to maximize Pakistan‟s cooperative status to ensure security of its nuclear assets and fetching support to weak economic conditions. After 9/11, Gen Pervez Musharraf came back from Karachi and there was meeting at Chaklala Cantonment Rawalpindi; it was agreed to support the GWOT. Gen Mahmood was not happy on giving free hand to CIA to operate inside Pakistan. The ISI did not want to abandon Taliban totally, though the latter did not listen to Pakistan yet they were not anti-Pakistan. “The stubberious of Mullah Omer was felt and talked even among higher ranks of Taliban leadership.”199 During the first week of October 2001, Taliban Ambassador in Islamabad, Wakeel Mutwakkil requested one-on-one meeting with me. I explained to him the kind of catastrophe the Afghanistan people were going to confront. He agreed and said “Mullah Omer does not realize, as from 1979, till today a warlike situation existed in Afghanistan, so instead of giving weight to Pakistan‟s foreign policy, the military policy was at play.”200
The civil and security establishments in Pakistan were engaged with each other for tailoring an appropriate policy response to the developing environment. The Foreign office was present in the consultative sessions held at the Presidency. “State affairs being seen by a general, the US and other countries would prefer to go to army for any future happening. US ambassador was in direct touch with GHQ. UK Prime Minister Tony Blair would also like to talk to the Army. After bombing at US
198 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 201. 199 Interview with former Ambassador Ayaz Wazir, held in Islamabad on January 24, 2018. 200 Interview with former Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar, held in Islamabad on February 9, 2019.
125 embassies in August 1998 in Africa, they were trying hard to get hold of Bin Laden. After seeing the non-cooperative mood of Taliban, there was an impression that the US had decided to go for a regime change in Afghanistan before 9/11. Gen Mahmood was engaged to convince Taliban to avoid the coming hell on Afghanistan but the details are not known. They worked out the details about the Coalition Support Fund (CSF), target engagement by drones, handing over suspected Al-Qaeda operators to US but the Foreign Office had no knowledge of these agreements as it all was taking place between US and Gen Pervez Musharraf. There is no denying the fact that the policy inputs or direction from the political elite has not been up to the mark as most of our Prime Ministers prefer to keep quiet due to capability issue. Due to their limited exposure, they have no answer for the complex foreign issues. Pakistan‟s cooperation to US after 9/11 was extended with very few conditions such as no free use of air space and the right of flight operations only from Jacobabad and Dalbandin bases.”201
The consultative process to finalize Pakistan‟s policy in post 9/11 scenario was at full swing among the higher echelons of the government. “The decisional meetings were chaired by Gen Pervez Musharraf, Foreign Minister and Foreign Secretary used to represent the foreign office. At times, the threats perceived were exaggerated i.e. Indian offer of bases as any flight from Indian bases has to pass through Pakistani air space, which could not happen with the cooperation from Pakistan. DG ISI was keen to convince Taliban for disowning Bin Laden. I also accompanied but I was out- flanked by him and I was dropped at Kabul and he went to meet Mullah Omer at Kandahar. I was made part of this mission on the insistence of Foreign Secretary in spite of the reluctance by DG ISI to take me along.”202
The world could see the upcoming wrath of US on Afghanistan. But Mullah Omer, for unknown reasons and orthodox way of dealing with such ordeals, (Have we not fought back a super power), ignored the advice of Pakistan and even of his own leaders. “Haji Qadeer, the military commander of Taliban, used to develop differences with Mulla Omer on many issues but due to the ideological loyalty, will submit to
201 Interview with former Foreign Secretary and Foreign Minister Inam-ul Haq held in Islamabad, on January 31, 2019. 202 Interview with former Ambassador Aziz Ahmed Khan, held at Islamabad, on February 16, 2018.
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Mullah Omer and would admit to us that my hands were tied. As ambassador, whenever I will interact with Wakil Mutawakkil for revision of certain decisions, invariably his answer will be that I cannot do anything as these are Chief‟s orders. Just prior to US onslaught against Afghanistan, I hardly heard that Mullah Omer was responsive to any suggestions by Pakistan to cooperate. During this evolving situation, prior to US attack, I came for a one year career course to Pakistan without my relief at Pakistan‟s Embassy (ambassador) in Afghanistan.”203
It was general consensus among policy makers to support GWOT, while being aware that doing so would mean losing Taliban, the only voice in Afghanistan, which was not being anti Pakistan. The advantages considered to support war on terrorism were „obviously in favor of Pakistan‟ as dictated by General Pervez Musharraf; “First we would be able to eliminate extremism from our society and flush out the foreign terrorists in our midst. We could not do this alone; we needed the technical and the financial support of the United States to be able to find and defeat these terrorists. We had been victims of terrorism by the Taliban and al-Qaeda and associated groups for years. Earlier, Pakistani governments had been hesitant about taking on the militant religious groups that were spreading extremism and fanaticism in our country. General Zia had openly courted them, for political support, and Nawaz Sharif was in the process of settling himself up as “commander of the faithful” type of national imam. For my part, I have always been a moderate Muslim, never comfortable with the rhetoric or the ways of the extremists. I moved against them when I banned a number of extremist religious organizations in February 2001 because they were involved in sectarian militancy. But now, here was a chance to confront them more boldly and openly. Second, even though being a frontline state fighting terrorism would deter foreign investment, there were certain obvious economic advantages, like loosening the strangle hold of our debt and lifting economic sanctions. Third, after being an outcast nation following our nuclear test, we would come to center stage.”204
Pakistan kept trying to convince Taliban for either handing over or expelling Mullah Omer. The old ties and working with Taliban by Pakistan were not yielding any purposeful outcome. “Efforts to convince Mullah Omer to expel Bin Laden were not supported by foreign office and security establishment with unanimity. On 19th September, 2001, the Council General of Pakistan in Kandahar conveyed to Mullah
203 Interview with former Ambassador to Afghanistan 2000-2001, Arif Ayub, held in Islamabad, on February 26, 2019. 204 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 201-203.
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Omer about pressure on Pakistan for withdrawing support to Taliban; but Mulla Omer remained unmoved, not sensing the war in air and not seeing the US resolve to punish Afghanistan. Pakistan's Defence Attaché in Afghanistan came back to Pakistan on 20th September.”205 “Before 9/11 Pakistan was trying hard to bring US and Taliban on table to discuss issues and attempt to resolve those. Taliban were least exposed to the external world power politics. Their only dream was to have a Land Cruiser jeep. The US was being persuaded by Pakistan to give some allowance to the diplomatic backwardness of the Taliban. There were earnest efforts for a trilateral meeting (US, Taliban and Pakistan) to move forward about finding some headway to tackle Bin Laden through expulsion or trial. After 9/11, Taliban leadership, instead of paying heed to our advices conveyed that you are our neighbor and brother, we realize your compulsions and you leave us. Being neighbor we knew that we will suffer the most after Afghanis.”206
The environment and mood prevailing among the Taliban in Afghanistan after 9/11, as has been described and analyzed above, was leading Pakistan to a clear conclusion based on the strategy of balancing self-interest while not offending the US. While factoring in regional and international constraints, a cautious cooperation in a UN approved action against Taliban, emerged as the only feasible alternative with major components as follows; “a) Pakistan should join the global consensus; b) It could not and should not oppose US attacks on targets in Afghanistan; and c) In the event of US request for Pakistan‟s cooperation, it should indicate a generally positive disposition and negotiate details later. Such a „Yes- but‟ approach would allow Pakistan tactical flexibility.”207
Meanwhile, the US demands were pouring in through various channels. “The US request for cooperation was received on 13th September, when US Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, summoned the Ambassador of Pakistan to US and the Director General Intelligence Services (who was on a visit to Washington at that time) for a meeting to convey the list of seven steps the US wanted Pakistan to take; “To stop al Qaeda operations at its border and end all logistical support for Bin Laden.
205 Interview with former Ambassador Ayaz Wazir held in Islamabad on January 24, 2018. 206 Interview with former Deputy Director General Security Establishment held in Rawalpindi, on February 15, 2019. 207 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2012, 258.
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To give United States blanket over-flight and landing rights for all necessary military and intelligence operations. To provide United States with intelligence information. To provide territorial access to US and allied military intelligence and other personnel to conduct operations against al Qaeda. To continue to publicly condemn the terrorist acts. To cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and stop recruits from going to Afghanistan. If the evidence implicated Bin Laden and al Qaeda, and the Taliban continued to harbor them, to break relations with the Taliban government.”208
Pakistan was examining all the options to act and cooperate with the world while joining the GWOT and the seven demands (as above) received from the US were also being evaluated for their impact; “Pakistan weighed the demands and their likely impact. Pakistan could accept these demands except the demands at number second and third. Pakistan however was ready to allow a narrow flight corridor that was far from any sensitive areas and instead of landing and takeoff rights at all Bases, the US was allowed the facility of Shamsi and Jacobabad Base and that also, only for logistics and aircraft recovery.”209
These bases were in south western part of Pakistan which were not operationally in use by Pakistan Air Force during peace time; see the map below.
208 Ibid., 260. 209 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 226.
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Map 3.5
Shami and Jocobaabd Air Base
Source: Google Maps
In the meantime, parallel efforts were being made by Pakistan for convincing Taliban to expel Osama bin Laden out of Afghanistan. For this purpose, DG ISI travelled many times to Afghanistan. But the visits proved non-productive as Taliban neither agreed to hand over Osama bin Laden nor to expel him to some third country. An exhaustive consultation process was undertaken by the top brass of policy makers. “After having discussed prevailing situations and future options on Pakistan either in foreign office or in Headquarters of ISI, the combined teams of these two organizations would go to Chief Executive for finalization of the policy options. From the Foreign Office, the then Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar and Foreign Secretary Inam-ul-Haq represented.”210
The respective stances and positions on extending support to GWOT or otherwise were deliberated and discussed, the summary of which is being given in table below.
210 Interview with Aziz Ahmed Khan Former Ambassador and Additional Secretary Afghanistan, MOFA, held in Islamabad on February 16, 2018.
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Table 3.5 Various Stands/Stances on Policy Decision of Parting Ways with Taliban in 2001 Civil Establishment Security Establishment Taliban are patently wrong by not Quick submission to the US be avoided; disowning al-Qaeda. No blanket permission to use the bases Taliban not in a mood to listen. and air space. Given the Taliban‟s inflexible stance and Pakistan has been supporting Taliban US‟s declared will to punish regime and US would leave one day but Afghanistan, the reason demands, we Taliban are an entity to be reckoned with. ensure /safeguard our national interests. Taliban were not given the diplomatic If Pakistan does not cooperate then India recognition by the world hence they lack will be over-willing to offer all kind of the worldly exposure; not that diplomatic. support, bases, flying rights through Attempt be made to guide them. Indian space etc. Though Pakistan cannot fight the US but “Yes-but” policy by Pakistan be adopted without Pakistan‟s support, Afghan war to broaden the „win set‟. cannot be won by the US. Pakistan to get a more sympathetic Indian offer of their bases to US is understanding from US for nuclear and operationally not feasible i.e. far off from economic security. Afghanistan, US will have to still fly through Pakistan‟s air space. Pakistan‟s nuclear assets are well-guarded and cannot be threatened by anyone. US be asked to go slow to let our efforts bear fruit about convincing Taliban to disown al-Qaeda. US be asked to delineate the exit strategy. Source: Table developed by the Author.
This list of interview of relevant civil and military establishment on this case study is presented in table below; Table 3.6 List of Interviewed Relevant Government Officials Serial Interview Appointment Held /Not Held Civil Establishment 1 Foreign Minister Yes 2 Foreign Secretary Yes 3 Additional Secretary Yes 4 Ambassador Yes 5 Director General Afghan Desk Yes Security Establishment 6 Director General Yes
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7 Deputy Director General Yes 8 Defense Attaché Yes 9 Director Yes Total (Interviews conducted) 09
3.6.2 Policy Outcomes and External Imperatives During Jihad time, CIA and ISI developed a cooperative understanding to support Jihadis for overt as well as covert operations. This understanding helped them continue intelligence sharing even after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. This kind of cooperation was active in late 1990s when the US targets were being hit by Al-Qaeda. During the Musharraf regime, many Al-Qaeda operatives, hiding in Pakistan, were captured and handed over to the US, e.g. Aimal Kansi, Khalid Sheikh etc. Another facet of this understanding was the continuous contact between the US and Pakistan military and intelligence officials. “When the US engaged Osama-bin- Laden camps in Afghanistan by Patriot missiles in 1998, while using Pakistani airspace, the US Chief of Joint Forces Gen. Zinni was present at Chaklala Airbase, Rawalpindi and having a walk with Pakistan Chief of Army Staff, General Jahangir Karamat, on the runway. When missiles were fired, General Zinni told General Karamat that these missiles were aimed against Osama bin Laden camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan need not to either raise any alarm or voice against the usage of Pakistan air space without permission.”211 The decision to allow the US to engage Al-Qaeda and Afghanistan Taliban in FATA area of Pakistan was only known to Gen Musharaf and the US authorities. Afterwards, when the US was engaging Al-Qaeda and Taliban targets through drones, a violation of Pakistan‟s airspace otherwise, “the information was only shared with General Musharraf and foreign office was out of the loop. It is heard that even DG ISI was left out of this understanding i.e. information on any impending drone attacks.”212
But in spite of the above mentioned understanding, there were some hic ups also. The US pressurized Pakistan to take action against Afghan Taliban‟s sanctuaries in North and South Waziristan agencies in FATA. Pakistan did take action but with due
211 Interview with a high security official dealing with Taliban, (on condition of anonymity) held in Rawalpindi on October 24, 2017. 212 Ibid.
132 consideration to the time and environment, which suited Pakistan i.e., from 2016 to 2018. The US continued using different tools to influence Pakistan foreign policy outcomes, which included the stoppage of the Coalition Support Fund, do more mantra, while ignoring Pakistan security concerns emanating from anti Pakistan elements using Afghan soil (India) etc.
3.7 Zardari Era (2008-2013): Pakistan under Attack Asif Ali Zardari became the President of Pakistan after the general elections of 2008. General Pervez Musharraf backed Muslim League-Q (Quaid-e-Azam) suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of Pakistan People‟s Party (PPP), mainly due to a compassionate vote after the assassination of its previous Chairperson Benazir Bhutto in an election gathering at Rawalpindi on 27 December 2007. “As the bilateral relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan were going on a low key, PPP, with a modernist outlook remained pro-West. The PPP government under the Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani declared its commitment to the War against Terror to curb al- Qaeda and the Taliban.”213
In 2009, the ISAF was suffering from heavy losses and the US was seriously thinking to up the ante; “In January 2009 when Barack Obama became the president of US, he focused on war in Afghanistan and the pressure on Pakistan to do more was increased. That was the time when the resurgence of Afghan Taliban was on a high trajectory. Their resurgence in Afghanistan had a serious fall out on Afghan Security Forces and foreign troops in Afghanistan. To suppress the Taliban, US was relying on the use of military force. Pakistan had been suggesting to US to use two prong strategy viz emphasis on development and negotiations with the militants as well as the use of force.”214
The US enhanced the drone attacks in FATA to take out the top leadership of Afghan Taliban. “Since 2008, drone attacks increased manifolds in frequency and, especially during 2010 showed improved precision in targeting militants through ground intelligence.”215 The civil government of PPP contented itself with diplomatic protests on drone attacks in FATA, to bring down the public pressure at domestic front. “At
213 Shahid M Amin, Pakistan Foreign Policy A Reappraisal, 325. 214 Ibid., 325-26. 215 Riaz Mohammad Khan, Afghanistan and Pakistan: Conflict, Extremism and Resistance to Modernity, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011):141.
133 the same time, Pakistan had drawn two red lines; it resisted repeated US suggestions to expand the scope of drone operations to areas outside tribal belt and secondly, opposed any ingress by US troops across Durand Line to engage al-Qaeda and Taliban targets.”216 But Afghan agencies along with the US support stepped up its skirmishes with Pakistani outposts along Durand Line. Another important happening was of Abbottabad operation, where US navy seals stormed Osama Bin Laden residence and took out his dead body. It was generally perceived as the ISI failure even Gen Musharref also expressed the same, (the US unclassified documents attached at Annexure-13).
A fateful event happened on November 26, 2011 when Pakistani troops at Salala border post were attacked from Afghan side, resulting in the death of twenty four Pakistani soldiers (See Map 3.6). As an immediate reaction, the crossing points between Afghanistan and Pakistan at Chaman (Baluchistan) and Torkham (FATA) were closed, for about ten months (See Map 3.7). “The impasse was resolved after the US fulfilled one of Pakistan‟s conditions i.e. an apology from the US; finally, the „sorry‟ came from the then US Secretary of State.”217 Meanwhile, Pakistani Parliament proved its mettle by setting guidelines to deal with and ward off such events in future. (Annexure-5)
216 Ibid., 144. 217 Huma Imtiaz, „After US says „sorry‟ for Salala attack, Pakistan reopens GLOCs‟ Express Tribune, July 3, 2012.
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Map 3.6 Pak-Afghan Border Area Map (Salala Post)
Source: Google Maps Map 3.7 NATO Forces Logistic Route through Pakistan
Source: Google Maps
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3.7.1 Decisional Outcomes The security and civil establishments were equally supporting the Afghan initiatives when the unprecedented situation emerged within and outside Pakistani borders. Pakistan‟s decision-makers came under heavy stress due to the offensive operations; increased drone attacks, Salala Checkpost attack and Abbottabad operation. Importantly, Pakistan‟s civil elite and decision-makers through Parliament took a very tough decision to close down the ground and air routes for the ISAF/NATO supplies into Afghanistan. This unprecedented move and assertiveness of the civil leadership was equally supported by the Russian Federation and China, who issued diplomatic backing to the Pakistani move.
Due to the unprecedented security challenges, in the face of offensive drives from across the border, Pakistan‟s security establishment and civil government, suffered heavy domestic pressure from the public and the politicians. This led to the closing of ranks by both the bureaucracies to take some proactive decisions to show its resolve to safeguard Pakistan‟s national security interests.
3.8 Nawaz Sharif Era (2013-2016): Negotiations with Taliban and QCG The prolonged engagement in Afghanistan and heavy losses, made the US to realize the need to move towards a negotiated settlement to bring peace. It was not only the population of Afghanistan but its neighbors also, who were sick of the persistent instability in Afghanistan. Most of the stakeholders got convinced that Taliban should be taken as a reality to come to terms with. China, for the first time, showed willingness to participate in peace talks and support the peace process. Afghan government itself was looking for an opportunity to get engaged with Taliban. Pakistan was also waiting for such an opportunity where such initiative helps to bring peace to Afghanistan and the same would have indirect positive impact for the security, lawlessness and Afghan Refugees issues in Pak-Afghan bordering areas. Pakistan and China supported the argument that the Afghan peace process must be Afghan led and Afghan owned; which implied that Afghan‟s should talk directly to each other (Afghanistan government and Taliban) and should sort out the issues and take the responsibility of their own future. Main events and activities pertaining to this case study are summed up in table below.
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Table 3.7 Summed Up Activities Related to QCG October 2014 General Elections in Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani (Pashtun) became the President and Abdullah Abdullah (NA) the Chief Executive of Unity Government in Kabul 14/15 Ghani visited Pakistan and desired to get in contact with Taliban November about Peace in Afghanistan 7 July 2015 Pakistan coordinated first face to face meeting between Taliban and Afghan Officials at Murree (Pakistan hill station). US and Chinese ambassadors were also present as Observers. 29th July Death of Mullah Omer announced by Afghan intelligence; Peace Process interrupted 8August Explosion in Kabul, causing a lot of causalities October 2015 Pakistan civil society delegation visited Kabul to meet President Ghani to initiate the peace process (Mr. Mehmud Achakzai, Mr. Asfand Yar Wali, Engineer Shoukat and Mr. Ayaz Wazir). October 2015 Paris Conference on Afghanistan; Pakistan PM and Afghan President meet on the side lines of the conference. 10-13 Afghan President Ghani attends working meetings for QCG; China, December US, Afghanistan and Pakistan 14/15 Dec Heart of Asia Conference held in Islamabad 2015 1 January 2016 1st meeting of QCG at Islamabad February 2016 QCG meeting at Kabul March 2016 QCG Meeting at Islamabad. Mullah Mansoor Akhtar (Taliban Commander) killed by a US drone in Baluchistan while crossing Iranian border. April 2016 QCG Meeting at Kabul May 2016 Fifth and last meeting of QCG
In the wake of general elections held in 2013, Nawaz Sharif became the Prime Minister of Pakistan for the third time. While allocating the ministerial portfolios to the Cabinet members, he kept the portfolio of the Foreign Minister with himself. However, he did appoint two of his close confidants as Special Assistants. Mr. Sartaj Aziz had been the Minister of Finance and Foreign Affairs previously and Mr. Tariq Fatmi, a former diplomat has been Pakistan‟s Ambassador to Belgium and EU in Brussels.
“Mr. Sartaj Aziz‟s expertise was mainly in economic field. The responsibilities between both the Advisors were not that well defined. The rationale of this decision might be better known to Nawaz Sharif himself. Foreign Office‟s routine work in such circumstance naturally became more challenging. To seek guidance or get
137 summaries through to the Prime Minister involved consultation with both the Advisors. The decision of sending High Commissioner and Deputy High Commissioner to India who had no previous experience of working on/in India, also appeared unique. This decision was interpreted as if Nawaz Sharif wanted such diplomats to be posted in India, who were “fresh minds” with no intellectual baggage of previous assumptions and dispositions about their newly posted country. Such decisions indicated that Nawaz Sharif wanted to assert himself. Nawaz Sharif embarked upon applying new dimensions to Pakistan foreign policy. Internationally, his focus was to enhance viable relationship with all countries particularly the US and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. At the regional level, he envisaged to remove obstacles in trade with neighbors, particularly with India. For him the equal priority was Afghanistan whose peace and stability was an integral part of ensuring stability in Pakistan.”218 Situation in Afghanistan was quite precarious. The US strategy of scaling down troops level and replacing the combat operations with Counter Insurgence (COIN) operations was underway. The Afghan National Army (ANA), despite having the support from donors in equipment and trained by foreigners, was struggling on ground to handle Taliban insurgency. “To have stability in Afghanistan, the US also started trilateral peace talks in 2013; comprising Taliban, Afghan High Peace Council and US. Qatar was extending logistics support for the Talks and provided an office for Taliban at Doha.”219 This peace effort did not materialize because of the mistrust between the participants and efforts were aborted without any mention-worthy results. The need of bringing Taliban on the negotiation table with the passage of time became more pressing.
3.8.1 Options and Outcomes Afghan government under President Ghani was asking Pakistan and other stakeholders to arrange direct talks with Taliban. Pakistan after exchanging views with the US and China decided to approach Taliban to join the fresh peace efforts. Pakistan‟s foreign office was also aware of the developments but it was ISI which was on the front seat, coordinating the direct talks. “With the efforts of ISI, a meeting was arranged at Murree in the first week of July 2015. Four member delegation of Taliban
218 Interview with former Ambassador Afrasiab Hashmi held at Islamabad, on February 7, 2019. 219 Interview with a senior security official who dealt with Taliban (on condition of anonymity), held in Rawalpindi on November 28, 2017.
138 was led by Mulla Durrani and eight member delegation of Afghanistan participated in meeting where the ambassadors of US and China participated as Observers. From Pakistan side, the Foreign Secretary and senior ISI officials participated. Taliban insisted that they should be recognized as Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and Afghan government should send an empowered delegation so that the decisions could be taken there and then without looking back and pending the issues for next meeting. Their demand was that the foreign troops should leave Afghanistan before we talk. The analogy they used to explain their stance that if a dog falls in a well, you may take out thousands of buckets of water, but the well cannot be purified till the time you take out the dog i.e. before any meaningful talks, foreign troops must leave. At the same time, it was decided that the secrecy of the meeting would be kept and nothing would be communicated to any other, by any side which may affect the trust or cast any ramifications for the stature of any organization/leader. The next meeting was proposed to be held during the last week of July 2015 where, it was decided, the issues such as the ceasefire, cessation of attacks on the urban areas, exchange of prisoners etc. would be discussed.”220 On 29th July, the news about the death of Mulla Omer (concealed by Taliban) was aired from the Afghan Presidency. Taliban reacted to this vehemently and walked out of any future talk process.
The law and order situation continued to deteriorate in Afghanistan. “By end of 2015, President Ghani had invited a Pakistani Delegation from the civil society to push for the peace process. The delegation was mainly comprised of political leaders and included Mr. Achakzai from Baluchistan, Mr. Asfandyar from KPK, ex-governor KPK Engineer Shaukat and ex-ambassador Ayaz Wazir. President Ghani talked about the issue of mistrust between Afghanistan and Pakistan and underscored the importance of having an international guarantor for any future peace talks. Those very days, a peace conference was being held in Paris. The Afghan President had decided not to attend the Conference but on the suggestion of this delegation that he should meet Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on the sideline of this conference to move forward in the next planned Heart of Asia conference in Islamabad, he decided to go
220 Interview with a senior security official dealing with Taliban (on condition of anonymity), held in Rawalpindi on November 27, 2018.
139 to Paris. Afterward, President Ashraf Ghani did come to Islamabad as some ice had melted during his meeting with Nawaz Sharif at Paris.”221
The top hierarchy of Pakistan government was keen to play a role in brokering the peace dialogue between the US, Afghanistan and Taliban. ISI shares the necessary information with MOFA, not according to some formally established protocols but on a „need to know basis.‟ “In foreign policy domains, ISI gives its view point on any issue usually in a prescriptive manner i.e. do it or do not do it. Because of the tactical knowledge, ISI, more often than not, has a narrow approach. COAS meets the PM for direct sharing with the top man but the foreign office gets the information from security establishment on a need-to-know basis, where they themselves decide the need. In the QCG process, Pakistan made it clear to all participant actors that Pakistan can make serious attempt to convince Taliban for joining the process but not in a position to compel Taliban to be driven in a particular direction.”222
Pakistan, China and the US were also considering and talking with each other for finding out possibilities of initiating fresh peace process efforts. “China had approached Pakistan to pursue the peace process. At the same time, Pakistan and the US also consulted each other for pushing the peace process. So all the stakeholders i.e. Afghanistan, US, China and Pakistan had discussed at length, the modalities and mechanism for the talks before reaching out to Taliban. They discussed among themselves to give a name to these talks. The name like „consultative‟ or „contact group‟ were discussed but finally „Coordination‟ suggested by China was agreed upon by all the stakeholders and this peace process was named as Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG).”223
By December 2015, after the Heart of Asia Conference in Islamabad, QCG initiative was set in motion with the efforts of all the stakeholders. “The genesis of QCG process can be traced back to the Heart of Asia Conferences. The process of initiating these conferences was undertaken by Turkey in 2014 with the aim to make available a forum to all the stakeholders to discuss and pursue peace in Afghanistan. Earlier,
221 Interview with former Ambassador Ayaz Wazir held in Islamabad on January 24, 2018. 222 Interview with a senor political elite, who looked after MOFA affairs (shared on condition for not to be named), held in Islamabad on January 31, 2019. 223 Interview with DG Afghan Desk, MOFA, held in Islamabad, on February 18, 2018.
140 these Conferences were held in Turkey, India and Afghanistan. Pakistan was to hold Heart of Asia Conference in December 2015. Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, wanted to have something „big‟ in bringing peace in Afghanistan. It was proposed by MOFA that a „Group of Four‟ comprising the US, China, Afghanistan and Pakistan should make an endeavor to bring Taliban and Afghan governments on table to talk, discuss and show resolve to move for Afghanistan peace process. MOFA held meetings with the US, China and Afghanistan with the aim to develop an understanding for pursuing a path jointly, which would ultimately lead to Afghanistan peace. The first meeting of QCG was held on 1st January 2016 in Islamabad. Roadmap and terms of references for QCG generally related to the coordination of such an environment, in which the reconciliation with Taliban could take place. It was expected that, during the process, the Taliban and the Afghan government will get engaged with each other to develop some understanding to end a prolonged war in Afghanistan. At the initiation stage, the US was reluctant to join as it did not see any participatory role of India. The US has blessed the progressive enhancement in Indian role to dominate Afghan scene. Secondly, the US had concerns about China‟s presence in the process, which may provide leverage for Pakistan to win China‟s support for Pakistan‟s view point during the QCG process. But ultimately the US decided to join the QCG.”224 “Another issue, which came up during the process was the different dispositions of participants about tackling the future situation if Taliban decide not to reconcile. The US and Afghanistan were of the view that in such a scenario, the Taliban be segregated in two categories i.e., reconcilable and irreconcilable and the irreconcilable Taliban be attacked /eliminated by Pakistan under the monitoring of the US and Afghanistan. Pakistan was of the view that first of all, the attacks on Taliban be stopped and sincere endevours should be done to bring them on Table and if they do not cooperate, then the segregation be done. It is only at that time that it will be decided what to be done with irreconcilable Taliban by Pakistan but without any monitoring by the US and Afghanistan.”225
Subsequent meetings of QCG were held alternatively in Kabul and Islamabad. At that stage, all parties were requested to put in their efforts to bring Taliban on table. Sensing the mood of the US and Afghanistan, ISI‟s view about QCG process became
224 Interview with senior official of MOFA (on condition not to be named) held in Islamabad, on January 1, 2019. 225 Ibid.
141 different from the MOFA. “As per the ISI assessment, the US held the key to bring peace in Afghanistan as Americans run the show in Afghanistan. The ISI recommended that Pakistan should not display any haste in giving an understanding or guarantee to anyone about Taliban for bringing on table or dashing to kill them afterwards. They advised that we should calibrate our own actions according to the ground dictates and our national interests. It was also emphasized that after witnessing the Murree talks, in July 2015, were intentionally sabotaged by Afghanis and the US by announcing the death of Mullah Omer and killing of Taliban leader Mullah Mansoor Akhtar respectively, we should first measure up their sincerity in efforts for peace process. Hence there was a need to develop an understanding, first and foremost with the US as to what they were going to offer to Taliban? This way, in case the QCG process could not make any headway, Pakistan would not be blamed.”226 “The QCG process was undertaken with high hopes but US and Afghanistan started giving the indications of exhaustion and aloofness. In the fourth meeting, it was decided that all the stakeholders should make an effort to contact Taliban and convince them to join the peace process. In the fifth meeting, Pakistan and China reported that Taliban were neither reluctant nor keen to participate. Whereas the US and Afghanistan reported that they could not contact Taliban.”227
In the entire process all stakeholders in Afghan issue were convinced to bring Taliban into main stream through peace dialogue. The US wanted to reduce the heavy size of its military contingent in Afghanistan. China was weary of suspected extremism export to its Xinjinag (Sinkiang) province from Afghanistan. Pakistan was anxiously watching to have peace in Afghanistan to take its trade to CARs through Afghan land. New unity government of President Ashraf Ghani in 2013 was more than eager to talk to Taliban for bringing peace and stability in Afghanistan.
Pakistan considered the evolving opportunity for peace dialogue to join for two reasons. One, if peace prevails in Afghanistan, it will reinforce the peace in Pakistan. Second, joining the peace process would enhance Pakistan‟s relevance at regional as well as at the international level. Yet another angle to facilitate the dialogue task was
226 Interview with a senior official of security establishment (on condition of anonymity), held in Islamabad, on November 27, 2018. 227 Interview with Ambassador Syed Abrar Hussain, Former Ambassador of Pakistan in Afghanistan (2012-14), held in Islamabad on February 26, 2018.
142 presence of China for the first time in the peace talks where Pakistan will have a chance to prove Chinese friends that how serious Pakistan was for any kind of peace efforts in Afghanistan. Pakistan foreign office was to push the peace talks whereas security establishment had reservations about the prospects of the dialogue as they anticipated that whole exercise may prove futile as the US had a shaky commitment towards peace in Afghanistan. “There were five rounds of peace talks under the QCG initiative. The focus of the talks was to bring Taliban on table and convince them for face to face interaction with Afghan government. Main feature of QCG roadmap was to envisage a division among the Taliban i.e., “reconcilable and irreconcilable” groups, where the second brand of the Taliban was to be fought furiously in the times to come. The Dialogue strategy was based on two hopes: one, Pakistan would bring the main group of Mullah Akhtar Mansoor to Islamabad or arrange another Taliban splinter group under Mullah Muhammad Rasul for peace talks. Secondly, if any group joins the peace talks, the remaining Taliban will join afterwards. The prelude to QCG was the arranging of peace talks in July 2015 at Murree, near Islamabad. For the first time, the Taliban representative sat under one roof with Afghan High Peace Council members, along with the other QCG members after hectic efforts of Pakistan.”228 All the stakeholders have been trying to arrange another round of peace talk in July 2016 and the parties were endeavoring to build trust among themselves. “In order to put the peace talks on path, the most difficult challenge was to convince Taliban to maintain their interest for the next rounds of talks. An incident put a halt to these direct talks efforts between the Taliban and Afghan government. Soon after the aborted Murree Talks, Mullah Akhtar Mansur, the senior Taliban leader, was killed by US drone in area along the Pak-Afghan border on May 21st 2016.”229 With the killing of Mullah Akhtar Mansur, the efforts for the resumption of peace talks went down the drain.
The policy decisions, involving the highest level of participation and shrouded by high secrecy are initiated and developed at higher official levels. “Any policy issue of a serious nature is neither initiated nor participated by the junior officers. With regard to serious policy issues like QCG peace process, the participation level generally is at
228 Interview with senior official of MOFA (on condition of not to be named) held in Islamabad January 11, 2019. 229 „US drone strike in Pakistan kills Taliban leader Mullah Mansoor‟ The Guardian, May 22, 2016.
143 the Director General level and above.”230 It is natural that such high „profile policy‟ issues belong to high policy formulation zone, where the higher echelon of government officials get engaged in policy decision making process.
Pakistan foreign policy prescriptions towards Taliban have evolved through various phases since 1989. During the first decade, under General Zia, it was mainly driven by the national security concerns like spillover effects from Afghanistan border, hot- pursuit operations by Soviet forces to punish Afghan Jihadis entering in Pakistan territory and ultimate threat of Russian interference in Pakistan to pave its way towards warm waters of Indian Ocean. During the following decades, foreign policy was under the influence of a combination of economic (opening trade route to CARs) and security concerns. Since 2001, the situation in the region, due to 9/11, brought in fears and uncertainty. Foreign policy considerations for Pakistan once gain were bedeviled by security concerns and protection of national interests i.e. Nuclear assets, Kashmir issue and economic well-being. After General Pervez Musharraf, Zardari era was dominated by counter terrorism efforts, mainly emanating from western borders. Following Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif era coincided with major efforts towards peace initiatives for Afghanistan‟s stability like Murree Talks and the QCG process. Though both the initiatives had a good beginning but the efforts were stalled due to mistrust; Taliban doubted US sincerity in talks and the vice versa. In the past, the civil and security establishments have been engaged in an aggregated foreign policy decision making, with different outlook towards Afghan Taliban. Their respective assumptions and dispositions (MOFA and ISI) on QCG case study of this research are summed up in table below. Table 3.8 Joining QCG Process in 2015 Positions and Stances of Civil and Security Establishment Civil Establishment Security Establishment Pakistan to coordinate with the US, China Pakistan should not take responsibility to and Afghanistan to work for a plan to bring and keep Taliban on the table. bring Taliban on negotiation table. At the end, in case of failure, the US may Inclusion of China in process will comfort accuse Pakistan of being the spoiler and Pakistan‟s pursuits towards Afghan peace retreat on some excuse because Murree process. talks were also sabotaged by US.
230 Interview with Acting Deputy Director of MOFA (Afghan Desk), held in Islamabad, on January 2, 2019.
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It is right time as Qatar talks have already The US must be asked as to what kind of failed and all fighting parties are willing concessions were they expected to extend to end the fighting. to Taliban and what was their exit Pakistan‟s dominant role may challenge strategy from Afghanistan. India for its attempts to have an enhanced Fighting and talks cannot go in step i.e. role in Afghanistan The US being bigger party may declare Foreign offices initiative has chances to not to take out at least the Taliban see success. leaders. Delegation from Afghanistan must have the authority to finalize likely agreements with Taliban instead of looking over their shoulders when such a time comes.
An effective participation of the policy makers at a given point and time matters a lot for the final policy outcomes as these outcomes are affected by their preferences, dispositions and pursuance vigor (manifestation of bureaucratic polices). Another importance of these officials is the value of evidence they carry for any specific policy decision making process. “You know where mostly the foreign policy issues related to Afghanistan, India and the US are deliberated and alternative options are exercised. That is the security establishment, which deals with these foreign policy issues.”231 The interviews held of the government officials relevant to this case study (QCG) are listed at table below. Table 3.9 Interview of Relevant Government Officials for the QCG Process Serial Interview Remarks Appointment Held / Not Held Civil Establishment 1 Foreign Affairs Advisor Yes 2 Foreign Secretary Yes 3 Additional Secretary Not held. Posted aboard 4 Ambassador Yes 5 Director General Yes 6 Deputy Director Yes Security Establishment 7 Director General ISI Not held Did not
231 Telephonic discussion with Danyal Aziz, Member National Assembly (representative PML-N at National Assembly Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs), in Islamabad, on December 22, 2017.
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agree to a meeting 8 Deputy Director General Yes 9 Defense Attaché No 10 Director Yes Total (Interviews conducted) 07
There are certain government officials who were not directly involved in the formulation of specific policies towards Afghan Taliban but they were privy to the general policy making mechanism, development of various issues and policy pursuits in broader perspective. List of the officials who were interviewed, in this category, to add further clarity to Pakistan‟s policy to deal with Afghan Taliban is given in table below. Table 3.10 Interview of Officials; Indirect Relevance Serial Interview Appointment Reason for Inclusion Civil Establishment 1 Ex Ambassador, Afrasiab Hashmi Policy formulation process 2 Ex Economic Minister European Policy formulation process Union 3 Secretary, Standing Committee on Role of National Assembly in Foreign Affairs, National Assembly Foreign Policy Making 4 Member, Standing Committee on Role of Parliament in Foreign Policy Foreign Affairs, National Assembly Making Security Establishment 5 Director General Plans, Joint Indirect information about the case Services Headquarters studies 6 Director General Intelligence, Joint Indirect information about the case Services Headquarters studies 7 Special Operations Officer Indirect information about the case studies Total 07
146
Grand Total (of all the Interviews 33 conducted by the Author)
The role played by Pakistan decision makers to evolve foreign policy projection towards Afghanistan for the period under review (1996 to 2016) always revolved around the rational approach to ensure the defense and compliance of dictates of national interests. Pakistan civil and military establishment have been rendering requisite input for the ultimate policy interventions as per evolving situation at any given juncture for the period under study. Next chapter dilates upon the decision process and how various processes have been performed towards ultimate integrated decision outcomes. It is also critically reviewed as to how the civil-military bureaucrats agree to ultimate decision outcomes and whether some partner has a dominant role and if yes, why.
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CHAPTER 4
IMPACT OF BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS ON PAKISTAN’S TALIBAN POLICY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS It is always a challenge to understand the web of foreign policy formulation process. In this process many relevant actors in a channel at different levels interact with each other with their decisional preferences. At the same time, decision-making process of policy outcomes remains a complex study where discourse of a decision process is either unrecorded or guarded for authorized access, being considered a secret domain towards the attainment of national objectives. Pakistan civil and security establishment have been responsible to work jointly for the appropriate foreign policy interventions to pursue the national interests at regional and international levels. The bureaucrats and other decisional actors compete for the decision outcomes as per their role and authority assigned to them in a decision channel. Bureaucratic politics model serves as a template to have an empirical analysis of Pakistan foreign policy towards Afghan Taliban from 1996-2016, for major policy decisions i.e. recognition of Taliban regime in 1997, parting ways with Taliban in 2001, and participation in QCG, 2015.
This empirical analysis of Pakistan‟s foreign policy projections towards Afghanistan from 1996 to 2016 is based on three case studies. This chapter of the study endeavors to have a comparative analysis of bureaucratic politics model and decision-making process within the policy framework pertaining to the major foreign policy decisions towards Afghan Taliban from 1996 to 2016. The macro foreign policy decisions were outcome of contribution made by the relevant senior government officials and bureaucrats (civil and military) in a foreign policy decision process for the under review period at various occasions.
4.1 Recognition of Afghan Taliban Regime Due to incompetency and rigidity of Jihadi leaders, peace in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989 became an illusion. All Jihadi leaders and their lower rank commanders were busy in mustering influence and grabbing money from the local population. Prevailing suppressive living conditions of Afghan masses provided a vacuum for some other leader to emerge with virtues of justice and
148 humanity. “Since the emergence of Taliban in Kandahar in October 1994 and their overwhelming control of most of Afghan territory including capital Kabul, Taliban emerged as a force to be reckoned with. As a consequence of Mujahedin leaders‟ interregnum, Taliban under their leader Mullah Omar devastated the hold of militia commanders in South Western Afghanistan by spring 1996.”232 After the capture of Uruzgan, Zabul, Paktia and Paktika provinces by mid-February 1995, Taliban were able to take control of Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan by September 1996. Taliban now were expecting the recognition of their regime from other countries in general and from Pakistan in particular. “Mullah Ghous, Taliban‟s representative at Islamabad will always press for the recognition whenever he will visit foreign office.”233
Pakistan viewed the above demand of Taliban as premature because Mazar-e-Sharif in the North-Western province and Northern Province of Panjsher were not yet under their control. By May 1997 ultimately Mazar-e-Sharif fell to Taliban. This development led to the recognition of Taliban regime by Pakistan. “Pakistan‟s policy decision of Taliban‟s regime recognition largely circumscribed by the notions of their hold over 90% Afghan territory and joining of General Malik (an Uzbak) of Mazar-e- Sharif.”234 Pakistan foreign office was of the view that recognition to Taliban regime be granted when they have complete territorial as well as political hold in entire width and breadth of Afghanistan. “Some of the minimum conditions considered for recognition were; “Reaching out to all ethnic segments of Afghanistan. Ensuring territorial control of the entire Afghanistan. Developing political consensus with all Afghan stakeholders for establishment of a broad based government in Afghanistan.”235
The Foreign Office of Pakistan was not in favor of early recognition of Taliban regime mainly due to three reasons. Firstly, Pakistan has been supporting the idea of broad based national government; having presence of all Afghan ethnic groups in a
232 Riaz Mohammad Khan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, 62. 233 Interview with former Ambassador and Additional Secretary, Syed Iftikhar Murshad, held in Islamabad on February 18, 2018. 234 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2012, 200. 235 Interview with former DG Afghanistan Desk and Ambassador Arif Ayub, held in Islamabad, on February 26, 2019.
149 newly formed government under Taliban. Secondly, the early recognition of Taliban regime will further alienate Northern Alliances and resultantly they will prove to be a hanging fruit for states whose interests in Afghanistan are at tangent with Pakistan (India, USA, Russia, Iran etc.) who will use them against Pakistan. Thirdly, Taliban must take some time to consolidate their gains and develop the skills of statecraft to improve their outlook inland and abroad.
Contrary to that, the security establishment of Pakistan was in favor of timely recognition; their rationale was based mainly on two grounds. First, historically, whosoever had the control of Kabul would win legitimacy to be recognized as ruler of Afghanistan, secondly the timely recognition by Pakistan would earn goodwill for Pakistan among Taliban. Advantages considered to recognize Taliban regime were analyzed by security establishment in detail. Firstly, early recognition will boost Taliban and resultantly their stepped up enthusiasm will quicken their complete control upon leftover resistance pockets in Afghanistan. Secondly, they will feel obliged and demonstrate positively to take care of Pakistan‟s futuristic hope of opening trade route to the Central Asian States. Thirdly, the security concerns of Pakistan may be diminished in their regime i.e. Afghan soil not used against Pakistan by hostile country (India).
In this decision the political hierarchy particularly the prime minister was merely on listening end; he will seldom show interest to get into the challenges and complexities of the issue. The issues taken to him have been ultimately resorting to the originator after agreeing to the recommended options, even without any incremental input. “During weekly routine meeting after hearing the brief update, mostly, the prime minister would just say that it be shared with the concerned one.”236 There were not that frequent discussion sessions by prime minister, foreign minister, DG ISI or and senior foreign office officials to discuss Taliban regime recognition issue in a heuristic way. “Since Gen Zia time (1979) an Afghan cell was established in foreign office. Regular discussion sessions used to be held for appraisals on war going in Afghanistan to tailor response. Participants (Gen Zia, Governor KPK, foreign minister, foreign secretary and DG ISI) will not get up from table till consensus was
236 Interview with senior security official (shared on condition of anonymity) held in Islamabad, on February 1, 2018.
150 not developed for the warranted response from Pakistan. Gen Zia will never get agitated from such prolonged policy discussion sessions. This used to be held on monthly basis. Contrary to that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif would rarely hold such discussion meetings. If at all, one odd may take place then in that situation his attention span would be a short lined (5-7 minutes) and then will expect wrapping up of proceedings in quicker time frame than to the planned one.”237
Apart from policy decision sessions another mean used to get elite approval of major foreign policy decisions is sought from either through position papers, brief note etc. It is expected that such papers are to be critically viewed by all in channel to ensure the adroitness of the final upcoming policy outcome. “He never read the briefs and position papers that the foreign office sent him. He had no patience for detail as he was in a hurry to win political laurels in the early months of his second tenure. As Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif did not realize that Pakistan no longer had influence in Afghanistan.”238 Agreeing to the put up decisional options speak of minimal input from the elite. Political elite at that time used to rely on the bureaucracy for entire range of foreign policy decision at large, whereby the top tier of decision channel had just a formal role thus leaving working of policy options to the bureaucratic turf i.e. between civil and security bureaucracy. “In 90% cases foreign minister and prime minister do yes to policy propels put up to them.”239
Pakistan foreign office and military officials logged their heads to discuss the opportune moment for the recognition of Taliban regime. “They had a meeting in foreign office in mid-1996. The meeting was attended by a Major General from ISI along with his team and Additional Secretary of Foreign Office along with his team. Military team was of the view that recognition to Taliban regime should be announced as soon as possible as Kabul is under Taliban control. But contrary to this, Foreign Office was of the view that till the time Taliban do not get control of province of Mazar-e-Sharif, recognition cannot be announced. Foreign Office reinforced their logic with the same stand of Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub.”240
237 Interview with former DG Afghan Desk and Ambassador Arif Ayub, held in Islamabad on February 26, 2019. 238 Syed Iftikhar Murshad, Afghanistan: The Taliban Years, 95. 239 Interview with former Ambassador Afrasyab Hashmi, held in Islamabad, on February 7, 2019. 240 Ibid.
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While seeing this divergent view within the establishment, ISI was waiting for the fall of Mazar-e-Sharif. “The day (24th May 1997) Mazar-e-Sharif was captured by Taliban DG ISI informed the same in person to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and got him convinced to announce the recognition of Taliban as soon as possible. PM agreed and asked him to inform Foreign Office for the needful. DG Afghanistan (Foreign Office) was informed to move towards the recognition of the Taliban Regime in the background of shared information with Prime Minister. It was expected that foreign office would project Taliban success to get nod from diplomats of other countries, to follow the suit and might have activated platforms like OIC to win support for newly Taliban regime from the rest of the world in general and Muslim countries in particular.”241
MOFA was also observing development in Afghanistan. Just prior to fall of Mazar-e- Sharif in the hands of Taliban, foreign office officials were thinking to give recognition to Taliban if they win other ethnic groups of Afghanistan to form a broad based government under Taliban regime. The other condition of taking over rest of the territory by Talban was also one of the qualifications for their regime recognition. But dropping their condition (all other ethnic groups participation in a new broad based government and control of 100% area of Afghanistan), the MOFA decided to go in step with security establishment as 33% percent of their criterion for regime recognition was met i.e. fall of Mazar-e-Sharif to the Taliban. On 24th May 1997, Foreign Office communicated to foreign minister about the entire development. “Recognition was announced on next day by foreign minister through a press conference. Afterwards there was feeling that Foreign Minister most probably did not share the likely announcement of this recognition and did it without taking Prime Minister in confidence as afterward prime minister did not seem happy the way it was done in haste.”242 This amply highlights decisional channels were either non functional or inefficient. MOFA perceived that ISI has informed prime minister so no need to move case to prime minster through foreign minister. Prime minster might have been expecting some fresh policy discussion sessions. At the same time the
241 Interview with senior official of security establishment (on condition of anonymity) held in Rawalpindi on February 1, 2018. 242 Interview with Iftikhar Murshad, DG Afghanistan and Additional Secretary MOFA, held in Islamabad on February18, 2018.
152 decision was neither taken up in cabinet nor was the standing committee of parliament on foreign affairs taken on board.
The policy decision on Afghan Taliban regime recognition was an issue since 1996 when Taliban entered Kabul. At that time, military through that Taliban regime be given recognition whereas MOFA considered that Pakistan should weight for an appropriate moment in the delayed timeframe. Bureaucratic politics among civil and military bureaucrats kept swinging between decision players of both the sides. To reach an aggregated policy decision it took almost one year. The decision game is summed up in the table below. The table shows how the initial stand/rational/preferences of civil and security establishment got adjusted in due course of time while accommodating each other for a rational policy decision. Table 4.1 Aggregated Decision by MOFA and Security Establishment about Taliban Regime Recognition in 1997
Stand / Disposition Accommodation /Retreating Aggregated Civil Military Civil Military Decision Establishment Establishment Establishment Establishment
*Complete area *History; who so *Northern Agreed to pend Instead of Control ever holds Kabul Alliance area decision i.e. extending Broad Based taken as Afghan still not under from September recognition to Govt; other ruler Taliban 1996 to May Taliban regime ethnic groups *Northern *Human rights 1997 in September on board Alliance would violation still 1996, civil and *At least Mazar never join committed by military e Sharif in Talban; Taliban establishment *Taliban‟s *More than 80% *Symbolic reached to an hands area of participation of aggregated Taliban to show Afghanistan other ethnic decision of flexible /mature under Taliban groups in recognition in extrovert *To behave Taliban regime May 1997. exposure maturely *Dropped rest *Let some (diplomatically) of their stands other countries first give them as of Taliban to recognize exposure regime *Take some *Early considerations time, not in recognition will of 1996 hurry enhance morale and enable them for further expansions *Western countries will not recognize, Iran,
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India will never Saudi Arabia & UAE will follow Pakistan.
The decision-making process for the above policy decision was result of many meetings between foreign office and ISI. But there was no high level meeting either under foreign minister or by cabinet under PM. It appeared that the Military Establishment when found that the Foreign Office is not in concurrence with their view point brushed aside the formal channel and got its approval from PM through DG ISI and foreign office was just told to do rest of the formalities of arranging a press conference and announcing the recognition. The adopted shortcut by DG ISI for getting the approval of PM at that time speaks sufficiently about the upper hand of ISI over Foreign Office due to their direct access to the PM. The viability of the Foreign Office to exert effectively is contributed to the fact that their head of office i.e. foreign minister was lacking required assertiveness to rule in its domain while heading policy meetings or taking the proceedings to the cabinet or PM. At the same time, PM also did not bother to get it processed through the channel i.e. initiating requisite deliberations in his cabinet.
4.2 Policy Shift and Parting Ways with Taliban-2001 General Pervez Musharraf, after his takeover as Chief Executive of Pakistan in October 1999 after packing up the civilian government, found it hard to establish his legitimacy. Gen Musharraf had many challenges in this regard; to begin with to get his government accepted in the West, especially in the US. He was still struggling with his legitimacy domestically. “Due to an overwhelmingly negative reception of his Coup D'etat in the West, he was forced to manage, on the one hand, the country affairs under US sanctions and on the other hand, manage the irritants in Pakistan's relationship with neighbors, especially with India and Afghanistan. Out of all these, the most pressing one was his own non-acceptance as a legitimate ruler of Pakistan by the West and the US. The sense of relegation by major powers of the world was at time embarrassing also.”243
243 Interview with former Ambassador Ayaz Wazir held in Islamabad on January 24, 2018.
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It is widely believed that the 9/11 afforded an opportunity to Gen Pervez Musharraf to win global legitimacy as Pakistan was once again needed as crucial ally of the US in GWOT, as it happened during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US shook the entire world. Pakistan being a neighbor of Afghanistan and considered close to Taliban was highly concerned about the possible fall out of the impending crisis. Rapidly developing situation demanded an in-depth and impassionate analysis of the situation with regard to Al-Qaeda and Taliban, the main question being nature of relationship with the Taliban in an extremely hostile anti-Taliban scenario. The policy community in Pakistan started realizing that the UN Security Council will most likely impose more sanctions on Taliban and the world community would either support physically or approve whatever US decides to do with Afghanistan. “Some quarters believed that in the emerging scenario, Pakistan will neither be in a position to pressure Taliban to disown Al-Qaeda nor to oppose the US wrath in Afghanistan.”244 Pakistan already had a sizeable anti-Taliban lobby. These lobbies asserted that; “Pakistan had two options. First was to cooperate and join the rest of the world in global war on terrorism at the cost its friendship of Taliban. Second was to stand with Taliban, which might cost Pakistan its vital national interests i.e. Nuclear Program, Kashmir issue, diplomatic isolation and irrevocable shock to a feeble economy.”245
On a closer examination, it becomes apparent that a powerful lobby in Pakistan claimed that it had only one option; the choice was only to the extent of embracing it voluntarily and maximize the gains or to be battered into it by force with getting any collateral advantages of a voluntary siding with the US. The key assumption of this approach was that the neutrality was not an option and the neutrality or siding with Taliban would produce instantaneous national security problems for Pakistan. “Most of the analyses of the situation pointed to an obvious conclusion i.e., Pakistan had to pursue a strategy that would reduce risks on Pakistan‟s own security and strategic interests. This crisis called for a policy that balanced global and regional constraints on the one hand and the immediate imperatives and long term interests, national priorities and the norms of an international order based on principal of international
244 Interview with former Foreign Secretary and Foreign Minister Inam-ul-Haq, held in Islamabad, on February 26, 2019. 245 Interview with Foreign Minister and Foreign Secretary Abdul Sattar, held in Islamabad, on February 2, 2019.
155 law on the other hand.”246 The policy community underscored the sensitivity of the issues for the US and its demands and suggested to the government to offer its cooperation but at the same time or in the times to come, should protect its vital geostrategic interests. The Foreign Office considered that such a „yes-but‟ approach would allow Pakistan tactical flexibility. It could then also seek modification of the US policy and its expectation of Pakistan.247
As far as the decision making medium is concerned, the two facts i.e., the pressure of time and non-existence of a political government created an entirely unique situation. In these circumstances, the debate did not really start in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the right earnest. Instead, the policy options were conceived and crystallized at the top-most level of the Army i.e. Chief Executive, that happened to be the Army Chief also and Corps Commanders Conferences. For all practical purposes, the decision process was deprived of the presence of political representatives at the national level. In fact, after the takeover by Gen Pervez Musharraf in October 1999, government was being run by hand-picked ministers, mostly technocrats at the Federal as well as Provincial level. At the operational level, however, the Foreign Office and the ISI were rendering their respective input for managing the foreign policy of the country in such difficult times. By the third week of September, the government was making it obvious that they were supportive towards GWOT and the parting of ways with Taliban was imminent. The government was pecking the key factors in such a way that the support to GWOT was actually advancing Pakistan‟s vital interests.
The survey of relevant literature and interviews with the relevant dignitaries makes it to believe that the leading consideration to side with the US in a quick manner at that juncture was the self-motivation of the Chief Executive of the country, Gen Pervez Musharraf, for the legitimacy of his own rule. The improved Pak-US relationship has always been considered by some in Pakistan as essential for other vital interests. But the asymmetry in the US-Pakistan relationship is such that the US in normal times can relegate Pakistan to a lower order of importance. It is their immense soft power that the Pakistani elites, Army included, keep on trying to curry favor with the Americans
246 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2012, 258. 247 Ibid.
156 instead of attempting to reduce the asymmetry in the bilateral relations. As a result, when an opportunity arises, the Pakistani elite, embraces the US security goals without much care about the costs of this strategy. This happened after 9/11 despite the fact that on many previous occasions, the US disregarded Pakistan's national interests rather easily. This history with the US should have impacted the decision making this time around.
Pakistan‟s geostrategic location and the presence of hostile big neighbor next door have catapulted the National Security as the number one goal of the statecraft in Pakistan since its inception. There is no wonder that these existential security fears have afforded more leverage to the security establishment to impact foreign policy decisions. Pakistan had a history of troubled relations with India since its creation and both countries have fought three wars since 1947. Another constant irritant for Pakistan has been its border (Durand Line) issue with Afghanistan. Afghanistan is land-locked and traditionally has depended on the Pakistan-Afghanistan Transit Trade, which has been creating its own troubles of smuggling. As the border is straddled by Tribal area, where the traditional writ of the government has been weak, these areas became sanctuaries of contraband and illegal activities and a breeding ground of Jihadis after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Afghanistan has been a major preoccupation in Pakistan national security calculus, creating serious implications for the domestic economy and society, particularly in the wake of refugees coming to Pakistan in millions and the attendant ills like gun running, narcotics and militancy. The extremists, including Afghan Taliban and elements of Tehrek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), have been hiding in Afghanistan. Initially, TTP was formed to support Afghanistan in their fight against the US in 1999. But TTP afterwards turned against Pakistani security forces, close to Afghan border and particularly Swat and Malakand areas of KPK province, to enforce Taliban style system in these areas. As per security compulsions, Pakistan perceived that alliance with the US will have negative impact on Pakistan security challenges.
Another preoccupation for Pakistan closely linked with the security challenges was the protection of Pakistan‟s nuclear program. Pakistan had paid a heavy cost, in terms of sanctions from the US, to become a nuclear power which is taken as the sole guarantor of its security. Hence this program and its security propped up as one of the
157 leading considerations which were factored while adopting a supportive role for GWOT, under the US.
Major features of Pakistan‟s support to the US included exchange of intelligence, allowing logistic support to move through Pakistan, allocating a dedicated air flying zone at Jacobabad and Shamsi air bases for humanitarian assistance. The other factor which spurred the decision-makers to join GWOT was the Indian factor. It was presumed that if Pakistan denies the cooperation to the US then it would go to India. “India has already tried to step in by offering its bases to US. Then India would get golden opportunity with regard to Kashmir. Indians may undertake a limited offensive in Kashmir or work with US and UN to turn present situation into a permanent status quo and the US would certainly have obliged.”248
The economic well-being of people remains a high priority for all the governments. Due to nuclear explosion in 1998, Pakistan was feeling the pinch of economic sanctions and interrupted supply of military hardware from the US. The situation after 9/11 provided Pakistan with an opportunity to reduce its economic worries through the cooperation in Global War on Terrorism. The same proved true afterward. “Significant economic and military assistance was extended by the US to Pakistan; amounting a $10 billion over a period of five years. Military hardware including F-16 (fighter aircraft) was also secured from the US after a gap of several years. A part of Pakistan‟s foreign debt was written off and a part rescheduled. Pakistan‟s exports rose by nearly fifty percent with the US.”249
Another factor which impacted the decision of parting ways with Taliban was the Taliban themselves. Over the last few years, Taliban attracted serious criticism from the world on account of their stringent interpretation of Sharia (Islamic laws) and rigid approach towards human rights. Their restrictions on female education & freedom of movement and non-tolerance of other ethnicities also contributed towards their negative image. The international opinion went against them when Taliban destroyed the ancient Buddha statues in Bamyan province. General Pervez Musharraf
248 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 202. 249 Shahid M Amin, Pakistan Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal, 320.
158 said that “Once we tried to convince Mullah Omar to not destroy the statues on behalf of the world but he paid no heed to us and destroyed these.”250
4.2.1 Rational Decision Preferences Post 9/11 decision to join GWOT did pass through a process. As per one of tenants of „bureaucratic politics model‟, the policy decision made by decision players is based on a rationale. While developing a rationale, the preferences for decision options are informed by certain perceptions. Foreign office and security establishment officials had certain factors of consideration impacting their perceptions. The factors which shaped the preferences of foreign officials included; Taliban will not disown Osama bin Laden. The US was already spewing venom against Taliban for sheltering Osama bin Laden. The US after being hit in their home will go to any limit for punishing the perpetrators and their supporters Taliban had a history not to listen to external forces. (Prince Turki Al Faisal was humiliated on the issue of handing over Osama bin Laden (an Arab national);dismissing Pakistan‟s advice for not destroying Banyan Buddhas.) If Pakistan does not cooperate, the India will be there, as already it has offered its bases to the US.
The security establishment officials were split over joining the GWOT. It was an unprecedented case of finalizing a policy option with differences of opinion at the level of generals. “Those who objected included religious minded generals like Usmani, Aziz Khan and also Mahmud.”251 The same kind of uneasiness on the part of DG ISI was noted by the other decision players also. Foreign Minister observed, “ISI thesis was not totally abandoning Taliban as they considered them pro-Pakistan, though they were not listening to Pakistan. During various conferences, it was felt that General Mahmud (DG ISI) had concerns about CIA and he did not want free hand to be given to them inside Pakistan to move and operate.”252 Such fears of security establishment were proved correct when American forces and CIA enlarged their
250 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 215. 251 Hassan Abbas, “The inside story of the Musharraf – Mahmood Tussle” Daily Times, September 26, 2006. 252 Interview with former Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar, held in Islamabad, on February 8, 2019.
159 operation zone to FATA, as tracking their targets and conducting drone attacks were not possible without having human intelligence network. “Some Pakistani officials have privately admitted that small groups of the US Special Forces personnel were admitted into operational territory in Waziristan for counter insurgency operations and were allowed the use of the military base in Tarbela. At one time, the estimated number of the US soldiers in Pakistan was between one to three regiments.”253 The factors which led to the formation of perception of security officials for their decisional discussions included;
The previous history of US is that they always exit at their will, not sharing the necessary information before time and they left chaos behind them instead of a balanced environment. CIA was already busy in recruiting anti-Taliban factions, specially the Northern Alliance; thus revivalism of war-lordism was on cards. Under the garb of GWOT the US, the only super power, will become Pakistan‟s next door neighbor making it difficult for a weak state like Pakistan with sovereignty. The US will tilt more towards Northern Alliance and grant more space to India, expositing Pakistan‟s western borders also as the eastern borders with India. Taliban, an entity which would not only stay relevant in Afghanistan, they may even become the most dominant faction, may brand Pakistan „not a friend of bad times.‟
4.2.2 Decision Team Just after 9/11, the foreign office convened its meeting for an in-house discussion to review the unfolding situation. After the return of DG ISI from the US, the ISI got engaged internally to work out the scenarios and challenges for Pakistan. The case for joining GWOT and parting ways with Taliban were primarily discussed by a team with variable participation and venues. The main decision players were the Chief Executive Gen Musharraf, Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar, Foreign Secretary Inam-ul- Haq, army corps commanders and DG ISI. Gen Pervez Musharraf did claim to consult experts, religious leaders, academia etc. but no evidence is available in this regard.
253 Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords: Pakistan Its Army, and Wars Within, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008):541.
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4.2.3. Decision Imperatives The critical foreign policy decisions are generally made under high pressure environment. Pakistan‟s decision to part ways with Taliban was taken in a complex international environment. The domestic affairs of Pakistan were also being managed on stop gap basis as the security establishment was in the driving seat at that time. The post 9/11 scenario brought a global change which required a unified battle against terrorism. The NATO countries stepped forward for a unified response. This sudden development and fast evolving situation put a serious challenge to Pakistan. The policy decision imperatives for Pakistan were complex. The happening of 9/11 put the entire world in a state of shock. As the US government was hell bent to show the world in general and Americans in particular that they have brought their perpetrators to the book, it put Pakistan in a precarious situation.
The coercive diplomacy of US (with dictates such as „you are either with US or with them‟, „the supporters of al-Qaeda to also pay‟, „bombing back to Stone Age‟ etc.) did not leave much choice to Pakistan but to go with the demands of the US. Various statements made by the US leadership used a harsh tone towards Pakistan for winning its cooperation.
“On 13th September when President Bush was asked whether he has made any progress in obtaining cooperation from Pakistan, Bush replied „We will give the Pakistani government a chance to cooperate‟. The note of warning was unmistakable.”254
General Pervez Musharraf says that; “While talking on the phone with Colin Powel, he was quite candid; you are either with us or against us. Similarly, the US Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, while talking to DG ISI said that if Pakistan chose to be with the terrorists, then Pakistan should be prepared to be bombed back to the stone-age.”255
The non-existence of the Parliament also meant that Gen. Musharraf would not be able to put the issue for consideration through institutional mechanism. This might have provided an excuse to offer a delayed policy response with an elaborate cooperative mechanism with the US rather than quicker submission to the US
254Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2012, 259. 255 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 201.
161 dictates. This mechanism might have helped to have detailed clauses of cooperation and the cooperative instruments would have been formalized between two states. This would have provided for the limits of cooperation, its form and the returns of cooperation. Contrary to this, the cooperative instrument was not made that formal.
4.2.4 Decision Channel and Process Till 12th September, no conditions or prequalification to join the war on Afghanistan were communicated by Pakistan to US. “When General Pervez Musharraf, who was on tour in Karachi, returned to Islamabad on the evening of 12th September, he immediately attended a high level meeting to discuss the grave crisis and its implications for Pakistan. Until then, there had been no contact or communication between governments of Pakistan and the US. It was decided to evolve a strategy of approach, keeping in mind the need for a realistic assessment of the obtaining environment.”256
After having analyzed the obtaining environment, General Pervez Musharraf made up his mind to join the war against terrorism. The rationalization of his decision centered over Pakistan national interests. “These interests included countering and containing Indian role in Afghanistan, security of strategic assets and guarding economic infrastructure built over half a century.”257 After making up his mind, General Pervez Musharraf started consulting various tiers of the government, and various groups of society. He later wrote that, “Having made my decision, I took it to the Cabinet. As expected, there was some concerns from the Ministers that they had not been consulted, even the Corps Commander, also expressed the same concern.”258 It is obvious that decision channel and process were not followed. Instead of initiating issue in normal channel and at appropriate level, the decision was taken by one individual i.e., General Pervez Musharraf. Afterwards, he shared the decision with the concerned ones with two aims either to win their support or remove their queries about the decision. This process lacked the procedural capabilities to build the consensus and having input of human faculties from more participants. Pakistan might have broadened its win set by extending willingness to cooperate with the US and
256 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2012, 257-258. 257 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 202. 258 Ibid., 206.
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negotiating for a better share of the pie. “Pakistan must have worked out a pragmatic programme about the disbursement of CSF, so that, afterwards, there would have been no ifs and buts for its payments to Pakistan.”259
4.2.5. Aggregating the Final Decision The response of foreign office and security establishment to the situation was shaped by their perceptions towards Taliban and Americans. The foreign office was of the view that Taliban have become liability and US is adamant to punish al-Qaeda and their protector (Taliban). Security establishment was still considering Taliban as an asset and the US as an unreliable party to whom Pakistan should not be presented as a free zone. Within the security establishment, there was a split on the kind of liberty to be given to CIA operatives inside Pakistan. Some senior members of the military establishment wanted to make earnest efforts to convince Taliban for disowning al- Qaeda and suggested to extend the time, before Taliban are bombed to get the desired outcome.
The process of reaching at an aggregated policy decision on partying ways with Taliban within establishment as per the Bureaucratic Politics Model is summed up at table below. Table 4.2 Aggregated Decision “Parting ways with Taliban in 2001” between Civil and Security Establishment Stand / Disposition Accommodation /Retreating Aggregated Civil Military Civil Military Decision Establishment Establishment Establishment Establishment Taliban are Quick An effort to If the concerted “After failed palpably submission to convince efforts to efforts to wrong; not the US to be Taliban may be convince Taliban convince disowning al- avoided; no made; as for disowning al- Taliban to Qaeda. blanket feasible. Qaeda fail, then disown al- Taliban not in a permission to Foreign office Taliban may be Qaeda, mood to listen use bases and has no issue for left on their own. Pakistan will Given air space. any operational No precondition join GWOT Taliban‟s Pakistan has coordination may be placed thus inflexible been supporting between the US for Pakistan‟s supporting stance and US Taliban regime and military support to US through declared will to since long. US commanders operations in intelligence punish would leave and intelligence Afghanistan but sharing,
259 Interview with Ambassador Syed Abrar Hussain, Former Ambassador to Afghanistan, held in Islamabad on February 26, 2018.
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Afghanistan, one day but agencies. the US be movement of the sagacity Taliban are an sounded out logistics demands we entity to be regarding our through ensure reckoned with. concerns i.e. Pakistan, use /safeguard our Taliban were economic and of prescribed own national not given military aid and Pakistani air interests. recognition by that Afghan soil space and If Pakistan does the world hence should not used granting not cooperate they lack the against takeoff and then India will worldly Pakistan. landing rights be over-willing exposure; they at Jacobabad to offer all kind are not that (Sindh of support like diplomatic and province) and bases, flying need to be Shamsi rights through guided for (Baluchistan Indian space worldly province) etc. obligations of a bases”. “Yes-but” state. policy by Though Pakistan be Pakistan cannot adopted to fight the US but broaden the without win- set. Pakistan‟s Pakistan to get support Afghan better war cannot be understanding won by the US. from US for Indian offer of nuclear and their bases to economic US is security operationally not feasible as India is far off from Afghanistan, thus US aircraft will have to fly through Pakistani air space. Pakistan nuclear assets are well- guarded and cannot be threatened by anyone. *US be suggested to go slow and give a chance to our
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efforts to convince Taliban to disown al- Qaeda. US be asked to share the exit strategy.
The inflexible approach of Taliban also impacted Pakistan‟s decision to withdraw its support for Taliban regime. At the global level, since 1994, the terrorist activities of al-Qaeda were condemned by the international community. This was worrisome for Pakistan also as the al-Qaeda in Afghanistan was protected by Afghan Taliban and supported by a segment of Pakistan‟s religious seminaries, situated mostly in the northern part of the country. “After the Yemen and Tanzania bombing by al-Qaeda, Pakistan was attempting to convince Taliban to get rid of al-Qaeda leadership present in Afghanistan. But Taliban leadership was not in the mood to listen our advises of likely future devastation for their insistence to continue sheltering al-Qaeda as they believed that there were no concrete proofs of Osama bin Laden‟s involvement in the terrorist attacks against the US interests. Even before 9/11, considering the al-Qaeda terrorist activities at the world level and Afghan Taliban‟s stubbornness, the US had decided to go for change of regime in Afghanistan.”260 Pakistan has been trying to convince Taliban to disown Osama bin Laden. Before 9/11, Pakistan was considering to modify its Taliban policy of one-side support to them owing to, firstly, for not listening to Pakistan and secondly, Pakistan could not afford to take the world pressure. “The considerations for parting our ways with Taliban ranked high in order of priority, given Pakistan‟s security (protection to our nuclear program), economic and diplomatic compulsions.”261
4.3 QCG Initiative and Pakistan’s Policy Since the US attacks on Afghanistan during October 2001, the US in particular and the West in general, were of the view that the melting down of the perpetrators (Al- Qaeda) of 9/11 tragedy facing the US might will be a quick affair. It was perceived that Al-Qaeda supporters, Taliban, will also wither away in a short timeframe and US
260 Interview with former Foreign Secretary and Foreign Minister Inam-ul-Haq held in Islamabad, on February 26, 2019. 261 Ibid.
165 will promptly replace orthodox regime of Taliban with westernized democratic system in Afghanistan. But things on ground developed differently. Taliban got dispersed, went in hiding and hibernation. The US mistook the minimal resistance of Taliban as a sign of their weakness and diverted significant military resources from Afghanistan to Iraq after two years of its arrival in Afghanistan. The US kept fighting the resurgent Taliban and finally realized that they needed to have a dialogue with the Taliban. “US was engaged in exploring ways and methods to have dialogue with Taliban. In early 2010 through Mullah Mansur, Taliban high- ranking leader, US attempted to reach Taliban but afterwards he disappeared. After a gap of about two years the US again tried to establish contacts with Taliban. The preliminary talks between the US and the Taliban representatives in Qatar were held in early 2012. In 2011 Afghanistan established a High Peace Council under Burhaanuddin Rabbani and established contact with the Taliban.”262
After witnessing the US efforts to negotiate with Taliban and Afghan government reconciliation efforts with Taliban, it was becoming clearer that Taliban were being taken as a force to be talked to. “The announcement of troops draw-down by the US President Obama in 2011, gave an impression to Taliban as if they were very close to the ultimate victory.263 On the request of Afghanistan to bring Taliban on the negotiating table, Pakistan made an attempt in 2014 and the “Taliban Shura members were brought to Murree. Delegation of Afghan government had eight members. The US and Chinese Ambassadors were present as observers.”264 This meeting also ended without any gains.
4.3.1 Establishing Contact with Taliban By the end of 2015, Pakistan was asked again to come forward and play its role in bringing Taliban to the negotiation table. Pakistan decided to avail this opportunity to reinforce its relevance. “ISI officials had a long history of working with Taliban as most of Taliban leadership had been ex-Jihadi who fought against the Soviets from 1979 to 1989. Another enabler of potential ISI influence was the presence of an
262 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2012, 295-96. 263 Interview with a security official dealing with Taliban (on condition of anonymity), held in Islamabad on July 13, 2017. 264 Ibid.
166 operational network on ground with requisite resources and liberty of action to deal directly with the Taliban.”265
According to a senior security establishment official, „The prolonged insurgency, unclear US exit strategy and enhanced influence of India were impinging upon Pakistan in the realm of security, blocked trade corridor to Central Asian States and extended presence of world super power next door.”266 “The parties for any concrete outcome remained, Taliban, Afghanistan and the US but none of these were ready to budge even an inch from their stated positions as the Taliban maintained that the US should commit exit first; Afghan government saying that the Taliban, while recognizing Afghan constitution should join the mainstream politics to play their political role, and US maintaining that Taliban must abandon militancy first.”267
4.3.2 Positions of Foreign Office and Security Establishment on Joining QCG A four party mechanism was worked out as QCG process to work and coordinate with Taliban, in individual capacities to ultimately bring them on table. The Foreign Office and ISI had their own reservations while working for such a policy option. “The Foreign Office looked things in a broader perspective whereas ISI had a narrowly based approach due to their operating, mostly, at the tactical level. But, the fact remains that no single person or institution has monopoly over wisdom and the shared and consultative forums contribute with utmost prudence and pragmatism.”268
A very senior civil bureaucrat (on condition of not to be named) shared his views on QCG process in the following words. “The Foreign Office was of the view that Pakistan must participate in QCG process whole-heartedly as the concept of QCG was conceived by Pakistan. And we should not put any preconditions, as advised by ISI, to other parties, for example asking the US and Afghanistan what they would offer to Taliban and commitment from the US not to disrupt for any reason. Such pre-
265 Interview with Ambassador Aziz Ahmed Khan, Former Ambassador to Afghanistan, held in Islamabad on February 16, 2018. 266 Interview with a security official dealing with Taliban (on condition of anonymity), held in Islamabad on July 13, 2017. 267 Interview with Mr. Aziz Ahmed Khan, Former Ambassador to Afghanistan, held in Islamabad on February 16, 2018. 268 Interview with former Foreign Affairs Advisor, (on conditions of anonymity) held in Islamabad on January 3, 2019.
167 conditions were later dropped and Pakistan went ahead with other parties. But the QCG process withered away without achieving any objectives.”269
The ISI had a hard time bringing Taliban to the table and then all the efforts fizzled out due to a non-committal approach of the US and Afghanistan government resulting in the failed Murree talks in July 2015, proving ISI right that the QCG would not yield results if US and Afghanistan did not spell out any offer to Taliban and did not share an exit strategy.
4.3.3 Decision Channel and Process The idea of QCG was conceived by the Foreign Office, after having heard the desire of the Prime Minster to do something „big‟ for Afghanistan peace efforts. As per one of the organizing concepts level of „Bureaucratic Politics Model‟, various high level officials of foreign office and security establishment have varying stances on joining QCG, because of the previous experience and information. Both these help respective officials to move issue in the decision channel i.e. from initiation of QCG initiative and its operationalization. The Foreign Office was in the lead to transform a Prime Minister‟s desire to a policy decision. The decision process got on its path with the first meeting between MOFA and ISI officials. After having revisited the issue in their respective organizations, they had another meeting where MOFA saw the QCG initiative with optimistic outlook whereas ISI had reservations about the outcome of QCG initiative. The decision channel culminated in getting approval of the Prime Minister to roll out the QCG process. It was decided that the MOFA would remain on the forefront of coordinating the ultimate QCG proceedings, with due input of ISI.
4.3.4 Evoking an Aggregated Decision The MOFA was advocating its rationale to initiate QCG process and get Taliban in the peace talks, bringing forth the realization of the new ground realities. These included a common concern of fresh peace initiative at the level of head of states of Pakistan and Afghanistan, China entering first time as a party to Afghan peace efforts and the US agreement to give a chance to the likelihood of QCG success. The ISI based its reservations about QCG process as a nonstarter on two accounts; firstly, the
269 Interview with former foreign secretary, on condition of anonymity, held in Islamabad on January 11, 2019.
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US exit strategy coupled with non-committal approach for granting meaningful space to Taliban to make them a part of dialogue was uncertain and ambiguous. Secondly, just five months ago the Taliban trust was broken by the Afghan government while announcing Mullah Omer‟s death and killing of senior Taliban commander Mullah Mansoor Akhtar, respectively. At the end of the day, MOFA and ISI reached to an aggregated policy decision that Pakistan would pursue Afghan peace process in such a way that the QCG initiative would coordinate the peace process and help shape their framework for the future but with a declared stance that Pakistan will make earnest effort to bring Taliban on negotiation table but would not be responsible for their conduct. Summary of reaching to this aggregated decision is given in the table below. Table 4.3 Aggregated Decision “Contacting Taliban for QCG Process” by Civil and Military Establishment
Stance / Disposition Accommodation /Retreating by Aggregated Civil Establishment Security Civil Security Decision Establishment Establishment Establishment Pakistan to Pakistan should take Pakistan will not Agreed for „Pakistan to coordinate with the responsibility to bring give any kind of joining the make an US, China and Taliban on the table and “guarantee” about process but with earnest Afghanistan to work of their conduct. bringing Taliban no attempt to for some plan to At the end, the US may on the table. “responsibility” coordinate bring Taliban on prove the spoiler and Pakistan only of bringing with the US, negotiation table. will retreat on some there to Taliban on China and Inclusion of China in excuse. Murree talks coordinate among table. Afghanistan process will comfort were sabotaged by US. parties and to Agreed for to work for Pakistan‟s pursuits The US to share what convince Taliban supporting to ultimate towards Afghan kind of concessions are for joining the reconciliation negotiations, peace process. likely to be extended to process but not and peace which can be It is right time as Taliban. being responsible process in spite joined by previous talks have Fighting and talks for their of the US Taliban; with already failed and all cannot go in step i.e. commitment or previous no stake holders are The US being bigger denial. dubious peace responsibility willing to end the party may declare not Security commitments. of ensured fighting fiasco. engaging Taliban establishment Taliban‟s QCG initiative will leaders. channel to be participation.‟ be a check on India Delegation from activated to for his active Afghanistan must have communicate/ attempts to enhance authority to finalize convince Taliban its role in likely agreements with for joining if Afghanistan. Taliban instead of future dialogue Foreign office will looking over their parameters are coordinate among all shoulders at that time. agreed upon by parties. all.
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4.4 Important Findings and Core Reflections After having gathered data on foreign policy decision-making in Pakistan (1996- 2016) towards Taliban, this study affords to draw some important findings and core reflections.
4.4.1 Pulling and Hauling Foreign policy decision-making entails inputs from all relevant government departments. These departments get involved in contextualizing an issue and embarking upon using the most favorable and workable option through many marathon discussion sessions. These sessions witness an active and heated debate by government officials at various tiers. The selected option, worked out through a competing participation, can be termed as bureaucratic politics, accommodating genuine concerns and inclusion of meaningful inputs under the process of “pulling and hauling.” Various government officials representing their respective departments tend to remain firm as per their original stance over an issue. But ultimately they budge to the necessary requirement i.e. to come up with a final policy option and agree to settle for some final outcome called an aggregated decision. Throughout this process, another string also has a role in impacting the final outcome. This is the manifestation of external influence over the policy options. In Pakistan‟s policy towards Taliban, the dominant effect has been coming from the US; at times visible and most of the times in an invisible manner. For the approval of recommended policy options, the political elite of Pakistan or executive heads have been more often than not, following the policy recommendations suggested by the government officials, instead of insisting on their own views.
4.4.2 Policy Making: The Arch Rivals Traditionally, many entities within a government lay their claim on the foreign policy domain. Many relevant ministries share their inputs, qualifying them to be a stakeholder. These Ministries mainly include the Ministries of Defense, Finance, Interior, Commerce and Security Establishment. Due to ever-enlarging role of ISI in Afghan Affairs, Foreign Office has been pushed aside to the second level of action, instead of being on the top to get policies approved. ISI being Pakistan‟s sole controller of Afghan Jihad against the Soviet Union invasion (1979 to 1989) grew out of its size. This out of size growth can be attributed to the unmatchable resources,
170 frequent military rules in Pakistan and close rapport with critical entities in Afghanistan (earlier with Afghan jihadi leaders and later on with Taliban). The influence of ISI on Afghan policy outcomes can be traced by recalling a few policy considerations and decisions. Decision of recognition of the Taliban regime in 1997 was communicated to the Foreign Office by ISI after directly getting the approval of the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. In 2001 ISI did attempt to persuade Taliban, without involving MOFA, for disowning but they failed. The Foreign Office was not in loop regarding the exact nature of support the US, CSF and US drone operations in FATA etc. While working before the QCG, the Murree meeting of the Taliban delegation with Afghan officials, Chinese and US ambassadors was in-fact ISI‟s initiative. Foreign Office came to know about it just a few days before the execution of this high profile meeting. For the QCG, however, the military establishment had its reservations and did agree for this endeavor but reluctantly.
4.4.3 Decisions and Authoritarian Equilibrium The maneuverings of Pakistan‟s Afghan policy, 1996 to 2016, have been witnessing policy interventions with policy options mostly suggested by the Army/ISI. Major reasons of this domination have been attributed by three main factors. First one is Pakistan‟s record of frequent interruptions in the democratic process, shutting the doors of the government to the political leaders. Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, General Yahya Khan, General Zia-ul-Haq and General Musharraf wounded the democratic processes in 1958, 1970, 1979 and 1999 respectively. Under these regimes, foreign policy was dominated by military elite.
Another factor, giving a larger sway to the Army, is the incapable and defeatest approach of civil leadership that they felt themselves contended with influence of military on foreign policy formulation practice. When Benazir Bhutto became Prime Minister in 1990, there were serious differences between the civil leadership and Army. “Army refused to let Bhutto govern as the Prime Minister until Washington brokered a deal in which she had to agree to allow the Army to run foreign policy and nuclear program, and not to reduce the military‟s budget. General Beg was to encroach even more over Bhutto‟s decision-making. Bhutto was not allowed to ask about the military‟s budget for the nuclear programme, tackling the Kashmir
171 insurgencies or the Afghan Mujahedeen.”270 Under these circumstances military had an edge prescribing any policy intervention; particularly towards Afghanistan.
Third factor has been the apathy of the parliamentarians from 1992 and onwards towards the foreign policy of Pakistan. Though both the houses of Parliament had Standing Committees of Foreign Affairs but they hardly contributed any meaningful input for policy formulation. These Committees had proportionate membership of political parties as per their seats in the respective house. But most of the Members of these Committees lack the capacity to make some solid contribution due to their limited knowledge on the subject of foreign affairs. Another reason for their ineffective contribution is linked to non-supportive environment for their job. They lack the supportive staff to assist them in research and creative pursuits. There may also be a tendency among some government departments and officials to dilly-delay while responding to the queries by these Committees and their Members.
4.4.4 Decisional Channels and Outcomes Foreign policy decision process towards Afghan Taliban has been mal-functioning and remains poorly explained. Starting with the framing of the issue, working out options, as per given contextual environment, to approval considerations, all the process has been mired in secrecy. The closed nature of decision process has been justified in the name of security considerations. This apathy reveals that all the decisions with regard to three case studies of this research were hardly debated properly through the appropriate channels, the relevant participants not playing their effective role being players at various decision games.
Recognition of Taliban regime in 1997 by political government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was done as per the recommendations made by the security establishment. Foreign Office and ISI had different approaches towards the Taliban regime recognition. Though the Foreign Office proposed condition, the inclusion of other ethnic groups in Taliban regime was not still met, yet the recognition was announced by the Foreign Minister. The second case about withdrawing the support of Pakistan to Taliban in 2001 was not a unanimous decision. Though the civilian
270 Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos, (New York: Penguin Groups, 2008):40.
172 government was not there, yet General Musharraf as Chief Executive was running the state affairs with the help of civilian set-up of handpicked Cabinet Ministers. “The Cabinet and particularly the Foreign Minister (Abdul Sattar) were of the view that cooperation with the US might be pledged but Pakistan must broaden its win set by getting certain warranties from the US, especially regarding the likely dominating role of Northern Alliance and India in the post US invasion set-up. When this issue was discussed in the Corps Commanders Conference, there were differences of opinions about the extent and mode of cooperation with the US. The DG ISI had feared that India would have more say in the Northern Alliance dominated Afghan political setup. The other two generals, (Lt. Gen. Aziz Ahmed, Chief of General Staff and Lt. Gen. Muzaffar Usmani, Corp Commander Karachi) were also of the view that without getting Indian role pre-defined by the US in post-Taliban set-up, Pakistan should not hurry up its support that was sought by the US.”271
Pakistan‟s decision towards the QCG is another example of bureaucratic politics within government institutions. Foreign Office till April 2015 had not considered it feasible to revive the contacts with Afghan Taliban. On the other hand, ISI had entered in reviving its contact with Taliban leadership to use them as leverage in Pakistan‟s foreign policy. After having seen the US and Karzai government establishing direct contact with Taliban leaders and struggling to have some dialogue mechanism with Taliban since 2008, on Pakistani side, such contacts were also considered important. When General Pasha was DG ISI, more efforts were put in. Prior to the initiative of QCG, ISI arranged the “Murree Meeting.” In 2016, Taliban sat with the US Ambassador, Chinese Ambassador and a high level Afghan delegate. This was surely an initiative of ISI and the Foreign Office was taken on board just before the execution of the meeting.
4.4.5 Bureaucratic Politics and Policy Decision Institutions in Pakistan have issues related to their effectiveness and efficiency because of their functional incapability, comparatively MOFA is better. These incapabilities can be traced back to the incompetence and laid back attitude of the political apparatus (lack of assertiveness of PM, Cabinet and Foreign Minister offices)
271 Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos, 79.
173 and lack of coordination for getting their appropriate inputs. The Standing Committees system of Parliament was established in 1992. This is perhaps too less a time for an organ like this to become effective and assertive. In the absence of a strong parliamentary influence, these are mainly the Foreign Office and security establishment, which have been locking their horns for foreign policy prescriptions towards the Afghan Taliban.
4.4.6 Policy Approach: The Foundation Foreign Office and the security establishment remain the competitors for choosing foreign policy interventions, particularly towards Afghanistan. Foreign office bureaucrats demonstrated a traditional diplomatic outlook towards all foreign policy issues based on winning and maintaining goodwill with Afghanistan. This goodwill intention of Foreign Office was coupled with the expectations of economic benefit through mutual trade and trade through Afghanistan with Central Asian States. On the other hand, Army being the custodian of Pakistan‟s frontiers, remained security conscious. Pakistan‟s border with Afghanistan being extremely rugged and highly porous posed one of the most potent threats. This threat is perceived owing to overflow of refugees, smuggling and easy movement of anti-Pakistan agents, particularly Indian RAW machinations from Afghan soil against Pakistan, due to an unending war like situation in Afghanistan. This security lens of Army always occluded a meaningful political process. Army maintained that in order to safeguard against security threats, due to the ill effects of the spillover from Afghan side, Pakistan needed a friendly or neutral government with least Indian influence. Towards the attainment of this security objective, Army/ISI emphasized to maintain liaison and relationship with the major stakeholders in Afghanistan. “The dominance of the Northern Alliance, being sponsored by India, US and Russia, remained the main source of mistrust between Afghanistan (less Taliban) and Pakistan. RAW‟s involvement in instigating insurgency in FATA and Baluchistan and sponsoring instability in rest of Pakistan, reinforced army‟s security concerns. The capture of a serving commander of Indian Navy from Baluchistan is a case that confirmed Pakistan‟s stand over RAW‟s involvement in Pakistan.”272 Therefore, the Army has
272 Interview with former Ambassador Syed Abrar Hussain, held in Islamabad on February 26, 2018.
174 always asserted that any current or future engagement with Afghanistan has to be viewed in the context of potential security ramifications.
4.4.7 Adhocism and Policy Prescriptions General foreign policy objectives of Pakistan have been clearly laid down i.e. friendly neighborhood, supporting world peace, non-interference, protecting economic and commercial interest of Pakistan and developing brotherly relations with Muslim world. The efforts to realize these foreign policy objectives are to be aligned with the national interests at any given point of time, which are to be defined at the government level. “As per practice in vogue under a Parliamentary System, the national interests are to be defined by Cabinet. Pakistan‟s national interests are neither defined by Cabinet nor exist in a conclusive form at any level and same remains true for Pak-Afghan foreign policy engagements.”273
Resultantly, the undefined nature of national interests of Pakistan towards Afghanistan has been casting serious repercussions. At times, this state of affairs leads to a self-defined perception of Pakistan‟s interests in Afghanistan by policy formulators. Pakistan‟s policy towards Taliban has a clear divide (between foreign office and military establishment) for Pakistan policy projections. In the post-Soviet withdrawal era, Pakistan has been struggling to support a pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan between 1989 and 1994. Afterwards, Pakistan has been supporting an apparently friendly Taliban regime between 1996 and 2001. In the post-US attack, Pakistan has been pursuing the Afghan government to stay neutral towards Pakistan and not let Afghan soil to be used against Pakistan between 2002 and 2016. In the face of prolonged US stay, tight grip of Northern Alliance on Afghan government, overarching influence of India in top decision-making hierarchy of Afghanistan and RAW‟s anti Pakistan activities in Pakistan territory, most of Pakistan‟s policy statements have been portraying Pakistan‟s stance as the one of non-interference in Afghan affairs between 2016 and 2017. An unclear and shifting policy direction from the country‟s political elite has often led to a knee jerk response to issues, erupting from time to time i.e. supporting jihad (1979-1989), efforts for national government formulation (1989-1994), recognition of Taliban regime (where only two other
273 Interview with Dr. Mohammad Faisal, DG MOFA, held in Islamabad on August 30, 2016.
175 countries in the world recognized), attack on Salala check post and prolonged closure of border crossing etc.
The above findings give us a fair insight into the dynamics of policy decision making. In the history of Pak-Afghan relations, spread over last twenty years, Afghan Taliban have remained a reality to be reckoned with, while considering and finalizing foreign policy interventions. Pakistan‟s policy towards Afghanistan has been pursued within the context of an ally being extremely introvert but with a clear streak of anti-Pakistan (less Taliban time). Pakistan‟s policy interventions have been grounded on creating goodwill, caring for trade interests and overwhelming concern for security. In order to develop policy interventions from time to time, the Bureaucratic Politics has been a tool in the decisional processes where a major pie of the decisions share has been attributed to the security establishment. This factor has crept in because of prolonged war like situation in Afghanistan and involvement of security establishment with all the other stakeholders and having their links in Afghanistan.
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CONCLUSION One of the lynchpins of foreign policy formulation is the process through which an ultimate foreign policy decision is reached at. The entire ambit of policy making process seeks to harness all resources to advance the national goals at regional and global levels. All decisional players or the actors in a channel while remaining cognizant of potential impact and imperatives of any future policy outcome, behave rationally and assert to leave an imprint of their contribution towards the final policy decision outcomes.
Pakistan‟s decision-making prism has remained lopsided due to many reasons and institutional imbalances have given way to individual‟s preponderance in civil and military bureaucracies. The over-whelming security orientation during the period of this study, 1996-2016, has led to the dominance of security establishment in the overall decision-making coupled with incapability or disinterested civil leadership. The foreign policy has been converted into security policy to safeguard the vital national security interests ranging from bilateral relations to all other issue areas. Since 1979, Pakistan has been in a warlike situation viz-a-viz Afghanistan and it is all but natural that decisional outcome also reflects the same. However, throughout this period, the overall national security interest remained the same but the preference and means to achieve have been impacted by international/regional security environment, political and economic stability at home, the role of the political elite and the influence of the United States.
Pakistan‟s policy towards Afghan Taliban since their emergence in 1994 has been the focus of this study. Dealing with the Taliban has been a big challenge for Pakistani policy makers. In this regard, the first major foreign policy issue was recognition of Taliban regime in 1997. Being a major role player, Pakistan‟s civil bureaucracy and military establishment have been maintaining varying stances about the recognition of Taliban regime. The main issue was of the timing and certain pre-conditions such as announcing the recognition only after the inclusion of all ethnic groups in government and control of the entire area of Afghanistan. Both sides had put different conditions but the final decision was a compromise between the two after contesting respective stances and allowing space for searching for an aggregated policy decision. The Foreign Office moved away from its stance regarding the establishment of a broad
177 based Afghan government comprised of all Afghan ethnic groups. On the other hand, the military establishment deferred its push of recognition on the fall of Kabul in 1996 till the fall of Mazar-e-Sharif in 1997.
In the backdrop of 9/11 terrorist attacks, Pakistan chose to sever its ties with Taliban after having decided to join the GWOT. Pakistani security establishment was of the view that the US ought to allow some time to pursue Taliban for withdrawing their support to Osama bin Laden before attacking Afghanistan. On the other hand, the Foreign Office was of the view that Pakistan should adopt a “yes-but policy” to cooperate with the US, where “yes” implied okay and “but” implied some commitments from the US. The items at “but” list included resolution of Kashmir issue, economic and security assistance apart from having no negativity for Pakistan‟s nuclear program. But finally “yes” to the US demands was agreed to end Pakistan‟s isolation at the world level owing to the military takeover by Gen. Pervez Musharraf in 1999. Subsequently, the US gave a lot of importance to the Northern Alliance and India could use the Afghan soil against Pakistan. Pakistan had already suffered losses due to the continued drone attacks and also it is suspected that the US supported terrorist activities to malign the religious elements in Pakistan. The Americans are believed to do this because they perceived Pakistan as a perpetrator also, in addition to being a victim. This perpetrator-victim narrative was essentially popularized by Musharraf himself and his supporters from the liberal sections of the society who took 9/11 as an opportunity to put pressure on the Islamists. Musharraf readily agreed with the Americans not only due to the desire for seeking his legitimacy rather he was surrounded with the people who coined the term „moderated emancipation.‟ In the case of supporting the US after 9/11, the bureaucratic politics was played out at the level of Corp Commanders. Both the Foreign Office and ISI had to compromise due to the high level geostrategic tussle surrounding the war on terror.
Decision of joining the QCG was rationalized mainly on account of two factors. First was to check India‟s ever expanding influence at the top of Afghan decisional hierarchy, inculcating the view in the Afghan government to take Pakistan as part of problem rather than as part of solution. The ultimate aim of this maneuver was to isolate Pakistan at the regional level. Secondly, since the disorder created by the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan has been suffering from negative spill-over
178 effects on the turmoil in Afghanistan. In this backdrop, Pakistan Foreign Office was too keen to push for the Afghan peace process but the military had reservations on two accounts. Their first reservation was about the absence of an enabling environment for the pursuance of peace process. The example of the failure of previous such efforts (Murree talks of July 2015) was too recent as these talks were sabotaged by Afghanistan and the US, while breaking the news of Mullah Omer‟s death and killing a senior Taliban commander Mullah Mansur in a drone attack respectively. Secondly, the US itself was not ready to take any onus of keeping Taliban engaged through the accommodation of some of their demands at least like the removal of Taliban leaders‟ names from the UN Sanctions List, stop killing Taliban leadership etc. Instead, the US tried to shift all the responsibility to Pakistan for keeping Taliban on the table. Finally, an aggregated decision was taken i.e. Pakistan would jointly push for the QCG process, making it clear to all the participants that Pakistan alone would not be responsible for bringing Taliban on the table. The interplay of Bureaucratic Politics was very much visible while making the decision of the Taliban regime recognition in 1997 and joining the QCG in 2015, whereas it was only moderately observable while making policy decision for parting ways with Taliban in 2001.
The application of Bureaucratic Politics Model to analyze the foreign policy decision- making process comes across some challenges in developing countries. This is not the non-suitability of the Model itself. The contention in this critical purview is that in comparatively less developed decision-making processes systems beset at the same time with difficulties in accessing these processes for accessing more evidence due to the secrecy, dampens the fuller display of the bureaucratic politics. This study has resorted to key players interviews to corroborate the existing information and collect widely spread pieces of information from open sources to fix the decision-making puzzle. Notwithstanding this challenge, this study has succeeded in establishing that the basic tenants of Bureaucratic Politics Model (entering in a decision game with preconceived ideas, pulling and hauling to squeeze others‟ decision ground and finally reaching to an aggregated/comprised decisional resultants) have a pre-eminent explanatory value in better understanding the major contributory factors towards Pakistan‟s policy interventions to deal with Afghan Taliban from 1996 to 2016.
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Usually, the decisional actors interpret an evolving reality in the realm of future gains pertaining to security, politics and economics in the lead up to the ultimate policy alternatives. They explore the processes and reasons to have a final preferred option for maximization of benefit and minimization of risks. This scrutinization of comparative policy options has an in-built accommodation of decisional players‟ divergent views for reaching finally to an aggregated/compromised decision. Foreign policy decisions analyzed at the individual level help to forecast their impact at unit and system level. Such impact at the individual level can be traced back by employing Bureaucratic Politics Model. Hence, the true identification of such impacts on the crafted policy decision compensates the inability of human beings to anticipate the compounding complexities of future foreign policy trajectories.
Based on the discussions and analysis carried out in this study, it is contend that the bureaucratic politics play a major role in decisional processes for final outcomes. The decision-making prism of Pakistan‟s foreign policy towards Afghanistan was also tilted towards the military establishment due to the ascendency of military establishment and frequent changes of civilian regimes. The military bureaucracy prevailed due to the security imperatives pinned with Afghanistan and dominated policy interventions towards the Afghan Taliban due to its effective „pulling‟ and „hauling.‟ However, the final decisional outcomes have been the result of „integrated‟ outcomes of different bureaucracies; civil and military. The context here is not international relations; it is inter-institutional politics within a state. In other words, the practices of statecraft are very important for a country but on the other hand these practices afford a ground for big power games.
Therefore, institutional policy orientation does make impact on the final outcome of the intended decisions. The interplay of bureaucratic competition/rivalry, the perceptional gaps and realization of ground realities lead to the different dynamics of institutional control over policy outcomes. The role played by individuals in the final decision-making also suggests the overwhelming dominance of a particular organ of the state. Thus, this study hypothesized that bureaucratic politics model is best suited to unravel the secrecy of Pakistan‟s decision-making of its policy towards Afghan Taliban in the realm of three case studies. It has been proved that the Bureaucratic Politics Model did play a considerable role in the final outcome of the decisions
180 where military/security establishment played a major role while the civil bureaucracy remained subdued. However, it is not to suggest that both military and civil bureaucracies were pursuing different national security objectives at the cost of other. Rather, it has been highlighted that the outcome decisions were the same but processing, pushing and hauling, and perceptional orientation vary in the pursuit of vital national security objectives at different times through different means.
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Interview with a security official dealing with Taliban (on the condition of anonymity), held in Islamabad on July 13, 2017.
Interview with a security official dealing with Taliban (on the condition of anonymity), held in Islamabad on November 28, 2017.
Interview with a security official dealing with Taliban (on the condition of anonymity), held in Islamabad on January 23, 2019.
Interview with a senior security official dealing with Taliban (on the condition of anonymity), held in Rawalpindi on February 1, 2018.
Interview with a senior security official dealing with Taliban (on the condition of anonymity), held in Rawalpindi on February 20, 2018.
Interview with a senior security official dealing with Taliban (on the condition of anonymity), held in Rawalpindi on November 28, 2017.
Interview with a senior security official dealing with Taliban (on the condition of anonymity), held in Rawalpindi on November 27, 2018.
Interview with Deputy Director General of Security Establishment (on the condition of anonymity), held in Islamabad, on February 15, 2019.
Interview with Ex-Advisor on Foreign Affairs (on the condition of anonymity), held in Islamabad, on January 3, 2019.
Interview with Ex-Foreign Secretary (on the condition of anonymity), held in Islamabad, on January 11, 2019.
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“The Afghanistan Essay: From Trenches to Table: Waging Peace in Afghanistan” Jinnah Institute Islamabad, January 23, 2018.
MEMOIRES Aziz, Sartaj, Between Dreams and Realities: Some Milestones in Pakistan’s History, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Kasuri, Khurshid Mahmud, Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove: An Insider’s Account of Pakistan’s Foreign Relations including Details of the Kashmir Framework, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2015.
Khan, Gohar Ayub, Glimpses into the Corridors of Power, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007.
Khan, Gohar Ayub, Testing Times as Foreign Minister, Islamabad: Dost Publications, 2009.
Khan, Riaz Mohammad, Afghanistan and Pakistan: Conflict, Extremism and Resistance to Modernity Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Musharraf, Pervez, In the Line of Fire, London: Simon & Schuster, 2006.
Sattar, Abdul, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2012, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013.
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ANNEXURE-1
QUESTIONNAIRE
Strata- 1 (Foreign Ministers)
1. How vital interests of country are incorporated in FP formulation? 2. What were Pakistan‟s vital interests in Afghanistan(as per the respective case study) 3. What is the mode and channel to finalize the policy alternative? 4. What is the mode and channel to get the approval of a foreign policy decision outcome? 5. How foreign office and security establishment work and perform towards the foreign policy decision outcomes? 6. How rigorously an issue or option is discussed at cabinet or PM level? 7. How much input is sought from various institutions other than foreign office and security establishment?
Strata-2 (Civil Bureaucracy)
1. How issues are structured? 2. When the other counterparts are involved in the foreign policy decision making process? 3. What is the mode and frequency of consultative meetings? 4. What is the level of participation of meetings between foreign office and security establishment officers? 5. Is sufficient amount of information shared by other stakeholders before getting into construction of various policy alternatives? 6. How pulling and hauling works to reach the final aggregated policy out comes? 7. How national interests are factored in policy formulation?
Strata- 3 (Security Establishment)
1. How information sharing with foreign office is done? 2. Which prism gets priority to calibrate the likely foreign policy outcomes i.e. political or economic or security? 3. What is the mechanism, frequency and level of interaction with foreign office? 4. How does accommodation of difference (of other participants) for policy alternative work? 5. What kind of stand is given to policy issues i.e. rigid/flexible/accommodative? 6. What determine the participant‟s final stand on the issue? 7. Is the final policy outcome an aggregated decision as compared to the initial stances on that issue?
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ANNEXURE-2 POLITICAL, BUREAUCRATIC AND MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT -1988-2016
Serial Election Prime Tenure Major Parties position Presidents Foreign Foreign COAS DG ISI Remarks Year Minister Ministers Secretary Party Seats 1 1988 Benazir Dec 88- PPPP 94 Ghulam Sahibzada Dr . Gen. Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul Coalition partner Bhutto Aug 90 Ishaq Khan- Yaqoob Hamayun Mirza with Haq Parast -13 Aug 88- Jul Khan Khan Aslam seats 93 Baig IJI 55 Tanvir Lt. Gen. Shamsur Rehman Kallu Total seats- 207 Amjad Khan Independents 37 Other parties 19 2 1990 Nawaz Nov 90- IJI 106 Ghulam Sahibzada Shehar Yar Gen Mirza Lt Gen Asad Durrani Coalition partner - Shairf July 93 Ishaq Khan- Yaqoob M Khan Aslam Haq Parast- 6 Aug 88- Jul Baig 93 PPP 44 Khan- Nov Gen. Asif Lt Gen Javed Nasir Total seats- 207 90-Mar 91 Nawaz Janjua Haq Parast 6 PM Himself Mar 91 – Jul 93 3 1993 Benazir Oct 93- PPP 89 Farooq Khan Aseff Shahryar M. Gen Abdul Lt. Gen. Javed Ashraf Qazi Total seats- 207 Bhutto Nov 96 Leghari- Nov Ahmad Ali Khan Waheed 93-Dec 97 PML(N) 73 Najam Uddin Lt Gen Naseem Rana Sheikh PML(J) 6 4 1997 Nawaz Feb 97- PML(N) 137 Mohammad Gohar Shamshad Gen Lt Gen Naseem Rana Sharif Oct 99 Rafiq Tarar- Ayub Khan Ahmad Jahangir Jan 98- June Karamat 01 PPP 18 Feb 97- Gen Lt Gen Zia Uddin Butt Aug 98 Pervaiz Musharaf Haq Parast 12 Sartaj Aziz ANP 10 Aug 98- Oct 99 Independents 21 5 1999 Gen. Oct 99- Abdul Shamshad Gen Lt Gen Mahmood Ahmad, Lt Gen Military Rule Pervaiz Jun 2002 Sattar- Nov Ahmad, Pervaiz Ehsan Ul Haq Musharaf 99- June 02 Inam- Ul- Musharaf (Chief Haq Executive)
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6 2002 Zafar Nov 02- PML(Q) 126 Gen Pervaiz Khursheed Riaz H Gen Lt Gen Ehsan Ul Haq Assembly seats Ullah June 04 Musharraf- Mehmod Khokhar Pervaiz including directly Jamali June 01-Aug Qasuri Musharaf and indirectly 08 members- 342 Shaukat Aug 04- PPPP 81 Nov 02- Riaz Gen Lt Gen Ashfaq Pervaiz Kiyaini Aziz Nov 07 Nov 07 Mohammad Ashfaq Khan Pervaiz Kiyani MMA 63 Lt Gen Nadeem Taj PML(N) 19 MQM 17 7 2008 Yousaf March PPPP 118 Asif Ali Shah Salman Gen Lt Gen Nadeem Taj Total seats- 342- Raza 08- June Zardari- Sep Mahmood Bashir Ashfaq Direct 271 Gilani 12 08- Sep 13 Qureshi Pervaiz Kiyani Raja June 12- PML(N) 89 March 08- Jalil Abbass Lt Gen Ahmad Shuja Pasha Pervaiz March Feb 11 Jilani Ashraf 13 PML(Q) 60 Hina Lt Gen Zaheer Ul Islam Rabbani Khar MQM 25 July 11- March 13 MMA 8 Independents 30 8 2013 Nawaz June 13- PML(N) 166 Mamnoon Sartaj Jalil Abbas Gen Lt Gen Zaheer Ul Islam Coalition partner Sharif July 17 Husain- Sep Aziz- Jilani Raheel MMA 13- Advisor Sharif Shahid July 17- PPPP 42 June 13- Aizaz Gen Lt Gen Rizwan Akhtar Total Seats 342- Khaqan June 18 Aug 17 Ahmad Qamar Direct 271 Abassi Chaudhry javed Bajwa PTI 35 Khawaja Temina Lt Gen Naveed Mukhtar Asif Janjua MQM 24 Aug 17- April 18 MMA 15 Khurram Dastagir Khan May 18- June 18
KEY ANP - Awami National Party COAS - Chief of Army Staff DG ISI - Director General Inter Services Intelligence IJI - Islami Jamhori Itehad
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MMA - Mutahida Majlis e Amal MQM - Muhajir Qoumi Movement PML (J) - Pakistan Muslim League Junejo PML (N) - Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz PML (Q) - Pakistan Muslim League Quaid-e-Azam PPP - Pakistan People Party PPPP - Pakistan Peoples Party Parliamentarians PTI - Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf
Source: The scholar has compiled the data while consulting https://www.ecp.gov.pk/, http://www.na.gov.pk/en/index.php and other sources.
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MOTION FOR FORMATION OF COMMITTEES
English translation of the above. Committee No: 9 is on foreign affairs. Its members are: Mr. Shah Mahmood Qureshi Sahibzada Ghanzanfar Ali Gul Dr. Zulfiqar Ali Mirza Mirza Mohammad Nasir Baig Mr. Khalid Ahmed Khan Kharal Mr. Ghulaam Mustafa Jataoi Mulana Fazl ur Rehamn Mr. Goher Ayub Khan Sheikh Rashid Ahmed Mian Adbul Wahid
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ANNEXURE-5
GUIDELINES FOR REVISED TERMS OF ENGAGEMENT WITH USA/NATO/ISAF AND GENERAL FOREIGN POLICY
PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
1. Pakistan‟s sovereignty shall not be compromised. The gap between assertion and facts on the ground needs to be qualitatively bridged through effective steps. The relationship with USA should be based on mutual respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of each other.
2. The Government needs to ensure that the principles of an independent foreign policy must be grounded in strict adherence to the Principles of Policy as stated in Article 40 of the Constitution of Pakistan, the UN Charter and observance of international law. The US footprint in Pakistan must be reviewed. This means (i) an immediate cessation of drone attacks inside the territorial borders of Pakistan, (ii) the cessation of infiltration into Pakistani territory on any pretext, including hot pursuit; (iii) Pakistani territory including its air space shall not be used for transportation of arms and ammunition to Afghanistan. 3. Pakistan‟s nuclear program and assets, including its safety and security cannot be compromised. The US-Indo civil nuclear agreement has significantly altered the strategic balance in the region therefore Pakistan should seek from the US and others a similar treatment/facility. The strategic position of Pakistan vis-à-vis India on the subject of FMCT must not be compromised and this principle be kept in view in negotiations on this matter.
4. Pakistan reaffirms its commitment to the elimination of terrorism and combating extremism in pursuance of its national interest.
5. The condemnable and unprovoked NATO/ISAF attack resulting in the martyrdom (shahadat) of 24 Pakistani soldiers, represents a breach of international law and constitutes a blatant violation of Pakistan‟s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Government of Pakistan should seek an unconditional apology from the US for the unprovoked incident dated 25th– 26th November, 2011, in Mohmand Agency in addition the following measures be taken; i) Those held responsible for the Mohmand Agency attack should be brought to justice. ii) Pakistan should be given assurances that such attacks or any other acts impinging on Pakistan‟s sovereignty will not recur.
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iii) Ministry of Defence/PAF should formulate new flying rules for areas contiguous to the border. 6. No verbal Agreement regarding national security shall be entered into by the Government, its Ministries, Divisions, Departments, attached Departments, Autonomous Bodies or other Organizations with any foreign Government or Authority. All such agreements or understandings shall cease to have effect forthwith. 7. No overt or covert operations inside Pakistan shall be permitted. 8. That for negotiating or re-negotiating Agreements/MOU‟s pertaining to or dealing with matters of national security, the following procedure shall be adopted: i) All Agreements/MOU‟s, including military cooperation and logistics, will be circulated to the Foreign Ministry and all concerned Ministries, attached or affiliated Organizations and Departments for their views; ii) All Agreements/MOU‟s will be vetted by the Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs; iii) All Agreements/MOU‟s will be circulated to the Parliamentary Committee on National Security. The Committee shall vet and make recommendations in consultation with the stakeholders and forward the same to the Federal Cabinet for approval under the Rules of Business of the Federal Government; iv) The Minister concerned will make a policy statement on the Agreements/MOU‟s in both Houses of Parliament. 9. No private security contractors and/or intelligence operatives shall be allowed. 10. Pakistan‟s territory will not be provided for the establishment of any foreign bases. 11. The international community should recognize Pakistan‟s colossal human and economic losses and continued suffering due to the war on terror. In the minimum, greater market access of Pakistan‟s exports to the US, NATO countries and global markets should be actively pursued. 12. In the battle for the hearts and minds an inclusive process based on primacy of dialogue and reconciliation should be adopted. Such process must respect local customs, traditions, values and religious beliefs; (a) There is no military solution to the Afghan conflict and efforts must be undertaken to promote a genuine national reconciliation in an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned process. (b) To strengthen security along the Pakistan–Afghanistan border, including the cross border flow of criminal elements, narcotics and weapons, the feasibility of additional measures including electronic surveillance may be evaluated and the process of local joint Jirgas should be encouraged according to local customs and traditions. 13. That Pakistani territory shall not be used for any kind of attacks on other countries and all foreign fighters, if found, shall be expelled from our soil.
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Likewise, Pakistan does not expect the soil of other countries to be used against it. 14. The Government needs to review the present focus of foreign policy keeping in view the aspirations of the people of Pakistan. It needs to establish a balance by emphasizing links with our traditional allies and building new relationships for diversifying the sources of economic, military and political support. In this regard it may take the following amongst other steps: i) Pakistan‟s foreign policy must continue to focus on creating a peaceful environment in the region to pursue the goals of economic development and social progress; ii) the dialogue process with India should be continued in a purposeful and result-oriented manner on the basis of mutual respect and mutual interest, including efforts for the solution of the Jammu & Kashmir dispute in accordance with the UN Resolutions; iii) special attention must continue to be paid to developing close cooperative relations with neighbouring countries; iv) the strategic partnership with China must be deepened in all its dimensions; v) the relationship with the European Union should be strengthened and enhanced in all spheres; vi) relationship with the Russian Federation should be further strengthened; vii) Pakistan‟s support for the promotion of peace and stability in Afghanistan remains the cornerstone of its foreign policy; viii) Pakistan‟s special relationship with the Islamic world should be reinforced; ix) Pakistan‟s full membership of SCO should be actively pursued; x) Pakistan‟s bilateral relationships in the region and its institutional partnership with ASEAN and GCC countries must be upgraded and strengthened; and xi) Pakistan should actively pursue the gas pipeline projects with Iran and Turkmenistan
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ANNEXURE-6
AFGHAN JIHADI GROUPS Hizb-e-Islami (Hekmatyar) The Hizb-e-Islami was one of the most militant hard-line resistance parties. The Hizb-e-Islami was more identified with Gulbaddin Hekmatyar as its founding member. The original Hizb was divided into two major factions, Hizb-e-Islami (Hekmatyar) and Hizb-e-Islami (Khalis). The Hizb‟s support base grew on the dogmatic followers devoted to the party or the peasantry living in extreme poverty. Hekmatyar, a Kharruti Pashtun from the Baghlan province, spent four years with the PDPA before he adopted the radical Islamic politics. He fled to Pakistan with others and founded Hizb-e-Islami and instigated the abortive anti-Daud insurrection in Panjsher in 1975. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) promoted Hekmatyar‟s party. Particularly, the ISI considered Hekmatyar‟s organization and its ideology more compatible with Pakistan‟s security interests.
Jamiat-i-Islami (Burhanuddin Rabbani) The founder of Jamiat-i-Islami was Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, a Tajik, who graduated from Al-Azhar University and taught in Kabul University as Professor of Islamic Law. In 1978, he established the Jamiat-e-Islami. Most of his followers joined it and it soon became the most prominent party of northern Afghanistan. It held special appeal to the Tajiks and other non-Pashtun minority ethnic groups, as well as some Pashtun in the North. The Jamiat‟s influence was greatly enhanced by the exemplary reputation of its commanders in the North; notable among them was Ismael Khan (operating between Herat and Maymana). The party came into limelight when Ahmed Shah Masud launched seven major offences on the Soviets in Panjsher valley from 1980-84 and became a living legend. Later on, Rabbani became the President of Afghanistan but was ousted by the Taliban in October 1996. He then moved to the Panjsher valley, which was the stronghold of Ahmed Shah Masud. Rabbani was killed in a suicide bombing in Kabul on 20 September 2011.
Afghan National Liberation Front (Mujaddadi) The Afghan National Liberation Front was founded by Professor Sibghatullah Mujaddadi, who belongs to one of the most prominent religious families of Afghanistan. Thirty members of his family were executed under the Taraki/Amin regime. He himself was imprisoned under the Daud regime. Another important connection was his association with Al-Azhar University, where he was trained as a theologian. He was later appointed as a Professor of Islamic Law in Kabul University, which was the nursery of many political activist groups. Following the coup, he came to Pakistan and established the Jabba-e-Milli Najat-e-Afghanistan (National Liberation Front). His Party had been described as a moderate, traditionalist and nationalist, which wanted to revise the traditionalist and nationalist, which wanted to revise the traditionalist color of the Afghan Society. After the exit of Najibullah from power, Professor Mujaddadi became the President of Afghanistan, but he faced
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problems right from the beginning and had to step down in favor of Professor Rabbani.
National Islamic Front (Gillani) The Front was closely identified with the image of its founder. Pir Syed Ahmed Gillani, who is a religious leader of international repute in the Muslim world. His followers included many Afghans, especially, the Pashtuns on both sides of the border. Before the 1973 coup, he was a religious advisor of King Zahir Shah. The Front was well organized and effective. Its political orientation had been described as traditionalists, nationalist and moderate, favoring a government incorporating Islamic law and Afghan tradition with a parliament based on free elections.
Islamic Revolutionary Movement (Nabi Mohammadi) The political ideology of the movement engenders a traditional, nationalist dispensation based on Islamic law. Moulvi Mohammadi belonged to the same generation as Professor Mujaddadi or Pir Gillani. Moulvi Mohammadi, a Pashtun, combined religious authority with political experience. He also studied at Al-Azhar University, and established and headed an influential religious academy. He was considered to have a considerable following among tribal leaders and mullahs in Kandahar and Helmand regions. The section of the urban middle class also supported the Movement. In the early 1980s, the movement was a major party, but most of its local commanders in Herat and Faryab joined Rabbani‟s Jamiat-i-Islami. With the passage of time, Professor Rabbani attracted the moderate elements, especially from the Tajik dominated areas.
Hizb-e-Islami (Khalis) Hizb-e-Islami had split into two major factions. One was headed by Hekmatyar and the other by Moulvi Mohammad Yunus Khalis, who is a Pashtun form Nangrahar province, trained as a mullah in the traditional Afghan religious schools and eventually became a university lecturer. The Hizb (Khalis) was considered less radical than some of the other Islamic parties closer to its political orientation to the groups head by Gillani, Mujaddadi and Nabi Mohammadi. The Hizb was tribal based, better organized with influence in strategic areas, though in terms of membership it was smaller than others. The conflict between Hekmatyar and Khalis emerged in 1979. Khalis blamed Hekmatyar for avoiding combat. Throughout the war, Khalis party was well prepared for combat. His own participation in the battlefield added prestige to the Hizb faction.
Ittehad-e-Islami (Sayyaf) Ittehad-e-Islami emerged in 1980. It was headed by Abdul Rashid Sayyaf, a Pashtun, who was also originally a high ranking member of the Muslim Brotherhood, with Hekmatyar as his deputy. The Ittehad was organized on the principle of an Islamic Shura, which envisaged that all power be vested in the religious leadership. Sayyaf speaks fluent Arabic and has an excellent contact with the conservative Arab elite in the Middle East. He was greatly responsible for a steady flow of substantial aid from the Middle Eastern counties to Afghanistan during the period of the Soviet military
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intervention. In the beginning, he joined Hekmatyar to reduce the influence of Khalis and Rabbani in the alliance. However, by 1983, he developed differences with Hekmatyar and finally, he converted the Ittehad into a party.
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ANNEXTURE 7 PESHAWAR PEACE ACCORD
In the Name of Allah, the Most Beneficient, the Most Merciful Salutation and peace be upon the Great Messenger of Allah and his Progeny and Companions. 22.10.1412 (22 Shawal) 24 April 1992
The structure and process for the provisional period of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, was formed as under:
1. It was decided that a 51 persons body, headed by Hazrat Sahib Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, would go inside Afghanistan so that they could take over power from the present rulers of Kabul, completely and without any terms and conditions during the two months period. The head of this body will also represent the Presidentship of the State during these two months. After this period, this body will remain as an interim Islamic Council, along with the Transitional State and its Chairmanship will be held by Hazrat Sahib. The period of this Council, will also be for four (4) months.
2. It was decided that Professor Rabbani will remain as the President of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan and the head of the Leadership Council for four (4) months. He will commence his work officially at the time when the two months of the transfer of power will be elapsed.
3. The above mentioned period will not be extended even by a day.
4. The Prime Minister and other members of the Cabinet will be appointed from the second grade members of the Tanzeemat, on the discretion of the heads of the Tanzeemat.
5. The Prime Ministership was assigned to the Hizb-e-Islami, Afghanistan.
6. The Deputy Prime Ministership and the Ministry of Interior, to Ittehad-e-Islami, Afghanistan.
7. The Deputy Prime Ministership and the Ministry of Education, to Hizb-e-Islami of Maulvi Khalis.
8. The Deputy Prime Ministership and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the National Islamic Front.
9. The Ministry of Defence to Jamiat-e-Islami, Afghanistan.
10. The Supreme Court to Harkat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami Organization.
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11. It was also decided that the Leadership Council, in additional to making the division of appointments in the Ministries, will also determine Ministries for Hizb-e- Wahdat, Shura-e-Etelaf (Council of Coalition) Maulvi Mansoor and other brothers.
12. The total period of this process will be six months. As regards to Transitional Government, the Islamic Council, will make unanimous decision. The period of this Transitional Government will be two (2) years.
Source: INCORE – International Conflict Research Institute
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ANNEXTURE-8
AFGHAN PEACE ACCORD (ISLAMABAD ACCORD) MARCH 1993
Given our submission to the will of Allah Almighty and commitment to seeking guidance from the Holy Quran and Sunnah, Recalling the glorious success of the epic Jehad waged by the valiant Afghan people against foreign occupation, Desirous of ensuring that the fruits of this glorious Jehad bring peace, progress and prosperity for the Afghan people.
Having agreed to bringing armed hostilities to an end, Recognizing the need for a broad-based Islamic Government in which all parties and groups representing all segments of Muslim Afghan society are represented so that the process of political transition can be advanced in an atmosphere of peace, harmony and stability, Committed to the preservation of unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan, Recognizing the urgency of rehabilitation and reconstruction of Afghanistan and of facilitating the return of all Afghan refugees, Committed to promoting peace and security in the region, Responding to the call of Khadim Al- Harmain Al-Sharifain His Majesty King Fahd Bin Abdul Aziz to resolve the differences among Afghan brothers through a peaceful dialogue, Appreciating the constructive role of good offices of Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and his sincere efforts to promote peace and conciliation in Afghanistan, Recognizing the positive support for these efforts extended by the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran, who have sent their Special Envoys for the conciliation talks in Islamabad, Having undertaken intensive intra-Afghan consultations separately and jointly to consolidate the gains of the glorious Jehad.
All the parties and groups concerned have agreed as follows:
To the formation of a Government for a period of 18 months in which President Burhanuddin Rabbani would remain President and Eng. Gulbedin Hikmatyar or his nominee would assume the office of Prime Minister. The powers of the President and Prime Minister and his cabinet which have been formulated through mutual consultations will form part of this Accord and is annexed;
The Cabinet shall be formed by the Prime Minister in consultations with the President, and leaders of Mujahideen Parties within two weeks of the signing of this Accord;
The following electoral process is agreed for implementation in a period of not more than 18 months with effect from 29 December 1992;
(a) The immediate formation of an independent Election Commission by all parties with full powers;
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(b) The Election Commission shall be mandated to hold elections for a Grand Constituent Assembly within eight months from the date of signature of this Accord;
(c) The duly elected Grant Constituent Assembly shall formulate a Constitution under which general elections for the President and the Parliament shall be held within the prescribed period of 18 months mentioned above. A defence Council comprising two members from each party will be set up to, inter alia,
(a) Enable the formation of a national army;
(b) Take possession of heavy weapons from all parties and sources which may be removed from Kabul and other cities and kept out of range to ensure the security of the Capital;
(c) Ensure that all roads in Afghanistan are kept open for normal use;
(d) Ensure that State funds shall not be used to finance private armies or armed retainers;
(e) Ensure that operational control of the armed forces shall be with the Defence Council.
There shall be immediate and unconditional release of all Afghan detainees held by the Government and different parties during the armed hostilities. All public and private buildings, residential areas and properties occupied by different armed groups during the hostilities shall be returned to their original owners. Effective steps shall be taken to facilitate the return of displaced persons to their respective homes and locations.
An All Party Committee shall be constituted to supervise control over the monetary system and currency regulations to keep it in conformity with existing Afghan banking laws and regulations.
A cease-fire shall come into force with immediate effect. After the formation of the Cabinet, there shall be permanent cessation of hostilities.
A Joint Commission comprising representatives of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and of all Afghan parties shall be formed to monitor the cease-fire and cessation of hostilities.
In confirmation of the above Accord the following have affixed their signatures hereunder, on Sunday, 7 March 1993 in Islamabad, Pakistan.
Division of Powers Preamble. The President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan is the Head of State and symbol of unity and solidarity of the country and shall guide the affairs of the State in
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accordance with Islamic laws and the principles laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah.
I. The Prime Minister shall form the Cabinet in consultation with the President and present the same to the President, who shall formally announce the Cabinet and take its oath. The Cabinet shall operate as a team under the leadership of the Prime Minister and shall work on the principle of collective responsibility.
II. The Prime Minister and the Cabinet shall regularly act in close consultation with the President on all important issues.
III. The President and the Prime Minister shall act in consultation with each other and shall try to resolve differences, if any, through mutual discussion. In case any issue remains unresolved, it should be decided by a reference to a joint meeting of the President and the Cabinet.
IV. All major policy decisions shall be made in the Cabinet, to be presided over by the Prime Minister. Ministers, Deputy Ministers and Ministers of State would be individually and collectively responsible for the decisions of the Government.
V. The formal appointment of the Chiefs of the Armed Forces shall be made in accordance with the existing practice and after mutual consultation. Powers of the President
VI. The President shall have the following powers and duties: (a) Appointment of Vice-President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan. (b) Appointment and retirement of judges of the Supreme Court, the Chief Justices, in consultation with the Prime Minister and in accordance with the provisions of the laws. (c) Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the country in the light of the objectives and structure of the Armed Forces of Afghanistan. (d) Declaring war and peace on the advice of the Cabinet or the Parliament. (e) Convening and inaugurating the Parliament according to Rules. (f) Consolidating national unity and upholding the independence, neutrality and the Islamic character of Afghanistan and the interests of all its citizens. (g) Commuting and pardoning of sentences according to the Shariah and the provisions of law. (h) Accrediting heads of Afghanistan‟s diplomatic missions in foreign States, appointing Afghanistan‟s permanent representatives to international organizations according to the normal diplomatic procedures and accepting the letters of credence of foreign diplomatic representatives. (i) Signing laws and ordinances and granting credentials for the conclusion and signing of international treaties in accordance with the provisions of law. (j) The President may, at his discretion, delegate any of his powers to the Vice- President, or to the Prime Minister.
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(k) In the event of the death or resignation of the President, the presidential functions shall be automatically entrusted to the Vice-President, who shall deputize till the new President is elected under the Constitution. (l) Granting formal permission to print money. (m) The President may call an extraordinary meeting of the Cabinet on issues of vital national significance which do not fall in the routine governance of the country. Power of the Prime Minister
VII. The Prime Minister and his Cabinet shall have the following duties and powers: (a) Formulation and implementation of the country‟s domestic and foreign policies in accordance with the provisions and spirit of this Accord and the provisions of law. (b) Administering, coordinating and supervising the affairs of the ministries, and other departments and public bodies and institutions. (c) Rendering executive and administrative decisions in accordance with laws and supervising their implementation. (d) Drafting of laws and formulating rules and regulations. (e) Preparing and controlling the State budget and adopting measures to mobilize resources to reconstruct the economy and establish a viable and stable monetary, financial and fiscal system. (f) Drafting and supervising implementation of the socio-economic and educational plans of the country with a view to establishing a self-reliant Islamic Welfare State. (g) Protecting and promoting the objectives and interests of Afghanistan in the world community and discussing and negotiating foreign treaties, protocols, international agreements and financial arrangements. (h) Adopting measures to ensure public order, peace, security and Islamic morality and to ensure administration of justice through an independent and impartial judiciary.
In confirmation of the above Accord, the following have affixed their signatures hereunder, on Sunday, 7 March 1993 in Islamabad, Pakistan.
Source: INCORE – International Conflict Research Institute
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ANNEXURE-10 CASE STUDY OF PAKISTAN’S POLICY TOWARDS AFGHAN TALIBAN 1996-2016 VIEWS BY LT. GEN. MAHMUD AHMED (RETD) Policy Formulation Paradigm National policy flows from national objectives and goals which are derived from aspirations of the people. Potential of the people combined with the country‟s geography, shape, natural resources and political system define its power potential. The health and strength of a country‟s socio-economic, education, defence and foreign policies depends on its power potential. Besides its natural attributes, a country‟s national policies are also influenced by environment and circumstance prevailing at the regional and global levels.
A country's foreign policy is a set of goals about how the country will work with other countries in such fields as socio-economic, political, trade, defence etc. Collectively the foreign office‟s inter-action with other countries may also be called diplomacy. Foreign policy implies nurturing and promoting national interests while interacting with other countries. Every country decides on the framework of its foreign policy according to its principles; decisions it takes about how and what kind of transactions it would carry out with other nations in times of peace and during hostilities depend entirely on harmony of its national will, aspirations and power potential.
According to Karl von Clausewitz, war is extension of policy through other means. A country resorts to use of war as an instrument of policy when it is unable to achieve its goals through political means. However, history shows that other means of policy do not get suspended entirely during active hostilities. Although military policy gains precedence over other policies in times of war, diplomacy continues to play its part as does trade during war. The military instrument is employed to alter the ground reality in favour of its employer in order to derive desired advantage over the opponent. The aggressor has to weigh carefully the outcome of war vis-a-vis the military resource employed. In case war ends in stalemate, the aggressor is forced to revert to diplomacy at considerable disadvantage. The outcome in such circumstances is compromise solution – if at all. If not then war conues at exorbitant cost with no result in sight – something that we have been witnessing in Afghanistan since December 1979.
Conduct of Pakistan‟s foreign policy concerning Afghanistan has to be seen in the light of the fact that ever since the advent of Soviet forces in December 1979, Afghanistan has been in a constant state of war; withdrawal of Russian forces in February 1989 was followed by years of civil war including US invasion of Afghanistan in January 2001 after Event 9/11.
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In view of the regional ground realities tempered by incessant war, influence of the military in formulation of Pakistan‟s foreign policy was inevitable.
Brief Overview of Pak - Afghanistan Relations King Zahir Shah had been on the Afghan throne for nearly a decade and a half when Pakistan came into being. Being in the Soviet sphere of influence, Afghanistan adopted a hostile attitude towards its new born Muslim neighbor which owing to Pakistan‟s pro-western leanings was regarded by Moscow as a potential ally of its rival bloc. Time and realities of land-locked geography compelled Zahir Shah to change posture and improve relations with Pakistan. However, the realisation came too late. For years the Soviet Union had been doing indoctrinization of Afghan youth with communist ideology to bring Afghanistan permanently under its sway. The outcome of Moscow‟s relentless pursuit to convert Afghanistan was total polarization of Afghan body politic and eventual division in two distinct factions - the urban community which lived in larger cities fell under the grip of communist idealogy, and the rural masses who faithfully clung to their ancient conservative belief in Islam.
In 1973 King Zahir Shah was overthrown by Sardar Daud Khan who was perhaps regarded by Moscow as a more reliable candidate to serve the communist manifesto. Daud also began with antagonism towards Pakistan and an oppressive domestic policy. Persecuted by the state police and the infamous KGB dominated (Afghan intelligence, many young Afghans fled into neighbouring Pakistan. The GOP of the mid-seventies under Z A Bhutto found it expedient to train the recalcitrant Afghan youth in guerrilla tactics in order to return home and organize resistance against the hated pro-communist regime. This may be regarded as an example of covert use of military means as a corollary to foreign policy.
It took Daud five years to see the reality of geo-political compulsions and the utter futility of unfriendly policy towards Pakistan. However, by 1978 Daud had lost credibility with his Soviet masters and was killed in a bloody coup engineered by Moscow bringing in Tarkai as the new Afghan President. Daud‟s assassination precipitated destabilization which eventually forced Soviet military intervention in a bid to retain hold over Afghanistan. At this stage internal turmoil and volatility of the situation precluded pursuit of normal foreign policy by Islamabad. In 1979, Tarkai was killed and Hafizullah Amin took over as President. After a few months Amin was executed and Babrak Karmal became the President. In December 1979 Soviet troops entered Afghanistan in support of the titular Karmal. In 1986 Babral Karmal was replaced by Dr Najib Ullah.
With Soviet Union fully entangled in the Afghan imbroglio, the US found it opportune to enter the conflict in support of the Afghan Mujahideen the outcome of which is well known history. Pakistan‟s contiguity dragged it into the fray.
The question which needs pondering is what policy would Pakistan have pursued if the US had stayed out of the Russo-Afghan Conflict. In all probability Islamabad
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would have been obliged to deal with a Soviet backed Kabul in the same way as Pakistan is practicing diplomacy with a US backed Kabul nowadays.
As mentioned above, the military instrument is employed to alter the political situation to the advantage of its user. However, if the use of military instrument fails to bring about the desired change in the ground situation, the aggressor is then forced to revert to diplomacy with considerable loss of advantage for the reason that losses on the battlefield cannot be recovered on the negotiating table. In Afghanistan, we have seen completion of such a cycle of events. In October 2001 the US used the military instrument to oust Mullah Omar‟s Taliban regime in order to install a compliant puppet regime of their choice. But fifteen years later Washington has had to resort to swallow its pride and resort to diplomacy to open negotiations with the same Taliban they had declared terrorists at time of invasion in 2001.
Question & Answers Q.1 Was there any input from MI to Foreign Office (FO) with regard to recognition of Taliban Regime in 1997? A.1 I don‟t remember any such input given from MI to FO during my tenure as DGMI. The MI Dte does not deal directly with the foreign office.
Q.2 How did Taliban emerge? A.2 Incessant civil war and complete breakdown of society catapulted Mullah Omar and his followers (Taliban) into prominence and later acceptance as representative government of the majority people.
Post 9/11 Policy Decision Making Processes Q.3 Gen Musharraf has written, “Our Director General Inter- Services Intelligence, who happened to be in Washington told me on the phone about his meeting with the US Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage. In what has to be the most undiplomatic statement ever made, Armitage added to what Colin Powell had said to me. He told the director general not only that we had to decide whether we were with America or with the terrorists, but that if we choose the terrorists, then we be prepared to be bombed back to the stone age” In The Line of Fire, A Memoir by General Pervez Musharraf , page 201. Did it happen this way?
A.3 a. Not entirely! Armitage could not have “…..added to what Colin Powell had said…..” because the US Deputy Secretary of State met me before Gen Colin Powell spoke to Gen Musharraf. b. I went on an official visit to the US from 2 to 10 September 2001. My visit had to be extended by a day to be able to attend a meeting with Congressman Porter Goss, Senator Bob Graham and Senator Jon Kyl at 8 o‟clock in the morning on 11 September. However, the catastrophe called Event 9/11 turned the world upside down in more than one way. For example right up to 8 Sep 2001, we (Pakistan) were running after the US trying to undo the negative
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effects of Pressler‟s Amendment; suddenly after 9/11 we were in great demand and the US was after us (Pakistan) to help them against terrorists! b. Though I was in the US on invitation of the CIA, my seven days trip was really a follow up of earlier visits that year by our Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar and Foreign Secretary Inam. The purpose of their visits was to improve bi-lateral relations and seek modification if not total withdrawal of Pressler‟s Amendment which was causing problems. It was in this context that during the first week of September 2001 I met with several second or third tier US govt officials in the State and Defense Departments, and the Pentagon. A meeting with Condoleezza Rice, at that time National Security Advisor, was also scheduled but she called it off at the last minute when I arrived at her office. Altogether it had been an unfruitful week during which though our team and I were received with lot of courtesy and many promises by the Americans but in the end there was nothing solid I could take back to Pakistan. c. Disaster struck in the morning on Monday 11 September when two planes crashed into the WTC towers and something also hit the Pentagon. Unfortunate and tragic though it was, Pakistan was suddenly in great demand by the US. After the calamity I met with nearly all the US officials I had met before Event 9/11. They all made renewed promises to help Pakistan. d. On his request I had two meetings with Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage in his office, the first on 12th and the second on 13th September 2011. e. Our group comprised Ambassador Maliha Lodhi, her Political Assistant Zamir Akram and our two military attaches Brig Mujtaba (outgoing) and Brig Mazhar (incoming). Richard Armitage was accompanied by a group of his staff officials. In the first meeting with Armitage on 12 September 2001, the US Deputy Secretary of State explained the crisis US was facing and requested Pakistan‟s help against terrorism. I found it opportune to vent our woes and complaints about US past treatment of Pakistan. I pointed out to him the unreliability of the US behavior towards Pakistan since our creation and the hostile feelings and their negative policies had engendered against the US among our people at home. Armitage assured us that the US would „open a new page‟ of relationship with Pakistan and that henceforth things between Pak–US would be positively different. f. The meeting on 12 Sep 2001 did not end entirely to the satisfaction of the US Deputy Secretary of State and so we met again on 13 September during which he handed me a paper with their requirements which I handed over to our Ambassador there and then in his presence. The requirements were routine and there was no demand at that time of any air bases etc in Pakistan. After the meeting I briefed Gen Musharraf about the meeting from our Ambassador‟s office on the secure telephone. g. Comments on A-3. The entire business with Armitage was a foreign policy subject and should have been conducted between the US State Department and our Ambassador in Washington DC. But since the US enterprise had
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military implications, and the fact that GOP was headed by our COAS, the US govt saw it fit to deal through the DGISI who happened to be in America at that critical time. Hence my point that ENVIRONMENT and EXPEDIENCY shape and influence decision making in foreign policy. j. Comments on ‘Bombing into Stone-age’. After our meeting with Armitage on 12 September, Ambassador Lodhi suggested that we should meet Senator Joe Biden (later Vice President with Obama). The Senator had uttered very negative remarks about Pakistan on one of the TV shows on 11 September evening. When our group met him, he was very hospitable and even apologetic about his remarks which he later retracted in another TV show that very evening on 12 September. During the meeting, Senator Biden said that members of the US govt were so angry about Event 9/11 that “….. they are even talking about using „nucs‟ against them!” I asked who he meant by “them” to which he promptly replied, “The Afghans of course”. No threat was sounded to us by any US official at that time; in fact their attitude was to „win‟ our support in what President Bush later termed war against terror. k. I was still in the US when Gen Colin Powel, US Secretary of State and perhaps President Bush opened direct channels with Gen Musharraf over the telephone. In other words, Event 9/11 had immediately transformed America‟s attitude of distant coldness into warm friendliness – something that our Foreign Secretary Inam, Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar and I had vainly tried to achieve during our respective visits. On return to Pakistan on 15 September 2001, I briefed Gen Musharraf in details about my whole visit including the discussions with the CIA, and also about the inter-action with all the officials of the US govt whom I had met before and after Event 9/11. Both Washinton DC and London were now in regular contact with Islamabad and our govt relished their show of „good will‟ and „solid support‟. However, the euphoria of American affable overtures began to evaporate with ever-growing US demands of tangible support from Pakistan for their war effort inside Afghanistan. Military failures in the field against the Taliban added to American frustration which was vented by blaming Pakistan of duplicity. Confronted on the one hand with ever increasing American demands to „do more‟, and on the other by growing unpopularity at home coupled with Pakistani intelligentsia‟s relentlessly seeking explanation of Islamabad‟s acquiescence, Gen Musharraf found it expedient to render his version as quoted by you in Q-3 above. It may be recalled that when Gen Musharraf mentioned „bombing into stone-age‟ on the lawns of the White House during his September 2006 visit to the US, Armitage strongly denied having made any remarks to this effect.
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Q.4 As DG ISI what was the frequency of meeting with General Musharraf? A.4 Very frequent when the situation demanded but routine during periods of normalcy.
Q.5 Who all have been attending meetings in the Presidency with regard to foreign policy decision about Afghan Taliban? A.5 Foreign Office officials, selected members of the cabinet and selected senior military officers.
Q.6 Whose idea was it to convince Taliban to abandoning Osama bin Laden? A.6 The US had been demanding his extradition ever since Osama bin Laden had arrived in Afghanistan from Sudan. The American govt had pronounced him guilty of bombing their embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. Event 9/11 was also linked with bin Laden which the US used as pretext to attack Afghanistan. It was in this context that we convinced Mullah Omar to give him up. Q.7 How was the above effort undertaken and what was the outcome?
Please see attached two pages of US Embassy Islamabad dated 24 September 2001 addressed to their State Dept. Relevant text is underline in RED. This document is illustrative of the situation just before the US bombardment began on 7 October 2001. It also throws light on our efforts to dissuade US using the military instrument in Afghanistan. Wendy Chamberlin, the author of this document was US Ambassador to Pakistan at that time.
A.7 a. The first effort was made by a group of scholars of our Islamic institutions who went to Kandhar in September 2001 and met Mullah Omar but to no avail. b. I made several trips to Afghanistan after Event 9/11. The main subject of my meetings with Mullah Omar was always Osama bin Laden, both before and after 9/11. It was always about the latter‟s expulsion from Afghanistan. Mullah Omar‟s consistent reply was that he had given his word to Osama and that handing over a Muslim to any non-Muslim authority was sacrilege. c. In my very last visit to Afghanistan which was during the first week of October 2001, I had a detailed discussion with Mullah Omar about Osama bin Laden‟s expulsion. I pointed out the imminence of US attack on Afghanistan and the absolute necessity of expelling Osama to avert the onslaught. I also tried to convince Mullah Omar to set free some foreigners belonging to an international organization called „Shelter Now‟ who had been confined in Kabul allegedly for espionage. He did not respond to the issue of the „Shelter Now‟ detainees but said that he could not hand over Osama to any non- Muslim authority, a factor he insisted I too knew as a Muslim. d. I put to him that prayers is a Muslim worship which is not excused even on deathbed. He agreed. “But what if a snake approaches while you are in the midst of prayers?” I said. “Well, you abandon your prayers and deal with the
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danger first and then resume your prayers,” he replied. I then asked, “Don‟t you see this „gigantic anaconda‟ approaching Afghanistan? As Amir (leader) of 25 million Afghans, is your oath of hospitality to Osama more sacrosanct than protection of your people?” He thought for a while and then said the Afghan Shura (Supreme Consultative Body) was to assemble in Kabul on the following day and that I should discuss the matter with them. I pointed out that the Shura would not be prepared to meet me without his express instructions. He acquiesced and gave the necessary instructions. So I flew from Kandhar to Kabul the following morning to meet the Afghan Shura. During my meeting with the Afghan Shura in Kabul, I applied the same logic I had employed with Mullah Omar in Kandhar. I was not particularly surprised when the Shura agreed with my point of view. e. Next day the Afghan Shura issued a statement to the effect that Osama was free to leave Afghanistan of his own free will. Bin Laden‟s departure from Afghanistan would have removed the main reason of American attacking Afghanistan. Therefore Afghan Shura‟s momentous announcement went „unnoticed‟ in the West.
Q.8 What was Pakistan‟s vital interest in Afghanistan after 9/11 changed scenario? A-8: a. Pakistan‟s vital interest has always been a peaceful, pro-Pakistan and a friendly Afghanistan. In September 2001 it was prevention of US invasion through diplomatic means which needless to say failed. b. The US used Event 9/11 as a justifiable cassus belli to declare war „on terror‟ and invade Afghanistan for reasons different from those stated. Pakistan did not have any potent means of averting the inevitable war which became a certainty with each passing day after 11 September 2001. We tried with our best during the second half of September 2001 to persuade the US not to attack Afghanistan. The American armada sailed nevertheless to the Persian Gulf from where both their strategic objectives, Iraq and Afghanistan were within easy striking range. In less than a month after the Event 9/11, USAF began bombardment of a hapless war ravaged prostrate Afghanistan. The bombardment lasted three months. In January 2002 the forces of Northern Alliance of Afghanistan backed by US forces swept across the devastated country. The Taliban simply melted away into the ravines of the rugged and inaccessible Hindukush Mountains from where they would fight the foreign invader as their ancestors had done some years before, first against the British and then the Russians. c. Pakistan was left with no option but to adjust to the new reality in the region – US military presence in Afghanistan.
Q.9 There is an impression that you had inclinations towards Taliban (Afghanistan and Pakistan, book by Riaz Muhammad Khan, page 85)? A.9 a. ISI is not an autonomous organization which can ever evolve or implement its own policy – foreign or domestic. It is part and parcel of
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Pakistan‟s military system and as such subject to national policy. Since 1947 every Pakistani govt has had to deal with whoever was ruling Afghanistan. Perusal of our short history will bear this out. In 1999 Afghanistan was being ruled by Taliban led by Mullah Omar. Pakistan was among the only three countries which had recognized Taliban govt. b. Our inclination was based on ground realities and our national interest and not on mere religious sentiments or ethnic ties. Taliban represented almost fifty percent of the Afghan population. Taliban came to power with widespread popular appeal among the masses; three-fourths of Afghanistan including such major towns as Kabul, Kandhar, Jalalabad, Ghazni, Farah and Herat went over to the Taliban without any fighting at all. Fighting raged north of Kabul at the mouth of Panjshir valley held by Ahmed Shah Masood and around Mazar-i-Sharif. By 1998, Talib govt controlled 27 out of the 31 provinces of their country where there was peace, law and order and poppy cultivation brought down to zero. c. Dealing with Taliban govt was Pakistan‟s strategic compulsion even before the Event 9/11. When the Taliban govt was ousted by the US invasion and a new govt was established in Afghanistan, Islamabad had no choice but to do „business‟ with Karzai and later with Ashraf Ghani. If the Taliban return to power in Afghanistan which is very likely, then Pakistan‟s foreign office and perhaps even the ISI will again have to deal with the Taliban!
Q.10 ISI justified its actions as stemming from fear of an Indian-controlled NA government in Kabul after the overthrow of the Taliban. It also did not want to totally abandon the Taliban, its only proxy in Afghanistan (Descent into Chaos, book by Ahmed Rashid, page 78). How for is this true? A.10 Not true. Taliban were NOT our proxy! Taliban are indigenous ethnic Afghans who rose from the turmoil which prevailed in their country after the Soviet withdrawal in Feb 1989 and the civil war which raged thereafter. As regards „ISI fears of an Indian controlled NA govt‟, the Afghan govt‟s attitude since January 2002 and the military operations Pak Army has had to undertake in KPK justifies ISI‟s assessment of the time.
Q.11 Will US ever leave Afghanistan? If not, then what policy options Pakistan has? A.11 a. Will the US Leave? The US is not likely to leave Afghanistan until there is a radical change of policy in Washington DC. American interests in the region are influenced by their desire to establish New World Order which plainly means absolute domination of the world. Stranglehold over ME oil reserves ensures American hegemony; presence in Afghanistan gives them control over mineral resources of the CARs and a strategic geo-political position vis- à-vis Iran, China, Pakistan and India – the latter three being nuclear countries. American military presence in Afghanistan also enables Washinton to keep the China-Pak Economic Corridor under close scrutiny. West Asia is the arena
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for the current superpower struggle and US bases in Afghanistan are of dangerous proximity to the entire region. b. Policy Options for Pakistan (1) Political stability promotes economic activity which engenders foreign investment which in turn adds to national health and strength. A healthy nation attracts friends and it can then pursue foreign policy which averts threats and enhances its role in regional and global politics. (2) A politically unstable country divided within is weak and therefore has no options other than those dictated by the powerful. (3) Pakistan‟s inclusion in the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) in 2015 to support the Afghan peace processes has been more as a result of military impasse inside Afghanistan than any diplomatic skill on our part. There are ground realities inside Afghanistan which have forced the third super power (first two being Britain and Russia) to revert to the negotiation table. Pakistan‟s vital interest still remains peaceful and friendly govt in Kabul. If Allah has turned the table in our favour, we must not squander the advantage because of our internal political instability and indecisiveness.
By Lt Gen Mahmud (Retd) Lahore, 24 March 2018
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Annexure - 11
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ANNEXURE - 12
------PAKISTAN / ISI ------6. "U.S. ANNOYANCE," editorial in August 1 centrist HINDUSTAN Hindi daily: "CIA Deputy Director Stephen R. Kappes confronted Pakistan officials with evidences about the ISI's links with terror groups in the north-western tribal areas during his Pakistan-visit. It is the first time that U.S. has demonstrated a hard line against the ISI. It seems that ISI's suspected role in the NATO troops' fight against terrorists in Afghanistan has crossed the limits of the U.S. endurance... Intelligence agencies in a democratic country are under civilian control, but the ISI in Pakistan follows the army's orders. The religious fanatics, created by Pakistan at one time to uproot the pro - Russian government in Afghanistan and create turmoil in India, have now become a headache for it. If Pakistan still does not learn a lesson, the situation will further degenerate." https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08NEWDELHI2126_a.html
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Annexure - 13
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