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Research Thesis – International Relations in Historical Perspective The development of India and Pakistan’s nuclear strategy What are the security implications of India and Pakistan’s development of their nuclear strategy? Thomas Hardeman 5552184 22 August 2020 Thomas Hardeman India and Pakistan’s nuclear strategy IRHP 2020 “There lies the port; the vessel puffs her sail: There gloom the dark, broad seas. Come, my friends, ’Tis not too late to seek a newer world. It may be that the gulfs will wash us down: It may be we shall touch the Happy Isles, And see the great Achilles, whom we knew.” Alfred Lord Tennyson, Ulysses Keith ‘Steve’ Skelding, 1930–2020 1 Thomas Hardeman India and Pakistan’s nuclear strategy IRHP 2020 Contents Abstract .................................................................................................................................................. 3 Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................ 4 Maps ....................................................................................................................................................... 5 Glossary .................................................................................................................................................. 8 Abbreviations ....................................................................................................................................... 10 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 12 Chapter 1 – Academic Discussion ......................................................................................................... 17 Chapter 2 – Theoretical Framework ..................................................................................................... 21 Chapter 3 – Historical context .............................................................................................................. 28 Chapter 4 – Pakistani nuclear doctrine ................................................................................................ 35 Chapter 5 – Pakistan’s nuclear command-and-control system ............................................................ 42 Chapter 6 – India’s nuclear doctrine .................................................................................................... 52 Chapter 7 – Indian nuclear command-and-control system .................................................................. 60 Chapter 8 – Conclusions ....................................................................................................................... 69 Bibliography .......................................................................................................................................... 76 2 Thomas Hardeman India and Pakistan’s nuclear strategy IRHP 2020 Abstract This thesis seeks to answer the question: How has India and Pakistan’s nuclear strategy development changed the security environment in South Asia? By applying a constructivist approach to this problem, this thesis challenges the dominant neorealist discourse on nuclear deterrence. By researching the nuclear command-and-control structure of India and Pakistan, instead of nuclear doctrine, this thesis has produced the following conclusions. Pakistan’s nuclear posture continues to inhibit India’s ability to compel Pakistan, raising the risk of nuclear escalation. India and Pakistan are horizontally developing their nuclear forces, raising the cost of nuclear escalation. India and Pakistan’s nuclear command-and control measures are respectively trending more towards positive control, or are already positive control-oriented, increasing the risk of unwanted nuclear use. India and Pakistan are vertically developing their nuclear forces as well, expanding their capabilities to include tactical nuclear weapons and sea-based missiles, thus lowering the threshold for nuclear use. This thesis finds that the development of India and Pakistan’s nuclear posture has opened up new avenues for a crisis to escalate to the nuclear level, and increased the number of nuclear missiles that would be involved. 3 Thomas Hardeman India and Pakistan’s nuclear strategy IRHP 2020 Acknowledgements First of all, I would like to thank my thesis supervisors dr. Frank Gerits and dr. Steffen Rimner for their feedback, their encouragement but most importantly, their patience with me. The late-night emails, nonsensical chapters and missed deadlines could have worn any person down and caused them to give up on me. I am immensely grateful that they did not do so. I would also like to thank Jelle Besselsen, Raquel MacDonald, Karina Urbanaviciute, Gerjanne Hoek and others for their academic feedback and assistance during the process. You have improved my thesis and made me a better scholar. Additional thanks go to my mother Jill and Hans, my father Rob, Maurits de Baar, Mark Pabai, Ranki Oberoi, and my oma Joan. In trying to reach for the stars, I stand on your shoulders. I dedicate my thesis to my Opa, Keith ‘Steve’ Skelding, who sadly passed away on the 6th of August. Opa, I already miss you. Though I am proud that I can present my complete thesis to the reader, I know that it is just as much the credit of the wonderful people mentioned above that I am able to do so. I have not always envisioned myself in this position, and yet I am now able to present my work of the past year. 4 Thomas Hardeman India and Pakistan’s nuclear strategy IRHP 2020 Image 1 - United Nations cartographic map of South Asia 5 Thomas Hardeman India and Pakistan’s nuclear strategy IRHP 2020 Image 2 - United Nations cartographic map of India 6 Thomas Hardeman India and Pakistan’s nuclear strategy IRHP 2020 Image 3 - United Nations cartographic map of Pakistan 7 Thomas Hardeman India and Pakistan’s nuclear strategy IRHP 2020 Glossary Term Definition Assertive command-and-control A nuclear C2 system that prioritises negative control Assured retaliation posture Nuclear strategy which aims to deter nuclear attack by using its nuclear capability Asymmetric escalation posture Nuclear strategy which aims to deter conventional attack using its nuclear capability Asymmetric warfare Warfare in which low-intensity tactics and strategies are used against a conventionally superior adversary Bharatiya Janata Party Political party in India, currently in government. Right-wing, Hindu nationalist party. Canisterised missiles Missiles which are pre-mated to their delivery vehicle Catalytic posture Nuclear strategy which aims to catalyse a third-party to intervene on its behalf, using its nuclear capability Chain of command The way (military) orders travel from the commanding authority to the executing unit Cold Start Indian strike plan, developed to strike Pakistan if necessary Command-and-control structure How a state chooses to operationalise its nuclear strategy through its nuclear force deployment, its command structure, and its command-and-control measures Compellence Forcing another to carry out a desired action. Antonym of deterrence Constructivism IR theory which places an emphasis on the social structures that govern the interests of all actors. Conventional weapons Non-nuclear weapons Decapitation When a nuclear strike eliminates all commanding authorities of a state, so that said state’s capacity for retaliation is destroyed Delegative command-and-control A nuclear C2 system that prioritises positive control Delivery vehicle The way a nuclear device gets to its destination when launched. Could be a missile or an airplane. Deterrence Forcing another to refrain from an undesired action. Antonym of compellence Dual-use missile A missile which can be loaded with a nuclear or conventional payload Fissile material Material capable of sustaining a nuclear fission chain reaction. Nuclear weapons need fissile material to work Highly enriched Uranium (HEU) Uranium with a high concentration of 235U, which makes it suitable for use in nuclear weapons Indian National Congress Indian political party, currently in opposition. Centre-left, secular party. Inter-Services Intelligence Pakistani intelligence service. Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) Pakistani-based Jihadist terror group. Aims to secede Kashmir from India and is responsible for several terrorist attacks in India, including the 2001 Parliament attack. Jammu and Kashmir Indian union territory which is disputed by Pakistan. Centre of Kashmir insurgency 8 Thomas Hardeman India and Pakistan’s nuclear strategy IRHP 2020 Kashmir Geographical region in South Asia which is divided in Indian, Pakistani and Chinese parts. All three claim another’s territory Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) Pakistani-based Jihadist terror group. Aims to secede Kashmir from India and is responsible for several terrorist attacks in India, including the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Minimum credible deterrence Key principle of Indian nuclear doctrine which states that India will develop a limited amount of nuclear weapons to credibly deter its adversaries Negative control Command-and-control measures designed to prevent unwanted use of a state’s nuclear weapons Neorealism IR theory which is emphasises the role of the state as a rational actor in an anarchic world system No-first-use (NFU) Key principle of Indian nuclear doctrine which states that India shall not use its nuclear weapons first in a conflict Nuclear doctrine What states say about the way they use their nuclear
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