NUCLEAR LEARNING IN SOUTH ASIA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO INDIA-PAKISTAN CRISES BEHAVIOR A thesis submitted to the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES by SANNIA ABDULLAH DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES QUAID-I-AZAM UNIVERSITY ISLAMABAD-PAKISTAN JULY 2015 i ii DECLARATION The PhD thesis “NUCLEAR LEARNING IN SOUTH ASIA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO INDIA-PAKISTAN CRISES BEHAVIOR”is based on the original research. No part of the thesis is copied or plagiarized; all sources are properly documented as per the guidance provided by the QAU/HEC. Sannia Abdullah Islamabad July 27, 2015 iii Dedicated to a mentor and friend, Dr. Nazir Hussain with special thanks for his support and guidance iv CONTENTS ABSTRACT viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ix ABBREVIATIONS x LIST OF TABLES/FIGURES xiv INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER 1: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 22 1.1. Nuclear Weapons and International Debate 1.2. International Relations Theory: Learning and Military Crises 1.3. Conceptualizing Nuclear Learning 1.3.1. Operationalizing the term ‘Learning’ in International Relations 1.3.2. Defining the Concept of Nuclear Learning 1.3.3. Who Learns?: Levels of Analyses Approach 1.3.4. Nuclear Learning and State Behavior 1.4. Nuclear Learning and Strategic Culture 1.5. Cognitive Dissonance and the Concept of Nuclear Learning 1.6. “Simple vs. Complex Learning” and Crisis Instability 1.7. Relationship between Nuclear Learning and Stable Nuclear Deterrence CHAPTER 2: NUCLEAR DECISION MAKING AS A DRIVER OF NUCLEAR LEARNING 44 2.1. Nuclear Learning between US and Soviet Union 2.1.1. Areas of Strong Mutual Learning 2.1.2. Areas of Weak Learning 2.2. Nuclear Learning between India and Pakistan 2.2.1. Major Drivers of Nuclear Learning in South Asia 2.2.2. Nuclear Decision-Making in South Asia 2.2.3. Nuclear Ambivalence: From Nehru to Gandhi 2.2.4. Buddha Smiles Again in May 1998 2.2.5. India’s Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) 2.3. Pakistan’s Nuclear Decision-Making 2.3.1. The Changing Nuclear Discourse and the Dawn of ‘Nuclear Nationalism’ in Pakistan 2.3.2. Role of Military in Nuclear Decision-Making 2.3.3. The Genesis of National Command Authority and Birth of SPD: 1999-2001 2.3.4. Evolution and Development of Command and Control Systems v CHAPTER 3: NUCLEAR LEARNING AND CRISIS INSTABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA 80 3.1. Possible Attack on Pakistan’s Nuclear Installations (1984-85) 3.2. Militarization of Siachen Glacier (1984) 3.3. Brasstacks (1986-87) 3.4. The 1990 Crisis 3.5. The Kargil War (1999) 3.6. 2001-02 Military Standoff 3.7. The A.Q Khan’s Proliferation Crisis 3.8. Mumbai Crisis 2008 CHAPTER 4: DOCTRINAL ASYMMETRIES AND STRATEGIC ARMS RACE: IMPLICATIONS FOR NUCLEAR LEARNING IN SOUTH ASIA109 4.1. India-Pakistan Doctrinal Asymmetry: Comparing the Postulates 4.1.1. Outcomes of Doctrinal Asymmetry 4.1.2. Nuclear Stockpiles Competition in South Asia 4.1.3. Missile Arms Race 4.1.4. Technological Spin-off: Tactical Nuclear Weapons, BMD and MIRVs 4.2. Evolving New Security Doctrines under Nuclear Overhang 4.2.1. India’s Proactive Military Operation Strategy: Revival of Limited War under Nuclear Shadow 4.2.2. Sub-Conventional War Trends in Nuclear South Asia 4.3. Assured Second Strike Capability and South Asian Learning Curve 4.4. Integrating Technological Arms Race into Existing Framework of C2 4.5. Implications for Nuclear Learning CHAPTER 5: CONFIDENCE BUILDING/NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION MEASURES: INDIA-PAKISTAN MILITARY CRISES 131 5.1. The Efficacy of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) 5.1.1. History of India-Pakistan CBMs/Bilateral Agreements 5.2. Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures 5.3. Contrasting Patterns of Nuclear Learning and Fate of Regional Proposals 5.3.1. South Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone 5.3.2. Strategic Restraint Regime Proposal: Caveats and Concerns 5.3.3. CBMs on Kashmir and Bane for Nuclear Learning 5.4. Common Challenges and Joint Approach: Prospects of CBMs/Arms Control CHAPTER 6:FACTORS DETERMINING SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR UNLEARNING IN THE POST-1998 ERA 147 6.1. Domestic Level 6.1.1. Civil-Military Relations in India and Nuclear Learning 6.1.2.Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan and Nuclear Learning 6.1.3. Domestic Hurdles in Pakistan (Post 1998) 6.2. The Policy of Jihadism and State Learning vi 6.3. The OBL Episode and Pakistan’s Response: Complacency vs Incompetence Dilemma 6.4. Regional Level 6.4.1. Post-Withdrawal Afghanistan: A battlefield of Conflicting Interests 6.4.2. Pakistan-China Cooperation: Another Determinant of South Asian Nuclear Learning Curve 6.5. International Level 6.5.1. U.S. Sanctions and Pakistan Strategic Culture: Learning under Stress 6.5.2. US-India Strategic Cooperation (2005) CHAPTER 7: NUCLEAR LEARNING IN SOUTH ASIA: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES 173 7.1. Nuclear Learning in the Next Decade 7.1.1. Role of Track II/ Back Channel Diplomacy 7.1.2. Overcoming Risk-Aversive Civil-Military Establishment 7.1.3. The Need for Institutional Reforms 7.1.4. Delinking South Asian Nuclear Dimensions for Regional Politics 7.2. Challenges to Nuclear Learning in South Asia 7.2.1. Geo-Politics and Alliances: Role of Perceptions in State Learning 7.2.2. Technological Determination and Policy Implications: Gap in State Learning CONCLUSION 190 BIBLIOGRAPHY 198 ANNEXURES 216 I Flowchart of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) II Bilateral Agreements/CBMS between India and Pakistan and Military Crises III Memorandum of Understanding [Lahore MoU] IV India-Pakistan Missile Inventory V Nuclear Related Bilateral Agreements/Conventions Treaties Signed between India and Pakistan VI Proposed Regional Initiatives between India and Pakistan vii ABSTRACT South Asia’s strategic stability is embroiled with deep rooted trust deficit, technological arms race, sub-conventional war trends and evolving doctrines. In the absence of sustainable dialogue process, the strategic anxieties of both India and Pakistan have consolidated into aggressive force postures leaving little room for shared learning. Instead of forging grounds to seek resolution to the bilateral disputes (complex learning), both states have adapted new means to pursue their existing state policies (simple learning). The drivers of nuclear learning in South Asia are primarily assessed at three levels of analyses i.e. individual, organizational level which directly affects the third tier i.e. the state level. Over the years, the state institutions in two countries have evolved following parochial interests eventually giving birth to rigid organizational cultures. Moreover, the idiosyncratic role of key decision makers remained vital in determining the military crises in both pre and post-1998 eras. Each military crisis is different in its backdrop, occurrence and termination from its preceding event. The reason being, each military crisis taught different lessons to either state, subject to different interpretations drawn by the decision makers on both sides. Hence, unlearning at the individual level is responsible for shaping a peculiar strategic culture of South Asia promoting crisis instability. It is important to explore the factors determining crisis behavior in the region while the two states have operationalized their deterrent capabilities and pursuing assured second strike pathways. Ideally, the acquisition of nuclear weapons should have inculcated enough confidence in both states to transform their ‘enduring rivalry’into a new relationship having greater credence on nuclear deterrence. In reality, both states have used nuclear shield to pursue their existing state practices thus, complicating deterrence stability in the region (stability-instability paradox).The study analyses the lag in nuclear learning as a determinant of crisis instability. One of the key levels of analysis is the individual level reiterating the role of strong personalities operating at different tiers of decision making remained involved in crises eruption. Interestingly, the ‘culture of secrecy’that shrouded in the development of nuclear programs of both the countries is eventually found a key factor for confining the nuclear decision making circle. This explains the inconsistent policies and risk prone behavior as a direct outcome of nuclear unlearning by the state due to incompetent judgment of the individuals facing security paranoia and organizational pathologies in the concerned bureaucracies. The recurrence of military crises is explained through the prism of nuclear learning, constructivism and cognitive dissonance in shaping a strategic culture conducive for crisis instability. viii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Completion of this doctoral dissertation was only possible with the astounding support, sincere guidance, consistent encouragement and scholarly contribution of my supervisor Dr. Nazir Hussain. A person with an amicable and optimistic disposition, he spared his valuable time to clarify my doubts despite his busy schedules. I consider myself fortunate to do my doctoral thesis under his guidance and learnt from his research expertise; he supported me in every possible way to see the completion of my research work. I owe my gratitude to Feroz Hassan Khan for his valuable guidance, feedback and support in conducting my research. My work was greatly facilitated by intellectually stimulating environment provided by Middlebury Institute of International Studies (MIIS) and Center of Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) with which I was associated as a visiting fellow. I extend word of thanks