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ORGANIZATION OJ ORGANISATION DE L'l.JNITE AFRICAN UNITY. AFRICAINE Secretariat Secretariat I'. O. Box 3243 B. P. 3243 •· Addis Ababa ..~ 441 ..ri.>t

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS CM/~03 (PART I) Twenty-First Ordinary Session Addis Ababa - May 1973

ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR Tll:E LIBEful.'HON OF AFRICA (COMMITTEE OF SEVENTEEN)

REPORT OF THE 21ST ORDINARY SESSION OF THE C.0-0RDINATINci------­ COMMITTEE FOR THE LIBERATION OF AFRICA TO THE 20TH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

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ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR THE LIBffiATION OF .Al!'.EUCA (COMMITTEE OF SEYENTEEN).

REPORT OF THE 21ST ORDINARY SESSION OF THE CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR THE LIBffi.ATION OF AFRICA Ki THE 20TH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL OF MINIST:ERS

This report covers the period between the 20th Ordinary Session whioh was held in Kampala, Uganda, in May 1972, and the 21st Ordina~. Session which took place in .Accra, Ghana from 8; - 12 .. Janua?y. 1973; ,- 2. At its 21st Session, the Committee which was fully "&t~ed by all.its 17 Members, examined in detail the activities of liberation movements as well as the developm.ent of the liberation struggle as a whole. It also considered the reports of the Standing Committee on Policy and Information, Defence, Finance a~d .Administration,

3, The Inaugural Session of the meeting was addressed by the Chairman of the National Redemption Council and Head of State of the Republic of Ghana, His Ex:cellency Colonel I, K. Acheampong, the out-going Chairman of the Committee, His Ex:oellency Mr. Wanume Kibedi, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Uganda and also by the .Administrative Secretary-General of the 0.AU, H.E, Mr. Nzo Ekangaki.

4, The Commissioner for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Ghana, N.E. Major Kwame Baah, was elected Chairman of the 21st Session while the following were elected Vice-Chairman: His the Eiccellency, Mr. Celestin Goma-F~utou, Minister Plenipotentiary of Republic of Congo and His Ex:cellency, Ambassador Taieb Bouszza of Morocco. The .Ambassador of Nigeria to Ethiopia, H. E. Mr. Olu Sanu was elected Rapporteur to be assisted by a Drafting Committee comprising Libya, Senegal, Zambia and Ethiopia.

I expressed its satisfaction with ~he political 5, The Committee , I and diplomatic victories soared by the African Group at 'the United Nations in securing United Nations observer status for some of the liberation movements and for its success on the inscription of the Comoro Islands as a dependent territory and was also privileged to CM/503 (PART I)

Page 2 be addressed by the Chairman of the United Nations Special Committee on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Territories (Committee of 24), the Chairman of the United Nations Committee on Apartheid and the President of the UN Council for Namibia who attended as speoial observ­ ers, Also attending as observers were representatives from the Gambia, Mali, Tunisia, following countries: Lesotho, Kenya, Gabon 1 Upper Volta, Sierra Leone, Togo, Sudan, Liberia and Burundi. It should also be noted that this was the.first Ordinary Session of the Committee since the increase in 1ts membership from ~leven to seventeen.

6. In a· general review of the liberation struggle in both West and Southern Africa, the Committee noted with satisfaction the / remarkable progress made by the freedom fighters both in the poli tioaJ. and military fields, Of particular significance has been the military achievement ma~e by P.A.I.G.C. in Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, the FRELIMO in Mozambique as well as the liberation movements operating in Angola,

P.A.I.G.C.:" (Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde)

7, During the period under review both regional and national elections were held by the P.A.I.G.C. in the liberated areas of Guinea­ Bissau and Cape Verde in a bid to pave the way for the proclamation of the territory as an l.ndependent and sovereign state in the very near future. The elections, which were a spectacular political achievement, were concluded on the 14th of October 1972. Regional elections _were held and those elected as members of the Regional Assemblies then returned 120 members to the National Assembly to work out the programme for declaration of an Independent State of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde.

8. In the military field, the P.A.I.G.C. made successive gains and intensified its operation on various fronts, Thus for example, in June and July 1972, the P.A,I.G.C. foroes successfully attacked fortified enemy posts and camps ira Kebn and Cabedu in the Southern front. In August 1972, P.A.I.G,C. forces also successfully carried out several military operations in the towns of Catio, in the south, and Bafata, in the Ell.st-Central of Guinea-Bissau. During the same period, however, Portugal intensified her pre-mediated policy of intimidation and oppression against some OAU Member-States bordering CM/503 (Part I) , Page 3

Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. The air space of the Republics of Guinea and Senegal were freq~ently violated. Notwithstanding the ';rutal repressive acts of Portugal in Cape Verde, the P.A.r:G:c. is still carrying out political mobilisation and underground ·activi tie.s in the ii.lands.

9. The Committee weloomed the plans being made by the P:A;I.G.c. leadership to proolaim Guinea-Bissa~ an independent sovereign S]ite and of the appeal made by its leader for recognition of the new

State and of the P.A.I.G.C. as its legitimate representatives~ 'l'll.e leader of the P.A.I.G.C., Dr. Amiloar Cabral, promised to unfold his party's timetable to OAU Member-States when the time was ripe

and to solicit their financial and moral ~upport at the crucial time.

10. The Committee after considering the appeal of P.A.I.G.C. decided that the case of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde merited priority treatment. It was felt t!lat m.aximum assistance, both financ:i,al as well as material, should be aocorded to PAIGC to enable that movement . I to execute its program~e for the launching of a new severeign arid independent State.

FRELIMO: (Mozambique) 11. One of the most important and· significant developments in Mozambique has been the opening of a new front by FRELIMO in the Central and strategic Province of Mani ca· e Sofala. FRELIMO forces also continued to operate South of the Zambezi along Rhodesian and · ,Maliawi borders. DJ.ring. the period under review, a delegation from the Executive Se_.,retariat, ~,.mprising the Executive Secretary, the Assistant Executive Seeretary for Defence, and two others, visited liberated areas in Mozambique and has reported:-

that the armed struggle in Mozambique was making satisfactory progress, that FRELIM0 1 s military strategy was sound, that FRELIMO enjoys tho f,ull support and confidence of the people in the liberated areas and that although the enemy still maintained air superiority CM/503 (PART I)

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FR:ELIMO was nevertheless'in full command of the situation on the ground. The report of the OAU Mission to both Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau are submitted as separate ' documents,

12. Sinoe·in the present circum8tances it would be necess~y for FRELIMO to consolidate its activities in the liberated areas, recruit more cadres and equip itself with more arms, ammunition, military equipment as well as non-military equipment like foodstuff clothing, medicine, school materials and the necessary funds, the requests submitted by the movement for both material and fightiag assistance were sympathetically considered l>y the Committee. As a result, the monthly allocation for foodstuff to FRELIMO has been increased.

M,P,t.A, and F.N.L.A, (Angola):

13. The successful effo~ts .made by the Foreign Ministers of Zambia, Zaire, Tanzania and Congo, to uni.te the two liberation movements of Angola (M.P.L.A. and F.'N.L.A.) were highly commended by the Committee, The Committee e:irpressed the hope that such an example would' soon be emulated b<' the other liberA.tion movements. The Committee took note of the efforts being made by the leaders of the two liberation movements of Angola to consolidate their union and to establish a Unified Military Command,

ZIMBABWE: 14. The Committee regretted that the Joint Military Command which was expected to be established between the two Zimbabwean Liberation Movements (ZANU and ZAPU) had not yet materialized, In order to effect the necessary unification between the two inoviements the Committee decided to establish an Ad Hoc Committee comprising Zambia, Cameroon, Ghana, Tanzania and Kenya to mediate between ZANU and ZAPU and report to the next As~embly of Heads of State and Government. The Ad Hoc Committee was invited to endeavour to bring about unity between the two liberation movements - ZANU and·ZAPU , and to assist them establish a firm united organisation. Failiqg to come together within the next CM/503 (PART I)

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six months, the Committee would have to reoonsider its position with regard to the two movements,

15, With regard to FROLIZI, the Committee took note of the views expressed by the Zambian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs to the effeot that the Movement was non-existent in reality. It was therefore deoided that FROLIZI cadres should be merged into the ZilJ'fJ/ as a ZANU Joint Milit~y Command. All forms of assistance to FROLIZI movement were to be discontinued forthwith. Only FROLIZI cadres who ' are willing to fight in Zimbabwe under the direction of the Joint Military Command would henceforth be provided for by the Ex:ecutive Secretariat,

16. The Committee took note of the increase in the tempo of the armed struggle in Zimbabwe as a result of which the illegal regime of Ian Smith has resolved to impose an economic blockade against the Republic of Zambia. The Committee however pledges its full solidarity with the Government and people of, Zambia in their endeavour to maintain their sovereignty and economic integrity. The Committee, also commended Zambia for not yielding to economic black-mail. A communique issued in this re~pect by the Committee is attached as Annex I,

SWAPO (Namibia):-

1 7,' While continuing its undergr~und and mobilisation work inside the country, SWAPO has been carrying out sabotage operations in the Northern and ])J,stern regions of Namibia (Okavange/Caprivi Strip),

A.N.C. and P.A.C. (South Africa):- 18. The poor level of activities being carried out by the two liberation movements the A.N.C. and the P.A.C. has been most discouraging. Whilst the P.A.C. attributed its failures to inadequate support from the Liberation Committee, the representative of the A,N,C, I stated that his O:r,ganization was trying to· build-up a political organization which would gradually develop into an armed struggle. ------

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19. The Committee decided to re-activate the Sub-Committee comprising Zambia and Tanzania and assisted by the Ececutive Secretariat, to assist the PAC and A.N.C. reach an agreement on the formation of a united front,

UNITY MOVl!Ml!NT OF SOUTH AFRICA:-

20, The Committee felt that the activities of the U.M,S,A. were not sufficiently effective or satis.factory as to merit recognition of that movement by the OAU.

S,P,U.P. (Seychelles):-

21, The Committee. expressed appreciation of the stJ.Oategi•. geographical position which the i"\land-'l._ pons ti tutine the- ~4hl>l.1e.i.. now oocupy especially following the set-back suffered by the WesteYn imperialist powers in Malagasy. Full support.and sympathy was expressed for the efforts being made by the S.P.U,P. which is the only ' ' lilo=a.i>ict1 · movement_.advaoail'48' ·indeyerul.enoe £or .the.. Seychelles'•

22, The Committee therefore deoide~ to grant :formal reoognit:i.~n to the S,P,U.P. in the hope that the movement would be enhanced in its ·-·- en•i'eavours for the liberation of that ter~i tory frdm foreign colonial ··r ' domination.

MOLINACO ( Comoro) :-

_,. 23 1 .The Committe~··expressed great satisfaction with the pol~tioal development in the Comoro !~lands following' the landslide ,. victory" of' the Pro,-Independence Coalition Party.· The Committee'was . ' , privileged to if~ten 'to· representative of the MOLINACO ~~ th~ plan~ .. , ' being made by the Pro~Independenoe Coalition Group to organise a s'.emin.ax'.-at whicli'a'strategy for the struggle for total independence would be)

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- (So-called French Somaliland) - (Djibouti):- F.L,C.S. and L.M.D, , ' 24. The Cammi ttee observed.' that President Pompidou of Franoe was soon to undertake a state visit to the so-called French Somaliland (Djibouti). , Due note was taken of the financial grant of £7,500 made to each of the two movem~nts (F.L.C.S. and L.M.D.) for the purpose of conducting a campaign to mobilise the people during the French President's visit to 'that territory. The two movements were however requested to submit to the next Session of the Committee a detailed report on the results of their campaign as well as a detailed account of how the special grant had been utilised. The Committee decided to send a telegram to President Pompidou expressing the hope that he will consider the case of the independence of that territory during hi&~.

M.L.S.T,P. (San Tome and Principe):-,

25. After listening to the petition submitted by the represent-, ative of the M.L;S, T. P. seeking for recognition of his movement by the OAU to enable it to re-activate the liberation struggle in that Portuguese territory of San Tome and Principe, the'Committee decided to recognise the movement.

26. The requests of liberation movements for assistance as ' contained in the report of the Standing O:immi ttee on Defence, have been approved as part of the 1973/74 Budget. (See Annex IV).

A NEW STMTIDY FOR 'l'HE,LIB:ERATION STRUGGLE;,.-

27. The Committee aooepted the prop~sal made by the Standing

Committee on Defenc~ that aftElI' ten years of armed struggle, it was now • desirable that new ways and means should be devise,d by which the libera- tion struggle could be further enhanced. The Committee decided to set up an Ad-Hoo Committee 'to examine a paper submitted by the Standing Committee on Defence on a review of the policy towards the liberation struggle with a view to developing a new strategy and new priorities. Some highlights of the new strategy inolude:- (i) Training of oadres in independent African States; (ii) Eliuoational and Technical training facilities for

liberation m~vements in Africa; CM/503 (PART I)

Page 8 ' (iii) Closer oontacts between the fighting cadres and

the OAU Mili·~ary Ex:perts; (iv) Aggressive information and propaganda service; (v) Member-States. should endeavolir to meet their o::iligations by paying their arrears o.jt cohtribution . towards the Speoial, Fu.nd. To this end the Chairman of the Libera·cion Cammi ttee should undertake trips to African countries to take up the matter with them; (vi) The Liberation Cammi ttee and its J!kecutive Secretariat should endeavour to bring about unity among the libera­ tion movemen·bs in order to oonsti-tute united fronts in all areas engaged in the liberation struggle.

The Accra Declaration on the new·strategy for the libera• tion s-trugg:te. ~a ..a.ttached_.as .. .Annex II of this Report,

28. One of the basio suggestions in the strategy was that a Cammi ttee headed by the Chairman of the Liberation Commi·btee should make contacts with the outside world particularly the non-aligned nations, the Scandinavian countr~.es and the 'l'lcialist countries which h1we sustained the ·armed struggle tb~c·ough the material, and financial aid made available to the liberation movements. However this suggestion caused prolonged' discussion as to whether the Organisation should embark on missions which would entail exorbitant expenditure. It was decided that no firm deeisions should be taken until the Council of Ministers had taken a closer look at the matter.

PROMOTION OF PROPAGANDA MACHINERY FOR THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE :-

29. The Cammi ttee a.eaided that a detailed plan for the promo­ tion of qn effective propaganda machinery should be worked out by the Ex:ecutive Secretariat. Iq this regard, the Ex:ecutive 'secretariat could make good use of OAU Regional Offices as well as African Diplomatic Missions abroad. with a view to enlisting their assistance in the disse­ mination of information and propaganda on the liberation struggle.

INFDRMATION SERVICE ;-

30, The Committee deoided that the question· of establishing . ' Intelligence Service in the Ex:eoutive Secretariat should be more CM/503 (PART I) ' Page 9

thoroughly studied before being presented to the Committee for further consideration.• Meanwhile expenses in respect of day-to-day information services could be met from the Special Fund. The Committee emphasised the importance of information and propaganda services and as such the urgency of. establishment of effective machinery to ca:rry out .... this task,

EXECUTIVE SJ[)REI'ARIAT 31 •. The Committee felt that matters of indiscipline, incompetence or inefficiency in the Ex:ecutive Secreta:riat should, in the final anal;y<>ia, be handled by the Ex:ecutive S

APFDINTMENT OF A NEW .EJXJiJJUTIVE SEJ'.:RE!'ARY :

32. The Committee w~loomed the appointment of Major Hashim Mbi ta, by the President of Tanzania, as the new Ex:eoutive Secreta:ry of the Liberation Committee in succession to Mr. George Magombe.

ALLOCATION OF DUTIES TO THE ASSISTANT l!XECUTIVE SEJ::REI'ARIES:

33, The Committee took note of the report of the Standing Committee on Administration and Finance, It was however felt that allocation of depa:rtmental duties by the Ex:ecutive S~creta:ry should take into consideration the qualifications and experience of the Assistant Ex:ecutive Secreta:ries, •

FIRST OAU ALL-AFRICA TRADE FAIR 34, The Committee took note of the over-expenditure incurred in respect of the pa:rticipation of liberation mwements at the First All-Africa Trade Fair and the fact that all bills have been settled.' The Committee's ratification of the over-expenditure should, however await the audit report being prepa:red by the General Secretariat, for Advisory Cammi ttee ozi. Budgeta:ry and Financial Matters, submission t'o the . ' on the accounts of the Liberation Committee. /

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RENOVATION OF THE MAIN OFFICE BUII,DING OF THE .EXEJUTIVE SIOCJRErARIAT

35, The Committee took note of the steps being taken to obtain tenders with cheaper quotations for the re-oonstruotion and repair of the old Secretariat Office building in Dar es Sala.am.

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTl!RS - MANAGEMENT OF JJUNJ)S :

36. On the ques·tion of the signing of the Cheq_ues of the Committee's funds, the Committee'deoides as follows :-

GJ!Nl!RAL ]UN]) (a) As regards the management of the General Fund the co-signatories to .the cheques shall be the Assistant Ex:ecutive Secretary in Charge of Administ:r-ation ,. and Finance,, and the Accountant, in conformity with the , practice which obtains in the General-Secretariat of the

OAU. The Ex:ecutive, Secretary. shall, however, be a reserve signatory in the ev·ent of the absence from post of either of the two principal signatories,

SP ElJ IAL ]UN]) (b)· For the management of the Special Fund, the Ex:ecutive Secretary and the Assistant Ex:eoutive Secretary (Administra,tion and Finance) shall be the sole signatories of cheques drawn from this, fund •

. CONSIDERATION OF THE DRAFT "RULES OF PROCEDURE 37, The Draft Rules of Procedure drawn up by the Sub-Committee set ~p for the purpose by the Standing Committee on Administration and Finance, was presented to the Committee by the Ececutive Secretariat, The Committee however, decided to defer the examination and discussion of the same to the next Session. .,

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APPOINTMJNT OF MILITARY EiCPERTS :

38. The Committee approved the budget proposed for Military Ex:perts as contained in Annex III. It decides to postpone discussion. of the re-appraisal of its policy on the mode of their appointment, functions and geographical distribution until the next Session.

PROPOSED BUDGE!' - SP:ElJIAL FUND 1973/74

39, The Committee approved the budget of the Special Fund as contained in Annex IV.

The Committee decided to maintain the status quo with regard to the budgetary appropriations for the 1973/74 financial yea:r but that future budgetary appropriations should take, into account the list of priorities set out in the newly-devised strategy and the \udgets submitted by the liberation movements.

I CONTINUED ISRAELI AGGRESSION AGAINST THE ARAB REPU13LIC OF IDYPT :

40. The Committee unanimously adopted a communique on the .continued Israeli aggression against the Arab Republic of Egypt and pledged its full support for and solidarity with the Egyptian·, people in their legitimate struggle to recover totally their occupied territory and to maintain by all means their territorial integrity. Text of communique is attached as Annex V.

VENUE OF NEX:T MEEI'ING 41. The Committee accepted with appreciation the invitation extended by the Somali Government through its Secretary of State, H.E.·Mr. Jalle Omar Arteh, to hold its next Ordinary Session in • Mog,,cisoio •

CLOSING CEREMONY: 42, The 21st. Ordinary Session was formally closed by His

Ex:oellenoy the Chairman of the National Redemption Co~noil and Head of State of the Republic of Ghana, Col. I.K. Acheampong and the Chair­ man of the Liberation Committee, H.E.· The Commissioner for Foreign Affairs; Major Kwame Baah, The Committee has taken note with thanks the offer of increased assistance by the Government of Ghana to libera­

tion movements in various fields including ~he establishment of an Information Centre for the +iberation struggle, Fund-Raising Campaigneto, MOTION OF THANKS: 43, A motion of thanks was moved by H.E. The Foreign Minister of the United Republio'of Tanzania, Hon. John Malecela, on behalf of the members of the Liberation Committee. 1 ~oOo-- / CM/503(Part I) _'INNEJC I •

ORGANIZ~TION OF AFRICAN UNITY CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR THE LIBERATION OF AFRICA

COMMUNIQUE ON THE LIBERATION CO!VJMITTEE 1 S PL.EDGE OF SOLIDARITY WITH ZAMBIA

The Orga.nization of African Unity's Liberation. Committee, holding ' its 21st Regular Session in Africa, Ghana, has learnt with great disgust

and indignation the d~sperate, attempts being made by the illegal racist minority r~gime cf Ian Smith to intimidate the heroic people of Zambia by economic strangulation into abandoning their support for the freedom­ lo-ving people of Zimbabwe.

The Committee wishes to express its full support for and solidarity with the Governm~nt a.nd people of Zambia in.their determination ·to maintai.n their sovereignty and economic integrity.

The Committee notes with great satisfey.ction the forthri~ht and

prompt declaration of soli~arity with and support for Zambia made by the G!i1J,naian Head of State and Chairman of the National Redemp,tion Council, His Excellency Colonel I. K, Acheampong, and calls upon all ' ' African States to rally round Zambia at this orucial time to def·eat the forces of oppression, imperialism, racism and colonialism, The action of the illegal regime of Ian Smith is an indication of the state of panic which the gallant freedom fighters have caused by their recent offensive,' The Committee calls upon these m·,vements to uni ta, • re-double their effort and intensify the struggle until Zimbabwe is free, It'also pledges the fighting forces its continuing support, b9th moral and material until total victory is won. )

ACCRA, GHANA, 10th January, 1973, / CM/503 (Part I.. ) ;\.nnex II Appendix I

21ST REGULAR SESSION ACCRA, GHANA

8 - 13 JANUARY, 1973

THE ACCRA DECLARA'l'ION ON THE NEW STRATEGY FOR THE LIBERATION OF AFRICA.

1. The OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, meeting in Accra, Ghana from January 8 - 13, 1973 has made a serious evaluation of the situation prevailing in the African T,1rritories sillr under foreign domination, This appraisal was made in the light of the experience gained in the last ten years since the launching of the Committee for the purpose of co-ordinating the struggle of the African people languishing under colonial and racist domination.

2 In so doing the Committee took note of the progress as well as the setbacks. In the light of its experience, the Committee is determined to draw the right conclusions and plan its work in a more dynamic way o.. for the purpose cf not only consolidating the gains so far achieved by the 1 Lberation mr;vements but also to intensify assistance to the struggling brethren so as to secure greater victories and move decisively towards the final elimination of colonialism and racism from our Continent.

3. Convinced of the commitment of the OAU Members States to the total liberation of the Continent, the Liberation Committee believes that this commitment should be matched with a more determined·concrete action, It is regrettably true that the total assistance so far provided to the 1 :'.beration movements by the African States is very negligible compared to the totality of aid received by these movements outside our Continent, If, as we rightly maintain, our Continent cannot c.laim complete freedom unless every single inch of its soil is liberated, then it is our duty and responsibility to fully, unequivocally and collectively meet our obligations to the struggle, C'!IJ/503 (Part I) I .lj.nnex II Appendix I

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4. While taking note of the progress made in several. theatres of war by the national l~beration.m1vements, particularly in Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, lliozambique rend Ang9la, we must admit that this progress is far frOfl! being commensura·he with Africats potential, We have to recognise 'that there have been a number of obstacles impeding the progress towards liberation, We are quite aware o.f the ~assive support that the enemies of Afrioan freedom - the raoist and colonial regimes received from their principal al~ies - some major Western·powers, But we would be shirking our responsibilities if we were merely contented with lamentations of ' this unholy alliance or, attributing all our setbacks to the viciousness of the enemy. We boldly accept our own responsibilities for lack of proper, concerted and effective action to confront tile onslaught of imperialism and reaction. As This Committee therefore enters the second d.ecade of supporting the armed struggle heorically being waged by the liberation movements, it is incumbent upon us to reevaluate the whole situation and devise more effective actions to meet the challenge imposed on Africa's freedom and dignity.

5. The Organiza·hion of Afrioan Unity oannot be accused of failing to explore all possible avenues towards a peaceful solution to the lib'eration problems, The Lusaka Manifesto which has been treated with contempt by the minority racist authorities in Southern Africa, is a living testimony of free Africa's desire to avoid bloodshed wherever and whenever possible. There is 'not a shadow of doubt that the liberation of most of the Afrioan T.arritories under foreign domination can only be achieved through armed struggle as clearly recognised by the Mogadiscio Declaration. Support for the armed struggle, of our, brothers is therefore the clarion call •.

6. The armed struggle in the T irritories under folleign domination has reached an advanced and crucial stage, ·Nationalist forces have inflicted severe defe~ts on the enem;y, liberated large areas a~d have extended the struggle to new regions and military fronts, The exigencies of the armed struggle hav~ become greater and so have the needs of active liberation movements increased in volume and quality. It is also evident that the evolution of the s~ruggle, the extension of war zones, the ever-increasing - CM/503 (Fart I ) .'l.nnO''= I:( Appendi~ I Page 3• •

build-up and aggressiveness of the enemy have created a new situation which makes it imperative for the liberation m~vements to be properly provided with the resources to meet the new situation, and with the necessary equipment to effectively contain and overcome the supremacy in weaponry which the enemy enjoys.

THE ROLE OF THE AFRICAN STATES:

1.. While the responsibility of carrying ~n the armed struggle remai·ns that of :the liberation m:ivements, free Ai'rica's role is no less crucial. The intensification of' such a st~ggle presupposes the avail­ ability of appropriate resources at the disposal of the liberation

movements. The OAU members must accept the responsibilities or pro~itiJ:lg and, where necessary; mobilising for these resourcos. It is regrettable to note that a number of States are still in arrears in their contribu­ tions to the Special Fund. All OAU embers must· now fulfil their commitments and pay without undue delay their outstanding dues. This is the minimum that we can do if we are determined to re-invigorate the liberation struggle. To achieve this goal, the Committee has mandated its current Chairman, to d esigna·te one or two Foreign Ministers, who would lacoompany him with senior officials of' the General Secretariat and the Executive Secretariat, to visit all those member oountries which have not paid their contributions or arrears. This mission shall make a personal plea to the Heads of State or Government requesting the settiement of the dues. The Committee earnestly hopes that all such' dues would have been paid at the time of the commemeration of the Tenth Anniversary of the Organization of African Unity.

8. The Committee also strongly recommended that the decisions of the ' Rabat Summit Conference, requesting Member States to make additional ·voluntary material and financial assistance to the liberation movements, be implemented without delay as such assistance is a must in the current situation. ' CM/503 (Part I) Annex II

Appendix I I Page 4· I I

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It was _further recoml)lended that Member States should as a matter of urgency, provide training facilities for the cadres of the l.tberation m:>vements in conformity with their needs and reg_uirements. '.!'his training which should as far as possible be extensively provided by the African States in a position to do so, would constitute the additional contribution of those Member _States to the liberation struggle. In this context, concrets programmes indicating specific number of cadres, should be periodically drawn by the liberation movements in conjuction with the Liberation Cammi ttee ·and in conformity with their ne,eds. / 10, Taking into account the desperate, and aggressive policies pursued by the olonial regimes against ·independent African States due to the reverses that these regimes suffe,r in their oolonies, the Committee firmly recommended that African States be collectively prepared to assist thes-e States in overcoming all economic and milit~ry aggressions~ The current economic blockade perpetrated by the racist regime of Ian Smith and the colonial regimes in s0uthern Africa against Zambia is a case in point. By the very J:lature of the struggle now.going on in s?uthern Africa and ' ·Guinea-Bissau, and Cape Verde, free Africa must be eg_uipped to meet any eventuality.

11. But Africa's total commitment to the struggle can only be properly ensured by a firm and dedicated commitment of its people. The need must therefore, be stressed to mobilise the African masses and in particular the youths and students so as to inculcate in them a greater sense of awareness of the struggle now intensifying, The Committee called for the maximum utilisation of the broadcasting and other mass media of communication for the attainment of this singular objective. Governments of all Member States are reg_uested to provide all possible assistance,.

THE ROLE OF THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS:

12. The supreme and decisive role of the l:\beration m?Vements in the struggle cannot be put to question, In the final analysis, it is they and they alone who are responsible for the progress or lack of progress in the liberation struggle. ' CM/~03 (ps_~:i;) .Annex II .1l.ppen

r

13. In evaluating the performance of the. Liberation Movements in this decade of the struggle, the ::.2.beration Committee noted with satis­ faction the generally serious and d<3dicated ::iatur•' of these Movements, They paid partioular tribute ";o tl'.J :.iberation 111ovements of Angola, ' Duinea.-Bissau and Capo Verds and Mozambique, '!'hoy especially welcomed. the r84>oncilia~ion b:itween· the M.P.L,A. and the F,N,L.A. which step is bound to have a positive effect en the strug~le in Angola1 In the· , same vein, the Committee no'ted with profound regrets and concern that this unity of purpose and action does not exist in other liberation wav.emell't6- of Zimbabwe and ·South .ilfrica.

14, ~he Committee called upon all liberation movement& to play fully• th.air J:'OlG by increasing thGil' Gfforte and activities and &tre.ngt.b.enitie '. their o:ffensive through the creation of conditions of ineeourity for the ellSmies, Experience has demonstrated that the liberation of one territory can never be won by two rival movements fighting ag":inst each other or separately, With this background in mind, the Liberation Committee is all the more disturbed by the ,dissension and, at times, petty rivalry that seem to permeate these m'Jvements ma.king the ob.jective of a united front a S

15. In order to meet the demands of.the second decade of the armed struggle, the Liberation Committee has resolved not to acquiesce to any further dissension or bickering i,n these liberation ra.ovements and among them, It has also resolved to energetically oppose any proliferation ' of splinter groups. To this end, the Committee firmly resolve~ to be guided in its future actions and policies by an overriding principle, that of grani;ing recognition and assistance only to "Fronts" which are politically and militarily united and which can provide evidence of effective operation within the country, While appealing once again to the said l :.beration movements to forge the necessary united fronts, the Committee decided if this appeal is unheeled, to reconsider its position on the m<>vements at its next Session, . il.t the same time, the Liberation Committee nppealed to all Member States of the OJ1U not to provide· encouragement and assistance to splinter organizations,

I CM/503 (Part I) %nnex,I+_ Append:i;x:. I Page 6

16. In its evaluation of the perf~rmance of the Liberation Movements and also the present phase of the struggle in the different areas, the Committee agreed on a set 'of priorities pertaining to the manner of providing assistance to the m·,vements, The Committee

18. In the context of t'he new strategy and in view of the announcement made by PAIGC to the effect that the People's National Assembly shall be invited to proclaim the existence of a State of Guinea Bissau to be er.dewed with executive organs which will meet inside the country and request international recognition, the Committee deems it necessary ' for the OAU to lend every necessary support for the consolidation of the State of Guinea Bissau and for the full realization of the objectives set forth by PAIGC. CM/503 (Part I) .Annex n; \ _Appendi;x: I Page 7

The Role of the Executive Secretariat:

19, The role of the Executive Secretariat is important and essential to the effective pursuit of the struggle. The need to strengthen the institutional structure of the Executive Secretariat to enhance its capacity to respond effectively to the urgent needs of the next phase of the liberation struggle was recognised by the Liberation Committee. The Liberation Committee stressed the importance for the· Executive Secretariat of fulfilling the functional role of an action orientated organ with sufficient fJ.exibility for fulfilling efficiently its task of co~o:i-dination.

International Action:

20, The African States have consistently appealed for the 1.1.Ddar- standing sympathy and support of the international community for the -Oause of African Liberation, They have directed numerous appeals particularly to the Western countries and more so to those principal allies and supporters of the colonial and racist regimes in Africa, These appeals have twice been made at the highest level of the Organization of African Unity,

The Committee took note of·the fact that in some oases the appeals have been,favourably responded to while in others they have fallen in deaf ears. In the latter case, Portugal, for example, continues to enjoy massive economic, political and military aid from some of her IrATO allies, This aid makes the African struggle more difficult,

21. Faced with this situation, the Liberation Committee is convinced of the imperative need to maximise international moral, political diplomatic and material support, This support must be solicited f~om all sympathetic sources as well as from international institutions in particular the United Nations family.

22. The Committee resolved that direct approaches be made to States ' , ae well as institutions be directly approached to obtain maximum concrete assistance, with special emphasis on arms and equipment, CM/503 (Part I) Annex II Appendix I I:age 8

The Committee resolved to work in close co-ordination with all UN of bodies dealing with decolonization and apartheid for the purpose 'r launching a ooncerted international campaign in support of the liberation struggle. and isolating the racist and colonial regimes in Africa, The Cammi ttee also agr.eed to request all OAU Member States to use their membership in both the United Nations and· its affiliated· bodies to urge for the provision of assistance by the specialised JLgencies to the :L.iberation movements - more so in the ·liberated areas.

23, To obtain such assistance, the Committee decided to despatoh miss;ions:

(1) to tho So~ialist. oountries currently assis~ing,the

liberation struggle including China and the USSR 1 for the purpose of solioiting greater material assistanoe to the liberation movements,

.. · (2) to the Non-Alligned countries as a follow-up of the decisions taken by the Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Georgetown, Guyana, in August 1972 pledging to support the liberation movements,

(3) t·o other sympathetio oountries in particular the Scandinavian countries in search of humanitarian and financial assistance,

24. These ~issions are to be led by the Chairman of the 21st Session of the Committee and assisted by one or two Ministers to be nominated by him with the Committee's approval 'and accompanied by senior represen­ tatives .of the OAU General.and Executive Secretariats,

• CONCLUSIONS: 25. It is to be reiterated· that the struggle for the liberation of our continent ~emains primarily the responsibility of the Africans themselves. The Supreme Organ of the African people the Orga~ization • of African Unity through its Liberation Committee will continue to fulfil its obligations in support of those who have taken up arms to de:t;'end: the freedom, honour and dignity of our continent, CM/503 (Part I) Annex II Appendix I Page 9

, 26. In reaffirming this commitment, the independent African States and the African Liberation Movements, are fully aware of its consequences and repercussions. Some i~dependent African States may suffer further aggressions by imperialism and colonialism. The African Liberation ' Movements will have to make greater sacrifices. But we shall not be deterred from our noble objective.

27, It shall always remain the firm determination of the African people and. their Organization, to make the.second decade of the armed struggle a decade of tangible and decisive victoriees, in the struggle for total African Liberation.

28. The Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of African which has been entrusted by the Assembly of Heads of State'and Government ' of the Organization of African-Unity, with the noble task of faoilita-­ ting· and co-ordinating the struggle of thg African freedom fighters,

pledges once. more its unequivocal committment to live to the expectati~ns of the millions of Africans still longing for their freedom and dignity, To this end, the Liberation Committee will work actively and relentlssly for the total mobilisation of resources in order to achieve this objective.

29~ In persuance of the above, the Liberation Committee wishes to reaffirm its faith and in full committment to this NEW STRATEGY.

------ODO ------

• CM/503/Part I/Annex II Appendix II

•'

COUNC·IL OF MINISTERS Twenty-First Ordinary Session Addis Ababa - May 1973

A NEW STRATEGY FOR THE LIBEBATION STRUGGLE

•

'

j CM/503/~art I/Annex II Appendix II

EXPLANATORY NOTE

• 1. The Standing Committee on Defence, which met. in Dar-es-SalaaB, • Tanzania, on 5th and 6th December 1972, has reviewed the militr-yy sitl'C.tion in dependent territories, the level of the liberation struggle and its requirements. 2. The Committee felt that after 10 years of armed struggle and the results achieved so far, it has become imperative that the Liberation Committee devises new ways and means of enhancing the liberati9n struggle. 3. Following an expose made by the Chairman of the Standing Committee on Defence underlying the necessity for a new approach to 'u~.e liberation struggle, the Cammi ttee ~ccepted a proposal made by the representative of Ghana that the following point be included as a special item on the Provisional Agenda of the 21st Ordinary Session of the Liberation Committee to be held in Accra, Ghana, from 8 to 13 January 1973: "Review of the policy towards the liberation struggle and in particular towards the Liberation Movements, with the view of developing a new strategy and setting priorities"" 4. The Standing Committee on Defence decided to set up a Sub-Co11L~ittee to prepare a Work~ng Document on this item. 5. The Sub-Committee met in Dar-es--Salaam on December 27 1972, and was compos'ed as follows: H.E. Mr. Tahar Gaid Ambassador of Algeria to Tanzania (CHAIRMAN) H.E. Mr. R.S. Makasa High Commissioner of Zambia. to Tan:o:ania. M:.:-. P. Rupia Director of Africa & Middle East Division, Foreign Affairs, Tanzania. Major ''. l"lb:i'.ta Executive Secretary OAU Liberation Committee. Mr. AL Sidky Assistant Executive Secretary in charge of Defence.

6. The Sub-Committee submits, for the consideration of the ·21st Cession of the Liberation Committee, the Working Document· attached herewith. CM/503/Part I/.llnnex II Appendix II Page 1.

A NEW STR1).TEGY FOR THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE

· Introduction:

1. The Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of ' ' Africa, meeting in its 21st Ordinary Session in Acera, Ghana• from s· to 13 January 1972, has reviewed the situation and conditions in territories still ~der foreign 'domination, after 10 years of armed liberation struggle.

2. Throughout these years OAU Member-States have continued ' to voice unequivocally their total comrnitinent to the prinaiples and purposes contained in Articles 2 and 3 of the Charter of · the OAU, especially in regard to the er~dication of all forms of colonialism from Africa and the absolute dedication to the • total emancipation of the African Territori~s whiyh are still under foreign domination.

3. In the manifesto on Southern Africa - The Lusaka Manifesto - ' unanimously adopted by the OAU 1 endorsed by th~ UN and the Conference of Non-Aligned States, but rejected by the racist regimes of Southern Africa, ' Member-States have stated cleary their posi ti•on on the question of decolonisation; that. is to say, . the legitimacy of t~e liberation struggle being waged by the peoples of Africa to obtain their inalienable rights to inde­ pendence, freedom, human dignity and equality, and that all Member-States of the OAU remain totally and unconditionally committed to their just struggle. It has also been agreed in the Lusaka Manifesto that any action to be 'taken by Member-States in regard to the solution of the problems of colon~alis~, racial discrimination and apartheid in Africa, must be underteken within the framework of the OAU and in full consultation with the liberation movements·of the territories concerned. CM/503/Part I/Annex II Appendix II Page 2.

4. At the 7th Summit Conference of the East and Central African States, in October 1971, the leaders of these countries adopted a historical declaration - The Mogadiscio 'Declaration - declaring .that ·there. was no way left to the liberation of ·.southern Africa except armed struggle. This declaration was . ' ' endorsed by the 9th OAU Gummit held in Rabat in June 1972 - (Document .AHG:/DEC/78 1.IX). Th;is was a very .important landmark in the struggle because it brought to an end the debate on ways and means of ending colonial rule and racist domination, thus enabling the liberation r:iovements and independent African States to organise and carry on the struggle till final victory.

General Assessment of the Armed 'Struggle

5. After 10 years of armed struggl~ the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa is bounl to review its e:KI{erience, to assess the progress made as well as shortcomings and to draw the correct lessons so that the coming decade must see much more rapid advance .towards the .total liberation of Africa• . 6. During the past decade the struggle in Territories under Portuguese domlnation has progressed. Nationalist forces while consolidating the liberated areas, had extended the struggle to new regions and military fronts whether in Angola, Mozambique or Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde.

(a) In Angola, both liberation movements recognised by the OAU - MPLA and FNLA - have throughout this period succeeded' in cohE0lidating and stabilising rear bases and liberated zones as well as developing new fronts. The important progress achieyed by MPLA has enabled guerrilla forces to advance towards.the more populated coast region, where the economic interests of the enemy lie. The Kinshasa Agreement signed by.MPLA and FNLA on December ' 13· 1972, on the creation of a_united front between these two CM/503/Part I/Annex II Appendix II Page 3

' ·. Movements is opening a wide range of po'ssibilities for action and is likely to revolutionise the war in Angola beyo1i.d all expecta-

tio113 c··

(b) In Mozambigue, the most predominant feature of the military situation has been the spread of the struggle to new regions towards the South, both jn Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Tete, creating strong bases for the launching of operations to new provinces. The opening of a new front in Manica a Sof ala is a significant development since it is bringing the war of liberation to the door~ steps of white-dominated Mozambique, and is constituting a military and political threat to the racist and colonial regimes in Southern Africa.

(c) In Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, the Fil.IGO has succeeded in liberating inore than two-thirds (2/3) of the natio!lal territory and the Portµguese High Command has come to the conclusion that the colonial war cannot be w'on by military means. Vast areas in the North, South and East have been liberated and the PAIGC is exercising effective control and administration in these areas.

The PAIGC has conducted elections inside the country for the Regional Councils and is about to hold elections for the National Popular Assembly. Upon completion of these elections, Fil.IGO intends to declare "The existence of the ~>tate of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde Islands". •. 7. In Namibia, SWAPO has continued to mobilise the oppressed population; to organise strikes and mass resistence; and to carry out underground operations and sabotage. On the political and the International level, SWAPO ·has continued with success its action in mobilising world public opinion against the illegal presence of South Africa in the territory.

8. On the other hand, in Zimbabwe, liberation movements have unfortunately, been engaged in internecine conflicts and dissensions CM/503/Part I/Annex II Appendix II Page 4.

to the extent that one can speak of a paralysis which has als<' affected negatively the struggle on other fronts. The Liberation Committee is continuing to exert all effrts t,o bring about a unified front between forces fighting in Zimb.abwe. This unf'ortrni;te state of affairs is more regrettable that the political situation inside the country has developed a climate of resistance and a massive rejection by the .Zimbabwe population of the proposals for settlement as evidenced by the conclusions .of the Pearce Commission.

9. Though a favourable political awareness to the idea of liberation is constantly shaping up within the masses in South Africa, the fact remains that the liberation movements ,recognised by t·he OAU have not organised themselves for launching the struggle even on a limited scale. The efforts of the Liberation Committee to bring about a united action front between these 0 ovements have yet to produce the required results.

10. As to the· enemy, a strong alliance has been developing • between Portugal, the illegal Ian Smit regime and South Africa, with the latter playing a predominant role. With the Portuguese reverses in Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, the regimes of Salisbury and Pretoria are escalating their intervention and their direct involvement in the colonial wars is not to be a~cluded. During the last decade t~e enemy has been embarking on its policy of subverting and aggressing independent African States committed to the support of the liberation struggle by frequent un­ provoked aggressions, and constant violation of the territorial inte­ grity and airspace of these countri~s. This decade has also witnessed an escalation of terrorism practised by the colonial and white rinority fascist regimes against the African people. These regimes have desperately attempted to demobilise the population through psychologi­ cal action and to destroy human and material means· essential to the development of the armed struggle •

. The enemy has increased and strengthened his military potential numericall;}'.", technologically, in terms of fire power, supplies and mobility. He has been endeavouring to strengthen and consolidate his /

CM/503/Part I/Annex II· • Appendix II Page 5.

repressive colonial machinery. Besides their political support, • some NATO powers continued to provide the colonial and racist regimes with all, sophisti~ated war material and equipment (fighter bomber jets, bombers, helicopters, transport ships, patrol poats, military vehicles, all types of NATO weapons and al!llllunition). NATO assistance to Por~ugal has enabled the enemy High Co=and in very short periods to replace needs and equipment destroyed by the guerrilla and ensured the absolute supremacy of the enemy in the air and on the sea.

In the economic field, projects as Cabora Bassa in Mozambique and Cunene in Angola, aim at perpetuating the colonial regimes,. on ' ' one hand and the commercial relations that some States c0utside Africa have with Portugal and the r1cist regimes on, the other hand, thus further strengthening the political and military postions of these regimes.

A New Strategy and·SAt of Priorities

11. The struggle against colonial and racist regimes in southern Africa is by definition a pro~racted war which will be long and bitter, for the enemy is ruthless and deeply entrenched. In order' to create a material ai:{d moral basis for victory it is imperative to develop a radically new approach to the liberation struggle in the light of the past experience. This _new strategy would be devised on the following levels:-

The Liberation Movements; Member States .of the OAU; OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa: 12. On the level of the liberation movements, the armed struggle in southern Africa must be considered .as an indivisible whole. The ostruggle waged in Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. cannot be dissociated from the struggle in South .Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe. It is necessary to develope a strategy adapted to all those territories and to co-ordinate the CM/503/Part I/l.nnex II Appendix II Page 60 activities of the liberation movements struggling in these territories. The progress achieved by liberation movements in territories under Portuguese domination has led to more co-ordination in the war effort between the colonial and facist regimes, and it i.s important to activate all fronts militarily in order to prev.ent the enemy from concentrating forces on one frdnt and to compel him to disperse his forces; The enemy, though potentially strong militarily and technologically, ,is experiencing shortage of persom1el, judging from the feverish policy of stepping-up the Africanization of the colonial wars by bringing in so-called African forces to confront the guerrilla. However, this policy is on its way of collapse. Deserters are joining the ranks of the guerrilla with their arms and e~uipment in growing numbers. If the Zimbabwean and South African fronts are militarily active, the Vorster and Smith forces will be compelled to withdraw or tJ reduce their forces from Mozambi~ue and Angola, thus acc~lerating the liberation of those territories, 13. In order to launch a meaningful and effective military struggle in Zimbabwe and South E£rica, the liberation movements recognized by the OAU should endeavour to forge united fronts and work out concrete joint programmes of action and to be greared to a situation of war organisationally, politically, ideologically, militarily and leadership-wise. They should ensure the mobilisPtion of the masses which are absolutely the most decisive force in the struggle. Their participation and the level of their participation are the determining factors whether the struggle succeeds or fails. Liberation movements should also ensure the existence of military and technical preparedness among the militants and cadres, 14. No war can succeed without the active and continuous support of a stable and reliable rear. The stable and reliable rear shall, however, be utterly of no value as has been demonstrated by practical experience, if there is no effective and efficient \ ' mechanism inside the country to receive, distribute and retionalise the means of struggle forwarded to the fronts by the rear. Never a war of liberation has been solely waged and won from outside or by elements in exile, CM/503/Part I/Annex II Appendix II Page 7.

15. Having unified their ranks an~ established strong organisa­ • tion inside the country, 1 iberation movements in Zimbabwe and • South Africa should create military alliances not only between themselves but also with other movements fighting in Mozambique, Angola and Namibia FJO as to co-ordinate their activities and draw up plans for the struggle in order t.o scatter the forces of the enemy on the largest possible number of fronts. The' experience in the wars of liberation has demonstrated that tbe liberation of one territory can never be won by two rival Move­ ments fighting against each other or separately: Unity is ;Jtrength.

) On the Level of OAU Member-States

16. The armed struggle in territories under PortuguesB domination has , reached an advanced stage. Nationalist forces, while consolida­ ting the liberated areas, are extending the struggle to new regions and military fronts. In some cases war zones have extended to ' . hundreds of miles from rear bases thus creatin~ problems and difficulties as to logistics.

Consequently, the exigencies of the armed struggle have become greater and needs of active liberation movements have necessarily increased in volume and quality (to equip the larger formations cr'eated, new recruits, trainees and self-def,ence uni ts; light weapons, ammunition and sabotage equipment; ade 1~uate anti­ aircraft defence; long-range artillery,; boats and naval equipment; teleco=unication; foodstuff; clothing and medicines,; means of transportation; financial assistance for urban guerrilla warfare; infiltration of cadres; work of mobilization and administration of the liberated areas).

17e The 9th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Gove'rnment, held in Habat, Morocco (June 1972), while ,, endorsing the Mogadiscio Declaration to the effect that the armed struggle has become the only means to liberate southern Africa, \ CM/503/Part I/1\.nns~.II I Appendix II Page 8.

Cape Verde, has recognised the urgent need for • Guinea-Bissau and material and financial assistance to the liberation • increasing struggle .and has consequently: ! . I ,- decided to increase the Special Fund for liberation by 5e%

reiterated its appeal to Member-States to meet their obligations to the Special Fund by paying their arrears and contributions;

requested Member-States wishing to make additional voluntary material and financial contributions to give the required assistance direct· to the Liberation Co=ittee - (AHG/DEC.71/IX).

I 18. Despite the fact that border States have continued to assume their historical responsibilities towards the struggle and that other Member-States continued on a limited scale to assist • liberation ~ovements, the bulk of war material and equipment has countries outside Africa. continued. to originate from f-riendly . On the other hand, the realities of contributions has continued to be far below the adopted figure in the budget and still falls seriously short of the actual requirements and exigencies of the armed struggle. Therefore, the strict implementation of the decisions of the OAU Heads of Btat.e and Government would greatly enhance the liberation struggle •

• 19. Border States are the immediate rear bases of support of the national liberation movements and with the progress achieved in Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and Cape, Verde, the enemy guerrilla forces from their rear is expected to try. to deprive. bases and logistic support in border States through armed provo­ cations and overt aggression against those countries. CM/503/Part I/Annex II Appendix II 6 Pll.ge 9

It is, therefore, the duty of all Member-States to give the necessary support to the States bordering the Territories under colonialist and minority racist domination and to be ready to go into action, if requested, against the enemy in order to deter or repel aggression' and violation of tµe territorial integrity of border States.

20e National liberation movements should be allowed free transit of" men and war materials through nEighbouring independent Member- States1 territories to the war fronts, bearing in mind the security of the States concerned. It is in the interest of the liberation struggle that the territories of .border States remain secure and strong rear bases.

21~ At the· present evolution of the liberation struggle, Member~ States should endeavour to inculcate to the African masses a high degree of consciousness and identity with the liberation struggle, ensure the strict implementation of the OAU and the UN resolutions on boycotts and sanctions against Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa and should reinforce their action on international level in order • to isolate the enemy bot~ politically and diplomatically.

The Co-ordination Action of the OAU Liberation Committee

22. On.the eve of the Tenth .Anniversary of the Organisation of African Unity, the Liberation Committee is bound to review its policy towards the liberation struggle and in particular towards the libera­ tion movements. In the light of past experiences and the exigencies of the struggle, the Committee has to devise new methods and a new approach if it is to carry out its mandate fully.

23. Though the national l~beration movements recognised by OAU are responsible for the planning and conduct of the armed struggle • and the.mandate of the Liberation Committee continues to be the harmonization and the co-ordination of assistance to the liberation CM/503/Part I/Anllax .II Appendix II Page '10

aovemsnts, it is nevertheless, evident that the evolution of the struggle, the military progress achieved in some territories, the extention of war zones, the ever-increasing build-up and 'aggressive­ ness of the enemy have created a new situation which adds to the ' ' responsibilities of the Committee as embodying the determination of Africa to resist and to liberate the Territories still under colonial and racist domination through armed struggle.

24. The Liberation Committee and its executive organ should be given all material and financial means to carry out its mandate. The ,consolidation of the.,liber(l.ted areas, the increasing require­ ments of new fronts and combat zones !constitute new exigencies. The planning and conduct of the struggle cannot be done on !£11f2.2. basis or conditioned by the availability of funds and the realities of contributions; a war budget is a must at the present juctlilre. Additional material, and financial volutary contributions have also \ . to be made to the Liberation Committee. The oathods of implementing the decisions of the Committee as well as .those of the OAU higher organs have to be adapted to a war situation.

25. In T,rritories under Portuguese domination, the military situation necessitates not only increased financial and material assistance to the nati.onalist forces, but new military means an<'!­ sophisticated equipment in order to nullify or neutralise the s;upremacy the enemy enjoys, especially in air and on the sea. The Liberation Committee should give serious consideration to this military aspect in the war in Guinea-Bissau and Ca1e Verae, Mozambique and Angola.

26. Though liberation movements in pri.iaciple are sovereign and solely responsible for" conducting their wars of liberation, the Committee should be able to intervene resolutely in order to redress a situation created on one front or more which, if left unattended, might affect negatively other fronts. The crisis which prevails within some liberation movements has not only crippled the struggle in some territories but has also enabled Ci~/503/P(:crt I/l\11110:~ II Appendix II Page 11"

the enemy to divert t? other important fronts its forces which could have been pinned doWn by a resoiute resistence and meaningful struggle.

27. Unless ' liberation movements in Zimbabwe and South Africa organise themselves politjcally and militarily, constitute strong united fronts and work out concrete programmes of joint action, the whole struggle in South~rn A£rica could be dealt a serious blow, at' a time when the Soµth African troops and the forces of the Ian Smith rebel regime are intervening directly in Portuguese colonial wars.

28. In the light of the above considerations, it is time for the Liberation Committee to reconsider its policy and strategy towards liberationnovements. It should be guided.by an overriding principle, that is to grant recognition and assistance .only to "Fronts" which are politically and militarily united. On the basis of this principle· it can draw its strategy:

/ within a definite period liberation movements should endeavour to forge united fronts; meanwhile the Liberation· Committee would c9ntinue to grant them material and fina­ ncial assistance, in accordance with its scale of priorities. .... On its part,. the Executive Secretariat will establish, in ·collaboration with Member-States concerned, programmes of ·, ' training and infiltration of a limited number at a·time.•

- · .Once the· above period has elapsed, the Committee· might be:confronted with two possible situetio:us:

* No unity achieved but one Movement has emerged as a strong orl!,an:itsation. In such case others would be requested to join, if not the Committee would re­ cognise .. only that Movement. ,

' ' ' CM/503/Part I/ll:nneX II Appendix II Page '12.

•,

No front has been achieved and no strong Movement has emerged. In such case, recognition would be ·withdrawn and no assistance granted.

29. For the past decade the Liberation Committee has continued to grant material and financial assistance to all liberation move­ ments recognised by the OAU. Member-States have also done, the same on bilater·al bases. Some liberation movements, despite all assistance granted to them, have shown throughout the years a persistent unwillingness to wage a meaningful struggle. Thus the efforts, energy and meagre resources of Africa have been dispersed without tangible results.

30. In the light of the progress achieved in Territories under Portuguese domination and the advanced st age of tbe war in these · ' territories, a new policy of setting priorities as ato allocation of material and financial assistance in the budget of the Special Fund has to be formulated. Three main active fronts exist at present:

Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, Mozambique and Angl;ila, which could be considered priority.fronts.

The action of the Liberation. Committee should concentrate on consolidating the struggle in these territorieso

In Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa, the armed struggle is either in the phase of establishment or in the embryonic stage of undepground activities and mobilisation. In these territories the Liberation Committee is called upon to assist national forces to estab.lish themselves and intensify underground activities until such time when they can pass to the :c~exc phase of. consoli­ dation. Other liberation movements engaged in political activities are to be assisted and given a low priority. CM/503/Part I/All~ex II Appendix II Page 13.·

The following ratio ' could be applied: •'

PAIGC 25% FRELIMO 25% JVJPLA & FNLA Unified Military Command 20% SW APO 10% JMC (Zimbabwe) 10% PAC and ANO 5% Other Liberation Movements 5%

' It goes without saying that the above ratios are eu.bject to change, depending on the progress of the struggle.

31~ One important aspect of the Liberation Committee's task is the development and strengthening of its propaganda machinery as well as the promotion of its political action in international forums to ensure the isolation of the colonial and racist regimes.

' CM/503/Part 1 ANNEX III

•' l"IILITARY EXPERTS ~ EMOLUMENTS DRAFT BUDGET 1972/73

us I. SALARIES: Step 8@ $11,707p.a.~ 11,707 1. Lt. Colonel Scale P3 ' I 4 Majors Scale P3 Step 4@ $10,695p.a.- 42,780 2 Captains Scaj)le P2 Step 8_@ $10,018p.a.~ 20,036 1 Medical Officer Scale P2 Step 8@ $10,0l8p.a.::' 10,0.18

6 Drivers (Locally "1?() recruited) . 900p.a.- 1 Cleaner (Locally recruited)

TOTAL a o a o a o o o a us $

• II. TRAVEL (HOME LEAVE, INITIAL RECRUITMENT, SEPARATION FROM SERVICE)

Passages for 4 non-Tanzanian Officers 11,450 with families 00000000•~

III. DEPENDENCY ALLOWANCE:

Seven married officers with children 0 •• 0 •• 4,400 •

IV. MEDICAL EXPENSES: 4,000 All officers, families and local staff e D 0 0 O o e ~

v. Transport and subsistence travel allowance 2,500

' VI. Gratuity for eight officers at 15% of basic 12,682 salary o•oO•OO ' GRAND TOTAL ••••••• U6$124,693 ======

' ' cc·a-NCIL. OF MINISTERS CM/503 (Part I) Twenty-First Ordinary Session Annex IV

Addi~ A~aba - May 1973

i ,

PROPOSED BUDGET OF THE SPECIAL FUND FOR THE FINANCIAL

• YEAR 1973/74 \ l

• CM/503 (Part I) .Annex IV

PROPOSED BUDGET OF THE SPECIAL FUND FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1973/74

REVENUE: /

In view; of the fact that the budgetary appropriations for the liberation movements have been increased in conformity with the decision of the 9th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government by 50%, the Standing Committee is ealled. u'pen ' to ·reco!nmEind are-vote of last year's budget as detailed hereunder:- • EXPENDITURE:

(a) Liberation Movements:

i. Administration and propaganda ) ii, Material and equipment to be ) supplied to Liberation MoVQments h 1,031,752-00 ' . (b) Training Centres: ......

( c) Reserve Fund: ...... 4,776-00

Total reocmmendation ·~ 1.)..)

CM/503 (Part I) Page 2

ADMINISTRATION .AND PUBLICITY

Country and Movement Allooation

.ANGOLA !; S. C, L, A, 21,600;00

GUINEA-BISSAU P. A. I. ,G. C. 17 ,500;00

MOZAMBIQUE FRELIMO

SOUTH AFR! CA A. N, C. 8,749.50 P. A. C, 1,752;00 • NAMIBIA SWAPO 9,000. 50

SO-CALLED FRJ'iNCH SOMALILAND (DJIBOUTI)

F. L, C. S. 6,000.00

L. M. D. 6,ooo~oo

COMORO (MOLIN ACO) 9,000;00

ZIMBABWE

ZAPU 13 ,125;00 ZANU 13,125;00

SEYCHELLES S. P. U. P. 10,000;00

SAN TOME AND PRINCIPE

L. M. S. T. P. 6,ooo~oo

Total CM/503 (Part I) Page 3

DETAILS OF THE DRAFT EXPENDITURE ON LIBERATION MOVEMENTS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR l213ll214 (All the figures are in Pound Sterling)

MATERIAL ASSIST.AN CE

Territo·ry and Movement Allocation .ANGOLAs

s. c. L. A...... ,. .. 160,500:00 GUINEA BISSbU:, 1 P. A. I. G. c...... 217,500:00 MOZAMBI QVE: FRELIMO .. • • ...... 217,500;00 SOUTH AFRICA: A. N. c. .. • • • • .. .. • • • • 52,500;00 .· P. A. c. .. • • • • • • .. • • .. i5,ooo.oo NAMIBIA• SW APO .. .. •• ...... •• 63,000:00 SO-CALLED FRENCH SOMALIL.AND:(Djibouti) F. L. c. S.' • • .. .. 12,000:00 L. M. D. (Djibouti) • • . . .. • • 12,000:00

COMORO: (MOLINACO) .. .. • • • • .. • • .. 12,000:00 ZIMBABWE: ZAPU •• .. • • .. • • .. .. 60,000~00 ZA.'IU ...... • • ...... 60,000:00 SEYCHELLES: ( s. P. u. p, • • • • .. • • • • • • • • 5,000:00 SAN TOME .AND PRINCIPE: M. L. s. T. P. .. .. 2,000;00 . II. TRAINING CENTRES: (a) East Africa: •• .. • • 183,755;25 (b) West Africa: .. •• .. .. • • 183,776;00 III. RESERVE FUND: 4,776:00

Grand Total !. l '265 '307: 25 ,. CM/503 (PartI) Page 4

DECISIONS OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE. ON DEFENCE INVOLVING FINANCIAL.IMPLICATIONS.

6TH DECEMBER 1972 .. ;,

,'··, ·... The :;;ltanding Cammi t'tee on Finano'e.ilild Administratia'.!l·.··· ·:· . ~·:·· . . - . . ..,...... ····· .,...... ,. ' .~"' ... ,. ,, ' ' ' - ' . . may wish to appro-ife tb'e following deoisions of the Standing Cammi ttee on De:t1.onoe involving finanoial implication.s: . "

ITEMS ESTIMATED COST ' ... ,·., I (stg~ :s)

1, Consolidation of the, .. l;i,per.ation struggle in Guinea (Bissau), Miizambique ·and Angola. Funds to be earmark.ed··for·that ·purpose and

disbursement effect.,,d:·under. thEf"st!pervision . ,.., .. of the three Chairmen of the Standing Co-. mmi ttee; · Requests made by MPLA, FRELIMO and PAIGC as per report of the Secretary of the Standing Committee on Defence. 'As·. to F, N. L. A., the Secretariat has been mandated to study with the leadership of that Movement their requests. • • .. • • •• .. 150,000.00

II, Increase in the FRELIMO monthly allocation for '

foodstuff (Sns. 40,000/-) by 50 per cent t • 0 I 3,529.e0 monthly (in­ cluding in­ crease)

·III. Allocation to MPLA, FRELIMO, PAIGC, of one (8-Tons) Truck and two Land' Rovers each. Total:

\ • OM/503 (Part I) Page 5

ITEMS ESTIMATED COST (Stg~ '1) ,

3 trucks and 6 Land Revers. (Cost per uni ti Truck - '16,000; Land Rover - 52,500) 33,0011.00

IV, Allo~ation to SWAPO of One (8-Tons) T:t"Uck and Two Land Rovers .. .. • • • • .. .. • •

V~ ~onstruotion of Six Store~i

* 2 for supplying Mozambique and Zimbabwe ., * 3 for supplying Angola (North/Eastern F:!:'ont) * l· for supplying the Eastern Angolan and Namibian Front.1.

VI, Two Trucks for the Secretariat Pool of Vehicles to be stationed at Lusaka • • .. • • ...... l?,000.00 - VII. Three trucks and Three Land Rovers for

Training Centres in East Africa ,, •• ,, );; 27 1000 One truck for Training Centres in West Africa ) (Existing vehicles to be traded-in) '

UPON APPROVAL of the above requests the Secretariat will start implementation according to priorities and within available funds. CM/503 (Part I) . ANNEX V :; Page 6

Communi~ue on the Continued Aggression of the Israeli Forces against the Arab Republic of Egypt

The OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Li­ beration of Africa meeting in its 21st Regular Session in Accra, Ghana from 8 to 12 January 1973, noted with anxiety and deep concern the deterioration of the si'tuation in the North Eastern part of Africa, as a result of the continued Israeli aggression against the territory of Egypt as well as other Arab States, for nearly five years:

Despite the numerous resolutions adopted by the OAU as· well as the United Nations calling upon Israel to withdraw immediately and unconditionally from all occupied I Arab territories, Israel continues to refuse~ comply with those resolutions, in defiance of the international community.

Considering.that the continued Pccupation of part of the territory of Egypt, a founding Member of the OAU, 'constitutes a serious threat to the independence, security ·and unity of the African continent at large, the Committee condemns Israel for its refusal to withdraw from all the oocup~ed Arab terri tori,es, and calls for the immediate with­ drawal of Israel from these territories to the pre-June 5, 1967 lines.

The Committee expresses its full support to and solidarity with the Arab Republic of Egypt in its legitimate struggle to recover totally and by all means its territorial integrity, CM/503 (Part I) .ANNEX V Page 1

Aware of the dangerous threat to the security, independence and unity of the African continent· represented by world imperialism, in all its manifestations namely zionism, colonialism and racism, the Committee welcomes all actions taken by African States to isolate the zionist·, racist and colonialist regimes;

I

' ' OM/503/Part II

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS Twenty-first Ordinary Session Addis Ababa, May 1973,

RhPORT OF TH? FIRST Mhl!.TING OF THh AD HOC COMMITThE ' ENTRUSThD WITH THb CRhATION OF A UNIThD FRONT OF THE,

~MBABWE·FREhDOM FIGHTbRS

LUSAKA , ZAl"!B IA • 13 - 17 March, 1973.

/CONFIDhNTIAL/, CM/503/Part II

ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAJT UNITY,

CO-ORDINATING COMHITTLL :OOR THh LIBhRATION OF AFRICA,

P.O. BO~{ 1767, ' DAP. E:.S sA:.,p...f',1·1 , TANZANIA.

RLPORT OF THh FIRST MEE.TING OF THh AD. HOC COMMITTEE -----~---·------·------·---- ENTR~JL.::.\111!:1_.'.H!.£_£!?,.£~.TJ;ON,_QF A_UNIT!;.JLfEONT OF THL illll'U~!?i!_E_fE E:.hD.QM FIGHT !;.RS l. During its 21st Ordina::y Session held in Accra, Ghana, January 1973, the Co-ordinating Coml'1i ttec for the Libcrat ion of Africa decided to s

The Lib

2. The Ad Hoc Committee met. accordingly in Lusaka from the 13th to th<' 17th of March, 1973, and His EXcellency_, Major Kwame Baab, Ghana's Commissioner for Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the 21st Session of the' ' Co-ordinatingJ Committee• for the Liberation of Africa, presided over thP opening session.

3. During the. pr<'liminary consultations hEld between the lcadErs of thr drlegations of Cameroun, Ghana and Zambia, and ' upon a suggPstion inade by the Executive Sf'cretary, it was df'c:j.dc-d to includP Tanzania and KPnya in thP mcmbrrship of the i1Q Hoc Committef'. Thus, the mreting was attPndcd by thP reprpsentativPs of Camcroun, Ghan;i., K0nya, Tanzania and Zambia and the 1E'ad0rs of ZANU and ZAPU outside Zimbabweo I

4. In his opening address, the Chairman of the Liberation Committee decriPd th<" machinations of th~ common Pnemy who was seeking through trick~ry and political blackmail and through outright usurpation to dPprive Zimbabwean p0oplP of th0ir land. · This was what madf' thP strugglE' of this peoople a legitimPtP one. - 2 - Cl'l/503/Part II

He called on the frerdom fighters of Zimbabwe to bury thrir differences and launch a decisive onslaught against their ' oppressors. Indeed, the current situation in Zimbabwe makes the need for such unity compelling. Thr enemy is panicking and must be rele·ntlessly assailed.

5. The representatives of Zambia and Cameroun indicated in th

6. The floor was then given to the representatives of the two LibPration Movem0nts, ZAPU and ZANU, who PXpressed their gratitude to the peoplr and Government of Zambia :for their sacrifice. They mainly stressed the seriousness of the situation following upon the action of the enemy and the closure 0£ the border between Zambia and Zimbabwe. They pledged to carry on the struggle with determination, until' final victory.

7. After having designated His Excellency, the Zambian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to chair the meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee, and after having decided on the procedure 0£ work, thP Committee startPd examining th€ question based on its terms 0£ reference as mentioned in paragraph (1).

8. ThP Committee listPned with attention to the statements made by the representatives 0£ the two Liberation Movements, ZANU and ZAPU, and proceeded with the discussion of the £acts and considerations raised by the ZANU and ZAPU rPpresentatives.

9. The participants of .the meeting of the Ad·Hoc Committee, while taking into account the stat<"ments· mad

10. Discussion took place on the two aspects 0£ the issue, namely:

3/ ... I

I

I

- 3 - CM/503/Part II

(a) the contents of the Mbeya Protocol which was signrd by thP leaders of thr two Libf'ration ·: MovPments, ZANU and Z~PU, which created a Joint Military Command to study, guide and undertake on thr battle-field all activities and oprrations rPlatPd to thr struggle on thr basis of a co-or.dina­ tf'd plan;

(b) thr derp differences of viPw points, as expressed in the statements of the ZANU and ZAPU leaders.

11. As the two quPstions are closPly relatPd, the Committee had, first of all, to out 'on record the position of the two MovemPnts.

'-..

( i) ZANU:

ThP leadership of ZANU statrd that since thr signing of the Mbeya Protocol which set up the Joint Military Command (J.M.C.), many happrnings had taken place and efforts made to such an rxtent that the provisions of thr- Protocol had bern overtakrn by E"VPnts: that anyhow thF J .M .c. h'ad n<'"i th•r br•n establishPd nor b•gun functioning;

that accordingly the J.M.C, was not a viable instrument for achieving the unification of the Zimbabwe freedom fighters;

that at thr- current sta~e, priority should be given to the strugglF and not to unity as the latter can

be achiPved du~ing the armPd action;

that in view of this considtora,tion ZANU was categori­ c~lly rPj<"cting th<' J.M.C. formula SPt out in MbPya as a basis for unity bPtWPen thr two Movements and thr prosecutions of thP struggle in Zimbabwe.

4/ ••• - 4 - CM.1503/Part II

(ii) ZAPU:

ZAPU accPptPd and rcgarddd thP J.M.C. as. the appropriatp

instrument for the prosecution of thP struggle. He said •that it had bel?n set up by common cons0nt by the two parties. ThE' ZAPU spokesman said further that the J.M.C. must bP given thP chancP to function and rejected th0 ZANU leaders' statement that the J.M.C, would hamper and prejudice thr liberation strugglr of the peopl

12, Gen0rally, thr Committee noted with regrPt and serious concern the ncgativ" attitude of the ZANU lraders as madc manifest througpout thc discussions and which clearly indicated that the ZANU leaders were rejecting the Mbeya Protocol and accordingly the exist<'nc0 of any united action front .•.

13, After lengthy and heated discussions intended to break the statE'm<'nt which the meeting had reached, the participants · · requEst<:.>d th<:.> l<:.>ad

14, During the exchange of views bPtwren thr leaders of the ' two Liberation Movements, with the assistance of the Chairman of th0 Ad Hoc Committee and thE' Ex£cutiv0 Secretary, they agrrrd to draw up a programme of common strategy for thP nrosecution of the librration struggle ~n Zimbabwe.

15. Thr Ad Hoc CommittP

16. According to its tPrms of rrfPr

5/ ••• - 5 - Cl"l/503/Part II

17. ThP participants to the Ad Hoc Committee meeting paid tributr to the fraternal spirit of re-conciliation which the reprrs12ntatives of ZANU and ZAPU displayrd during thP dPlibPrations.

18. Thr participants WPrP also gratifird by the- r<'sults achiPved and paid spec;ial tribut0 to H.. E. Pre:sid0nt K, Kaunda and the Government of thr Republic of Zambia for thr rPlentless <'fforts thry had rxcrt<'d to f'nsurr thr succrss of the mr rting.

--oo--

\ ' .

CM/503/Part II Ann0x I

STRATEGY FOR THE LIBERATION OF ZIMBABWE

. PREAMBLE:

( . Considc:ring

(a)· that tbe peoplr of Zimbabwr ar<" one, and our Organisations'have the same objective;

(b} that th@ objective of achieving the unity of our Movements could best be attained through combined action;

(c) the grave necessity to wage a more effective revolutionary armed struggle, for the attainment of that obj0ctive;

{d} the current phase of the mass resistance of our peopl0 to the settler machinery of oppression;

Conscious of thr increasing danger to the attainment of ' these objectives posed by intPrnal and external forcrs which arE' determined to '··J'>Ose, promot€ or accommodate. splitist divisionary or disruptive · elemPnts ·in thP Zimpabw0 revolutionary· struggle;

Determin.-d to giv.- effpct to our Bcmghazi Declaration of January 18th, 1972, and our subsequent joint • document dated 11th February, 1912·, whose essential

purpose is' to attain si~uitanPous~y the unity of ( the Zimbabwe people, and a more pffective prosecution of t.he armed revolutionary struggl0 and having signed the Mbeya Protocol es'tablishing the J',M .C. on March, 23•;':).972.

.- '

2/ ••• CM/503/Part II - 2 - Ann<"X I

WP, thP External Missions of ZANU/ZAF\.J, having r0vi0wrd the J.M.C. as Pstablished at Mbeya in March, 1972, now deci·d.,:-

that a Political Council for ZimbabwP bP created,

A. JOINT MILITARY COMMAND - (J .M .C.)

1. That a unifi<"d military command bP crPatPd;

2, That areas of joint action Qf the J.M.C. shall be,among

other thi~gs:

(i) recruitmPnt and training (ii) logistics and supplies (iii) operations (iv) military intelligence and information.

3. Th<" Joint Military Command shall b.- rPsponsiblP for planning and conducting the war in all its asprcts and shall remain subject to the genrral dirrctives of thr Political Council of ZimbabwP.

4. ThP Joint Military Command shall consist of:-

(i) Chairman, (ii) Vice-Chairman, (iii) Six military cadres s<"lectpd by ZANU, (iv) Six military cadr<'s selPcted by ZAPU. • s. ThP Chairman of the J.fvl.C. shall be provided by ZANU and • thP Vice-Chairman by ZAPU,

6, The J.M.C. shall work out as soon as possible programm0s for familiarisation, recruitment, training, deployment and assPssmi:-nt of thco· means of th<" strugglP and joint \ op<"rations.

3/ .•. CM/503 - 3 - Part II Annex I

B. PObJJIC~b COUNCIL bF ZUABA!li!.£

1. That a Political Council of ?imbabwe be created: 2... Th<' Political Council of Zi~t-tkwi; (P.C.Z.) shall be I rPsponsiblP for, among othPr things:

(i) propaganda, mobilization and diplomatic activities,

(ii) welfare of the civilian population,

(iii) administration and consolidation of areas of operation.

3, The Political Council of Zimbab~e shall also work out a programme of political integration.

4; The Political Council of Zimbabwe shall consist of:-

(i) Chairman (ii) Vice-Chairman (iii) Six members to be providPd by ZANU, and (iv) Six members to be prov id Pd by ZAPU.

5. Thr Chairman of the f'olitical Council of Zimbabwe shall bP providPd by ZAPU and thP Vice-Chairman by ZANU.

- •. ZANU and ZAPU have agreed on:-

(i) Th< establishment of an atmosphere of peace and fraternity among their forces;

(ii) The imm.C?diate Cl'ssation of all acts of hosti.lity or attacks in the press, the r,adio and other mass m0dia;

(iii) The fact that from now onwards, in order to gradually achievP. unity; their press.. relPasPs and all propaganda work shall give emphasis on ' the newly-created bodies, J .M .C. and P ;C .Z., as to make them known to the pe>ople of Zimbabwe.

(iv) To work out a common policy for integration of all Zimbabweans willing to join :the struggle.

4/ .•• - 4 - Cl"l/503/P.ART II .Annex I c. IMPLFM hNTATION

T~is document will· comr to forc<' two months

hPnCP, during which pl'riod th<' two Parties, with thE'

help of thr Ministe~ of ForE'ign Affairs of Tanzania

and Zambia assistE'd by thc- ExecutivE' SPcrE'tariat of thE' O.A.U. Liberation CommittPE'; wlll work out1methods

of fmpiPmentation.

Thi' Chairman of the O.A.U. Liberation Committef'

.and thP ForPign Ministers of Tanzania and Zambia,assistPd

by th<- Executive Secrf'tariat of the Liberation Committee,

shall supc-rvis0 the implemPntat ion of this Agreement.

5/' .•

\ Ci'I/503/Part II - 5 - .Annex I • This Agreement was signed under our hands this seventeenth day of March, Ninetl:'en· hundred and Sevpnty three;

H.W. CHITEPO J .z. MOYO CF ZAPU RhPRhSbN'.t:ATIVh OF ZANU RLPRESENTATIVE

in the Drf'SPnCP of th<" O.A.U. Ad Hoc Committ•r. for the Conciliation con.sis ting of: -

HON. E.H.K. MUDhNDA,M.P. , 2, MAJOR KWAME BAAH, MINISThR OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, COMMI~SIONbR FOR FOREIGN ZAMBIA. AFFAIRS, GHANA.

3. HON. VINChNT EFON 4. HON. B. ·NABWERA, M,P;, MINISThR OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ASSISTANT MINISThR OF CAMhROUN, FORhIGN AFFAIRS, KhNYJ\.

s. HON. I .A. ShPhTU, M. P. , 6·. MAJOR H. I, MBITA, JUNIOR MINISTJ::R OF hXhCUTIVh ShCRhTARY FORhIGN AFFAIRS, OF OAU LIBhRATION TANZANIA. COMM ITT hf. •

. ' CM/503/Part II' Annex II

LUSAKA MEETING

' UNITY BB.TWEEN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN ZIMBABWE . LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

CAMB.ROUN: H:E:Vinc~nt E£on - MinistEr 0£ Foreign A££airs H.E, hlhaj M.H. Dicko - Ambassador 0£ Cameroun to Ethiopia.

rnANli: H.L. Major Kwamc Baah - Commissionrr £or Foreig~ A££airs Mr. Annan A. Cato - Special Assistant to the Conimissioner £or Foreign Affairs"

KENYA: Hon. Burudi Nabwera,M .• P. Assistant Minister £or Foreign Affairs.

H.E. L.P. Odero - Kenya High Commissioner to Zambia. Mr. Micha0 l G, Okeyo - Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "I TANZANIA: Hon. I.A. SepE:·tu, M.P •. - Junior Minist<"r £or Foreign A££airs. H.E. Mr·. O.M. Katikaza - Tanzania .High Commissioner· to Zambia. Mr. P. Rupia - Director £or African Affairs ' and Middle East A££airs.

ZAMBIA: Hoii.E.H.K. Mudenda,M.P.-. Minister ·Of Foreign A££airs Hon. G. Zulu, M.P. - Minister of Defence Hon.T.J. Kankasa, M;P. - Minister 0£ State for Foreign Affairs. Hoi;i. C.M. Mwananshiku, M.P. - Minister of State for Defence

Mr. A.N. Chimuka - Under-Secretary, Foreign Affairs. Mr. C.T.A. Banda - Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Defence. Lt. Col. T. Fara - Ministry of De£encc Mr. J.C. Musole - Ministry 0£ D££ence,

~ 2/ ... 01'1/503/Part II Ai:;:w6X II

\ •

ZAPU: Mr. J.Z. Mayo Chairman of R£volutionary Council Mr. T.G. Silundika S<:'crPtary for Publicity and Information. Mr, Dumiso DabE'ngwa Secr•tary of RPvolutionary Council, Mr, A1£rc-d Nikita Chief of Sta££.

ZANU: Mr. H. W. Chitc-po Chairman {National) Mr. M .K. Hamadziripi Treasurer Mr. M. M. Mudzi AdministrativP Spcretary Mr. W. Malianga Publicity Secr0tary.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Major H. Mbita Exccutivr Srcretary Mr. A. Sidky Assistant Executive Secr0tary in Charge of Defence"

Mr. M. K. Simumba Dir0ctor of Lusaka Sub-O££ic0 Mr. J. Sh0nouda Int0rprctrr, ( Exccutivr SFcrrtariat).

--Ob-- \ .. ,.. . . ; -

OK?.GANIZATION OE l_,j, ·':}\ o.b- 11 ~ ORGANISATION DE L'UNITE AFRICAN UNITY • • .I '-" AFRICAINE • 4-...t IJ.f...Jl · ~fflliWff, OF MINISTERS . r-rt.! Secretariat ~· ~1'1't;?~rst Ordinary Session ·Y ·.i' B. P. 3243 Addis Ababa - May 1973

Addis Ababa • l.l.11 ...... i>I , • • . • " C'.!/503 (PART III) appendix I

..

THE EXECUTIVE SEJ'.:REI'ARIAT 1 S MISSION TO LIBERA.TED AREAS IN MOZAMBIQUE

(FROM 5 TO 17 OCTOBER 1972)

•

·. \ ' /

CM/503/(PART III) Appendix I Page l

_REJ:ORT OF THE EXE:CUTIV.O: SECRGTARIAT ON ITS· MISSION TO THE LIBERATED ARFAS IN MOZAMBIQUE

' (FROM" 5 TO 17 OCTOBER 1972)

I ,I I

INTRODUCTION

Objeoti ves and Acti vi tJ.es of the Mission:

} .1. The eyolution of the armed struggle waged by FRELIMO i• Mozam~iqtlAI . ' and the recent developments ,on the terrain ouJ.mi.natine in th~ opening by FRELIMO of a new Military Front,, in .July 1972, in the strategio Prdvince of Manicae Sofala has been of significant importance, both

for the war in Mozambiq_ue and the gl "'bal strat~yyin "•,nrthe=. A:f'ri..ca... __.. -----·­ Tliese developments made it imperative upon the Ex:ecutive Secretariat, ~h order to assess the situation and to familiarise itself with it and to carry out more fully its co-ordinating task of assistance to 1PRELIMO, to undertake without delay a mission to one of the li~erated areas in Mozambiq_ue, especially so that since May 1968 no mission has been sent by the Liberation Committee to bhe liberated areas, ''

2. Discussions with FRELIMll leadership on the matter led to the oho±•e of the Province of Cabo Delgado as the visiting site for the following

reasons i

The President of FRELIMO was at the moment inside at Cabe Delgado;

·- An important meeting of Military Commanders. and responsible cadres of different Provinces and War Zones was taking plaoe ' ·. at Cabo Delgado andI would enable the Mission to get first-han

' •' CM/ .03(PART III) Ap:,iendix I Page 2

During the month of September 1972, FRELIMO had launched a generalized offensive against Portuguese posts and encampmebtu in the First and Second Sectors particularly,

3. The Mission was composed of:

Major Hashim !llbita Ex:eoutive Secretary (CHAIRMAN) Mr. Ahmed M· Sidky Assistant Executive Secretary (In CharGe of Defence) Capt. ·s. A. Makaranga Military Expert (Headquar~ers) Dr, J.P. Kasiga Based at Headquarters Mr. Jenerali Ulimwengu. Jou:rnalist (Daily News),·

4·; The Mission left D:>r'-es-Salaam on October 5th 1972, W<":it immediately to the point of entry where it was met by the President of FREI.IMO, Comrade Samora Machel, crossed the Ruvuma Ri v3r under heavy FRELIM'' armed escort and went to Caba Delgado in /f!ozam.bique,

5, During the 10 days and 11 r;ights whic!l it spent in Mo!Oambique,

the Mission travelled or. foot mostly by day time, a distan~e of approximately 180 kilometres and in some instances betireen 8 and 10 marching hours a day on the oentre.l plateau of the First Military Sector,

(i) It visited:

a control centre an Instruction Cen'vre a Central Base (which was the target of the enemy offensive "Gordian Knot" druing 1970 and 1971) a school Field medical units and dispensaries a Co-operative Centre for produc'ti ou and marketing (at the border)

FRELIMO '

(ii) It discussed at great length with FRELIMO leadership, Military Commanders, Political Commissars, responsible cadres for production, health, education and social welfare, It reviewed with them the military situation in various Fronts and Combat Zones·, the programmes of consolidation' of the liberated areas and, in particular, the present needs and exigencies of the armed struggle. , in Mozambique,

(iii) The Mission attended mass public meetings and had ~he opportunity to gain an insight into the i,,ondi tions of lif~ of the population of the liberated areas and had the opportunity to see .the devastati'on brought up by enemy aerial bombardmenit on the villages and ou.ltivated field)" of the inhabitants.

(iv) The Mission was also shown a wide variety of captured . enemy aquipment and war material as a result o± FRELIMO's assaults on Portuguese posts and encampments; vehicles des·oroyed ! unexploded bombs; planes and helicopters shot down, etc,

6,, An account of the visit, together with the Mission's observations, conclusions and recommendations., is set out below, In addition, it may be noted that'material collected hy the Mission in the form of taped inter,iews, photos, films, captured enemy material, etc. is available at both ]'RELIMO and the Liberation Committee H,ead­ quarters,

• 7. Though material oonditions have not allowed the Ei~~hti.,.-e SQoretaria~ to organise fact· tir.J.ing .missions to other liberated areas or combat zones in Mozambique (Niassa and Tete) which would be d"ne in future,

FRELIMO lead~rship has asserted that the general observation and • conclusions that could be made in Cabo Delgado also apply to other Provinces as to the military situation in general, the need for more oonsolidation of the.liberated areas and the exigencies of the armed struggle. CM/50) (PART III) Appendix I Page 4

It may 1-.e useful, in this respect tQ, mention that other liberated areas have been vl.sited by various delegations from Afri.ca and outside, testifying to the progress and consolidation of the struggle:

a delegation of Dar-es-Salaam University students visited Niassa in 1971;

in December 1971 and January 1972, a five-man team of journalists and Cameramen from the People 1s Republic of China visited Caba DeJ.gado;

~ during Maret, 1972, a team of Russian Journalists visited Tete;

three members of the British Committee for Freedom in Territo:::-ies under Portuguese Domination visited Tete in le.gust 1972;

an I·'.rnlian Delega'Jion visited Caba De'.i.gado in August 1972,

Observations of the Mission: ·--·-~---... ·--·---....

From its own experience o~·- the ter:':"~·l-~\.'1 and from wid.a discussions with FRELIIv'iO Military Commanders in various military sectors as ;;ell as other responsible ce,dres, the mission is in a position tc make the following observations:

8, The Portuguese army uni ts c,re f0:·· the most part - in the First Military Sector - entrenched in the few remaining and isolated posts in the liberated areas, .Chese posts and encampments ai·a being beseiged' by the forces of FRELIMO and are being supplied by air. The enemy has been compelled to evacuate some of the posts - such as Limpopc and Muidumbe - which he was not anymore Cl~/'.903 (PART III) .AppendiX I . Page_ 5

able to hold. The remaining enemy posts in the First Sector are Ng 1 apa, Namatil.i, Nangade, Sagal, J;Jiaca, Nangololo, Palma and l\!ueda. These are constantly attached and harassed by guerrilla forces; On the

ground the enemy is unable t .. move without being ambushed, atta~-ked or destroyed, Though the Mission travell2d on foot for 10 days and mostly in dr~ time no ground activities of the enemy were signalled in the whole of the First Sector, In the three other Military Seotors constituting the Province of Cabe Delgado the situation is-not different,

9, Enemy activities are being carried out exclusively through air operatio~s: aerial bombardments of liberated areas, points of concentra­ tion of the population (villages, water spots, etc,), destruction of crops by incendiary bombs, napalm and chemical agents, Very limited helibor~e oyerations take place occasionally for few hours or 48 hours at maximum, Though the Mission itself did not come. under direct air attack by the enemy, it was able to hear sporadio bombardments and ' to see reconnaissance planes, helicopters, ])ODl1)a-:-a e"~d jets flying ove:c- head, bombarding and straffing the bush in neighbouring areas, In one instance enemy bomba. dment occurred sc me 4 kilometres from the itinerary_ of the Mission and some villagers were reported to have been killed or wounded. Enemy aerial ac-tion gained intensity on the 7th, 10th-, 11th, l,2th and 13th of November and one of the FRELIMO Bases was bombarded

a few hours aTter the Thlission had left, while FRELIMO's amt~-aircraft H,M,G, and artillery went· into action against enemy planes, The Mission was told that the recrudescence in air activity was exceptio­ nal and to be considered as a reaction to FRELIM0 1s successful offensive during September 1972, particularly against ·Jl!ueda .Air Base, wtioh took the enemy completely by'surfrise. (See below),

The Mission identified the enemy aircraf~s used during bombardments as:

- Cessna T-37 C Dornier :00,27 - North American Harvard T-6 - Fiat G.91 Nata Type R-4 - Alouettes 2 and 3 cw/503 (PART III) Appendix I Page 6

I 10, The enemy in his isolated post8 seems to be quite demoralised • judging from the increasingly reported number of deserters from both the metropolitan contingents and the African troops, By night the Mission could hear sporadic enemy artillery positions (Recoil Cannons) firing at random into the bush in vain attempts to keep away1guerrilla forces,

11. The Missi.on was shown a quant1. ty' of captured arms and ammuni tio1', (all this material in good condition is NATO type) as well as :~exploded fragmentation bombs (57 Kg.) French-made), tele-0ommun- , ication equipment (French-m.:W.e) as a result of FRELIM0 1e aeeaults'\O~ enemy posts, ambushed vehicles, planes and helicopters ·uot down etc,,

The Mission indentified,, among other things, the following: • Walter P.38 9 mm. Pistols (West Germany) Browning FN 9 mm. Pistols (Belgium) G 7,62 NATO type S. L. R. (West Germany) 3 FN 7.62 NATO type (Belgium) FN M.A.G. Sub-maohine guns (Belgium) 60 mm. Mortars (French-USA) 81 mm. Mortars (USA-NATO) Rocket Launchers F.44-1 (w. Germany-USA) Fragmentation hand grenades (U.S.A.)

12, The Mission was given a detailed. account on the September FRELIMO

offen~ive in Cabo Delgado.

On.i.18th September, 1972, guerrilla forces combining infantry and artillery, attacked the Portuguese Military Headquarters, Mueda, and its airfield·

destroying 18 planes and helicopters on the grou~d, blowing up matGrial stores, fuel depots and officers' quarters. A force of 800 guerrillas participated in this attack and the enemy was taken complete·ly by surprise to the ext'ent that he did not react. cMj503 (Pil.RT ru) Apper:.d.u I -· 1<,., ,, 7

FRELIMO forces have also attacked simultaneously ' 7 enemy posts in the First Sector, Paralysing him completely. One of the Planes - a harvard bomber - in.tervening from Nongalolo nearby ai;r--field was shot dcwn and crash-landed in FRELIMO positions. Inside the wreckage two bodies were found, a radio salvaged and two sub-machine guns. I

- On the 24th of September a helicopter was also shot down in the First Sector.

- On the 4th of October FRELIMO attacked the post of · Lissomo on the ocean near Mocinna de Praia, the post Commander and his.wife were killed and the guerrillas managed to liberate one African from a concentration oamp. The Mission interviewed him and was shown r official files and persor.al belongings of the Post Commander,

13. At present, the predominant features of the military situation is the spreading of the struggle to new regions towards th~ South, both in Cabo Ilelgado,. Niassa and in Tete, The progress of the struggle was made possible after FRELIMO had achieved a high 1 level of consolidation of the lib~rated areas, Such has been FRELIM0 s success that Ca~o Delgado, Niassa and Tete now provide strong and effective rear bases, both militar~ly and politically, from which forward movement can spring,

The enemy, realizing the signific.anoe of the progress ao~ieved

and ~he changes which had taken place in the military situation, decide~ to transfer the Headquarters of the general staff of its armed forces from NAMroLA, in the North, to BEIRA in the · Cer.tre of the country, l

CM/503 (PART III) f;ppencj.iz: I, Pa;,·e u

• While consolidating and strengthening control of , the libera11.1d, zones,

FRELIMO's strategy aims at ext~nding. war zones to the South and at isolating enemy positions. By constantly attacking and harassing,

FRELIMO prevented the enemy in 1972, fr~m launching any major offensive. Whenever the enemy starts to concentrate the giierrilla launches preventive strikes in order to di'sorganise its forces.

FRELIMO lead'ership and military commanders reiterated to the Mission that at present the Portuguese forces are unable to launoh major offensives in the liberated areas such as those it carried out during 1970/71 in which it concentrated, in 20 days, 55,000 soldiers and 15,000 Tons of material, The period of the dry season elapsed witho1 tany <.:o.ypossi bili ty for the Portuguese High Comma::>d to res9rt to, its

. "lass:i,c dry season offensives •·,l.:eatb.a::: · :'..;~ Caso Delgado, ¥iassa or Tete.

14. It is important to mention some observati0ns of a military character which the Mission was able to ascertain:

FRELIMO's modus operandi at present in assaulting enemy posts and positions is hy large formations (up to one thousand men 'in some cases) combining infantry aud art;i­

llery. 'It has particularl~ improved qualitatively its field artillery and anti-aircraft weapons,

The Mission was able to Witnesu i~ position:

75 mm, ·Recoiless BlO

12,7 mm.' H.M,G. (Ths 14.50 mm, Ao~. Cannon has also been introduced) 60 mm. Mortars 82 mm. Mortars Rocket Launchers It has b,een able to exert control on the lines of oc·mmunioation between the border, the 1i berated areas and war zones,

\ I. cMj503 (PART· III)

Appenr(l.iz I . l J I )l T Page 9

· --·. Transmission on enemy activities is ensured by a solid net of ·information r.nd intelligenne with the active and unconditional participation of the population and militia,

It is important to mention in this respect that the Mission was able to move-and-·change--bases as ··q'.ickly--as information ··on enell17· movemer.t was-bei!-.g signalled,

I FRELIMO-. has--e s.tablished. ...a-sys-t em--0£--oo:A trol in--~- l:Lloa.ratQd - . areas to fail enemy attempts to infiltrate agents,

The looa.l _lX>Pula1;.ion...i.s-asaumiJ'lg._j__tself'-··-t'b.e--de.fe>toe -.o.f ..

. ---·-·· . -----~~__x;l.ll~es and various localities,

- The enemy yolioy·-of- strate1ri.c_hamle'ts.. (AJ.deamer.tos) completely

--·------·--·Jailed-in Cabo Delgado, Niassa and particularly in T~e where the arms given to the population to defend thell'l.SeJ.ves··aga:inet

the so-called "ter~'btists" 1;ere. simply handed over to the guerrillas· thus--contri bu-ting to the opening o:f the new front of Manica e Jofala,

Along with the armed struggle, FRELIMO is intensifying its work of political mobilisation on all levels of its organisa- tion (armed forces,· militia, papilla ti on of- the liberated areas,. population of the combat ~ones) to the. extent that one can Speak in in the liberated areas of .a higb:ly mobilized and committ&d ·population in arms, The Mission often came across popular columns transporting material and equipment for-·-bhe _guerrillas, on foot and marching more than eight hours a day-with total-'ded.i.- -...... cation and abnegation,

15.. With the evolution of the armed struggle, the extens:ion· 0£ -the liberated areas and comba:t .. wnes, ..tlle Mission was abl1,.to saa f~ .!>taelf e.nd ·ta 'di-6'- .. - -· .ouss_at.lsngth ~ith FRELIMO leadership.and ~~litary Commanders the ne 0 ds ·-- and requirements of the Movement whicl) have necessarily increased in CM/503 (PART III) Appenjllz fl: , ~ • . l Page 10

volume and quality to equip the larger military··formations created, new recrutts, trainees and self-defence units, besides the programmes of O<•l!.SOlidation of li.bera-hed areas and the work of mobilisation and infiltration in new zones,

(:!.)-... Th.ere . .is---- ·an _incr.~asing ---demand-- for war material and equipment 1 ( Semi._J3ill;01lla:il.o .lli.,Ues 7. 62 mm. Light weapons with ammunition ( Sub-machine guns 7,62 mm. and in.f'a.n.t~pment ( 1. M. G. 7. 62 mm. ( Automatic Pistols ( Hand Grenades ( Mine Detectors

Uniforms Ground Sheets Underwares Pullovers Boots SeiQl!:S Blankets WE>.t•rrbottles Binoculars Shovels sacks

' Mugs, watches, Transistor Radios, • Soap, Jericans, Kerosene, torches greasing oil for equipment mainte­ nance, Foodstuff (dried ration), medicin~s and equipment for field medical uni ts,

TNT in block forms, fuse and electric Sabotage equipment code mines, anti-vehicle mines (T!.!,,16) &x:plosi ves (Plastic) Electric detcna-'- !tors - Dynamos · (Deto1ating cords - electri6 wire, (wire cutters.

(Pyrotechinic - chemical produ~ts (to manufacture explosives, r

CM/503 (PART III) ~ppendjl.:I: I l 1 ··~ie .:i.l

75 mm. Recoille~s B,10 Anti-Tank · Field artillery , weapons· 60 mm, Mortars and 82 mm. with ammunition, L. P, G. 2 and R. P. G, 7 Rocket \ Launchers. I Anti-aircraft weapons (12.7 mm, H.M.G, ·(Double Barrelled) with ammunition, ( 14. 50 mm. A. 1.. Cannon,

(ii) The extension of combat zones has made communication and intelligence very important for the success of the war, In Mozambique there is a serious shortage of telecommuni­ cation equipment,' As a start FRELIMO is requesting short and medium range transmission equ~pment (Man-pack).

(iii) In Mozambique the progress achieved by FRELIMO has been associated with an acute problem as to logistics, •· Needs are:

~ Sufficient means of transportation from rear bases to the border (Trucks, Land Rovers), I Supply inside Mozambique is effected by popular columns on foot and for several weeks, particularly for advanoed units~ FRELIMO is requesting the provision of beasts of traction to alleviate this problem. (Mules, Donkeys),

In most liberated areas and combat zones transport of supply through rivers, especially during the rainy season, creates immeuse problems, hence the urgent need for small pne1matic or fibre/plastic boatti,

(iv) FRELIMO leadership pointed out time and gain to the urgent need for increased financial assistance to implement its programmes of underground activities and urbaa guerrilla warefare as well as to carry out the task of national reconstruction'i::t the liberated zones, (Collective Centre~, CM/503 (PART III) Appendli.x I~ Fag," 12

Ag:;-icmltural Co-operatiTes, etc,.). The Movement has emphati­ cally mentioned in this respect that the monthly allocation it receives from the Liberation Committee for foodstuff (Shs,40,000/-) has become completely inadequate and ought tc be increased,

NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

1'. The Mission has wi'91essed in the liberated areas of Mo~ambique a gigantic effort of,•ational reconstruction and a radical transformation of the

·eolonised society in all its social, cultural, e·~onomic, administrativ\) and· political aspects; The nationalist administration is firmly establi­ shed in the liberated areas and FRELIMO has drawn up programmes with the aim of increasing production in the rural areas, of developing handicraft industry, building the bases for light industries, improving existing•resources, health conditions and educational· services,

THE PRODUCTION SYSTEM - (RECONSTRUCTION OF THE ECONOMY) l'f. The Mission ·held discussi ms· ll'i th responsible cadres for produotion, It also participated to discuss with the local population at public meetings,

FRELIM0 1s policy in the li~erated areas is aimed at eliminating all vestiges of economic organisation and exploitation ,imposed by the Portuguese and replacing it with a new economic. system appropr~•te to the needs of the country, As the econoffiY of the liberated areas is essentially agriculture, FRELIM0 1s first concern was to ensure a minimum.level of agricultural production, sufficient both to meet the people's need in food as well as the combatants and to produce some surpluses which oould •e exported in order to provid" the means for obtaining essential manufactured goods, (PAR'f'_IJiI) .,CM/503. I. .L\ppendi:t I · · . I Page 13

Strv.otural.. mobilisation also had to be made in produotion, Political mobil:j.sation in favour of ·the.co-operative mode of production has made it possible to generalise peat· 'lt mutual aid and co-operative. movement which has made· produotion efforts ..far. more effective despite the-persistent war conditions, bembihg rates, and. spraying of chemical agents. Di versification of agricul "ture was a must, to meet local r€1{:tui,rements. Production consists of-simsi.m,. castor-oil s<>eds,_ ground-nuts, cashew nu-ts, dri.ed fish, salt and bees wax, etc,

Party property

~- .. Golle-o-lrl.-.,.e ·pro]:><>rty .. ·· ....-- Individual property

:i.a to st. ··caJ_omal . .army population. Helj ported · troops come to search and loot, to _pho­ burn c~ops and grenaries. The airforce uses napalm and. Phosphorous bombs on crops. More recently; with South African h'10 help, the enemy has been using chemical. agents~- and spraying parti.cularly affected cassava,

One of the most serious bottle-ne.cks in bo'th external and internal trade is the lack of transport facilities apart from men, A man can oarry an average of 25 kilos over a dis­ tance of about 40 kilometres~ a day's march which is not nearly enough for the level of production already.reached and for the internal a,rid external tra,de requireme~ts for the liberated areas. There exist also craft-based light industry tendencies (carving, salt extracting, manufacture of element&ry' agricultural impliments, though there is a serious shortage in the necessary tools for agriculture in' the liberated areas). CM/503 (PART III) Ap,:endix I · ,, Page 14

Trade is transacted on a barter basis and Protuguese currency is no longer usea •. People's stores, organised by FRELIMO, are in the process of establishment throughout the liberated ar·eas where the villagers may exchange their produce under the barter system for basic necessities such as clothing, cooking utensils and other manufactured goods, Local produoe is stored for use of the liberatio~ army and for distributioa in regions where th'ere is a shortage or the destruction of cl.'ops, The, surplus is exported in exchange for manufactured goods needed by the population.

The Eliucational System:

The deve).opment of education is one of the highest priorities in the programme of national reoonstruotion. FR;irrLIM0 1s. policy for tile liberated areas aims at rapid elimination of illiteracy, Schools are organised and centrally administered by FRELIMO • ... • The Mission 'visited an Infantario (Nursery) where 54 children from 7 to 10 yoars of age were boarded. They were either orphans of the war of liberation or children of combatants. The Centre is run by solidier nurses,

Tba responsible cadres for education i~formed the Mission that in one District, Nangade, there exist 11 elementary schools with 1104 students,

Health Conditions:

The.~im is to provide health services to active freedom_ f~ghters and to the population of the liberated areas in general. Medical facilities are under the direction of FRELIM0 1 s Military_ Command. Hospitals located at Military Bases give first priority to the treatment of wounded CM/503 (PART III) AA>penqix I • L. 15

combatants'and to the victims of Portuguese bombardments from the civilian. population, The Mission was told, however, that the efforts of the health service were hampered by the serious lack of medical eQuipment and supplies, especially suppl.ies of anti··biotics, anti-parasitic drugs and vaccines, There was a similar shortage of vitamins and protein diet as well as food supplement. Another difficulty is the transport situation, It is not easy to carry seriously~wounded or sick people to FRELIMO hospitals at rear bases,

Because of the difficulties of war, it is impossible to establish proper di'et. So in these areas mulnutri tion of all kinds is endemic, Diseases here are plenty, virulent and mortality is exceedingly high because of the empoverished life, malnutrition and water situation, Hospitals in these areas are rudimentary because it is impossible to establish proper hospitals for fear'of enemy attacks, lack of facilities and trained personn.el.

The most common diseases ar~: malnutrition, dystenry, baoterial and amoebic, ·resulting from the consumption 9f filthy water; tropical ulcers and helmintic diseases suoh as Ankylostomial (hook worm), tape worm, ascariasis (round worms) and bilharzia1 malaria, pneumonia, tuberculosis and leprosy/ sleeping sickness, hydrocoeles and eye disease,

Medical facilities a~·

There are, however, ways which could help these areas improve in this. field, First on the list is the fast recovery of th.e · economic situation, This process has already been started by

FREL~O in their programmes of national reconstruction, Next • CM/503 (PART III) Apps11di:it·I Paf!;e l•

.is the improvement of sources of water in these areas. Better wells could be construoted. and protected to reduce diseases. Rsga.rd,iJl€_)'llitr1tion, to start with, thes~ areas must bs helped with foodstuffs, espaoiaJ.),y in .oJ>ganiz~ habi.t....,,.. .su<>b, as schools, nurseries and hospitals.

<),. .i.;....,.... .,.. ~valen;t now, a steady supply of drugs is weeded

and also a tra.i~ P"'~ £=. --~ to :thii;i j<>l>. i-" lJl.'gent.J.¥ ;i:-equired.

jttwara Hospital:

The Mtwara Hospitn~. a • small_ pharmacy and a laboratory. Most of the facilities are meaf!;re in comparison to the amount of work which is pQ~~ 1\'l the hospital, The hospital was opened in 1970 and was meant not only to oater for the injused FRElJ:M) soldiers, ~t for ~he masses in the liberated areas.

The hospital gets its medical supplies from-donations from friendly organizations and governments. The Liberation Committee has not yet been able to offer very substantial aid,

Besides the hospital, there is an annex at Kianga village where the recuperant patients and those receiving ambulatory out-patient treatment. This Camp consists of two buildings which are furnished with double-decker beds, Here it must be emphasized that the greatest problem facing FRELIMO is accommodation and food for these people,

To try and reduce some costs of food FRELIMJ has opened a "shamba" for the patients. They are taken to work when they feel well enough to do so, \

CM/503 (PART III), • Appendix I •, Page 17

During the Mission's visit FRELHD urgently asked for weight· scales for babies and adults, as well as anti-biotics.

There are, at the moment, plans -Go expand the hospital and the cost of expansion will be met· by the Dutch' Government.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMWJENDATIONS

20. Having spent 10 days in the liberated areas of Caba Delgado province in Mozambigue, familiarising itself with the.

prevailing situation in these a~eas; holuing lengthy discussions and exchange of views on mj.li tery developments in various fronts and combat zones 1ri th FRELH!O leadership, Military Commanders, Poli ti cal Commissars, responsible

cadres, s~ldiers ·of the National Liberati a~' Army, Civilian • population of the liberated areas; visj:bing FRELIMO 1 s I operational bases, oentreu, schools, hospitals, co-operatives; the Mission fe1els that it is in a T)osition to submit to 'the Liberation Committee its conclusions and recommendations.

The. Ex:ecuti ve Secretariat t~'usts ".ohat they would receive the serious consideration they deserve on the part of the

Committee and would contribute', ·bo fur~,her and enhance the armed struggle waged by FRELI'!'ftJ in Mozambigue. I

21. The armed struggle in Mozambigue continues to progress. FRELIMJ, while consolidating the liberated areas in Cabo Delgado, Niassa a,-id Tete, has 8Xtended its operational ' .. ' zones further South and has oper.<;d new fronts.

22. FRELIMO has re-organized 'its forces, both guan~itatively 1 and gualitatively, oarry.ing out systematic assaults on Portugl.1-ese posts, harassing its cc·nvoys and disrupting its lines of communications. ,Portliguese posts in liberated areas have become besieged garrisons, being supplied solely by air, unable to communicate by land· without being ambushed, attacked or destroyed, I CM/503 (PART III) APPENDIX I Page 18

23. The Mission found FRELIM0 1 s strategy militarily sound, pa~ticularly by carrying out:

offensive action aiming a"h disorgani1>.ing the ene;;iy forces and preventing him from concentrating the superior means at its disposal;

~urprise attacks on its airfields and installations, using large formations, combining infantry and. artillery which adds to its demoralization.

This strategy has prevented the enemy from launching any major offensive during the period under review.. Moreover, FRELIJ[) succeeded in foiling enemy attempts to commit guerrilla forces to fight on defensive ·fortified perimetres as in _the oase of the Cabora Bassa area; instead while containing the enemy it managed to extend its operational • zones further South and to open a new front, Manica e Sofala, in the oentre of the country heavily populated and where the-economic interests of the colonialists are.

24. In the liberated areas, though the enemy has lost the initiative on the ground, he is_ still master of the sky and is using this superiority to the maximum by frequent air bombardments and straffing of suspected points of concentration of FRELIMO cadres as well as the civilian

population, He is also resorting to ~idespread indiscri­ ' minate bombing of villages, the use of napalm, inoendiary, fragmentation bombs, defoliants and various types of chemical agents to subdue the_ population by means of famine and starvation.

25. Most of the captured enemy material and equipment displayed to the Mission was of NATO type, originating from NATO countries. CM/503 (P.A:RT III) Appendix I 1 Page 19

~-• Everywhere-th'e...Missior.-wi1;r.e.ssed the presence of a strong organisation - FRELIMO - with capable -leadership and c. dres, deeply united with the masses,

27.• In the liberated areas visited by the Mission the colonial administrative machi:;.ery x:o longer exists and has- beep. rep.laced by a !lew natior.al administrative and poli tioal organisation ooverlllg every facet of community life, The Mission was impressed by the. enthusiastic and .whole-hearted· <"o-operatioll. and support FRELIMO receives from the people in the liberated

areas a~d the extent· to whi~h they are.participating in the administrative machinery set up by FRELIMO--and .. fur-the--variowi . ' __ pro~·-of-n.a:ti.Dnal .:Ceo-Ol'.Etrll.."'1;i.o11 • • . -· ·::n. As to the enemy, the Exeo..itive Secretariat is in no way minimis~ its potential a..~d responsibilities, On the-contra.rj'·he is expected in the coming mont!:s to ex 'rt .all efforts-.and.depl

on the part of South Afri~an and Ian· Smith's rebel regime in the war in Mozambique. Their physical inv©lvement will increase with Portuguese reverses.

' 28, ·on the other hand as FRELIMO extends its operational zones, it will no do'·llt encour.ter vast problems as to· logistics, armaments, recruitment, foodstuff, mobilisation work, etc, Hence the necessity for the Liberatic.n Commitee to be in a position to cope with the exigencies of the armed struggle,

29. The Mission recommends to the Liberation Cammi ttee that the requests submitted hy FRELIMO and endorsed by tiie Ex:ef'utive Secretariat as set out above in paragraph 15, be met, especially the provision for: ·

Light armament with ammunition CM/503 (PART III) Appendix I Page 20

Infantry equipment Artillery weapons with ammunition Anti-aircraft weapons with ammunition Sabotage equipment. Transmission equipment; Logistics (trucks, Land Rovers, Boats) Medicines and medical equipment,

It is also of paramount importance that the monthly allocations for FRELIMO for foodstuff and fuel be increased •.

30,· The Executive Secretariat would like to put emphasis on the FRELIWil reuqests for increased financial assistance to implement its programmes for boosting the urhan guerrilla action, since it has started to operate in· the vicinty· of cities and heavily populated agglomerations.

31. As FRELIM0 1s new opera,tional zones are at present along the border with Rhodesia, it is a must that the Zimbabwe Western Front be militarily activated to prevent Smith's troops from assisting the Portuguese in Tete and Manica e Sofala which they are doing already. Hence the necessity of reconciling the activities of both ZAPU and ZANU under the Joint Military Command with FRELI!l:08s strategy. In other words, the crisis within Zimbabwean Liberation Movements should be resolved and the J.M.C. be put '>n foot at all costs. The Bx:ecutive Secretariat considers that the armed strug~le in Southern Africa must be taken as an indivisible whole and that t.he struggle waged in Mozambique and Angola cannot be dissociated from the struggle in South Africa and Rhodesia,

3?., The Executive Secretariat strongly feels that the Liberation Committee's action should concentrate particularly on consoli­ dating the liberated areas so as to be strong~r rear bases from which further advance to the 3outh could sprL1g.

\ CM/503 (PART III) Appendix I Page 21

33, The Mission wishes to place on record its appreciation to the Leaders of FRELIMO, in particular to its President, Comrade Samora Machel, for the constant assistance and

co-op~ration~ and for the facilities they have placed at the Mission's disposal during its visit to the liberated areas of Mozambique. A particularly warm tribute is due ' t~-' the officials and cadres of FRELIMO who accompanied the · Miasion throughout its visit,

.t' ' ·-

\

• c

•

• • CM/503 (PART III) APPENDIX II

COUNCIL OF -MINIS'l'ERS __ _ Twenty-First Ordinary Session -~--.. ·-- Addis Ababa - May 1973

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT'S MISSION TO THE--~-­ • LIBERATED AREAS IN GUINEA BISSAU

(From 7 to 16 November 1972)

"

•

• CM/503 (Part III) Appendix II Page 1

.REPORT OF THE EXECU~'IV~ SF::?RETARIAT • ON ITS MISSION TO THE LIBERATED • AREAS IN GUINEA BIS~A:Q:

( (FROM 7 t,,~ 16_.lIDYWMBER l9]J)

PURPOSE OF THE MISSION AND ITS ACTIVITIES• / '

1. The Executive Secretariat feit that the evolution of the poli tioo- mili tary situation in Guinea.Bissau and the crucial phase of the armed struggle reached by P, A. I. G, C, necessi.tated a thorough assessment of the situation on the spot.

At the present juncture rounC: up d:i.soussions ui th P.A. I. G., C. leadership were of paI·amount importa:nce to find ways and means to strengthen PlA. I. G. C, action both militarily and poli tioally.

The Executive Secretariat also felt that consultations with officials of the host country, the Republic of Giinea, deeply committed .to the support of the. liberation strugg1e, and shoulderin.g a great part of the burden of the war as 3. strong :>:>ear oass fc'r P.A. I. G, C,, were not only • useful but impe.ra.tive.

It had also to look into the work of 'the Libe1-ation Ccmmi ttee 1 s ·Sub-Office in Conakry and assess· its action after one year of operation, O.A. U, Training Centres in Wes b 1'.frioa were also to be inspected,

2, The Mission was composed of•

Major Hashim llibi ta Executive Sec:cetary Mr. Ahmed M. Sidky Assistant Executive Secretary (In Charge cf Defence) • Major M'Zemba,Keita Director of the Sub-Regional Officer Conakry, • Capt. S. Makaranga Military Ex:pert (Hgrs,) Mr. Bala Kouyate Staff membei· of the Sub­ Regional Of:i'ice ;.:1 Conakry, • \

CM/503 (Part III) .l\,ppendix II page 2

• 3. The a~tivities of the Mission for the time it spent in Guinea Bissau and the ~epublic of Guinea were as follows;

A. The Mission was met at Conakry by Mr. Aristides Pereira,

Deputy Seere~ary-General of P.A. I. G. C, and Jllr, Victor Maria, Member of the Executive Committee with whom the itinerary of its visit to the liberated areas of Guniea Bissau was worked out,

·B, A visit to the liberated areas of the Southern Front (Balana - Kitafine Seo~or). Base of the Southern Command,

Control base at Kandiafra Base of the Political Commissariat for the Southern Sector. Military base of the Southern Command Anti-aircraft batteries covering the border area A Fi.eld Hospital at Donka A Co-operative Centre for production and marketing (Peoples' Stores) Attended mass public meetings.

·C, A visit to the liberated areas of the Eastern Front (Madina da Bar Sector) - P.A.I.G,C, Politico/Military Orientation Centre.

D, A visit to P.A.I.v.c. Hospital in Bake.

E. A visit to PAIGC pilot school and kindergarten in Conakry F. Inspection of OAU Training Centres in West Africa. G. The Mission held discussions in Conakry with

• The Secretary-General· of P,A.I,G,c., Mr. Amilcar Cabral and. members of the • Ex:ecutive Committee The Minister of Defence of the Republic of Guinea The Deputry Foreign Minister·of the Republic. of Guinea The Minister of Justice of the Republic of Guinea The Governor of Boke Province.

H. The Mission was privileged to be received b~ His Ex:ecellency­ President Ahmed Sekou Toure of the Republic of Guinea. CM/503 (Part III) Appendix II Page 3 ' • 4, An account of the visit, together wHh the Mission 1 s .observations, ' conclusions and rebommendations, is set out below.

OBSERVATIONS OF 'I'HE MISSION:

5~ From,its visits to th£' liberated zones in the Southern and

Eas~ern fronts as well as form discussions with P.A.I.G.C. leadership, Military Commanders, Political Commissars,. Responsible Cadres for Production, Health, Educationmd Social Welfa~e, the Mission is in a position to make the fellowing observations: I

The Military Situation:

6. ·_ It ·is a well known fact that after ten years of armed struggle, the P.A.I.G,C. has succeeded in liberating mere than two-thirds of the

national te~ritory and is administering large liberated areas where it exercises all attributes of _sovereignty.

7. In the Southern Sector visited by the Mission, Portuguese forces are entrenched in few isolated posts in the liberated areas. These posts are besieged by P.A.I.G.C, forces and constantly attacked er harassed. The remaining enemy posts in .the Balana-Kitaf.ine Seater, along the border are Aldeia, Formose, Guiledge and Cadamael, They are heavily fortified and supplied by air. In general the enemy has evacuated most of its fortified positions and withdrawn to the ooean where it oan def·end them through sea power. Enemy activities are carried out by air operations: aerial bombardments of liberated areas, points of concentration cf the population, destruction of crops and -livestock by incendiary bombs, napalm·and chemical agents • • 8. Commander "Nine", Chief of Staff of P.A. I. a. C. Army and member ' • of the 1High Council cf War, emphasized to the Mission that the enemy enjoys total supxemacy on the air and overwhelming power on the sea and rivers,aud... :hat it was imperative for P.A.I.G,c. in order to nulliiT

that sui-:,···~naoy to utilise more advanced technical means. The Mission has, in ihis respect, observed the fellowing:

' , CM/503 (Part III) Appendix II , page 4

• That the Po11tuguese air f'oroe has of' late intensified its bombardments and burning of' villages in an attempt to destroy and sweep away signs of' P.A. I. G, C. sovereignty in the liberated areas. In the Southern' Seotor, the Mission came aotoss one village 11 Tchinchidi" which has been bombed and burnt several times. It was also reported during our :presence in the Southern Sector that the enemy was bombing f'or the second oonsecutive week the area of 11 Tombali 11 in the Catio Sector. During the last three months enemy air action has been particularly severe against border villages, but significant enough the population stayed working in the rice fields.

The Mission trav, lled twice for more than 4 hours on the Balana River - main route of supply for the Southern Front and noticed that most of' P.A.I.G.C. and population movements on , rivers are effected by night to evade enemy reconnaissance and air attacks, wreckage of' boats destroyed by the enemy was olearly seen in different spots. Though P.A.I,G.O. has succeeded in de,stroying and sinking a big number of enemy boats on the rivers with light artillery, the enemy ,is st.ill using them unchallenged due to air cover,

That P.A.I.G.C, has not got enough or adequate antiaircraft weapons to cover all the liberated areas. The Mission visited the site of' an A.A. Batteries covering the border area and met the personnel manning them who had also been a week earlier involved in important engagements. In position were:

;I 12 • 7 mm, ( 4-Barrelled) - · 14,5 mm. 37 mm. Cannon. . It was obvious that these weap,ons, though suitable f'or the area visited, were too heavy f'or tactical deployment inside the country, . CM/503 (Part III) Appendix II Page 5 •

• The Mission could hear sporadic artillery fire from nearby Portuguese posts, shelling guerrella key positions and routes supply. The ~act that these posts are heavily fortified makes P.A.I.G,C, assaults often costly due to ~he lack of Long Range artillery. In this respect P.A.I.G.O. arsenal consists' mainly of:

82 mm. mortars

75 mm. Recoiless gun RPG 2 and 7 (Rocket Launchers) 122 mm, Rocket Launchers (in limited numbern).

10. TransILission equipment used by P.A.I. G, C. is ej.ther not adequate for jungle warfare or very limited in range and therefore create diffi­ culties as to the co-ordination of infantry action as well as the correction of ground artillery fire.

11. In the Eastern Front visited by.the Mission (Madina Da Boe Sector) the military situation is different from the ,South. The area is not heavily populated. In this Sector the liberated zones are vast and in an area • of 3,600 sq, Km. adjacent to the border not even a single enemy post exists since the P.A.I,G.C, big offensive in 1969. In order to reach the first Portuguese·posts it is necessary to march 4 days, and P.A.I.G,0, is using ~ehioles up to 15C' Km. inside the libera·~ed zones. In this Sector Portuguese offensives are non-existent and the enemy realizes that the bombing of combatants would not achieve results. Its strategy there is purely defensive especially in Gabu and Bafata Sectors.

12. At Madina da Boe, where the Command of the Eastern Sector is based, the Mission visited PAIGC's Politico-Military orientation Centre for the formation and training of cad.res to the armed forces. The school, which • started in 1969, has at present 35n cadres besides Instructors and Political Commissars. It represents one of the greatest P.A.I.G,C. achievements, for its main objective is the integra.tion of cadres coming from different regions and tribal background into one single and homogenous fighting force, Training takes usually. two or three months. Morsovar,. aot.ivities of the school are not limited to training and proViding educa­ tion, the centre is also entrusted with the inculcation of a high level of national consciousness not only·to cadres under training but also to ·cM/503 (Part III) Appendix II Page 6 • all other oadres serving in the army or having other activities, especially those who have returned from abroad after accomplishing missions or undertaking studies for a number of years and might have lost during thJt period touch ~ith the realities and conditions in the country, The Mission visited the school premises, looked into military, educational, health and social programmes, Cadres displayed self'-defenoe and close combat e:x:ero.ises. i-lome of the instructors and oadres were previously enrolled in the "African Forces" of t4e Portuguese army and have joined the ranks of P.A.I,G,C,

13. The liberated areas are divided into three military zones (North, South, and East) administered each by a National Committee and one Military Command. The "Superior Cou_noil of War" directs the armed struggle, Besides the National Regular Army (Army Corps), local armed forces (units of self'­ defenoe) are organised by Regions, and plans are underway to bring the local forces to the level of the Regular Army; some local units have already participated in assnults against enemy positions, • To each Army Corps is attached a group o_f artillery; plans for restruoturation of the artillery for more mobility are-near·oompletion,

14. P,A.I.G.C. military action is mainly characterised by systematic assults against enemy posts and positions, combining heavy artillery and large infantry formations. While intensifying attacks against enemy convoys and means of transportation on the roads and rivers, P.A.I.G.C. has started, since the beginning of the year, developing commandos' action and sabotage against urban centres (Bissau - the Capital, Bafata, Gabu and Fa:x:im have been attacked by 122 mm. Rockets more than once during the period under review).

15. The Portuguese polioy of· the 11 afrioanisation of the war" is on the way to total collapse. Military Commanders and the Secretary-General .. of P.A.I.G.c., Mr, Amiloar Cabral, on numerous occasions introduoe'd to the Mission Officers and soldiers from the enemy "African Forces" who \ 'had deserted and joined the PAIGC Army with their arms and equipment in most oases. "

CM/503 (Part III) Appendix II page 7

Work of Mobilisation:

16, Along with the armed struggle, F.A.I.G.i'• is intensifying its work of politioal mobilisation on all levels of its organization (armed forces, local defence forces, :population of the liberated areas; oomoat zones and the inhabitants of Cape Verde Islands).- It exercises llA eff$0o't;ivs a.dm,inistrative cont.rol on more of two-thirds of the national territory (except Cape Verde Islands) with signs and attributes of ~~izy, ( •ainea Bissau has an area -0f app:i.ox~ma:b~ }7-,J)OO 1>q,. Km• l•

court records - medical statistics birth certifioates and oivio status * school attendance cards Ls.issez--passer

• .:i.JiV<>j.PO"l .a.I)'\ ~.,q ~i_pts

~' i;he Party enjoys the total SU.p1>0r-1' of the population whifh.. 'af;ively participates in the work of na:no.na:J. ~.,..,~~OA and the

~ffort• The Population is fully aware that after 10 years ~f !U"Olet,, war .. •' •t:ruule it has 'iQQ for itself the right to self-government.-

llleotions for Regional Councils and the People's National Assembly: Declaration on the "existence of the State of Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde Islands".

The Mission discussed at length with Mr • .Amilcar Cabral on the future political developments in Guinea Bissau in the light of his 11 intervention before the U.N. General As'sembly 1 s Committee on Trustee­ ship and Non-Sell-Governing Territories, in October this'year, to the effeot 'that Guinea (Bissau) will be declared an independent State by the end of 1972 or early 1973. The P.A.I.G.C. Secretary-General explained that the People of Guinea (Bissau) had already achieved self-determination through 10 years of armed struggle and possessed all the components of sovereignty, C!1Ij503 (Part III) Appendix II page 8

He added that P.A. I. G, C, had been considering such a s.tep since 1969 but had preferred to .wait until all the conditions gathered,

He went on to say,

11 Now, how.ever, these r_,ondi tions had been fulfilled because the people had already achieved self-determination by liberating more than two-thirds of the territory and by establishing a sovereign political, economic, social and cultural entity, In other words, CLlinea (Bissau) was in fact

an independent State, part of whose territory was occupied by a foreign ll.!J~, 11

L 8. Mr, Cabral explained further that the elections for the People's National Assembly was to be oarried out' in two phases, The first of which - 'elections for the Regional Councils - were completed in early October, 1972, with heavy participation from the population of the liberated areas, In the second 'phase of the elections - which was to

start soon - the Councillors of each region ~rnuld elect one-third of their members to represent the region as Deputies in the People's National Assembly, which would be composed of 120 Deputies, of whom 40 would be representatives of P.A.I,G.C, from the Northe:cn, Southern, Eastern Regions and the Bijagos Islands, and Sci would be representatives of mass organiza- ' . tions, suoh as the "Union of Guinean Workers",' the 11 Un{on of Youth and Students" and the "Union of Guinean Homen",

19. Upon completion of elections for the People's National Assembly P.A. I. G, C, will declare Th~_Exi~eJ1:.~_£[__1'._~ "Si!ate of Guinea• (Bissau} and Cape Verde Islar.ds" and the establi.shmen-o of a National Executive without prejudicing the fight and the pursuit of war. From this stage, the new State shall ask for reoogni ti on· an.d integration with the OAU and shall also request the' U.N. for representation within the U,N, system and its specialised agencies as.observer or associated members, From there the new 'state will act step by. step to occupy its rightful pla~e, taking into consideration the real situation in the country and the fact that parts of its territory would be still occupied by foreign troops, with all what suoh a situation entails in I!1ternational Law, I

\

\ CM/503 (Part III) Appendix II page 9

Educational System:

20. The development of education is ·one of the highest priorities in the programme of PAIC1C reconstruction, The Party policy for the liberated the rapid elimination of illiteracy, From the outset of areas aims at I the liberation struggle, a mass literaoy oampaign has been in for,oe. P.A.I,G,C, has established more than 200 schools in the liberated area,

wi~h a.n enrolment in exc·ess of 20,000 students. These schools are organised and centrally administered by the Party,

The P.A.I,G.c., with the help .it receives from friendly countries

and UNESCO program~e, has already printed its own toxt books in History, Geography, Arithmetio, Grammer; eto.

21. The Mission visited in Conakry, Republic of Guinea, the following institutions run by P.A.I.G.C, g

Kindergarten with 68 children (between 6 and 8.years of age) all of them either orphans of war or oombatantsm children; . I '• Secondary pilot school· with 118 pupils ohosen according to merit from e~ementary schools in the liberated ~reas.

Health Conditions:

22. The organization of health services is being given a high ~riority I within the national reconstruction.scheme with the aim of providing treatment to aotive freedom fighters and to the population of the liberated areas in general. Medical services are under the direction of the P,A,I,G,C. Military Command.

23. There exists a Central Hospital for each of the three military fronts:

:Soke ·in the South - Republic of Guinea Koundara in .the North / East Republic of Guinea Zinguinohor in the Republio o,f Senegal, -,-

CM/503 (Part III) Appendix II page 10

in the P.A.I.G.C. ,has also 9 Field Hospitals and 116 Dispensaries by medical • liberated areas. Hospitals and Field Hospitals are run while doctors (foreign volunteers or nationals of Guinea Bissau) disponsaries are run by Medical Assistants. Field Hospital 24. In the Southern Sector the Mission visited a Mobile of W>unded combatants (Donka area). It gives first priority to the treatment operations).' and to victims of Portuguese bombardments (minor surgical general. The Subject to this, treatment is given to sick persons in Medical Donka Field Hospital gives also First Aid training for Assistants, giving 25, The Mission also visited the P,A,I,G.C, Bake Hospital alike. It has treatment to serious oases of combatants and civilians 76 beds and consists of: an operation room Radiology room Pharmachology room • A Laboratory Medical Doctors •, It is run by a P.A. I. G. C, Medical Doctor and 5 Yugoslav and Specialists. anti­ The mission was told that there exi,sts a laok in anti-biotics, Assistants are parasi tic drugs and vaccines. Specialised trained Medical situation is very limited in' number. On the other hand the transport carried from creating serious problems since most important cases are and then by a ihe front and combat zones in the South, to the border ver,.r rough road to Boke. Mission that 26, The Secretary-General of the Party informed the in forming 600 P.A.I.G.C. succeeded during the years of the struggle are studying Medical Doctors and Nurses and that at present 497 cadres \ I abroad,

• l

\ CM/503 (Part III) Appendix II page 11

The Produotion System - (Reconstruction of the Eoonomy)

27; The Mission held discussions with responsible cadres for production. The P.A.I.G.C. policy in the liberated areas is aimed at eliminating all signs of economic' exploitation imposed by the oolonial system and replacing it with a new eoonomic organization appropriate to the need of the country. PAIGC 1s" first 'concern -is to ensure a minimum level of agricultural production, sufficient both to meet the people's need in food as well as the combatants, and to produoe some surpluses whioh would be exported in order to provide the population with the basin necessities of life,

A system of co-operative farming has been created and the main :produata to-day are groundnuts,. rice, palm kernels and palm oil~ kola nuts and wax,

Sinoe the commencement of the armed struggle in each village has been created a Committee (Comite de Ease) composed of 5 members which is ~: the political adjllinistrative organ res-ponsible for the produotion, and each family contribu~es to the Party a oertain quantity of a,grioultUl'al food for supply of the armed forces.

Trade is transacted on a barter basis through peoplefs co­ operative shops and Portuguese currency is no longer used, People's ' Stores, organised by the P,A.I.G.c., exist throughout the liberated areas where the villagers may change their produce under the barter system for such needs as clothing, cooking utensils and other manufao­ ture' goods. Looal produce accumulated at the People's Stores is used fo.r the needs of the Liberation Army and for distribution in Regions where shortage may ooour; the surplus is exported to neighbouring, countries. The P.A. I. G. C, exports quantities of rice, kola nuts, beeswax and crocodile skins.

The Responsibles for produotion informed the Mission that the People's Stores are in need of tobacco, cloth, material for clothing, sewing machines and agricultural impliments., '· r

CM/503/(Part III) Appendix II Page 12.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS • In 'the light of the above observations, the Mission feels that it is in a position to submit to the Liberation Committee 'the following findings, oonolusions and recommendations on its visit to the liberated areas of Guinea (Bissau):-·

28, After 10 years' of armed struggle the P.A.I.G.C. has

succeeded in ~iberating more than two-thirds of the national territory and the Portuguese High Command in.Guinea (Bissau) has acme to the conclusion that the colonial war cannot be won by military means,

29, Vast areas in the North, South and East have been liberated and the P_.A.I.G.C. is exercising effective control and administration in these areas and enjoys full support on the part of the poyulation which is actively pa:rticipating in the effort of war. Everywhere the Mission witnessed the "• presence of a strong organisation, P.A.I.G.C,, with able leadersh;i.p, cadres and a population all geared ,towards armed struggle a,nd national I:'econstruction t,o the extent tha'i one can speak confidently of the achievements which symbolize all necessary facets of sovereignty,

30. The armed struggle in Guinea Bissau co~tinues to progress, P.A.I,G.C. armed forces and local defence forces are daily engaged in fight against positions still held by the enemy, Isola,ted Portuguese posts iri the liberated areas are syste­ matically assaulted·by infantry and artillery, the enemy has been compelled to evacuate many of its posts which it has not been able any more to hold. The P.A.I.G.C. has started, since the beginning of the year, to launch bold atta,oks,

commando operations and sabotages against ~he urban oentres, while in the Cape Verde Islcinds the mobilisation.of the people is making important progress preparing the ground for a new phase of struggle. CM/503/(Part III) Appendix II Page 13

The Portuguese policy of the "Afr.icanisa ti on of ihe war" i 31. by using African troops has comp~etely failed and deserters in growing numbers come everyday to join the guerrilla ranks.

32. The enemy action is being characterised mainly by intensive air bombardments ag~inst the liberated areas and its population in an attempt to destroy all signs of sovereignty.

Villages 1 livestock and crops are frequently bombed or destroyed through the use of napalm, incindi~ry bombs and chemical agents. Few and very limited heliborne operations take place.

33. P.A.I.G.C. is continuing to consolidate the liberated areas, establishing schools, hospitals, people's tribunals,

~eople 1 s Stores, Co-operatives and other services. It has successfully carried out the first ppase of elections inside the country, the Regional Council elections thus realising self-government and elections for the People's National Assembly would be held soon,

34, On the military side,. though checked '1nd isolated in posts and urban centres, the enemy is able to carry on its colonial war due to the following•

(i) increased help from its allies in NATO in sophisticated material and equipment (fighter bomber jets, bombers, helicopters, transport ships, patrol boats, minesweepers, milit'1ry vehicles, all types of NATO weapons and ammunition) NATO assistance to Portugal is

enabling ~he enemy High Command in very short periods to replace means and equipment destroyed by the guerrillas • .., CM/503/(Part III) Appendix II Page 14

• (ii) The enemy enjoys an absolute supremacy in the s!Cies, using most sophisticated aircr~fts (Fiat G,91, Sabre, etc.) while PAIGC's anti­ aircraft defence is very limited, unable to cover the whole liberated o.re.i.s, Large zones are completely without anti-aircraft weapons, leaving the enemy free tc move with impunity,

(iii) The enemy has also complete supremacy on the sea and on murnerous rivers in the country. The Portuguese fleet, though limited in number, is able to bring in wi•hout challenge all kinds of cargoes and transport of troops. On the other hand though PAIGC attacks enemy patrol P.oa ts and mo.tor launches with- ligh:t .. artillery from the rivers' banks its action is not quite effective due to the fact that these em)arkations are usually protected from the air, while most ·

o' guerrilla movements on the rivers are effected by I ni.ght to evade reconn.i.issance and air bomb..i.rdmen·t.

(iv) The P.A.I,G,C. is lacking long range artillery (15 30 Km) to hammer enemy main positions and urban centres which are usually heavily fortified, Guerrilla attacks against these positions are sometimes costly.

(v) The P.A.I.G.C. is badly in need of more ammunition for its artillery weapons to eubdue enemy positiens. it is necessary at the present stage of the war to utilise a bigger quantity of ammunition fer the purpose of saturation and a stronger impact. ' '

(vi) Means of transportation. for supplying the various • fronts are either inadequate or limited suoh as, 4-wheel drive trucks and motor-boats. CM/503/(Part III) Appendix II I ~age 15

(vii) Financial assistance that P.A.I.G.C. receives from the O.A.U. or on bilateral ·basis from some Af:t•ican countries is fa.r from corresponding to the new exigencies of the struggle as well as to the administration of the vast zones already liberated.

35., From the above consi.der":tions, it is clear that the armed struggle in Guinea (Bi.ssau) has re~ched a crucial stage. All means should therefore be pu·G at the disposal of P.A.I.G.c. to enable it overcome the difficulties it encounters and nullify or neutralise the enemy advantages · ' or supremacy in the military sphere. Unless a substantial and adequate assistance is granted to P.A.I.G.C., a _ stalemate in the war is ~.nevi table, with the Portuguese holding fortified positions and urbc.n centres, the guerrillas continuing to assault these positions and to hold the countryside without any decisive conclusion on the terr

36. The Executive Secretariat discussed at length with P.A.I.G.C. , leadership and Military Commanders the Party's urgent needs and requests whi.oh are listed below, The Secretariat • trusts that they would receive the serious consideration they deserve on the part of the Li bera,tion Cammi ttee in order to bring the armed struggle in Guinea Bissau to a successful end. In that way will be fulfilled the hope expressed by the Heads of.State and Govarnment of Africa at their meeting .in Addis Ababa in June 1971, that at least one African territory will be totall;y J.i beru.' ted. from colonialism ii). / the two or three years to come. CM/503/(Part III) Appendix II Page 16

NEEDS ARE:-

(J.') Nava l Eguipment:

Motor boats or Launches (Light - 40 Knots - armed) for action, patrol and control of ' costs against enemy transport and supply

ships as well as the control of rive~·s. This type of equipment could be mostly needed ' for operutions at -::ha entrance of'•Bissau · (Canal do Ge ba) ••....•..•• ( any number)

Pneumatic boats for 4/6 and 8/12 persons without board motors for supplying variou·s fronts and liberated areas ••••••• (any number)

Two or three boats (large autonomy)' armed for liaison with Cape Verde Islands: (16 Knots)

Naval mines.

(ii) Anti-Aircraft Weapons and Ammuni'tions:

Heavy A.A. on the level of the border: 3 7 mm., 14,.5 mm, 12.7 mm 2 and 4-barrelled. Light A.A. on the level of various fronts, combat zones and. liberated areas:

12.7 mm simple H.M.G.

Man-pack' anti-aircraft·missile (carried ~nd fired by one man - weighs 13 Kg.) • Type: Red-eye, American-made or Eastern type equivalent weapon. This missile with its expandable launching· tube, has proved to be, with its auto direction device, a d·eadly weapon for interception of aircrafts and helicopters flying at low altitude. CM/503/(~art III) Ap:pendix II Page 17

(iii) Artillery and Infantry Weapons with Ammunition: r Long-Range artillery_ (15 - 30 Km) to be used against enemy f-ortified positions and urban centres. Heavy artillery at the .level of the border; Light in the various operational zones.

More ~rtillery wea:pons and ammunition from type already used by P.A.I.G.C.

Mortar 82 mm 75 mm Recoiless Rocket wunchers R.P.G.2 (40 mm-.) ammunition badly needen. Rocket Launchers R.P.G.7 Rocket Launchers 122 mm (Type GRAD-P) improved version for 15 - 18 Km. Range.

(iv) Transmission Equipment suitable for Jungle:

Medium Range for co-ordination of Infantry action. ' Short Range for coDrecting artillery fire.

(Transmission equipment presently used - R,104,

E~stern -type, direct waves - not suitable for - Jungle communication) • • (v) Means of Transport to improve the Supply of Various Fronts and Liberated Zones

Trucks, 4-wheel drive (Mercedes, Berliet, Zil 131, GAZ 66, MAZ.). Jeeps, Land Rovers, Ambulances. Pueuma tic boats ( ou:~boards) Fuel and lubricants.

(vi) Infantry Eguipment:

Uniforms, boots, water bottles, hamacks, I sac a dos, mosquito nets, etc.

(vii) Financial Assistance to continue the war, and to cope with the situation in the liberated areas. GM/503/(Part III) Append.ix II ·Page 18

38. 3 Having outlined the ~1ew exige~cies of P.A. I. ci. C. struggle and its needs, the Executive Secreti1riat would like to

point out to the n";cessi ty of strengthening_ PAigC.~s actioi:i politically and in in~ernationiJ.l forums. This is an area -where the O.A,U. i1nd_ the Liberation Committee should contribute to the utmost, especially in the few months to ~ome during which P.A.I.G,C. is expected to declare the \ ' existence of the "Sta.te of Guinea (Bissau) and Co.pe Verde Islands".

39, The Executive Secretariat would like to· pay a special tribute to. the peoples, leaders and Governments of ihe Repubiic of Guinea and Senegal who are sparing no efforts . in supporting and assisting the struggle waged by P.A.I.G.C., and who are shouldering an importan1 part of the burden of the war.of liberation. The territories of these two Member-Countries are strong rear bases of P.A.I.G.C. The leadersh:i.,p of the Movement has expressed to the Mission its deep appreciation and gratitude for their commitment .! and relentless efforts. According tO Mr, Amilcu.r Cabral'11 own stcLtement: "They are suffering everyday with us from Portuguese terrorism and their reserves are ours".

40_. ·rhe Mission had the honour to be received by His Excellency, President Ahmed Sekou Toure, whose kind words and wise advice, were ~ source of great inspiration and .enoouro.gement to the members of the Mission. Talks held with various Ministers and Officials of the Guinea Government proved to be most useful for the practical conduct of the liberation struggle.

41, The Mission wishes. to place on record its appreciati.on to the P.A.I.G.C, leaders, in particular to its Secretary- ' General, Mr. Amilcar Cabral, for their constant assistance I and co-operation, and for the facilities they have placed at the Mission's disposal during its visit to the liberated areas of Guinea' Bissau, A warm tribute is a.lso due . to the l . officials and cadres of P.A.I.G,·c. who accompanied the Mission throughout its visit. AFRICAN UNION UNION AFRICAINE African Union Common Repository http://archives.au.int

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