Russian Japanology Review 2020

Institute of Oriental Studies of Russian Academy of Sciences Association of Japanologists of Russia

RUSSIAN JAPANOLOGY REVIEW 2020. Vol. 3 (No. 1)

MOSCOW Editors

Streltsov D.V. Doctor of Sciences (History), Professor, Head of Department of Afro-Asian Studies, MGIMO-University, Chairman of the Association of Japanologists of Russia

Grishachev S.V. Ph.D. (History), Associate professor, Russian State University for the Humanities (RSUH), Executive secretary of Association of Japanologists of Russia

With compliment to Japan Foundation and The International Chodiev Foundation.

Russian Japanology Review, 2020. Vol. 3 (No. 1). 143 p.

The Russian Japanology Review is semiannual edition. This edition is published under the auspice of Association of Japanologists in cooperation with Institute of Oriental Studies of Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS). The purpose of this project is broader international promotion of the results of Japanese Studies in Russia and the introduction of the academic activities of Russian Japanologists.

Association of Japanologists Institute of Oriental Studies of Russian Academy of Sciences 12, Rozhdestvenka street, Moscow, 107031

Telephone: +7 (495) 628-9780 E-mail: [email protected] Web sites: www.japanstudies.ru www.japanreview.ru

ISSN: 2658-6789

Shvydko V.G. Abenomics: A Change in the Concept ...... 5

Muratshina K.G. Japan and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons ...... 22

Kul’neva P.V. The Place of Historical Memory in Perception of China by Japanese Society ...... 42

Osmanov E.M. Training Manuals for Military Personnel in the Meiji Period (1868-1912) ...... 65

Meshscheryakov A.N. Ten Essays on National Character by Haga Yaichi ...... 77

Marakhonova S.I. Serge Elisséeff: Dreams of Japan ...... 97 Bibliography of Serge Elisséeff Composed by E.O. Reischauer, revised and appended by S.I. Marakhonova ...... 130

DOI: 10.24411/2658-6789-2020-10001

Abenomics: A Change in the Concept

V.G. Shvydko

Abstract. The article addresses recent changes in the views of the Japanese government, headed by Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, regarding the content and desired effect of its economic policy, which is presented to the public under the brand of Abenomics. The article highlights the major points of the economic credo proclaimed by the Japanese cabinet set up by the current leader of the ruling Liberal Democratic party after the Diet Lower House elections of late 2012. It presents the mid-term goals set by the new cabinet, as well as the principal macroeconomic tools that were meant to be mobilized by the cabinet in order to secure the achievement of these goals by means of modifying the tendencies which had solidified during the previous two decades, and bringing fresh stimulus and dynamism to the Japanese economy. The author briefly reviews the results of economic performance following several years of practicing Abenomics by the government and monetary authorities and possible explanations of the lack of significant progress in achieving the goals that had been initially set. The author traces the evolution of the priorities in the economic tasks formulated by the Abe cabinets, which have been shifting from stimulating demand and reflation to promoting growth of productivity through dissemination of new technologies and ensuring an adequate supply of labor resources. The article notes the reassessment in 2015-2016 of potential effectiveness of monetary policy instruments as a means of supporting and accelerating economic growth, as well as the awareness of limited potential of additional input of public funds through government efforts as a tool for invigorating investment activity in the economy. A change in priorities is

5 Russian Japanology Review, 2020. Vol. 3 (No. 1) pointed out, both in the public presentation of the government’s economic and social policies and, to a lesser extent, in their practical implementation, which was the logical consequence of the reevaluation of effectiveness of former tools. Recent government documents setting larger goals, in particular the annual Future Investment Strategy, are analyzed as a reflection of the new vision of the economic role of the state. This vision includes less concern for current short-term macroeconomic indicators and more responsibility of the government for the fundamental characteristics and quality of the resources laying the foundation for national economic activities. The article concludes that the Japanese government’s policy regarding social and business activities has been seriously adjusted to raise Japan’s global competitiveness and ensure conditions for long-term sustainable growth of its economy. The said adjustment includes the abandonment of the traditional “industrial policy” concept.

Keywords: Japan, Abenomics, economic strategy, sustainable development, global competitiveness, post-information society

Economic policy of the Japanese government in the last decade, especially with Abe Shinzō’s ascending to the post of the Prime Minister, has been subject to numerous comments with lavish use of PR cliché and labels. The most popular among them has been the term Abenomics launched by Japanese economists linked to the government back in 2013. Initially it was used in the media as a convenient catchphrase, but then it gradually came to be used in government documents, and finally became an official brand-name for the economic policy of Abe’s government. Its content as understood by the government economists gradually expanded with each passing year, coming to include more diverse, long-term ambitious goals and objectives, and finally became synonymous with the government’s vision of the strategy of Japan’s development. Nowadays, Abenomics as a policy concept extends to various areas far exceeding its initial scope, such as promoting considerable changes to healthcare system, innovative transport facilities, financial services and trading platforms based on new technologies, introducing digital technologies into every industry and

6 Shvydko V.G. Abenomics: A Change in the Concept sphere, creating an environment friendly to research and innovation, reducing carbon emission, and many others. At the same time, such a broad interpretation of this term has been accepted by the government and used by its PR service in official presentations and other public materials [Abenomics 2019]. Moreover, as the government was releasing more documents explaining the government’s vision of the strategy for Japan’s social and economic development, the Abenomics concept became more all-embracing, with its content very vague and abstract. From a plan of measures and steps to be implemented by the government, it was turning into a kind of a comprehensive vision of the desired future, often with no reference to specific dates and figures. At the same time, it became difficult to draw the line between the result of natural evolution of things and that of policy efforts of authorities, so that any growth of the size and sophistication of economic and social activity in the country could be presented by government strategists as a success of the ruling cabinet and its policy. However, initially Abenomics had more limited tasks and was concerned primarily, if not exclusively, with accelerating long-term growth of GDP. It came against the background of two previous decades of stagnation, when obvious qualitative changes in consumption and the technological level of the economy went in parallel to nearly zero quantitative growth of GDP and real incomes. Average annual growth rates of these indicators for each decade were below 1 percent, and occasional recoveries, which sometimes lasted several quarters in a row, failed to bring about sustainable rapid growth. At first, this apparent macroeconomic slowdown did not cause much concern, as it was considered to be an inevitable consequence of the structural changes in the economy. However, by the end of the first decade of the 21st century, it came to be viewed as a serious problem. As Japan lost the status of Asia’s largest economy and felt the threat of its business corporations further shifting the focus of their activities to overseas locations, the slowdown in growth rates came to be viewed as a political problem. The need to overcome chronic stagnation gradually

7 Russian Japanology Review, 2020. Vol. 3 (No. 1) began to occupy an increasing place in public debate and the national political agenda [Strel’tsov 2014]. Accordingly, the first edition of the program of Abe’s first cabinet, which was outlined in a series of interviews and public speeches in 2013, was based on his promise to remedy unacceptably sluggish long- term growth. Part of the program that dealt with structural policy measures aimed at long-term restructuring of the Japanese economy was transformed into an official document ambitiously named Japan Revitalization Strategy [Nihon saikō senryaku 2013]. Despite catchy slogans designed to draw public attention (these were the widely publicized Abe’s three arrows, which marked respectively 1) soft monetary policy, 2) government stimulus spending, and 3) structural reforms), the presented program mostly consisted of traditional tools of demand stimulus routinely practiced by every developed market economy. Namely, it included increase in money supply through injecting additional liquidity into the banking system, and additional spending on public works financed from the national budget. All other measures included in the economic policy package by the new prime minister were more of psychological nature. Indeed, they were either not backed up by effective tools that could be used by the government, or could be implemented only in the long-term perspective and accordingly could not directly and promptly affect business conditions. Thus, structural measures aimed at increasing supply (particularly through productivity growth) were too vaguely defined and not backed up by effective measures that could yield results in the short term. Theoretically speaking, the government’s determination to help mobilize and optimize available resources through small but persistent institutional changes and incentives could possibly encourage the business community to be more proactive. In practice, though, it is always checked by inertia, so even if these measures do spin the growth spiral, the process is slow and very gradual. As for the attempt to boost competitiveness through national currency depreciation through verbal and actual interventions by the central bank, the impact of the latter on the exchange rate dynamics

8 Shvydko V.G. Abenomics: A Change in the Concept could naturally be short-term only. The result of this impact could be traced in the weakening of the yen in 2013-2014, but this trend changed to the opposite in the second half of 2015, and, in a little more than a year, the exchange rate returned to the 2013 year-end level (slightly more than 100 yen per 1 U.S. dollar). Thus, leaving aside Abe’s PR activity (to which he spared much more attention and effort than his predecessors), in the first two years of his premiership, Abenomics was, in fact, confined to several packages of additional infrastructure financing programs and measures to increase money supply and ensure moderate but stable growth of consumer prices. However, implemented measures were actually quite limited in size and scope, and that contrasted very much with the ambitious initial promises to the public. Thus, additional spending on infrastructure projects, which was extensively discussed during the first year of Abenomics, actually ended with relatively modest additions to budget expenditure plans of FY 2013-2015 and failed to become a factor that even government economists believed to be a powerful boost to economic growth. Since 2014, the focus of fiscal policy has shifted towards tax relief for private companies, such as measures to reduce the effective corporate tax rate. As for the increase in the money supply, its main tool was a Japanese equivalent of “quantitative easing” pursued by the U.S. Federal Reserve System after the recession of 2008-2009. In April 2013, the Bank of Japan, or BOJ (the central bank of Japan), headed by Kuroda Haruhiko, a known confidant of Prime Minister Abe, launched a targeted program of buying out government bonds from corporate holders, primarily private commercial banks. In fact, regular buying of government bonds in the open market had been routinely practiced before that. Moreover, from 2009, it was steadily on the increase, nearly doubling the volume of government bonds on the central bank’s balance sheet to the end of 2013. However, the newly- appointed BOJ governor boosted the volume of purchase and brought the monthly volume of such transactions to over 5 trillion yen, and in the period of a year and a half, starting from the third quarter of 2013,

9 Russian Japanology Review, 2020. Vol. 3 (No. 1) effectively doubled the amount of government securities on the balance sheet of the Bank of Japan, bringing it to 200 trillion yen. The result was a corresponding growth of the money supply due to politically motivated large-scale increase in the monetary base as a result of BOJ policy. Monetary expansion led to a decrease in the market borrowing costs, and commercial banks’ loans to the non-financial sector steadily increased from 2013 to 2015. However, the authorities failed to achieve the specified interim objectives of this policy, namely 1) defeating deflation, which had been characteristic of the Japanese economy since the late 1990s and was considered to be one of the main obstacles to restarting fast sustainable growth, and 2) significantly increasing propensity to consumption and consumer activity in the household sector. Thus, the growth of consumer demand during the first three-year period of Abe’s premiership was sluggish and unsustainable, and the negative impact on it of raising the rate of consumption tax in April 2014 was much stronger and longer than government economists expected. The decision to postpone the second of the two planned increases of the rate of this tax (up to 10 percent) to October 2019 did not help to accelerate demand growth. As for the consumer prices, they hiked shortly, partly as a result of the aforementioned increase of the consumption tax rate. However, from the second half of 2014, price dynamics began to slow down and almost came to naught by mid-2015. As a result, the government failed to unwind the spiral of positive dynamics (the so-called virtuous circle) of prices, consumption, and incomes of economic actors despite strong and cheerful statements to the contrary by Prime Minister Abe and his economic advisers. Accordingly, the goal set by the Japan Revitalization Strategy to bring annual growth rates to the 2 percent-plus level remained unattained.1

1 The “Strategy…” set a target for GDP growth of an average of 2 percent per annum in real terms over the next 10 years. In the first half of this 10-year period, an even higher growth rate was envisaged [Nihon saikō senryaku 2013, p. 2].

10 Shvydko V.G. Abenomics: A Change in the Concept

Nevertheless, government economists saw no reason to adjust their policies. A new version of the aforementioned basic document, approved by the Cabinet in June 2016, assessed the 2013-2015 implementation of economic strategy of the Japanese cabinet as successful [Nihon saikō senryaku 2016, p. 1]. However, specific indicators of this success, as cited in the document, were only indirectly related to the original objectives. Thus, the Abe cabinet was credited with boosting employment (more than a million new workers in three years) and presumably improved corporate governance in the private sector. The latter, as well as the stated increase in productivity in the economy, were interpreted in the document as a result of easing regulation in the electricity production, agriculture, healthcare, in particular as a result of measures aimed at liberalization that the government agreed to during the negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement. Also, the document claimed that the government had succeeded in reducing the tax burden on private business and in giving it more flexibility by allowing to freely choose forms and conditions of employment. As for the goals of reviving consumer activity and overcoming deflation, the government could not provide convincing evidence of their achievement, and the fact was used as an argument to continue the policy of stimulating demand through fiscal and monetary expansion. Indeed, in the following period, the BOJ continued large-scale market operations of purchasing government bonds and holding them in the central bank’s investment portfolio. The outstanding amount of long-term government bonds held by the BOJ showed a twofold increase over two and a half years, exceeding 400 trillion yen by mid-2017. As a result, financial institutions that were selling the bonds to the central bank accumulated an unprecedented amount of monetary liquidity. That should have led them to step up search for potential borrowers in the non-banking sector and thus indirectly pull up commodity prices. For the same purpose, monetary authorities resorted to the policy of extremely low interest rates set by the central bank as a regulator of financial markets. Since the basic rate for financial institutions to borrow from the Bank of Japan was set at a very low level of 0.3 percent as

11 Russian Japanology Review, 2020. Vol. 3 (No. 1) early as 2008 and afterwards, in order to increase pressure on financial markets to further reduce the cost of borrowing, BOJ resorted to cutting the deposit rate applied to balances of commercial banks’ accounts in the central bank. In 2016, the key rate applied to selected balances of accounts of credit institutions (policy-rate account balances) was set at a negative level and has been kept negative ever since. Another tool that was used for these purposes was the indirect regulation of government bond yields on secondary market. From a certain point in time, the volume of the BOJ’s purchase of government bonds came to be determined with reference to its impact on their yields at market prices. The target yield was set at zero. So, the goal of the central bank’s interest rate policy as well as its “quantitative easing” was to push the maximum amount of bank liquidity into the corporate and consumer finance markets, thus bringing about an overall increase in investment, consumer spending and commodity prices in the economy [Shvydko 2018]. As for the government’s fiscal policy in 2015-2017, no significant innovations could be traced, including traces of any new significant packages to infuse large amounts of public money into the economy. There was, however, no overall cut in spending to balance the budget, which was originally stated in 2013-2014 as a strategic goal for the medium and long term. Moreover, achieving the interim goal of securing zero primary deficit of consolidated budget (i.e. cleared of revenues and expenditures linked to government debt, or “primary balance”) was postponed from 2020 to 2025. Fiscal policy generally remained rather soft and subordinated to the task of maintaining economic growth rather than consolidating public finances. However, it has become increasingly apparent that measures from the original version of Abenomics as a policy to promote growth through stimulation of demand and fighting deflation had only limited potential effect. A boom in consumer spending, as well as in domestic investment, could not be achieved precisely because of the limited potential effect of monetary stimulus in the actual conditions of the Japanese economy in the 2010s.

12 Shvydko V.G. Abenomics: A Change in the Concept

Indeed, the decreased cost of borrowing did not automatically lead to an increase in demand for money from non-bank corporations and the population, and possibilities for further decrease of these costs were next to nil, as interest rates applied by financial regulators were close to zero. In such a situation, the traditional textbook methods of “fine- tuning” the demand for loans prove to be ineffective, as was noted, for example, by Paul Krugman in his paper on the Japanese economy [Krugman 2015, p. 178]. Moreover, the low cost of borrowing slows down natural selection of companies based on their efficiency, allowing trouble-ridden enterprises to remain “afloat” for a long time while having no prospects for growth and development. At the same time, negative rates of the regulator worsen already troubled financial situation of the banking sector, and zero or even negative yields of government bonds destroy their markets. In the long run, they are beneficial to no one except the government. As Japanese economist Yumoto Kenji, who served as economic adviser to former Prime Minister Obuchi Keizō, justly remarked, “monetary policy can buy time, but it does not solve all the problems” [Miller, Fujioka 2019]. What makes it worse, economic actors get used to monetary expansion when it is practiced continuously. They no longer react positively to incentives inherent in monetary expansion but are prepared to react negatively when authorities abandon it and turn to restrictive measures. As a result, monetary authorities, speaking figuratively, continue to press the accelerator to no effect, while they are afraid to apply breaks. While understanding that reflation (bringing consumer inflation to the target level of 2 percent) and higher propensity of households to consume could not be possibly attained, the BOJ policy-makers have been keeping all basic parameters of its policy unchanged for many years and refuse to discuss the need to change them in the near future. The fact that maintaining this line is financially beneficial to the government only adds to the doubts that BOJ’s clinging to the course once set by the Abe government may not be possibly justified. Against this background, since mid-2010s, the concept of Abenomics and its official interpretation have been undergoing gradual

13 Russian Japanology Review, 2020. Vol. 3 (No. 1) but visible change. Firstly, while the final goal of achieving sustainable long-term growth remains more or less unchanged, the government has begun abandoning specific quantitative targets, such as GDP growth rates, prices, budget indicators, etc. Thus, the documents issued in 2017-2018 fail to mention specific rates of GDP growth as short- and medium-term targets, while the goal of bringing nominal GDP to 600 trillion yen is not linked to any specific timeframe. While the task of finally getting away with deflation remains unchanged, early benchmark in the form of 2 percent inflation rate is mentioned less frequently and is not linked to specific time horizons. The goal of achieving a zero primary deficit of consolidated budget has been postponed to times far beyond the expected end of Abe’s tenure as Prime Minister. As for the additional budgetary expenditures serving economic policy goals, they may be definitely set for certain directions, but their terms and amounts are not specified. Secondly (and this is even more important), in the contents of the future policies, the emphasis is shifted to measures that foster producers’ capacities, or from “economy of demand” to “economy of supply”, if we put it in familiar terms. Official documents, which are meant to set out the government’s economic and social strategy, focus on productivity, competitiveness, investment, and innovation, on the quality and availability of economic resources. The government’s focus shifts from stimulating demand for manufactured goods and services towards improving the quality of resources – human, intellectual, and entrepreneurial, including the quality of management, as well as to encouraging an increase in their supply. In particular, these measures include encouraging economic activity in certain age groups, improving the quality of education and training, easy access to information, better protection of intellectual property rights, etc. Also, the time horizon of this policy broadens: measures envisaged by the documents could bring positive results in 5-10 years or even later. On the one hand, it requires better arguments based on sound calculations and well-founded forecasts. On the other hand, it largely frees the government from responsibility for poor progress of growth parameters

14 Shvydko V.G. Abenomics: A Change in the Concept in the short term. The latter gives the government considerable leeway to choose its priorities and goals that are increasingly postulated in most general terms, thus moving the government away from the zone of possible criticism and accusations of inefficiency. Thirdly (and perhaps most importantly), the economic philosophy and practical activities of the government led by Abe are moving further away from the government-led regulatory approach to the management of national economy, which had been typical of Japan’s development after World War II. Although this policy U-turn is not always postulated clearly and unambiguously, careful reading of government statements reveals definite and significant policy change. On the one hand, Abe and his cabinets broke with the tradition of so-called “industrial policy”, when the government singled out priority sectors of the economy and used the means at its disposal, which changed over time, to ensure a more intensive inflow of various resources, such as finance, labor, and entrepreneurship, into designated industries. In recent documents, the government has avoided naming specific industries or sectors which are treated as prioritized in its economic policy and which are to receive administrative advantages over others. Instead, it spells out the most promising directions of innovations designated by experts, and these directions are expected to greatly impact the competitiveness of Japanese companies in international and domestic markets. Most of these directions are centered around certain technological or social phenomena and have functional rather than industry-specific nature. On the other hand, the government’s activities in these directions are limited to assurances of full support for the efforts of the private sector and specialized public corporations in these areas. No quantitative targets are set to secure allocation of public resources, such as finance, for these purposes. Funding for specific programs or projects relevant to prospective directions of innovation is allocated by relevant institutions and departments. The forms and volumes of such funding are determined within the framework of the national budget and do not take the form of political megaprojects with separate large-scale budgets.

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A typical example of the new approach to economic strategy formulated by the Japanese government as a new interpretation of the Abenomics concept is the so-called Future Investment Strategy, a document that replaced The Strategy of Japan’s Revitalization as an annually updated manifesto that articulates the government’s vision of the country’s medium- and long-term future and thus defines the context for evaluating concrete steps and initiatives of the government and its head. Two annual reports under this title have been published and presented as 2017 and 2018 versions. The first of them, [Mirai tōshi senryaku 2017] has the subtitle: Reforms for Realization of Society 5.0, the second [Mirai tōshi senryaku 2018] – Change towards Society 5.0 – Society Driven by Data. With some nuances in the details, both are essentially based on the premise that society in Japan is undergoing a profound transformation associated with fundamentally new role of technologies based on the use of huge and rapidly growing volume of data. This transformation will affect all aspects of life and will continue for several decades, forming a new way of life (Society 5.0), different from both industrial society (Society 3.0) and information society (Society 4.0). Authors of these documents believe that the changes introduced by this process into society are so great that they require a fundamental change in the methods and directions of government policy, reorienting it from the traditional policy of regulating business cycles to frontal promotion by state of structural changes in society, regardless of its impact on the short-term dynamics of particular macroeconomic indicators. Having admitted that the four preceding years failed to change fundamentally the environment for the private sector through creating a new and powerful source of demand and did not significantly accelerate productivity growth despite the government’s efforts, the 2017 document makes the following fundamental conclusion. In order to overcome the prolonged stagnation and meet the challenge of securing sustainable growth in the medium and long term, Japan needs to implement the concept of a post-information society (New Generation society, Society 5.0), based on the use of the achievements of the

16 Shvydko V.G. Abenomics: A Change in the Concept

Fourth Industrial Revolution (mainly the Internet of Things, big data analysis, artificial intelligence, robotics) in all sectors of the economy and social life. In other words, this new understanding insists that the path to sustainable growth and development is not the use of traditional tools to stimulate consumer and investment demand, but changes in the quantity, quality, and nature of economic resources available to society, and interaction between these various resources. For this purpose, it is believed necessary to focus efforts on promoting interpenetration, interaction, and mutual stimulation of activities in different sectors and spheres of public life. Examples of such efforts include compatibility of software and hardware and their integration in combined systems; formation of integrated databases; easy access to and use of large databases by business units in various industries; promoting research and innovation in relevant areas, including facilitating contacts and connections between business and the academic community, as well as between business and independent research organizations. These efforts, according to government strategists, will help to create a system allowing to “optimize economic activity and increase added value, to create a vital society-economy. (...) If the reaction to the innovations of the Fourth Industrial Revolution is delayed, and bold reforms are held off with indecision, we run the risk of becoming subcontractors of the world’s leading corporations and of accompanying erosion of our middle class” [Mirai tōshi senryaku 2017, p. 2]. Given Japan’s conditions and potential advantages in the global economy, the authors of the strategy propose to replace the previous approach based on prioritizing specific industries with a new one focusing on organizational and financial assistance of the government in five directions, which, in their view, could become the engine of the Japanese economy in the medium and long term. These directions are as follows: 1. Increasing longevity of active and healthy life. 2. Innovations that increase population mobility. 3. Creating next-generation distribution systems. 4. Infrastructure and urban innovation. 5. New financial technologies.

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Although the new economic policy priorities are vaguely worded, and may be subject to different interpretations, it certainly is a fundamental change compared to everything that was said (and, to a large extent, practiced) during the previous decades. Leaving aside the rather intricate forms in which the new approach is expressed in official documents, its essence is that the government abandons short-term indicators of success of economic policy and focuses on institutional reforms designed to make the Japanese economy and hence the Japanese society more competitive in the global context. In the context stated above, the term reforms is somewhat misleading. Although it is frequently and deliberately used in the documents, it seems obvious that the talk is not so much about reforms in the original meaning of the word, but rather about relatively small changes in regulatory documents and their implementation, intended to serve as a kind of signal to business actors. It is these actors from whom decisive efforts are expected, which will improve the productivity and global competitiveness of the Japanese economy. This approach can be observed not only in the “Strategy...” documents, which are of general nature by definition, but also in a more practical document, positioned as a roadmap for the new stage of Abenomics. This document, entitled New economic policy package [Atarashii keizai seisaku pakkēji 2017] and enacted by the Cabinet’s decision in December 2017, displays exactly this approach. Although the text mentions some specific measures planned for implementation in FY 2018-2020, they are only indirectly related to economic policy in its traditional understanding. These include, for example, additional coverage for low-income groups of the cost of pre- school and university education; raising the wages of social workers caring for the elderly and disabled and facilitating the obtaining of long-term visas for foreign nationals working in this area. They include supporting the use of digital and information technologies in small and medium-sized companies, providing advice and logistic assistance to such companies, and changing regulation of subcontracting. There is also a promise of educational, information, and advertising support

18 Shvydko V.G. Abenomics: A Change in the Concept for regional businesses in order to increase their efficiency and dynamism, etc. At the same time, the topics in the document which directly relate to economic policy (changes in tax rates and exemptions from tax base for businesses, creation of investment funds and funds that use public money to support small and medium-sized regional businesses, etc.), are dealt with in a rather general mode, looking more like a proclamation of intentions rather than specific commitments. Nevertheless, the document clearly spells out the general line towards abandoning the ideology and policy of strong regulation and selective support of leading companies, which was typical for Japan in the second half of the last century, in favor of general promotion of self-supporting efforts by business to improve its productivity, of raising both the number and quality of national economic actors. It would be fair to say that this is exactly the new interpretation of the economic role of the state as the essence of the concept of Abenomics in its present form. The expected result in quantitative terms of the said promotional efforts, according to the government version, is a 10 percent increase of the annual volume of investment by FY2020 compared to the results of FY2016; wage increases of at least 3 percent per annum and an increase in productivity of up to 2 percent per annum, which is roughly two times more than the actual performance of the first half of the 2010s [Atarashii keizai seisaku pakkēji 2017, p. 16]. Also, the government expects the growth of employment in the economy and better adaptation of workforce to changing labor requirements despite unfavorable demographic trends (caused by the decreasing birth rate in the preceding period and “ageing” of the population). The coming years will probably make it possible to judge the effectiveness of the Japanese government’s efforts outlined in recent strategic instruments and see whether its optimistic forecasts are justified in the changing global situation.

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References

Abenomics. For Future Growth, for Future Generations and for a Future Japan (2019). The Government of Japan. https://www.japan.go.jp/ abenomics/_userdata/abenomics/pdf/1903_abenomics.pdf (accessed: 18 May 2020). Atarashii keizai seisaku pakkēji [New Economic Policy Package] (2017). Cabinet Office. https://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai1/package/20171208_ package.pdf (accessed: 18 May 2020). Krugman, P. (2015). Yaponskaya lovushka [Japanese Trap]. Ekonomiches- kaya politika, № 1 (Vol.10). Pp. 177-194. Miller B., Fujioka T. (2019) Dissecting the Bank of Japan’s Zero-Rate Policy 20 Years on. 6 february 2019. The Japan Times. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/02/06/business/financial-markets/dissecting- bank-japans-zero-rate-policy-20-years/ (accessed: 18 May 2020). Mirai tōshi senryaku 2017 – Society 5.0 no jitsugen ni muketa kaikaku [Future Investment Strategy 2017. Reforms for Realization of Society 5.0] (2017). Prime Minister of Japan and His Office. http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/ keizaisaisei /pdf/miraitousi2017.pdf (accessed: 22 April 2020). Mirai tōshi senryaku 2018 – Society 5.0. Dēta kudō gata shakai e no henkaku [Future Investment Strategy 2018. Change towards Society 5.0 – Society Driven by Data]. Prime Minister of Japan and His Office. http://www. kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/keizaisaisei/pdf/miraitousi2018_zentai.pdf (accessed: 22 April 2020). Nihon saikō senryaku – JAPAN is BACK: [The Strategy of Japan’s Revitalization] (2013). Prime Minister of Japan and His Office. http://www.kantei.go.jp/ jp/singi/keizaisaisei/pdf/saikou_jpn.pdf (accessed: 22 April 2020). Nihon saikō senryaku 2016. Daiyonji sangyou kakumei ni mukete [The Strategy of Japan’s Revitalization. Towards Fourth Industrial Revolution] (2016). Prime Minister of Japan and His Office. http://www.kantei.go.jp/ jp/singi/keizaisaisei/pdf/zentaihombun_160602.pdf (accessed: 22 April 2020).

20 Shvydko V.G. Abenomics: A Change in the Concept

Shvydko, V. (2018). Yaponiya: tekushchiy opyt preodoleniya deflyatsii [Japan: Current Experience of Defeating Deflation]. Ekonomika i biznes: teoriya i praktika, № 11-2. Pp. 143-149. (In Russian) Strel’tsov, D. (2014). Popadut li “strely” Abenomiki v tsel’? [Will the Arrows of “Abenomics” Hit the Target?]. Aziya i Afrika segodnya. №3. Pp. 9-14. (In Russian)

SHVYDKO Vitaliy Grigor’yevich – PhD (Economics), Leading researcher, National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences. E-mail: [email protected]

Russian edition of the article: Japanese Studies in Russia. 2019 № 2. Pp. 95-108 DOI: 10.24411/2500-2872-2019-10013

21 DOI: 10.24411/2658-6789-2020-10002

Japan and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons1

K.G. Muratshina

Abstract. The article discusses the attitude of Japanese government towards the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which was introduced in the United Nations’ agenda in 2017. The case of Japan is special and even unique, due to the fact that, in spite of its historical experience of atomic bombings and the position of its civil society, which supports the idea of a nuclear ban, Tokyo refuses to sign the Treaty. Moreover, the rejection of the TPNW does not correlate with Japan’s active participation in the international nuclear non-proliferation initiatives. As far as Japan is undoubtedly an influential member of world community and a threshold state, possessing advanced nuclear technologies and ready to transform its peaceful nuclear program into a military one, its position regarding the TPNW can have a significant impact on the prospects of the nuclear non-proliferation regime in Asia. The author concludes that Japan has demonstrated an obvious refusal to sign the TPNW, in spite of all factors which could have produced the alternative position. However, its views remain ambiguous, as Tokyo adheres to international nuclear non-proliferation regimes and comprehensive nuclear disarmament. On the one hand, Japan is one of the U.S.’ main allies, remaining under the U.S. security guaranties, being protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella from external threats, and incorporated in the global system of nuclear deterrence. On the other hand, there is certain support for ideas of nuclear non-proliferation and prohibition of nuclear weapons in Japanese

1 This research was supported by RFBR grant № 18-014-00033.

22 Muratshina K.G. Japan and the TPNW society, which is demonstrated by the activity of Japanese anti-nuclear non- governmental organizations. Consequently, in relation to the TPNW, Japan demonstrates an inconsistent course, involving the reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella in order to provide its security and active participation in the international nuclear non-proliferation initiatives simultaneously.

Keywords: Japan, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, nuclear non-proliferation, international regimes, non-governmental organizations, disarmament, Preparatory Committee for the NPT Review Conference.

The opening for signature of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which took place during the 72nd session of the UN General Assembly on 20 September 2017, became the result of a multilateral initiative of non-nuclear states and anti-nuclear NGOs [Sign the Nuclear Ban Treaty 2018]. The initiative is currently continued to be discussed in academic circles and political institutions of the non- proliferation regime. The treaty imposes on the states that accept its conditions the obligation not to have, use, produce, acquire, or deploy nuclear weapons, as well as to eliminate all existing stockpiles and to conduct an “irreversible conversion” [Dogovor o zapreshchenii… 2017]. As of 1 May 2020, the Treaty had been signed by 81 states, and 36 of them had ratified it [Signature and Ratification Status 2020]. Against the TPNW are the permanent members of the UN Security Council, which are the recognized members of the global “nuclear club”, other countries possessing nuclear weapons (India, Pakistan, Israel, and the DPRK), as well as some non-nuclear states – NATO members and Japan. In the Russian and foreign academic circles, there are discussions concerning the legal aspects of the TPNW, its contradictions with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and the struggle of interests within the campaign concerning the TPNW [Borrie, Spies, Wan 2018; Stefanovich 2017; MID: Moskva ne stanet… 2017]. In its most general version, the position of Russia and other nuclear states is that the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons is fraught

23 Russian Japanology Review, 2020. Vol. 3 (No. 1) with the risks of a drastic change of status quo, the change in the existing global balance of power, and the deregulation of the international system of strategic deterrence, which, for more than half a century, has been successful in preventing armed conflicts of a global scale. Non-nuclear NATO member states do not join the TPNW due to the collective nature of the alliance, as the nuclear forces of the US, the UK, and France provide security guarantees to all its members. When the multilateral Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons became open for signature, Japan’s position immediately became the focus of attention. As the only state in the world that has been the target of a nuclear bombing and that continues to tackle the problems of long- term health consequences of the hibakusha (the survivors of the nuclear bombing), and that has in its constitution the renunciation of war as means of settling international disputes, Japan, it seemed, naturally had to join the treaty. However, in reality, Tokyo essentially ignored the initiative. For example, the 2018 Diplomatic Bluebook does not say a single word about the treaty [Diplomatic Bluebook 2018]. The TPNW was also not mentioned in the Japanese side’s statement in April 2018 at the meeting of the Preparatory Committee held at the UN Office in Geneva [Statement by H. E. Mr. Taro Kono 2018]. The most “articulated” expression of the nation’s position can be considered to be the reply by Japan’s Foreign Minister Kōno Tarō to a journalist’s question at a press conference in October 2018: “[...] Japan has still not decided anything. However, Japan is not thinking of signing the TPNW” [Press Conference by Foreign Minister Taro Kono 2018]. It is worth noting that such a reply still leaves some space for maneuver. The evasiveness of the government representative’s words obviously expresses the fact that Japan, being under the “nuclear umbrella” of the U.S., has to maneuver so as not to lose the support of and to retain its authority among non-nuclear states. After that, Japan reaffirmed its refusal to sign the TPNW and demonstrated the duality of its nuclear disarmament policy during the UN General Assembly session in December 2018. Then, Japan and

24 Muratshina K.G. Japan and the TPNW other 40 countries (nuclear states, their allies and partners) voted against the Austria-backed resolution supporting the TPNW, which called for its early signature and ratification by all states that had not done it yet [A/RES/73/48 2018]. However, this was not the only anti-nuclear document not supported by Japan at that session. Its position became even more dubious after the Japanese delegation abstained during the discussion of the draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons [A/RES/73/74 2018]. Given the historical experience of being a victim of nuclear bombing, an open vote against the resolution would look too outrageous. Therefore, it seems, such a compromise variant was chosen. As a “compensation”, at the same session, Japan introduced its own, much more general and neutral resolution, calling for general disarmament, strengthening of trust between states, and reduction of international tension [U.N. Adopts Japan’s Anti-Nuke Resolution… 2018]. The document was so vague and so thoroughly avoided mentioning the TPNW that even the U.S. did not vote against it and only abstained. Only Russia, China, the DPRK, and Syria voted against it [A/RES/73/62 2018]. In February 2019, during the UN disarmament conference in Geneva, the Japanese delegation did not make any references to the TPNW in its statement, though it made a pompous, virtually meaningless, and unsupported statement about the “responsibility” of the Japanese state to “lead international efforts towards the elimination of nuclear weapons” [Statement by H. E. Mr. Kiyoto Tsuji… 2019]. In late April – early May 2019, another session of the Preparatory Committee for the NPT Review Conference was held in New York. And, once again, the Japanese representative’s speech contained not a single word about the TPNW, even though the general necessity of nuclear disarmament was emphasized multiple times. Instead of this document, the Japanese delegation recommended all others to follow the NPT and to facilitate the coming into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and also to increase the transparency of information about their nuclear programs and to promote trust in the relations between nuclear and non-nuclear states [General Statement by H.R. Mr. Kiyoto Tsuji 2019].

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To understand Japan’s position regarding the TPNW, it is worthwhile to recall the legal framework defining this nation’s policy regarding nuclear weapons. This framework is set by its participation in the NPT [Status of the Treaty 2018] and the CTBT [Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty 2018]. Japan attempts to position itself in the international community as a nation actively opposing nuclear weapons [Disarmament and Non-Proliferation… 2018]. At the official level, it follows the so- called Three Non-Nuclear Principles formulated in 1967 by Prime Minister E. Satō: not to possess nuclear weapons, not to manufacture them, and not to permit their introduction into Japanese territory [Three Non-Nuclear Principles 2018]. The country’s commitment to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles was reaffirmed at different times by Japanese officials (for example, by prime ministers E. Satō [Three Non-Nuclear Principles 2018], Y. Noda [Message by Prime Minister… 2011], and N. Kan [Address by Prime Minister Naoto Kan… 2011]), and was stipulated in several Diet resolutions, though the nation’s “Non-Nuclear Principles” have not become treaty obligations. Besides, the 2015 U.S.-Japan Joint Statement on the NPT expressed the Japanese side’s commitment to the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and universal nuclear disarmament [U.S-Japan Joint Statement… 2015]. Meanwhile, Tokyo’s policy regarding the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons contains substantial contradictions. Positioning itself as a non- nuclear state, in its security policy, Japan continues to rely on the “nuclear umbrella” – the U.S. nuclear security guarantees [Kristensen 2015]. Thus, if an enemy attacks Japan with nuclear weapons, the U.S. will take all measures to retaliate and will respond with a nuclear strike. The same is true in the case of an attack with non-nuclear weapons. In the Asia Pacific region, these obligations are extended to three U.S. allies – Japan, South Korea, and Australia. Essentially, these nations receive the same security guarantees as the U.S. citizens themselves [Jackson 2015]. For Japan, these guarantees became even more relevant given the nuclear threats from the DPRK, which pursues its own nuclear program, and the growing tension in relations with nuclear-armed China, whose military might is growing rapidly.

26 Muratshina K.G. Japan and the TPNW

However, observers also note that the above-mentioned U.S. nuclear guarantees – seemingly, most significant and important, if not exceptional – nevertheless do not possess sufficient weight, as they represent “a promise for the least-likely situation”. Indeed, a nuclear attack, for example, by China seems less likely than an escalation of the two nations’ territorial dispute in the East China Sea and a clash caused by this issue. However, the U.S. prefer to either remain neutral in the situation with the East China Sea, or give minimal and almost exclusively verbal support to the Japanese claims to the islands [Jackson 2015], although Japan’s obligations of a U.S.’ ally are growing [Strel’tsov 2016]. A neighboring state, China, keeps growing its might, both nuclear and conventional, does not ratify the CTBT, regularly reminds its neighbors about its territorial claims, while, as far as the balance of power is concerned, Japan is inferior to the actively militarizing Beijing. As a result, Japan is increasingly building up its own military. And while this is still limited to conventional weapons, Japan lacks a direct legal prohibition of nuclear weapons, while the supporters of the “nuclear option” enjoy relatively strong positions in the military establishment of the nation. It is no accident that, during the past several decades, various political forces in Japan made statements about the possibility and even advisability of acquiring an independent nuclear arsenal [Strel’tsov 2010], which happened even (!) after the growth of public concern with the issues of nuclear security and the worsening of radioactive situation in some areas due to the Fukishima Daiichi nuclear disaster [Kingston 2012, p. 12]. Many experts, both from Russia and other countries, consider Japan one of the threshold states, which have all technical and economic possibilities to quickly create a nuclear arsenal [Fuhrmann, Tkach 2015; Burnie, Smith 2001; Turner 2003; Zemletryasenie v Yaponii… 2011; Pis’mo amerikanskikh… 2013]. Besides the cutting-edge level of its high- tech industry, Japan also possesses the amount of plutonium sufficient to produce at least 6,000 nuclear warheads. According to some estimates, these reserves reach 45 tons, while 8 kg is sufficient to create a nuclear device. Only Russia and the U.S. possess larger declared stockpiles,

27 Russian Japanology Review, 2020. Vol. 3 (No. 1) and the amount of China’s plutonium stockpiles is unknown. Besides, Japan has means of delivery – missiles capable of carrying a payload a long distance. The time it might take Japan to create nuclear weapons, provided such a political decision is taken, is estimated within the range of half a year to a year [Winn 2019]. The main Japanese political force that supports the acquisition of nuclear weapons are the far-right nationalists. As far as their representation in the nation’s politics is concerned, their organized groups and communities number about a thousand. They conduct active propaganda, use every effort to convey their radical ideas to the people. As a result, according to surveys, nowadays every tenth Japanese person supports their country acquiring its own nuclear arsenal [Winn 2019]. And while no open steps towards its creation have been observed yet, Japan has often been in the spotlight of scandals related to fissile materials and nuclear technologies, for example, related to the disappearance of more than 200 kg of plutonium [Yaponskiye atomshchiki… 2003], failure to provide to the IAEA information about all stockpiles of plutonium in the country [MID KNR potrebovalo… 2014], etc. Several Western media reported informal contacts between nuclear scientists from Japan, North Korea, and Taiwan [Hayes, Cavazos 2015, p. 285]. And some Japanese politicians do not hesitate to state in their interviews that it is high time to leave only two out of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, at least permitting the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Japan’s territory [Velloor 2019]. At the same time, Japan is very active in international non- proliferation regime institutes. For example, together with Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the Philippines, Poland, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, since 2010, Japan participates in the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI). This group unites a number of influential non-nuclear states from all regions of the world. In the 2010s, the NPDI group of nations regularly published various documents on the current issues of non- proliferation of nuclear weapons. Among them were the suggestions to create in the Middle East a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ),

28 Muratshina K.G. Japan and the TPNW resolutions condemning the DRPK nuclear tests, calls to de-alert the nuclear weapons of nuclear states [Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative 2018], etc. Of importance are the following activities of the group: involving a maximum number of nations in the CTBT, propaganda of the necessity of its signature and ratification, regular exchanges of information on the issues of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; demanding the increase of transparency of military programs of nuclear powers [Statement by H.E. Mr. Taro Kono 2018]. Besides its activities within the framework of the NPDI, Japan also calls for the spread of information about the consequences of use of nuclear weapons and for wider education in the field of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and also takes on the responsibility to promote these activities within the country [Statement by H.E. Mr. Taro Kono, 2018]. In 2015-2017 Japan co-chaired the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT [Kazakhstan vystupit… 2015]. At the 2015 NPT Review Conference, the Japanese side, in addition to the standard calls to universal disarmament and improvement of mechanisms of its verification, called the attention of the participants to the humanitarian consequences of use of nuclear weapons in relation to the 70th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Japanese representative voiced the suggestions of the NPDI group on securing the transparency of military programs of nuclear states [Statement by H.E. Mr. Toshio Sano 2015] and, on behalf of 76 states, made a statement on non-proliferation education. Among the signatories of this statement were various nations of Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America – both non-nuclear ones and the nuclear-possessing U.S. and Great Britain. The statement said that “a world without nuclear weapons is the common objective” of all NPT signatory states, and that the development of non-proliferation education and raising awareness of nuclear weapons-related threats and risks among all people of the planet, especially the young generation, should be one of the most important conditions of reaching this goal [Joint Statement on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education 2015]. The commitment to the ideas of the statement was also expressed by the

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Japanese delegation at the session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2017 NPT Review Conference [Statement by Nobushige Takamizawa… 2017; Statement by Ambassador Mitsuru Kitano 2017]. It would be wrong to ignore the position of Japanese NGOs when covering the issue of the official Tokyo’s position on the TPNW. These organizations, incorporating both experts and civil society activists, influence the government with their active efforts both by means of direct influence on the decision making process and by forming the public opinion, which the authorities have to pay attention to. The most active of these are such organizations as the Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament, Peace Depot, Peace Boat, Nagasaki Youth, the Japanese Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (JALANA), various hibakusha societies (for example, Hibakusha Appeal, Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organisations, Japanese Liaison Council of Second- Generation Atomic Bomb Survivors, etc). A group of activists affiliated with the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) is also functioning in Japan. Some academic organizations are also engaged in the social activism. For example, the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA) is an important participant of the global non-proliferation movement [Nagasaki daigaku kakuheiki haizetsu kenkyū sentā]. The activities of all these actors are similar – they include promotion of initiatives on development of non- proliferation education within the country, propaganda of ideas of the non-nuclear status of the country and universal nuclear disarmament. Non-acceptance of the TPNW by Japan is partly explained in a detailed report by the Group of Eminent Persons issued in 2018. According to the authors of the report, the TPNW, despite all its humanitarian and political significance and its resonance with the aspirations and fears of non-nuclear nations, will not become efficient due to the non- participation of the “nuclear five”. Besides, the Treaty does not take into consideration the realities of international security and the threats due to which the nuclear states and their allies (an almost direct reference to Japan – K. M.) have to employ nuclear deterrence. The report’s authors

30 Muratshina K.G. Japan and the TPNW justly note that the Treaty clarifies neither the mechanisms of verification of nuclear disarmament, nor the measures to facilitate it. Moreover, according to the Group of Eminent Persons NGO, the adoption of the TPNW leads to the “delegitimation of the foundations of the international non-proliferation regime” [Building Bridges… 2018, p. 17-18]. During the 2018 Preparatory Committee, the Group of Eminent Persons held a special briefing. The experts representing the organization voiced the ideas of “non-compatibility of nuclear weapons with the norms of international humanitarian law”, the importance of joint work for the purpose of evaluating the threats to the non-proliferation regime, the necessity to produce practical proposals aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the regime towards the 2020 Review Conference, the necessity of preserving the “spirit of the NPT”, increasing the transparency of technical aspects of military programs of nuclear states, decreasing the role of nuclear weapons in national security doctrines, and emphasizing the concept of human security in these doctrines, which should gradually replace the concept of national security. However, as far as the TPNW was concerned, it was only said that “it was not worth evaluating it as definitely good or definitely bad”. According to the experts of the Japanese NGO, what is most important is that it creates “an international environment for the discussion of the problem”. A more positive evaluation of the TPNW is presented in the 2018 Hiroshima Report distributed during the sessions of the Preparatory Committee by the Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non- Proliferation of the Japan Institute of International Affairs. The report evaluates the TPNW as the first attempt to legally ban nuclear weapons and as an example of the role of civil society in international processes. At the same time, the report emphasizes that the treaty has been ratified only by a small number of countries and that the members of the “nuclear club” refused to conduct any negotiations about the document [Hiroshima Report 2018]. The author of this article also collected the comments about Japan’s position concerning the TPNW from other representatives of Japanese academic circles and civil society activists. For example, Hirose Satoshi,

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Professor of the Nagasaki University, noted that the TPNW appeared “too early”, that it was “incomplete”, that it contained many gaps, and that, most importantly, there were no concrete parameters of verifying the fulfillment of obligations. The expert evaluated the role of the Treaty as merely symbolic, expressed mostly in it “stigmatizing” nuclear weapons. Compared to other multilateral documents in the field of WMD control (the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, which became effective, respectively, in 1975 and 1997), the TPNW is a “skeleton without bones and muscle”, and currently there seem to be no prospects of improving it. S. Hirose notes that Japan itself “hates nuclear weapons in principle”, but, because there remains a real danger posed, first of all, by the threats from the DPRK, Japan need the U.S. “nuclear umbrella”. The researcher also acknowledges that Japan’s far-right circles harbor nuclear ambitions. Besides, according to S. Hirose, an important factor defining Japan’s position is the militarization of China, which is strengthening its military might, first of all, due to internal reasons: President of the PRC, Xi Jinping, aims to, on the one hand, secure the support of the people by means of economic development of the country and, on the other hand, to prevent excessive independence of its citizens, who must rely on the state and the Communist Party in all matters. The spread of radical nationalism in the PRC also poses a threat [The Author’s Interview with S. Hirose]. According to another researcher from the Nagasaki University, Professor Suzuki Tatsujirō, the reason for refusal to sign the TPNW consists in the fact that “the Japanese government considers the system of nuclear deterrence necessary due to the difficult international environment in North East Asia”. Japan is relying on the U.S. role in the ultimate settlement of the problem of the DPRK nuclear program and categorically distrusts the declarations of China about its rejection of possibility of a preemptive nuclear strike. The principle of Japan’s rejection of nuclear weapons is not a legal obligation. T. Suzuki notes

32 Muratshina K.G. Japan and the TPNW that, from the legal point of view, even the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Japan cannot be ruled out: “Americans may not introduce nuclear weapons into Japanese territory, but the Japanese government will refuse only if they ask for its permission, but, in reality, the U.S. does not thoroughly report the contents of every ship. Under these conditions, T. Suzuki believes, the TPNW is respected by the Japanese society as an initiative with great potential that has gained the support of many non-nuclear states, but, nevertheless, Japan will hardly be able to ever sign it [The Author’s Interview with T. Suzuki]. Meanwhile, it is worth noting that, in addition to the threat from China and the DPRK, Japan is also concerned about the presence of two more nuclear states in its relative proximity, in the same region of the Asia Pacific, namely, India and Pakistan. In particular, during the 2018 Preparatory Committee, the Japanese delegation urged to strive for making both of these nations eventually join the NPT as non-nuclear states, i.e. it essentially demanded their disarmament [Statement by Ambassador Mitsuru Kitano 2018]. Going back to the opinions of Japanese activists, it is also worth noting that the coordinator of the Peace Depot group, Yamaguchi Daisuke, believes that the reason for Japan’s refusal to sign the TPNW is that, as far as the issue of nuclear non-proliferation is concerned, there is a clear division in the country: there is the position of the civil society (in favor of universal disarmament, abandonment of nuclear weapons, and signing the TPNW), and there is the position of the state (in favor of the universal nuclear deterrence system). The state’s position is defined by the presence of outside threats, originating mainly from North Korea and China. However, the Japanese activist notes that one should not ascribe the views of Chinese party and military leadership in the field of arms buildup to the entire Chinese people, as “the people in China have no freedom of speech. Probably, the general public think differently” [The Author’s Interview with D. Yamaguchi]. A similar opinion concerning the position of the Japanese state on the TPNW is also expressed by the ICAN Japan coordinator, Kawasaki Akira, who is simultaneously a member of the Peace Boat: while the Treaty “corresponds to the aspirations of those who have been

33 Russian Japanology Review, 2020. Vol. 3 (No. 1) unfortunate to suffer the effects of nuclear weapons in some way”, the Japanese politics has “two faces”, the activist says: the one belonging to Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and other regional centers together with their leaders, and the one belonging to Tokyo, the government representatives, the diplomats. The former support the ideals of universal nuclear disarmament, while the latter embody an absolutely clear policy – that of a nation that has an alliance with the U.S. It is them who declare that Japan will not sign or ratify the TPNW in the foreseeable future, despite the “normative role” of the TPNW, the “pressure of the public opinion”, and its role in “stigmatizing” nuclear weapons, which is still “a symbol of a nation’s greatness in mass consciousness”, but still bears the threat of “inhuman suffering”. Meanwhile, Japan needs the U.S. “nuclear umbrella” given the threats from China and North Korea, even though, according to A. Kawasaki, China will hardly go to war with Japan, because it depends on the latter and “will not be able to develop without cooperation with it” [The Author’s Interview with A. Kawasaki]. The NGO representatives claim to be trying to influence the Japanese government, but there have been no substantial changes in its position. They also work with the global public opinion: for example, during the 2018 Preparatory Committee, petitions in support of the TPNW were distributed among the delegates by such Japanese NGOs as Hibakusha Appeal, Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organisations, “Mayors for Peace”, as well as a well-known religious organization Sōka Gakkai. The representatives of the Japanese media also believe the government’s position to be at odds with the public opinion. During the 2018 Preparatory Committee, in informal conversations with the author, they noted that Japan’s position looked “strange”, while highly evaluating the work of NGOs aimed at fostering anti-nuclear ideas in society. Outside the framework of the Preparatory Committee, one can also provide examples of media publications which condemn the Japanese government’s chosen position of refusing to sign the TPNW [Kakugunshuku dōkō hyōka Nihon 12 i ni kōtai 2018; Thakur 2017] and follow the campaigns of Japanese anti-nuclear NGOs [Nakayama 2018].

34 Muratshina K.G. Japan and the TPNW

* * * Remaining an active participant of the international non- proliferation regime, Japan nevertheless does not join the initiative to ban nuclear weapons and refuses to sign the TPNW. This can be seen from the fact that, in their official statements, the Japanese government representatives evade the issue of the TPNW and do not state their refusal to sign it openly and categorically. The situation is paradoxical because Japan has suffered the consequences of nuclear bombings, some hibakusha are still alive, and their second generation suffer from health issues as well; finally, several anti-nuclear NGOs are active in the country. But none of these reasons is able to force the Japanese government to change its position. The reason that is impervious to the influence of Japanese civil society is the fact that Japan has an alliance with the U.S., depends on it and keeps reaffirming that it is under the U.S. security guarantees. Japan is not ready to abandon these guarantees now and will hardly be able to do that in the foreseeable future due to the presence of threats to its security, or risks that it is interpreting as threats. Therefore, Japan continues to have a certain duality in its non-proliferation policy and leaves for itself a space for maneuver, using less important initiatives to maintain its image of a proponent of a non-nuclear world while simultaneously pursuing its own security interests.

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Message by Prime Minister of Japan to the Global Zero Summit. 11 October 2011. Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. http://japan.kantei. go.jp/noda/statement/201110/11 message_e.html (accessed: 03 October 2018). MID: Moskva ne stanet podpisyvat’ dogovor o zapreshchenii yadernogo oruzhiya [MFA: Moscow will not Sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons]. 5 October 2017. Voennoye Obozreniye. https:// topwar.ru/126562-mid-moskva-ne-stanet-podpisyvat-dogovor-o- zapreschenii-yadernogo-oruzhiya.html (accessed: 15 March 2018). (In Russian) MID KNR potrebovalo ot Yaponii ob’yasneniy po povodu sokrytiya informatsii o plutonii ot MAGATE [The Chinese MFA Demanded for Japan’s Explanation of Plutonium Non-Disclosure to IAEA]. 09 June 2014. Russian.china.org.cn http://russian.china.org.cn/china/txt/2014-06/09/content_32615415.htm (accessed: 14 December 2018). (In Russian) Nagasaki daigaku kakuheiki haizetsu kenkyū sentā [Nagasaki University Research Center for Nuclear Abolition]. Information Sheet, Given to the Author by T. Suzuki. Nakayama Yumi. (2018). Pīsu bōto kikoku, 15ka koku 18 toshi de kakuheiki haizetsu uttae [“Peace Boat” Returns Home, 15 Countries and 18 Cities Took Part in Nuclear Weapons Abolition Campaign]. 21 August 2018. Asahi Shimbun. https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASL8P31Y3L8PUTIL006.html (accessed: 20 October 2018). Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (2018). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/npdi/ index.html (accessed: 18 November 2018). Pis’mo amerikanskikh uchenykh-atomshchikov Obame [Letter of American Nuclear Scientists to Obama] 16 October 2013. TASS. E-subscription press- release. (In Russian) Press Conference by Foreign Minister Taro Kono. 23 October 2018. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/kaiken/ kaiken4e_000562.html (accessed: 19 December 2018). Sign the Nuclear Ban Treaty (2018). ICAN. http://www.icanw.org (accessed: 15 March 2018, no longer accessible).

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Signature and Ratification Status (2020) ICAN. http://www.icanw.org/status- of-the-treaty-on-the-prohibition-of-nuclear-weapons/ (accessed: 04 May 2020). Statement by Ambassador Mitsuru Kitano. 08 May 2017. Statements. UN Meetings. http://statements.unmeetings.org/media2/14684482/japan.pdf (accessed: 07 January 2019). Statement by Ambassador Mitsuru Kitano, Ambassador, Permanent Mission of Japan to the International Organizations in Vienna. 30 April 2018. Statements. UN Meetings. http://statements.unmeetings.org/ media2/18559684/japan-cluster-ii-specific-issue.pdf (accessed: 13 May 2018). Statement by H.E. Mr. Kiyoto Tsuji, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan. 27 February 2019. The United Nations Office in Geneva. https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/7A3E1731213E4 E95C12583AE004A345F/$file/Japan+for+website.pdf (accessed: 01 April 2019). Statement by H.E. Mr. Taro Kono, Minister for foreign affairs of Japan. 24 April 2018. Statements. UN Meetings. http://statements.unmeetings. org/media2/18559219/japan-printer_20180424_114638-1-.pdf (accessed: 30 June 2018). Statement by H.E. Mr. Toshio Sano, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament at the NPT Review Conference in 2015 Meeting of Main Committee I. 01 May 2015. Statements. UN Meetings. http://statements.unmeetings.org/media2/4658082/japan.pdf (accessed: 07 January 2019). Statement by Nobushige Takamizawa, Ambassador of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament. 4 May 2017. Statements. UN Meetings. http:// statements.unmeetings.org/media2/14684354/japan-cluster-1- disarmament-statement-japan-4-may-.pdf (accessed: 07 January 2019). Status of the Treaty (2018). United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt (accessed: 03 October 2018). Stefanovich, D. (2017). Dogovor o zapreshchenii yadernogo oruzhiya mozhet rasshatat’ situatsiyu v Evrazii [Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Can Undermine the Balance in Eurasia]. 22 September 2017. Eurasia

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Expert. http://eurasia.expert/dogovor-o-zapreshchenii-yadernogo- oruzhiya-evrazii/ (accessed: 15 March 2018). (In Russian). Strel’tsov, D.V. (2010). «Yadernaya dilemma» vo vneshney politike poslevoennoy Yaponii [The Nuclear Dilemma in the Foreign Policy of the Post-War Japan], MGIMO Review of International Relations. № 6. Рр. 56-64. (In Russian) Strel’tsov, D.V. (2016). Politika Yaponii v sfere voennoy bezopasnosti pri kabinetakh S. Abe: novyye podkhody [Japan’s Policy in the Field of Military Security Pursued by the Abe Governments: New Approaches]. Far Eastern Affairs. № 3. Рр. 21-31. (In Russian) Thakur, R. (2017). Japan on the Wrong Side of Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty. 10 October 2017. Japan Times. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/ opinion/2017/07/10/commentary/japan-commentary/japan-wrong-side- nuclear-weapons-ban-treaty/ (accessed: 20 October 2018). The Author’s Interview with Hirose Satoshi. Geneva, 26 April 2018. The Author’s Interview with Kawasaki Akira. Geneva, 26 April 2018. The Author’s Interview with Yamaguchi Daisuke. Geneva, 26 April 2018. The Author’s Interview with Suzuki Tatsujiro. Geneva, 2 May 2018. Three Non-Nuclear Principles (2018). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/nnp/ (accessed: 03 October 2018). Turner, W.D. (2003). Japanese Plutonium Stockpiles: A Transportation, Storage, and Public Relations Challenge. Journal of Environment & Development. № 1(12) Рр. 99-110. U.N. Adopts Japan’s Anti-Nuke Resolution but U.S. Abstains. 6 December 2018. Japan Times. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/12/06/national/ politics-diplomacy/u-n-adopts-japans-anti-nuke-resolution-u-s-abstains/ (accessed: 07 January 2019). U.S-Japan Joint Statement on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). 28 April 2015. The White House. https:// obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/04/28/us-japan- joint-statement-treaty-non-proliferation-nuclear-weapons-npt (accessed: 03 October 2018).

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Velloor, R. (2017). Japan and that Look in the Eye. 3 November 2017. The Straits Times. https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/japan-and-that-look-in-the- eye (accessed: 28 April 2019). Winn, P. (2019). Japan has Plutonium, Rockets and Rivals. Will it ever Build a Nuke? 14 March 2019. Public Radio International. https://interactive.pri. org/2019/03/japan-nuclear/index.html (accessed: 03 July 2019). Yaponskiye atomshchiki poteryali 206 kilogrammov plutoniya [Japanese Nuclear Industry Lost 206 Kilograms of Plutonium]. 29 January 2003. Lenta.ru. https://lenta.ru/news/2003/01/29/plutonium/ (accessed: 18 November 2018). (In Russian) Zemletryasenie v Yaponii – rezul’tat neudachnogo yadernogo podzemnogo ispytaniya [Earthquake in Japan is the Result of Unsuccessful Nuclear Test]. 04 April 2011. Fond strategicheskoi kul’tury. http://www.fondsk.ru (accessed: 05 April 2011, no longer accessible). (In Russian)

MURATSHINA Kseniya Gennad’yevna – PhD (History), Associate professor, Ural Federal University (Yekaterinburg) ORCID 0000-0001-7952-6299 E-mail: [email protected]

Russian edition of the article: Japanese Studies in Russia. 2019 № 4. Рр. 6–23. http://japanjournal.ru/images/js/2019/js_2019_4_6-23.pdf DOI: 10.24411/2500-2872-2019-10025

41 DOI: 10.24411/2658-6789-2020-10003

The Place of Historical Memory in Perception of China by Japanese Society

P.V. Kul’neva

Abstract. Despite the strong economic gravity between Japan and China, there are still many social factors that pull the countries apart. One of such factors is the negative image of the partner, which is largely related to the memory of World War II. The perception of China in Japanese society has been changing over the post-war decades. After Japan’s surrender and occupation of the country by the Allied Powers, political, economic, and cultural distance between the two countries grew. This led to a “lapse of memory” related to China among the post-war generation of the Japanese. Interest towards China in Japan started growing noticeably after some time had passed since the normalization of Sino- Japanese relations (1972) – from the late 1980s-early 1990s, as the contacts between the countries on different levels became increasingly active. The image of China in Japan deteriorated dramatically for the first time after the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, which demonstrated that China was an unsafe country with a repressive state machine. The attitude of Japanese society to China has been worsening since then for various reasons. Starting from the 1990s, as the Sino-Japanese relations were developing and becoming increasingly complex, new problems shaping the negative image of China emerged, including the struggle for geopolitical influence, global competition, negative influence of China on the environmental situation in the region, insufficient quality of Chinese products, problems of communication with Chinese business partners, the growing number of Chinese tourists in Japan, etc. As Sino-Japanese relations became more complicated, the problem

42 Kul’neva P.V. Historical Memory in Perception of China of historical memory was felt more and more acutely. This problem fits into the whole picture of controversies accumulated in the Sino-Japanese relations and intensifies some of them. Despite the unfavorable perception of China by Japanese society, signs of improvement can be seen in the last few years. In particular, many young Japanese view China and the prospects of developing the bilateral relations positively. Contacts with China give them ample opportunity to understand that country better, and closer economic ties make the influence of political factors less pronounced.

Keywords: Sino-Japanese relations, World War II, historical memory, Yasukuni Shrine, public opinion, China’s image, business environment in China, interaction of economics and politics.

Japan and China1 are among the largest economies in the Asia- Pacific region and are linked by close trade relations, direct investments, active cultural and scientific cooperation, and tourist exchanges. These ties are currently so strong that it allows both the Japanese and Chinese sides to speak about economic “interdependence”. At the same time, it is surprising that, while in the economic sphere Japan and China are strongly attracted to each other, in the social sphere, there are many factors that pull the countries apart. According to a recent sociological survey conducted by the Japanese nonprofit organization Genron NPO, in 2018 only 13.1 percent of the Japanese people felt good about China, whereas more than 80 percent of the respondents did not have a positive attitude towards China. On the Chinese side, the situation was somewhat better: 42.2 percent of the respondents said they had a good opinion about Japan, and 56.1 percent gave opposite answers [Dai 14-kai… 2018, p. 2]. However, as the survey shows, for most of the Chinese respondents, Japan is still not an attractive country.

1 China in this article refers to the Peoples’ Republic of China, or mainland China, unless indicated otherwise.

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The above-mentioned Genron NPO survey partly explains the causes of such perception by the Japanese and Chinese people of each other in the section “reasons for [the relevant] attitude to the country”. Thus, for the Japanese the main reasons for the negative perception of China in 2018 were (in descending order of priority) “the periodic invasion of the neighbour into the territorial waters and airspace near the Senkaku Islands” (this reason was indicated by 58.6 percent of the respondents); “inconsistency of China’s actions with the world order” (48.0 percent); “criticism from China regarding historical issues” (41.8 percent). For the Chinese, the negative perception of Japan was primarily due to the fact that Japan “did not repent properly and did not apologize for the invasion of the Chinese territory” (54.7 percent), and also to “the nationalization of the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands and the resulting confrontation” (50.5 percent). The third most important factor was geopolitical – 41.5 percent of the respondents said that “Japan, jointly with the USA, is trying to ambush China from the military, economic and ideological points of view” [Dai 14-kai… 2018, p. 5]. A smaller but rather significant number of the Japanese respondents noted, among other reasons for the negative perception of China, the “constant anti-Japanese publications in the Chinese media” (often touching upon military topics) and fears related to China’s increasing military power. Each of these reasons was indicated by 30 percent of the respondents. In general, analyzing the causes of the negative perception by the Japanese and the Chinese of each other, one can see mutual accusations of nationalism, fears related to the growing military power of the neighbor, and disagreements on world political issues [Dai 14-kai… 2018, p. 5]. The problem of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, a prominent issue in the mutual perception of the two countries, worsened after their nationalization by the Japanese government in 2012. The situation with the islands was the occasion for China to recall again the Japanese aggression of the 1930s–40s, the interpretation of the military events in Japanese history textbooks, and visits by Japanese senior officials to the Yasukuni Shrine, where, as it is believed, rest the souls of the Japanese soldiers who died for their homeland, with war

44 Kul’neva P.V. Historical Memory in Perception of China criminals among them. The large-scale anti-Japanese demonstrations that took place in China in 2012 were accompanied by relevant slogans and publications in the Chinese media. It is not surprising that the anti-Japanese sentiments damaged China’s image in Japan, as they seriously undermined the stability of Japanese companies’ operation and created an uncomfortable environment for tourists. The consequences for the Japanese business were quite tangible: for instance, the sales of Mitsubishi cars in the Chinese market in September 2012 (during the demonstrations) shrank by 63 percent against the same period of the previous year; sales of the Toyota company decreased by 40 percent in the same month, and the Nissan and Mazda companies had smaller sales as well [Toyota no kugatsu Chugoku hambai… 2012]. Similarly, serious losses were suffered by Japanese electronics manufacturers: in August 2012, Toshiba sales in Chinese retail chains decreased by 40.3 percent compared with the previous month, Sanyo lost 44.3 percent, Panasonic 23.4 percent, and Sharp 21.1 percent [Nihon kaden mēka no… 2012]. As a result, the decline in Japanese exports to China became quite visible, and after a while Japanese investment decreased as well. Being a complex and abstract category, historical memory is undoubtedly an integral part of China’s image in Japanese society and, as the 2012 events showed, it is of great importance, among other things, for real indicators of Japan-China economic cooperation. In this regard, it is important to understand how the historical memory of the military events in the mid-20th century is formed; what part it played in Japan- China relations at different stages of their post-war development and why its significance in the mutual perception of the two countries is so great at the present time. In this article, we will try to assess from these points of view the place of historical memory in the perception of China by Japanese society. First of all, it should be noted that the memory of military events became a burning issue in Sino-Japanese relations fairly recently. When, for the first time since the end of the war, China’s image in Japan deteriorated dramatically in the early 1990s, this was not due to

45 Russian Japanology Review, 2020. Vol. 3 (No. 1) the conflicting views on the historical past but in connection with the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, which showed that China was an unsafe country with a repressive state machine. While in the 1980s about 70 percent of the Japanese had friendly feelings for China [Naikakufu yoron chōsa… 2013], in the 1990s the number of the Japanese with friendly feelings for that country already hovered around 50 percent, and in the subsequent years the situation was only worsening.

Dynamics of perception of China by Japanese society (1978–2013)

Percentage of people responding that they have friendly feelings for China According to a public opinion poll conducted by the Cabinet of Japan

This is not to say that the attitude of Japanese society towards China became negative right after the war. According to researchers of that time, the feelings that the Japanese had for their neighbour in the 1950s and 1960s were “a mixture of fear, disdain, and a sense of kinship”, while the feeling of kinship largely softened the hostility caused by fear and disdain [Ōgata 1965, pp. 390-391]. Fear stemmed from uncertainty, because, despite its weakness in the second half of the 19th and early 20th

46 Kul’neva P.V. Historical Memory in Perception of China centuries, China was determined to become a mighty power under the new communist government and, obviously, had internal resources for this. Disdain was inherited from pre-war anti-Chinese education that presented China as a poor, backward country and Japan as the leader of modernization in the region. However, for many representatives of the same pre-war generation, the war enhanced the feeling of “kinship” with China; the country was not completely alien to these people. The Japanese born after the war found themselves in completely new conditions: these people did not know China in the first half of the 20th century and were not around during the military events. After the surrender of Japan and its occupation by the Allied Forces, the political, economic, and cultural distance between Japan and China increased, while the Western values became much closer. In general, before the relations between the countries were normalized in 1972, there were relatively few contacts between them; interest in China was not high, and for a whole generation of the Japanese that country became actually alien. A major contribution to increasing the distance between China and Japan was made by the policy of the Allied Forces led by General MacArthur, which was pursued during the seven-year period of Japan’s occupation (September 1945 – April 1952). According to the American anthropologist Ruth Benedict, the occupation was perceived by the Japanese people as the “natural consequences” of the mistakes made and as a step necessary for the further development of the country along the path of peace and democracy. Therefore, the Japanese willingly accepted the new constitution developed by the USA and the proposed political and economic models [Benedict 2013, pp. 213-214]. Japan’s radical reorientation towards the United States was accompanied by the adoption of American values, which, in the subsequent decades, firmly established themselves in the culture and worldview of the Japanese and still remain there. The generally accepted view on the events of the military past, which correlated well with the national identity of the Japanese and provided a suitable basis for the reforms of the US authorities, was the idea that the Japanese aggression and cruelty resulted from the incorrect actions by

47 Russian Japanology Review, 2020. Vol. 3 (No. 1) the country’s leaders and that the Japanese people were not responsible for what they had done. According to US Japanologist Carol Gluck, Japan’s occupation by the Allied Forces closed for the country one chapter of history and opened a new one. “In the ‘right history’, as General MacArthur saw it, the prewar ‘feudal’ past should be completely abandoned in the name of what the occupying troops considered its historical opposite, democracy” [Gordon (ed.) 1993, p. 66]. The crimes committed from 1928 to 1945 were categorized in the course of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE). Formulating the causes and results of the actions of concrete people during the tribunal, issuing indictments, and punishing those responsible helped to draw a line under the events. The mass culture of the post-war period was aimed at mitigating the people’s disappointment over the defeat in the war. So, the Japanese cinema of the 1950-60s tried to show more attractive aspects of the military events and avoid acute problems that could adversely affect the self-esteem of Japanese viewers. The Japanese soldiers were most often portrayed as courageous and disciplined and the war as disorderly and unjust. Thus, the soldiers became victims of the system and circumstances, while war criminals, if they happened to be the heroes of a film, were subordinated to the commanders who placed them in a desperate situation. With this course of development of Japanese cinema, the plots of most films during that period were focused not on the war in China, but on other parts of the Pacific War, where it was easier to depict the actions of Japan in a positive way [Wilson 2013, p. 539]. Thus, information about Japan’s nearest Asian neighbour was insufficient and its objectivity was disputable. Of great importance was also the education system, which forms the views of young people about the world around them. In the postwar decades, history textbooks were confined to a rather brief and incomplete description of military operations, and their contents were tightly controlled by a network of textbook review commissions created with the support of the Ministry of Education [Nozaki 2008, pp. 11-12]. A threat to the Japanese state was seen not only in a description of events that could undermine the feeling of patriotism, but also in the influence of Chinese

48 Kul’neva P.V. Historical Memory in Perception of China ideology [Jiang 2003, pp. 198-220], which also affected the knowledge about China, which had been so close to Japan before. A recent survey of the generation born in 1955-1965 showed that these people do not have a full picture and deep knowledge about China of that period. There are only fragmentary memories associated with some of the most significant events that were covered in the news (Cultural Revolution, the death of Zhou Enlai, etc.), and with the few contacts during events with China’s participation (sports competitions, the Expo- 70 international exhibition). Many respondents still had childhood memories of the pandas donated to the Japanese zoo to commemorate the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations in 1972. [Hirakawa 2005, pp. 4-6]. So, for many Japanese people, the 1950s-70s became a lapse in memory related to China. A few years after the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, in 1978, China launched a series of reforms within the framework of the “reform and openness” policy initiated by Deng Xiaoping. Gradually, with the advancement of market reforms and the creation of an increasing number of Special Economic Zones with a preferential regime for trade and foreign investment, China was becoming an important subject of international economic cooperation. Japan started to play a special part again among the country’s partners, as it maintained informal trade links with China even in the 1950-60s, in the absence of diplomatic relations, seeing a lot of potential in them. The rapprochement with China did not happen immediately. In the 1980s, the influence of American and European culture still prevailed in Japan, and the new popular word “globalization” was still perceived in relation to the countries of Europe and America. There was no mass interest in China, but some of the Japanese who were interested in politics had questions regarding Japan-China relations. Some people were puzzled by the fact that Japan and China could not mark a decisive end to the military events. At that time, the proceedings, which began back in the 1960s, continued between the Japanese historian Ienaga Saburō and the Japanese Ministry of Education: in 1982, Ienaga filed a third lawsuit

49 Russian Japanology Review, 2020. Vol. 3 (No. 1) against the Ministry to demand compensation for the damage caused by the rejection of his draft textbook. The process attracted public attention. It is interesting, however, that a contemporary of those events recalled that having learned from the media about Japan’s ill acts with regard to the neighbouring countries during the war, she could not associate this information with herself [Hirakawa 2005, p. 6]. This speaks to the effect that during several post-war decades, in the absence of official contacts with China and the Japanese government’s policy aimed at strengthening patriotism and forgetting the unpleasant chapters of history, Japanese society distanced itself not only from China, but also from the problems of the military past. In the 1990s, the situation in Sino-Japanese relations changed. This decade was a period of their rapid development: not only did trade and investment grow, but also tourism, scientific and cultural exchange expanded. The basis for this was the obvious success of the Chinese reforms: the country’s economy grew at an accelerated rate, exceeding 10 percent in 1992-1995. The size of the middle class in the developed regions of China was rapidly enlarging. This resulted in an increase in the purchasing power of the Chinese population and the development of outbound tourism. In general, China was beginning to play a more prominent part on the international scene, strengthening its positions in world politics and economy. In the 1990s, China was actively preparing to join the World Trade Organization (which happened in 2001). At the same time, after the collapse of the “bubble economy” in the late 1980s, Japan entered a difficult period of economic depression, which undermined the country’s position in the global economy and still affects its business activity and other economic indicators to this day. All this had dual consequences for Sino-Japanese relations and China’s perception by Japanese society. On the one hand, the affinity of the two countries had become unprecedented since the end of World War II, which generated mutual interest and the desire of the two nations to understand each other. The Chinese language was becoming popular in Japan and more and more literature about China was being published. On the other hand, China’s growing influence and close contacts with that

50 Kul’neva P.V. Historical Memory in Perception of China country caused apprehension in Japan, which was felt quite strongly and consisted of various components. In the mid-1990s, there appeared the first signs that China could surpass Japan in GDP, and in 2010, this really happened. This economic breakthrough was not expected by Japanese society and was perceived as a threat, since it meant that China was ousting Japan from the position of Asia’s strongest economic power, and the center of power in Sino- Japanese relations was shifting toward China. In general, of growing concern for Japan was China’s increasing geopolitical influence, the weight of that country in international decision-making, its nuclear potential and military expenditure. The phasing out of official development assistance (ODA) in the 2000s, which Japan had been providing to China in rather large amounts for nearly 40 years, was largely due to fears of misuse of the funds and the growth of China’s military power2. In addition to the geopolitical factors and global competition issues, Japanese society’s other concerns are environmental problems, rather low quality of Chinese products, different mentality of Chinese business partners, predominance of Chinese tourists, etc. Thus, at the present time, Sino-Japanese relations are of complex nature; they are characterized by active bilateral contacts at different levels and a large number of problems that need to be addressed. With the development and complication of the relations, the problem of historical memory has become increasingly acute. This problem can be said to fit into the set of contradictions that have accumulated in Sino-Japanese relations to date, and it not only supplements but also enhances some of them. The special place of historical memory in Japan-China relations at the present stage can be explained, firstly, by the fact that enough time has passed since the end of the war; many issues have been rethought and attracted attention again; secondly, it can be also explained by the nature of the two countries’ relationships: as we said before, owing to

2 The problem of the connection between the Japanese ODA and the compensation of military damage to Asian countries, its motives, structure, dynamics, and other issues are discussed quite fully in: [Kovrigin 2012; Kovrigin 2014].

51 Russian Japanology Review, 2020. Vol. 3 (No. 1) their close ties and economic interdependence any disagreement may affect very painfully the indicators of bilateral cooperation. We can mention one more reason that added to the importance of historical memory and made its manifestations more visible. Historical problems often become an instrument of pressure and manipulation both in international relations and in domestic politics of states. It is believed that Chinese society became more sensitive to issues of the military past in the 1980s as a result of liberalization and higher living standards. The newly emerging middle class was given an opportunity to express its views more freely than under Mao Zedong, while the country’s successful economic development helped enhance patriotism. In this situation, the sensitivity of the Chinese to world affairs concerning China was becoming more pronounced. Moreover, with the expansion of media freedom and the advent of the Internet, public opinion became an increasingly serious concern for the Chinese authorities, and anti- Japanese propaganda was used as a tool to divert attention from internal problems [Zakowski 2012, p. 50]. The situation in the region also developed in such a way that the PRC government needed a new image of an external enemy to consolidate society and increase confidence in the Communist Party (CPC). The mid- 1980s saw the emergence in Taiwan of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) opposed to the Kuomintang and advocating the proclamation of Taiwan as an independent state, and the Kuomintang turned from an enemy into a potential ally of the CPC in the fight against the external threat. Social instability and demonstrations in the Tiananmen Square in 1989 created for the CPC an urgent need for patriotic education, the central place in which was now taken by the negative image of Japan. In the 1980s and 1990s, China made adjustments to history textbooks, established new military museums, released numerous feature films which presented China as a victim in the 1937-1945 war of resistance to the Japanese invaders. Not surprisingly, after the 1980s, China’s reaction to many problems related to the military past became more emotional. In turn, Japanese society became more emotionally responsive to statements by Chinese

52 Kul’neva P.V. Historical Memory in Perception of China politicians, publications in the Chinese media and, in general, the anti- Japanese attitude of the Chinese people. Consequently, criticisms from China in relation to historical problems became one of the key factors contributing to the negative image of China in Japan. It was in the 1980s that the first diplomatic conflicts arose in Japan- China relations over the contents of Japanese history textbooks. At the same time the Chinese government began to make a serious diplomatic problem out of visits by Japanese government officials to the Yasukuni Shrine, a Shinto sanctuary, where the souls of the Japanese who died in the wars are believed to repose. The problem of history textbooks periodically comes to the fore in Japan-China relations, causing serious concern to both sides. In 1982, China accused Japan of softening the tone in describing the 1937- 1945 events, namely, replacing the word shinryaku (“aggression” [of Japan in China]) with shinshutsu (“offensive”) as instructed by the Ministry of Education. Later it was found out that this amendment was not made [Pyle 1983, pp. 298-300], but the problem received a great response in the media and was widely discussed. In addition to the 1982 conflict, there were three more crises [Fukuoka 2011, p. 85- 87] when disagreements over the contents of textbooks arose on the international level. In 1986, the Chinese government criticized the new history textbook approved by the Ministry of Education, considering it biased and not taking into account the interests of Japan’s neighbours. In the 1990s, the situation was relatively stable largely thanks to the fact that, being aware of diplomatic costs, Tokyo took measures to settle it3; however, in the 2000s, there were two more crises, accompanied by large-scale anti-Japanese demonstrations in China.

3 After the first conflict, Chief Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa Kiichi made a statement in which he regretted the current situation and promised that Japan would pay due attention to the criticism. Also in 1982, the Ministry of Educa- tion adopted the so-called “Asian Neighbours Clause” which stressed the need for international understanding and agreement with the neighbouring Asian countries when considering events of recent history.

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Another reason for China’s periodic attacks on Japan is the visits of Japanese political leaders to the Yasukuni Shrine, which for the first time caused a noticeable reaction in the mid-1980s, when, on the 40th anniversary of Japan’s defeat in the war, the sanctuary was visited by Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro. The actions of the Japanese prime minister were harshly criticized by the Chinese Foreign Ministry, and in the 1990s, China voiced a protest on behalf of the whole nation [Molodyakova 2007, p. 64]. The problem escalated at the turn of the century, during the rule of Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō. Over a fairly long period of tenure (from 2001 to 2006), Koizumi visited the Yasukuni Shrine every year, each time provoking a negative reaction from Japan’s Asian neighbors. The above assumption that the increasing role of the historical memory factor in China-Japan relations has to do with the internal situation in China is also confirmed by the fact that the problems of textbooks and Yasukuni Shrine arose much earlier than they became a subject of diplomatic conflicts between the two countries. Controversy over the contents of history textbooks practically did not stop in Japan throughout the post-war decades. When the occupation was over, the influence of conservative forces rose again; they sought to get maximum control over the education system (including the content of the course in history), achieve romanticization of the military events, create a heroic image of Japan, and minimize description of facts that present the country in a negative light. State control in the field of education was opposed by progressive-minded researchers and teachers who insisted on a reliable description of historical facts in textbooks and a wider use of such study aids [Arai 2010]. The most famous advocate of the objective reflection of military events in textbooks was Professor Ienaga Saburō, the aforementioned Japanese historian. Thus, the transformation of historical memory in Japan was influenced by internal forces, and the projection of the problem on China began as a result of the reforms in the PRC and the expansion of its contacts with Japan. The Yasukuni Shrine issue has even deeper religious, cultural, and historical roots. The sanctuary itself is associated with the state Shinto

54 Kul’neva P.V. Historical Memory in Perception of China

(kokka shintō), a religion that was used by the Japanese ruling circles as a means of asserting power in the period between the Meiji restoration (1868) and the end of World War II. For obvious reasons, associations with the militaristic ideology and the totalitarian wartime regime cause a negative reaction among the nations affected by the Japanese aggression, the more so as the souls of the war criminals convicted by the International Military Tribunal rest in the sanctuary. At the same time, the shrine is part of the historical memory of the Japanese and is of great importance for them as a place of sorrow and veneration for fellow countrymen who sacrificed their lives for the sake of their homeland [Molodyakova 2007, p. 59]. According to Elgena Molodyakova, the complexity and “multidimensionality” of the Yasukuni Shrine issue opens up possibilities for speculations and playing the Yasukuni card in world politics. Japanese society’s assessment of the situation with the Yasukuni Shrine reflects exactly the multidimensionality of the problem. According to a 2013 survey conducted by the Mainichi newspaper, about 60 percent of the Japanese (in both age groups surveyed: from 20 to 30 years and older than 30 years) are not against Japan’s prime minister visiting the shrine. At the same time, most of the respondents (56 percent of the 20 to 30-year-old group and 84 percent of the over 30-year-olds) know that war criminals convicted by the IMTFE are venerated in the sanctuary, and about 50 percent of the respondents (45 percent in the first age group and 55 percent in the second) said that they considered the war aggressive with regard to Asian countries. Evidently, people regard the Yasukuni Shrine primarily as a place of grief and memory of the war. It is important that at the same time Japanese society is concerned about the diplomatic problems associated with the Yasukuni Shrine. For instance, 69.8 percent of the Japanese polled on this issue in the same year by Kyōdō Tsūshin said that attention should be paid to diplomatic relations 4. Reception of the Yasukuni Shrine issue by the Japanese speaks of diverging views on the military events inside the country and abroad.

4 Survey data are given in an article by independent Japanese journalist Kimura Masato, who worked at the London office ofSankei Shimbun.

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A US historian John Dower points out that for many Japanese living in Japan the war is remembered as a tragic “history of losses”, while for people in Asian countries, Britons, and Americans Japan is certainly an aggressor country [Kimura 2013]. Under the influence of Japan’s intrinsic closeness, tendency to shut off from the outside world, and under the pressure of conservative forces, historical memory in Japan ran its own course. It is because of the different perception of the military events in Japan and China that historical memory remains a heavy burden in Sino-Japanese relations. A serious China-Japan joint study of public opinion on the subject of mutual perception and attitude of the nations towards each other, which started about 15 years ago and focuses on the problems of history, proves that the two sides recognize the urgency of the historical memory problem. In 2005, the non-profit organization Genron NPO (from Japan) and the China Daily publishing company and Peking University (from China) published the results of the first joint public opinion poll. Since then, the survey has been carried out annually and much attention is paid to any slight fluctuations in the mutual image and perception. The survey investigates a wide range of issues – from public opinion on security in the region to having friends and acquaintances in the neighbouring country. It is characteristic that all editions of the survey emphasize the importance of the historical memory problem and there is a special section devoted to it. The historical memory problem can also be seen distinctly in the answers of respondents to general questions from other sections, such as “the reason for the negative attitude to China / Japan” or “what, in your opinion, impedes most of all the development of Japan-China relations”. Over 15 years, the set of “historical memory problems that require solution”, proposed to assess the Japanese and Chinese audiences, has remained unchanged: this is the attitude to the war and its most painful episodes (the Nanking massacre, comfort women), recognition by the Japanese of their guilt and compensation for the damage, coverage of the military events in history textbooks (both Japanese and Chinese), statements by politicians and publications in the media. The distribution of votes shows that these problems carry different weight with Japanese

56 Kul’neva P.V. Historical Memory in Perception of China and Chinese society; however significant groups in both Japan and China agree that they are yet to be resolved (Table 1). Table 1 Historical problems of Sino-Japanese relations that require solution (2018)*

Problem Percentage Percentage of respondents of respondents (Japan) (China) Japan’s attitude to the aggressive war 36.6 62.2 Problem of Japanese history textbooks 21.7 40.9 Japan’s reparations, problems of comfort 32.0 44.3 women, forced labour, etc. Japan’s attitude to the Nanking massacre 20.6 52.2 Statements by Japanese politicians about China 7.1 37.7 Japanese media’s publications on China 14.2 29.4 Japan’s insufficient admission of guilt for the 6.6 26.5 aggression Anti-Japanese education in China and textbook 64.6 12.3 content China’s attitude to the Nanking massacre 30.9 13.7 Statements by Chinese politicians about Japan 27.2 6.4 Chinese media’s publications on Japan 38.8 2.7 Other 2.1 0.0 Don’t know 4.3 0.0 No answer 0.3 0.1

* Percentage of respondents from the target group who noted the importance of the problem. Source: [Dai 14-kai… 2018, p. 24]

The Japanese audience pays much attention to anti-Japanese sentiment in general, including the peculiarities of the Chinese education system and the content of textbooks, as well as China’s attitude to the

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Nanking massacre, statements by Chinese politicians and representatives of the media. At the same time, respondents are aware of the need to address the historical memory problem on the part of Japan. So, 36.6 percent believe that Japan should reconsider its attitude to the aggressive war, and 20.6 percent – that the attitude to the Nanking massacre should be revised. 21.7 percent of the Japanese respondents point to the need to work on the content of Japanese history textbooks. 32.0 percent of the respondents believe that the issues of reparations and compensation to the victims have not been resolved yet. More than 60 percent of the Japanese participants in the survey consider historical problems an obstacle to the development of Sino-Japanese relations. Speaking about the fact that historical memory supplements and adds to the other problems existing in China-Japan relations, it is necessary to emphasize once again that it affects economic cooperation. Japanese businesses perceive China as a business partner bearing this factor in mind. Thus, in the China Risk Management Research Association Report of the JETRO organization, anti-Japanese sentiments and historical problems are mentioned as specific risks. It is also noted that Japanese companies are often targeted by the Chinese media [Chugoku risuku… 2013, p. 43]. Historical memory is certainly a factor of uncertainty and an obstacle to expanding the business of Japanese companies in China. It instills in them feelings of uncertainty, instability and disappointment. For instance, after the 2012 devastating demonstrations, the director of the affected Aeon department store (Qingdao), Orita Fumiaki, expressed regret and frustration, because despite the fact that the company had done so much for China by hiring 3.800 Chinese employees, allocating 15 million yen to Chinese students over three years and making every effort to reach an understanding with the locals, they were repaid with hatred [Gekika suru… 2012]. Currently, the Japanese media are widely discussing the closure of a Takashimaya department store in Shanghai, whose financial problems began with the 2012 anti-Japanese demonstrations. The department store was opened three months after the nationalization of the Senkaku

58 Kul’neva P.V. Historical Memory in Perception of China

Islands, and because of material damage and a boycott of Japanese goods it could not achieve the expected financial results [Takashimaya ga Chugoku tettai e… 2019]. For the Japanese, this means that the historical memory factor must be taken into consideration in long-term planning. The anti-Japanese sentiment in China worries Japanese tourists as well. Many tourists were afraid to go to China after the demonstrations began, and travel agencies canceled the planned tours [Hannichi demo de… 2012]. Ordinary Japanese people, including tourists, are primarily concerned about security issues. The fear of instability, aggressive attitude, and misunderstanding often outweighs the interest in China that has emerged in recent decades. However, not all Japanese people were frightened by the situation. An interesting example is a group of students from Meiji University who went on a planned study trip to the PRC in 2012 despite the demonstrations. In their reflections on the trip after returning home, many of them wrote that the visit to China in this difficult time increased their interest in studying the history, culture, and language of that country. Those who had expected a cold welcome were impressed by Chinese cordiality and hospitality. One of the students pointed to the difference between the real situation and what the Japanese media portrayed. Contrary to the opinion existing in Japan, Chinese people at local level turned out to be more benevolent and said they loved Japan. According to another participant in the trip, the interpretation of the Senkaku Islands issue on Chinese and Japanese television was completely different [Kaigai zemi gasshuku… 2012]. This confirms the serious influence of media publications onthe formation of the assessment of a country and of specific events, the importance of critical attitude and independent study of an issue in situ, through personal experience. Young Japanese people have more and more opportunities for that. A good sign is that, according to a public opinion survey conducted by the Cabinet of Japan, among the respondents who have friendly feelings for China and who believe that the situation in Sino-Japanese relations is favorable, there are more young people. In 2017, 31.5 percent of the Japanese aged 18 to 29 had a feeling of neighborship with China,

59 Russian Japanology Review, 2020. Vol. 3 (No. 1) and 19.7 percent of the respondents in this age group said that, in their opinion, Japan’s relations with China were “good” or “rather good”. It is interesting to note that, while the assessment of the relations with China varies depending on the age group, the feeling of closeness with China steadily increases with a decrease in the age of respondents (Table 2). For older Japanese people, China is less close, except for the group of over 70 year–olds (i.e., those who were born in 1947 or earlier): these people are more inclined to perceive China as a close country.

Table 2 Assessment by Japanese society of relations with China by age group (2017)

Age Relations of Japan with China There is a feeling are “good” or “rather good” of closeness with China (percentage) (percentage) 18–29 years 19.7 31.5 30–39 years 15.5 23.0 40–49 years 13.7 20.1 50–59 years 16.5 18.5 60–69 13.4 12.7 Over 70 years 14.3 16.9 Average for all groups 14.9 18.8 Previous year average 12.5 16.8

Source: [Naikakufu yoron chōsa … 2013]

Judging by the mean value, both indicators improved compared with the previous year, and in general there is positive dynamics in the image of China and Japan-China relations. Japan is fostering cooperation with China in science, culture, education, tourism, trade and investment. All of this requires active human contacts. It is characteristic that although the contemporary generation keeps memory of the post-war problems in Japan-China relations and of everything that formed the negative image

60 Kul’neva P.V. Historical Memory in Perception of China of China in the 1980s and 1990s, the positive image of the neighboring country is created largely due to socio-economic ties, cultural exchange, and tourism. Thus, according to Genron NPO’s 2018 report, a positive attitude towards China among the Japanese audience is taking shape due to various forms of Japan-China relations, including travel, interest in Chinese music, literature and history, satisfaction with the economic achievements of the PRC and with the growing standard of living of the Chinese population (which to some extent brings the Chinese consumer closer to the Japanese one). It is also interesting that for nearly 20 percent of the respondents China’s positive image was associated with the low cost and attractiveness of Chinese products [Dai 14-kai... 2018, pp. 4-5], whereas previously the opinion of them was very negative. At the present stage, Sino-Japanese relations are, on the one hand, complex in the areas of activity that they embrace, and also in the diversity of their participants and subjects, and, on the other hand, they are strong and largely driven by economic interests. It can be even said that the activity of socio-economic contacts began to sideline some political problems. Professor Liu Jiangyong of the Tsinghua University in China, who studies the influence of political factors on the Japan-China economic relations, points out that in the 1990s they entered a new stage, when economic ties did not depend so much on the political situation as before. This even led to the fact that, in the early 21st century, during the rule of Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō, which was an extremely unfavourable period for Sino-Japanese political relations (during that period the Chinese side responded negatively to the visits by Japanese senior officials to the Yasukuni Shrine), there emerged an unprecedented situation of “heyday of economic relations with coldness in politics” (zhèng lěng jīng rè in Chinese) [Liu 2007, p. 48-86]. Nevertheless, the increasing complexity of Sino-Japanese relations gives rise to new problems and makes the old unresolved ones, including the issue of historical memory, resurface. There is still a lot of work to be done to achieve mutual understanding both at the level of politicians and at the level of Japanese and Chinese society.

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References

Arai Shin’ichi (2010). History Textbooks in Twentieth Century Japan: A Chronological Overview. Journal of Educational Media, Memory & Society. № 2 (Vol. 2). Special Issue: Contextualizing School Textbook Revision. Pp. 113-121. Benedict, R. (2013). Khrizantema i mech: modeli yaponskoy kul’tury [The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture]. Moscow-St. Petersburg. Tsentr gumanitarnykh initsiativ. (In Russian) Chugoku risuku manejimento kenkyukai. Hōkokusho [China Risk Management Research Association Report] (2013). JETRO. https://www. jetro.go.jp/ext_images/jfile/report/0 7001515/07001515.pdf (accessed: 04 May 2020). Dai 14-kai nitchu kyōdō yoron chōsa [The 14th Joint Japan-China Opinion Poll Survey]. 09 October 2018. The Genron NPO. http://www.genron-npo.net/ world/archives/7053.html (accessed: 04 May 2020). Fukuoka Kazuya (2011). School History Textbooks and Historical Memories in Japan: A Study of Reception. International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society. № 3/4 (Vol. 24). Pp. 83-103. Gekika suru hannichi demo – chugoku to dō mukiau ka [Escalating anti-Japanese Demonstrations – How Should We Face China]. 18 September 2012. NHK Broadcasting Corporation. http://www.nhk.or.jp/gendai/articles/3248/1. html (accessed: 08 July 2019, no longer accessible). Gordon, A. (ed.). (1993). Postwar Japan and History. London: University of California Press. Hannichi demo de Chugoku tsua chushi aitsugu. Nitchu kōryu, kankō ni kage [China Tours Canceled due to anti-Japanese Demonstrations. Shadow has Fallen on Japan-China Exchange and Tourism]. 16 September 2012. Nihon Keizai Shimbun. https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASDG1503D_ V10C12A9CC1000/ (accessed: 04 May 2020). Hirakawa Sachiko (2005). 40 dai nihonjin no Chugokukan wo saguru [Exploring the View on China among the Japanese Born in 1940s]. CORE. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/46867540.pdf (accessed: 11 April 2019, no longer accessible).

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Jiang Xiaojing (2003). Rekishi kyōkasho mondai wo meguru nitchu kankei [Sino-Japanese Relations as Revealed in the Issues of History Textbooks]. The bulletin of the Graduate School of the Soka University. № 25. Pp. 197-220. Kaigai zemi gasshuku 2012 sankasha no kansōbun (kikoku repōto yori) [Reflections of the Participants of the 2012 Overseas Seminar Camp after Returning Home] (2012). Meiji University. http://www.kisc.meiji. ac.jp/~asiashi/images/report005.pdf (accessed: 04 May 2020). Kimura Masato (2013). Shushō no Yasukuni sampai. Asahi no yoron chōsa de mo 6 wari sansei [Prime-Minister’s Visit to Yasukuni. 60 Percent Support in the Opinion Poll of Asahi]. 30 December 2013. Personal Blog of Kimura Masato. https://news.yahoo.co.jp/byline/kimuramasato/20131230-00031149/ (accessed: 04 May 2020). Kovrigin, E.B. (2012). Yaponiya – Kitay: ofitsial’naya pomoshch’ razvitiyu kak instrument ekonomicheskogo vzaimodeystviya [Japan – China: Official Development Assistance as an Instrument of Economic Interaction]. Prostranstvennaya ekonomika. № 3. Pp. 9-33. (In Russian) Kovrigin, E.B. (2014). Yaponiya – ASEAN: evolyutsiya ofitsial’noy pomoshchi razvitiyu [Japan – ASEAN: Evolution of the Official Development Assistance]. Prostranstvennaya ekonomika. № 2. Рр. 40-74. (In Russian). Liu Jiangyong (2007). Zhongguo yu Riben. Bianhua zhong de “zhengleng jingre” guanxi [China and Japan. The Changing Relations of “Cold Politics and Hot Economy”]. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe. (In Chinese) Molodyakova, E.V. (2007). Mnogoaspektnost’ problemy svyatilishcha Yasukuni [Multiple Aspects of the Yasukuni Shrine Issue]. Yearbook Japan 2007. Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies of RAS. Pp. 48-68. (In Russian) Naikakufu yoron chōsa [Public Opinion Survey of the Cabinet Office]. October 2013. Cabinet Office, Government Of Japan. https://survey.gov-online. go.jp/h25/h25-gaiko/zh/z10.html (accessed: 04 May 2020). Nihon kaden mēka no hambairyō ga gekigen [Sales Volume of Japanese Home Electronics Manufacturers has Fallen Sharply]. 12 September 2012. Searchina. http://news.searchina.ne.jp/disp.cgi?y=2012&d=0912&f=busi ness_0912_16 1.shtml (accessed: 04 May 2020).

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Nozaki Yoshiko (2008). War Memory, Nationalism and Education in Postwar Japan, 1945–2007: The Japanese History Textbook Controversy and Ienaga Saburo’s Court Challenges. London-New-York: Routledge. Ōgata Sadako (1965). Japanese Attitude toward China. Asian Survey. № 5 (8). Pp. 389-398. Pyle, K.B. (1983). Japan Besieged: The Textbook Controversy. Journal of Japanese Studies. № 9 (2). Pp. 297-300. Takashimaya ga Chugoku tettai e. Chugoku netto de wa “shippai shita gen’in” shiteki suru koe mo [Takashimaya Leaves China. Opinions on the Reasons for its “Failor” Published on the Chinese Internet]. 26 June 2019. Record China. https://www.recordchina.co.jp/b724422-s0-c20-d0054.html (accessed: 04 May 2020). Toyota no kugatsu Chugoku hambai 4 wari gen, hannichi de nenkan mokuhyō mitatsu mo [Toyota Sales in China have Fallen by 40 Percent, Annual Goals might not be Achieved because of the anti-Japanese Demonstrations]. 05 October 2012. Reuters. http://jp.reuters.com/article/JPauto/idJPTY- E89401N20121005 (accessed: 04 May 2020). Wilson, S. (2013). Film and Soldier: Japanese War Movies in the 1950s. Journal of Contemporary History. № 48 (3). Pp. 537-555. Zakowski, K. (2012). Reaction to Popular Pressure or a Political Tool? Different Interpretations of China’s Policy Regarding Koizumi’s Visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia. № 11(2). Pp. 47-60.

KUL’NEVA Polina Victorovna – PhD (Economics), Researcher, Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. E-mail: [email protected]

Russian edition of the article: Japanese Studies in Russia. 2019, № 4: 103–119. http://japanjournal.ru/images/js/2019/js_2019_4_103-119.pdf DOI: 10.24411/2500-2872-2019-10031

64 DOI: 10.24411/2658-6789-2020-10004

Training Manuals for Military Personnel in the Meiji Period (1868-1912)

E.M. Osmanov

Abstract. The article discusses training manuals for military personnel which were the basis of the ideological education of soldiers and officers in the Imperial Japanese Army. These manuals, being an important instrument of ideological education, played an important part in the life of Japanese society in the Meiji period. Their authors took into account all possible aspects of the military service, seeking to give answers and explanations to all questions of spiritual, legal, and practical character. Those manuals regulated every movement of the soldiers, shaping their consciousness and way of thinking.

Keywords: training manuals, regulations for military personnel, ideological indoctrination, Imperial Japanese Army.

After creating the armed forces which were based, unlike the previous samurai military units, on representatives of the common people, most of whom were from the peasant class, the government faced a serious problem. The core of the issue was that, despite the historically high level of general literacy of the Japanese people, the new historical reality did not let the Japanese keep up with the current rate of westernization, which not only generated various myths about the Western way of life and technical means but also caused certain difficulties related to the army life organized in the European way.

65 Russian Japanology Review, 2020. Vol. 3 (No. 1)

Thus, one of the government’s objectives was to make the armed forces, the core of which was young people, a vehicle for spreading new knowledge, which, after the demobilization of the military personnel, would be disseminated among the civilian section of Japanese society. Consequently, in the situation where the europeanized education system was practically absent, it were the armed forces that, in addition to their direct duties, also performed the educational function. In this context, there is an obvious relationship between the armed forces and the Japanese society as a whole. Many servicemen recalled that they owed their success in life primarily to the knowledge and skills they had received during their service in the army. The first mass-produced printed materials meant for training military personnel appeared among the troops practically at the same time when the formation of the armed forces began under the Conscription Law enacted in 1873. As the bulk of the Japanese people had very vague ideas about a centralized army and navy to be created and about military service, the purpose of these documents was to dispel the myths widespread among the peasants with regard to military conscription as well as to provide answers to the most frequently asked questions in the course of active military service. Also, since the text of the Law was written in rather complicated language, these materials could be easily understood by poorly educated sections of Japanese society. Among the documents of this kind the best known are materials explaining procedures for exemption from military service, which, given the desire of the majority of the male population to avoid recruitment in the first Meiji years, were very popular in society. A good example is the document Explanation of Conscription Exemption (Chōhei men’eki yōroku 徴兵免除要録), which throughout the 1870s was a reference book in many families where there were men of military age [Chōhei men’eki yōroku 1875]. Unlike the typical 1870s works which focused on how to avoid conscription and were written for the most part by people who had served military conscription, the documents of the 1880s were completely different. With amazing regularity appeared the Memorandum for

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Servicemen, compiled by various authors. The most popular was the Memorandum written in 1886 by Aizawa Tomizō, a well-known author of such documents for those doing military service. This 88- page book was a pocket companion for many soldiers in the Imperial Japanese Army. In 1877, its author was called up for military service, which he did in the 1st Engineer Regiment at the Tokyo garrison. After demobilization, he established a publishing house, Kōseidō (厚生堂), which specialized in publishing printed materials for the military. Until his death in 1915, Aizawa published over 100 works on different aspects of military service, which were very popular in society. In the preface to his Memorandum he wrote, “A family’s prosperity or decline, life or death are inextricably linked with the life of the state. Harmony can only be achieved through mutual care. Servicemen must realize themselves that the state is their home and the whole nation is their family. When defending the state, soldiers defend the graves of their ancestors.” [Aizawa 1886, p. 4]. Thus, the importance and significance of military service was explained to new recruits simply and without undue pomp, for which purpose the author used fundamental constructs that existed in the mind of every Japanese from childhood, such as native places (furusato 故郷) and ancestors’ graves (fumbo 墳墓). Naturally, the main objective of such documents was not just to clarify the issues of military service, but to promote the development of a certain system of values, as a result of which the entire population of Japan would come to realize the importance and, ultimately, the honor of doing military service. Meanwhile, before the Sino-Japanese War, each military unit published its own materials reflecting their specifics and meant only for their own personnel. Even very important matters such as handling weapons, addressing the commander, marching formation, etc. were explained differently in the training manuals of different regiments, and in most cases (especially in the first half of the Meiji period) these rules were announced by the commanders orally. Major General Soga Sukenori (曾我祐準), who in 1882-1885 was Vice Chief of the General Staff, emphasized in his article On Education in the Army (Taichū bunkyōron 隊中文教論) that “a man who has become

67 Russian Japanology Review, 2020. Vol. 3 (No. 1) a soldier must remember that he is obliged to do his duty without sparing himself for the sake of every person in our country... To help him in this, it is necessary to write appropriate teaching aids that will make him an educated person in the broad sense and an expert in military matters in the narrow sense” [Soga 1876, p. 2]. Based on this, it can be assumed that at least by 1876 such textbooks had not been created yet. However, starting from 1883, such publications began to appear in many regiments. What did these manuals teach? The common feature to all of them was that they began with the text of the 1882 Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors and comments on it. As a rule, a manual consisted of several sections, the first of which contained rules of conduct in the barracks. These rules were arranged in the form of questions from soldiers and answers of the commander, i.e. resembling oral answers. In this sections, for example, there were questions like “What is to be done if liquid starts to leak out of the barracks window?” And, accordingly, the answer was “If liquid leaks out or solid objects get in or something knocks on the frame, in no case can the lamp be lit without permission” [Heisotsu kuchijūmon kotaeroku 1886, p. 8]. The answer to the question “When is it allowed to ease oneself?” was “Number one and number two should be done only in the latrine” [Heisotsu kutijūmon kotaeroku 1886, p. 11]. The second section dealt with military personnel’s attitude towards civilians. “A soldier should not be arrogant or insolent towards civilians. Otherwise he will be considered vulgar and rude” [Heisotsu kuchijūmon kotaeroku 1886, p. 42]. In addition, this section focused on the concept of duty: a soldier is the defender of the people who is highly valued in society. Thus, pursuing the aim to strengthen discipline, by means of the explanations contained in this section, the ideologists sought to tame the violent spirit typical of the soldiers before the Sino-Japanese War. The third section was devoted to soldiers’ weapon handling. So, one of the manuals, made in the form of questions and answers, gave an explanation of the functions of small arms, their names and roles of their main parts. Question: “What is a rifle?” Answer: “In the broad sense a rifle is a tool for protecting the country, while in the narrow sense it

68 Osmanov E.M. Training Manuals for Meiji Military is a means of self-defense [Heisotsu hikkei, 1883 p. 52]. Through this explanation the soldiers were to correlate their life and destiny with the destiny and existence of the state, which, in the long run, helped to form the sense of “internal nationalism”. The next section of such manuals had to do with the soldier-state relations and was often called “relations between me and the state” (watakushi to kokka to no kankei 私と国家との関係). This section had, for example, questions like “What should you do if, after serving active military duty, you return home and see that your parents are very ill and that you have come under the call-out of reserves?” The ideologically correct answer to this difficult question was “Honest and loyal service is very important for the soldier, and even if your parents are ill, you should immediately go to do military service, as you are indispensable for the state that personifies your ancestors and parents” [Yonjūichinenshiki hohei kyōkasho 1908, p. 103]. Influenced by such explanations, soldiers embraced the idea that the state was the main value and that for its sake they should go to serve, even leaving their sick parents. However, the growing education level of the Japanese, the increasing role of the armed forces in society and the state, the rising status of the soldier, tightened censorship, etc. stopped the publication of training manuals in the regiments. These materials were replaced by national- level manuals that were written by prominent authors and champions of military ideology. Such manuals were published until the defeat of Japan in the Pacific War and played a great role in nurturing fidelity, courage, selfless devotion, and contempt of death in the soldiers. As an example, let us look at the interpretation of the concept of “patriotism” presented in the 1895 manual for soldiers. “Patriotism is love of one’s country, our Great Japan, ruled by the continuous imperial dynasty. Patriotism helped us to avoid the invasion of foreign powers after the opening of the country and to become a prosperous and world-famous state. Our ancestors protect us because they love and take pride in Great Japan” [Heisotsu kyōkasho 1895, p. 4]. This passage in its pathos is evidently different from the more mundane phrases in the textbooks and memos published before the Sino-Japanese War.

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Having defeated the great continental power, which for a long time had been a teacher and a store of knowledge for Japan, supporters of militarization began to make every effort to ensure that this victory had the greatest possible impact on Japanese society. While before the Sino- Japanese War the need to create armed forces was explained by the need to preserve Japan’s sovereignty, since the mid-1890s the answer to the question why the army was needed started to sound in a slightly different way. In his Manual on Military Science, Idota Ititarō, the author of numerous works on the war with China, wrote the following on this subject: “The reason for the existence of armed forces in the state is that they do not allow other countries to offend us, guarantee harmony, contribute to our glory abroad and, like a fence, ensure peace inside the country” [Idota 1901, p. 30]. In general, the idea of the army as a fence protecting society from all evils was quite popular. For instance, Takahashi Seiko wrote in his work Gunjin dokuhon on the social role of the armed forces: “The army is like a wall of a warehouse or a fence around a house. If a warehouse does not have a wall, the wares will not be safe. If there is no fence around a house, thieves can easily enter it at night. That is why the men of our country must do the duty of military service and be responsible for protecting the empire” [Takahashi 1902, p. 24]. Thus, the need for armed forces and military service was explained in a simple and easily understandable manner. The slogan army is a school of life, popular in the USSR and in modern Russia, began to be used in Japan back in the 1870s in a slightly different form. The expression life school (jinsei gakkō 人生学校) with regard to the armed forces was closely associated with the personal gain of the soldier. The government tried to not only show its concern for military personnel during their military service, but also give them knowledge that would be in demand in society after their demobilization. Given the social nature of the knowledge gained during the years of military service, the expression the army is the school of the people was popular in the period under review, meaning that old-timers share their knowledge and experience with new recruits. The main effort

70 Osmanov E.M. Training Manuals for Meiji Military of the military leaders was aimed at making a new recruit regard the service as his personal gain, giving him a great advantage over those who were not honored to be a soldier. After Japan’s victory in the war with China, the tone of materials meant for the education of military personnel changed somewhat. Although the general theoretical ideological constructs remained unchanged, the enemy image was radically reviewed. On the eve and during the Sino-Japanese war the main objective was to strengthen the patriotism of the Japanese soldiers, which was often achieved through anti-Chinese rhetoric, whereas during the preparation and waging of the war against Russia anti-Russian rhetoric came to the fore. For example, some training manuals stated that Japan’s aim was to protect China against Russian expansion in the Far East. The claim about the defense of China was fully justified in the sense that, after its defeat, it could not pose any serious competition to Japan. Thus, the soldiers were indoctrinated with the idea that the support and protection of China were linked to the independence and security of Japan. The texts of many materials meant for soldiers show that, in addition to purely theoretical questions of duty, fidelity, courage, etc., practical legislative issues were also very important. The Japanese legislation during the Russo-Japanese War prescribed to a person to be mobilized to settle all domestic matters in advance. This was explained by the fact that a new recruit or a reservist called up for service during a large-scale war may not return from the battleground, which could cause certain legal difficulties. The well-thought-out materials and the precise planning of each step, even a very insignificant one, conditioned in many respects the far- sightedness and sagacity of the Japanese, which still amaze researchers. Thus, the materials that inspired soldiers during the Russo-Japanese War do not only clearly express confidence in the victory of Japan, but also describe the triumphant return of the soldiers in a number of sections. For instance, Speeches to Welcome and to See Off the Military (Sōgei gunjin shukusai enzetsu 送迎軍人祝祭演説), published in mid- 1904, contained a section titled Solemn Speeches on the Occasion of

71 Russian Japanology Review, 2020. Vol. 3 (No. 1) the Triumphant Return of the Soldiers (兵士の凱旋祝文). One of the speeches there included the following passage: “Our soldiers have accomplished a great task in defeating Russia and have restored peace in the Far East, thanks to which we have risen high in the world. Now, rejoicing and jubilant, they are returning home in triumph” [Sōgei gunjin shukusai enzetsu 1904, p. 93]. In general, it was during the Russo-Japanese War that the theoretical constructs which finally took shape after the war with China were worked out in practice. The fact that the army, the state, and society were a single monolithic whole during the conflict with Russia is confirmed by the fact that this war was perceived in Japan as a truly people’s war. This is evidenced, for instance, by mass production and sale in all shops of cheap popular prints with military scenes and portraits of war heroes, which enjoyed enormous popularity with the people; there were lots of children’s toys ranging from sailor suits with the names of famous ships to small models of ships, weapons, and all kinds of tin soldiers. Vladimir Kraevskiy, who was travelling across Japan at that time, rightly noted: “the war is a continuous holiday in all of Japan” [Kraevskiy 1905, p. 32]. In certain situations, the training manuals required that soldiers should abandon all sorts of human feelings. This was particularly pronounced not with regard to the enemy, which would be quite natural, but to their comrades in arms. An example is the ban on providing any aid to wounded fellow soldiers until the end of the battle, including bandaging the wounds and sending them to the rear area. The reason for this ban was explained in the following way: rendering aid to one wounded man meant two people coming out of action – the wounded soldier and the one helping him. “This weakens the combat capabilities of the unit, which plays into the hands of the enemy. So, by assisting the wounded soldier, you indirectly help the enemy, thus committing treason” [Yonjūichinenshiki hohei kyōkasho 1908, p. 35]. It should be noted that this phenomenon, typical of the entire subsequent history of the Japanese army, was actively discussed by Western researchers, who consigned it solely to the natural cruelty of the Japanese without trying to understand properly its true causes.

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After the Russo-Japanese War there appeared a stereotype: “a good citizen is a good soldier, and a good soldier is a good citizen”. In fact, this determined the nature of the whole of Japanese society, which was now based exclusively on moral categories typical of the military milieu. Therefore, a man who did not serve in the army without objective reasons had many professions banned for him; moreover, society regarded him as an outcast. By analogy with the well-known proverb He who is not a Taira is not a man (Taira ni arazu mono wa hito ni arazu 平らにあらずものは人にあらず), a saying came along at the end of the Meiji period which stated: He who has not served is not a man (Nyūei wo shinai hito wa hito ni arazu 入営をしない人は人にあらず); it was the best possible way to define society’s attitude to military service and the army as a whole. Aiming to strengthen the connection between the civil and military sections of Japanese society, in 1908, the Imperial Military Association – (Teikoku gunji kyōkai 帝国軍事協会) – began to publish the Sword and Quill magazine (文武). The issues of this magazine, whose main readers were the families of military personnel, published materials (diaries, letters, essays, etc.) written by ordinary soldiers and related to various aspects of the army service. The preface to the special issue Collected Works of the Military Personnel (Gunjin bunshū 軍人文集), published on the basis of these materials, explained the purpose of the publication as follows: “...dissemination of the views of the military milieu among the civilian population..., familiarization of the population of the empire with the situation in the army” [Gunjin bunshū 1910, p. 4.]. Although this magazine and its special issues were not training aids for soldiers in the literal sense, the fact that these publications were very popular among conscripts and recruits, who wanted to know the details of the service, makes them worth mentioning. The fact that the writings of ordinary soldiers were published in magazines was an unprecedented luck for the Meiji military men, which naturally played an important part in the ideological education of Japanese society. Words written by ordinary soldiers were often more effective than official government propaganda.

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Concluding the analysis of materials intended for the military personnel of the Imperial Army, a few words should also be said about the more mundane, but at the same time very important and, in fact, fundamental things – money allowances and food supply for the soldiers. Pursuing the aim of creating a militarized society in a certain sense of the word, Japanese ideologists also took into account the negative aspects of the public perception of the military institution in the first half of the period under study, and in its second half they managed to completely eliminate these negative points. Training materials, too, played a certain role in the process. Thus, before the Sino-Japanese War, money transfers to soldiers from their parents were quite widespread. This fact prevented the formation of a favorable image of the armed forces, since the army in the minds of the people was seen as a place where a person suffered certain hardships, which money helped to overcome. Moreover, taking away even a small sum from the meager incomes caused public dislike. Therefore, by the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, money transfers to soldiers had already been prohibited. After the Russo-Japanese War, during the period of active service, soldiers received a very decent salary by the standards of that time. Thus, according to the 1910 Army Salary Code (Rikugun kyūyo rei 陸軍給与令), the average monthly salary of privates ranged from 1 yen 56 sen to 1 yen 95 sen. In principle, given the prices of that period, this money was quite enough for the basic daily expenses of soldiers – purchases of ink, brushes, postcards, stamps, tooth powder, soap, etc. Buying these goods at the military store cost on average from 53 sen 7 rin to 1 yen 2 sen and 3 rin per month. Since many soldiers smoked, the additional spending on buying tobacco was about 52 sen per month, with 5 cigarettes smoked per day. So, soldiers had about 50 sen left to buy sweets or small souvenirs for their families. One more component in the shaping of a favorable image of the armed forces was propaganda of the food security of the military. The soldier manuals stressed that the army ration was quite sufficient and varied, and well-balanced in composition and taste. It was put in soldiers’ heads that the government took great care of them, and society began to

74 Osmanov E.M. Training Manuals for Meiji Military view the army as a place where the food was very good and satisfying, which also played an important role in shaping the general perception of the armed forces. Taking into account the fact that the food of ordinary peasants was rather simple and meager, the variety of food in the army was a secondary but still important incentive to sign on as a soldier. Thus, we can conclude that training manuals for the soldiers, being an important instrument of ideological education, played an important part in the life of Japanese society in the Meiji period. Their authors took into account all possible aspects of the military service, seeking to give answers and explanations to all questions of spiritual, legal, and practical character. These manuals regulated every movement of the soldiers, shaping their consciousness and way of thinking. It is safe to say that no army in the world at that time had such a large number of printed materials intended for military personnel. Moreover, a specific feature of many of these manuals was that they were meant not only for the military, but also for the civilian audience, thus covering the whole of Japanese society.

References

Aizawa Tomizō (1886). Heikisha shintoku [Memorandum for Servicemen]. Itoigawamachi kappansha. Chōhei men’eki yōroku [Explanation of Conscription Exemption] (1875). No place. Gunjin bunshū [Collected Works of the Military Personnel] (1910). Bumbuhen. Heisotsu hikkei [Manual for the Military] (1883). Nagoya: Hohei dairoku rentai (Sixth Infantry Regiment). Heisotsu kuchijūmon kotaeroku [Military Service in Questions and Answers] (1886). Sendai. Heisotsu kyōkasho [Training Aid for the Military] (1895). No place. Idota Ichitarō (1901). Guntai gaku kōtei: hohei-yō [Manual on Military Science: For Infantry]. Nagoya: Kinjōdōbun. Kraevskiy, V.V. (1905). V Yaponii [In Japan]. Moscow: Sytin’s printing house.

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Soga Sukenori (1876). Taichū bunkyōron [On Education in the Army]. Naigai shimbun № 13. June. Pp. 1-2. Sōgei gunjin shukusai enzetsu [Speeches to Welcome and to See Off the Military] (1904). Tokyo. Takahashi Seiko (1902). Gunjin dokuhon [Manual for Soldiers]. Sendai. Yonjūichinenshiki hohei kyōkasho [Infantry Manual Model 41] (1908). Kiyomizurenjōhen.

Osmanov Evgeniy Magomedovich – Ph.D (History), Associate Professor, Department of Theory of Social Development of Asian and African Countries, Saint Petersburg State University. ORCID: 0000-0003-2520-5187 E-mail: [email protected]

76 DOI: 10.24411/2658-6789-2020-10005

Ten Essays on National Character by Haga Yaichi

A.N. Meshscheryakov

Abstract. In the late 19th – early 20th centuries we see active search for the national characteristics of the Japanese people. This article analyzes the book by a famous expert on Japanese literature Haga Yaichi (1867-1927) Ten Essays on National Character (1907). This book was, to a large extent, a response to the work by Kishimoto Nobuta, Five Features of the Japanese (1902), who was a Christian. A number of similarities are observed in these works (they appreciate the cleanliness of the Japanese, their cheerfulness and activity, ability to adapt borrowings, their sense of beauty, politeness, and etiquette behavior). However, there are radical differences too. For Kishimoto, “the Japanese” was an independent entity, while Haga described the Japanese in their relation to the state and as its attachment. Kishimoto talked about the character of the Japanese in peaceful times, while Haga Yaichi interpreted the peculiarities of the national character primarily from the viewpoint of readiness for war and death for the emperor and the motherland. Kishimoto’s writing was not popular and was forgotten. But the views of Haga Yaichi were adopted by the propaganda machine and became one of the main sources for the Kokutai no hongi, the fundamental text of Japanese totalitarianism.

Keywords: Japan, Haga Yaichi, Kokuminsei jūron, Japanese national character, Kishimoto Nobuta, Nihonjin no gotokushitsu, Hisamatsu Sen’ichi, Kokutai no hongi.

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Haga Yaichi (1867-1927) was an eminent philologist who contributed significantly to the creation of the literary canon of classical Japanese literature. He belonged to the pro-governmental intellectual elite and was involved in composing school textbooks on literature, exerting significant influence on the formation of the spiritual and ideological atmosphere. Haga became a member of the Imperial Academy of Sciences in 1915, and, in 1918, he was appointed rector of the Kokugakuin University which was under the patronage of the Imperial family and which focused on studying classical literature, Shinto, and preparing patriotically minded cadres (including Shinto priests). Haga was one of the first scholars to start excluding the numerous Chinese texts created in Japan from the history of Japanese literature which corresponded to the general policy of finding the “truly Japanese” in Japanese literature [Suzuki 2006, p. 195]. The historians of literature (especially those who worked in the Tokyo Imperial University) played a substantial role in forming the official ideology. The ancient times occupied an important place in this construction, as it was believed that they had not been tainted by foreign influences, and that early emperors wielded the entirety of power (later, shoguns pushed the emperors into the background). Because of this, special hopes were placed on specialists studying ancient history. The “ancient” texts are, first of all, the mythological-historical chronicles Kojiki and Nihon shoki, as well as the poetical anthology Man’yōshū. Literary scholars who interpreted these monuments from “correct” positions belonged to the intellectual establishment. They treated Shinto myths as indisputable truth, and sometimes their “academic” discourse was more akin to theological speculations. In Europe, secular tendencies were growing, while Japan experienced the opposite process: the Tokugawa era state was less religious than that of the Meiji period. Haga Yaichi studied the most ancient texts as well, but his greatest achievement is currently believed to be the introduction into scholarly study of the fundamental collection of Buddhist legends Konjaku monogatari (11th century). Earlier, it served as a religious text, but Haga Yaichi presented it to the public as a literary monument, and, since

78 Meshscheryakov A.N. Haga Yaichi’s Ten Essays then, no representative history of Japanese literature fails to analyze the Konjaku [Trubnikova, Babkova 2018]. What Haga did with the Konjaku was in line with the trends of his time. The elite were searching for national identity, first of all, on the basis of Shinto, and they were quite cautious about Buddhism for two key reasons: first, Buddhism was a “foreign” teaching, and, second, it fostered a “passive” attitude to life, which seemed unacceptable for the nation that was conducting large-scale reforms aimed at catching up with and surpassing the West [Meshcheryakov 2018]. In the first years after the Meiji Restoration, there even were attacks on Buddhist temples, and the traditional funerals (cremations) according to the Buddhist rite were banned for some time. However, it soon became clear that Buddhism had become firmly embedded into Japanese culture, and it would be impossible to get rid of it completely. As one of the measures to “integrate” Buddhism into the realities of the new Japan, Buddhist religious objects were declared “art” – these were the items requisitioned from Buddhist temples that became the basis of the collection of the Imperial Museum in Nara. Haga Yaichi’s thought followed the same direction, so he presented the Konjaku as a “literary” text, instead of a “religious” one. His attitude towards Buddhism remained rather skeptical: in an act of wishful thinking, in 1907, he claimed that the influence of Buddhism had declined substantively, that the function of Buddhist temples was now reduced to organizing funerals, and that only old people were visiting temples [Haga 1945, p. 45]. During the early Meiji period, Japan felt a strong inferiority complex towards the West. But it was gradually decreasing. Of crucial importance in overcoming it were the victorious wars with China (1894-1895) and, in particular, with Russia (1904-1905). Nationalistic and xenophobic sentiments were growing in the country. The mood in universities of the time can be illustrated by the following fact. S.G. Eliseyev (one of the first professional Japanese studies scholars in Russia), who studied under Haga, ranked third in his year by academic achievements (he graduated from Tokyo University in 1912), but, in the official list of graduates, his

79 Russian Japanology Review, 2020. Vol. 3 (No. 1) name was the last. Haga explained to him that “it was just impossible to place the name of a foreigner higher than the name of a Japanese” [Marakhonova 2016, p. 49]. The thinkers of the latter half of the Meiji period were concerned with the search for national identity. The nation of Japan had a relatively simple answer to that: proceeding from the Shinto myth, the Tokugawa era thinkers of the National Learning (kokugaku) school had long been talking about the “divinity” of Japan, headed by the continuous imperial dynasty which descended from the sun goddess Amaterasu. During the Tokugawa period, their ideas were not in high demand (the official ideology was based on Confucianism), but, under the Meiji emperor, such thinkers as Motoori Norinaga or Hirata Atsutane became cult figures. Therefore, the Meiji ideologues had at their disposal aready language to describe the political system. But now they were facing the task of forming a nation state. This task was a new one – the governance structure of the Tokugawa Shogunate was based on the fragmentation of society into classes and feudal domains. The Meiji government spend colossal efforts to create a nation – it was justly believed that, without it, Japan was bound to remain inferior to the West, or even to become a colony. The creation of a vocabulary and language for describing “Japanese people” intensified in the 1890s. One line of creating such a language linked the national character of the Japanese to geographical conditions [Meshcheryakov 2014]. In spring 1894, the magazine Kokumin no tomo (The Nation’s Friend) published an article by a famed historian Kume Kunitake (1839-1931), titled Island people’s character. According to Kume, there are two such “characters”. In the first case, the island people pursue a policy of isolationism, suffer from xenophobia, are not prone to borrowing the achievements of the world civilization and, as a consequence, become a backward country. The second type is open to the world. The people of such an “island character” conquer the seas, are prone to civilizational borrowings and expansion. The most vivid example is the island country of England. The Japanese belong to the second, active type, and the isolationist policy of the Tokugawa Shogunate was only an unfortunate

80 Meshscheryakov A.N. Haga Yaichi’s Ten Essays mistake contrary to the original Japanese character. To prove this argument, Kume analyzes the mythical-historical chronicles of the Kojiki and the Nihon shoki, the characters of which possess substantial mobility and creativity. A well-known journalist and government official Nitobe Inazō (1862-1933) in his 1904 publication The Island Nation Spirit claimed that the island nation spirit (shimaguni konjō) of the Japanese had no relation to the natural conditions. It is characterized by narrow- mindedness, rigidity, self-conceit, suspiciousness, pathos, and excessive pride. The reason for the formation of such national characteristics lies, first of all, in history, that is, the policy of isolationism pursued by the Tokugawa Shogunate [Nitobe 1907, p. 37-38]. To overcome the narrow-mindedness, Nitobe recommended to pursue colonial expansion. In 1908, he became the first chair of the colonial studies department at Tokyo University. One more direction of research was aimed at uncovering the national character as such, without the direct connection to the geographical or historical realities. For example, in 1902, Kishimoto Nobuta (1866-1928) published a brochure Nihonjin no gotokushitsu (Five Characteristics of the Japanese). The text of the brochure is the transcript of lectures delivered at the Iitsukan prayer house, belonging to the Unitarian Church, which, among other things, focused on educational and welfare activities among workers. Kishimoto himself played an active role in the Japanese Unitarian Church, which was known for its unorthodoxy. He penned several works on religious studies and English textbooks, and was teaching English at Waseda University. Kishimoto named the following characteristics of the Japanese character: 1. Cleanliness; 2. A cheerful, active character and appreciation of beauty, which is the consequence of the beautiful Japanese nature; 3. Ability to perceive the new and to rework it to one’s liking; 4. Politeness and etiquette behavior; 5. Non-greediness and justice.

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All these characteristics are claimed to be either unique, or more developed in the Japanese than in other peoples. Kishimoto urged to preserve these qualities in the future as well. Having defined the five positive characteristics of the Japanese people, Kishimoto believed that, in the near future they would help Japan to occupy leading positions in the world [Kishimoto 1902, p. 68]. At the same time, at the end of his work Kishimoto also defined the three negative qualities which should be rid of: 1. Impatience and inconsistency (for example: a university student who at one point becomes interested in English literature, but after a short time becomes interested in Japanese literature, and this is how such a person, unable to focus on the most important things, reaches nothing in life); 2. The tendency to live with the present day, not think about the future, indulge in luxury, and not make any savings. In this respect, the Japanese are inferior to the Europeans and the Chinese; 3. Physical weakness of the Japanese, their short height and sickliness. Not offering any concrete measures to improve the situation, the author recalls his distress about his short height when he was in America, and urges the Japanese not boast with their stature before the people who are inferior to them in this respect [Kishimoto 1902, p. 68-79]. As the text of the brochure is a transcript of a lecture, it notes some particularly “apt” places to which the audience reacted with laughter. These are, among other things, Kishimoto’s jabs at the Europeans: they seldom wash, and even if they do, they wash, first of all, the visible places – their hands and their faces, so their armpits stink; instead of washing regularly, they prefer to change their clothes more often; Americans rarely brush their teeth – that is why they had to improve their dentistry; Koreans live not in houses, but in some kind of pig pens. Nevertheless, one should also note the author’s critical attitude towards the Japanese themselves and his obvious lack of desire to stick to the official ideological line: not a single word is said about Shinto, the emperor, or the continuous dynasty, though at that time such references became almost mandatory.

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Instead, these words were said by Haga Yaichi, who published a short book Ten Essays on National Character (Kokuminsei no jūron). Haga was obviously familiar with Kishimoto’s work, as it was no accident that, in the preface, which was written by a scholar of literature Hisamatsu Sen’ichi (1894-1976), it is Kishimoto who is mentioned as a direct precursor of Haga in the field of studying the Japanese national character. Agreeing with Kishimoto in some points (though Kishimoto’s name is never referred to directly), Haga uses a different approach: he considers the Japanese people not in themselves, but in their relation to the state. Waseda was a private university of a liberal direction, while the Tokyo Imperial University was a bulwark of official ideology. Kishimoto was a Christian, while Haga, a Shinto priest’s son, urged to worship Shinto gods. In his book, Haga was in essence an opponent of Kishimoto. Kishimoto’s ideas were based primarily on personal observations. As for Haga, in line with his main specialization, he bases his work on the literary classics. He refers to the Koijki, the Nihon shoki, the Man’yōshū, the norito prayers, the Taketori monogatari, the Konjaku monogatari, the Uji shūi monogatari, The Pillow Book by Sei Shōnagon, the warrior epics (gunki), the kyōgen plays, writings of Ihara Saikaku, Motoori Norinaga, Rai San’yō, etc. In the preface, Haga claims that, when considering an individual and nation, one should use two dimensions: external and internal. Every person has a certain appearance and his internal world, and every nation should be described in the same way, prioritizing the internal, for appearances are deceiving: all Europeans look the same, but every nation uses its own language and have its own culture. In Japan there are regional differences, but, when compared to Europeans, it turns out that, by their internal nature, all these regional people are Japanese. They are united by a common character (seishitsu 性質), which influences culture and produces the political system, laws, language, literature, customs, which, in turn, influence the national character [Haga 1945, p. 2]. In the modern world, there seems to be globalized, but, on the other hand, there is a tendency towards conflict. The Russian Tsar calls for peace, but there are Jewish pogroms in Russia. America supported the Anglo-Japanese

83 Russian Japanology Review, 2020. Vol. 3 (No. 1) alliance, but was simultaneously oppressing the “yellows” in its Pacific Coast. Learning about others, we learn about ourselves. In ancient times, Japan borrowed Chinese and Indian culture, but nowadays all Oriental countries are passive, and only Japan became a world power. How did it manage to “domesticate” the borrowings and turn them into its own heritage? Haga names the following ten key qualities of the Japanese people. 1. Loyalty to the sovereign and love for the country (chūkun aikoku 忠君愛国). 2. Worshipping ancestors and maintaining the honor of one’s house (sosen wo tattobi, kamei wo omonzu 祖先を尊び、家名を重んず ). 3. This-worldliness and practicality (genseiteki jissaiteki 現世的実際的). 4. Love for grasses and trees, joy of observing nature (kusaki wo ai shi, shizen wo yorokobu 草木を愛し、自然を喜ぶ). 5. Optimism and cheerfulness (rakuten sharaku 楽天洒落). 6. Simplicity and unsophistication (tampaku shōsha淡白瀟洒). 7. Love of the small, ability to make the small (senrei senkō 繊麗繊巧). 8. Cleanliness (shōjō keppaku 清浄潔白). 9. Ceremoniousness (reisetsu sahō 礼節作法). 10. Softness and love of peace (onwa kanjō 温和寛恕). The main goal of the work consisted in uncovering the moral foundations of the Japanese people. The Tokugawa era thinkers and writers believed that the care for morals to be the most important task. Haga inherited this belief. It is no accident that The Tale of Genji caused in him such irritation: “It is rather regrettable that we have to value as a masterpiece of our literature a work that describes such a decadent society. It is terrible that students are forced to read it as a learning material” [Haga 1899, p. 117]. The writers of the Tokugawa period were bound to have a limited audience, as no such thing as “the Japanese people” existed at the time. But Haga spoke to the entire nation. Taking up the literature, he hoped to show the nation its literary reflection.

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Haga believed that the loyalty to the sovereign and patriotism were the key qualities of the Japanese and repeated the claims which had already become conventional by that time that Imperial dynasty did not have a single break in history (the claim that was written down in the constitution) and that the Emperor was a father and Japanese people were his infants (such a metaphor was used in Imperial decrees). What is the secret of such unity? There are foreigners who explain the strength of Japanese soldiers by the fact that every day they eat the “national flag” (an onigiri rice ball with umeboshi pickled red plum), and this is how they raise their battle spirit, but this is a lowly materialistic explanation. The real reason is the ancient spirit of loyalty to the emperor [Haga 1945, p. 18]. Loyalty to the emperor is loyalty to the country, and, unlike the West, the two are not separated. There, only Louis XIV understood how it should be, which is proven by his words: “I am the state” [Haga 1945, p. 19]. In the second essay [Haga 1945, p. 20-34] the author claims that the preservation of the Imperial system became possible because in Japan despite the attributes of a modern state (democracy and the Diet), ancestor worship has been preserved to this day, which secures the transmission of tradition. In Japanese Christian families there is no altar of ancestor worship, and Christians refuse to pray at Shinto shrines. They claim that they should worship only their own God (this is a jab against Kishimoto). This happens because they do not understand the foundations of our state (kokutai). But it’s only natural to bow to your parents. In the West there are monuments to famous people everywhere, and people bring flowers to them as a sign of respect. Shinto shrine performs the same function. In the Yasukuni Shrine the memory of dead heroes is honored but it has no relation to religion. In the third essay [Haga 1945, p. 35-48] which is devoted to the “this-worldliness” the author says that the Shinto myth does not pose the question about the other world because the Japanese did not think about the afterlife, and were not afraid of death. That is why all their thoughts are about life in this world. Even the proliferation of Buddhism could not alter the situation (the author politely ignores the most popular

85 Russian Japanology Review, 2020. Vol. 3 (No. 1) sect of Japanese Buddhism, Amidaism, which puts heavy emphasis upon retribution in paradise or in hell). This is the reason why the samurai said goodbye to his life so easily for the sake of his lord. The story of the 47 rōnin and the life of Kusunoki Masashige serve as inspiring examples for present-day subjects who willingly die for the emperor and the motherland, which was brilliantly demonstrated by them during the Russo-Japanese war. Our focus on “this” life is expressed in the pragmatism which the Japanese demonstrate in the process of borrowings from abroad: the bad is removed and only the good is taken, while the latter is reworked according to native world view. For instance, taking Confucianism from China, we, the Japanese, rejected the concept of the Mandate of Heaven, for it implied dynastic change. In China filial duty is put in the first place, while in Japan it is the duty to the emperor. Vulgar borrowing is apishness, and we always imbue the borrowings with our spirit. Borrowing from England, France, and Germany, we improved the technical aspects of the army and the navy, but we imbued them with the Japanese spirit. In the fourth essay [Haga 1945, p. 49-62] the author discusses the beautiful Japanese nature, the clear-cut of four seasons, due to which the Japanese have a bright and cheerful character. Because the environment is so good, it causes attraction to life, facilitates the development of arts and poetry. Unlike the European art, our art and way of life has a more pronounced plant element (plant dyes, ornamentations, food; dishes are shaped as plants and flowers; and there are flower-based names of women in the Tale of Genji). Ikebana, tiny interior gardens (hakoniwa), bonsai – only we have it all. What can the Europeans put up against it? Only a bunch of cut flowers. The samurai appreciated flowers, and the European knights – their fair ladies. There is no such other poetic people as the Japanese. Even criminals sentenced to death make poems before their execution. The fifth essay [Haga 1945, p. 62-75] tells about the optimism and cheerfulness of the Japanese, who, the author believes, are of sanguine temperament and are similar to Italians by their character. This is facilitated by the excellent climate and abundance of sunlight. The

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Japanese can easily be imagined with wreaths on their heads and with a drum; they are like butterflies fluttering among flowers. Their cheerful nature is expressed in love of an inspiring drink. Otomo Tabito praised wine-drinking in the Man’yōshū. In a similar fashion, the Japanese enjoy the blossoming of beautiful sakura. It is only natural because the words sakura and sake are of the same root word (in fact, the word sakura comes from saku, “to blossom”). Sakura is not only our national flower, it is also the symbol of our army. The sakura flowers blossom all at once, and their petals fall down beautifully in the wind. A Japanese warrior is the same: he fights beautifully (literally, “in a flower-like manner”, hanabanashiku) and falls down (dies) beautifully (fearlessly). The Japanese live in agreement with nature, joyfully and fully. Buddhism fosters disgust towards life but the Japanese are different. They live here and now, not thinking about the afterlife. The Japanese do not like to mourn for too long, they are always active. That is why they bravely go to the battlefield, bravely fight, and bravely die. The sixth essay [Haga 1945, p. 76-86] praises the simplicity and the unsophistication of the Japanese way of life, which also originates from the natural environment. The Japanese tobacco is neither strong nor bitter. The Japanese flowers are beautiful but not too fragrant. The birds are beautiful but few of them are noisy. The Japanese have always eaten a lot of fish and only a little meat. Fish is a food with little fat, and, compared to Chinese and European cuisine, Japanese dishes have an unobtrusive and light taste. Sashimi, broths (suimono), tea-poured rice (chazuke) are the strong points of Japanese cuisine. European cuisine uses meat and butter, its taste is intense and strong. The Europeans put sugar and milk even to tea and coffee. Meanwhile, in Japan, the “Zen taste” is dominant (Haga obviously does not count Zen as Buddhism and calls it Zenshū– the Zen school). Borrowing Buddhism, Japan borrowed the luxury of gold, but it also kept the unsophisticatedness of Shinto (we see that in the Ise Shrine). Zen matches such an aesthetic. The Zen taste is expressed in humbleness, simplicity, unsophistication, lack of pretentiousness. Zen is a communication from heart to heart, it abhors wordiness, and it is from Zen that the Way of the Warrior (Bushidō), was

87 Russian Japanology Review, 2020. Vol. 3 (No. 1) born. The characteristics of Japanese poetry are brevity and simplicity. European interiors are filled with furniture, while the Japanese ones are not; our houses are hidden in semi-darkness. The ideal is a humble tea room sized by four and a half tatami. A Western woman is covered in lacework, her hat is decorated with artificial flowers, her dress is frilled, which distinguishes her from a Japanese woman whose kimono has clear, simple and pleasant line. Western opera is pompousness, while the Noh theater is simplicity. The seventh essay [Haga 1945, p. 87-96] is dedicated to the love for the small and the ability to create the small, which is based on the peculiarities of the natural environment. The Japanese mountains are low and beautiful, their good point is not their height but their tree- covered slopes. The rivers are short, shallow, and clear. The gigantic Nile urges to build huge pyramids, but in Japan there are no such grandiose objects made by man. Under the Indo-Chinese influence, we created the magnificent temples and the Great Buddha statue in Tōdaiji (in Nara), but one should remember that the height of the tallest Japanese temple, Tōji (in Kyoto), is ten times smaller than that of the Eiffel Tower. One should consider as representative such things as a tiny tea room, short haiku, miniature gardens, bonsai, ikebana, and praising of small objects in poetry (mulberries, shells, pebbles, small flowers). The Europeans use large plates and cups, while the Japanese use small ones. European food is huge pieces, while ours is small bits. European toothpicks are 4-5 sun long, while ours are one sun long. Even our horses and dogs are smaller than the European ones. The Japanese eat with chopsticks, which develops manual dexterity, thanks to which we are good at making small items. Everybody can see that in sword guards (tsuba), stamps, woodcut blocks, carvings upon rice seeds, origami, netsuke. And a European cannot even sharpen a pencil properly. As we are good at miniature work, the glory of our excellent matches has reached foreign lands. The eighth essay begins with the description of the cleanliness of the Japanese. We are people who love clean straw mats and cleanliness in general, which distinguishes us sharply from the Chinese. Nobody in

88 Meshscheryakov A.N. Haga Yaichi’s Ten Essays the world loves bathing as much as we do. In Tokyo there are more than 800 public bathhouses. There are many furo baths in private houses as well. Out of 1.3 million residents of Tokyo, one third takes a bath every day. The habit of bathing has a long history – partly because there are so many hot springs in Japan. And even emperors visited hot springs (for example, Empress Suiko, reigned 592-628). Europeans always note the cleanliness of the Japanese, especially when they come here after having visited China. In the Shinto myth some gods give birth after a ritual ablution (misogi). Bodily pollution is spiritual pollution – so believed the ancient Japanese. The ritual of the great cleansing (ooharae), which used to be performed in ancient Japan, proves it. From the scientific point of view, the ancient Japanese got rid of bacteria and illness due to washing. The notion of cleanliness is linked to the concept of physical and ritual pollution (kegare). This is why seclusion was practiced after death of people or pet animals, giving birth (of humans and domestic animals), miscarriages, menstruation. Most types of pollution are connected to women, so it is no surprise that a man is considered a higher being compared to a woman, and women are not permitted to participate in various rituals, they are forbidden from climbing Mount Fuji, and until recently they were forbidden from making pilgrimage to Ise. In ancient times, the Greeks and the Romans also loved cleanliness. But eventually they abandoned this, while the Japanese kept their ancient customs which originate from the gods. After childbirth mother does not visit shrine for 30 days. A newborn child also may not be brought there. Having returned from the funeral, one casts salt before the gates so as to get rid of the taint. Cleaning rituals express our love of life in this world. The shrine territory must be clean. One must never take number one there (however, the text says nothing about number two), and before entering the sacred territory one must wash one’s hands. But Europeans (the text goes like this, without any transition) have a habit of keeping shoes and hats in one box, they do not wash their hands after going to the toilet. The Japanese wash their whole body before going outside or participating in some ritual, while Europeans do nothing but shave before going out.

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Because the Japanese keep their bodies and the space near their bodies clean their thoughts are also pure. We value honor more than money. In China, bribes are taken without shame, while in Japan bribery has always been infrequent. And when there are public corruption-related scandals, all Japanese are outraged. For any service in Europe one must pay a “commission” but this is unthinkable in Japan. Before entering the Sanssouci palace in Potsdam one can even see a plaque saying that one should not tip the guides, and this attests to how widespread this corrupt practice is. If you give a coin to a palace attendant in Naples he will take out of the show-case the item that is prohibited to touch. In the Goethe Museum in Weimar a guide was begging a high-ranking official for a tip. I saw all of that with my own eyes! A German judge named Prost told how he tried to tip a Japanese rail conductor and a policeman, but they refused, which caused his sincere surprise. Will we be able to preserve our beautiful customs forever? In the ninth essay [Haga 1945, p. 108-120], the author speaks about the etiquette of Japanese behavior, which is so surprising to foreigners. Even pedestrians in the street bow to each other, and, depending on circumstance, the bows can be deep and multiple. At a European theater I once saw a play where courtiers did not bow properly even to the king. All greetings in Europe are standing. They nod to each other, shake hands, but do not prostrate on the floor. They do not revere their parents, and a younger brother does not show reverence to the older brother. In Japan the grades of politeness are the heritage of feudalism and complicated vassal relations. The hierarchy of society dates back to the era of gods, when they were ranked according to their importance. In the future the language will simplify, but the politeness of speech must not disappear as it is not merely the heritage of feudalism. Manners are not just for other people, they are for oneself, so that one can feel cultured. Therefore, there are strict rules even for harakiri. In China there also used to be etiquette. Confucius claimed that, if somebody lacks manners and etiquette, he cannot have the right heart. But in China ruling dynasties changed many times, while we have an ancient and unchanged dynasty, and that is why we managed to preserve our etiquette throughout the centuries.

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In ancient times it was expressed by worshipping gods and ancestors, and later it expanded to daily life. The Europeans express their emotions in public, but we do not like to show our sorrows to others. We cry with our hearts, not with our eyes. The Japanese do not hug or kiss each other in public. That is why the Europeans think that we have “cold” relations in families. The Europeans also have complicated etiquette rules – the courteous attitude to women, which is very strange to us. In the final essay Haga Yaichi discusses the peacefulness and kindness of the Japanese [Haga 1945, p. 121-133]. After the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars the Europeans started talking about the belligerence of the Japanese and the “yellow peril” coming from them, fearing that the Japanese army might invade Europe. Yes, from ancient times, we were valiant and courageous people, and we had the Bushidō code. But the Japanese have never been aggressive people and we showed our warlike spirit only for defensive purposes. A samurai sword is not a weapon of murder, but an instrument of self-defense. A true samurai never unsheathed his sword without a valid reason. Lately, a martial art named jūjūtsu (jiu-jitsu, judō) invented by Kanō Jigorō (1860-1938) has become popular. In Japan he has seven thousand disciples, and jūjūtsu became popular in Europe and America. Jūjūtsu transmits a true samurai spirit, it is the art of softness, and not of hardness. It is meant for self- defense and is in line with the spirit of the famous swordsman Tsukahara Bokuden (1489-1571). Ancient Empress Jingu-kōgō attacked Silla not without reason, but because they disobeyed our orders. The battles with the Mongol invaders, the movement to subjugate Korea in the first years of the Meiji era, the Russo-Japanese war were the consequences of insults inflicted upon us. Japan was always generous with other peoples. When the hayato and the kumasо (the ancient “barbarian” tribes living in the territory of Japan) showed obedience, this was how they were treated. The same is true for other peoples conquered by the first Emperor Jimmu. When in ancient times Koreans were coming to Japan they were given estates. Many Korean families are listed in the Shinsen shōjiroku (genealogical lists of noble houses). In our history there are no examples

91 Russian Japanology Review, 2020. Vol. 3 (No. 1) of brutal murder of succumbing foreigners. But the Chinese history knows such examples, and there were even cases of the Chinese eating the corpses of their enemies. Our soldiers never violate foreign women, while in 1900 Russian soldiers and cossacks drowned in the Amur river and murdered several thousand Manchurians. The brutality of the Spanish during the conquest of South America is well known. The white people are racists, they treat negroes as non-humans. The Europeans turned foreigners into slaves and sold them. In Japan slavery also existed in ancient times but we never sold people. Unlike the European myths and fairy tales, which often speak of cruelty and violence, Japanese literature describes very few such cases. And even if they can be found, these are stories borrowed from China. As for the samurai, they had the spirit of duty and compassion. That is why the activities of the Japanese Red Cross turned out to be so effective. The Japanese do not like killing animals. In ancient times, they ate the meat of deer and hares, but they never ate the meat of domestic animals. Even now very few Japanese kill the chickens they keep. And this is not the influence of Buddhism, as one might think, but the original nature of the Japanese. That is why animal husbandry was not developed here. In the West where slavery has been abolished only recently, now there are societies for animal protection, but in Japan animals have always been treated well. Not only do peasants treat well their cows and horses but there are also plenty of examples when a soldier weeps when parting with his war horse. The samurai also loved their horses. The Japanese are religiously tolerant. It is true that under the Shogunate, Christianity was forbidden, and the believers were prosecuted because they posed a threat to the state, but the cases of extreme violence were rare. The Japanese were forced to trample an icon to determine whether that person was a Christian, but how could one compare this to religious prosecution in Europe! There are also fewer tortures and executions in the history of Japan than in the history of Europe. The climate of Japan is mild, it lacks extremes, and the character of the Japanese is the same. The Japanese are agricultural people, they were peacefully farming their fields and were not going to conquer anyone.

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But the Europeans need to remember that the Japanese, as well as other “colored” peoples, must not be insulted or subjugated – otherwise, even the peaceful sun goddess Amaterasu may show her warlike side. Haga Yaichi and Kishimoto Nobuta more or less overlap concerning the cleanliness of the Japanese, their cheerfulness and activity, ability to adapt the borrowings, the feeling of the beautiful, the etiquette of behavior. However, Kishimoto talked about the Japanese character in peaceful times, while Haga Yaichi interpreted the characteristics of the Japanese national character, first of all, from the point of view of readiness for war and death for the emperor and the motherland. This type of death is seen as a doubtless merit. Your personal death will serve the country, that is, all Japanese people. At the same time Haga repeats several times that suicide due to personal reasons, suicide as such has no right to exist because the beautiful life of a Japanese gives no reason for it. As for the faults that Kishimoto points out in the Japanese, Haga Yaichi either does not notice them, or presents them in a positive light. Responding to Kishimoto’s argument about the weak physical development of the Japanese, Haga argued that the rickshaws have strong bodies and are excellent soldiers [Haga 1945, p. 73]. Kishimoto scolded the Japanese for being prodigal spenders and living with the present day, while Haga said: yes, the Japanese do not like to make savings, like the Jews (his negative attitude to the Jews was probably influenced during his study in Germany), which attests to the broadness of Japanese character. Meanwhile, the changeability of the Japanese permits them to easily undertake reforms [Haga 1945, p. 72-73]. As for focusing on the present day and ignoring the future, Haga constantly repeats: this is precisely the quality that enables the Japanese to easily sacrifice their lives for the motherland and the emperor. Kishimoto claimed that glorious were the people who could make their contribution to the world civilization [Kishimoto 1902, p. 4], while Haga stated that recently cosmopolitanism (sekaishugi) gained undesirable growing [Haga 1945, p. 135]. After praising the Japanese to a full extent Haga concluded that Japan had become “the prime power of the East”. And here he permits himself

93 Russian Japanology Review, 2020. Vol. 3 (No. 1) to provide some criticism [Haga 1945, p. 134-136]. He claimed that not all Japanese had the qualities described by Haga as exemplary, and which the ancient Japanese possessed. The author says that nowadays there are some people who do not respond with pious gratitude to the grace of the gods, and who do not have a Shinto altar (kamidana) in their homes. There also are those who, due to financial quarrels, sue their parents. There are husbands who treat their wives as equals and who address them using -san. Individualism, cosmopolitanism, socialism have spread. Fight for survival and competition are present on all levels. Modern-day literature must “awake the people’s spirit that is hidden in the ancient civilization”. Modern musical concerts deprive people’s taste of old music. Brick buildings are built, modest Japanese food is replaced by fatty Western one. The samurai spirit is replaced by the spirit of mercantilism. Theater and waka poetry are being reformed in a worse direction. Under the influence of modern education old language customs disappear. One should know that there are such negative tendencies in Japan. One must know our past well, so as to eliminate them. This is our duty before our ancestors. In other words, what is meant here is “freezing” the “centuries- old” values of the Japanese people, which implies a fight against the problems accompanying modernization: the conflict between generations, gender equality, the primacy of the personal interests over national, class struggle, the devaluation of the concept of “motherland”, the dying out of the past world view. Haga Yaichi was concerned about the “decay” of mores of his contemporary Japan and urged not to remain idle. He was heard, and the eventual development of the Japanese state and society, generally speaking, followed Haga’s ideals, and not those of people like Kishimoto. Haga’s book enjoyed broad popularity, it was in line with the official ideology, and it was often re-printed by one of the largest publishing houses of the time, Fuzambō. The preface by Hisamatsu Sen’ichi, which was written in 1938, gave the book even more weight and official backing. From 1938 to 1945, the book was re-printed 16 times. Hisamatsu Sen’ichi is now most known for his research of ancient Japanese literature

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(in particular, the Man’yōshū), and his public activities have become forgotten, but in the heyday of totalitarianism he headed the group of authors creating the Kokutai no hongi (The Foundations of Our Nation, 1937) – one of the key propaganda documents of the time, composed under the guidance of the Ministry of Education. Hisamatsu believed that Haga had managed to describe the national character so completely that future researchers would only have to repeat after him [Haga 1945, p. 4]. Indeed, all key ideas of the Ten Essays were in some way or another expressed in the Kokutai no hongi. Therefore, the work by Haga was recognized as exemplary and canonical. Put into action and brought to absurd, Haga’s ideas lead to the creation of the ultra- nationalistic Japanese version of totalitarianism, which was utterly defeated in 1945. It is often believed that in the 1920s Japan was moving along a “right”, “democratic” way (the so called Taishō democracy) but abandoned it in the 1930s, transforming into an aggressive, militaristic nation. This is only partially true. The analysis of the Ten Essays on National Character shows that all key principles of the Japanese totalitarianism had been formulated much earlier.

References

Haga Yaichi (1899). Kokubungakushi jikkō [Ten Ideas About National Literature]. Tokyo: Fuzambō. Haga Yaichi (1945). Kokuminsei jūron [Ten Essays on the Character of the Japanese]. Tokyo: Fuzambō. Kishimoto Nobuta (1902). Nihonjin no gotokushitsu [Five peculiarities of the Japanese]. Tokyo: Min’yūsha. Marakhonova, S.I. (2016). Orden svyashchennogo sokrovishcha Sergeya Eliseyeva. Kak syn russkogo kuptsa stal osnovatelem amerikanskogo yaponovedeniya [Sergei Eliseev’s Order of Sacred Treasure. How a Russian Merchant’s Son Turned to be the Founder of American Japanology]. Saint- Petersburg: SINEL. (In Russian)

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Meshcheryakov, A.N. (2014). Terra Nipponica: sreda obitaniya i sreda voobrazheniya [Terra Nipponica: natural habitat and habitat of imagination]. Moscow: Delo. (In Russian) Meshcheryakov, A.N. (2018). Reformy perioda Meydzi: chelovecheskoye izmereniye [Meiji Era reforms: the Human Dimension]. Yearbook Japan 2018. Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies of RAS. Pр. 350-366. (In Russian) Nitobe Inazō (1907). Zuisōroku [Essays]. Tokyo: Hinoto Hitsuji. Suzuki Sadami (2006). The concept of “Literature” in Japan. Kyoto: International Research Center for Japanese Studies. Trubnikova, N.N., Babkova, M.V. (2018). “Sobraniye starodavnikh povestey” v otsenkakh issledovateley [“Konjaku Monogatarishū” in Scholar Appreciation: Main Issues and Problems]. Yearbook Japan 2018. Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies of RAS. Pр. 163-203. (In Russian)

MESHCHERYAKOV Aleksander Nikolayevich – Senior researcher, Professor, Institute for Oriental and Classical Studies of National Research University “Higher School of Economics” (HSE). ORCID 0000-0001-6004-5743 E-mail: [email protected]

Russian edition of the article: Orientalia et Classica. Trudy Instituta Vostochnykh Kul’tur i Antichnosti. [Orientalia et Classica. Papers of the Institute for Oriental and Classical Studies.]. Issue I (LXXII). 2020. – Moscow: Higher School of Economics Publishing House. Pр. 201-214. DOI: 10.17323/978-5-7598-2108-3

96 DOI: 10.24411/2658-6789-2020-10006

Serge Elisséeff: Dreams of Japan

S.I. Marakhonova

Abstract: This article is devoted to the memory of Serge Elisséeff (Sergey Grigor’yevich Eliseev), a prominent Japanologist of the 20th century; a globally recognized researcher and educator; founder of the Far Eastern school of research in the USA and academic Japanese studies in France; one of the first Russian experts on Japan and an emigrant from Soviet Russia. It describes different stages of his life and work in several countries of the world, and scientific and educational institutions he was connected with. The author also focuses on Eliseev’s contribution to the dissemination of knowledge about Japan and Japanese mentality in the Western world.

Keywords: Sergey (Sergei) Grigor’yevich Eliseev, Serge Elisséeff, Japanese studies, Japanese art, Japanese literature, Russian emigrant world, Musée Guimet, School of Living Oriental Languages, Practical School of Higher Studies, Harvard University, Harvard-Yenching Institute, Christian universities in China, Kyoto bombing.

Sergey Grigor’yevich Eliseev (1889-1975) was one of the first Japanologists in Russia and abroad who received a professional training. Moreover, Sergey Eliseev was the only one to get a special education at the Imperial Tokyo University, in the Japanese Language and Literature Department of the Historical-Philological Faculty. He was the first European who received a diploma of this elite educational establishment. In July 1912, shortly before his death, Emperor Meiji personally welcomed

97 Russian Japanology Review, 2020. Vol. 3 (No. 1) the young European among the best University graduates as tradition prompted. The University Certificate was dated as of July 10, 1912. Sergey Eliseev’s graduation soon became known in Russia. The 1912 issue of the Commentaries of the Amur Region Department of the Imperial Society of Oriental Studies journal reported on page 300: “Sergey Eliseev, 23, received a degree in Japanese literature from the Tokyo Imperial University. No European has so far managed to graduate from a Japanese university. There were only students from India and China who did it. Thus, Eliseev is the first European who succeeded in getting the academic degree of Bungaku shi. The academic degree of Bungaku shi was conferred on the young scholar for his thesis On the Poetry of Bashō, a Great National Poet of Japan. Having completed the post-graduate course in Tokyo in July 1914, right before the beginning of World War I, Sergey Eliseev returned to Russia. His plans to perfect his knowledge at a Western university collapsed, but Nikolay Marr, Dean of the Oriental languages faculty in the Petrograd University, was interested in the best modern Japanese language expert of that time. Yet, making the Japanese diploma equal to that of any European university required the Public Education Minister’s intervention as well as a Supreme Order. After all formal procedures had been completed – passing professional exams and delivering two public lectures – he was appointed a visiting Professor of Japanese language and literature. As Eliseev studied at the Japanese university for six years, familiarized himself with the country, its culture, traditions, he turned into a universal orientalist competent in all areas of Japanese studies. His friendship and close communication with prominent writer Natsume Sōseki and emerging authors – members of his “Thursday Club” (the coterie convened on Thursdays in the writer’s mountain house) – enhanced his relentless focus on Japanese literature. It is not without reason that he chose the works of an excellent medieval poet Bashō as the theme of his graduation thesis. Lessons taken from a Kabuki master and acquaintance with actors plunged him into the world of traditional theater and made him focus on its

98 Marakhonova S.I. Serge Elisséeff: Dreams of Japan history. Visits to temples, monasteries, museums, and workshops laid the ground for his study of Japan’s history, geography, and art. In Petrograd, like most academic intellectuals, Sergey Eliseev worked for several institutions before and after the revolution. In addition to his work at the University, he was the Archives director at the Asiatic Museum of the Academy of Sciences, delivered lectures on Far Eastern art at the Institute of Arts history; and, as a member of the Archeological commission, he was involved in looking for private collections of oriental art, which he studied and described. He was a member of many academic societies: Russian Archeological, Russian Geographic, Russian-Japanese, Oriental Society, and even such an unusual one as the Society of Japanese University graduates. There, Eliseev made several presentations on literature, history, geography, and economy of Japan; he also gave talks on the Russian-Japanese treaty signed in 1916 and on the Japanese scientist and politician Arai Hakuseki. Sergey Eliseev was born in Saint-Petersburg to a famous merchant family, one of the richest in Russia. In 1907, he graduated from the Larinskiy Gymnasium with a gold medal and went to Berlin University for a year to get the basic knowledge of the Japanese and Chinese languages. His goal was certainly the Imperial Tokyo University. In Berlin, Sergey Eliseev got a very decent training in basic subjects, particularly, in comparative linguistics of Indo-European Languages, philosophy, aesthetics, as well as history and art of Japan and China. However, Japanese language teaching left much to be desired. As a result, Eliseev went to Japan with nearly zero knowledge of the language and had to master it using primary school textbooks. He first reached Vladivostok by the Trans-Siberian railroad, went by boat to the Japanese port of Tsuruga, then to the cities of Maibara and Kyoto, from where he finally reached Tokyo by train. Sergey Eliseev’s wish to receive such a rare and exotic specialty was shaping gradually – along with his growing childhood interest in Japan. The reason was a shock from what he saw in the pavilions of Asian countries during the World Exhibition in Paris (1900), his visit to the exhibition of Sergey Kitaev’s Japanese art collection in 1905-06,

99 Russian Japanology Review, 2020. Vol. 3 (No. 1) and browsing through Japanese art magazines. The boy himself had an artistic bent and took lessons of drawing and painting. On the other hand, with his ability for scientific analysis, he tried to understand the cause of Russia’s defeat in the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese war. But it seemed impossible without studying Japan and the Japanese language. It was with great difficulty that Eliseev managed to enroll fora Japanese literature course at the Tokyo Imperial University. More difficulties were in store for him later: he understood nearly nothing in the lectures delivered in Japanese, and Japanese students treated him, a foreigner, with suspicion. He was surrounded by a strange oriental world. Owing to the support from professors, first-class tutors, and nearly round-the-clock studies, the Russian student reached the required level by the end of the second year. He was thoroughly schooled by such outstanding philologists as Ueda Mannen, Haga Yaichi, Fujioka Sakutarō, Fujioka Katsuji and others. He made new friends, among whom was Komiya Toyotaka, a student who later became a famous Germanist and writer. It was Komiya who introduced him to Natsume Sōseki’s coterie, and Eliseev and Natsume soon patched up a close relationship. The writer treated Eliseev like a son, and Sergey considered himself to be Natsume’s disciple. Eliseev wrote a number of essays about contemporary Russian literature and published them in the New Russian Writers section of Asahi Shimbun. Natsume Sōseki was a great help as he was the editor of the Literature and Art section in this newspaper. The Russian student also made publications in other editions; he stepped up as a theater critic writing about Russian and Japanese theater. In 1910, his father, Grigoriy Grigor’yevich Eliseev, an excellent entrepreneur, philanthropist, and public man, was ennobled with his entire family for his merits in trade. Thus, Sergey Eliseev became a nobleman; yet he liked to be referred to the class of bourgeoise and always adhered to liberal views. In February 1917, he heartily welcomed the first Russian revolution that toppled the monarchy. The Bolshevik coup aroused negative feelings in him, but Sergey cooperated with the new authorities and continued to work in the same, now Soviet, institutions.

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His teaching and academic career was quite successful: he was elected Professor at the Institute of Arts history and headed a division in the Archeological commission. In late 1919, for a number of reasons, he remained the only professor of Japanese studies at the Petrograd University. The young scholar wrote several articles on Japanese and Chinese art – about monochrome painting, landscape and portrait, sculpture, and Japanese cold-arms. He was the first professional Japanologist to touch upon the theme of Far Eastern art. It had been the field of Western art experts before, but Sergey Eliseev’s advantage was his knowledge of the language, which enabled him to resort to original sources and Japanese scholars’ works. His own experience accumulated during his life in Japan was of great importance. Alas, none of his works was published due to the financial difficulties Russia was facing at that time. Eliseev was preparing the History of Far Eastern Art monograph for publication by the famous publishing house Brockhaus-Efron, but his departure from Russia put an end to this project. At the university, Sergey Eliseev’s students became acquainted with the classical Japanese literature and with the contemporary works as well – such as Sanshirō and Mon (The Gate) by Natsume Sōseki. The academic’s archive contains a fragment of Sanshirō translated into Russian. Had he remained in Petrograd, he would have become the first translator of the story into a European (Russian) language. Literature was the second “Japanese” passion of the young orientalist after art. “Having first stepped on the Japanese soil in September 1908”, the Russian young man understood or felt intuitively “that the country with such a magnificent art must have great literature as well” [Elisseev 1914, p. 30]. The ability to appreciate literary works created in another cultural environment enabled Eliseev to develop new approaches to the study of Japanese literature and work out new cultural, historical, and philosophical principles of research. Unlike his predecessors, European Japanologists W.G. Aston, Karl Florenz, and B.H. Chamberlain, who always compared Japanese literature with familiar notions and examples of European literature, thus underrating the former, Eliseev suggested treating Japanese works as a very special phenomenon outside the

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Western literary paradigm. The beginning scholar pointed out the difference in the inner structure of European and Japanese works, the primary and the secondary, the whole and its parts. “The difficulty of understanding lies not in the philosophy of life reflected in literature… The difficulty is to understand unknown foreign forms, in which the point is not where it would have been with us; where the writer just touches on something perceived by Europeans as the most important. Hence a different perception of the parts and a different perception of the whole. We should not treat Japanese literature with ready-made templates and deny everything not matching them. On the contrary, we need to understand these new forms of literature” [Elisseev 2000, p. 243]. The Japanese Literature essay in the Literature of the East digest of articles is the only paper by Sergey Eliseev published in the Russian language [Eliseev 1920]. It was the best critical review of Japanese literature of that time, which retained its significance for several decades. In 1936, when Eliseev was working at Harvard University, one of the American publishers was ready to publish this digest in English, but it never happened. Until the spring of 1919, Eliseev hesitated to emigrate from the Soviet Russia, as he feared the uncertainty and hoped that the Bolshevik power would collapse. His family, like most Petrograd inhabitants, was surviving through several years of severe hunger, cold, and misery. Eliseev, his wife Vera Petrovna, and their two children had their health seriously undermined. And in the end of May 1919, he was suddenly arrested as a hostage during the Yudenich Army’s offensive on Petrograd. He spent ten days in a military prison and was released only through his colleagues’ petition. However, he was in danger now and could be arrested any time. Eliseev twice submitted documents for an academic trip to Europe with his family. It was the only legitimate way to leave Soviet Russia. After both attempts failed, he made a decision to flee. On the night of September 23, 1920, the Eliseevs crossed the Finnish Bay by smugglers’ boat and arrived in Finland. Soon they were in Sweden, where the academic managed to get a temporary job at the Stockholm University – he was to deliver a course of Far East Art Fundamentals

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(in German). In January of 1921, the family arrived in Paris, where Vera Eliseev’s sister resided. Later they were joined by Sergey’s brother Nikolay. His entry to the new environment was not easy. But Eliseev’s position as an orientalist, a specialist in a rare field equally acceptable for any European country, differed him advantageously from most Russian emigrants. In the absence of professional Japanologists in Paris – the center of European Sinology in the early 20th century – he had every reason to occupy the leading position. Of great help was that Eliseev was acquainted with French orientalists as well as Japanese diplomats, writers, journalists, and academics. Eliseev’s most stable income came from his interpretation services at the Japanese embassy and a liaison officer position in the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation under the League of Nations (Institut International de Coopération Intellectuellе). One of the most important spheres of his job in the Institute was to enhance cooperation with several Japanese organizations, to ensure representation of Japanese scientists at international symposiums, etc. Japanologist Orest Pletner, who was staying in Japan, mentioned that all the Japanese sent to Europe had gone “through S.G. Eliseev’s hands and got relevant training”. [Or.V. Pletner’s Letter to V.M. Alekseev (undated, by context, spring, 1929). – Orientalists’ Archive of the Institute of Oriental Manuscripts of the Russian Academy of Sciences]1. The young Russian scholar was already well known in the academic circles of France as the best expert in Japanese art and literature. He received a warm welcome from Paul Pelliot, Sylvain Levi, Henri Maspero, and other orientalists. Nevertheless, he failed to bolster his career for a long time because of some objective reasons: all positions were occupied by other people, though inferior in competence. In addition, he was a foreigner and obtained French citizenship as late as on June 23, 1931.

1 The document was introduced into scientific discourse in: [Marakhonova S.I. 2016]. Some of the sources below were also introduced into scientific discourse in the above-stated book.

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Then, he changed the spelling of his name from Sergey Еliseev to Serge Elisséeff, under which he gained worldwide renown. Yet, the first spelling was seen more frequently before his departure to the USA. In 1921, Eliseev started working for the Guimet Museum of Asian art. Having served there until 1932, he did not achieve any serious position, although the museum’s administration regarded him as an “outstanding expert”. He dealt in inventory taking and compiling catalogues of Japanese books, translating Japanese documents and identifying museum artefacts [Archives of Guimet Museum. Correspondence Administrative. 1907-1925. № 532]. A great cultural response was aroused by Eliseev’s lectures on Far Eastern art delivered at the museum. The news spread even in Petrograd owing to Vassiliy Alekseev’s essay Oriental Studies Abroad, published in the East journal. “As a lecturer, he (S.G. Eliseev – S. M.) is known in Paris due to his lectures in the Guimet Museum where he works as a catalog librarian” [Alekseev 1923, p. 132]. His work in the museum satisfied Eliseev’s interest for Japanese (and, in a wider sense, Far Eastern) art. During his ten years in France, the scholar wrote and published virtually all his articles on art history. Most of them were published in the Revue des Arts Asiatiques journal, issued since 1924 under the aegis of the Guimet Museum and Cernuschi Museum of Chinese and Japanese art. Jointly with the Guimet deputy curator Claude Maître, an art critic, Eliseev took part in publishing the Japon et Extrême-Orient monthly journal, which was issued with the financial support of the Japanese embassy, the Nichibutsu Ginkō bank, and the Mitsubishi company, and testified to a new deep interest for Japanese culture in France. In each issue, Eliseev presented to the French readers translations of novels by contemporary Japanese writers: Akutagawa Ryunosuke, Nagai Kafu, Shiga Naoya, Kubota Mantarō, Tanizaki Jun’ichirō, and many others. Those were frequently the first translations of these authors’ works in the world. Through these translations, Eliseev proved himself to be a wonderful translator of literary texts, but he failed to achieve his potential later on for objective reasons. He also published critical articles on Japanese literature and wrote analytical reviews of scholarly papers.

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Unfortunately, due to Claude Maître’s sudden death, the journal was published for a short period from December 1923 till December 1924, and only 12 issues came out. The Russian scholar also made many publications in the Journal Asiatique, issued by the respectable Asian Society association, set up in Paris in 1822. Sergey Eliseev was its member since 1921. During his first years in Paris, Eliseev managed to get a position of a visiting professor in Sorbonne, where he delivered lectures on Japanese literature of different periods and a course of written Japanese grammar. But his work in Sorbonne was apparently quite short. Since 1923, he worked at the School of Living Oriental Languages (École des Langues Orientales Vivantes, today – INALCO); first, he was not a professor of Japanese studies, but an examiner. Once a year, he examined students in the Japanese language (May 29, 1923, May 29, 1924, May 13, 1925, and so on, until 1930). In 1921 and 1922, before Sergey Eliseev started his work, exams had not been taken by a professional Japanologist, but by the French Consul in Japan Monsieur Bourgois [National Archives of France. F17/13610]. In 1925-34, the Russian emigrant taught a course of Japanese philology at the School. However, he succeeded in getting the position of a professor only at the free (open to the public) courses of oriental languages set up in the School for the general audience. All positions in the Japanese department that was teaching university students had been long and steadily occupied by Josef Dautremer, a former consul in Japan, and Japanese coach Naitō. The National Archives of France still contain posters with the program of free courses in the late 1920s – early 1930s. They state that “Mr. Eliseev delivered lectures on Grammar and History of Japanese Literary Language” [National Archives of France. 62 AJ 70]. In February 1932, the situation in the Japanese department changed dramatically as Professor Dautremer resigned. The department announced a competition to fill the vacancy and it seemed that Eliseev had every reason to occupy it as a professional Japanologist and an experienced teacher. But the congregation of French professors opted

105 Russian Japanology Review, 2020. Vol. 3 (No. 1) for their countryman Charles Haguénauer, a diplomat and secretary of the House of France in Tokyo, who had no experience in teaching. Ten professors voted for him and only five for Eliseev, who passed as the second candidate. That is how Eliseev characterized Haguénauer: “He is a knowledgeable Japanologist, but with no zest, no enthusiasm; students of the School of Oriental Languages complain he is very boring” [S.G. Elisséeff’s Letter to V.M. Alekseev. May 1934. Cited from: Dyakonova, Smirnov 2005, p. 43-44]. It took Haguénauer quite a while to grow to a leading French Japanologist, linguist, and ethnologist; he also attended several lectures delivered by Eliseev. Apparently, in 1928 Sergey Eliseev was entrusted with delivering lectures on Far Eastern Art at the Louvre School (École de Louvre) [Pouillon (ed.) 2008, p. 377], although only the 1930-32 documents have survived. He held a course of General History of Arts, Japanese and Chinese art. It is known that in the second semester of the 1933/1934 academic year he read a course of Chinese painting. He also delivered lectures open to public that were held on Sundays at 10 a.m. in the Louvre School [Archives of the State Museums of France. F 26]. It was only in the Sorbonne Practical School of Higher Studies (École Pratique des Hautes Études, EPHE) that the scholar reached a high position – and very quickly at that. Like in the School of Living Oriental Languages, he started by delivering public lectures for free courses open to public. On February 1, 1930, Sergey Eliseev was appointed a temporary professor to replace a departing colleague and delivered one, then two lectures a week on the subject of Japanese Religions. The academic himself specified that these had been lectures on the history of Buddhist art, specifically iconography [Dyakonova 2000, p. 157, 162]. In spring 1931, when the Practical School of Higher Studies had a vacancy of a regular Assistant Professor (maître de conférences), Sylvain Levi nominated Eliseev, but the colleagues elected Mestre, a beginning French teacher of the Annamese (Vietnamese) language, and not Eliseev. Only in late 1932, on November, 1 Eliseev was appointed a full professor (directeur d’études) of the Department of Japanese Religions (section V) [National Archives of France. F17/27834].

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Sergey Eliseev’s competences as the foremost expert in Japanese art were highly sought soon after his arrival in Paris. He was involved in academic advice on the exhibition of modern Japanese art (the Meiji era – 1868-1912) held in Grand Palais from April 20 to June 30, 1922. The exhibition was arranged and conducted at the highest level – under the patronage of Raymond Poincare, President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Léon Bérard, Minister of Public Education and Fine Arts, and Viscount Ishii, Ambassador of Japan to France. Eliseev was an organizer and a cataloguer of the exhibition. In Vassiliy Alekseev’s opinion, the catalog professionally compiled by Eliseev “was nearly for the first time made by the person who combined the knowledge of the language with the knowledge and understanding of art, and thus will mark an epoch in Japanese studies” [Alekseev 1923, p. 132]. The Japanese side selected for the exhibition several works by modern artists Kume Keiichirō, Wada Eisaku, and Nagatochi Hideta, grand masters of the Tokyo school of painting. They had spent some time in Paris, taking lessons from French painters, and adhered to the principles of Western painting in their works. The Paris exhibition received 388 contemporary works including paintings, drawings, scrolls, kimonos, and others. An earlier period of the Japanese history – the 17th and 18th centuries – was represented by just 97 artefacts. A major interest of the public and critics was aroused by items of traditional art, familiar to them since the last third of the 19th century. Contemporary Japanese paintings received, however, a frosty welcome. Therefore, Sergey Eliseev’s monograph Contemporary Painting in Japan [Eliseev 1923], that was connected with the opening of the exhibition in Grand Palais, was of great educational significance. It was the first work on the Japanese art of this period that remained to be the only one until the late 20th century. In the first part of the book, Eliseev made a professional review of the traditional Japanese painting development and analyzed particular features of various art schools, manners, and styles. In the second and third parts, the author studied the process of influence of Western on the Japanese painting of the Meiji era and analyzed works of over 70 contemporary artists belonging to traditional

107 Russian Japanology Review, 2020. Vol. 3 (No. 1) and western trends. As today’s art critics estimate, “he (Eliseev – S. M.) has the most objective position towards Far Eastern aesthetics; he does not make apriori statements and is never limited by Western vision. His interpretation is similar to current research in the field of Japanese art” [Sharie 2000, p. 104]. In addition to the monograph, Eliseev wrote articles on several issues of Far Eastern art that were not described in the book: portrait painting in China and Japan; peculiarities of the Kanō art school; and Japanese monochrome painting. He used his Petrograd material there – unpublished articles and lecture courses. In the years that followed, Elisséeff 2 continued to organize and curate art exhibitions. Thus, in the autumn of 1931, he was appointed the Commissar of the Japanese art exhibition that was conceived to be held in Stockholm by the Swedish-Japanese Society. Elisséeff’s task, as a “great expert in art and philology” in the organizers’ opinion, was to select items of Japanese painting, sculpture, applied art, and arms owned by private collectors and public organizations in Sweden. He also compiled a very detailed catalog of the exhibition supplementing it with a serious introduction. The exhibition was held under the patronage of Crown-Prince Eugene of Sweden and Japanese Prince Chichibu on November 8-22, 1931. In Elisséeff’s opinion it was unexpectedly a great success and aroused interest of Swedes for Japanese art and all “the things Japanese” as a whole. In the summer of 1934, before departing from France, Elisséeff prepared an exposition of 500 Chinese bronze items (vessels, vases, and arms) in the Orangerie Museum. Having studied these items, the author wrote an article with his conclusions that simplified dating these vessels and vases. In 1938, when working in Harvard, Serge Elisséeff participated in arranging an exhibition of sculptures and bronze items in New York and presented the exhibition catalog to Paul Pelliot [S. Elisséeff’s Letter to P. Pelliot (12 January 1939). Archives of Guimet Museum. Pel. 108 p. 1939. № 3].

2 Here in the article we use the spelling Sergey Eliseev prior to 1931 and Serge Elisséeff after 1931.

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Serge Elisséeff’s long-term studies in the field of Far Eastern art were summarized in vast chapters on China and Japan in the Oriental volume of the huge History of Arts. It was virtually his last profound approach to the theme of art, the culmination of his work. While previously Elisséeff had repeatedly discussed different aspects of painting, sculpture, and Buddhist iconography, his reference to architecture in these chapters was the first and the only one. In his lecture course, he always focused on architecture, believing that it expresses social and class-specific tastes best of all. The study of Japanese architecture presented by Elisséeff in his book was one of the first in the Western historiography of the 1920-30s. As a Japanologist, the author managed to discuss the architecture of Japan in the sociohistorical context of different epochs. Elisséeff wrote essays about the Japanese, Korean, and Ainu languages for the prestigious edition Languages of the World. He participated in creating the fundamental book History and Historians for the Last Fifty Years (1876-1926), for which he wrote a large section on Japan’s historiography. In 1933, Serge Elisséeff’s book on the Kabuki Theater with Alexander Yakovlev’s illustrations came off the press [Iacovleff A., Elisséeff 1933]. Strictly speaking, at first the Japanologist saw the album with Yakovlev’s drawings made in Japan in 1917-19 and then wrote an academic text for it. Publisher Jules Meynial probably gave a priority to the artistic component оf the book and put the name of Yakovlev (against the Latin alphabet order) first [Iacovleff, Elisséeff 1933]. It was an edition of a very few copies, which soon made it a rarity. This monograph was the first scientific paper in Western historiography specifically devoted to the history and peculiarities of the Kabuki Theater and written by a professional orientalist. Moreover, it was created not just by a scholar, but by a person who found the way to gain an insight into the essence of this Japanese cultural phenomenon, as he had participated in the performances himself. During his young days in Japan, Eliseev was so keen on the Kabuki Theater that he began to take lessons from a Kabuki master and made progress in this art. He

109 Russian Japanology Review, 2020. Vol. 3 (No. 1) was well trained in dancing, could portray any scenic image, and was acquainted with the actors. The young Russian performed dances even at the meetings of Natsume Sōseki’s coterie. It is interesting to mention that in the 1920s the Japanese Embassy’s employees in Paris asked Sergey Eliseev’s advice on how to stage a Kabuki production [Кomiya, Abe, Nakamura 1953, p. 19]. Eliseev had developed some artistry and interest for the theater in his childhood, because twice a year his family used to stage amateur performances with the participation of children and adults. His mother, Maria Eliseev, acted in her own amateur theater. There is an old photo with Maria Eliseev acting in E.N. Zalesova’s comedy “Mother In-Law in the House – All Upside Down”, which was very popular at the end of the 19th century [Personal Archives of Ya. Elisseeff (USA)]. His younger brother, Pyotr Eliseev, a former officer, acted under the stage name of Kamensky after the 1917 revolution until his expulsion from Leningrad in 1934. Serge Elisséeff and his wife Vera participated in performances of some “antique theater” at the Sorbonne in Paris in the early 1930s. It is known that Serge made settings, while Vera sewed Byzantine costumes. It is quite possible that they also played roles in the performances. Later, residing in the USA, they rehearsed some parts for a performance in Harvard in 1935 [Archives of the French School of the Far East. Vadim Elisséeff’s foundation]. Thus, in the early 1930s, the Russian Japanologist occupied a very steady position in the orientalist community of France and laid the foundation of academic Japanese studies through his professional research. A decade in France proved to be very beneficial for Elisséeff as a scholar. The bulk of his papers were created at that time and became publicly known. He was also quite satisfied with his position of the head of the Department of Japanese Religions at the Practical School of Higher Studies. It is very likely that a rather successful career was in store for Eliseev in France, but a sudden proposal from overseas caused a dramatic change in his life. In 1928, Harvard University in the USA set up a private Harvard- Yenching Institute. Its purpose, stated in the Memorandum of 1925, was to develop and perfect higher education in China in the field of traditional

110 Marakhonova S.I. Serge Elisséeff: Dreams of Japan culture (literature, art, history, linguistics, etc.). The document indicated the possibility of cooperating with other countries of Eastern Asia as well. That referred mainly to financial and scientific support for six Christian universities (Yenching University near Beijing and others) and several colleges in China. It was essential to ensure a good education in Sinology for Chinese students of Harvard University and those who would attend Master Courses in Chinese Christian universities, which were to be arranged with the help of Western scholars. Therefore, an equal priority for the Institute was to organize Far Eastern studies at the highest level in Harvard itself [Harvard University Archives. HUF 890.140.32]. The Trustees offered the post of the first director of the Harvard- Yenching Institute to the prominent French Sinologists Paul Pelliot. But he refused and pointed to Serge Elisséeff instead. Elisséeff was invited to Harvard as a professor for the 1932-33 academic year to deliver a number of lectures on the history of Japan. He also held practical classes with students on contemporary Japanese and Chinese historical texts. In the Lowell Institute in Boston, he delivered a course of eight public lectures on Japanese literature and its reflection in art. Elisséeff showed his good organizing skills when developing a program of Chinese and Japanese classes: he brought forward an idea of publishing an academic journal on the Far East and compiled a list of books on Japanese studies for the Institute’s library. Serge Elisséeff made a very positive impression on the Trustees of the Harvard-Yenching Institute by his professionalism, motivation, commitment, and devotion to the cause. The only minus was his qualification of a Japanologist, and not a Sinologist; the Chinese colleagues showed a negative attitude to the person who had received a diploma of higher education in Tokyo. However, this slight controversy was easily overcome by the argument that the Institute’s Director would reside mainly in the USA, while other people who had received a degree in Harvard would be working in China. The Trustees approved Elisséeff’s candidacy. The academic worked in Paris for another year, pondering over a pivotal decision. Now he had a department where he was teaching

111 Russian Japanology Review, 2020. Vol. 3 (No. 1) a course on Buddhist iconography; he was used to “regular personal communication with gurus of Far-Eastern studies”; he would rather be “the last in Rome” and would not strive to be “the first in the village” [S.G. Elisséeff’s Letter to V.M. Alekseev (26 May 1934). Cited from: Dyakonova, Smirnov 2005, p. 43]. But Elisséeff could not earn enough money in France to provide higher education for his sons. This must have played a major part in making the decision to move to the USA. He was also tempted by the grandiose tasks, both pedagogical and organizational, that awaited him overseas. Paul Pelliot assuaged his doubts by advising as follows: «...if I can find a better position in Harvard and it looks more interesting, I should not hesitate because it is also important for Japanese studies” [S.G. Elisséeff’s Letter to V.M. Alekseev (21 January 1933). Cited from: Dyakonova 2000, p. 157]. On 18 July 1934, applying to the National Education Minister of France with a request to permit accepting the Harvard proposal, Elisséeff explained that “this mission is beneficial to France albeit performed within the walls of the American university” [National Archives of France. F17/27834]. It is no coincidence that in 1949 France awarded the scientist its highest Order – that of the Legion of Honor – in the nomination “Professor of the Natural Sciences and Humanities Department of Harvard University (USA)”. The award was adjudged on a submission from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Assuming on October 1, 1934 the post of the Harvard-Yenching Institute Director and Harvard Professor of Far-Eastern Languages, Elisséeff was regarded to be on an official trip, which continued, with regular prolongations, for 23 years. Thus, Serge Elisséeff was not only the first Director of the Institute – he occupied this post longer than any of his successors. In as little as one year Elisséeff reorganized the teaching system in the Harvard Faculty of Arts and Sciences. The Chinese language courses were extended and rearranged. New courses were added: Elementary, Intermediate, and Advanced Chinese, Interpretation of Ancient Chinese Texts, Historiography, and History of Particular Dynasties. Other innovations included a program of Chinese art evolution from ancient to

112 Marakhonova S.I. Serge Elisséeff: Dreams of Japan contemporary times and a special course on reading and analyzing texts, which did not exist in other universities. The situation with teaching the Japanese language was much worse. Japanese poetry and religion had been studied in Harvard since the 1895- 96 academic year – 61 students in all for the years until the early 1930s. Although the issue of instituting the post of the Japanese Language and Literature Professor had been raised on a very high academic and administrative level in the early 1900s, the course of Japanese language and reading for beginners was introduced as late as in 1931- 32. The teacher was a Japanese, Kishimoto Hideo, a former professor of philosophy at the Tokyo Imperial University. The following year, Kishimoto started two more courses: History of Japanese Civilization and History of Japanese Religions. But in the 1934-35 academic year, he left Harvard forever. Kishimoto had barely laid the first foundations of the Japanese studies during the three years of his stint, while the real study of the language and other Japan-related disciplines developed later – and through Elisséeff’s effort. Elisséeff started courses of Elementary and Intermediate Japanese, Japanese Literature, History of Japan, and Art of some Far Eastern countries with a focus on architecture. The professor delivered all lectures by himself during the first years, with a big academic load of 12 hours a week. Then he was joined by Shimoyama Shigemaru, Edwin O. Reischauer, and later – Yoshihashi Takehiko, McKenzie, V.H. Viglielmo and Bennet. In 1939, a department of Far Eastern studies was set up with the number of employees growing continuously. Serge Elisséeff was not only a pioneer in a number of scientific studies where he suggested quite new, non-traditional approaches. He applied an unusual method of teaching Far Eastern languages in Harvard, which was drastically different from the previous one. Western universities practiced a scrupulous study of ancient languages; teachers and students very rarely had a good command of modern colloquial languages. Elisséeff made a focus on the study of contemporary languages – Japanese and Chinese – and, having it as a basis, acquainted the students with the traditional culture of these countries and earlier language forms. He

113 Russian Japanology Review, 2020. Vol. 3 (No. 1) invented a new standard of teaching in the West, which was applied by his disciples very successfully. The professor instilled in his students self-confidence, ability to read, analyze and interpret oriental texts, translate them correctly, and use dictionaries. Being in charge of the curricula in Chinese Christian universities as the director of the Harvard-Yenching Institute, Elisséeff tried to introduce Western methods of education there and balance off the focus on fiction – traditional for the Chinese language study – with the reading of historical works and, predominantly, original sources. With the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, when some of the universities and colleges assigned to Harvard found themselves on the occupied territory, their American trustees, and, first of all, Serge Elisséeff as an administrator, had to reorganize educational institutions, reconsider the programs, and provide a higher than usual financial support. Elisséeff considered establishing major centers for Japanese and Chinese studies in Harvard as one of his most important tasks. The success of this endeavor could be achieved by founding a scientific journal where scholars along with students, would have an opportunity to publish articles devoted to China, Japan, Korea, India, and other Asian countries. The first issue of theHarvard Journal of Asiatic Studies came out in April 1936. Specially for this issue Serge Elisséeff wrote the article The Bommōkyō and the Great Buddha of the Tōdaiji. Three more issues appeared until the end of the year. Since that time, the journal’s publication has been regular, and today Elisséeff’s project is one of the most authoritative peer-reviewed editions in the field of Oriental Studies. During Serge Elisséeff’s tenure in Harvard, he was so successful in enriching the scientific library of the Harvard-Yenching Institute with rare books in Oriental languages, manuscripts, wood engravings, and works by Western authors, that he made it the best library on Oriental studies in the Western hemisphere. It was second only to the US Congress Library by the number of volumes. The university’s library was founded in 1879, when a small number of Chinese books were purchased. In 1927, the library counted 4,526 books in Chinese and 1,668 books in Japanese. As of July 1, 1956, the library contained

114 Marakhonova S.I. Serge Elisséeff: Dreams of Japan

299,841 volumes in the languages of Eastern Asia, including 231,189 publications in Chinese and 56,381 in Japanese [Archives of the Harvard- Yenching Institute. Report. 14 November 1956]. In the 1940s, coauthored with E.O. Reischauer and T. Yoshihashi, Elisséeff compiled a number of Japanese language text-books for university and college students as well as Japanese text readers. With the beginning of World War II, especially in the Pacific, the Department of Far Eastern Languages, in addition to the existing programs, used special ones to train linguists and translators from Japanese and Chinese. The first crash courses were arranged in the summer of 1941 at the Cornell University, Ithaka. The Chinese language was taught by Cornell University Professor Peter Boodberg, while Serge Elisséeff was invited to teach the Japanese language to a group consisting of 8 students [Archives of the French School of the Far East. V. Elisséeff’s Foundation]. In autumn 1941, crash courses of the Japanese and Chinese languages were organized urgently at Harvard and the University of California, Berkeley, under the contract with the Naval Ministry. Harvard had 25 students; after nine months of daily five-hour practice with Elisséeff, Reischauer, and other teachers, the best of them mastered spoken Japanese. Yet Professor Elisséeff disappointed the military as he did not want to change his method of academic, unhurried and highly theoretical teaching for the sake of rapid training of military translators. As a result, the military stopped cooperation with Harvard and the contract was terminated in September 1942 [McNaughton 1952, p. 58]. Nevertheless, in 1943, Harvard University was involved in the training program for various specialists in Engineering, Medicine, and the Humanities for the army needs (Army School Training Program). Over 20 students studied Chinese, and some – Japanese, at the intensive courses of colloquial language (30 class hours a week without the study of Chinese characters). The best among them mastered simple colloquial language and could translate from Japanese or Chinese. In 1943-46, Serge Elisséeff was the only teacher for four language courses. In total, about six thousand people underwent training in this program in the USA [Harvard University Archives. UAV 344; Elisséeff 1949, p. 259].

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Regular academic Japanese language courses continued to work as well. Attendance thereof increased considerably – 237 students were studying there in 1941-45. Naturally, Elisséeff held a number of classes there. A summer semester of 12 weeks was added to the academic year to expedite the training of specialists, and the classes became more intensive. In the autumn of 1943, Elisséeff was invited to work for the Office of Strategic Services in Washington. Having a high workload at the university, he was able to come to Washington only for one day a week, Saturday, spending two nights on the train. He was offered the post of a consultant in the Moral Operations Branch, specifically, for providing assistance in conducting information warfare with Japan. According to the special services, “S. Elisséeff is definitely one of the most competent specialists who is able to give us essential advice in the field…” [National Archives and Records Administration. RG226 E92A B102 F2131]. He was allowed to serve only after a thorough check of his reliability; the fact that his sons were in France occupied by the Nazis was given a serious consideration. Elisséeff’s responsibility in the Moral Operations Branch wasto conduct individual classes with employees and hold general meetings for solving special issues. He gave consultations on the Japanese language, literature, customs and traditions, peculiar mentality of the Japanese and their response to propaganda. This information was used for writing leaflets, developing scripts for rumors and compiling “Black Radio” programs. The employees of the Branch had three scenarios of information attacks: “black propaganda”, i.e. false information per se; “black propaganda” in reply to Japanese broadcasting, and sudden cross-cutting of Japanese programs. It was also essential to obtain the professor’s recommendations on photos and cartoons as well as on surrender proposal texts broadcast to the frontline. Being a Russian, a citizen of France, and an American professor, Serge Elisséeff considered his aid to the special services against militarist Japan to be very important for the USA, for the Soviet Union, and for himself personally. But as a Japanologist aware of the value of ancient

116 Marakhonova S.I. Serge Elisséeff: Dreams of Japan

Japanese monuments, he tried to prevent their destruction. He realized only too well that the loss of such cities as Kyoto, Nara, and Kamakura, sacred to the heart of every Japanese, would hamper the process of restoring relations between the USA and Japan after the war and compel Japan to take a sharp turn towards the USSR. By his own account, Elisséeff applied to the Military Command to discuss this issue. In 1972, speaking with a Japanese reporter, he described those events as follows: “During World War II, Americans were bombing Japan with all their might, but Kyoto was spared. I worked at the Yenching research center in Harvard at that time and applied to the American Military Command with the advice to refrain from bombing Kyoto as this city is a cultural asset of the country – and cultural monuments must not be destroyed” [Umeda 2000, p. 107]. Also, working with security officers, Serge Elisséeff had every opportunity of shaping a proper image of Japan among them and explaining the particulars of Japanese perception of religion, nature, art, and beauty in general. Elisséeff’s arguments against Kyoto’s carpet bombing were, probably, communicated to US Defense Secretary Henry Stimson. And although the Americans’ goal was to raze most Japanese cities to the ground and Tokyo was virtually wiped off the face of the earth, Kyoto, Nara, and Kamakura were saved from full destruction. It was certainly not Serge Elisséeff alone who was fighting for the salvation of Japanese holy places. For example, one of the journals issued by the Guimet Museum stated that Serge Elisséeff jointly with Langdon Warner saved from bombing the wonderful Japanese cities of Nara and Kyoto – the cultural assets of the country [In Memoriam… 1976]. Langdon Warner, a Harvard Professor of Archeology and History of Far Eastern Art and the curator of the Eastern Art Department in the Harvard Fogg Museum, worked for a special division of the American military during the war. The Division of Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives dealt in preserving cultural values in the combat zones, on the occupied and liberated territories. There were other units engaged in preserving monuments. Thus, on January 21, 1944, a conference on the protection of cultural values in

117 Russian Japanology Review, 2020. Vol. 3 (No. 1) the Far East was held in Washington under the aegis of the American Commission of Scientific Institutions. Serge Elisséeff and Langdon Warner were to attend the conference along with other persons of science and culture. The main issue of the conference was to discuss the program of assistance to the territories of Eastern and South-Eastern Asia that were subjected (or could be subjected) to attacks of the Ground and Naval Forces as well as air bombing. The American Defense, Harvard Group, compiled lists of the most important monuments in a number of countries. Relevant lists on Japan, China, Korea and Siam were made by Langdon Warner. Yet, neither he, nor Elisséeff were able to attend the conference, and we will never know what each of them was going to say on the salvation of cultural monuments [National Archives and Records Administration. American Comission. Washington, 21 January 1944.]3. On April 27, 1945, Kyoto, as a city with a population of over one million with a large number of industrial enterprises, was included into the list of atomic bombing targets under number 2. But in late July, during the Peace Conference in Potsdam, President Henry Truman and Secretary of War Henry Stimson eliminated Kyoto from this notorious list, repeating Elisséeff’s argument almost ad verbum. In his diary on July 24 Stimson wrote: “…if elimination was not done, the bitterness which would be caused by such a wanton act might make it impossible during the long post-war period to reconcile the Japanese to us” [Stimson’s Diary. 24 July 1945]. Truman confirmed this position in his diary on July 25: “... we as the leader of the world for the common welfare cannot drop that terrible bomb on the old capital (Kyoto) or the new (Tokyo)” [Bernstein 1980, p. 34]. Serge Elisséeff worked for the Moral Operations Branch for about a year but had to stop this cooperation because he had to perform another task of the Army Command. In the autumn 1944, when the war

3 Conference on Protection of Cultural Treasures in the Far East under the Auspices of the American Council of Learned Societies Century Club. Wash- ington, 21 January 1944. Microfilm publication. This document available at: http;//www.fold3.com/image/ 270023159 (access free with authorization).

118 Marakhonova S.I. Serge Elisséeff: Dreams of Japan outcome was clear to all, Harvard University (along with five other US universities) introduced a special program for Civil Affairs Training Schools. It was a training program for officers who were to work in Germany and Japan occupied by the Allied Forces. Harvard trained experts for Japan who were fluent in colloquial Japanese and familiar with the national specifics. After the war, the alignment of forces in the world changed, and the Asian Studies in Harvard memorandum, written by Serge Elisséeff with contributions from Sinologist J.K. Fairbank, suggested new areas of Asian research: Arab countries, Iran, Turkey, Korea, Mongolia, India, and the Asian part of the USSR. These objectives were very well captured by instituting language teaching courses at the Department of Far Eastern languages in 1940-1945: Mongolian, Korean, Tibetan, Vietnamese, Persian, and languages of India. The foundation of the Chinese People’s Republic in 1949 changed dramatically the Harvard-Yenching Institute’s policy towards Chinese Christian universities in its charge. Chinese authorities’ interference in curricula and their ideologization made the Institute’s assistance unfeasible. The Board decided to terminate the Institute’s activities in China and transfer projects to other countries: Japan, Korea, India, and Hong Kong. It was possible to cooperate only with the institutions associated with the church or Christian missionary work [Archives of the Harvard-Yenching Institute. Report. 5 November 1951. List 118, 122-124]. In January 1953, Director Elisséeff arrived in Japan after a long interval to clear up the situation and select institutions for further cooperation. He also delivered several lectures in educational establishments. During his work at the Seikadō Archives in Tokyo he was lucky to find a book by medieval scientist, politician and statesman Arai Hakuseki; the young Japanologist once, long ago, had delivered a lecture about him in Petrograd. On arrival to Kyoto, the scholar was met at the rail station by eight famous Japanese professors and a photographer from Asahi Shimbun. The photographer captured Elisséeff shaking hands with Professor Umehara [Archives of the French School of the Far East. Vadim Elisséeff’s

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Foundation]. Elisséeff decided in favor of Japan’s International Christian University in Tokyo and the Tokyo Women’s Christian College Tōyō Bunko, as well as Dōshisha University in Kyoto and the Research Institute for the Humanities (Eastern Section) affiliated with Kyoto University. The institute’s responsibility was to provide all these universities with required literature and compile programs for professor exchange between Christian educational institutions [Archives of the Harvard-Yenching Institute. Report. 25 March 1954, р. 329]. Serge Elisséeff visited Japan for the last time in the spring of 1955 to audit educational establishments that had received grants from the Harvard-Yenching Institute. In August 1956, at the age of 67, Professor Elisséeff passed the post of the Harvard-Yenching Institute’s Director over to E.O. Reischauer, but he continued to teach at Harvard University for another academic year. In the summer of 1957, he resigned and, together with his wife, returned to France forever – he retained French citizenship till the end of his days. For over 23 years Serge Elisséeff was connected with Harvard, and his merits before the academic community are indisputable. Having achieved his capacity as an organizer of the learning process, he set up in Harvard the USA’s largest center of Far Eastern studies, predominantly in the sphere of Japanology and Sinology. The Department of Far Eastern Languages started with one teacher in the early 1930s, then two or three. In the 1950s, the number of professors and teachers ranged from seven to twelve with some more working part-time. They delivered lectures not only on different linguistic aspects, but also on literature, history, and other country-specific disciplines. Besides Elisséeff, the following professors worked for the Department: E.O. Reischauer; partner professors G.W. Ware, F.W. Cleaves, R.G. Hightower, and Yang Lien-sheng; assistant professors R.N. Frye, D.H.H. Ingalls, and Dr. J. Pelzel; two visiting tutors K. Chen and Su. Nearly all of them had been Elisséeff’s students in some special disciplines. Among his other famous alumni are H.S. Hibbett, M.B. Jansen, D.H. Shively, P. Akamatsu, A. Wright, D. Keen, and H. Rosovsky. The number of Orientalist students at Harvard grew tenfold during the 1930-50s. In the decade of 1950-60, the number of students (1028)

120 Marakhonova S.I. Serge Elisséeff: Dreams of Japan exceeded that (908) for all the previous 55 years. While in 1930-35 there were 36 students of Japanese studies, in 1956-60 the number increased to as many as 627 [The Edwin O. Reischauer Institute… 1996, p. 24]. Elisséeff’s students remembered their teacher as a devoted, dynamic and vital man with a spacious mind and a fine sense of humor; he was an excellent specialist who loved and respected his students. They noted his brilliant mind, warmth and specific “zest” in everything he did; they underlined the tact and delicacy of Serge Elisséeff, who created a special atmosphere of teaching at Harvard [Akamatsu 1975, p. 205; Serge Elisséeff: A Japan Scholar… 1977]. The issue of the Harvard Alumni Bulletin newspaper devoted to the ten years of his work at Harvard stressed that Serge Elisséeff’s lifework was to interpret the Oriental way of thinking in the Western world. Bidding farewell to Serge Elisséeff, Harvard University President Nathan Pusey emphasized that in Harvard “no field reached more fruitful results than Far Eastern research conducted under your (Elisséeff’s – S. M.) caring guidance and inspired by your great expertise” [Reischauer 1957, p. 28]. Members of the New York Visiting Committee associated with Harvard also expressed their gratitude to the professor. Their welcome letter said: “What Harvard stands for today in the field of Far Eastern Civilization is your accomplishment and your monument. But the members of the Committee do want you to know that they recognize the accomplishment and, as you end your nearly quarter century of service to Harvard and return to your work in Paris, they wish to express to you their appreciation, admiration and affection” [Archives of the French School of the Far East. Vadim Elisséeff’s Foundation]. Serge Elisséeff, as the first Harvard-Yenching Institute Director, played the pivotal role in developing and introducing educational programs in China’s Christian universities. As a long-standing director of the Institute, he was confronted with the need to make changes in the learning process organization during the Sino-Japanese war in 1937- 45, when a large part of China was occupied. When, after World War II, the balance of power changed, the director had to totally change

121 Russian Japanology Review, 2020. Vol. 3 (No. 1) the strategy of the Institute and look for partners in the countries other than before. Serge Elisséeff coped with these challenges successfully and passed over to Edwin O. Reischauer a very well-functioning institution. Over 60 years have passed since Serge Elisséeff left Harvard; this year, it is 45 years since the academic’s death. Nearly all his disciples passed away; very few remain who saw Elisséeff during the last days of his life. The Harvard-Yenching Institute – indebted to him in many ways – has long radically changed its focus and is now engaged only in Chinese studies. The Reischauer Institute of Japanese studies set up by Edwin O. Reischauer in Harvard in 1973 – the oldest among the global centers of Japanese studies – now bears the name of Elisséeff’s first disciple. Serge Elisséeff’s name has only been immortalized by the fund of Japanese collection compiled in the early 2000s to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the Harvard-Yenching Institute Library. There is a large portrait of the scholar in the office of the Institute’s current director. The historical building of Boylston Hall, which housed the Harvard- Yenching Institute, its library and the Department of Far Eastern Studies under Serge Elisséeff, now accommodates the Faculty of Arts. With Elisséeff’s resignation from Harvard and return to Paris, his career can generally be considered completed. Officially, he could claim his former position at the Practical School of Higher Studies because for a long period of over twenty years he had been regarded to be its employee on a mission to the USA. By law, he was to be reinstated in his position as soon as a vacancy opened. However, he faced the same situation as in the early 1920s when the Russian emigrant-Japanologist started to “conquer” academic Parris, laying claim to French citizens’ jobs. Now the reason was more profound and significant – Paris witnessed a return of the scholar who had won himself a name in the USA, initiated Far Eastern research at Harvard, governed a very successful institution for many years and had vast ties in a number of Asian countries. Envy and fear to lose one’s position did, as usual, play their role. Some of the French Japanologists were just shy to communicate with Elisséeff on his return from the USA because of his brilliant command of Japanese [Matsubara 1977, p. 142].

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H.Ch. Puech, President of the V section in the Practical School, in his letter of December 23, 1958, notified the Minister of National Education, Youth and Sports, that there was no vacancy and Elisséeff’s position had long been occupied by Charles Haguénauer [National Archives of France. F17/27834]. It seems that the main reason was different – Serge Elisséeff had very tense relations with the administration and faculty of the School. Elisséeff’s reinstatement was discussed on the official level as early as in the 1950s, on the eve of his resignation from Harvard. Puech expressed a very hostile attitude to the situation in his letter to the Minister of January 7, 1952: “Elisséeff has been no part of our section’s faculty for a long time… Attempts to reinstate him are made contrary to consultations with the Section Bureau that believes Elisséeff has nothing to do with it” [National Archives of France. F17/27834]. In another letter to the Minister Puech said that “the colleagues considered the circumstances of the scholar’s departure from the Practical School of Higher Studies (in 1934 – S. M.) to be objectionable”. He could not provide even elementary data about the academic – the date and place of his birth and his address, as he did not maintain any relationship with him [National Archives of France. F17/27834]. The order of the National Education Minister reinstated Serge Elisséeff in the Practical School from October 1, 1957, but he failedto get back his previous status: first he became an auxiliary teacher or an unpaid ordinary Professor, and then – a first-class ordinary professor (as previously), but in the other section. Elisséeff delivered weekly lectures on the Tokugawa period in the Modern Japanese History Section. He planned to publish a book on his research [Archives of the French School of the Far East. Vadim Elisséeff’s Foundation]. He delivered a course of lectures on Japanese literature in the School of the Living Oriental Languages, but for a very short time [Matsubara 1977, p. 153]. Elisséeff was quite active for several years after his return to France, although he made a few publications and mainly wrote forewords to some editions. It would be absolutely essential to mention one of his papers of that time: in 1961, three issues of his essay Japanese Literature in the General History of Literatures series came out, which

123 Russian Japanology Review, 2020. Vol. 3 (No. 1) was the result of his many years of analysis of Japanese literary works. He examined the main features of the works in a cultural and historical context, adding the authors’ biographies. Starting with a review of ancient and medieval works, the author proceeded to contemporary literature written after 1945 Serge Elisséeff was elected a corresponding member of one of the French Academies as well as an honorary member of the French School of Far Eastern Studies. France highly appreciated his scientific, pedagogical, and organizational activities: apart from the Order of the Legion of Honor, he was awarded the Order of Academic Palms. General De Gaulle, President of France, and his wife invited Serge Elisséeff, a Sorbonne Professor, with his wife to the Elysee Palace for breakfast on July 20, 1961, at 13.15 [Archives of the French School of Far East. Vadim Elisséeff’s Foundation]. In 1964, at the age of 75, Serge Elisséeff left his post due to a serious illness, but he still kept abreast of all academic news and read a lot of contemporary Japanese fiction. He maintained an active correspondence with his fellow Japanologists, particularly, in the USSR, and received his Japanese friends and acquaintances in his home. Elisséeff’s another important merit was the creation of an academic dynasty. Both of his sons became prominent Orientalists, scholars and teachers: Nikita (1915–1997) was a Middle East expert, and Vadim (1918- 2002) – a Far East expert. Nikita Elisséeff received a degree in Oriental Studies from the Sorbonne and the School of Living Oriental Languages. Being an expert on the Middle East, he worked in Damascus for a long time, then taught history and Arabic in universities of Lyon and Paris. He was in charge of several research expeditions to the Moslem East. On graduation from the School of Contemporary Oriental Languages, Vadim Elisséeff obtained a degree of a Japanologist and a Sinologist and focused on the archeology and art of the Far East. He was also famous for his museum activities, being Director of the Cernuschi and Guimet Museums and Curator General of Paris museums; he also worked for UNESCO. The Elisséeff brothers were knights of the Legion of Honor; they had other awards as well as Resistance medals.

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In 1968, for the foundation of Japanology and dissemination of knowledge about Japan in other countries of the world, the scientist became a foreign knight of the Order of the Sacred Treasure, 2nd class, the highest degree for a foreigner. Serge wrote about it in his letter to Orest Pletner of April 4, 1969: “There was a reception in the embassy of Japan yesterday. Regretfully, I could not attend because of illness (cox arthrose), and the Order of the Sacred Treasure was handed over to Vadim. Nikita, who arrived from Lyon for the Easter holidays, was present there and told me that Ambassador Matsui, handing the order over to Vadim, said very cordial words. The 2nd class Order is a star carried on the side in most solemn cases. I did not at all expect such a monarchal largesse. The reigning Emperor’s grandfather was present at the University Act of 1912 when I was getting my Bungaku- Shi diploma” [Ermakova 2005, p. 261]. In 1973, Elisséeff was the first to be awarded the Japan Foundation Prize in the category “Foreign Citizens Contributing to Dissemination of Knowledge about Japan and Japanese Culture among Their Peoples”. After his wife’s death on March 16, 1971, Elisséeff led a very secluded life. He died on Sunday morning April 13, 1975, at the age of 86 in the Bishar hospital. Serge Elisséeff laid to rest in the Russian Cemetery in Sainte-Geneviève-des-Bois near Paris next to Vera Petrovna. Nikita Elisséeff was buried there in 1997. A simple wooden cross is rising over their grave… The article in memory of the teacher, published in Harvard, was signed by his now widely famous disciples – Far East Orientalists Francis W. Cleaves, Edwin O. Reischauer, Donald H. Shively, Yan Liang Sheng, and Howard S. Hibbett. They assured that “it would be impossible to doubt the depth of his influence as well as admiration and gratitude that will forever live in the memory of his numerous students here (in the USA – S. M.) and abroad” [Serge Elisséeff: A Japan Scholar… 1977]. In France, Serge Elisséeff’s name is associated with the creation of scientific Japanology and foundation of the Orientalist dynasty. In the USA, he remains to be the pioneer of Far Eastern research (Japanese studies, primarily), who organized his own scientific school, as well as

125 Russian Japanology Review, 2020. Vol. 3 (No. 1) a brilliant strategist who developed new programs of academic help to universities in Asian countries. In Japan, he is remembered as a “legend” – he was the first European student who received a degree from the Imperial Tokyo University and one among the few non-Japanese scientists who laid down the foundation of Japanese studies in the West. In contemporary Russia, he is known as a remarkable representative of the Russian expatriate scientific community who brought glory to his motherland by his versatile talent.

Conclusion

Serge Elisséeff’s name is predominantly associated with the foundation of the Far Eastern research, primarily Japanology, in the USA. At Harvard University, he managed to create a first-class teaching center for the Japanese, Chinese, Korean, Mongolian, Tibetan, Vietnamese, and other languages, whose graduates became outstanding Orientalists. Elisséeff’s efforts as the first director of the Harvard-Yenching Institute focused on cooperation with China’s Christian universities in the field of higher education. In the USA, the prominent Orientalist demonstrated excellent teaching and organizational competences. He proved himself as a scholar mainly in France where he pioneered scientific Japanology. The bulk of his research papers were published in France, as well as numerous translations of modern Japanese writers into French. It was not by his will that Serge Elisséeff emigrated from Soviet Russia where he had also proved himself as a serious and promising young researcher as well as a talented teacher. From the very beginning he already had an original view of his subject matter and was known for his wide-ranging scholarly interests. His works on Japan’s literature, language, art, theater, and mythology were pioneering as he used in them new methods of research. This made Serge Elisséeff one of the most prominent Orientalists in the world.

126 Marakhonova S.I. Serge Elisséeff: Dreams of Japan

References

Archives and museums Archives of Guimet Museum Archives of the French School of the Far East. Vadim Elisséeff’s Foundation (not inventoried). Archives of the State Museums of France Archives of the Harvard-Yenching Institute Harvard University Archives National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) National Archives of France Orientalists’ Archive of the Institute of Oriental Manuscripts of the Russian Academy of Sciences Personal archives of Ya. Elisseyeff (USA) Akamatsu Paul (1975). Nécrologie. Serge Elisséeff (1889-1995). Journal asiatique. T. CCLXIII. Р. 205-210. Alekseev, V.M. (1923). Russkoye vostokovedeniye za granitsey [The Russian Oriental Studies Abroad]. Vostok. Book 2. Р. 132. (In Russian). Bernstein, B. (1980). Truman at Potsdam: His Secret Diary. Foreign Service Journal. July/August. Pp. 29-36. Available at: https://www. documentcloud.org/ documents/3913511-Truman-s-Potsdam-Diary. html (accessed: 11 May 2020). Dyakonova, E.M. (2000). Pis’ma S.G. Eliseeva k V.M. Alekseevu 1933-1936. [S.G. Elisséeff’s letters to V.M. Alekseev]. In: S.G. Eliseev i mirovoye yaponovedeniye (Rossiya, Yaponiya, SShA, Frantsiya, Shvetsiya, V’yetnam). Materialy mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoi konferentsii [S.G. Elisseeff and the International Japanology (Russia, Japan, USA, France, Sweden, Vietnam). Materials of the International Scientific Conference]. Moscow: Yaponiya segodn’a. Pp. 144-196. (In Russian) Dyakonova, E.M., Smirnov, I.S. (2005). Pis’ma S.G. Eliseeva k V.M. Alekseevu 1933-1936. [S.G. Elisséeff’s Letters to V.M. Alekseev]. Vostok-Zapad. Istoriko-literaturnyi al’manakh. 2003-2004. [East-West. Historical- Literary Almanac. 2003-2004]. Moscow: Vostochnaya literatura. Pp. 28-78. (In Russian)

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Eliseev, S.G. (1914). Hi no moto no kuni wo saru nozomite [Leaving Japan]. Kokoro no hana. № 9 (Vol. 18). Pp. 30-33. Eliseev, S.G. (1920). Yaponskaya literatura [The Japanese Literature]. Literatura Vostoka. Issue II. Vsemirnaya literatura. Petrograd: Goslitizdat. Pp. 38-89 (In Russian) Eliseev, S.G. (1923). La Peinture Contemporaine au Japon. Paris: E. de Boccard. Elisséeff, S.G. (1949). Études des Langues Extrême-Orientales aux États-Unis Pendant la Guerre 1941-1945. Actes du XXIe Congrès International des Orientalistes. 21-23 juillet 1948. Paris. Рp. 258-260. Elisseev, S.G. (2000). Yaponskaya literatura [Japanese Literature]. In: S.G. Eliseev i mirovoye yaponovedeniye (Rossiya, Yaponiya, SShA, Frantsiya, Shvetsiya, V’yetnam). Materialy mezhdunarodnoy nauchnoy konferentsii [S.G. Elisseeff and the International Japanology (Russia, Japan, USA, France, Sweden, Vietnam). Materials of the International Scientific Conference]. Moscow: Yaponiya segodn’a. Pp. 242-284. (In Russian) Ermakova, L.M. (2005). Vesti o Yapan-ostrove v starodavnei Rossii i drugoye. [The Information about Japan Island in Old Russia and Other]. Moscow: Yazyki slavyanskoy kul’tury. (In Russian) Iacovleff A., Elisseeff, S.G. (1933). Le Théâtre Japonais (Kabuki). Paris: Meynial. In Memoriam. Serge Elisséeff (1976). Arts Asiatiques. T. XXXII. Pp. 287-288. Komiya Toyotaka, Abe Yoshishige, Nakamura Kitizaemon (1953). Eriseefu wo kakonde kōdankai [Around Eliseev]. Tosho. № 43. Pp. 17-20. Marakhonova, S.I. (2016). Orden svyashchennogo sokrovishcha Sergeya Eliseyeva. Kak syn russkogo kuptsa stal osnovatelem amerikanskogo yaponovedeniya [Sergei Eliseev’s Order of Sacred Treasure. How a Russian Merchant’s Son Turned to be the Founder of American Japanology]. Saint- Petersburg: SINEL. (In Russian) Matsubara Shunui (1977). Perēru gai no rōgakusha – Eriseefu shi to kataru [The Scholar from Pereire Street – Talks with Eliseev]. Kangeiyutsu. № 1. Pp. 140-153. McNaughton, J.C. (1952). Nisei Linguists. Japanese Americans in the Military Intelligence Service during World War II. Government Printing Office. Pouillon, Fr. (ed.) (2008). Dictionnaire des Orientalistes de Langue Français (2008). Paris: Éditions Karthala.

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Reischauer, E.O. (1957). Serge Elisséeff. Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies. № 20. Рp. 1-35. Serge Elisséeff: A Japan Scholar of “Wit, Warmth, Unflagging Zest”. Memorial Minute Adopted by the Faculty of Arts and Sciences Harvard University, April 12 1977. Harvard University Gazette. 1977, May 27. Vol. LXXII. № 33. Sharie, I. (2000). Sergey Eliseev i sovremennoye yaponskoye iskusstvo [Serge Elisséeff and Modern Japanese Art]. In: S.G. Eliseev i mirovoye yaponovedeniye (Rossiya, Yaponiya, SShA, Frantsiya, Shvetsiya, V’yetnam). Materialy mezhdunarodnoy nauchnoy konferentsii [S.G. Elisseeff and the International Japanology (Russia, Japan, USA, France, Sweden, Vietnam). Materials of the International Scientific Conference]. Moscow: Yaponiya segodn’a. Pp. 92-105. (In Russian) Stimson’s Diary. 24 July 1945. Yale University Manuscripts and Archives. Yale University Library. https://imageserver.library.yale.edu/digcoll:4345881/ guestcb [email protected]/ of3rrNZmaHmvHFKsi4HcPydWGDI/1500.jpe?authroot=findit.library. yale.edu&parentfolder=digcoll:4345881&ip=91.108.30.34 (accessed: 11 May 2020). The Edwin O. Reishauer Institute of Japanese Studies. A Twenty-Year Chronicle (1996). Cambridge (Mass.). Umeda Yoshimi (2000). Vospominaniya o Sergeye Eliseyeve [Reminiscences оf Serge Elisséeff] In: S.G. Eliseev i mirovoye yaponovedeniye (Rossiya, Yaponiya, SShA, Frantsiya, Shvetsiya, V’yetnam). Materialy mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoi konferentsii [S.G. Elisseeff and the International Japanology (Russia, Japan, USA, France, Sweden, Vietnam). Materials of the International Scientific Conference]. Moscow: Yaponiya segodn’a. Pp. 106-107. (In Russian)

MARAKHONOVA Svetlana Ivanovna – PhD (History), Institute of Oriental Manuscripts of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Saint-Petersburg). E-mail: [email protected]

129 Russian Japanology Review, 2020. Vol. 3 (No. 1)

Bibliography of Serge Elisséeff Composed by E.O. Reischauer, revised and appended by S.I. Marakhonova

1909 Rokoku gendai no dekadan shi [Decadence in Modern Russian Poetry]. Тeikoku bungaku. 1909. January. Saikin no rokoku bundan [Modern Russian Literature]. Shumi. 1909. January.

1910 B. Ropshin saku “Aojiroi uma” [B. Ropshyn. Pale Horse]. Roshia bungaku. 1910. October. Pp. 69-74. Rokoku no shibai jijō [Dramatic Culture in Russia]. Каbuki. 1910. T. 123. P. 46. Tōzai no sumo to shibai [Sumo Wrestling and Theatre in the East and in the West]. Shumi. 1910. February.

1913 Inshō shijin Bashō [Impressions of the Poet Bashō]. Haimi. 1913. Pp. 2-14.

1914 Das Theater in Japan im Jahre 1913. Mitteilungen der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens. 1914. T. 16. Pp. 112-125. Hi no moto no kuni wo saru ni nozomite [When I leave Japan]. Коkоrо nо hаnа. 1914. T. 18, № 9. Pp. 30-33. Toshikoshi no majinai [Wishes for the New Year]. Коkоrо nо hаnа. 1914. Т. 18, № 1. Pp. 90-92.

1917 Politicheskiye vpechatleniya leta 1917 goda. Ministerstvo Terauti, diplomaticheskoye soveshchaniye i torgovl’a Yaponii za pervye polgoda 1917 goda. [Political Impressions of the Summer of

130 Marakhonova S.I. Bibliography of Serge Eliséeff

1917. The Ministry of Terauchi, the Diplomatic Council and the Japanene Trade in the First Half of 1917]. (Ed. by S. Marakhonova). Pis’mennye pam’atniki Vostoka. 2016, № 2 (25). Рр. 100-111. (In Russian) Roshia ni okeru nihon kenkyū [Japanology in Russia]. Teikoku bungaku. 1917. Т. 10. Russko-yaponskiye otnosheniya i zhelatel’nost’ russko-yaponskogo soyuza. [Russian-Japanese Relations and Desirability of a Russian- Japanese Alliance]. (Ed. by A. Borisova and S. Marakhonova). Pis’mennye pam’atniki Vostoka. 2014, № 2(21). Pp. 222-242. (In Russian)

1920 Idealisticheskiy peizazh v Yaponii i Sess’u. [Idealistic Landscape in Japan and Sesshū]. (Ed. by S. Marakhonova). Pis’mennye pam’atniki Vostoka. 2017. T. 14, № 2. Рp. 76-96. (In Russian) Yaponskaya literatura [The Japanese Literature]. Literatura Vostoka. Issue II. (In Russian) Vsemirnaya literatura. Petrograd: Goslitizdat, 1920. Pp. 38-89. (In Russian)

1921 Sekiro no hitojichi nikki. [Hostage Diary in Soviet Russia]. Osaka: Osaka Asahi Shimbun Taishō, 1921.

1923 La Peinture Contemporaine au Japon. Paris: E. de Boccard, 1923. Les Tremblements de Terre au Japon. La Vie des Peuples. 1923. October. Pp. 288-303. Quelques Notes sur la Peinture Japonaise Modern. Paris L’An Neuf. 1923. Pp. 28-37. Shiga Naoya. Le Crime du Jongleur (Trad. par S. Elisséev). Japon et Extrême-Orient. 1923. №. 1. Pp. 24-39.

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Review: Sekine Mokuan. Kabukigeki to sono haiyū [Le Théâtre de Kabuki et ses Acteurs]. Tokyo: Kokushi kōshūkwai, 1923. Japon et Extrême- Orient. 1923. № 1. Pp. 77-84.

1924 Akutagawa Ryūnosuke. Les Poupées (Trad. par S. Elisséev). Japon et Extrême-Orient. 1924. № 4. Pp. 327-346. Hasegawa Nyozekan. Le Cornac (Trad. par S. Elisséev). Japon et Extrême-Orient. 1924. № 7-8. Pp. 13-55. Hina Matsuri. La Fête des Poupées. Japon et Extrême-Orient. 1924. № 4. Pp. 364-366. Jippensha Ikku et le Hizakurige. Japon et Extrême-Orient. 1924. № 5. Pp. 439-448. Kikuchi Kan. Le Double Suicide de Shimabara (Trad. par S. Elisséev). Japon et Extrême-Orient. 1924. № 9. Pp. 123-147. Kubota Mantarō. L’Été qui Commence (Trad. par S. Elisséev). Japon et Extrême-Orient. 1924. № 6. Pp. 471-484. L’Assemblée Impériale de Poésie du Nouvel An. Japon et Extrême- Orient. 1924. № 2. Pp. 139-142. La Langue Japonaise, la Langue Coréenne, la Langue Aînu, les Langues Hyperboréennes. Les langues du monde. Paris: E. Champion, 1924. Pp. 245-272. Le Double Suicide (Shinjū). Japon et Extrême-Orient. 1924. № 9. Pp. 107-122. M-me Okada Yachiyo. Les Trois Jours (Trad. par S. Elisséev). Japon et Extrême-Orient. 1924. № 5. Pp. 405-419. Nagai Kafū. Le Renard (Trad. par S. Elisséev). Japon et Extrême-Orient. 1924. № 3. Pp. 194-216. Neuf Nouvelles Japonaises. Paris: G. van Oest, 1924. (Extrait de “Japon et Extrême-Orient”). Nishimura Shinji. Rapports de la Civilization Japonaise et de la Forme des Bateaux (Trad. par S. Elisséev). Japon et Extrême-Orient. 1924. № 10-11. Pp. 346-369.

132 Marakhonova S.I. Bibliography of Serge Eliséeff

Satomi Ton. Le Bruit des Vagues de la Rivière (Trad. par S. Elisséev). Japon et Extrême-Orient. 1924. № 10. Pp. 205-227. Tanizaki Jun’ichirō. Le Tatouage (Trad. par S. Elisséev). Japon et Extrême-Orient. 1924. № 2. Pp. 116-129. Une Collection de Folklore Japonais. Japon et Extrême Orient. 1924. № 10. Review: Rohoen sōsho [Au Coin du Feu]. Tokyo: Société Kyōdo Kenkyūsha, librairie Tōkyōdō. Japon et Extrême-Orient. 1924. № 10. Pp. 279-292. Review: Takasu Baikei. Kindai bungei shiron [Etude Historique de la Literature Modern]. T. I. Tokyo: Société Nippon Heironsha, 1921. Japon et Extrême-Orient. 1924. № 3. Pp. 281-288.

1925 La Sculpture Chinoise. Documents d’Art Chinois de la Collection Osvald Sirén. Ars Asiatica. 1925. T. VII. Pp. 22-31. Les Peintres de l’École Kanō. Revue des Arts Asiatiques. 1925. № 4. Pp. 14-26. Sur le Paysage à l’Encre de Chine du Japon. Review des Arts Asiatiques. 1925. № 2. Pp. 30-38. Review: Albert Maybon. Le Théâtre Japonais. Revue des Arts Asiatiques. 1925. № 4. P. 52.

1926 Bref Compte Rendu de l’Expédition Concernant l’Étude de la Mongolie du Nord et de l’Expédition Mongolo-Tibétaine de P.K. Kozlov, Léningrad, 1925. Édition de l’Académie des Sciences de l’U.R.S.S. Revue des Arts Asiatiques. 1926. № 1. Pp. 45-46. Claude Maître. Revue des Arts Asiatiques. 1926. № 1. Pp. 37-40. L’Influence des Écrivains Russes sur la Littérature Japonaise Contemporaine. La Revue Européene. 1926. Vol. 7. № 42. Pp. 55-67. Les Feux par Shiga Naoya. Europe. 1926. № 39. Pp. 366-378. Umehara Sueji. Deux Grandes Découvertes Archéologiques en Corée (Trad. par S. Elisséev). Revue des Arts Asiatiques. 1926. № 1. Pp. 24-33.

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Review: George Roerich. Tibetan Paintings. Paris: Geuthner, 1925. Revue des Arts Asiatiques. 1926. № 1. P. 44. Review: B.Y. Vladimirtsov. Cingis Han. Études de Z.I. Crzebin. Berlin, Petrograd, Moscow, 1922. Revue des Arts Asiatiques. 1926. № 1. Pp. 44-45.

1927 Nagai Kafū. Le Jardin des Pivoines Suivi de Cinq Récits d’Écrivains Contemporains (Trad. par S. Elisséev). Paris: Au Sans Pareil, 1927. Shimmura Idzuru. L’Introduction de la Peinture Occidentale au Japon (Trad. par S. Elisséev). Revue des Arts Asiatiques. 1927. № 4. Pp. 195-203. Umehara Sueji. L’Analyse Chimique des Bronzes Anciens de la Chine (Trad. par S. Elisséev). Artibus Asiae. 1927. № 4. Pp. 247-264. Un Japonologue Français: Claude-Eugène Maître. Artibus Asiae. 1927. № 1. Pp. 49-57. Wang Wei. La Révélation des Secrets de la Peinture (Trad. par S. Elisséev). Revue des Arts Asiatiques. 1927. № 4. Pp. 212-215.

1928 “Japon”. Histoire et Historiens depuis Cinquante Ans: Méthodes, Organisation et Résultats de Travail Historique de 1876 à 1926. Bibliothèque de la Revue Historique. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1928. Pp. 560-569. Mythologie du Japon: I. Mythologie Shintoique; II. Mythologie Bouddhique. Mythologie Asiatique Illustrée. Paris: Librairie de France, 1928. Pp. 363-424. Paysage à l’Encre de Chine au Japon Kano. Revue des Arts Asiatiques. 1928. T. II. № 2. Review: Albert Maybon: Les Temples du Japon. Architecture et Sculpture, Paris: E. de Boccard. Revue des Arts Asiatiques. 1928. T. V. № 4. Pp. 263-264. Review: Kuroda Genji. Seiyō no eikyō wo uketaru nihonga [Les Influences Occidentales dans la Peinture Japonaise]. Tokyo: Société

134 Marakhonova S.I. Bibliography of Serge Eliséeff

Chūgai shuppan, 1924. Revue des Arts Asiatiques. 1928. № 1. Pp. 59-61. Review: Georg Shurhammer. Le Problème de la Langue d’Église dans la Mission des Jésuites au Japon aux XVIe et XVIIe Siècles. Volume XXIIIe des Mitteilungen der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens, Tokyo, 1928. Revue des Arts Asiatiques. 1928. № 2. Pp. 120-124. Review: Émile Bayard. L’art de Reconnaître les Styles. Le Style Japonais. Paris, 1928. Revue des Arts Asiatiques. 1928. № 3. Pp. 189-191.

1929 Paysage à l’Encre de Chine au Japon Kanō. Revue des Arts Asiatiques. 1929. T. II. № 4.

1930 Maçamouné Hakoutchō. Les Larmes Froides (Traduit du Japonais par S. Asada et Charles Jacob, avec un avant-propos de Serge Elisséev). Les prosateurs étrangers modernes. Paris, 1930. (Avant-propos pp. 7-16). Review: Osvald Sirén: Les Peintures Chinoises dans les Collections Américaines. Ed. G. van Oest, 1927-1928. Revue des Arts Asiatiques. 1929-1930. T. VI. № 1. P. 65. Review: Oscar Nachod: Bibliography of the Japanese Empire, 1906- 1926. Leipzig: Goldston, Londres, et Hiersemann, 1928. Revue des Arts Asiatiques. 1929-1930. T. VI. № 1. Pp. 66-67.

1931 Introduction à l’Art Japonais. Utställning av Japansk Konst ur Svenska samlingar Konstnärshuset den 8-22 nov. 1931. Nordisk Rotogravyr. Stockholm, 1931. Pp. 15-22. Sakurazawa Nyoiti. Principe Unique de la Philosophie et la Science d’ Extrême-Orient. (Préface de MM S. Elisséev et R. Grousset). Paris, 1931.

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1932

The Mythology of Japan. Asiatic Mythology. London, George G. Harrap and Co. 1932. Pp. 385-448. Lecture by Professor S. Eliséeff on the Occasion of the Swedish-Japanese Society’s Exhibition of Japanese Art in Stockholm, 1931. Stockholm, 1932. Notes sur le Portrait en Extrême-Orient. Études d’Orientalisme Publiées par Le Musée Guimet à la Mémoire de Raymonde Linossier. Paris, 1932. Vol. 1. Pp. 169-202. Review: Nakaya Juijirō. Nihon sekkijidai bunken mokuroku [Bibliographie Concernant l’Époque Néolithique du Japon]. Tokyo: Oka-shoin, 1930. Revue des Arts Asiatiques. 1931-1932. Т. VII. № 1. P. 52. Review: Imaoka Dzsuicsiro. Uj Nippon [Imaoka Juichirō: Le Nouveau Japon]. Budapest: Az Athenaeum Kiadasa, 1930. Revue des Arts Asiatiques. 1931-1932. T. VII. № 1. Pp. 52-53. Review: Getsuyōbikai hensan. Edojidai shōki e iri bon hyakushū [Société du Lundi. Recueil de Cent Livres Illustrés du Début de l’Époque d’Edo]. Sugita daigakudō, Kyoto, 1927. Revue des Arts Asiatiques. 1931-1932. T. VII. № 1. Pp. 53-54. Review: Shōwa yonen no kokushigakkai: Yoyogikai hensan Tsukuba kenkyūbu hakkō [Les Études d’Histoire Japonaise au Cours de l’Année 1929, par la Société “Yoyogi”]. Tokyo, 1930. Revue des Arts Asiatiques. 1931-1932. T. VII. № 1. Pp. 54-55. Review: Chōsen Kobijutsu taikan: Sekkutsuan to Bukkokuji [L’art Ancien de la Corée. Les Sanctuaires Sekkutsuan et Bukkokuji]. 1932. Revue des Arts Asiatiques. 1931-1932. T. VII. № 3. Pp. 182-183. Review: Takasu Hōjirō. Nihon shisō jūroku kō [Seize Conférences sur l’Évolution des Idées au Japon]. Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1928. Revue des Arts Asiatiques. 1931-1932. Т. VII. № 3. P. 183. Review: Tokiwa Daijō. Shina ni okeru bukkyō jūkyō to dōkyō [Le Bouddhisme, le Confucianisme et le Taoīsme en Chine]. Tokyo:

136 Marakhonova S.I. Bibliography of Serge Eliséeff

Édition de Tōyōbunkō, 1932. Revue des Arts Asiatiques. 1931-1932. Т. VII. № 4. P. 250. Review: Kobayashi Katsu. Kabuki kumadori gaikan [Aperçu sur le Maquillage du Visage au Théâtre Kabuki]. Kyoto, 1932. Revue des Arts Asiatiques. 1931-1932. T. VII. № 4. P. 250.

1933 Le Théâtre Japonais (Kabuki). Paris: Meynial, 1933 (Illustration de A. Iacovleff).

1934 A Short Note on Iwasa Matabei (1578-1650). Svensk-Japanska Sällskapet Årsskrift Årgang. Stockholm, 1934. Vol. 5. Pp. 33-39. Bibliographie Japonaise. Revue des Arts Asiatiques. 1934. T. VIII. № 3. Pp. 196-199. Notes sur les Travaux Japonais Conçernant les Bronzes Anciens de la Chine. Revue des Arts Asiatiques. 1934. T. VIII. № 3. Pp. 187-190. Peri Noël. Essai sur les Gammes Japonaises. Révision du Manuscript, Notice Bibliographie, Bibliographique et Tableau des Modes, par Serge Elisséev et Philippe Stern. Paris, 1934. Quelques Heures à l’Exposition des Bronzes Chinois (Orangerie, mai-juin, 1934). Revue des Arts Asiatiques 1934. T. VIII. № 4. Pp. 229-241. Rokuji Morimoto. L’âge du Bronze au Japon et l’Expansion de la Civilisation des Han vers l’Est (Trad. par S. Elisséeff).Revue des Arts Asiatiques. 1934. T. VIII. № 2. Pp. 65-76. The Aims of the Harvard-Yenching Institute. Harvard Alumni Bulletin. Cambridge (Mass.), 1934. Vol. 37. № 3. Pp. 72-74. Review: Berthold Laufer. The Early History of Polo, a Study of the Origins of the Great Game, Made from Ancient Documents. Revue des Arts Asiatiques. 1934. T. VIII. № 1. Pp. 63-64. Review: Bijutsu kenkyū [Les Études des Arts]. Tоkyо, 1932. Revue des Arts Asiatiques. 1934. T. VIII. № 2. Pp. 126-128.

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1936 A Paper Read at the Annual Dinner of the Associated Boards of Christian Universities in China, 21 April, 1936. Baltimore, 1936. Calligraphy Ranks with Painting in Esthetic Value. Boston Evening Tran- script. Special Japanese Art Exhibition Section. 1936. September, 12. Part 5. P. 8. Foreword [to the Volume in Memoriam of J.H. Woods]. Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies. 1936. Vol. I. № 1. Pp. 1-5. The Bommōkyō and the Great Buddha of the Tōdaiji. Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies. 1936. Vol. 1. № 1. Pp. 84-95. Review: Victor Segalen, Gilbert de Voisins et Jean Lartigue: Mission Archéologique en Chine (1914): L’art funéraire à l’Époque des Han, p. 304, Paul Geuthner, Paris, 1935. Atlas, Tome 1, La Sculpture et les Monuments Funéraires (Provinces du Chànsi et du Sseu-tch’ouan), Planches I à LXVIII. Paris, 1923. Atlas, Tome 2, Monuments Funéraires (Région de Nankin), Monuments Bouddhiques (Provinces du Sseu-tch’ouan), Planches LXIX à CXLIV. Paris, 1924. Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies. 1936. Vol. I. № 3-4. Pp. 391-393. Review: Shōwa jūnen no kokushi gakkai [The Academic World of Japanese History during 1935]. Compiled by the Yoyogikai and Published by the Tsukuba Kenkyūbu, Tokyo, 1936. Vol. 7.

1938 Hamada Kōsaku (1881-1938). Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies. 1938. Vol. 3. № 3-4. Pp. 1-8, 407-429. Shinjō Shinzō (1873-1938). Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies. 1938. Vol. 3. № 3-4. P. 430. Staël-Holstein’s Contribution to Asiatic Studies. Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies. 1938. Vol. 3. № 1. Pp. 1-8, 431.

1939 Arts Musulmans, Extrême-Orient, Inde-Indochine-Insulide-Chine- Japon-Asie Centrale-Tibet par S. Elisséev, Directeur d’Études à l’École Pratique des Hautes Études; R. Grousset, Conservateur du Musée

138 Marakhonova S.I. Bibliography of Serge Eliséeff

Cernuschi. Professeur à l’École du Louvre; J. Hackin, Conservateur du Musée Guimet. Professeur à l’École du Louvre; G. Salles, Chargé du Department des Arts Asiatiques au Musée du Louvre; Ph. Stern, Conservateur adjoint du Musée Guimet. Conservateur du Musée Indochinois, Professeur à l’École du Louvre, Histoire Universelle des Arts des Temps Primitifs jusqu’à Nos Jours, Publiée sous la Direction de Louis Réau, Librairie Armand Colin, 103, Boulevard Saint-Michel, Paris, 1939. [L’Art de la Chine par Serge Elisséev, Directeur d’Études à l’École Pratique des Hautes Études, Livre V. Pp. 285-371; L’Art du Japon par Serge Elisséev, Directeur d’Études à l’École Pratique des Hautes Études, Livre VI. Pp. 373-457].

1940 A Selected List of Books and Articles on Japan in English, French and German. Compiled by Hugh Borton, Serge Elisséeff, Edwin O. Reischauer. Committee on Japanese Studies, American Council of Learned Societies, 907 Fifteenth St., N.W., Washington, D.C., 1940.

1941 Elementary Japanese for University Students. Texts. Compiled by S. Elisséeff, E.O. Reischauer. Harvard University, Harvard-Yenching Institute, Cambridge (Mass.), 1941. Elementary Japanese for University Students. Vocabularies, Grammar and Notes. Prepared by S. Elisséeff and E.O. Reischauer. Harvard University, Harvard-Yenching Institute, Cambridge (Mass.), 1941.

1942 Elementary Japanese for University Students. Texts. Compiled by S. Elisséeff and E.O. Reischauer. Second Enlarged Edition. Harvard- Yenching Institute, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1942. Elementary Japanese for University Students, Vocabularies, Grammar and Notes. Compiled by S. Elisséeff and E.O. Reischauer. Second

139 Russian Japanology Review, 2020. Vol. 3 (No. 1)

Enlarged Edition. Harvard-Yenching Institute, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1942. Selected Japanese Texts for University Students. Vol I. Compiled by S. Elisséeff and E.O. Reischauer. Harvard-Yenching Institute, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1942. Selected Japanese Texts for University Students (Encyclopedias, Dictionaries and Newspapers). Vol II. Compiled by S. Elisséeff and E.O. Reischauer. Harvard-Yenching Institute, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1942.

1944 Elementary Japanese for College Students, Japanese Text. Compiled by S. Elisséeff, E.O. Reischauer and Takehiko Yoshihashi. P. I. Harvard- Yenching Institute, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1944. Elementary Japanese for College Students, Vocabularies, Grammar and Notes. Compiled by S. Elisséeff, E.O. Reischauer and Takehiko Yoshihashi. P. II. Harvard-Yenching Institute, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1944. Elementary Japanese for College Students, Rōmaji Text. Compiled by S. Elisséeff, E.O. Reischauer and Takehiko Yoshihashi. P. III. Harvard-Yenching Institute, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1944.

1947 Selected Japanese Texts for University Students. Literature and History. Vol. III. Compiled by S. Elisséeff and E.O. Reischauer. Harvard- Yenching Institute, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1947.

1948 Selected Japanese Texts for University Students. Vol. I. Compiled by S. Elisséeff and E.O. Reischauer. Third Printing. Harvard-Yenching Institute, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1948.

140 Marakhonova S.I. Bibliography of Serge Eliséeff

Selected Japanese Texts for University Students (Encyclopedias, Dictionaries and Newspapers). Vol. II. Compiled by S. Elisséeff and E.O. Reischauer. Third Printing. Harvard-Yenching Institute, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1948. Review: Ia.B. Radul’-Zatulovskii: The Materialistic Philosophy of Itō Jinsai (1627-1705), Soviet Oriental Studies № 2 (1941), pp. 53- 80. Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies. 1948. Vol. 11. № 3-4. Pp. 464-468.

1949 Etudes des Langues Extrême-Orientales aux Etats-Unis pendant la Guerre 1941-1945. Actes du XXIe Congrès International des Orientalistes, Paris, 23-31 Juillet, 1948. Paris, 1949. Pp. 258-260.

1950 Review: Jimbun kenkyū [Studies in the Humanities]. The Journal of the Literary Association of the Osaka City University. Vol. 1, № 1-4. November 1949-February 1950. Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies. 1950. Vol. 13. № 1-2. Pp. 268-270.

1951 Robert Pierpont Blake (1886-1950). Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies. 1951. Vol. 14. № 1 and 2. Pp. v-xvii.

1954 A Selected List of Books and Articles on Japan in English, French and German. Revised and Enlarged, Compiled by Hugh Borton, Serge Elisséeff, William W. Lockwood, John C. Pelzel. Harvard University Press for The Harvard-Yenching Institute, Cambridge (Mass.), 1954. Chinese-English Dictionary Project. Preface S. Elisséeff. Edited by W. Hung. Cambridge (Mass.), 1954.

141 Russian Japanology Review, 2020. Vol. 3 (No. 1)

1955 Wallace Brett Donham (1877-1954). Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies. 1955. Vol. 18. № 1 and 2. Pp. vii-ix.

1956 Elementary Japanese for College Students, Japanese Text. Compiled by S. Elisséeff, E.O. Reischauer and Takehiko Yoshihashi. P. I. Published for the Harvard-Yenching Institute, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1956. [Third printing]. Elementary Japanese for College Students, Vocabularies, Grammar and Notes. Compiled by S. Elisséeff, E.O. Reischauer and Takehiko Yoshihashi. P. II. Published for the Harvard-Yenching Institute, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1956. The Chinese-Japanese Library of the Harvard-Yenching Institute. Harvard Library Bulletin. Cambridge (Mass.). 1956. Vol. X. № 1. Pp. 73-93. The Orthodox Church and the Russian Merchant Class. Some Personal Recollections. The Harvard Theological Review. 1956. Vol. XLIX. № 4. Pp. 185-205. The Reverend Antoine Mostaert, C.I.C.M. Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies. 1956. Vol. 19. № 1 and 2. Pp. vii-xiv.

1959 Japan: Ancient Buddhist Paintings. Preface Serge Elisséeff. Introduction Takaaki Matsushita. New York, 1959. Pp. 5-11. Japon. Peintures Anciennes de l’Art Bouddhique. Préface: S. Elisséeff, Introduction: Тakaaki Matsushita. Paris-New York, 1959 (Collection UNESCO de l’Art Mondial. № 11).

1960 Hiroshige. Tōkaidō. Introduction et Commentaires de Serge Elisséeff. Paris: Éditions du Crédit Lyonnais, 1960.

142 Marakhonova S.I. Bibliography of Serge Eliséeff

1961 Littérature Japonaise. Histoire générale des littératures. Quillet, 1961. Vol. I: pp. 477-494 et 816-836; vol. II: pp. 545-560; vol. III: pp. 667-682 et 833-836.

1963 Review: Akademik V.M. Alekseev. V starom Kitae. Dnevniki puteshestviya 1907 goda. Russkiye puteshestvenniki v stranakh Vostoka. [V.M. Alekseev, Academician. Dans la Veille Chine. Journaux de Voyage de 1907. Coll. Les Voyageurs Russes dans les Pays d’Orient. Académie des Sciences de l’URSS, Institut de Sinologie. Ed. de Littérature Orientale]. T’oung pao. 1963. Vol. L, livr. 4-5. Pp. 475-492. (In Russian)

1964 2000 revues d’Asie par Roger Pelissier et Danielle Le Nan; sous la Direction de Serge Elisséeff. Paris: Bibliothèque Nationale, 1964.

1973 Sakurazawa Nyoiti. Principe Unique de la Philosophie et la Science d’ Extrême-Orient. Préface de MM S. Elisséev et R. Grousset. Paris, 1973. Pp. 3-6.

1976 Sekiro no hitojichi nikki [Hostage Diary in Soviet Russia]. Tokyo: Chūōkōronsha, 1976.

143 S.G. Eliseev’s parents, Grigoriy Grigor’yevich and Mariya Andreyevna Eliseev in their youth. 1884.

S.G. Eliseev in 1913. S.G. Eliseev in a geisha costume. Tokyo, 1908.

S.G. and V.P. Eliseev in Tokyo, 1916. S.G. Eliseev with his sons Nikita (left) and Vadim, ca. 1936.

S.G. Eliseev near the Harvard- Yenching Institute, 1942. Nikita Sergeyevich Eliseev, late 1980s – early 1990s.

Vadim Sergeyevich Eliseev with his children, 1982. Russian Japanology Review 2020. Vol. 3 (No. 1)

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